ISSUE 2, 2019
Volume 1, Number 1, 1999
Traditions of conflict resolution in South Africa
Grappling with the past The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa
Southern Africa in water crisis – A case study of theof thePangara River River water water shortage, shortage, 1987–1996 1987–1996 Towards a resource-based conflict management and resolution perspective
Civil control over the security institutions in South Africa Suggestions for the future and notes on replicating the experience in Africa
Prospects for African conflict resolution in the next millennium South Africa’s view
1992–2017
CT2|2019 CONTENTS
EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden
FEATURES 3 ECOWAS’s Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau’s Protracted Political Crisis, 2015–2019 by Brown Odigie
12 Oil Pipeline Vandalism in the Niger Delta: Need, Greed and Grievance Factors by Al Chukwuma Okoli
20 Appraising Intergroup Contact in Zambia’s Electoral Politics by Kabale Ignatius Mukunto
28 Food Aid, Village Politics and Conflict in Rural Zimbabwe: The Case of the Tandi Chiefdom by Mark Chingono
36 A Leadership Perspective for Sustainable Peace in the Central African Republic by Opeyemi Ademola Olayiwola
45 Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Naila Salihu
BOOK REVIEW 55 Conducting Track II Peacemaking: A Peacemaker’s Toolkit Book 3 – Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess by Dudziro Nhengu
Cover photo: Military and police peacekeepers serving with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrol the Muslim enclave of PK5 in Bangui (October 2017). UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe.
conflict trends I 1 EDITORIAL BY VASU GOUNDEN
On 3 February 1960, the United Kingdom prime to transform our economies, social systems and political minister Harold Macmillan, addressing the South African institutions. Parliament, said: “The wind of change is blowing through this These challenges will take decades and generations to continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national address. In the meanwhile, the immediate challenge is how consciousness is a political fact.” Five decades later, those to ensure a smooth transition from one set of leaders to winds of change led to a substantially decolonised and free another; how to ensure continuity in governance and, where it continent. However, the shackles of poverty, unemployment has broken down, how to rebuild it; how to ensure continued and inequality have still not been removed for the vast or renewed safety, security and stability; and how to ensure majority of people on the continent. economic stability and growth. This is a tall order, even for Today, we once again see those winds of change sweeping the most efficient, honest and capable leaders. It is even more across Africa, bringing a renewed national consciousness. difficult where institutions of governance have deteriorated. This time, people are not removing colonial rulers but long- The recent cases of Zimbabwe, Algeria and Sudan need standing African rulers who have failed to deal with poverty, to be closely observed for lessons and solutions to these unemployment and inequality. Leaders in Burkina Faso, Libya, challenges. These countries are relatively stable, have the Central African Republic, Zimbabwe and, more recently, in not reached the stage of being failed states, still have their Algeria and Sudan have all been removed by street protests in institutions of governance that are relatively intact, and cities where people have been rapidly urbanising for the past have economies which can be turned around. Our ability to several decades. negotiate smooth transitions in these countries will determine An exponential population growth and multitudes of the fate of our continent. The current trends in Africa young people with little prospect of employment characterise indicate that these countries are not the last to experience cities in such countries. In addition, deteriorating public such challenges. Many relatively stable countries that have services, poor governance, corruption and economic and not succeeded in transforming their economies to address social marginalisation for the majority of people to the poverty, unemployment and inequality meaningfully will find advantage of a small political and business elite, have led to themselves in similar situations. a growing national consciousness around these challenges. These complex problems require reasoned thinking Triggers such as rising food and fuel prices, impacting on and analysis of actual events that are occurring for the the daily lives of people, have converted long-term structural development of appropriate solutions. Resorting to populist challenges into immediate crises. This has resulted in poverty, rhetoric will not resolve these challenges; neither will easy unemployment and inequality becoming a reality for middle- “either/or” dichotomous problem-solving. The solutions to class citizens, too, and driving solidarity among economically the current crises in Zimbabwe, Algeria and Sudan are not marginalised, economically disadvantaged and gainfully simply a choice between the negotiations and elections based employed people. on democratic principles that the protestors are calling for, or This national consciousness and class solidarity have the stability that the military promises. The problems are more been welcomed across the continent. However, it leaves us complex than just these choices. Therefore, we cannot reduce with new challenges to which we have few, if any, answers. our analysis and problem-solving of such complex challenges Prime among these questions is how to manage such to a simple choice between democracy and stability. transitions so that life, for those who are protesting injustices and inequalities, gets better and not worse. Our record in managing transitions has not been satisfactory, and part of the answer lies in the fact that we have not dealt with the Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive deep structural challenges that resulted from our failure Director of ACCORD.
2 I conflict trends ECOWAS’S EFFORTS AT RESOLVING GUINEA-BISSAU’S PROTRACTED POLITICAL CRISIS, 2015–2019
BY BROWN ODIGIE UN PHOTO/KARIM TIBARI
Introduction serving personal interests, and general governance deficits. Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony in West Africa The case with Guinea-Bissau, however, is peculiar. It has a long with a population of 1.8 million people,1 has been embroiled in history of political and institutional fragility dating back to its political and institutional crises since August 2015, following independence in 1974, with recurring coups and assassinations the run-off presidential elections of May 2014 that produced of political leaders.2 With the exemption of President Vaz, President José Mário Vaz. The political and institutional crises had roots in certain structural factors common to most post-colonial African states: an underdeveloped economy, overdependence on foreign aid and former colonial masters, Above: José Mário Vaz was elected president of Guinea- fractionalised and factionalised elites, a praetorian army Bissau in the April 2014 election.
conflict trends I 3 GUINEA-BISSAU Kolda Kounkané Bignona S E N EGA L Wassadou Sédhiou Salikénié Koumbakara Tanaf asam Cuntima Sare Bácar Pirada C an Cambaju Kandika ce Bajocunda Dungal Jumbembem Canhâmina Canquelifá Ziguinchor Diattakounda Paunca Oussouye Farim Mpak R . bari Buruntuma Bigene di m heu Canja Sonaco Canjufa ~ Cac Sao Domingos R. Contuboel Camajábà Ingoré Kabrousse Barro Mansaina Pitche Olossato a Mansabá b Gabú a Cacheu Gamamudo ê lib Susana . G o Varela u ~ R K e a h Jolmete Bissora Uacaba s c ~ Bafatá s a o C Sao Vicente p io OIO Gêba R C A C H E U am GAB Ú Cuitá R. C Foula Mori Bula ôa Cabuca Calequisse Canchungo Binar Mansôa ns Ma B A FAT Á Encheia R. Bambadinca Safim Nhacra Galomaro Porto Gole Caió a Xime ô s BIOMBO Gêb n Rio a I. de a Ché Ché M Jeta Bissau Dulombi Béli Ilha de o Quinhámel i Enxudé Pecixe R Prábis BISSAU Koumbia ATLANTIC Iljante Fulacunda R
Tite . l Vendu Leidi C a Boé a o Xitole b b ru u ê bal r G o OCEAN d o C C a n a l . QUINAR A R Buba Ilha de Kambéra Féfiné Caravela Bolama I. de Ponta I. de Maio I. de Bolama e Dabalaré nd ra Caravela G a lha de Ilha de o ub Empada Quebo Abu I. das i B Carache Formosa R e Galhinas d n R o . a g Balan o B O L AMA K I. de Enu I. de Soga Madina de G UINE A I. de Baixo li Arquipélago dos Bijagós ba Bedanda Rubane m I. de Uracane o Bubaque .T Catió I. de Unhocomo Ilha de R Kandiafara Ilha de o Bubaque Tombali h Uno in Uno z I. de T OMB A L I o Ilha de om Canogo oc Roxa Sangonha nh Eticoga National capital I. de U I. de Ilha de Ilha de Meneque Orangozinho Cacine Sansalé Orango Regional capital e in IIlha I. de Melo c Town, village a Campeane I. dos Cavalos Joao Vieira C
o Airport Ilhéu i R do Meio Boke i GUINEA-BISSAU International boundary n Dobali o ^ p
Iles m Regional boundary
o
Tristao K
o
i Main road 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 km R Secondary road 0 10 20 30 UN PHOTO/CIA PAK whose constitutionally mandated term of office ended on 23 June 2019, no elected president has ever completed a term of office – an indicator of the gravity of the country’s political instability. This article examines the lingering political crisis that erupted in August 2015 within the leadership cadre of the country’s governing elites, following the dismissal of Prime Minister (PM) Domingos Simões Pereira by President Vaz and the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) sustained efforts to foster peace, political stability and harmonious relationships among the country’s governing members. It concludes by noting that although ECOWAS and friends of Guinea-Bissau have a responsibility to assist the country in finding enduring solutions to its political and institutional crises, the primary responsibility rests with the country’s political and military leaders and their resolve to collectively act in the best interest of the country.
The dismissal of Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira by President Vaz in August 2015 triggered a political crisis in Guinea-Bissau.
4 I conflict trends SIA KAMBOU/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
In September 2015 the Supreme Court ruled that Baciro Djá’s appointment to Prime Minister, by President Vaz, was unconstitutional.
Political Crisis under President Vaz and Efforts to The crisis then assumed a scale that necessitated Broker Peace by ECOWAS ECOWAS’s intervention. Guinea-Bissau returned to constitutional order in 2014, On 21 August 2015, in his capacity as chairperson of the following years of political fragility occasioned by military ECOWAS Regional Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau, President coups and political assassinations, with the election Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria appointed former Nigerian of Vaz as president. Pereira was appointed PM by the president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as special envoy, mandated president. Both individuals belonged to the Party for the to engage the disputing parties to work out a solution to the Independence for Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), a party crisis. Between 14 and 18 September 2015, following the that has dominated the political landscape of the country Supreme Court’s pronouncement, Obasanjo visited Bissau since its formation in 1956. But the relationship between and his mediation efforts yielded the appointment of Carlos Vaz and Pereira deteriorated, leading to renewed political Correia as PM. In forming his government, on 2 October 2015 and institutional crises. Since assuming the presidency Correia submitted a list of cabinet nominees to Vaz, which and the holding of parliamentary elections on 10 March included Pereira. The president rejected the proposed cabinet, 2019, Vaz has worked with seven PMs3 – an indicator of thus triggering another round of crises that necessitated a the degree of political instability that characterises his second mediation mission by Obasanjo to Bissau, from 9 to administration. On 12 August 2015, Pereira – who doubled 11 October 2015, to hold further negotiations with key actors, as leader of the ruling party – was dismissed as PM by the with the specific focus on negotiating a list of cabinet ministers. president over what appears to be a personality clash.4 Following Pereira’s dismissal, the president requested PAIGC to nominate a replacement, but the party presented GUINEA-BISSAU RETURNED TO CONSTI- Pereira again and insisted that in accordance with its statute, TUTIONAL ORDER IN 2014, FOLLOWING the party leader is to be appointed PM. The nomination was rejected by the president; instead, he appointed the YEARS OF POLITICAL FRAGILITY OCCA- third vice president of PAIGC, Baciro Djá, thus triggering SIONED BY MILITARY COUPS AND a series of political crises, with PAIGC approaching the Supreme Court for adjudication. On 8 September 2015, the POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS, WITH THE Supreme Court ruled Djá’s appointment unconstitutional.5 ELECTION OF VAZ AS PRESIDENT
conflict trends I 5 UN PHOTO/MARK GARTEN
In 2015, ECOWAS appointed former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, as special envoy, mandated to engage the disputing parties to work out a solution to the crisis in Guinea-Bissau.
Consensus was reached on the list, which then excluded extended the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) – Pereira. With the new cabinet formed, the 2016 budget and which has played a stabilising role, despite the infighting programme were presented to parliament for ratification – among political actors – by one year. but in a new twist of events, 15 members of parliament Pursuant to the directives of the Authority, a ministerial (MPs) from the PAIGC, perceived to be loyal to the president, delegation comprising the ministers of foreign affairs of attempted blockage of its passage. With this action, the 15 Liberia and Sierra Leone, the minister of state and secretary MPs were expelled from the PAIGC by the party’s leadership, general of the presidency of the Republic of Guinea, and thus re-igniting hostilities and putting the country’s fledgling the president of the ECOWAS Commission, were in Bissau democracy in serious jeopardy. On 10 February 2016, Obasanjo from 7 to 8 September 2016 to hold initial consultations embarked on a third mission to seek a political solution to with political stakeholders. This lead to the adoption of the crisis. This was followed by a fourth mission on 2 May a six-point roadmap for the resolution of the conflict. 2016, to renew earlier attempts at resolution of the crisis. Vaz On 10 September 2016, a presidential mission – comprising dismissed Correia and reappointed Djá as PM on 27 May 2016. President Alpha Conde of Guinea and ECOWAS mediator The appointment was rejected by the leadership of the PAIGC, for Guinea-Bissau and President Ernest Bai Koroma of thus deepening the crisis. Sierra Leone – joined the mission. From 11 to 14 October With growing political hostility having a negative impact on 2016, Conde hosted Bissau-Guinean political stakeholders, governance, ECOWAS, at its 49th Ordinary Summit of Authority including representatives of religious groups and civil of Heads of State and Government on 4 June 2016, “urged society organisations, in a four-day political dialogue in all political stakeholders to engage in dialogue with a view to Conakry, Guinea, resulting in the signing of the Conakry resolving the crisis and commended the professionalism of Accord of 14 October 2016.8 the army for not involving itself in the political impasse and encouraged it to continue in that direction.”6 The summit Monitoring the Implementation of the Accord “designated a Presidential Mission comprising Guinea, The Conakry Accord provided for: Senegal and Sierra Leone to meet and conduct discussions 1. consensus on the choice of a PM who has the confidence with those involved in the political crisis… in order to better of the president of the republic. The PM should be in office assess the current political situation.”7 The summit equally until the 2018 legislative elections;
6 I conflict trends 2. the formation of an inclusive government, based on IV. new political party law, including public funding of an organogram agreed upon by all political parties political parties on the basis of their representation in the National Assembly, in line with the principle of in the National Assembly, V. defence, security and justice sector reform, and proportional representation; VI. implementation of a development programme in 3. the possibility of appointing independent prominent line with vision “Terra Ranka”9; figures and civil society leaders to the inclusive 7. ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), the Community of government; Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the United 4. the inclusive government to implement a programme Nations (UN) and the European Union’s (EU) support for prepared by a national roundtable dialogue within the development, implementation and monitoring of 30 days following the appointment of the PM; the stability pact, in particular through the provision of 5. compliance with the existing principle for the appointment high-level expertise as well as other substantial financial of senior officials of the republic; resources and logistics; 6. preparation and adoption, by the national roundtable 8. establishment of a three-level monitoring and evaluation dialogue, of a stability pact signed by key political framework to ensure the stability of the process: and social stakeholders, and structured around the • at the level of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, principles of: • at the level of the ECOWAS Commission, in conjunction I. accountability and transparency in institutional with international partners, and decision-making, • at the level of the mediator, who will report to the II. constitutional reform aimed at establishing stable ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government; relations between the executive, the legislative and 9. constitutional reform, which will be conducted as part of the judiciary, a nationwide consultation, taking into account existing III. reform of the electoral law for the organisation of review structures. ECOWAS and the UN will provide high- legislative and local elections in 2018, level constitutional experts; and ALFA BALDE/AFP/GETTYIMAGES
ECOWAS extended the mandate of the ECOWAS Mission for Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) at its Summit meeting in June 2017.
conflict trends I 7 10. the unconditional reintegration of the 15 radical MPs into sanctions against all those who obstructed the smooth PAIGC, albeit in consonance with existing texts10 within implementation of the accord, if warranted. It once again PAIGC. commended the army on its non-interference in the political impasse, urging it to continue in the like manner.14 All parties that signed the accord undertook to work By October 2017, it was apparent that the stakeholders had in good faith towards its successful implementation, but again failed to reach an agreement on a consensus PM. this was far from the reality, as its implementation became The Ministerial Monitoring Committee embarked on a mission ensnared in controversy over the choice of a consensus PM – to Bissau from 2–3 December 2017 to assess the situation once the first item on the accord. Another controversy that again. The committee submitted its report to the 52nd Summit militated against the smooth implementation was the of Authority of Heads of States and Government meeting meaning of the text in the content of the Conakry Accord in Abuja, Nigeria on 16 December 2017. At this summit, the translated into Portuguese, which was later seen to be Authority bemoaned the lack of progress in the implementation inconsistent with the original French language used in of the Conakry Accord and consequently entrusted Conde, the drafting the accord. The president had appointed Umaro ECOWAS mediator for Guinea-Bissau, and President Faure Embaló Sissoco as new PM on 18 November 2016, but this Essozimna Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo and chairperson was objected by the PAIGC, claiming a lack of consensus on of the ECOWAS Authority with the responsibility of holding his candidacy. With sustained opposition to the appointment talks with all Bissau-Guinean stakeholders within a month to of Sissoco by the leadership of the PAIGC and the increasing resolve the impasse, failing which individual and collective breakdown of trust necessary for implementing the accord, sanctions would be imposed on all those who obstructed the ECOWAS, at its 50th Ordinary Summit of the Authority implementation of the accord. The summit thereafter called of Heads of State and Government held in Abuja on on the international community – notably the UN, AU and 17 December 2016, emphasised the importance of dialogue all sub-regional organisations – to support ECOWAS in the and reaffirmed its deep concern over the protracted crisis, application of the sanctions.15 In response to the directive of urging Vaz and all parties to comply with the explicit contents 11 of the Conakry Accord. For a second time, the Authority UN PHOTO/CIA PAK commended the non-interference of the army in the political crisis and strongly urged it to continue in the like manner, while reiterating the planned withdrawal of ECOMIB, effective 30 June 2017.12 ECOMIB’s withdrawal would lead to the deterioration of security, yet the political actors were unperturbed and remained stuck in their positions. The leadership and MPs of PAIGC sustained its opposition to the appointment of Sissoco, whilst the group of 15 expelled MPs from PAIGC, in alliance with the Party for Social Renewal (PRS) (the main opposition party), backed his appointment.13 Against the backdrop of possible complete government breakdown, the ECOWAS Council of Ministers Monitoring Committee on the Accord embarked on a mission to Bissau from 23 to 24 April 2017 to assess the situation and report back to the Authority. After wide consultations, the delegation urged all stakeholders to act in good faith in seeking to strictly implement the Conakry Accord, with the appointment of a PM with the consensus of all stakeholders within 30 days – the failure of which would result in a recommendation to the Authority to consider the adoption of sanctions targeting individuals and entities obstructing strict compliance with the accord. The ultimatum elapsed, with stakeholders unable to agree on a consensus PM. Mindful of the dire security implications of withdrawing ECOMIB, and to give another opportunity for the Bissau- Guinean political stakeholders to hold direct talks, especially on the appointment of a consensus PM, the ECOWAS President Vaz appointed Umaro Embaló Sissoco as the Authority, at its Summit of 4 June 2017 in Liberia, extended new Prime Minister on 18 November 2016 but this was the mandate of ECOMIB for three months – and, for the objected by the PAIGC, claiming a lack of consensus on first time, affirmed its determination to institute targeted his candidacy.
8 I conflict trends UN PHOTO/LOEY FELIPE
On 17 April 2018 President Vaz announced the appointment of Aristides Gomes as the consensus Prime Minister. the Authority, on 30 January 2018, Vaz appointed Augusto Due to logistical and financial challenges, the elections were Artur Da Silva as PM, but this appointment was again rejected pushed further and held on 10 March 2019, with support from by the leadership of the PAIGC, claiming lack of consultation ECOWAS and other partners. and consensus. On 27 January 2018, during the 30th Ordinary Summit Political Realignments and the Re-enactment of an Old of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of Order the African Union in Ethiopia, the ECOWAS Heads of In the lead-up to the parliamentary elections on 10 March States and Government held a meeting to review political 2019, there were alignments and realignments, with the group developments in Guinea-Bissau. Noting the failure of 15 expelled MPs from the PAIGC forming a new political by Vaz to appoint a PM who had the consensus of all party, the Movement for a Democratic Alternative G-15 stakeholders, they dispatched the Ministerial Monitoring (MADEM G.15). Twenty-one political parties contested the 102 Committee to Guinea-Bissau from 31 January to parliamentary seats, with the PAIGC securing 47, MADEM G.15 1 February 2018 to hold further consultations with political with 27, Party for Social Renewal (PRS) with 21, Assembly of stakeholders. The delegation noted the failure by the the People United (APU-PDGB) with 5, New Democratic Party leadership of Guinea-Bissau to appoint a consensus PM. (PND) with 1 and Union for Change (UM) with 1. Although the Acting on the report of the committee, the ECOWAS PAIGC lost 10 seats, costing it an absolute majority, a post- Commission announced the imposition of individual and election negotiated pact with the APU-PDGB, PND and UM collective sanctions, effective from 1 February 2018, on all gave the PAIGC-led coalition a six-seat majority in parliament. persons or organisations hampering the process to end the The new parliament was inaugurated on 18 April crisis.16 With sanctions in full effect and taking their toll on the 2019, with the PAIGC-led coalition expected to form a new affected individuals, consultations between the Guinea-Bissau government. A power tussle between the PAIGC-led coalition leadership and all relevant stakeholders to the crisis intensified. and the MADEM G.15/PRS parties over the composition of In an Extraordinary Summit of 14 April 2018, Vaz informed the Bureau of the Parliament – the organ responsible for the ECOWAS Authority on the possibility of finally having a managing parliamentary affairs – became a new source of consensus PM in a few days. On 17 April 2018, by presidential conflict, stalling the prompt formation of the government.17 decree, the appointment of Aristides Gomes as consensus In a swift response to the stalemate, on 30 April 2019, an PM was announced. Parliament was reopened on 19 April ECOWAS ministerial delegation comprising Nigeria’s 2018, with parliamentary elections set for 18 November 2018. foreign affairs minister, Geoffrey Onyeama; minister of state The lifespan of the parliament was extended to accommodate and secretary-general of the presidency of the Republic of the new date, following which the election management Guinea, Naby Bangoura; and the president of the ECOWAS body was constituted to organise the scheduled elections. Commission, Jean-Claude Kassi Brou, visited Guinea-Bissau
conflict trends I 9 SEYLLOU/AFP/GETTY IMAGE
An electoral worker holds up a parliamentary election voting form at a polling station in Bissau (10 March 2019).
to hold consultations with the various stakeholders, including Ordinary Session held in Abuja, Nigeria on 29 June 2019, took Vaz, Gomes, the president of the National People’s Assembly, far-reaching decisions towards the resolution of the impasse, Cipriano Cassama and the various groups represented in the which includes amongst others; parliament. Noting that an impasse was not unexpected in • President Vaz to sign the decree of nomination of the parliament, the political actors were urged to finalise the government before 3 July 2019, on the basis of the composition and installation of the Bureau of Parliament in proposition made by the Prime Minister, conformity with the outcome of the elections as expressed • the government will, amongst other things, engage in by the people, while reiterating the readiness of ECOWAS the preparation of the presidential election to be held on to support the government to be formed in resolving the 24 November 2019, protracted crisis and restoring peace and development to the • a new Attorney-General to be nominated on the basis of country.18 consensus before 3 July 2019 and, On 17 June 2019 President Vaz requested PAIGC’s • President Vaz to stay in office until the next presidential nomination for the position of Prime Minister and the party election while government affairs will be fully conducted by submitted the name of its leader, Domingos Pereira. Vaz the newly-formed government in line with the Guinea Bissau rejected this and asked the party for another nominee. constitution.19 The disputing parties held on to their positions prompting a second visit to Bissau by the ECOWAS Ministerial A new government was formed on 3 July 2019 with the Monitoring Committee on 19 June 2019. In the course of exception of the appointment of a new Attorney-General which their consultations with President Vaz and other political remains a source of dispute among the political stakeholders. stakeholders, the Ministerial Committee again expressed There also remains disagreement over the constitution of the concerns over the climate of political uncertainty in the country Bureau of Parliament. and urged all political actors to engage in inclusive dialogue aimed at resolving the impasse, with the appointment of Conclusion a Prime Minister on or before 23 June 2019 (the last day of The ECOWAS Authority affirmed its confidence in the the constitutional term of office for President Vaz). On 23 Conakry Accord as a solution to the prolonged political and June 2019 Vaz announced the reappointment of Aristides institutional crisis in Guinea-Bissau, and urged all stakeholders Gomes as Prime Minister. Taking into account the end of to strictly respect and comply with the contents of the accord.20 tenure for President Vaz on 23 June 2019, the absence of a The UNSC reiterated the same.21 Full implementation of the new government, and on the basis of the consensus reached accord for the most part of the last three years was stalled by political stakeholders, the ECOWAS Authority, at its 55th over disagreement on the appointment of a consensus PM –
10 I conflict trends the first item in the agreement. A consensus PM was eventually 5 BBC News (2015) ‘Guinea-Bissau’s “unconstitutional” PM Baciro Dja resigns’, 9 September, Available at:
conflict trends I 11
OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM IN THE NIGER C H A D NIGER Sokoto Lake Chad u to Komadug ko SOKOTO Katsina o ana DELTA: NEED, GREED AND GRIEVANCE S G u g KATSINA u N ejia ad ig Birnin ad Kom e H N'Djamena r Zamf B O R N O Kebbi ara S Gusau o JIGAWA k Y O B E o Kano ZAMFARA t Maiduguri FACTORS o m Damaturu Gulbin Dutse ra Ka e ds KANO Ye K EBBI
la AL CHUKWUMA OKOLI Zaria o BY g n o Kainj KADUNA B A U C H I G Maroua Reservoir Kaduna K Bauchi GOMBE BENIN a d
REUTERS/AKINTUNDE AKINLEYE u Gombe NIGERIA na Jos
Kajama Minna ADAMAWA Garoua é CHAD Nig P L ATEAU Bénou KWARA er Abuja Jalingo Yola ABUJA CAPITAL Q NASSARAWA NIGERIA u TERRITORY é m Ilorin
é Lafia O Y O Niger Delta Ogbomosho T ARABA Benue Lokaja EKITI Oshogbo Ibadan Ado-Ekiti K OGI Makurdi Ife BENUE OSUN Akure r
e
g Abeokuta ONDO i National capital N OGUN State capital A ENUGU E D O N Ikeja TTown,own, villagevillage L A Enugu LAGOS Benin City Abakaliki a M Major airairportport g am Porto- B b o Asaba M International boundary Novo s R Awka EBONY Lake International boundary a A Bamendjing h State boundarboundaryy C.A.R. Bight of Benin nits CROSS O IMO HighwHighwayay DELTA ABIA RIVERS NIGER DELTA Owerri Umuahia Bafoussam Main road CAMEROON SecondarRailroad y road Aba a RIVERS Calabar Nikongsamba nag Railroad N Uyo Sa0 50 100 150 200 km Gulf of Guinea i Yenagoa g Port AKWA e Kumba 0 50 100 150 200 km r BAYELSA Harcourt IBOM 0 50 100 mi D e 0 50 100 mi l ta Bight of Biafra Douala
Introduction as a centre for the primitive accumulation of wealth as well This article examines the basis of petroleum pipeline as a platform for petro-rentier crimes. Within this sector, vandalism in the Niger Delta, against the backdrop of petroleum rents have been the object of an opportunistic the high prevalence and incidences of such events in the scramble by corrupt political elites and their counterparts. region in recent years. Nigeria is an oil-endowed state and In effect, the significance of oil wealth in Nigeria has been an example of a petro-dependent economy. Oil wealth and contradictory: it has been a blessing as well as a curse, by petroleum resources account for about 75% of Nigeria’s generating both revenue and criminality. This seeming foreign exchange earnings.1 The petroleum sector is thus, paradox resonates with the “resource-curse” thesis – which justifiably, the mainstay of the economy.
Although the petroleum sector has rightly been the Above: Nigeria is an oil-endowed state and an example of backbone of Nigeria’s economy, it has paradoxically doubled a petro-dependent economy.
12 I conflict trends
OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM IN THE NIGER C H A D NIGER Sokoto Lake Chad u to Komadug ko SOKOTO Katsina o ana DELTA: NEED, GREED AND GRIEVANCE S G u g KATSINA u N ejia ad ig Birnin ad Kom e H N'Djamena r Zamf B O R N O Kebbi ara S Gusau o JIGAWA k Y O B E o Kano ZAMFARA t Maiduguri FACTORS o m Damaturu Gulbin Dutse ra Ka e ds KANO Ye K EBBI
la o Zaria g n o Kainj KADUNA B A U C H I G Maroua Reservoir Kaduna K Bauchi GOMBE BENIN a d u Gombe NIGERIA na Jos
Kajama Minna ADAMAWA Garoua é CHAD Nig P L ATEAU Bénou KWARA er Abuja Jalingo Yola ABUJA CAPITAL Q NASSARAWA NIGERIA u TERRITORY é m Ilorin
é Lafia O Y O Niger Delta Ogbomosho T ARABA Benue Lokaja EKITI Oshogbo Ibadan Ado-Ekiti K OGI Makurdi Ife BENUE OSUN Akure r
e
g Abeokuta ONDO i National capital N OGUN State capital A ENUGU E D O N Ikeja TTown,own, villagevillage L A Enugu LAGOS Benin City Abakaliki a M Major airairportport g am Porto- B b o Asaba M International boundary Novo s R Awka EBONY Lake International boundary a A Bamendjing h State boundarboundaryy C.A.R. Bight of Benin nits CROSS O IMO HighwHighwayay DELTA ABIA RIVERS NIGER DELTA Owerri Umuahia Bafoussam Main road CAMEROON SecondarRailroad y road Aba a RIVERS Calabar Nikongsamba nag Railroad N Uyo Sa0 50 100 150 200 km Gulf of Guinea i Yenagoa g Port AKWA e Kumba 0 50 100 150 200 km r BAYELSA Harcourt IBOM 0 50 100 mi D e 0 50 100 mi l ta Bight of Biafra Douala
holds, among other things, that oil-rich nations have the concentrated on the political economy of organised crime tendency to squander their development prospects through and violence, with disproportionate emphasis on how the the abuse or mismanagement of their oil wealth.2 factors of “greed” and “grievance” provide impetus for the Over the years, the Nigerian petroleum sector has crimes. Beyond refreshing the aforementioned perspectives, presented many petro-rentier problems: corruption, armed this article adds the variable of “need” in an attempt to criminality, violence, and so on. A critical dimension of proffer a more robust and comprehensive account of the manifestation of the petro-rentier problem in Nigeria’s petroleum pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta. Thus, based oil industry is the phenomenon of petroleum pipeline on the factors of “need”, “greed” and “grievance”, this vandalism – the wilful and malicious destruction of oil and article provides a socio-structural analysis of the oil pipeline gas pipelines for economic, political or idiosyncratic reasons. challenge. The article is a by-product of the author’s doctoral Incidences of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria research, undertaken in 2015-2016, on oil pipeline vandalism have spiralled over the years. By way of example, such in select communities of the Niger Delta.5 What is reported occurrences surged from 57 incidents in 1998 to over 2 500 in this article derives substantively from the outcome of incidents in 2008.3 This is rather ominous, considering the the study. primacy of the petroleum sector vis-a-vis the sustenance of the Nigerian economy. The alarming occurrence and Conceptualising Petroleum Pipeline Vandalism trajectory of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has Petroleum pipeline vandalism has to do with the caught the attention of scholars and policymakers. There violation of the safety and functional integrity of a petroleum now exist many scholarly and policy-based studies on the pipeline for political, economic or idiosyncratic reasons. various aspects of this subject.4 This principally takes the form of sabotage, motivated by Nonetheless, most of the insights into petroleum pipeline political reasons, or theft, motivated by economic need. vandalism in Nigeria has been inadequate in proffering a Petroleum pipeline vandalism could also be informed by rigorous interrogation of the socio-structural basis of the accidental occurrences, such as reckless agricultural or phenomenon. What is more, the existing works have overtly construction activities. The target of petroleum pipeline
conflict trends I 13 REUTERS/AKINTUNDE AKINLEYE
Firefighters work near the shore of a lagoon after vandals hacked into an oil pipeline to siphon fuel at Ilado village, on the outskirts Lagos (2013).
vandalism can be any aspect of the pipeline hardware or the OIL THEFT REFERS TO THE ACT OF product(s) that it carries. Essentially, oil pipeline vandalism HACKING INTO PIPELINES WITH THE has been associated with two important motivations: theft and sabotage. INTENT TO STEAL PRODUCT(S) THEREOF, Oil theft refers to the act of hacking into pipelines with the EITHER FOR SALE OR PERSONAL USE intent to steal product(s) thereof, either for sale or personal use. Oil theft involves the stealing of crude oil and its derivatives from pipelines through a variety of mechanisms, the structural theory holds that crime is a creation of including illegal “bunkering” and fuel pilfering.6 Oil sabotage society and that people tend to take to crime principally has been motivated by malicious intent, often associated as a consequence of existential conditions, which make with industrial uprising, militancy and terrorism, and can criminal living not only attractive but also compelling.7 be physical or technical. Oil sabotage is physical when the The structural materialism of crime is thus hinged on the prime targets are the critical physical components of the oil understanding that “the structure matters”. This is to and gas infrastructure. On the other hand, it is mechanical the extent that the structural underpinnings of a society when it involves damaging non-physical components of determine both the character and dynamics of such a the infrastructure, such as digital and cyber resources. society. Hence, the problem of petroleum pipeline vandalism The incidences of pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta is fundamentally structural, both in origin and essence. typify physical and structural sabotage of the petroleum The factors that are responsible for the phenomenon infrastructure. are rooted in the socio-structural foundations of society, especially the material conditions of the people, the state of Theoretical Premise: Structural Materialism the economy, and the socio-economic imperatives that arise. The incidences of petroleum pipeline vandalism can Poverty in Nigeria creates a material pretext and best be understood and explicated using the general incentive for survival or “need”-based criminality. This is structural paradigm of crime. Propounded by criminologists, evident in the prevalence of corruption and opportunistic
14 I conflict trends
REUTERS/AKINTUNDE AKINLEYE
A signboard campaigning against oil pipeline vandalism is seen along a road in Yenagoa, Nigeria.
living in the country. The spiralling unemployment rate in petroleum resources. The scenario creates a vicious cycle of the country has added a dire complication to the situation, criminality and violence. and the aforementioned situations fester within the operational environment of a petro-rentier state system. Oil Pipeline Vandalism in the Niger Delta and Need, A petro-rentier state is one that is mischaracterised by an Greed and Grievance overdeveloped petroleum economy, which reproduces “a The Need Factor: The social conditions of the Niger Delta dynamic crowded political economy”, driving “competition present a context and pretext for oil-related crimes, among for looted resources”.8 Embedded in this state system are which is petroleum vandalism. The region is characterised sundry anomalies such as oil piracy, pipeline vandalism, oil by high levels of poverty. There is a high prevalence of bunkering and the illicit refining of petrol. material destitution, and basic amenities – such as potable The tragedy of Nigeria’s petro-state syndrome is a crisis water, schools and electricity – barely exist. The incidences of unearned income. There is a fraught, intensive struggle of environmental degradation arising from oil pollution have for the acquisition and appropriation of petro-dollars among exacerbated the situation by making it almost impossible for the people. The battle is desperate and opportunistic. rural dwellers to engage in sustainable farming and fishing, In the absence of mediating state mechanisms to moderate which used to be their traditional mainstay. Furthermore, this, what prevails is a wild race for the plundering of the occurrence of armed militancy in the region has created more insecurity, which impedes rural productivity and sustainable livelihoods. This aggravated insecurity in the Niger Delta is THERE IS A HIGH PREVALENCE OF exemplified in high rates of illiteracy, unemployment, poverty MATERIAL DESTITUTION, AND BASIC and livelihood failures. This scenario inescapably drives a AMENITIES – SUCH AS POTABLE desperate struggle for survival. The desperation is such that even criminal opportunities are explored in a bid to survive. WATER, SCHOOLS AND ELECTRICITY – Thus, the “need” factor in petroleum pipeline vandalism BARELY EXIST refers to the imperative of material subsistence and survival.
conflict trends I 15 The field research underlying this article revealed that a The Greed Factor: The greed factor refers to the number of people in the Niger Delta who took to oil pipeline inordinate ambition of individuals to accumulate and amass vandalism did so as a means of ensuring survival in adverse wealth. This accumulative tendency is driven by crass socio-economic conditions. Some youth who are involved in materialism and ostentatious living. With a high premium placed on material aggrandisement in Nigeria, some people petty vandalism in the area are unemployed and, therefore, are inclined to take to crime – such as oil pipeline vandalism – susceptible to opportunistic living. They took to petroleum in a bid to further their accumulation of wealth. The outcome pipeline vandalism as a means to an end. As a key informant of the field research showed that organised vandalism was stated: “…[W]e have learned to resort to self-help strategies perpetrated by the rich. The use of sophisticated hardware – in order to survive; our boys take to the act [pipeline such as barges, sea boats, road tankers, hoses, and so vandalism] to make ends meet.”9 on, which could not easily be afforded by the poor – is an The need factor is certainly plausible in explaining acts indicator that organised petro-pipeline vandalism is an elitist of petty vandalism in the Niger Delta. It is, however, quite venture, too. naive to assume that only the poor and needy indulge in oil The field study also discovered a new and arcane pipeline vandalism. This brings us to the issue of greed as a pattern of petro-pipeline vandalism – that is, vandalism critical driver of petro-pipeline vandalism. motivated by the quest for compensation and clean-up.10 Often, the oil multinationals award monetary compensation for environmental damage engendered by incidents of oil pollution and/or spillage. They also award “clean-up THE FIELD STUDY ALSO DISCOVERED contracts” in the aftermath of such occurrences to restore A NEW AND ARCANE PATTERN OF the ecological safety of the areas affected by oil pollution. PETRO-PIPELINE VANDALISM – THAT IS, In view of this, disgruntled actors in Niger Delta communities have often connived with some criminal elements in the VANDALISM MOTIVATED BY THE QUEST oil and gas industry to instigate pipeline vandalism for FOR COMPENSATION AND CLEAN-UP the purpose of prospecting monetary rewards in terms REUTERS/AKINTUNDE AKINLEYE
Poverty in the Niger Delta creates the material incentive for survival or “need”-based criminality.
16 I conflict trends of ecological damage compensation or clean-up contract been influenced by survivalist and/or accumulative concerns awards. This is an emerging practice that has added a new disguised otherwise. dimension to the challenge of pipeline vandalism. Contemporary trajectories of petroleum pipeline The Grievance Factor: Grievance explains the pattern of vandalism in the Niger Delta indicate that the phenomenon pipeline vandalism that is motivated by collective agitation is becoming a flourishing economic crime. What is at issue in the context of militancy. In this regard, oil pipeline is the scramble for petro-dollars though illicit means. So, vandalism is an avenue for expressing grievances against while the kingpins indulge in organised oil theft via pipeline the perceptibly hostile and indifferent Nigerian state and the vandalism (oil bunkering) – often in collusion with elements oil multinationals. The field study confirmed the prevalence of public security agencies and multinational oil companies – of this pattern of pipeline vandalism, particularly during the petty vandals engage in the rudimentary breaking of the critical era of the Niger Delta crisis (1998/99–2009). pipelines to pilfer products. Of all the factors highlighted Driven by populist grievances against the state and the oil here as drivers of pipeline vandalism, the most salient is companies over resource equity, militants in the Niger Delta economic motivation. The need-greed-grievance schema of took up arms and damaged pipelines and allied petroleum petro-pipeline vandalism is illustrated in Figure 1. infrastructure. This scenario came to a head in the late 2000s, when oil production in the Niger Delta was almost grounded following the relentless destruction of petroleum THIS SCENARIO CAME TO A HEAD IN infrastructure in the area. The exigencies of this situation forced the federal government of Nigeria into a sort of peace THE LATE 2000s, WHEN OIL PRODUCTION bargain with the irate militants – a deal that morphed into IN THE NIGER DELTA WAS ALMOST 11 the Amnesty Programme. It must be pointed out that some GROUNDED FOLLOWING THE RELENTLESS militants involved in petro-pipeline vandalism were driven by motivations other than concerns for resistance or self- DESTRUCTION OF PETROLEUM INFRA- determination. In fact, a good number of them could have STRUCTURE IN THE AREA REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE
Grievance explains the pattern of pipeline vandalism that is motivated by collective agitation in the context of militancy.
conflict trends I 17 GETTY IMAGES/PIUS UTOMI EKPEI
Driven by populist grievances against the state and the oil companies over resource equity, militants in the Niger Delta took up arms and damaged pipelines and petroleum infrastructure.
Figure 1 shows that the need factor (innermost circle) Nigeria’s petroleum sector has been a veritable arena constitutes the most basic driver of pipeline vandalism. for petro-rentier violence and criminality. Over the years, This is followed by the greed factor (middle circle), which criminals, militants and state agents have abused the sector is intermediary, and the grievance factor in the outer- through systematic plundering and/or physical sabotage. most circle. There have been massive oil thefts as well as infrastructural Need vandalism, leading to enormous development costs. The phenomenon of pipeline vandalism is at the core of Greed this systemic abuse. Underpinning the phenomenon of petro-pipeline vandalism is an underworld political economy based on the illicit exploitation of oil resources. As Katsouris Grievance and Sayne12 rightly observe: Nigerian crude oil is being stolen on an industrial scale…– it is not entirely clear how much is exported. Proceeds are then laundered through world financial centres and used to buy estates in Nigeria and abroad. In Nigeria, politicians, government security forces, militants, oil industry personnel, oil traders and community members benefit to varying degrees along with organized criminal networks.
NIGERIA’S PETROLEUM SECTOR HAS
Figure 1: Need-greed-grievance factors in Niger Delta BEEN A VERITABLE ARENA FOR PETRO- pipeline vandalism RENTIER VIOLENCE AND CRIMINALITY
18 I conflict trends Hence, in its apparent dynamics of systemic degenera- Dr Al Chukwuma Okoli is a Lecturer in Political tion, the Nigerian petroleum sector has presented a veritable Science at the Federal University Lafia in Nigeria, context for rentier politics and crime. The petro-rentier where he is also the Coordinator of the Peace challenge is sustained and reproduced by the prevailing Studies and Conflict Resolution Programme. culture of criminal opportunism, impunity and indulgence. Pipeline vandalism represents only one of the most critical dimensions of this systemic problem. Endnotes 1 Okoli, Al Chukwuma (2016) Petroleum Pipeline Vandalism and WHAT IS COMMON ACROSS ALL THESE National Security in Nigeria, 2001–2012. PhD thesis submitted to the School of Post-graduate Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, PATTERNS OF PETROLEUM PIPELINE Kaduna, p. 1. VANDALISM IS THAT EACH OF THEM 2 Ibeanu, Okechukwu (2009) Oil, Environment and Conflict in Coastal Zone of West Africa (1–34). In Ibeanu, Okechukwu and IS DRIVEN BY A SOCIO-EXISTENTIAL Ibrahim, Jibrin (eds) Beyond Resource Violence. Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD). IMPERATIVE 3 Okoli, Al Chukwuma (2016) op. cit. pp. 112–113. 4 See Ekwo, Unite (2011) Collaboration-based Management of Petroleum Pipeline Rights of Way in Nigeria. PhD thesis Conclusion submitted to the School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape, Since its advent in the 1970s, the petroleum sector Newcastle University, United Kingdom; and Evoh, Chijioke (2009) has predominantly sustained the Nigerian economy. Green Crimes, Petro-violence and the Tragedy of Oil: The Case of the Niger-Delta in Nigeria. In-Spire Journal of Law, Politics and The sector has also been a centre for petro-rentier politics Society, 4 (1), pp. 40–60. and corruption – more specifically crime and violence, 5 Okoli, Al Chukwuma (2016) op. cit. including oil theft sabotage and pipeline vandalism. 6 Odalonu, Boris (2015) The Upsurge of Oil Theft and Illegal This article examined the phenomenon of petroleum Bunkering in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Is There Any Way pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta from a socio- Out? Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6 (3), pp. 363–573. structural perspective that focuses on the factors of need, 7 Alemika, Etannibi (ed.) (2013) The Impact of Organized Crime greed and grievance. The article posits that petro-pipeline on Governance in West African. Abuja, Nigeria: Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung, pp. 55–75. vandalism has been variously motivated, depending on the socio-structural dynamics underpinning its occurrence. 8 Katsouris, Christiana and Sayne, Aaron (2013) Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil. The characteristics of the Niger Delta social context have London: Chatham House, p. 1. informed three patterns of petro-pipeline vandalism, 9 Personal communication (field study), Oporoma, Bayelsa State, represented in the “need-greed-grievance” schema. Need- May 2015. based vandalism is driven by the imperative for subsistence 10 Insights from the author’s field study; also corroborated by Asuni, and survival, while greed-based vandalism is associated Judith (2009) Blood Oil in the Niger Delta. Washington, DC: with the quest for primitive accumulation of petro-wealth. United States Institute of Peace. Grievance-based vandalism, on the other hand, refers to 11 The Amnesty Programme is a stabilisation initiative designed to demobilise, demilitarise and reintegrate the youth who were pipeline vandalism as an avenue for the advancement of engaged in the Niger Delta militancy. For specific details, see an environmental justice cause. What is common across all Okoli, Al Chukwuma and David, Nachanaa (2016) Militancy and these patterns of petroleum pipeline vandalism is that each the Dilemma of Petro-rentier Criminality in the Niger Delta. of them is driven by a socio-existential imperative. Whether Online Journal of Arts, Management and Social Sciences, 1 (1), pp. 221–239. it is “need”, “greed” or “grievance”, the implication is that 12 Katsouris, Christiana and Sayne, Aaron (2013) op. cit., p. 1. the cause of any form of pipeline vandalism is essentially embedded in the socio-structural dynamics of its occurrence. The lesson in this respect is that any meaningful endeavour towards mitigating incidences of petro-pipeline vandalism must be predicated on a proper understanding of its structurally dynamic material roots. Such an effort must recognise and prioritise the gamut of organic and often intersecting social, economic, political and idiosyncratic variables that precipitate the occurrence. There is also a need to discourage criminal impunity by ensuring that the cost of indulging in a crime is much higher than its reward.
conflict trends I 19
L . T 24 27 30 a 33 ° ° ° n ° UNITED g Lake a n Rukwa REPUBLIC OF Pweto y ZAMBIA Kaputa i L. Upemba ka L. Mweru TANZANIA International boundary Wantipa Mpulungu Province boundary Lake L bu Mbala u fu Mbeya L Mweru National capital u Nchelenge Mporokoso fi K Province capital ra al un Mwenzo gwis Town, village h i DEMOCRATIC L Main road REPUBLIC Kawambwa U Secondary road OF THE Luwingu Kasama Isoka 10° A i Railroad Kasenga sh CONGO be P am Airport Ch s Kolwezi a Chipili l U n u L. p NOR T H E R N i a L Likasi Lake L Retenue u a L Lu A Bangweulu t Chama Caianda a a l a Mansa n b Mzuzu k a u Lubumbashi Samfya N ze Mayuka be Mwinilunga Lake o e
m
a Kampolombo MOZAMBIQUE M Z Bangweulu M
Swamp Mpika a R
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Lundazi Mutanda g n A
a a a n u g a E
ANGOLA Mufulira w L n b i Chingola l u m h o L L w c a Kitwe Ndola u T NORTH- L u po 13 m Luanshya M A w 13 ° Chavuma o ° b WESTERN
a Serenje S i K Kasempa Lu Zambezi COPPERBELT Chisomo a W ng Chipata u w Kabompo B e Mkushi L b A u Dongwe Mukopa ng Kapiri Mposhi Chadiza I u Busanga MboromaA E Swamp Petauke Lilongwe Lukulu afue R Katete K Lukanga Kabwe Nyimba T L. ts Swamp mfwa Fla nse Malombe Luena Kaoma N Lu Kalabo Mumbwa C E Mongu Chunga Camp Rufunsa Lusaka LUSAKA MOZAMBIQUE afue Chilanga ezi Luangwa Mavua Namwala K mb L. Chilwa WESTERN Kafue Za Lago de Mazabuka Cahora Bassa Kataba 16° Senanga Monze Chirundu 16° Shangombo SOUTHERN Kariba Lake Zam Z Kariba be am Mulobezi ZIMBABWE ze b e Kalomo Choma ZAMBIA z i
Zimba o Sesheke m Sinazongwe Chinhoyi o l a K 0 50 100 150 km Katima Mulilo Livingstone The boundaries and names shown and the designations used NAMIBIA on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 24 27 by the United Nations. 30 33 0 50 100 mi ° BOTSWANA ° ° °
Map No. 3731 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section
APPRAISING INTERGROUP CONTACT IN ZAMBIA’S ELECTORAL POLITICS
BY KABALE IGNATIUS MUKUNTO
Introduction political independence. Political players are no strangers to While senior leaders on both sides of Zambia’s political polarisation, and differences in ideologies or ascension to divide may communicate civilly when faced with differences, leadership positions have culminated in splinter parties. the majority of their rank and file members seldom do What is worrisome is the propensity for violent so. For the latter, the handling of political conflicts is engagements when managing political disagreements, synonymous with violence. The socialisation of the current especially at the lower strata of the Zambian polity. There cohort of political party stalwarts is devoid of peace-oriented is very little effort invested in cultivating an environment mechanisms of dealing with political dissent. Electoral that facilitates collegial contact among political party politics have continued to be characterised by skirmishes, affiliates. Such an environment of contact may also discontent and violence, 54 years after the country’s promote and support mutual understanding, tolerance and
20 I conflict trends
a sense of coexistence. Contact and learning about other as identifying the commonalities and diversities between parties (outgroups) reduce preconceptions and negative the opposing groups. The “confrontational approach” assumptions that drive hostilities, antagonisms and violence emphasises conflict issues and the power relations of the within the polity. Elite interparty interactions, even if on parties. It does not aim at cultivating harmony; instead, it a slighter scale, also ought to permeate all political party attempts to allow participating groups to engage in direct structures horizontally. This article therefore appraises confrontation.3 While of the two approaches the former intergroup contact in light of Zambia’s electoral politics and is preferred and recommended, given its orientation to the emergent violence. promote partnership and cooperation between parties, Zambia’s electoral politics appears to embrace the latter Understanding Intergroup Contact approach. The contact hypothesis theory posits that sustained While electoral politics may be oriented towards the interaction between diverse groups ultimately reduces confrontational model, the coexistence approach parallels prejudice and hostility and promotes friendship.1 It further communication styles from Asia and Africa that merit holds that regular interactions between groups invariably engenders reduced intergroup tensions and conflicts. On the contrary, the isolation of groups fosters the emergence of CONTACT ALSO LEADS TO DISSIPATION negative attitudes, preconceptions and labels.2 Contact also OF THE RIGID POLITICAL BOUNDARIES leads to dissipation of the rigid political boundaries that breed hostility and impede conviviality among political entities THAT BREED HOSTILITY AND IMPEDE and their respective members. There are two dominant CONVIVIALITY AMONG POLITICAL approaches to intergroup contact. The “coexistence ENTITIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE approach” encourages mutual understanding and tolerance to reduce stereotypes and outgroup discrimination, as well MEMBERS GETTY IMAGES
The contact hypothesis theory posits that sustained interaction between diverse groups ultimately reduces prejudice and hostility and promotes friendship.
conflict trends I 21 ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Regular interactions between groups invariably engenders reduced intergroup tensions and conflicts.
mention. Sarwari, for example, argues that the Asian or ameliorated. However, effective intergroup contact is Eastern part of the world practises a high-context style of realised in situations driven by six conditions or factors: communication that stresses politeness and indirectness.4 mutual interdependence; common goal; equal status of Similarly, in Kiswahili, Mtu ni Utu (“a person is humanness”) group members; having informal and interpersonal contact; signifies the value in humanness. Utu highlights forgiveness, multiple contact with members of the outgroup; and social showing compassion and sharing with others. As Njogu norms to promote equality.6 Before delving into these adds, it encourages going beyond “self” to the “other” to get conditions, it is imperative to look at Zambia’s electoral fulfilment.5 Just as language is shaped through interaction, politics and the resulting violence. so is our humanity, and our relationships are continually dialogic. The further we move away from this dialogic Zambia’s Electoral Politics and Violence interaction, the more we are separated from our humanity. A fundamental understanding of electoral politics The point of the high-context communication pattern includes meetings, rallies and campaigns by political and the value of humanness is that despite differences parties for purposes of informing would-be voters about in ideologies, players across the political continuum in their policies and programmes. The ultimate goal is to Zambia can communicate civilly. Africa is endowed with persuade voters to vote for the politicians. Mohapatra and principles that can have a positive bearing on intergroup Bhattacharyya associate electoral politics with the primary or interpersonal contacts within the polity. Thus, political mechanism of citizen mobilisation, and the communication interactions predisposed to violence can steadily be of ideologies and actions behind the process of choosing from among the candidates.7 They add that it is also about paying attention to the integration of voters’ individual JUST AS LANGUAGE IS SHAPED choices into a collective expression. In the case of Zambia, THROUGH INTERACTION, SO IS OUR there is an inextricable link between electoral politics and violence. HUMANITY, AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS Since 2015, the country has continued to witness ARE CONTINUALLY DIALOGIC unprecedented increases in electoral violence. Electoral
22 I conflict trends DAWOOD SALIM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Electoral violence encompasses any intimidation or harassing action that is directly related to the electoral process.
UN PHOTO/LOEY FELIPE violence encompasses any intimidation or harassing action that is directly related to the electoral process. This may be before elections, on polling day or immediately after an election has taken place, often as a result of the announcement of the outcome.8 The events that accompanied the 11 August 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections are aptly captured by this definition. The intensity of electoral violence prior to the elections, and when the results were announced, obligated the incumbent, President Edgar Chagwa Lungu, to constitute a commission of inquiry into electoral violence and voting patterns.9 The commission was instituted in October 2016 and concluded its work on 31 December 2018. The findings of the commission have not yet been made public, but an independent conflict structural vulnerability assessment (SVA) revealed that electoral politics contributed to most of the country’s conflicts. Political party leaders and party members’ inclination to use violence as a means to achieve their goals during electioneering was cited as the thrust.10 This trend has remained, with nearly every local government and/or parliamentary election giving rise to incidences of violence. Examples of Zambia’s electoral President Edgar Lungu of Zambia constituted a violence can be seen in three such cases. commission of inquiry into electoral violence and voting First, the parliamentary by-elections in June 2018 in patterns following the August 2016 presidential election. Chilanga District of Lusaka Province witnessed unmatched
conflict trends I 23 levels of violence. Young political party cadres were • no political party shall import cadres from outside reportedly blocking roads and intimidating people during Chilanga during the campaign period; the filing of nominations by candidates.11 Following the • the carrying of offensive weapons – for example guns, close of voting, when counting of votes was underway, machetes, golf clubs, catapults and knives – during the these members from competing parties allegedly attacked campaign period shall not be tolerated; journalists from several media organisations.12 Perhaps it is • campaign messages shall be issues-based and must critical to highlight here that during the campaigns, some of avoid character assassination; the senior party leaders seemed to have endorsed the violent • the resolutions taken at this meeting must be acts of “their cadres”. For example, two leaders firmly urged disseminated to all members in various political their supporters not to be scared, and to defend themselves parties; and whenever attacked.13 • door-to-door programmes are open to all political From what may be described as an attempt to sanitise parties participating in the elections.15 their past records, the front-runner political parties during the Chilanga violence, the Patriotic Front (PF) party and the Second, despite these commitments, the Lusaka United Party for National Development (UPND), pledged city mayoral by-elections were not devoid of violence. to maintain peace through a joint communique. Signed by For example, it was alleged that PF members attacked party representatives, the police and the district electoral the house of the UPND mayoral candidate, but the officer, the 10-point plan was a commitment to end violence attack was thwarted by his alert security.16 The ECZ’s during future elections in the same district and across the intervention was a firm indicator to participating parties country. Supervised by the Electoral Commission of Zambia of possible disqualification if the Electoral Act was (ECZ) officials, some of the agreements in the communique abrogated. The Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 part that merit mention are:14 VIII under Section 83 (Election Offences), among other DAWOOD SALIM/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Zambian police intervene between supporters of the main Zambian opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND) and the Zambian ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF) before the presidential election (10 August 2016).
24 I conflict trends provisions, stipulates that a person shall not directly from the UPND and other opposition parties, as they all or indirectly, by oneself or through any other person – aspire to govern the Zambian people. Commitments such as (a) make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence those made during a joint press briefing in July 2018 – to or restraint upon any other person; and (b) do or threaten to be tolerant, and to promote coexistence and non-violence do anything to the disadvantage of any person in order to within rank and file – should be realised. induce or compel any persons –…“to vote or not to vote”; Second, implicitly or overtly, parties should commit to “to vote or not vote for any registered party or candidate”; make contact with the “other”, because they theoretically or “to support or not support any political registered party share a common goal – to govern and provide leadership, or candidate”.17 including creating new trajectories and relationships. Parties While some of these provisions may have been violated on both sides of the political divide should be civil and allow with diminutive effect in previous elections, the Lusaka the contacts at the top level of leadership to translate into mayoral by-elections revealed a worrying result. Over 80% of cohesion. The contact and cohesion notion suggests that registered voters did not vote, despite the election day being “contact initiation” should be followed by negotiation, declared a holiday (only 131 777 people of 839 027 voted).18 cognition and finally cohesion.22 The PF and UPND (and This outcome was implicitly attributed by some to the other opposition party) leaders should allow contact to violence that continued to characterise elections since 2016, trickle down within their party structures. For example, claiming that if civility returned to elections, the situation youth cadres should demilitarise during campaigns, and would be different. there should be joint programmes held to denounce violence Third, another parliamentary by-election that saw and propagate violence-free elections. There must be follow- unparalleled incidences of violence was that of Sesheke through of all this. in western Zambia, held on 12 February 2019. Once more, the front-runner parties included the PF and UPND, which clashed in different locations during the pre-election FOR EXAMPLE, THE PF NATIONAL YOUTH campaigns. Allegations of possessing the voters’ register LEADER ATTRIBUTED THE PROPENSITY and distribution of money to voters in some areas triggered TO VIOLENCE TO THE TRANSPORTATION violence. This occurred in addition to mere provocation and attacks for belonging to the other party. It appears that the OF CADRES, MOSTLY FROM CITIES SUCH leaders of both political parties fully understand what makes AS LUSAKA, INTO ELECTION AREAS areas holding elections, such as Sesheke, predisposed to violence. For example, the PF national youth leader attributed the propensity to violence to the transportation Third, contact situations should symbolise equal status of cadres, mostly from cities such as Lusaka, into election between the parties. A strong zero-sum-based competition areas.19 Both PF and UPND were guilty of this. between outgroup and ingroup members may perhaps A UPND Lusaka Province chairperson, while denying “pollute” the mutual relationships, due to high stakes.23 the movement of cadres into election areas, affirmed his One of the hurdles to civil contact between parties is the party’s “self-defence” whenever attacked, and doing so with quest to win elections at all costs, and not even allow the full force.20 Both the PF and UPND leaders and their party other party to freely canvass for votes. Within the Zambian members are more often in confrontation mode during polity, party members must refrain from seeing themselves electoral campaigns. When canvassing for votes, there as above the law. The principle holds that the equal status of seems to be very little commitment to peace and coexistence group members is important for contact. Both the incumbent beyond campaign rhetoric, as these three cases attest. There and opposition parties should be able to enjoy equal status is a need for improved civil interactions before any election, for effective and cohesive intergroup contact. In other words, and generally in electoral politics. Thus, the recommendation all political players ought to have access to a level playing of this article is for political party associates to consider field devoid of unnecessary restrictions. For instance, some cultivated contacts across the board in their politics. young party members have advanced no-go-area threats toward their opponents. Some senior leaders have been The Value and Challenge of Intergroup Contact threatened and/or barred from accessing perceived/claimed In appreciating the value of intergroup contact, the six stronghold areas (wards, constituencies or towns). Although factors mentioned earlier, as espoused by Allport,21 are some have persisted as threats, most of such intimidations contextualised in response to electoral violence within have resulted in clashes, especially between UPND and PF the Zambian polity. First, mutual interdependence of two party members. or more groups needing each other to accomplish a goal Fourth, informal interpersonal contacts between is anchored on the cultivation of coexistence, enhanced members of the ingroup and outgroup has a bearing on the relationships and cooperation. Thus, the PF as the ruling overall outlook of the contact. Informal interpersonal contact party should accommodate “positive” checks and balances has the potential to lessen prejudices, defined as an avertive
conflict trends I 25 GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)
Leaders from the main political parties committed to depoliticising markets and other trading places to create space for everybody to trade freely. Markets and bus terminals have often been the centre of clashes between members of different parties.
and hostile attitude towards an individual simply because includes reducing group infrahumanisation – that is, one belongs to a particular party. The UPND has suffered the inclination to see the ingroup as more human than unsubstantiated accusations of being a tribal political the outgroups. Sometimes, the predisposition to attack party for simply having a slightly larger proportion of its an opponent is driven by negative perceptions, such as membership and leaders from the southern region. hooliganism or criminality by the other group. Another Fifth, beyond informal interpersonal contact, the contact norm that may support intergroup contact is “intergroup hypothesis also calls for multiple contacts with members forgiveness”, or clemency for the others’ past wrongdoings.25 of the outgroup. In 2018, one of the attempts at cultivating While the elite often communicate courteously despite peace between the UPND and PF had a special focus on their divergent political ideologies, and even cross over young people. Leaders from both parties committed to to other parties, their respective rank and file rarely do so. depoliticising markets and other trading places to create Thus, the call from an intergroup contact lens is for party space for everyone to trade freely. Markets and bus terminals stalwarts to appreciate political plurality. For example, senior have often been the centre of clashes between members party members should socialise/enlighten lower-ranking of different parties. Intergroup contact calls for multiple members to embrace the existence of other parties as equal interactions of different party stalwarts, including youth and stakeholders. Any differences should be handled civilly women, beyond official party business. This, in keeping with through dialogue and reconciliation. Vezzali and Stathi, entails that “contact between individuals from groups (parties) can stimulate the development of more Conclusion positive outgroup attitudes”.24 There is a need in Zambia to build interactions and Lastly, some of the specific social norms that may capacities of different players for enhanced political be encouraged to foster contact between the two parties tolerance. Intergroup contact should not simply be for the
26 I conflict trends sake of contact, but should instead include planned efforts 11 Lusaka Times (2018a) ‘OYV Condemns Behaviour of PF Cadres to socialise party stalwarts differently. Put differently, it during Chilanga Nominations’, Available at:
conflict trends I 27 REUTERS/PHILIMON BULAWAYO
FOOD AID, VILLAGE POLITICS AND CONFLICT IN RURAL ZIMBABWE: THE CASE OF THE TANDI CHIEFDOM
BY MARK CHINGONO
Introduction politics of food aid distribution at grassroots level. The article Much has been written on the politics of food aid. In the shows that the food aid distribution system is flawed and literature,1 food aid has been variously depicted as necessary is abused by villagers, and that village politics determines to address the chronic food insecurities in poor countries; an who gets food. It identifies the inherent flaws and popular instrument of foreign policy by donor countries; destroying criticisms of the food aid distribution system. Specifically, it local agriculture while securing markets for subsidised shows that the selection of food aid recipients is not always farmers in donor countries; entrenching the dependency based on the “poorest and most vulnerable” principle as syndrome; and fuelling the rampant practice by politicians of espoused by donors, but is oftentimes determined by the using food aid to reward supporters and punish opponents. village politics of kinship, alliances and power. Consequently, A little known, if not more insidious, dimension of the politics some of the poorest and most vulnerable fail to get food of food aid is its impact on communities at the grassroots aid, while some of the rich get it. Even worse still, food aid level. This article focuses on the Tandi chiefdom in rural Above: Food aid is depicted as necessary to address the Zimbabwe and critically examines the dynamics, impacts and chronic food insecurities in poor countries.
28 I conflict trends Cahora Bassa 28 Lusaka 30 32 Dam 34 ° ° Zumbo ° ° Kafue bezi Z Kafue am Cahora am Z Kanyemba b Mazabuka Albufeira de Bassa è Namwala z ZIMBABWE Cahora Bassa e
16° Chirundu 16°
Monze Makuti i n MOZAMBIQUE Tete
a
y
Kariba n Z A MBI A Kariba Dam u H MASHONALAND LakeKariba Centenary Mount Darwin Mulobezi Choma Karoi Mhangura
S e Changara a o n CENTRAL z Z y MASHONALAND a a a M m Kalomo ti Zave b Bindura e WEST Kildonan Shamva z Masuku i Siabuwa TMutoko S Sesheke Maamba Chinhoyi Glendale A E D Kazungula Binga N Lake Harare A NAMIBIA Livingstone Manyame L e A hob Kasane Victoria i C M L. N 18 nt Falls Victoria Falls Gokwe u Chitungwiza O Marondera 18 ya° ny Nyanga Catandica ° in Matetsi at Chegutu H L Kachikau Kamativi i S G Sengwa A Hwange wa Kadoma yi M Rusape Pandamatenga Dahlia Hwedza (Gwayi River Farms) Dete Nyazura zi Sha d ngani S O a v Lupane Kwekwe e Manica Redcliff Chivhu Mutare MATABELELAND MIDL ANDS Mvuma Chimoio MANICALAND Lago R Eastnor Chicamba io NORTH Gweru G M Hot Springs w Inyati Shurugwi u t Gutu BOTS W ANA a i y r R i
i k u Chimanimani Nata n w
d i Glenclova
e Dombé
Bulawayo 20 Birchenough i 20 ° Masvingo Chipinge z ° Lake u Nata Esigodini Zvishavane Bridge B Mutirikwi io e R Plumtree v a
National capital S Espungabera MASVINGO Provincial capital Mosetse Town, village Makgadikgadi Pan Antelope Gwanda Nandi Mill Major airport Mine
S Triangle International boundary h West Nicholson Chiredzi Francistown a s R Provincial boundary h Rutenga u e n MATABELELAND Mbizi d U e Main road m E SOUTH z U ZIMBABWE in Makado Secondary road g IQ w M B a a Railroad n n M i is Thuli A i Z O 0 50 100 150 km Selebi-Pikwe Beitbridge M 22° impopo Malvernia L 0 50 100 mi o Messina op Limp S O U TH A F RICA 26° 28°
tends to exacerbate community conflict, promote laziness situation, and forced about 3 million people to depend and entrench the dependency syndrome. The article ends by on donor food aid2 and vegetation. Villagers in the Tandi considering policy options to address some of the challenges chiefdom were not spared the wrath of the drought. of the food aid distribution system. The Tandi chiefdom is in the Makoni District of Analytically, the article provides a micro-level analysis Manicaland Province and about 170 km south-east of the of the relationship between village politics and food aid capital city, Harare. The chiefdom has 46 villages, with distribution, and of the unintended consequences of free households ranging from seven to over 40 per village. food aid. It exposes the underlying oppressive structures As the area is semi-barren and overly populated, villagers that produce egoistic and violent behaviour exhibited during grow mainly maize on small pieces of land. Some own food aid distribution. Methodologically, it is based on critical small heads of cattle. Not surprisingly, many villagers in the observations and interviews conducted by the author during chiefdom survived the 2008–2009 drought through food aid. the 2008–2009 food aid distribution in the Tandi chiefdom. Presenting emergency food aid support funds to the World Food Programme (WFP), Dave Fish, head of the United Context Kingdom’s aid programme to Zimbabwe, said: Food insecurity in Zimbabwe dates back to British The UK has given $6.7 million for food aid that will help colonial land dispossession. Robert Mugabe’s attempt to reach 1.8 million of the poorest and most vulnerable redress these colonial injustices through a chaotic and Zimbabweans in the lean months.3 violent land reform, which started in 2000, worsened the food security situation, and transformed the country from being Feeding the poorest and most vulnerable is indeed a Africa’s bread basket to a nation dependent on food aid. noble deed. However, the experience of the Tandi chiefdom The 2008–2009 drought compounded an already bad demonstrates that the reality on the ground is a far cry from
conflict trends I 29 this noble ideal; accurately targeting the most vulnerable is a Therefore, to effectively assist the poorest and most complex and difficult task. vulnerable, vulnerability assessments should be more Village politics, characterised by backstabbing, corruption detailed, holistic and inclusive. and jealousy,4 has compromised the “poorest and most Second, the exclusive focus on the individual and the vulnerable” principle of the food aid distribution system. “numbers game” of counting heads in a poor household Not infrequently, some of the poorest and most vulnerable is problematic. Not only is accurately ascertaining the level fail to access food aid, while some of the relatively rich of individual vulnerability difficult and costly, but also by receive the aid, thereby widening the gap between the rural focusing on the individual, the selection criteria ignore poor and the rich. family and class background. Thus, individual orphans are considered the most vulnerable, yet it is their family and Flaws of the Food Aid Distribution System class background that determines their level of vulnerability In theory, the WFP humanitarian food aid distribution and standard of living. Through inheritance as well as programme is based on the “poorest and most vulnerable” assistance from extended family members, orphans from principle. The most vulnerable are defined as poor families rich families are better cushioned against poverty than with no source of income – usually comprised of orphans, children of living poor families: a late “rich dad” can be a young children, widows, the elderly and the disabled. However, this system is flawed and is open to abuse much better provider than a living “poor dad”. by villagers, and has many other negative unintended Third, allocating food aid to the individual child consequences. contributes to the disintegration of the family by First, targeting the poorest and most vulnerable only undermining the authority of elders. In the past, elders may not be the most effective strategy for addressing had control of economic resources. Now, with the donor persistent poverty. Among other things, focus on poverty perceived as the new rich godfather, that source of power only allows other important issues – of economic injustice and authority is being eroded. Some children who receive and development policy, for instance – to slip out of view. food aid are becoming rebellious against their pauperised KATE HOLT/AFRICA PRACTICE
Women carry their village’s food aid in a cart, near a World Food Programme food distribution point in Zimbabwe (April 2009).
30 I conflict trends REUTERS/EMMANUEL CHITATE
Mozambicans flee across the border to refugee camps in Malawi, following clashes between Frelimo government forces and Renamo militants (January 2016).
Young adults are often excluded from food aid programmes on the presumption that they are still energetic, productive and able to fend for themselves.
guardians, claiming the right to do whatever they wish with rental houses in Harare – qualified as beneficiaries, while the “their” food aid; some end up stealing and selling it. poor young adults who do casual work for these families Fourth, because of the focus on age – namely, young were disqualified. children and the elderly – young adults are excluded from A fifth shortcoming is the insensitivity to gender, and the food aid programme on the fallacious presumption especially to the plight of young single mothers. In traditional that they are still energetic and productive, and therefore Shona society, women are considered minors, and this able to fend for themselves. The reality is that owing to the means that poor single mothers living with their parents are economic crisis of the last decade, most young rural adults not eligible for food aid in their own right. Rather, whether have never had formal employment, and indeed are among or not they receive food aid depends on the eligibility or the poorest and most vulnerable of the rural people. Unlike otherwise of their guardian. In one such case, a poor single some of the elderly, who are either supported by their adult mother, her child and two orphan cousins all had to depend children and/or own bride wealth cattle as well as rented on the meagre pension of their great grandfather, who they houses in towns, young unemployed adults do not own any live with – all pensioners (and workers) are ineligible for valuable assets. In one village, for example, the focus on food aid. Poor, vulnerable and discriminated against, some age led to an absurd situation in which elderly but relatively of these young women end up as sex workers, thereby rich villagers – a family that owns the biggest shop at a local exposing themselves to HIV/AIDS and premature death (as business centre, and another that owns a farm, a truck and happened to the young woman in this case). All this gives further momentum to the vicious circle of poverty. A sixth challenge relates to village size. There seems to THERE SEEMS TO BE A THRESHOLD be a threshold number of people in a village that donors NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN A VILLAGE THAT are comfortable feeding at a given time. When this number is exceeded, and regardless of the degree of vulnerability, DONORS ARE COMFORTABLE FEEDING AT the “excess people” are denied food. In other words, the A GIVEN TIME relatively well-off in smaller villages stand a better chance
conflict trends I 31 KATE HOLT / AUSAID
In traditional Shona society, women are considered minors, and this means that poor single mothers living with their parents are not eligible for food aid in their own right.
of receiving food aid than the relatively poorer in bigger Some relatively well-off people with minor disabilities that villages; in the smallest villages, everyone usually gets food only marginally affect their productive capacity have been aid. regular food aid recipients. One such recipient – a partially A seventh challenge: giving bigger families more food, disabled but relatively rich farmer – is able to sell his produce while understandable, encourages the poor to have bigger because he receives food aid all the time. The point is: families – which, in turn, exacerbates the problems of poverty disability is not synonymous with inability, and its extent and hunger. For example, when bulgur wheat – considered a should therefore be assessed accurately. delicacy by the poor – was only given to families with six or more children, some of those with smaller families openly Selection of Food Aid Recipients wished they also had bigger ones too. When the poor keep Beneficiaries are selected through a rudimentary process over-procreating, the hope of ever breaking the vicious circle in which the villagers identify and vote for those eligible. of poverty diminishes. The selection criteria are open to abuse and manipulation by villagers. The process also exposes the limits of village FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN BULGUR WHEAT – democracy. Chiefs and headmen play a prominent role in identifying beneficiaries in their villages, and food aid CONSIDERED A DELICACY BY THE POOR – disbursement offers them an opportunity to assert their WAS ONLY GIVEN TO FAMILIES WITH SIX fragile authority. It allows them to punish dissenters by OR MORE CHILDREN, SOME OF THOSE excluding them from the beneficiary list, and reward supporters by including them. WITH SMALLER FAMILIES OPENLY WISHED Further, and with even more serious implications, THEY ALSO HAD BIGGER ONES TOO villagers form alliances in vetting and voting for potential beneficiaries. In a manner not too dissimilar from vote Finally, the automatic privileging of disability without buying by corrupt politicians, they vote for one another assessing the level of disability may “disable” the reciprocally, or in exchange for food and other favours. It is selection system’s capacity to reach the most vulnerable. not uncommon for those voted for to give a portion of their
32 I conflict trends food to those who voted for them. In closely knit villages, all to get food aid as they are considered outsiders. Typically, the members, including the relatively rich, regularly receive they are rejected by villagers of their new homes as “aliens” food aid. and by their old villages as “exiles”. New arrivals from other parts of the country are routinely excluded from receiving Poor, Vulnerable and Unpopular food aid and dismissed as “strangers”. The poorest and most vulnerable have great difficulty Another group that tends to be excluded from receiving being popularly voted for, for they are too poor to afford food aid is the previously well-off, but presently down and resources (such as goods to give to neighbours) for social out. One such family, visibly distraught and malnourished, networking and mobilising support. In addition, poverty complained bitterly for being consistently voted out of the comes with low self-esteem, lack of confidence, and a sense food aid programme. A beautiful house, built during the of failure and being unentitled. All these factors militate “good old days”, caused jealous neighbours to disqualify against the capacity of the poorest and most vulnerable to them for food aid. defend their interests vis-a-vis those of the powerful. Yet another example of a victim of village politics is that There are quite a few categories of the poorest and of a prophetess with three vulnerable children of her own most vulnerable who, for some reason, are unpopular with and another three orphan wards from her deceased sister. other villagers. For example, orphans and the elderly who Although they are probably the poorest family in her village, she has never been voted for to receive aid for allegedly are forced to stay with relatives in other villages usually fail exposing the “evil” ways of other villagers. The prophetess REUTERS/PHILIMON BULAWAYO
Food aid beneficiaries are selected through a rudimentary process in which the villagers identify and vote for those eligible.
conflict trends I 33 JESSIE KALSMITH/USAID-BEST PROJECT
A long-term solution should involve capacitating the poor to become self-reliant and graduate from being aid recipients to becoming aid providers.
has had to abandon her home and relocate to a peri-urban egoistic instinct of self-preservation looms large in food shanty town on the outskirts of Harare. In a nutshell, the aid beneficiary selection. With villagers using food aid dynamics of village politics means that power, networking distribution to settle scores and/or to profit, the outcome is and alliances determine who ultimately gets food aid. rising conflict. For example, a male villager spent six months in jail as a result of a physical fight with another villager’s Abuse of the System wife over his alleged unfairness in portioning out donated The food aid distribution system is open to abuse by rice. In another case, two village women were in a conflict many. In one case, a headman was accused of including on after one of them revealed that the other only had one child the beneficiary list names of deceased people, and receiving and not two dependent children. the food himself on their behalf. It is alleged that some In another case, a woman was warned by an angry of the new arrivals try to beat the system by getting food neighbour whom she had “sold out” that: “We will use the aid in both their old and new villages. Many more inflate cooking oil you have received at your funeral.” The “traitor” the number of their dependent children, usually including is since deceased. Given the strong superstitious beliefs independent children. among villagers, her death was attributed to witchcraft by Some recipients of food aid sell it, while others use it to the one she had “sold out”. In all these examples, relations pay for casual farm work (or to feed chickens, in the case between the extended family members of the parties to the of bulgur wheat). Quite often, casual farm workers are the conflict became strained, and when other villagers were poorest and most vulnerable who fail to access food aid. In forced to take sides, the village became polarised. addition, the process of selecting beneficiaries generates conflict within communities. Popular Criticisms Popular criticism against food aid is mounting. First, donors Community Conflict are criticised for offering what they have and not what recipients Since everyone wants to get something of the little need – for instance, rice and cooking oil instead of seeds and food aid available, it is not surprising that the Hobbesian5 fertiliser. Not surprisingly, some recipients end up selling food
34 I conflict trends aid to get money to buy other basic essentials not provided the subject should be revisited with a view to making by donors. farms productive again. A 1998 conference on “The Land Second, food aid is said to make planning and budgeting Question in Zimbabwe”, held at the University of Cambridge, difficult. As one villager complained: recommended a win-win outcome in which only the unused It is difficult to plan and budget when you don’t know part of farms would be reallocated.7 This would have when they (donors) are coming next, and how much they avoided the disruption of production and its catastrophic are bringing. consequences, the suffering endured by displaced farmers and farm workers, the looting of farm equipment, and the Third, waiting for food aid – oftentimes in vain – need to compensate farmers. It would also have promoted is time-consuming and causes anxiety. Often, when rumours racial reconciliation and even the learning of new skills spread that food aid is coming, villagers flock to the food by new farmers from the established farmers. Such distribution point only to be sent back home empty-handed, an approach, which should involve consultations with angry and hungry. Finally, those who fail to receive food aid all stakeholders, seems the only way that stability and are scathing in their criticism, and their angry outbursts are development can be achieved. quite revealing: WFP should never come back again; it is promoting Conclusion laziness; free food will not take us far; it is embarrassing Colonial land dispossession, chaotic land reform and and humiliating to keep being fed by other people; we drought have all conspired to produce food insecurity of want to farm and feed ourselves as we have always catastrophic proportions in rural Zimbabwe. Consequently, done, but now in addition to political sanctions, we also humanitarian food aid has become a major source of have God’s sanctions – drought. livelihood sustenance for many of the country’s rural poor. The dynamics of village politics, coupled with the inherent The desire to become self-sufficient seems to run flaws of the beneficiary selection system, mean that some through these popular criticisms. Therefore, policy changes of those who deserve food aid sometimes fail to get it, while should create conditions for a realisation of these dreams. the undeserving get it. To address the inadequacies of the food aid distribution system effectively, a holistic policy The Way Forward rethink is essential. The politics of “who gets what and why” of the food aid – especially when too few of the many who are Dr Mark Chingono is a Senior Lecturer in the hungry get it – is potentially destructive and destabilising. Department of Political and Administrative Studies New innovative ideas, as suggested below, are needed to at the University of Eswatini, Swaziland. deal with this challenge. A local chief reasoned that since drought affects everyone, everyone should be given a little of what is available. Some felt that instead of providing a complete Endnotes package – of cooking oil, beans/peas and maize – to a 1 Riley, Barry (2017) The Political History of American Food Aid: An Uneasy Benevolence. New York: Oxford University Press; selected few, donors should provide only maize to everyone, and Paarlberg, Robert L. (1982) Food Policy and Farm Programs, as maize meal is the most basic staple. Others suggested Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, 34 (3), that to discourage the pervasive “free dinner” mentality, the pp. 25–39. food should be sold at affordable prices. 2 Howe, Doreen (2019) Former Aid Recipients Become Aid A long-term solution should be holistic. First, it should Providers. Newsday, 23 April. involve capacitating the poor to become self-reliant and 3 Fish, Dave (2009) UK’s Aid Programme to Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Independent, 11–17 December. graduate from being “aid recipients to becoming aid 4 Werbner, Richard (2011) Tears of the Dead: The Social Biography providers”, as happened to the beneficiaries of the United of an African Family (2nd edition). Edinburgh: Edinburgh States Agency for International Development (USAID’s) University Press. Enhancing Nutrition, Stepping Up Resilience and Enterprise 5 Hobbes, Thomas (1651) Leviathan. Available at:
conflict trends I 35 A LEADERSHIP PERSPECTIVE FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BY OPEYEMI ADEMOLA OLAYIWOLA FLORENT VERGNES/AFP/GETTY IMAGES
Introduction the 14 armed groups that signed the agreement abandoned On 6 February 2019, a peace agreement was signed the deal, while another armed group quit a new government between the government of the Central African Republic designed to be the keystone to the agreement.2 The failure of (CAR) and 14 armed groups that control most of the country. such peace agreements to stabilise the CAR suggests a need After two weeks of talks in Sudan, the Khartoum Agreement to examine the role of leadership in processes of building was agreed upon to end years of civil war in the CAR. peace. While the agreement is seen by some as a step towards Since independence in 1960, the CAR has suffered five lasting peace, others are sceptical about its viability.1 successful coups d’état. The 2013 coup, orchestrated by the Such pessimistic reactions are understandable for several Séléka – Séléka means “coalition” in the Sango language – reasons. First, the Khartoum Agreement is the eighth of such agreements to attempt to bring peace to the CAR since the Above: The Khartoum Agreement is the eighth of such country descended into conflict in 2013. Second, less than agreements attempting to bring peace to the Central a month after the new peace agreement was signed, one of African Republic.
36 I conflict trends 14° 16° 18° 20° 22° 24° 26° The boundaries and names shown and the designations AmAm Timan Timan é Aoukal used on this map do not implay official endorsement or CENTRAL AFRICAN acceptance by the United Nations.
t a lou SUDAN REPUBLIC m u B a a l O h a r r S h e a Birao l r B Al Fifi 'A 10 h r 10 a a ° B b ° C h a VAKAGA r i C H A D
k SarhSarh Bahr Aou Garba CENTRAL Ouanda AFRICAN Djallé REPUBLIC Doba BAMINGUI-BANGORAN Sam Ouandja
Maïkouma Ndélé S O U T H
i Ouadda u
8 g Kaouadja 8 ° Goré n SUDAN ° i b B i a Kabo r m i na G n Bamingui Vi Markounda g ui Batangafo HAUTE-KOTTO
Bocaranga Kaga Bandoro Yangalia to ot OUHAM NANA GRÉBIZI K
OUHAM-PENDÉ m Mbrès HAUT - a Bria uh Bouca Yalinga o O OUAKA k n M B OMOU i
Bossangoa Dékoa h C
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Bozoum i Djéma KÉMO r
6 Bouar a 6
° b ° Bambari a M Ouarr Baboua Baoro Grimari NANA-MAMBÉRÉ Sibut Bakouma M a Bossembélé M B OMOU Obo m gú M be an i bo re OMBELLA-MPOKO ub a Zémio mo O Ouak Mingala Rafaï u B ASSE Damara Kouango Carnot KOTTO Bangassou MAMHAUTEBERE SANGH-KADAEI National capital Mobaye Boda Ouango Préfecture capital Berberati L Bangui o Town, village b LOBAYE Kadei Gamboula ay 4 4 e Uele Major airport ° Mbaïki ° SANGHA Mongoumba Bondo International boundary YokadoumaYokadouma ngala Tomori Nola Mo Undetermined boundary* M B A ERE BusingaBusinga Préfecture boundary Salo MainTitule road 0 50 100 150 200 250 km DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC Secondary road a h CAMEROONCAMEROON g 0 50 100 150 mi Railroad n Buta a OF THE CONGO
S i g * Final boundary between the Republic of the Sudan n Bumba and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been a LisalaLisala b go determined. U Con 2° CONGO 2° 16° 18° 20° 22° 24° 26°
Map No. 4048 Rev. 8 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support June 2016 Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section) occurred against the backdrop of a phantom state and a that narrowly focuses only on particular personalities or collapsed economy.3 The Séléka rebels opposed the regime individuals in formal positions of authority, offers a potential of President François Bozizé. After Bozizé fled from the for peaceful solutions that are the product of interaction CAR to neighbouring Cameroon, Michel Djotodia, head between those administering peace and the whole of the of the Séléka, declared himself president of the country affected society receiving peace. Process-based leadership on 25 March 2013. Due to the perception that the Séléka is conceptualised as process – it opens up the possibility was a foreign Muslim force pillaging and perpetrating of finding lasting solutions to conflict, from within wider deadly violence in a country with a Christian majority, the society.5 This article looks at the historical and contemporary CAR sank into an unprecedented ethno-religious conflict, roots of conflict in the CAR. The dilemma of peacebuilding predominantly between the Séléka and the mostly Christian in the CAR is then discussed, followed by leadership as a Anti-Balaka groups. As a result, the international community process in peacebuilding. and regional powers increased pressure on Djotodia to step down; he yielded on 10 January 2014. Catherine Samba- The Roots of Conflict in the CAR Panza took the lead as interim president that same month, The roots of conflict that characterise the political system paving the way for the election of Faustin-Archange Touadéra of the CAR have been traced back to the colonial period. as president of the CAR in March 2016.4 However, instability During this time, the CAR, unlike other French colonies in and violence continued, in spite of these political transitions Africa, was largely neglected by the colonial power.6 Rather and the measures put in place to stop the fighting, reconcile than develop an administration, French colonial officials warring parties and stabilise the CAR. leased the territory to private companies to run for their This article argues for a process-based leadership own profit (or loss).7 This privatisation of public space has perspective for achieving sustainable peace in the CAR. been a recurrent practice throughout the country’s history.8 A process-based approach to leadership, rather than one Opposition to colonial authorities and the recruitment
conflict trends I 37 REUTERS/EMMANUEL BRAUN
People celebrate the resignation of Central African Republic’s president, Michel Djotodia (10 January 2014).
and mistreatment of local populations by concessionary does not care about its Muslim citizens – many of whom companies further contributed to the culture of resistance already share greater social connections with communities and self-defence among local communities.9 However, the in Chad and Sudan. In turn, this helps ferment opposition economic exploitation of the colony did not result in social against Muslims by Christians, resulting in the narrative and economic development. that Muslim Séléka forces, supported by foreign powers, By independence in 1960, infrastructure in the CAR was are trying to “Islamise” central African society.13 virtually non-existent.10 More so, the post-independence The institutional crisis has also been both the cause and period was characterised by a disequilibrium between the consequence of the near collapse of the country’s economy. rural areas and the centre of power, Bangui, and inequalities between different groups within the population – all leading THE FORMAL ECONOMY WAS to the underdevelopment of the country. Regions outside of Bangui have consequently become marginalised, to DRASTICALLY REDUCED AS FOREIGN the detriment of populations and ethnic groups living in COMPANIES GRADUALLY LEFT THE those areas. This has resulted in a weak state that has little capacity or political will to govern beyond the capital.11 COUNTRY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT The government’s failure to provide services to outlying BECAME THE COMMON FATE OF A LARGE regions in the north and east is a major grievance and PART OF THE POPULATION a key driver of conflict. This, in turn, perpetuates the cycle of conflict, poverty and grievances, and the further subcontracting of governance to international organisations. The introduction of economic liberalisation in the late This fractured social landscape has created deep distrust 1980s reduced the state’s capacity and position to distribute between communities, and between the general population resources, and structural adjustment programmes seem and the central government.12 to have further contributed to the downfall of the CAR. Consequently, it has triggered politics of religion and The formal economy was drastically reduced as foreign identity by adding to the narrative that the government companies gradually left the country, and unemployment
38 I conflict trends became the common fate of a large part of the population. situations that have experienced concerted peacemaking Furthermore, for years the CAR’s natural wealth has and peacebuilding interventions, while conflict resurgence flowed out of the country rather than being used for local occurs when armed conflict increases after a period of development. This has created a system whereby CAR concerted peacebuilding interventions.15 For example, the politicians are often more concerned with the personal Bangui Forum was organised from 4 to 11 May 2015 to relationships they hold with these outside sources of power collect people’s grievances and concerns.16 Although the than with fulfilling their social contract with CAR citizens.14 forum was seen as a sign of hope for the country, there The military’s interference in political and civil affairs has was conflict relapse. Also, the failure of successive peace further resulted in a cyclical pattern of political instability, agreements between the warring parties revealed similar economic stagnation and social dissatisfaction. patterns of relapse. This is consistent with research, which It is clear that the CAR is faced with the need to address indicates that a significant percentage of armed conflicts the structural problems inherited from the colonial power, that conclude through negotiated settlement have a chance as well as challenges arising from its leadership. To respond of relapse within 10 years.17 Similarly, in some cases in the to and address the structural problems, leadership should CAR, rather than end instability and armed conflict, peace take into consideration a broad understanding of the agreements can add layers of further violence and division. comprehensive challenges facing the citizens of the CAR, The impact of both conflict relapse and conflict resurgence in build the eroded social cohesion, and design measures to the CAR is devastating and deadly. address such challenges, among other things. Against this backdrop, the need for prevention of armed conflict in the first instance and prevention of its relapse or The Challenges of Peacebuilding in the CAR resurgence where conflict was not prevented seems obvious A careful examination of the security situation in the and necessary.18 More so, African countries have realised the CAR shows that the key challenges confronting national, importance of prevention rather than reaction, because the regional and international peacebuilders in the country costs of reaction are high. Despite this realisation, armed are conflict relapse and conflict resurgence. Conflict conflict in the CAR still represents high costs of reaction, as relapse refers to decline into armed conflict in a number of regional and international bodies such as the African Union REUTERS/GORAN TOMASEVIC
Séléka (Muslim) fighters patrol as they search for Anti-Balaka Christian militia members near the town of Lioto (6 June 2014).
conflict trends I 39
22 A process-based approach to leadership offers offers A process-based approach to leadership OTHERS CONSIDER LEADERSHIP AS THE OTHERS CONSIDER LEADERSHIP AS THE OR COALITION OF ABILITY OF A COUNTRY THE GUIDE AND INITIATE TO COUNTRIES ACTIONS OF A WIDER GROUP OF STATES COMMON SATISFY SUSTAINABLY TO GOOD AND NEED leadership be understood and applied if it is to have value it is to have value leadership be understood and applied if challenges? peacebuilding with framework perhaps the most robust and all-encompassing of analysis for the pursuit of sustainable peace. Central to a process-based approach to leadership in the of exchange societal the peace is sustainable for search situation the to responses or solutions seeking in influence involves influence of exchange This society. that confronting a process of interaction in which the whole society is involved in seeking solutions to their mutual situation. Typically, Typically, 19 But none of these perspectives But none of these perspectives 21 Others consider leadership as the ability of a a of ability the as leadership consider Others 20 I conflict trends Many studies of leadership reveal multiple interpretationsmultiple Many studies of leadership reveal Members of the of the Anti-Balaka militia in the in the town of Bocaranga, Central African Republic (28 April 2017).Members of the of the Anti-Balaka militia 40 country or coalition of countries to initiate and guide the the guide and initiate to countries of coalition or country actions of a wider group of states to sustainably satisfy common good and need. have consistently explained or delivered sustainable peace in in peace sustainable or delivered explained have consistently How then must conflicts in Africa, and the CAR in particular. Process-based Leadership in Peacebuilding (AU) and United Nations (UN) respectively have expended have expended (AU) and United Nations (UN) respectively conflict in the huge investments to respond to the armed Thus, addressing the challenges of peacebuilding country. of factors in the CAR requires a broad understanding resurgence, conflict and relapse for conflict responsible commitment. prevention by followed of what constitutes process-based leadership. much emphasis is placed on individual leaders and their their and leaders on individual is placed emphasis much to serve cases, many in which, – inactions or actions undercut rather than bolster the potential for peace and Some perspectives view prosperity that exists in society. leadership as a psychological endowment, or as result oriented. GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS/JOSEPH OKANGA REUTERS/SIEGFRIED MODOLA Adopting this Adopting this 27 This offers a more viable a more viable This offers 26 conflict trends I 41 In line with this summation, it is important for it is important for this summation, In line with 25 The CAR is an example of the lack of process-based of the lack of process-based The CAR is an example perspective offers a better lens for understanding conflict better lens for understanding conflict perspective offers a dynamics. peacebuilding and which has engendered leadership in peacebuilding, IN THE CAR, THIS IMPORTANT LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP IMPORTANT THIS CAR, THE IN ELUDED HAVE TO SEEMS ELEMENT AS PEACEBUILDING INTERVENTIONS, EXCLUDED WIDER SOCIETY HAS BEEN FROM PEACE PROCESSES in the provinces, priests have successfully mediated local local mediated successfully have priests provinces, the in conflicts. path to peace rather than an approach that simply seeks to than an approach that simply seeks to path to peace rather outside of that context (or sometimes identify individuals attractive personal qualities but within), who may have situation at hand. are irrelevant to the external actors seeking to intervene in war-affected societies societies in war-affected intervene to seeking actors external with recognise those leaders the context and to understand have of that society broad cross-section whom a sufficiently needs and goals. mutually held
24 As a result, the the result, a As 23 Leaders who exert influence in peacebuilding contexts contexts peacebuilding in influence exert who Leaders Central to a process-based approach to leadership is the societal exchange of influence in seeking solutions to the in seeking solutions to the influence of exchange to leadership is the societal approach to a process-based Central challenges facing society. work achieved by such top-down approaches is undermined undermined is approaches top-down by such achieved work the local level (which continue to by communities at and conflict), where the root causes perpetuate the violence situated. Thus, leadership as a process of conflict are often provide for a societal exchange of in peacebuilding should conflict. of issues underlying the addressing for influence government in positions formal hold always not may do not rely on position power. and therefore or society, feelings shared of sense a have leaders these Nonetheless, a particular or intentions among people experiencing and solutions to the situation, and offer the most viable ideas in that situation. mutually felt needs of the affected society For example, religious leaders in the CAR have successfully have successfully For example, religious leaders in the CAR for restraint, and harnessed their symbolic influence to call In the CAR, this important leadership element seems to to seems element leadership important CAR, this In the society as wider peacebuilding interventions, have eluded the addition, In processes. peace from excluded been has conflict of victims considered are CAR the in society wider of aid, while the process of humanitarian and/or recipients armed actors, state concerns that activity an is peacemaking actors. international and leaders group
In addition, addition, In 28 Leadership emergence in the CAR has been characterised Leadership emergence in the CAR has been characterised on the emergence of leaders through elections but also on but also on on the emergence of leaders through elections the addressing and relationship-building reconciliation, conflict. the of causes structural Exchange of Influence: The Missing Link influential highly is France actors. external of influence the by in the internal processes of the CAR. For example, a French- the in colonel a Bokassa, Jean-Bédel by led coup sponsored overthrew the regime of David Dacko in 1960. CAR military, Whereas Dacko was removed due to his close ties to China, Bokassa was chosen because of his devotion to France and France had problems his anti-communist stance. Eventually, him. supporting stopped and too, Bokassa, with there is the Chadian interference in the CAR’s domestic domestic there is the Chadian interference in the CAR’s has been at least as president, Idriss Déby, affairs. Chad’s influential in CAR politics as has the former colonial power. In fact, Chad has become known as the “king maker” in the benefited Bozizé 2003, In decades. few last the over CAR
I conflict trends THE COMMON LEADERSHIP EFFORTS IN IN THE COMMON LEADERSHIP EFFORTS ON INTERACTIONS CENTRE THE COUNTRY ELITES AND BETWEEN NATIONAL INTERLOCUTORS INTERNATIONAL 42 political instability, violence and disillusionment. violence and disillusionment. political instability, country centre on The common leadership efforts in the interactions between national elites and international of this is often the control of The outcome interlocutors. the state and its resources by the elites. The interference of the military in the state with external backing has further produced a leadership approach that is based on than rather elites, the by authority and power amassing exchanging influence with CAR citizens. Thus, achieving sustainable peace in the CAR requires an “exchange of influence” between the leaders administering peace and the wider society receiving peace, with a focus not only An Archbishop and Imam participate in a street tour to spread tolerance and reconciliation in the outskirts of Bangui a street tour to spread tolerance and reconciliation in the outskirts of Bangui An Archbishop and Imam participate in (11 December 2013). REUTERS/SAM PHELPS UN PHOTO/AMANDA VOISARD
Chad’s president, Idriss Deby, has been influential in the Central African Republic’s politics.
THE POPULATION RECEIVING THE on the leaders. Most simply, the leaders with ideas assert influence by sharing them with the wider society – which, in LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE OFTEN turn, accepts this assertion of influence if and when they are RESPONDS BY ASSERTING INFLUENCE IN seen to offer a relevant solution.30 However, wider society in RETURN – THAT IS, BY MAKING DEMANDS the CAR was excluded from the exchange of influence, and therefore the scope of relationships and interactions were ON THE LEADERS reduced. The decision to form a transitional government in 2015, from Chadian support to topple the Ange-Félix Patassé which resulted in Samba-Panza becoming president, was regime. Likewise, in 2013, Djotodia received support from tasked with the main aim of guiding the CAR to elections. Chad to ascend to power.29 The lack of substantive exchange This decision was reached during an Economic Community of influence within the CAR population served as one basis of Central African States (ECCAS) summit in Chad’s capital, for the rejection of Djotodia’s government and subsequent Ndjamena.31 In addition, the decision stopped Samba-Panza, conflict, as future incentives for conflict were not reduced. Djotodia and Bozizé from contesting the elections. However, The exchange of influence in peacebuilding entails the the process did not include discussions on the structural involvement of the CAR population in the emergence of causes of successive coups. The process only involved leaders with ideas to deal with the issues at hand, and whose discussions on the immediate planning of elections as a influence on the population is accepted. The population resolution to the trigger causes of the conflict. Furthermore, receiving the leadership influence often responds by the process of selecting Samba-Panza as the president was asserting influence in return – that is, by making demands concluded in Chad, under the influence of Déby, together
conflict trends I 43 with France and ECCAS.32 Such leadership emergence occurs 4. Douglas-Bowers, Devon (2015) ‘Colonialism, Coups, and Conflict: The Violence in the Central African Republic’, Available at: when forces outside the group assign leadership to an
44 I conflict trends ELECTIONS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
BY NAILA SALIHU UN PHOTO/MICHAEL ALI
Introduction Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the postponement The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been of elections, citing reasons of violence in parts of the home to the one of the oldest peacekeeping missions in the country, as well as logistical and financial constraints. world – the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission CENI also petitioned the Constitutional Court and obtained in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) – due authorisation to postpone elections to compile a fresh voter to many periods of instability. Since independence in 1960, register. These developments were met with widespread the country has been embroiled in conflict. Joseph Kabila anger and protests over what some saw as Kabila’s refusal succeeded his late father, Laurent Kabila, as president, to relinquish power at the end of his second constitutionally following the latter’s assassination in 2001. He ruled the mandated term. country for almost 17 years, and controversially won two elections, in 2006 and 2011. His tenure expired in November Above: The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the 2016, necessitating presidential and legislative elections. Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is one of However, in September 2016, the Independent National the oldest peacekeeping missions in the world.
conflict trends I 45 10°E 15°E CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 25°E Obo 30°E SOUTH SUDAN 5°N Bangassou 5°N Bangui Yambio Juba DEMOCRATIC Berbérati Mobaye Torit Gbadolite Bondo Ango Dakwa Mbaïki N O R D - Libenge B AS-U É L É Dungu Faradje REPUBLIC OF Nola U B ANG I Uélé Gemena Businga Likati HAU T - THE CONGO SUD - Buta Isiro U É L É Watsa U B ANG I Gulu ala ong i Budjala M g Lisala Bumba Wamba n
a UGANDA b
U o MONGA L A Ituri Oyem Ouésso Impfondo ng Bagbunda Bunia EQUATORIAL i o or u C Lop i Bongandanga Basoko Mambasa Lake g i Lake GUINEA n Aruwu m Bafwasende Kyoga a Basankusu I T U R I Albert b nga u ulo Makokou O L Kisangani Libreville É QUA T E U R Befale Beni Kampala Jinja Ilungu T SHOP O Kasese GABON Mbandaka Maringa Butembo 0° CONGO Busira Boende Lubero 0° Tsh Ubundu Owando uapa N O R D - Lake Port- Ingende Bokungu Opala L Edward Lambaréné u Lubutu KIV U Lake Ewo Sa a Gentil lon L l Koulamoutou ga om a Rutshuru Victoria Lukolela e Ikela b la a Punia Franceville T SHUAP A Goma Bukoba Musoma Mouila Lac RWANDA Inongo ndi Lac Uli Kivu Kigali Djambala Mai-Ndombe Lomela Bukavu Kutu MAI - Shabunda Mwanza Tchibanga Kindu Mushie NDOM B E Katako- Luke SUD-KIV U nie Dekese Lodja Kombe MANI E M A Bujumbura Sibiti Kagulube Bandundu Kas Kibombo Uvira K ai SANKU R U BURUNDI w Lodi Sa Dolisie Brazzaville i nk l ur Fizi Kinshasa u u Kasongo SA Pointe- A H Masi-Manimba Pene- S Kenge Noire Luozi KIN K W I L U Idiofa Lusambo Mende Kigoma 5°S Kikwit Tabora 5°S Cabinda KONGO CENTRAL Mbanza- Demba Lubao Kongolo (ANGOLA) Ngungu uga Boma Matadi Gungu KASA I Mbuji- L OMAM I uk Kabalo L Kalemie Feshi Mayi Kabinda ATLANTIC M’banza Congo Tshikapa Kananga Niemba UNITED Kasongo- Ka L sa KASAI Makena T ANGANYIK A a REPUBLIC i L k OCEAN Lunda C E N T R A L u e
a OF
KASAI l
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w ORIENTAL Lu a n a v TANZANIA n u g Uíge g Kaniama a Pepa a o n y Sumbawanga National capital i HAU T - L OMAM I Molira k District capital Lucapa Kapanga Pweto a Lake Rukwa Caxito City, town Luanda Kamina L U A L A B A Mbeya Bukama Major airport L Lake N’dalatando u lu Musabira Mweru International boundary Malanje Saurimo a HAU T - Province boundary 10°S ANGOLA Lubudi K A T ANG A Kasama 10°S Main road DEMOCRATIC
Mutshatsha Kolwezi Kasenga REPUBLIC OF THE Dilolo M
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0 100 200 300 km a a Z io l
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Kuito w 0 100 200 mi Solwezi i Huambo The boundaries and names shown and the designations used I Sakania on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Ndola 10°E 15°E 20°E 25°E 30°E ZAMBIA
Map No. 4007 Rev. 11 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support May 2016 Geospatial Information Section (former Cartographic Section)
In the face of a legitimacy crisis and mounting domestic The disputed elections have larger consequences for the and external pressures from western powers, the African post-Kabila government. Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community This article discusses the issues surrounding the (SADC) and the International Conference on the Great elections and implications for stability in the post-election Lakes Region (ICGLR), combined presidential, legislative environment. The first section discusses the contentious and provincial elections were held on 30 December 2018. issues that characterised the pre-election phase. This is The initial announcement to the elections was met with some followed by an analysis of developments in the post-election reservations. Nonetheless, the elections took place. Contrary environment and the overall implications for stability. to widely held views of machinations by the incumbent government to cling to power, long-time opposition leader, Contentious Pre-election Issues Félix Tshisekedi, emerged as the new president of the DRC, Electoral preparations did not include some of the having secured over 7 million votes, representing 38.57% important elements of the Saint Sylvester Agreement, signed of the total votes cast. The runner-up – another opposition by the government and its opponents on 31 December 2016. candidate, Martin Fayulu, leader of the Lamuka coalition – This agreement was brokered by the influential Catholic garnered about 6.3 million votes (34.38%). The ruling bishops of the National Episcopal Conference of the Congo coalition’s candidate, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, came (CENCO), following the heavy security clampdown on in third with over 4.3 million votes, representing 23.84% of protesters calling for Kabila to step down.3 The agreement votes cast.1 The voter turnout was 47.6%. However, Fayulu, set out a power-sharing roadmap for the transition period who led the pre-election polls, filed a fraud complaint with until elections by 31 December 2018. The agreement the country’s highest court, calling for a recount of the forbade Kabila from attempting a third presidential term official results. The court upheld the results. The DRC’s and precluded constitutional amendments during the Catholic Church also intimated that the results gathered transition period. It also outlined certain measures meant by its 40 000-strong monitoring team pointed to a different to ease political tensions, including the release of political outcome than announced by the electoral commission.2 prisoners.4
46 I conflict trends MONUSCO/JOHN BOPENGO
Joseph Kabila, who succeeded his late father, Laurent Kabila, as the Democractic Republic of the Congo’s president in 2001, and presided for almost 17 years, casts his vote during the presidential and legislative elections in Kinshasa (30 December 2018).
Following the announcement of the electoral calendar, electoral coalitions to ensure that they could garner sufficient preparations for the election started. These included new votes to meet the new electoral thresholds and qualify for electoral legislation, voter registration, introduction of seats in future national and provincial assemblies. new voting technology, and dialogues between the CENI On 13 January 2018, the head of CENI, Corneille Nangaa, and opposition parties. Kabila approved a new electoral announced the end of voter registration, which took place law on 24 December 2017. This law included provisions between 25 July and 8 August 2017. This was an important that sought to reduce the huge number of candidates, as milestone in electoral preparations. The DRC government was experienced in previous elections in 2006 and 2011. funded a US$400 million voter registration exercise, which For example, the proliferation of political parties (more than recorded over 46 million potential voters (well above the 600) and candidates led to a 55-page ballot in Kinshasa 41 million expected),8 and was seen as a very expensive and in 2011.5 The law also included electoral thresholds complex process. Nonetheless, opposition and other interest (the minimum shares of the total vote that parties must groups, such as the Catholic church, cited irregularities in win to qualify for seats in the national and provincial the registration process and challenged the ensuing voter legislatures), and increased the non-refundable deposit register. for national assembly candidates to US$1 000, and almost One major issue was the electoral calendar and the doubled that of presidential candidates – from US$5 000 to limited transition period. The electoral cycle, including US$100 000.6 These reforms were aimed at addressing some local elections, should be completed by 16 February 2020. of the structural flaws of the Congolese political system. The timetable was criticised by political and civil society Typically, they helped reduce fragmentation in the legislature groups as a difficult schedule orchestrated to give Kabila and and led to a decrease in the number of smaller parties.7 Since his ruling party an unfair advantage, as the then ruling party February 2018, smaller parties were compelled to form new had an upper hand in terms of organisational and resource
conflict trends I 47 REUTERS/BAZ RATNER
In September 2016 the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) announced the postponement of elections, which some saw as President Kabila’s refusal to relinquish power.
capabilities. On the contrary, the relatively tight nature of of a successor whom Kabila trusted to safeguard his the electoral calendar was seen as disadvantageous to the family interests in the successor government, as Shadary numerous and fragmented opposition political parties, which is known to be close to Kabila.11 While some members of needed more preparation time. Despite scepticism about the the international community viewed the election calendar process, most parties took steps to keep up with the CENI as a sign of progress, many Congolese people remained calendar.9 sceptical, citing the rising tensions in the country.12 In spite of calls by the international community for him The country’s history of political conflicts remains a driver of to make public his intentions of not seeking re-election, instability, and violent conflict continued in the eastern part Kabila remained silent on the topic until his prime minister, of the country.13 The pre-election period was characterised Bruno Tshibala Nzenze, announced in June 2018 that Kabila by violent protests and the state responding with excessive would not seek re-election.10 This announcement helped to force.14 calm tensions at the time. The incumbent Peoples’ Party for The PPRD has carried out some reforms, including Reconciliation and Democracy (PPRD) announced Shadary, making Kabila the president of the party, among other the former interior minister, as its presidential candidate. internal restructuring. These actions and political This partly resolved earlier concerns and speculation preparations pointed to a regime strategy that would see about Kabila’s intentions, and also indicated the selection Kabila step down but still exercise a degree of control behind the scenes as the PPRD president. Even though Shadary has been beaten to third place in the presidential election, legislative results from the election showed that the THE PRE-ELECTION PERIOD WAS Common Front for Congo (FCC), a pro-Kabila coalition, won CHARACTERISED BY VIOLENT PROTESTS a majority, with 341 of the 500 seats in the national assembly. This figure exceeds the threshold of 250 seats needed for AND THE STATE RESPONDING WITH a majority. Tshisekedi’s Union for Democracy and Social EXCESSIVE FORCE Progress (UDPS) and its allied Union for the Congolese
48 I conflict trends REUTERS/ OLIVIA ACLAND
Félix Tshisekedi is sworn into office as the new new president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the inauguration ceremony at the Palais de la Nation in Kinshasa (24 January 2019).
Nation (UNC) only managed 46 seats, while Fayulu’s Lumuka raised issues about voter confidentiality. Other political, coalition won 94 seats.15 technical and financial concerns were also raised. Before the elections, there were some concerns As recounted by a civil society activist: “DRC currently has about the transparency and overall outcome of the polls. a population which is 65% illiterate – mostly women and The Kabila government was operating from a position of young people – who would consequently have enormous relative strength: it retained firm control of the state security difficulties in using these machines, particularly as they and electoral machinery, and was also better resourced are programmed in the French language, not the local than most of the relatively weak and fragmented opposition language.”17 Others argued that although the CENI was parties. The Kabila government had a strong footing in the testing prototypes that were reportedly more reliable, using CENI and the Constitutional Court, which arbitrates electoral novel technology potentially posed a risk, given the poor disputes in the presidential and legislative elections. It also infrastructure and a lack of reliable electricity.18 Notably, controlled most provincial governments. Furthermore, public there were concerns about financial transparency and the perception about the impartiality of the CENI was low. Some procurement of the machines, their timely delivery and local civil society groups described this as a “total crisis of the likely effects on training needed to use them. Some confidence” in the electoral process.16 of these concerns were confirmed by the delay in the In addition, there were concerns about preparations for the elections, especially the logistics. In particular, the introduction of new voting technology stirred more THE OPPOSITION AND CIVIL SOCIETY controversy. The electoral body envisaged using voting machines instead of printed ballot papers – a change that GROUPS WERE WORRIED THAT sought to remedy the logistical challenges encountered ELECTRONIC VOTING MACHINES COULD in previous elections, particularly lengthy ballots. LEAD TO VOTER FRAUD, AND RAISED The opposition and civil society groups were worried that electronic voting machines could lead to voter fraud, and ISSUES ABOUT VOTER CONFIDENTIALITY
conflict trends I 49 election process, especially in the collation of the results. party’s candidate for the upcoming presidential election.20 The electoral body had to grapple with some logistical However, his candidature was disqualified by the electoral challenges – for instance, in early December 2018, one commission, citing a pending case in which Bemba was of its warehouses was burnt to the ground, including the convicted of interfering with witnesses. This charge has been thousands of electronic voting machines stored there. linked with corruption, as Congolese law prevents people Voting was also suspended and delayed in some parts of the convicted of corruption from running for the presidency. country – for example, close to a million people could not Unsurprisingly, on 3 September 2018, the Constitutional vote in states affected by the Ebola outbreak.19 Court upheld the electoral commission’s decision that Another contentious issue involved the contenders in Bemba could not run because of the pending case at the the presidential elections. The names of prominent people – ICC.21 Congolese authorities also blocked Katumbi, another such as former vice president, Jean-Pierre Bemba, and Moise top opposition contender, from entering the country to Katumbi, an exiled businessman and former governor of register as a candidate. In addition, the Constitutional Court Katanga province – surfaced as likely candidates. However, upheld the invalidation of former prime minister Adolphe opposition forces accused Kabila’s government of blocking Muzito,22 but surprisingly, the Constitutional Court reinstated some top candidates from running. Notably, Bemba was a the candidature of former prime minister, Samy Badibanga surprise contender after the International Criminal Court (ICC) Ntita, who was accused of having a second nationality.23 appeal judges, in June 2018, acquitted him of war crimes A further issue had to do with the role of the international committed by his Movement for the Liberation of Congo community in the election process. The Congolese (MLC) forces in the neighbouring Central African Republic government indicated that the election was a purely internal in 2002 and 2003. Bemba returned to the DRC after more affair and would fully pay for it. Interestingly, MONUSCO than a decade, and five weeks after his conviction for war was mandated through Resolution 2409 to provide technical crimes was overturned, he was nominated by the MLC as the assistance and logistical support for the electoral process, REUTERS/KENNY KATOMBE
An official from Congo’s National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) records the finger prints of a resident during voter registration (31 May 2017).
50 I conflict trends REUTERS/KENNY KATOMBE
28 conflict trends I 51 The roles of regional powers and neighbours neighbours and powers regional of roles The 27
The high demand for electricity by both pre-existing and start-up businesses helped to guarantee a client base ready to consume as much electricity as the Mutsora hydrofacility was able to produce. in the election is noteworthy – for example, southern in the election is noteworthy – for example, southern Kabila’s with frustrated appeared governments African failure to cooperate with their election-related initiatives. The DRC government turned down both South Africa The DRC government turned down both South Africa offers of technical support that followed a and SADC’s experts. election and officials SADC of visit 2017 December Nonetheless, while SADC leaders nudged Kabila toward Nonetheless, while SADC leaders nudged Kabila toward – neighbours immediate DRC’s of leaders some elections, Peace and Security Council re-emphasised its support for its support for Peace and Security Council re-emphasised Agreement and the implementation of the Saint Sylvester community called for the region and the wider international support for the financial and logistical technical, provide to elections. AT A REGIONAL LEVEL, THE AU A REGIONAL LEVEL, THEAT AU A SMALL LIAISONESTABLISHED OFFICE IN KINSHASA PREVENTIVE IN AND ENGAGED WITH CONGOLESE DIPLOMACYTALKS POLITICAL ACTORS AND REGIONAL LEADERS Western Western 26 The country also also country The 25 The government also indicated that it was not not The government also indicated that it was 24 At a regional level, the AU established a small liaison level, the AU established a small liaison At a regional
Congo’s National Independent ElectoralCongo’s Commission (CENI) tests a voting machine ahead of the postponed presidential election (24 December 2018). continued to suffer from recurrent outbreaks of the deadly deadly the of outbreaks recurrent from suffer to continued Ebola virus. The position of the government was seen as part of a scheme aimed at repairing the image of the DRC to make it attractive to foreign direct investment. in coordination with the Congolese authorities. However, However, authorities. Congolese the with coordination in from assistance any accept not would it that stated CENI the MONUSCO. governments and local civil society were sceptical about the the about sceptical were society civil local and governments capacity of the government to bear financial responsibility with place, take did elections the however, – elections the for funding. state enormous talks diplomacy in preventive and engaged Kinshasa in office AU The leaders. regional and actors political Congolese with open to having any outside special envoys observing the the observing envoys special outside any having to open elections, and demanded an exit strategy for MONUSCO. For various reasons, in April 2018 the government denied country the of in parts crisis a humanitarian of existence the Geneva, in conference international an attend to refused and organised by the United Nations (UN), to raise US$1.7 billion for emergency assistance for over 13 million people in violence. recent by affected Congo
31 Indeed, Tshisekedi’s posture towards Kabila Kabila towards posture Tshisekedi’s Indeed, 30 Tshisekedi was simply the least-worst option was simply the least-worst option Tshisekedi 29 Some regional powers did not publicly congratulate did not publicly congratulate Some regional powers after the elections surprised many. During a speech, he he During a speech, surprised many. after the elections as instead but an adversary, longer “no as Kabila to referred country”. our in change democratic the in partner a for Kabila and his networks, given Shadary’s manifest manifest Shadary’s given networks, his and Kabila for unpopularity. the need for stability in the country. The aftermath of the the of aftermath The country. the in stability for need the doubts credence to some has seemed to give elections that There are allegations credibility of the CENI. about the victor, Kabila to be declared struck a deal with Tshisekedi of the the election in favour difficult to rig when it proved behind influence exerting continue to sought Kabila FCC. the scenes. President Tshisekedi, and he has a legitimacy deficit to and he has a legitimacy deficit to President Tshisekedi, the government will likely find it overcome. As such, DRC the that reforms serious many the undertake to difficult the Dynamics in of legitimacy. lack of its requires, because new government. near future could be interesting for the down from office, Although Kabila has officially stepped to control he and his associates will most likely continue such as the military and the economic the levers of power, in His political coalition, with the majority of seats sector. in the choice of prime has a voice the National Assembly, of outcome the Furthermore, ministers. cabinet and minister I conflict trends The results of the elections were finally announced after after announced finally were the elections of results The
Voters queue outside a pollingVoters centre in Kinshasa, to cast their votes in the presidential and legislative elections (30 December 2018). 52 a long delay, amidst tensions and allegations of tampering and allegations of tampering amidst tensions delay, a long in the release the delay However, by different candidates. by the CENI as being a result of of results was explained of tally sheets from across the vast the slow transmission elections, the in of fraud were allegations There country. the candidate reason to challenge giving the runner-up there were concerns by both local results in court, and outcome. and international actors about the election – a call that was The AU called for a recount of the votes criticises election uncharacteristic of the AU, which rarely the ICGLR expressed “great concern” results. Similarly, for called initially SADC Interestingly, controversy. the about international the urge to backtrack later and only recount, a stressing sovereignty, community to respect the DRC’s The Post-election Environment and Prospects for Environment and Prospects for The Post-election Democratic Stability Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi – seemed not to be directly to be directly not – seemed and Burundi Rwanda Uganda, countries have all three neighbouring involved. Interestingly, to stay in in the past their own constitutions manipulated respect of to push for and so have little credibility power, their concerns vis-à-vis despite their security term limits, DRC. the with borders MONUSCO/JOHN BOPENGO REUTERS/KENNY KATOMBE
Congolese riot policemen disperse supporters of the runner-up in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s presidential election following his appeal, contesting the Congo’s National Independent Electoral Commission’s (CENI) results of the presidential election, at the constitutional court in Kinshasa (12 January 2019).
CONTRARY TO THE WIDELY HELD in response to the political developments in the country. Its mission remains essential for meeting the existing PERCEPTION OF THE RULING PARTY security challenges of the DRC – in particular, those posed HOLDING ON TO POWER THROUGH by armed groups in the east of the country. Nonetheless, ELECTIONS, THE OUTCOME WAS there is a gradual disengagement of the mission in tandem with the effective exercise of the full sovereignty of the state DIFFERENT IN THE DRC over the entire territory.36 It is, however, still unclear how the recent democratic transition can provide an enabling the senate elections in March 2019 seem to have tightened environment for lasting peace in the country, and possibly the leash on Tshisekedi, as the FCC won overwhelming lead to the end of one of the oldest peacekeeping missions control of the senate, with 90 of 108 seats.32 In May 2019, in Africa. Tshisekedi named Sylvestre Ilunga Ilukamba, former head of the national railway company, as the new prime minister. Conclusion This appointment comes from a political agreement between In hindsight, local and international pressure worked Tshisekedi and Kabila.33 to get Kabila to organise elections and respect the The election hurdle has been crossed, amidst some constitutional term limit. The delayed elections eventually challenges with consequences for political stability in took place amidst contentious political, financial and the country. While there are functioning executive and technical obstacles. Contrary to the widely held perception legislative arms of government in place, the DRC remains of the ruling party holding on to power through elections, unstable and underdeveloped, despite being rich in minerals. the outcome was different in the DRC. The contested The country continues to face severe challenges in exercising elections produced a government with a legitimacy deficit the essential functions of a state, such as security and to tackle the DRC’s multiple security and development sustainable development, and is placed 176th out of a possible challenges. Some argue that the acceptance by many 189 on the Human Development Index.34 Deadly epidemics, players in the international community of the outcome of the such as Ebola, continue to break out in the country, and January 2019 elections in the DRC in the name of stability, issues of sexual and gender-based violence persist – conflict- represents a failure to the Congolese people.37 The DRC has related sexual violence against women, girls and boys is benefited from significant international investments over rampant.35 MONUSCO has metamorphosed over the years the past two decades to help stabilise the country and the
conflict trends I 53 region. The international community must engage in robust un-right-conditions-needed-credible-elections-drc/4501481.html> Accessed 10 September 2018. preventive diplomacy to address some of the contentious issues still prevailing, and possibly push for important 18 International Crisis Group (2018) op. cit. political and institutional reforms that will contribute to 19 Englebert, Pierre (2019) ‘Congo’s 2018 Elections: An Analysis of Implausible Results. African Arguments’, 10 January, Available building confidence in future electoral processes, and to the at:
17 VOA News (2018) ‘UN: Right Conditions Needed for Credible Elections in DRC’, Available at: 54 I conflict trends BOOK REVIEW REVIEWED BY DUDZIRO NHENGU Conducting CONDUCTING TRACK II TRACK II Peacemaking PEACEMAKING: A PEACEMAKER’S Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess TOOLKIT BOOK 3 Authors Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess Year 2013 Publisher United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC ISBN 978-1-60127-069-6 Pages 88 (print), 84 (Kindle online) This handbook, Conducting Track II Peacemaking: may catalyse unwilling parties to rethink their interests A Peacemaker’s Toolkit Book 3, links the evolvement of track and positions. Track II can also facilitate communication, II diplomacy to the complexity and intractability of post-Cold build trust and relationships, break down stereotypes, and War conflicts. Modern-day conflicts involve too many actors develop new ways of seeing and solving vexing problems. with incompatible interests, violent histories and complex Further, track II can ameliorate situations where conflict international entanglements. As such, militaries and teams involves a party seen by another as “illegitimate”, as in the of mediators alone cannot make and keep the peace. case of terrorists. Track II actors can work quietly through In response to this situation, national and multinational back channels to ensure that the interests of an illegitimate actors have launched loosely coordinated peace efforts party are brought to the table – what the authors refer to as involving development specialists and relevant conflict the needs versus values approach. Where direct contact with resolution experts to complement track I efforts. illegitimate parties is legally prohibited, track II actors can The handbook delineates several levels of track I and work with surrogates – local citizens who share the same track II diplomacy. Track I refers to official interactions aspirations with illegitimate groups, but have legal access to between states and among several states, regionally or negotiate with the state. This is referred to in the handbook globally. Track II is the unofficial interaction and intervention as the lower-power parties versus the higher-power parties. of development actors with civil society, individuals or Theoretically, track II is a series of linear activities. groups of individuals – sometimes called “non-state actors”. In practice, however, the process is not as linear, and the The handbook also outlines, with examples, how track handbook clarifies that actors can decide to start with stage II efforts complement track I efforts in myriad ways and two before stage one, according to the specific conflict at various points. Track II prepares the ground for track I situation. Again, different track II practitioners can conduct various track II efforts concurrently in any one conflict setting – when track II practitioners bring parties together across or repeat the same steps within a single intervention – as the conflict lines to talk, build relationships, engage in joint civic situation demands. In some situations, while one track II actor projects, or even develop new ideas about potential political may undertake a similar series of steps with each activity, solutions to the conflict. Track II diplomacy is also valuable different track II practitioners may also conduct many other if conducted simultaneously with track I efforts, and can track II efforts simultaneously in the same conflict setting. complement post-track I efforts. The book acknowledges the In addition, the intervener is likely to repeat the same steps existence of multiple-track diplomacy, but limits discussions within a single intervention, conducting the same process to track I and track II diplomacy. with different audiences or modifying the process as the When a conflict is not ripe for negotiations, track II situation on the ground changes. Furthermore, some steps activities can stimulate ripeness. Third party consultation actually take place throughout the process – for example, conflict trends I 55 evaluation can start from beginning of the process and continue to the end. The handbook thus CONFLICT TRENDS discusses the need for ensuring that different peacemaking efforts complement and reinforce Editor-In-Chief one another. Creating such synergy involves not only aligning track I and track II efforts, but also Vasu Gounden coordinating the various track II efforts to maximise their positive impact. Managing Editor The first step in track II diplomacy involves conflict assessment or “going up on the balcony” Venashri Pillay to get a broader perspective of the situation, opportunities and challenges the intervention is Language Editor likely to encounter. This is also known as a needs assessment. Knowing the local history of Haley Abrahams track II activities helps determine what new activities will be both possible and fruitful. As noted, Design and Layout track II activities depend on the presence of a reasonably developed and active civil society for Immins Naudé success, but most importantly if that civil society voluntarily involves itself and does so in good Contributors faith. Interveners must thus assess attitudes, because if people are content with the status quo or pessimistic about the possibility for change, they will not participate effectively. Moreover, if Mark Chingono people are cajoled into participating, they are likely to undermine the process more than help Kabale Ignatius Mukunto it. Where little civil society activity exists, peacebuilding efforts can start prior to dialogues, Dudziro Nhengu workshops and other bilateral or multilateral processes. Sometimes, even where an active civil Brown Odigie society exists, track II efforts may be difficult because of restrictions on civil liberties. Al Chukwuma Okoli The second step includes developing a strategy for engagement – one that maximises Opeyemi Ademola Olayiwola benefits to bring about the desired change. This entails deciding on the level of intervention Naila Salihu (whether interpersonal, psychological or relational; interethnic dialogues and problem-solving workshops, or combining the two for maximum benefit) and planning for coordination (deciding Publisher how to fit the strategy into the larger picture of peacemaking activities, using the knowledge The African Centre for the gained in the needs assessment to prepare a map of past and present activities that will indicate Constructive Resolution of Disputes gaps, areas of need that are not being addressed, and possible avenues for coordination). (ACCORD) Private Bag X018 The third step centres on designing the best suitable process for the conflict. Processes include Umhlanga Rocks 4320 training, intergroup dialogues, interactive conflict resolution/problem-solving workshops, public South Africa peace and tolerance education (face to face or media-based), and joint projects (to increase Tel: +27 031 502 3908 collaboration and intergroup understanding). These processes are most useful if undertaken Fax: +27 031 502 4160 simultaneously with track I negotiations, to help bring broader segments of society together. Email: [email protected] Website: 1 Prescriptive training or intervention assumes that the intervener – the trainer, the dialogue facilitator or the mediator – is the “expert” and that they are sharing their expertise with the client. 2 The elicitive approach assumes that the clients are actually the experts – they understand their situation better than any outsider, and they know (though they may not realise that they know) the best way to solve their problem. 56 I conflict trends