Beyond 'The Soldier and the State'
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE Jon Rahbek-Clemmensen Beyond ‘The Soldier and the State’ -The Theoretical Framework of Elite Civil-Military Relations Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy London, August 2013 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD Degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgment is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe on the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 83,382 words. Statement of use of third party for editorial help I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Mr. Jay Merrick. 1 Content Abstract ............................................................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................. 4 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 5 Part I: Theories of civil-military relations 2. The past and present of civil-military relations theory ................................................................. 20 Part II: Societal civil-military relations 3. The functional imperative ............................................................................................................. 48 4. The societal imperative ................................................................................................................. 76 Part III: Elite civil-military relations 5. Military expertise ........................................................................................................................ 102 6. Civilian control ............................................................................................................................ 120 7. Military values and political neutrality ....................................................................................... 145 8. Military effectiveness .................................................................................................................. 170 9. The elite civil-military system ..................................................................................................... 186 10. Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 205 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 215 2 Abstract Though the civil-military relations field has seen a lot of theoretical work in recent years, the field still lacks consistent overarching theories. This dissertation argues that the field requires a new and better theoretical framework. Scholars do not agree about how to define key concepts or how these concepts affect one another. They therefore have a tendency to talk past one another when debating and developing theories of civil-military relations. This dissertation develops a new and more sophisticated theoretical framework for elite civil-military relations. The field’s current theoretical framework was developed by Samuel Huntington in The Soldier and the State. This dissertation uses his framework as a starting point for a larger conceptual analysis, where political and military sociology, international relations, political theory, and military science are used to define the key concepts of civil-military relations. There are two heterogeneous types of civil-military relations that should be studied separately: societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. Political science approaches to civil-military relations, such as this dissertation, typically focus on the latter type. Elite civil-military relations consist of two separate fields of study: civilian control and military effectiveness. Elite civil-military relations function as a system that essentially depends on civilian overall preferences, the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians, the institutional set-up of the state, and the actual skills of civilian and military elites. The dissertation challenges several of the field’s established truths. It shows that one cannot claim that one civilian control policy is superior a priori. Instead, the choice of policy depends on the situational circumstances. It also shows that military professionalism plays a less significant role than commonly thought. It clarifies that civilian control depends on both the internal norms of the officer corps and the external control institutions of the state. Finally, it demonstrates that Samuel Huntington’s work, though clearly impressive for its time, lacks the sophistication needed of a modern social science theory and theoretical framework. It therefore argues that the civil-military relations field should move beyond The Soldier and the State. 3 Acknowledgements The embryonic idea for this dissertation was born in California in the spring of 2007. I would like to thank the many remarkable people who have supported me throughout the more than six years that have passed since then. Of course, I alone bear all responsibility for any inaccuracies or mistakes. First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Christopher Coker. Professor Coker has been a rock of support since I first approached him at a conference in Copenhagen in 2009 with a vague idea about a project on civil-military relations. He has been a harsh critic of my incoherent ramblings, but he has always allowed me to seek my own way, even when it was not clear for anyone (least of all me) that it would ever lead anywhere. At one of our first meetings, he recommended that I should pause, have a drink, and watch Wimbledon for a couple of days, whenever I lost my way. I can safely say that I have followed this piece of advice from time to time. Several outstanding academics have gone out of their way to help me throughout the past years. I owe a debt of gratitude to Aaron Belkin, Richard K. Betts, Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, Patricia Digeser, Roger Eatwell, Spyros Economides, Michael Freeden, Anders Henriksen, Rune Henriksen, Chris Hughes, Robert Jervis, Henrik Jedig Jørgensen, Richard H. Kohn, Kristian Søby Kristensen, George Lawson, Margot Light, Anthony Lopez, Mark Manger, Rose McDermott, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, and Vibeke Tjalve. I am also thankful for the generous support I have received from the Economic and Social Research Council, Bikubenfonden, Danmark-Amerika Fonden, the American-Scandinavian Foundation, the Helen Lee and Emil Lassen Fund, the ScanDesign Foundation by Inger & Jens Bruun Fund, the LSE Research Studentship Scheme, Augustinusfonden, Knud Højgaards Fond, Reinholdt W. Jorck og Hustrus Fond, Frimodt-Heineke Fonden, Politikenfonden and the Anglo-Danish Society. I must also thank Jay Merrick, who proofread this work. I want to thank the many amazing LSE graduate students, who made the years I spent around Houghton Street a time of intellectual challenges and crooked smiles. I especially have to thank Benedetta Voltolini, Philipp Lamprecht, Curtis Ohlers, Jacob Parakilas, Maja K. Rasmussen and the Q building crew (Natali Bulamaciouglu, Richard Campanaro, Zeynep Kaya, Outi Keranen, Hadi Makarem, Roberto Orsi, and Yaniv Voller). Our many facetious chats supplied me with enough dirt to ensure that none of them will ever seek public office. My immediate family – Gerd, Poul, Thea, Troels, Christopher, Davide, and Mira – has, of course, been my biggest support. They have reminded me that there is a life beyond the academy. I would also like to thank my Danish friends, especially Søren and Henrik, who, though not always physically present, goaded me on by their example alone. My London friends – especially Giovanni, Natsuko, and the Football Radar crowd – were always patient when I began on yet another rant about war. I fear I would never have finished my dissertation had Columbia University not accepted me as a visiting PhD scholar at the Department of Political Science. This allowed me to meet a host of inspiring people – at Columbia, AGH, and elsewhere – whose ambitions and spirit motivated me to finish my work. Finally, I could not have completed this project without Helene Mark. Helene’s presence – her warmth, drive, and all-round insanity - has been a much needed refuge. She bore the brunt of my doubts and reset my priorities when needed. I am forever thankful for this. Though probably not much of a gesture, I can do nothing but dedicate this dissertation to her. 4 - 1 - Introduction This dissertation is about civil-military relations theory. It examines how much we know about the way soldiers and civilians interact in advanced, Western democracies and – perhaps more importantly – what we do not know, and why we do not know it.1 After a wave of new theoretical