Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods
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Kant and Lindahl
KANT AND LINDAHL By John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre February 2021 COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 2278 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS YALE UNIVERSITY Box 208281 New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281 http://cowles.yale.edu/ “Kant and Lindahl” by John E. Roemer, Yale University, and Joaquim Silvestre, University of California, Davis* February 2021 1. Introduction A good is public if its consumption is nonrival, and some public goods are nonexcludable. We consider three different ways by which the amounts of a public good and the distribution of its costs are determined: (i) The political system; (ii) Private supply by voluntary contributions; (iii) The supply of an excludable public good by private firms. 1.1. Public provision by the political system For many public goods, the decisions on their provision and financing are made by the public sector. These goods are quantitatively important, their supply requiring a substantial fraction of the budget at all levels of government. Knut Wicksell (1896) and Erik Lindahl (1919) analyzed the operation of a representative parliament.1 They envisaged a negotiation among the various parties in the parliament until all universally beneficial alternatives were exhausted. The resulting unanimous agreement yields (Pareto) efficiency. Section 2 below offers a precise model. 1.2. Private provision by voluntary contributions Some public goods are provided outside the public sector and outside the market by individual voluntary contributions: the textbook example is public radio. These tend to be quantitatively less important than the ones provided by the government. But information is a public good par excellence: thanks to the internet, much information is now provided on a voluntary contribution basis (Wikipedia, consumer ratings of products…). -
A Study of Paul A. Samuelson's Economics
Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. A Study of Paul A. Samuelson's Econol11ics: Making Economics Accessible to Students A thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics at Massey University Palmerston North, New Zealand. Leanne Marie Smith July 2000 Abstract Paul A. Samuelson is the founder of the modem introductory economics textbook. His textbook Economics has become a classic, and the yardstick of introductory economics textbooks. What is said to distinguish economics from the other social sciences is the development of a textbook tradition. The textbook presents the fundamental paradigms of the discipline, these gradually evolve over time as puzzles emerge, and solutions are found or suggested. The textbook is central to the dissemination of the principles of a discipline. Economics has, and does contribute to the education of students, and advances economic literacy and understanding in society. It provided a common economic language for students. Systematic analysis and research into introductory textbooks is relatively recent. The contribution that textbooks play in portraying a discipline and its evolution has been undervalued and under-researched. Specifically, applying bibliographical and textual analysis to textbook writing in economics, examining a single introductory economics textbook and its successive editions through time is new. When it is considered that an economics textbook is more than a disseminator of information, but a physical object with specific content, presented in a particular way, it changes the way a researcher looks at that textbook. -
Structural Reform and Economic Policy
Structural Reform and Economic Policy Edited by Robert M. Solow Structural Reform and Economic Policy This is IEA conference volume no. 139 This page intentionally left blank Structural Reform and Economic Policy Edited by Robert M. Solow Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA in association with the INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION © International Economic Association 2004 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1–4039–3646–3 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. -
Rolling the DICE: William Nordhaus's Dubious Case for a Carbon
SUBSCRIBE NOW AND RECEIVE CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN* FREE! “The Independent Review does not accept “The Independent Review is pronouncements of government officials nor the excellent.” conventional wisdom at face value.” —GARY BECKER, Noble Laureate —JOHN R. MACARTHUR, Publisher, Harper’s in Economic Sciences Subscribe to The Independent Review and receive a free book of your choice* such as the 25th Anniversary Edition of Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government, by Founding Editor Robert Higgs. This quarterly journal, guided by co-editors Christopher J. Coyne, and Michael C. Munger, and Robert M. Whaples offers leading-edge insights on today’s most critical issues in economics, healthcare, education, law, history, political science, philosophy, and sociology. Thought-provoking and educational, The Independent Review is blazing the way toward informed debate! Student? Educator? Journalist? Business or civic leader? Engaged citizen? This journal is for YOU! *Order today for more FREE book options Perfect for students or anyone on the go! The Independent Review is available on mobile devices or tablets: iOS devices, Amazon Kindle Fire, or Android through Magzter. INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, 100 SWAN WAY, OAKLAND, CA 94621 • 800-927-8733 • [email protected] PROMO CODE IRA1703 Rolling the DICE William Nordhaus’s Dubious Case for a Carbon Tax F ROBERT P. M URPHY he 2007 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) underscores the public’s growing aware- T ness of and concern about anthropogenic (man-made) global warming. Many climatologists and other relevant scientists claim that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) from human activity will lead to increases in the earth’s temperature, which in turn will spell potentially catastrophic hardship for future generations. -
Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix David G. Duff Associate Professor Faculty
Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix David G. Duff Associate Professor Faculty of Law University of Toronto Visiting Associate Professor Faculty of Law University of British Columbia November 2008 I. Introduction Justice, John Rawls famously wrote, is the first virtue of social institutions.1 Since a society’s tax system is one of its most basic and essential social institutions, the justice or fairness of this tax system is an important subject for social and political theory, as well as for practical politics. In order to assess the fairness of any particular tax or the tax system as a whole, however, it is essential to consider the purpose of the tax and the tax system in general. Although the most obvious purpose of most taxes is to raise revenue to finance public expenditures, this is not the only rationale for taxation which may also be employed to regulate social and economic behaviour and to shape the distribution of economic resources.2 For this reason, the concept of tax fairness is necessarily pluralistic, depending on the particular purpose for which the tax is imposed. Not surprisingly, therefore, modern welfare states typically levy a mix of taxes, including personal and corporate income taxes, broad-based consumption taxes, excise taxes on specific goods or services, payroll taxes, property or wealth taxes, wealth transfer taxes, as well as user fees and benefit taxes. Since the justification for any tax presumably depends on the legitimacy of the underlying purpose which it is designed to promote, the concept of fair taxation is necessarily secondary and derivative – depending on more fundamental principles concerning the fairness or justice of the public spending that taxes finance, the regulatory goals that they support, and the distribution of economic resources that they help to define. -
The Scandinavian Contribution to National Accounting
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Aukrust, Odd Working Paper — Digitized Version The Scandinavian Contribution to National Accounting Discussion Papers, No. 73 Provided in Cooperation with: Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo Suggested Citation: Aukrust, Odd (1992) : The Scandinavian Contribution to National Accounting, Discussion Papers, No. 73, Statistics Norway, Research Department, Oslo This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/192057 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. -
The Role of Models and Probabilities in the Monetary Policy Process
1017-01 BPEA/Sims 12/30/02 14:48 Page 1 CHRISTOPHER A. SIMS Princeton University The Role of Models and Probabilities in the Monetary Policy Process This is a paper on the way data relate to decisionmaking in central banks. One component of the paper is based on a series of interviews with staff members and a few policy committee members of four central banks: the Swedish Riksbank, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. These interviews focused on the policy process and sought to determine how forecasts were made, how uncertainty was characterized and handled, and what role formal economic models played in the process at each central bank. In each of the four central banks, “subjective” forecasting, based on data analysis by sectoral “experts,” plays an important role. At the Federal Reserve, a seventeen-year record of model-based forecasts can be com- pared with a longer record of subjective forecasts, and a second compo- nent of this paper is an analysis of these records. Two of the central banks—the Riksbank and the Bank of England— have explicit inflation-targeting policies that require them to set quantita- tive targets for inflation and to publish, several times a year, their forecasts of inflation. A third component of the paper discusses the effects of such a policy regime on the policy process and on the role of models within it. The large models in use in central banks today grew out of a first generation of large models that were thought to be founded on the statisti- cal theory of simultaneous-equations models. -
Political Business Cycles 40 Years After Nordhaus Eric Dubois
Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus Eric Dubois To cite this version: Eric Dubois. Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus. Public Choice, Springer Verlag, 2016, 166 (1-2), pp.235-259. 10.1007/s11127-016-0313-z. hal-01291401 HAL Id: hal-01291401 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01291401 Submitted on 21 Mar 2016 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus Eric Dubois1 Abstract: The aim of this article is to survey the huge literature that has emerged in the last four decades following Nordhaus’s (1975) publication on political business cycles (PBCs). I first propose some developments in history of thought to examine the context in which this ground-breaking contribution saw the light of the day. I also present a simplified version of Nordhaus’s model to highlight his key results. I detail some early critiques of this model and the fields of investigations to which they gave birth. I then focus on the institutional context and examine its influence on political business cycles, the actual research agenda. Finally, I derive some paths for future research. -
Political Business Cycle and Economic Instability - Literature Review
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Tiganas, Claudiu-Gabriel; Peptine, Claudiu Article Political Business Cycle and Economic Instability - Literature Review CES Working Papers Provided in Cooperation with: Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Suggested Citation: Tiganas, Claudiu-Gabriel; Peptine, Claudiu (2012) : Political Business Cycle and Economic Instability - Literature Review, CES Working Papers, ISSN 2067-7693, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, pp. 853-865 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/198221 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend -
1017-04 BPEA/Nordhaus 12/30/02 15:01 Page 211
1017-04 BPEA/Nordhaus 12/30/02 15:01 Page 211 WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS Yale University Productivity Growth and the New Economy What, another paper on the new economy? When financial markets are raking through the debris of $8 trillion in lost equity value, and “.com” is a reviled four-symbol word, a paper on the impact of the new economy on productivity would seem as welcome as an analysis of the role of whales in the lighting revolution. In fact, the new economy (or, more precisely, information technolo- gies) continues to raise important puzzles about productivity growth. Variations in productivity growth have proved to be one of the most durable puzzles in macroeconomics. After a period of rapid growth fol- lowing World War II, productivity stagnated in the early 1970s. There was no shortage of explanations offered, including rising energy prices, high and unpredictable inflation, rising tax rates, growing government, burdensome environmental and health regulation, declining research and development, deteriorating labor skills, depleted possibilities for inven- tion, and societal laziness.1 Yet these explanations seemed increasingly inadequate as inflation fell, tax rates were cut, regulatory burdens stabi- lized, government’s share of output fell, research and development and patents granted grew sharply, real energy prices fell back to pre-1973 lev- els, and a burst of invention in the new economy and other sectors fueled an investment boom in the 1990s. The productivity slowdown puzzle of the 1980s evolved into the Solow paradox of the early 1990s: computers were everywhere except in the The author is grateful for comments from Ray Fair, Robert Yuskavage, and members of the Brookings Panel. -
The Economic Costs of a War in Iraq
cepr CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH Briefing Paper The Economic Costs of a War in Iraq: The Negative Scenario By Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot1 December 9, 2002 CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH 1621 CONNECTICUT AVE., NW, SUITE 500 • WASHINGTON , D.C. 20009 • (202) 293-5380 • <WWW.CEPR.NET> • EMAIL: [email protected] 1 Dean Baker and Mark Weisbrot are co-Directors of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Simone Baribeau, Andrea Blatchford, Debayani Kar, Todd Tucker, John Schmitt, and Jefferson Beck provided helpful research and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper examines the potential economic costs of a war with Iraq in a scenario in which the war is not over quickly. It follows loosely from the negative scenario developed in a recent study by William Nordhaus. The paper discusses several ways in which a war can impose large economic costs, that have not been seriously considered in policy debates to date. The paper notes that: 1) Nordhaus’ estimate of GDP loss in a negative war outcome, implies a loss of 1.6 million jobs in 2003 and 2004. It implies that the economy will have an average of 300,000 fewer jobs over the next seven years (2005-2011), as it gradually recovers from a war-related oil shock. Nordhaus’ estimate of the immediate impact of a war-related oil price shock is comparable to the high-end estimates of the job loss in the United States that would result from implementing a Kyoto-type agreement restricting the emission of greenhouse gases. -
Employment- Unemployment
EMPLOYMENT- UNEMPLOYMENT HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PART 10 MAY 6, JUNE 3, JULY 8, AND AUGUST 5, 1977 Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 98-520 0 WASHINGTON : 1977 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock Number 052-070-04402-1 r' I ; \ I ) JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (Created pursuant to see. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Cong.) RICHARD BOLLING, Missouri, Chairman HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota, Vice Chairman HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SENATE HENRY S. REUSS, Wisconsin JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama WILLIAM S. MOORHEAD, Pennsylvania WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Wisconsin LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut GILLIS W. LONG, Louisiana LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas OTIS G. PIKE, New York EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts CLARENCE J. BROWN, Ohio JACOB K. JAVITS, New York GARRY BROWN, Michigan WILLIAM V. ROTH, Ja., Delaware MARGARET M. HECKLER, Massachusetts JAMES A. McCLURE, Idaho JOHN H. ROUSSELOT, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah JOHN R. STAaK, Executive Director LouIs C. KRAUTHOFF II, Assistant Director RICHARD F. KAUFMAN, General Counsel ECONOMISTS 0. THOMAS CATOR KENT H. HUGHES PHILIP MCMARTIN WILLIAM A. Cox SARAH JACKSON DEBORAH NORELLI THOMAS F. DEaNBUaG JOHN R. KARLIK GEORGE R. TYLEa ROBERT D. HAMRIN L. DOUGLAS LEE MISNSETY CHARLES H. BRADFORD STEPHEN J. ENTIN GEORGE D. KRUMBHAAR, Ja. M. CATHERINE MILLER MARK R. PoLICINSKI (II) CONTENTS WITNESSES AND STATEMENTS FRIDAY, MAY 6, 1977 Long, Hon. Gillis W., member of the Joint Economic Committee: Opening Page statement -_----------_ -------- ___ -------- 1737 Shiskin, Hon.