WHO Field Coordinators, Libya Country Office Districts Health Situation Update April 2021

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WHO Field Coordinators, Libya Country Office Districts Health Situation Update April 2021 Draft WHO Field Coordinators, Libya Country Office Districts Health Situation Update April 2021 Districts by General health situation (including information Functioning & Non- HR & Health services Immediate needs (drugs, Recommended Meetings & field visits: Region on suspected alerts and/or outbreaks; IDPs, functioning public not available in consumables, equip) of follow up / refugees, migrants) in the area: health facilities (HF): functioning HF: functioning HF: actions EAST Region Ajdabia Ajdabiya Isolation Ctr. closed due to explosion in Functioning HF: Hospitals: Hospitals: -Support O2 Regular meetings with the main O2 system. Almogharif General Almogharif Hospital: Almogharif Hospital: supply to Ajdabiya COVID-19 medical Almogharif Hospital Isolation department open Hospital, Jalu General Laboratory The Hospital main Isolation Ctrs., committee branch & NCDC (still suffer from shortage in O2 supply). Hospital, Brega General Jalu Hospital: laboratory still suffers Hospitals & Ajdabiya branch & RRTs. Shortage of diabetic drugs. Hosp -Newly open Trauma, Laboratory shortages of all laboratory PHCs. Ajdabiya NCDC branch Shortage of NCD drugs in PHCs. Zoueitena Rural Hosp, & Zoueitena Rural tests. -Assess Diabetic conducted a “COVID-19 Shortage in TB drugs (combination drugs). Basher Rural Hospital. Hospital: Trauma, Jalu Hospital: Centre needs monitoring & investigation Shortage of National Programme Vaccines. Diabetic Centre Surgery, GYN, Trauma Kit. (especially campaign” using RDTs in Ajdabiya Oncology Ctr. lack of medications. PHCs: 4 functioning & Laboratory. Basher PHCs: Insulin: Pen, public & private schools Refuge &Migration Ctr.: 43 arrivals from 10 partially functioning Rural Hospital: Diabetic Ctr.: NCD Kit. Insulin mix & targeting 38 schools with Cameron, Sudan, Ethiopia &Somalia. (Most PHCs in lack Internal Medicine, ALdurra PHC: NCD Kit & Lantus) 10 samples from each COVID-19 Centres in Ajdabiya area: medical services). Paediatric, Surgery, PPEs. -Report to the school. All centers suffer from shortage of O2. Non-functioning HF: Trauma & Jalu PHC: PPEs. national The results reported: 380 Ajdabiya Isolation Ctr.: closed. Ejkheria Rural Hospital, Laboratory. Shahwan PHC: PPEs. programme tested / 3 cases Positive (1 Alwahat Isolation Ctr.: functioning. Abo Shalla PHC (closed vaccines needs teacher & 2 students). Brega Isolation Ctr.: functioning (no ICU, only & now functioning as of Rota, BCG. The 3 cases confirmed by OPD). isolation Centre. Real time PCR. Aljabal Almansoura Isolation Ctr.: Severe shortage of Functioning: Hospitals: Hospitals: Shahat Isolation Ctr.: Support both Visited the vaccination Alakhdar O2 supply & equipment. Althoura Edu Hospital, Althoura Hospital: Assess O2 requirements. Shahat isolation Ctrs. & met the vaccination New COVID-19 cases in the last consecutive two Shahat Qurina Hospital Paediatric-Surgery, Diabetic Ctr.: Ctr. & Diabetes director & head of COVID- weeks exceeding the capacity of the Ctr. Total Omar Almukhtar Hosp Endocrine, Oncology, Assess oral hypoglycaemic Ctr.. 19 vaccination campaign number of positive cases: 61, Death: 15. Sussa Hospital, Shahat & Psychiatry drugs, Insulin & lab committee. Albida Medical Ctr.: Increase number of chest Isolation Ctr. & (No CT or MRI). reagent. Regular visits to the infection cases with poor outcome, the number Polyclinic Shahat Hospital: isolation centres. of deaths increased before testing. PHCs: 8 functioning. Thoracic surgery & Participated in training Shahat filter Ctr.: Non-functioning PHCs: Trauma, Paediatrics, course for medical received 217 patients, 72 positive cases 7 Non-functioning. (3 Neurosurgery, GYN, personnel participating in confirmed by rapid PCR test. PHC out of services due Oncology, Psychiatry COVID-19 vaccination to illegally seized). & Psychology. campaign. Draft Omar Almukhtar Hospital: Emergency & Trauma (No ICU or CCU), Physiotherapy Aljufra The general situation specially regarding COVID- Functioning: Hospitals: Waddan Rural Alafia Hospital: Renewal of Visited vaccination Ctrs. & 19 better as marked decrease in new diagnosis & Alafia Gen Hospital, Hospital: Trauma & Surgical kit. WHO EMT met the vaccination admission to isolation centre. Total number of Houn, Waddan rural Surgery. Isolation Ctr.: contracts. director & head of COVID- diagnosed cases are 27, Recovered 16, Death 1. Hospital & Isolation Ctr. Isolation Ctr.: ICU drugs, paracetamol 19 vaccination campaign New CT scan received &installed in NCDC Aljufra PHCs: 5 functioning. Anaesthesiologist & IV, Ventolin solution for committee. branch. PHCs: 4 Non- Nurses. Nebulizer, PPEs. Regular visits to the New O2 tank &new O2 system received & functioning. isolation Ctr. installed in Aljufra isolation. Participated in the training All facilities functioning as OPDs only. course for the medical Trauma & Normal delivery available at Waddan personnel in COVID-19 Hospital. vaccination campaign. Alkufra Total registered positive cases 451 & recovered Functioning: Hospitals: Tazerbu Oncology Lab cases 389, & death 52. Martyr Attia Alkasih Department investigation Tazerbu: The condition in isolation Ctr. are good Hosp, Tazarbu Hospital, material & NCD with 5 active cases. There is no shortage of AlHawari Martyrs Rural Drugs. medical personnel. Hosp, Alkufra Women & Total positive cases 267, Recovered cases 247, Child HC, Diabetes Ctr., Death 4. Physiotherapy Ctr. & Now active cases 16. Alkufra polyclinic. PHCs: 6 functioning (2 functioning as vaccination only). PHCs 4 Non-functioning (lack of medical staff or under maintenance). Almarj Health situation is better than last month. Functioning Hospitals: Elmarj Hospital: Almarj Hospital: Support Almarj Visited to health Ctrs. The number of COVID-19 cases increase with Almarj Hospital, doctors & night duty Surgical &trauma kits. Hospital with (suffering from a severe increase in rate of death. Bata Hospital, nurses. COVID-19 isolation Ctr.: surgical shortage of medical There is shortage in chronic disease medicine. Tolmitha Hospital, PHCs: Medical & Ventilators & patient &trauma kits. supplies &a shortage of Vaccination available. Jardas and Taknes surgery doctors. monitors. Support COVID- medical staff). IDPs, refugees, migrant situation bad. Hospital, PHCs: Basic kits. 19 isolation Ctr.. Visited Almarj Hospital isolation Ctr. (noticeable Draft Farzoga Hospital, increase in the number of ALbaiada Hospital. COVID-19 cases with PHCs: No regular increase in death rate). services in most of PHCs especially emergency services. Non-functioning: PHCs 4 non-functioning Benghazi Large number of COVID-19 cases diagnosed daily Functioning: Hospitals: Alhawari General Benghazi Medical Centre COVID-19: Visited in the world health & increase needs of O2 for critical cases. Benghazi Medical Ctr. Hospital: (the main Isolation Centre: O2 ventilators, day the following facilities: Benghazi Medical Ctr. Isolation Ctr.: Shortage of Aljala Hospital: (RTA & building damaged by supply equipment for Benghazi PHCs. O2 supply. surgery). war; surgery, medical Alabyar Hospital: O2 supply, Almajory PHC. Alkwaifia Chest Hospital & paediatric are reported needs: Surgical, Trauma and Benghazi health services Many Hospitals (outside the city) has no trauma Benghazi Hospital for closed, the other Emergency trauma & NCD kits. administration. care (Toukra rural Hospital 70 km & Alabyar rural paediatric surgery. building urology & Caesarean kits, lab Cancer drugs. Hospital 40 km away from nearest health facility Benghazi Cardiology ENT is functioning). reagents, ventilators, provides trauma services). Ctr. Alabyar rural anaesthesia machines, OT Vaccines Most of PHCs have no first aid health services. Alhawari ENT & Urology Hospital: (no ER & no beds. shortages: BCG, Tawergha IDPs Camps: inadequate medical Hospital. trauma care). Alhawari Hospital polio, hep B. services & shortage in basic medical supplies Benghazi Kidney Ctr. Tokra rural Hospital: Urology: &consumables. Benghazi Psychiatry No ICU doctors, no GP Supplies: (Omnic, IV Hospital (OPD), shortage of contrast for CT, Sidi-Hussein Diabetes midwifes. nephrostomy & Ctr. No surgical staff for suprapubic set), PPEs & PHCs: 3 functioning. elective surgery & no gloves. OT rooms for elective Tokra Hospital: Basic kit, Non-functioning: surgery. Consumables & Aljamhuria Hospital. PHCs: No regular OPD equipment (O2 27th October Hospital. due to shortage of regulators). Alhawari Gen. Hospital. medical staff. Aljahshia PHC: NCD kit. PHCs 3 non-functioning. Bersis : Basic & NCD kit, ORS & laboratory reagents. Daryana PHC: refrigerator for vaccines. Draft Derna 243 COVID-19 tests (98 females, 145 male). 82 Functioning Hospitals: Alwehda Hospital: Alwehda Hospital: COVID-19 Meeting Alwahda Hospital positive cases, 38 recovery cases & 12 deaths. Alwehda Central anaesthetist, NCD kit, anaesthesia isolation centre Gen director & in charge of 19 cases still at isolation centre (7 cases in ICU & Hospital (incl. dialysis). orthopaedist, drugs, mechanical suffers shortage COVID-19 committee. 12 in the department). Alquba Hospital., Om radiologist & ventilators & Ambulance of staff, O2 & Visited Youssef Bou Raheel Alrazm Gen. Hospital neurosurgery Om Alrazm Gen. Hospital: drugs -heparin polyclinics provides ENT, Martouba Rural Hosp, doctors. Medical waste Needs constant ophthalmology, dentist, Alazzyat Rural Hospital Martouba Rural incinerator, emergency supply of lab urology, internal medicine, Sussa Hospital, Hospital: drugs & C-arm X ray consumables, orthopaedic, vaccinations, Alqaigab Hospital gynaecologist, machine.
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