<<

Beliefs Versus Knowledge: A Necessary Distinction for Explaining, Predicting, and Assessing Conceptual Change

Thomas D. Griffin ([email protected]) Stellan Ohlsson ([email protected]) Department of Psychology, 1007 West Harrison Street (M/C 285) Chicago, IL 60607, U.S.A.

Abstract needed to explain how new knowledge representations can be created that will not be distorted by the Empirical research and theoretical treatments of conflicting prior concepts. They suggest that activation conceptual change have paid little attention to the of conflicting prior concepts activates related abstract distinction between knowledge and . The concepts that are not in direct conflict with the new distinction implies that conceptual change involves both knowledge acquisition and belief revision, and highlights information, and that can be utilized in constructing an the need to consider the reasons that beliefs are held. We accurate representation of the new information. These argue that the effects of prior beliefs on conceptual aspects of the conceptual change process become more learning depends upon whether a given belief is held for important when we consider how beliefs differ from its coherence with a network of supporting knowledge, knowledge. or held for the affective goals that it serves. We also contend that the of prior beliefs will determine the Belief Versus Knowledge relationship between the knowledge acquisition and the belief revision stages of the conceptual change process. The present paper defines knowledge as the Preliminary data suggests that prior beliefs vary in comprehension or awareness of an idea or proposition whether they are held for knowledge or affect-based ("I understand the claim that evolved from reasons, and that this variability may predict whether a early "). After a proposition is known, one can change in knowledge will result in belief revision. accept it as true ("I believe the claim that..."), reject it as false ("I disbelieve the claim that..."), or withhold Introduction judgment about its truth-value ("I have no opinion Theorists and researchers tend to agree that prior about the claim that..."). concepts often impede people's ability to learn The present knowledge/belief distinction is intended conflicting information (e.g., Chi, 1992; Dole & to be psychological. Thus, knowledge and belief refer Sinatra, 1998; Thagard, 1992). The paradox of to qualitatively different aspects of the mental knowledge acquisition is that new information can only representation: knowledge refers to the representation be understood in terms of existing ideas, yet existing of a proposition, and belief refers to the representation ideas act as a filter, often distorting new information to of a truth-value associated with a proposition. These make it more consistent with prior concepts. This raises definitions are consistent with Quine, and Ullian's the question of how we ever learn anything (1970) argument that people can have knowledge of an fundamentally new. idea or proposition, but either not believe it to be true, At least two widely cited models agree about crucial or hold a belief that the concept is false. steps in the conceptual change process (Chi, 1992; A proper distinction between comprehension versus Thagard, 1992): (1) recognizing that the new acceptance or rejection of an idea allows us to consider information conflicts with (or is fundamentally different the multiple influences on belief formation, and to from) existing concepts; (2) constructing a new speak more clearly (and realistically) about the knowledge structure to support the new information; (3) relationship between knowledge and belief change. replacing the old concepts with the new, more coherent concepts. In short, conceptual change involves learning A Change in Knowledge, Beliefs, or Both? new concepts and then substituting them for the old. It is striking that discussions of conceptual change Though these models (i.e., Chi, 1992; Thagard, 1992) use the terms 'knowledge', 'beliefs', and 'prior diverge in some of the details about the process, they conceptions' interchangeably. Recently, diSessa (2000) seem to agree that conceptual coherence largely highlighted the unexamined lack of agreement among determines conceptual replacement. conceptual change researchers regarding basic issues In addition, Ohlsson and Lehtinen (1997) have such as whether the conceptual change refers to a suggested that the use of abstract schemas may be change in concepts, beliefs, nodes, or links. In the models previously mentioned (Chi, 1992; providing a context that facilitates the construction of a Thagard, 1992) conceptual change involves both the new conceptual representation. creation of new knowledge (step 2), and a process of Knowledge-based beliefs are defined by greater abandoning the old ideas in favor of the new ones (step coherence with related conceptual networks than beliefs 3). Step 2 amounts to acquiring new knowledge or held for affective goals. Therefore, a person should conceptual understanding, while step 3 amounts to more easily recognize when the evidence, argument, or belief revision. Thus, belief revision is characterized as logical implications of a new conceptual scheme are in rationally disavowing a prior belief whenever the conflict with a knowledge-based belief than with an computed conceptual coherence of a new knowledge affect-based belief. As already stated, conflict structure is higher. This account presupposes that recognition is the first step in the conceptual change knowledge is the only foundation for belief. process and a necessary step in avoiding distortion via The present argument favors a distinction between assimilation (Chi, 1992; Thagard, 1992). Thus, when knowledge and belief, but acknowledges that people encounter information that conflicts with knowledge of a concept must precede any judgment of knowledge-based versus affect-based beliefs, they its truth or falsehood. The issue being raised here is should be less likely to assimilate and distort and more that acceptance or rejection of a concept may not be likely to begin the process of constructing an accurate solely contingent upon the coherence of its relations to representation of the information. supporting knowledge in the form of evidence, Following conflict recognition, the richer and more argument, and logical implications. Belief in a concept detailed conceptual context of knowledge-based beliefs may serve affective and social functions. Thus, people should help compare and contrast the belief with the might accept a certain idea independent of its coherence new information, thus facilitating the process of with relevant knowledge, and perhaps change a belief constructing a representation of the new information. even though it will reduce conceptual coherence. By definition, a prior belief that conflicts with new Beliefs may vary qualitatively in the degree to which information is relevant to that new information. The they are part of a specified and coherent network of concepts of ‘black’ and ‘white’ contain components relevant knowledge. that oppose one another, yet our understanding of This claim about the varying bases of belief is similar ‘black’ seems to rely heavily on its contrast with the to one made regarding the affective versus cognitive concept of ‘white’. Conceptual contrast could help bases of attitudes (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). highlight the boundaries that separate and therefore However, while attitudes refer to subjective evaluations define the concepts. of objects as 'positive' or 'negative', beliefs refer to the In addition, contrasting old and new concepts might acceptance or rejection of propositions. Knowing that a lead to the generation of useful abstractions that capture person in a proposition, such as "humans the principles underlying the contrast. In fact, the evolved form primates", tells us nothing about whether conceptual network underlying knowledge-based that person feels positively or negatively about this state beliefs may provide direct links to abstract concepts of affairs. Furthermore, attitude-change theories predict that already exist. Given the theorized role of abstract greater change in attitudes that are grounded more in concepts in constructing new representations (i.e., affect than cognitions: precisely the opposite prediction Ohlsson & Lehtinen, 1997), the conceptual framework being made here for affect-based beliefs. provided by knowledge-based beliefs could prove quite A number of implications arise when considering the beneficial in the comprehension of conflicting concepts. variability in the bases of beliefs. This variability could The hypothesis that conflicting beliefs can assist influence how belief-conflicting information is learning via conceptual contrast has received indirect processed and understood. Even if a new conceptual support from classroom studies of pedagogical scheme is understood, the role of affective motivations techniques (for a review, see Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, in belief acceptance calls into question the notion that Gamas, 1993). A meta-analysis of 70 reading and belief revision results every time a new conceptual education studies revealed that techniques that scheme increases coherence. contrasted new concepts with common misconceptions resulted in better comprehension of the new concepts Belief Bases and Conceptual Learning compared to a number of alternative techniques. The Part of the importance in making a knowledge/belief problematic conclusion drawn from was that prior distinction lies in the potential influence that a belief's concepts impede learning, so they must be refuted. underlying knowledge structure (or lack thereof) might However, refutational techniques did not directly refute have on the comprehension of belief-conflicting the students' own prior concepts, but rather informed information. The greater conceptual coherence of students of common misconceptions, then presented knowledge-based beliefs should aid in conceptual new concepts as a contrast to these misconceptions. learning by making conflict recognition more likely and It is possible that merely highlighting contrasting In short, the present paper advances the following concepts facilitated comprehension. This interpretation arguments: (1) beliefs differ from knowledge; (2) is consistent with the fact that students who did not beliefs vary in whether they are held for coherence with already possess the prior concepts appeared to benefited supporting knowledge versus affective motives; (3) equally from refutation compared to students who did conceptual change involves both knowledge acquisition have the misconceptions. Contrary to a common and belief revision; (4) the variability in prior belief assumption, these results could be evidence that bases may influence both of these components of the conflicting prior beliefs can aid in conceptual learning, conceptual change process. The first step in the so long as the prior concepts are made salient and empirical validation of these claims is to demonstrate explicitly contrasted with the new information. that people believe in different concepts for affective as In sum, there are sound theoretical reasons to expect well as knowledge-based reasons and that this that knowledge-based beliefs should lead to greater difference is related to their willingness to change those conceptual understanding of conflicting information beliefs. than affect-based beliefs. In fact, if the initial problem of recognizing conceptual conflict is overcome, then the Method conceptual framework of knowledge-based beliefs may The following study was a preliminary investigation of result in greater comprehension than when there are no the variability in the underlying bases for beliefs. Any prior beliefs at all. However, the final stage of attempt to assess whether beliefs are the result of conceptual change (i.e., belief revision) remains. knowledge coherence or affective goals will have weaknesses that can only be overcome with the use of Belief Bases and Belief Revision multiple converging methodologies. Our modest goal in There are some obvious reasons to expect that the third this study was to examine whether people would self- and final stage of conceptual change will also be report that their beliefs were held for largely affective influenced by the underlying source of prior beliefs. reasons and not due to support from relevant Updating beliefs with new knowledge should be knowledge. We hoped to demonstrate variability across heavily influenced by motivation and epistemological beliefs regarding their bases in knowledge versus affect. values. Those who are affectively motivated to form We also expected that people's underlying reasons for beliefs independent of conceptual coherence will have holding their beliefs would be related to their self- little motivation to revise those beliefs in light of new reported willingness to revise those beliefs in the face ideas that could increase coherence. These people may of strong conflicting evidence. be specifically motivated to 'isolate' new information and actively avoid evaluative comparisons of Participants conceptual coherence. Recent work has shown that Participants were 120 undergraduates at the University different kinds of beliefs are associated with different of Illinois at Chicago. epistemological values, and these values predict how different beliefs are affected by anomalous information Belief Assessment Materials and Procedures (Chinn & Brewer, 2000). Conceptual replacement or Participants reported their prior beliefs on five different belief revision may follow the competitive rules of topics: , , extra sensory perception, conceptual coherence, but only when the initial belief is the 'opposites attract' theory of romantic attraction, and based upon its coherence with other knowledge. the existence of an . The topics were chosen for Beyond motivational influences on belief revision, their potential relationships to relevant knowledge and the conceptual structure of prior beliefs is likely to have affect. For each topic participants were told "for the direct cognitive effects on coherence comparisons. purpose of this study [topic] is defined as...", followed Making meaningful comparisons between affect-based by a one sentence description of the topic. The beliefs and new conceptual knowledge will prove descriptions were worded as simply as possible and difficult given the different levels of conceptual participants were told to ask for clarification if needed.1 specification. Also, if coherence comparisons are made, Following each description was the question "To the lack of conceptual specificity inherent in affect- what extent do you believe in [topic]?" Participants based beliefs will make any revision short of complete indicated their level of belief on a scale ranging from 1 abandonment cognitively difficult. Thus, affective (completely disbelieve) to 9 (completely believe). beliefs seem to face an 'all or nothing' dilemma, where the most probable outcome is a lack of belief revision.

Issues of motivation and conceptual structure make it 1 No participants asked for clarification. Also, failures in unlikely that affect-based beliefs will be revised definition comprehension would be consistent with the following the comprehension of a coherent conceptual present theory, and would not alter the interpretation of the framework. present results. Participants were then asked to list their top 3 reasons affective and knowledge-based reasons for their beliefs. for their belief on the topic. This self-generation task The types of reasons varied systematically across topics was designed to examine participants' most accessible and between believers and non-believers (see Table 2, reasons that they had previously associated with their for prototypical reasons given by 'believers'). The belief on the topic. reasons given for belief in creationism, an afterlife, and After participants reported their degree of belief and disbelief in evolution were rarely knowledge-based and listed their reasons for all five topics, they were often referred to affect. Some participants simply presented with a list of potential reasons why a person mentioned that the belief was part of their or might hold any given belief. They were told "for each just how they were brought up. In contrast, belief in potential reason below indicate whether that reason is evolution, and disbelief in creationism and an afterlife why you personally, hold your belief about the idea." were never supported with affective reasons and Participants responded on a likert-scale ranging from participants often referred to evidence. Belief and 1(not at all my reason) to 9(completely my reason). disbelief in ESP and opposites attract was most often Five reasons were presented, two knowledge based supported by personal experience or reference to media reasons and three affective reasons (see Table 1). portrayals, but affective reasons were also provided.

Table 1. Knowledge and Affective Reasons for Belief. Table 2. Prototypical reasons for belief*. ______Affective Reasons*: Creationism My belief about [topic] makes me feel good or is "I rely on "; "the says so"; "I couldn't live if I comforting. didn't think there was a " When it comes to issues like [topic], I trust my 'heart', Afterlife not my 'head' to tell me the truth. "I hope there is one"; "It relieves my fear"; " would I don't need proof, I have faith that my belief about be meaningless otherwise" [topic] is correct. Evolution "biological evidence"; "You can observe similarities Knowledge Reasons*: between species" My belief about [topic] is a result of examining all of ESP the evidence I'm aware of and choosing the most "I have this ability"; "t.v. documentaries"; "It sounds convincing explanation. cool" My belief about [topic] is supported by current Opposites attract scientific knowledge. "personal experience"; "media"; "I have seen it" ______*Reasons were not labeled 'affective' or 'knowledge'. *Reasons for disbelief are not included in this table

After rating their reasons for each belief, participants Ratings of Knowledge Versus Affective Reasons were asked: "Imagine that you were presented with The mean scores were calculated for the three affect strong evidence that contradicted your belief. How reasons and the two knowledge reasons. Figures 1 and 2 likely would you be to change your belief?" report the mean levels of knowledge and affect scores, Participants indicated their willingness to change each and self-reported willingness to change a belief or belief on a scale from 1(not at all) to 9(completely). disbelief in the face of conflicting evidence. As mentioned previously, each participants belief or Results disbelief varied as a function of topic. This presents a For each of the five topics, participants were classified problem for any straightforward statistical test of the into one of three groups: 1 to 3 rating = 'disbeliever'; 4 Belief X Topic interaction. Thus, a qualitative to 6 rating = 'no opinion'; 7 to 9 rating = 'believer'. comparison of the means was followed-up by a formal Believers on one topic could be believers, disbelievers, test using correlational methods. or have no opinion on the other topics. The results that As expected, both the mean levels of affect and follow compare the knowledge versus affective reasons knowledge associated with a belief varied across the given by believers and disbelievers across the five different topics (see Figure 1). Belief in evolution was topics. Those with no opinion are not included here. associated with higher knowledge than affect scores, and with lower affect scores than belief in the other four Self-Generated Reasons topics. In contrast, belief in creationism and an afterlife A qualitative examination of participants' self-generated were associated with higher affect than knowledge reasons for belief revealed that participants gave both scores, and with higher affect than belief in the other three topics. as belief in the issue was greater, knowledge reasons Knowledge Affect Change 9 decreased compared to affect reasons. This was the case 8 for belief on all issues except for evolution. As belief in 7 evolution increased the endorsement of knowledge 6 5 reasons increased greatly compared to affect reasons. 4 These findings are consistent with the descriptive 3 examination of the mean scores for believers and 2 1 disbelievers. n = 59 n = 60 n = 41 n = 39 n = 52 Reasons for belief were also related to self-reported willingness to change. As seen in Figures 1 and 2, mean Creation After Opposite ESP Evolution change scores were lowest when beliefs were associated with higher affect than knowledge scores, as was the case for belief in creationism, an afterlife, and a Figure 1: Reasons and Will to Change for Believers. disbelief in evolution. This relationship was tested by correlating participants' knowledge-affect difference scores with their willingness to change their beliefs on Knowledge Affect Change the five topics. All five bi-variate correlations were 9 significant at p < .05, and the coefficients ranged 8 between .30 and .40. Thus, the more a participant's 7 6 belief was based in knowledge relative to affect, the 5 more willing they were to change that belief in the face 4 of conflicting evidence. 3 2 In sum, many participants reported that their beliefs 1 were based more on affect than on any relation to n = 30 n = 18 n = 18 n = 40 n = 29 existing knowledge. Also, there was significant variation among beliefs in terms of their knowledge Creation A fter Opposite ESP Evolution versus affective bases. Lastly, participants claimed they would be less willing to change affect-based beliefs than knowledge-based beliefs if presented with sound belief conflicting evidence. Figure 2: Reasons and Will to Change for Disbelievers. Table 3. Correlations between knowledge-affect The opposite pattern of results was found for difference scores and belief, on all five topics. disbelief across topics (see Figure 2). Specifically, ______disbelief in creationism was associated with higher Creationism Afterlife ESP Opposites Evolution knowledge than affect scores, and higher knowledge -.68* -.38* -.42* -.35* .73* scores than disbelief in the other four topics. In *p < .05. contrast, disbelief in evolution was associated with higher affect than knowledge scores, and higher affect Discussion than the other topics. Overall, the differences in These preliminary results support our hypothesis that knowledge and affective scores for belief and disbelief beliefs and knowledge are related but distinct across the five topics were consistent with the kinds of constructs. People will not only report that some of reasons participants provided in the self-generation their beliefs are held on affective grounds, they will task. even specifically reject knowledge based reasons as the To get around the problem of the membership bases for some of their beliefs. In addition, these self- overlap between believers and disbelievers across reported reasons for belief predicted participants topics, belief was treated as a continuous variable. Also, willingness to change those beliefs. a single score of endorsed reasons was calculated for These data are only a first attempt to examine this participants on each topic, by subtracting their affect issue. It is a difficult task to assess the true bases for score from their knowledge score on each topic. Each individual beliefs. If belief formation and maintenance of the five difference scores was correlated with the are relatively deliberate mental enterprises then it is continuous measure of belief for the corresponding reasonable to assume that people would be able to topic. The results are the five coefficients in Table 3. accurately report the relationships between their beliefs For all topics, the knowledge-affect difference score and relevant knowledge and affective goals. The was significantly correlated with the tendency to validity of these self-reports is aided by the fact that believe or disbelieve. Negative correlations suggest that participants' self-generated reasons matched their coherent beliefs. The present theory suggests several endorsement of the knowledge and affective reasons reasons to expect just the opposite in some that we provided. circumstances. Affect-based beliefs by virtue of their It should be noted that self-reported willingness to lack of coherence with the conceptual framework might change a belief was not intended to be an actual be immune to threats posed by conflicting information. measure of belief revision. This point is made obvious Any new information is likely to be distorted, and if it by the fact that no belief conflicting information was is accurately comprehended, it will have little influence ever provided to participants. However, we argue that on an affect-based belief. belief revision is highly subject to motivational The present theory predicts that emotional beliefs not influence and that epistemological values are integral to derived from relevant knowledge are the least likely to people's motivation to update beliefs with any newly change in the face of conflicting information. This acquired knowledge. Self-reported willingness to prediction should make intuitive sense to anyone who change a belief reflects belief-specific epistemological has ever had a dinner-time discussion about politics or values that should affect the motivations relevant to religion. Scientific ideas may change slowly, but the belief revision. Thus, it is noteworthy that participants informal that they seem to change quicker reported being rather unwilling to change their affect- than non-scientific ideas may be an indication that the based beliefs, even if presented with sound conflicting scientific enterprise generally does adhere to the evidence, but relatively willing to change knowledge- principles of forming ideas based on knowledge and based beliefs. coherent argument. Implications and Future Research References The obvious next step is to see whether these reported Chi, M. T. H. (1992). Conceptual change within and differences in belief bases predict how well people across ontological categories: Examples from comprehend new information in conflict with their learning and discovery in science. In R. N. Giere beliefs. The distinction between knowledge and beliefs (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science: requires that outcome measures be tailored to assess Vol. XV, Cognitive models of science (pp. 129-186). change in one or the other. If conceptual understanding Minneapolis: Press. (knowledge change) is being assessed, then participants Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (2000). Knowledge must be clear that their task is to demonstrate their change in response to data in science, religion, and understanding of the new concepts, and not to report magic. In K. S. Rosengren, C, N. Johnson, and P. L. their current point of view. Harris (Eds.), Imagining the impossible: Magical, A similar concern arises when the outcome of interest scientific, and religious thinking in children (pp. 334- is belief revision or conceptual replacement. Dependent 371). Cambridge, U. K.: Cambridge University Press. measures must show that people are spontaneously diSessa, A. A. (2000). A complex adaptive systems employing new concepts in their thinking, not merely view of conceptual change. In L. R. Gleitman and A. adapting their thinking to the expectations of K. Joshi (Eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty-Second experimental or educational settings. Being explicit in Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society our discussions and methodologies about beliefs versus (pp. 8-9). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum knowledge may reveal where the real disagreements are Associates Publishers. in the area of conceptual change and perhaps reveal that Dole, J. A., & Sinatra, G. M. (1998). Reconceptualizing there is less disagreement than it seems. change in the cognitive construction of knowledge. Previous accounts of conceptual change have Educational Psychologist, 33, 109-128. assumed a uniformly negative influence of prior beliefs Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of on conceptual change. We argue that the knowledge attitudes. London: Harcourt Brace Publishers. versus affective basis of prior beliefs may be an Guzzetti, B. J., Snyder, T. E., Glass, G. V., & Gamas, important determinant of whether conflicting concepts W. S. (1993). Promoting conceptual change in are accurately understood. We also contend that the science: A comparative meta-analysis of instructional coherence competition accounts of belief revision are interventions from reading education and science too simplistic, given the existence of affect-based education. Reading Research Quarterly, 28, 117-159. beliefs. A conceptual-coherence theory of belief Ohlsson, S., & Lehtinen, E. (1997). Abstraction and the revision only makes sense for the sub-set of beliefs that acquisition of complex ideas. International Journal of are initially based on their coherence with current Educational Research, 27, 37-48. knowledge. Quine, W. V., & Ullian, J. S. (1970). The web of belief. Previous theories claim that conceptual change is in New York: . the direction of greater coherence. Thus, incoherent Thagard, P. (1992). Conceptual revolutions. Princeton, prior beliefs should be more likely to change than NJ: Princeton University Press.