Internacionals CIDOB 151 KALININGRAD in the “MIRROR WORLD”: JUNE from Soviet “Bastion” to Russian “Fortress” 2016
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CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona notesISSN: 2013-4428 internacionals CIDOB 151 KALININGRAD IN THE “MIRROR WORLD”: JUNE From Soviet “bastion” to Russian “fortress” 2016 Sergey Sukhankin, Associate Expert, International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS), Kiev; Historian, Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University, Kaliningrad he escalation of tensions between the Russian Federation “Great expectations”… and the ugly reality of and NATO member states over the Baltic that skyrock- post-Soviet transformation eted in April 2016 revealed two main tendencies. First, Tthe region has proven to be vital for the Kremlin, which per- The collapse of the Soviet Union, which at the time seemed ceives it as its natural sphere of influence. Second, Moscow’s to have tossed the oppressive communist regime into the growing assertiveness has given totally new meaning to the dustbin of history, was perceived by many as a new begin- issue of “border regions” ning and a road to a bright and territories that are physi- future promising numerous cally separated from Russia Moscow’s growing assertiveness has given totally new mean- opportunities and prospects. proper. Under these circum- ing to the issue of “border regions” and territories that are phys- These feelings were especial- stances the role of Kalinin- ically separated from Russia proper. Under these circumstances ly strong in the westernmost grad Oblast has largely been the role of Kaliningrad Oblast has largely been recovered. region of the Russian Feder- recovered. It would be true to ation. Once one of the most suggest that it has reacquired Inspired by the rapid integration of its former communist militarised spots in Europe its former status, and become neighbours into the regional architecture the first democratic (and perhaps the world), the governor dreamed of turning Kaliningrad into the “Baltic Hong the Russian “stronghold” on former “Soviet bastion” on Kong”. the Baltic. Moreover, recent the Baltic gazed at the new developments have signalled world full of promises. These aliningrad gained a gruesome reputation as the “smugglers a resurrection of Russian po- K expectations were addition- capital” of the Baltic Sea region and many observers defined litical ambitions in the region, ally boosted by the successes Kaliningrad as the “black hole of Europe”. which for centuries has been of Kaliningrad’s geographi- a long-desired object of the The so-called “Kaliningrad identity” forged during the Soviet cal neighbours and the over- Russian state’s expansionary was a system of privileges and compensation for its “unfavour- all odour of freedom that was policies and a battleground able” geopolitical position and this special status was gladly in the air. The so-called “Bal- between Russia and the West. embraced by the local community and became deeply rooted in tic Sea Rim” that had by then This article aims to trace the the public mass consciousness. embraced Poland, Lithuania, essence, patterns, logic and, to Latvia and Estonia and man- some extent, even the inevita- An aggressive Kremlin-sponsored information campaign car- aged to break the shackles bility of the retransformation ried out in 2002–2003 aimed to portray Kaliningrad as a “be- of foreign ideology and the of post-Soviet Kaliningrad. In sieged bastion” and cut-off Russian region being strangulated political regime lured Kalin- addition, key factors (both in- by Lithuania and Poland. ingrad as well. This example ternal and external) that have was particularly glorified by led to this perplexing, quite Kaliningrad has never been an exclusive zone of European those committed to a demo- gruesome and perhaps po- responsibility. The EU could only act in accordance with Rus- cratic future as the only pos- tentially dangerous metamor- sia, not on a separate basis, which would surely have been con- sible path for Russia. One of phosis shall be discussed. strued as a sign of irredentism. those was the first governor notes internacionals CIDOB 151 . JUNE 2016 1 of Kaliningrad, Yurii Matochkin. A well-known scholar (he had tual Matochkin. This ushered in the dark era of anarchy, havoc, PhD in economics), intellectual and practitioner, he was one of the blossoming of organised criminal groups and endemic very few to recognise that Kaliningrad could only prosper as a corruption. Kaliningrad gained a gruesome reputation as the “bridge” between Russia and Europe – not a secluded “island” “smugglers capital” of the Baltic Sea region, with skyrocketing as it was from 1945 to 1990. Inspired by the rapid integration of rates of HIV infection (peaking in 1997 with Kaliningrad then its former communist neighbours (Poland and the Baltic states) Russia’s most infected region), tuberculosis and other highly into the regional architecture, Matochkin and his team dreamed contagious deceases. These developments have led many ob- of turning Kaliningrad into the “Baltic Hong Kong” – a place servers to define Kaliningrad as the “black hole of Europe”. where two distinct yet in many ways close civilisations would Undoubtedly, such unfavourable conditions could not pos- meet, merge and complete each other, leading to prosperity for sibly have promoted the oblast as a desirable destination for Kaliningrad. Indeed, Kaliningrad (contrary to the rest of Rus- foreign (and even Russian) investors, leaving it at the mercy of sia) was endowed with qualities and conditions that at the time the Kremlin’s reluctant support. were quite rare in the mainland. Namely, it was spared from ethnic conflicts, violent separatism, aggressive far-right move- In the meantime, ailing/ageing president Boris Yeltsin, who ments and other discouraging factors. The apex of liberal think- was tending to spend more and more time outside Moscow, ing was the governor’s proposal to attract ethnic Russians from was losing control over processes that were underway in Rus- abroad to Kaliningrad to make it an “intellectual capital” of the sia. Moreover, the humiliating Khasavyurt Accord (1996) and Russian Federation and an embodiment of multiculturalism financial collapse of 1998 diluted the economic power and po- and cooperation. litical ambitions of the Russian Federation, which had reached a very dangerous historical threshold, with the image of the Unfortunately, this dream was never meant to come true. The “Time of Troubles” (end of 16th - beginning of 17th century) main reason was the absence of clear strategy on/for Kalinin- revived in a modern version. grad on the part of two key powers. Russian elites were en- gulfed in a whirlpool of political strife while the country itself Under these circumstances, with financially and politically was facing the grim spectre of separatism that put its territorial troubled Kaliningrad cut off from Russia proper and ruled by a chaotic and incoherent governor (though In the end, the burden of transformation and the not completely without ambitions of his own), it steadily but surely evolved into a bulk of challenges encountered by Kaliningrad liability rather than an undisputable advan- tage. It may sound utterly outlandish today, outweighed the opportunities. yet back in the 1990s even populists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and emerging impe- rial nationalist Aleksandr Dugin seriously considered the possibility of handing Ka- integrity into question. Europe was not keen to meddle in Rus- liningrad to Germany as a part of a “grand bargain” aimed at sian internal affairs lest it jeopardise its nascent relations with improving relations with Germany in pursuit of an anti-Amer- post-Soviet Russia and resurrect Russian imperial nationalism ican Eurasia led by both Russia and Germany as the two main (which, incidentally, was on its way anyway). Moreover, ma- centres of power. It goes without saying that such a prospect jor European players after the Maastricht Treaty (1992) were would terrify everyone with even basic knowledge of 20th cen- mainly concerned with European integration and the processes tury history. that accompanied it, thereby paying little attention to the tiny speck on the Baltic. European integration came into clear dis- It must be highlighted that the Russian economic crisis that oc- sonance with the Russian disintegration stemming from below curred in 1998 turned out to be a genuine calamity for Kalinin- that Moscow tried to suppress by all means available. grad which, in addition to having suffered an economic shock, was affected in a number of other ways. For instance, a grow- In the end, the burden of transformation and the bulk of chal- ing sense of alienation and self-escapism, widespread aloof- lenges encountered by Kaliningrad outweighed the opportuni- ness and the changing perception of a distant Russia would be ties. Being unable to get rid of the “Soviet legacy”, Kaliningrad further affected by inevitable comparison with the buoyancy was about to experience one of the murkiest chapters in its con- of its geographical neighbours. In this regard it is worth men- temporary history. But the image of prosperity and wellbeing tioning that separatism (this tendency was quite evident in sev- Kaliningrad pursued was, in fact, a mirage leading it no closer eral Russian regions) had never been a serious issue. Even the to its goal. so-called Baltic Republican Party, which stood on the platform of greater autonomy from a federal centre, never seriously attempted to repeat either the “Chechen” or “Tatarstan” sce- From the “black hole of Europe” to illusory progress: nario. It would not, however, be thoroughly accurate to search how costly is freedom? for an explanation in the domain of such a popular notion as “patriotism”, as it is currently actively promoted by president The landmark events that predetermined the development tra- Putin and the Russian ruling elites. Rather, the roots should jectory of contemporary Kaliningrad were the local elections be looked for in two main dimensions. First, a deep fear of re- (1996) that led to the victory of Leonid Gorbeko – who was por- peating the path taken by Chechnya, which was given a harsh trayed as an “effective manager” (and explicitly supported by “lesson” for inappropriate assertiveness.