Symposium on New Dynamics in Japanese Security Policy

Summary Report from Symposium on New Dynamics in Japanese Security Policy Organized and Co-Sponsored by Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis The International Security Studies Program The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy July 2015 For further information please contact: Dr. Charles M. Perry Vice President & Director of Studies Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Central Plaza Building 675 Massachusetts Avenue, 10th Floor Cambridge, MA 02139 USA Tel: 617-492-2116/Fax: 617-492-8242 [email protected] http://www.ifpa.org Symposium on New Dynamics in Japanese Security Policy Organized and Co-Sponsored by Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis The International Security Studies Program The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Summary Report July 2015 Contents Introduction 1 Key Rationale behind Tokyo’s Proactive Pacifism 4 Spratly Islands 7 Security Policy Changes and the 2015 Guidelines 15 Next Steps and Domestic Challenges Ahead 24 New Opportunities for U.S.-Japan 30 Security Cooperation Opportunities for Broader Regional 39 Security Cooperation South China Sea Areas Claimed by China 40 Conclusion 49 Keynote Luncheon Speech 50 Agenda 61 Acknowledgments 65 iii Introduction AS JAPAN CONTINUES to craft a new legal framework that will govern the country’s changing military posture, we are witnessing nothing less than a decisive turning point in Japanese security policy and, hence, a real transformation in the way other nations in the Asia-Pacific region, and even well beyond, now see Japan as a strategic actor. In just a little over a year’s time, the cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has set in place Japan’s first true national security council, released its first-ever National Security Strategy, completed a major update of Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines and its Mid-Term Defense Plan (which defines Tokyo’s military capabilities and defense priorities until 2018), and loosened earlier constraints on arms exports and defense technology cooperation. Recently, the cabinet also revised regulations guiding how Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) can be used to help foreign militaries for non-defense pur- poses (including for “gray area” missions like anti-terrorism and cyber security), and approved in January 2015 a record high, ¥4.98 trillion ($41.3 billion) defense budget for the next fiscal year, mak- ing it the third consecutive year of increased defense spending following a decade of cuts. Perhaps most important of all for the U.S.-Japan alliance, however, was the decision in July 2014 to reinterpret the so-called peace clause enshrined in Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to allow Japan 1 New Dynamics in Japanese Security Policy to exercise the right of collective self-defense (often referred to as CSD) and to come to the aid of allies under attack. Significantly, this new interpretation represents a policy shift that promises to have a major effect on U.S. and Japanese military roles and respon- sibilities under their newly finalized bilateral guidelines for defense cooperation. Taken together, these adjustments and others still to come – especially if Prime Minister Abe’s hand is strength- ened after elections for the upper house of Japan’s legislature (the Diet) in the summer of 2016 – may open the door to actual changes in Japan’s constitution (depending on the state of intricate co- alition politics at the time) going beyond a simple reinterpretation of Article 9. All of this signals that Japan is Japan is now poised now poised to become, in the words of the National Security Strategy, a more “pro- to become a more active contributor to peace” at both the regional and global levels, and that it is “proactive contributor ready to do so to a degree and in a manner many thought quite impossible just two or to peace” at both the three years ago. Before delving too deeply into how the regional and global levels Abe government might implement its de- cisions with respect to collective self-defense, participants at the March 31, 2015, IFPA-Fletcher School symposium on new dynamics in Japanese security strategy agreed that translating these new policies and initiatives into action will not be easy. This is a process that will certainly take time, and Tokyo will likely encounter resistance, both domestically and from coun- tries in the region. In addition, how things go may also swing a bit on what Prime Minister Abe says – and reactions to it – in speech- es and statements he makes regarding the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II and the fiftieth anniversary of the normal- ization of relations between Japan and South Korea. All that being said, however, a fundamental change in Japan’s capacity and will- ingness to take strategic action is clearly in the works. Symposium discussions sought to better understand how that process is likely 2 Summary Report to unfold in the years to come, focusing first on some of the core drivers, motivations, and constraints—both internal and external— that are shaping Japan’s evolving security strategy. 3 Key Rationale behind Tokyo’s Proactive Pacifism AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to normalize Japan’s defense forces and expand their roles and missions signal the beginning stages of a historic departure from the postwar political, military, economic, and foreign policy order that has defined the country over the last seven decades. What has brought us to this important crossroads with respect to the U.S.-Japan alliance, it was argued by more than one symposium participant, is the confluence of changes in the nature of regional security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, Japan’s policy re- sponses, and America’s regional approach. In terms of regional security more specifically, particular note was made of recent ad- vances in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, as well as the Kim Jong-un regime’s record of increasingly erratic be- havior, including unprecedented provocative moves into the cyber domain with the hack on Sony Pictures studios in December 2014. Some would argue, it was acknowledged, that the Obama adminis- tration’s continued focus in the past two years on curtailing Iran’s nuclear program had given Pyongyang a freer hand than it would otherwise have to expand significantly its own atomic arsenal and missile capabilities in an apparent buildup that many officials and observers in the region fear can no longer be stopped. Satellite photographs of the North’s main nuclear facility, for example, have shown a recent doubling in size of the nuclear enrichment plant 4 Summary Report Session I Panel (L to R): Joseph Young, Takashi Kawakami, Sheila Smith, Satoshi Morimoto, and Charles Perry there, which Americans suspect is not the only one, and a gener- al consensus is emerging that North Korea most likely possesses at least a dozen nuclear weapons already and is projected to ac- quire an arsenal of as many as twenty nuclear bombs by the end of 2016.1 Aside from worries about regional stability and the North’s pre-emptive strike capability, the situation is further complicat- ed by the potential that Pyongyang may eventually decide to sell part of its additional supply of highly enriched uranium, especially if its stockpile increases to fifty or more weapons by 2020, as a number of military strategists have predicted. Meanwhile, participants emphasized, China has continued its rapid acquisition of new capabilities, fueled by its double-digit increases in defense spending, which is already close to four times that of Japan, leading to a military budget of over $141 billion as of March 2015, or an annual rise of 10 percent. In addition, as not- ed in a new report by the United States Navy, China’s coast guard fleet, currently the largest in the world, has improved and expanded the number of coast guard ships it operates by 25 percent 1 David Sanger, “With U.S. Eyes on Iran, North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal Expanded,” New York Times, May 7, 2015. 5 New Dynamics in Japanese Security Policy in the last three years alone, with Beijing launching more naval ships per year than any other country since 2013. According to one Japanese symposium participant, the Chinese navy regular- ly uses such vessels to patrol the waters of the South China Sea and to put pressure on territories throughout the region, including continued incursions near the Senkaku Islands, administered by Japan. Of even greater concern is the surge of opaque land reclamation activity by the Chinese government, which is now constructing artificial islands, designed to host military installa- tions, and is expanding a growing number of reefs, atolls, and rock formations in contested areas of the South China Sea, all part of a strategy aimed at strengthening Beijing’s maritime claims and al- tering the regional balance of power in its favor. Recent satellite images of Chinese activities in the disputed Fiery Cross Reefs and the Paracels, for instance, show concentrated efforts to build air- strips with runways of about three thousand meters, which will enable the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to conduct operations with major military aircraft, deploy early-warning radars and ad- vanced missile systems, and increase its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) coverage in the South China Sea through the use of ASW helicopter landing pads.2 Similar efforts are appearing at Subi Reef, in the Spratly Islands, and experts expect to see the construction of more port facilities to provide logistics and host coast guard and navy vessels. Although international law would not confer any legal sovereign rights on China over waters surrounding the artificial structures, Beijing’s massive dredging program is in essence gradually creating facts on the ground that will enable it to intimidate rival claimants through military force and coercion, turning the area into a permanent gray zone.

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