Centre for Land Warfare Studies (Claws) Report on National Seminar on India-China Relationship: Remembering the Past to Look Into the Future
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CENTRE FOR LAND WARFARE STUDIES (CLAWS) REPORT ON NATIONAL SEMINAR ON INDIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: REMEMBERING THE PAST TO LOOK INTO THE FUTURE General The Centre for Land Warfare Studies organized a one day seminar on “India- China Relationship: Remembering the Past to look into the Future” on 23rd November 2012 at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. Maj Gen (Retd) Dhruv C Katoch, SM, VSM, Director CLAWS delivered the welcome address. His Excellency Gen (Retd) JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, and Governor of Arunachal Pradesh delivered the keynote address. The Indo-China Seminar reflected on the Battle of 1962 in the context of various reasons responsible for India‟s failure and a vigorous analysis over what the future beckons us to do. The defense capabilities of India were seen in the light of that of China, the contentious issues prevalent between the two were discussed, the co-operation that exists between Military and political leadership at present in India was closely observed. It therefore revolved around how India‟s foreign policy towards China can be directed towards risk reduction for potential conflict. The seminar was attended by serving and retired officers of all three services, members of the strategic community and the defense industry sector. Inaugural Session Keynote Address- His Excellency Gen JJ Singh, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, Governor of Arunachal Pradesh The 1962 war was an unmitigated disaster which laid bare the ineptness in evolving our strategy as also the inability of our leadership -- political, military, intelligence agencies and the civil services -- to read the Chinese designs and intentions, and the lack of preparedness of the military and the nation to face the challenge posed by China's aggression. In his book „Prepare or Perish‟, Gen KV Krishna Rao, a distinguished former Army Chief and later Governor of Jammu and Kashmir has stated that, the Indian government “deluded itself into believing that the Chinese would not resort to a war to settle the border problem”. Enough has been written about the background, causes and lessons learnt from that war, but these issues again factor in today's deliberations and meaningful deductions drawn thereupon. Given their geo-strategic location, size, population, resources and potential, the relations between India and China assume the highest importance for peace, prosperity and stability of the region and the world at large. The challenges that impact the relations between the two nations are: An unresolved boundary along the Himalayas Chinese perception of a US-India strategy to contain China. The possibility of diversion of waters of rivers emanating from Tibet. A latent potential for unrest in Tibet, which comes to the surface from time to time. The political and economic dimensions of two rising powers of Asia -- rivalry or competition -- for markets and resources. On the other hand, there are positive factors that would usher convergence of interests and cooperation such as: Improved bilateral relations due to the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership Agreement of 2005. The new leadership in China will give great importance to relations with India, as stated by Wen Jiabao recently. Growing trade and commerce which could touch $100 billion by 2015, a phenomenal increase from $0.35 billion in 1992. Of necessity, the trade imbalance has to be set right, so that it is a win-win for both nations. A growing understanding amongst the leadership of the two nations that peace and stability is imperative to bring up the socio-economic conditions of millions of their people. Greater sense of responsibility coming in the wake of recognition of having acquired or in the process of acquiring the status of powerful nations in the region and globally. An understanding that there is "enough space for growth", as stated by the respective prime ministers of both countries. Enhancement of military power of both sides, albeit the Chinese having a definite edge at present, and the deterrence value of nuclear weapons. Challenge posed by the altitude and terrain in Tibet region that would inhibit the deployment of the full might of either side (an imperative to facilitate a decisive result in a conflict situation) and thereby, act as a restraining factor. A comprehensive review of the boundary issue between India and China brings out, first, that India's northern boundary is essentially a product of environmental and historical factors operating over centuries, secondly, that although parts of the boundary had already become traditional even before the British rule, other sectors took their present shape under the impact of new threats from inner Asia in the 19th and early 20th century and the new concepts of security which the British brought with them, and thirdly, that the end product was by and large, the formulation of the principle of the highest crest line or watershed of the northern mountain system as the boundary for political purposes. Reconciling differences The Sino-Indian border issue needs to be addressed on a faster pace. For years both sides have been adopting fixed positions. The visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988 was a landmark event, laying the foundation for a more vibrant bilateral relationship. It resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquility along the border in 1993, during the visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. The two sides agree that a border settlement must be fair and equitable. The question arises as to how to reconcile the known differences within a reasonable timeframe. During Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003, both countries forged a commitment at the highest level to move ahead purposefully and resolve the boundary question peacefully. The two sides agreed to appoint a special representative to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship, the framework of a boundary settlement. Meanwhile, peace and tranquility would be maintained in the border areas by strengthening mechanisms on the ground. To resolve a complex problem like this, no straight forward or universally applicable principle can be rigidly applied. Geography does not follow cardinal directions or make available an unbroken chain of a mountain system to create an undisputable boundary. Although the Great Himalaya is a formidable barrier going in an arc, there are important rivers cutting across from Tibet to the Indian plains with attendant problems of defining the boundary in certain areas. Hence, any mutually acceptable solution will have to be an exercise carried out objectively and pragmatically, based on the agreement on political parameters and guiding principles signed in 2005. A new equation is emerging in the balance of power in the world, with the centre of gravity shifting towards Asia. The cooperation in the field of defence has also grown phenomenally consequent to the highly significant Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation that was signed during the visit of then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Beijing in 2006. Important aspects of this MoU were given concrete shape during my visit as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee with a tri-service delegation to China in May 2007. We were able to take our military to military engagement to an unprecedented high and we agreed to hold the first-ever defence dialogue and also settled upon the modalities of joint training. For army officers of our generation and our predecessors who had been through the 1962 showdown, this was something incredible. The same may have been the case on the Chinese side. There are regular exchanges of officers undergoing training in both countries, goodwill visits and engagement of defence experts in various seminars and conferences. Besides this, military observers have been permitted by both sides to attend military exercises and manoeuvres. As part of the confidence building exercise for ensuring peace and tranquility on the border, troops of both countries hold sports and cultural meets regularly, particularly during national day celebrations and flag meetings at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In another dimension, we need to have a careful look at the existing structure of our national security apparatus and defence management at the strategic level. The institutionalisation of the military component of this apparatus in the decision-making loop is unexceptional. This would ensure that expert military advice is available to the national leadership and policy-makers, as is the case in other major democratic nations. Military diplomacy While formulating and conducting foreign policy, particularly in our fairly volatile neighbourhood and also in those countries where the military is all-powerful, military diplomacy and the views of the service chiefs would prove to be invaluable. Timely advice can help in the prevention of a security situation from snowballing out of control. In a few security related situations in the past, the armed forces were not quite aware of the big picture or were caught unprepared or without having the desired readiness levels when asked to execute a mission. Such instances are not in the best interests of the nation and hence, should be scrupulously avoided as far as possible. An integrated team with officials from the services and the ministries of defence, external affairs, finance and home makes good sense. Equally important is the need to have integrated teams within the army, navy and air force at the theatre commands and at the service HQs. Once this model has matured over a few years, we could have in place a Chief of Defence Staff by 2020, with the operational responsibility of the armed forces and the accountability that goes with it. Well-orchestrated military diplomacy can help in the achievement of our foreign policy goals and in addressing our national security concerns. I have been a great advocate of involving the armed forces during the evolution and formulation of our foreign policy with respect to our neighbouring countries.