ISSUE 2, 2019 Volume 1, Number 1, 1999 Traditions of conflict resolution in South Africa Grappling with the past The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Southern Africa in water crisis – A case study of theof thePangara River River water water shortage, shortage, 1987–1996 1987–1996 Towards a resource-based conflict management and resolution perspective Civil control over the security institutions in South Africa Suggestions for the future and notes on replicating the experience in Africa Prospects for African conflict resolution in the next millennium South Africa’s view 1992–2017 CT2|2019 CONTENTS EDITORIAL 2 by Vasu Gounden FEATURES 3 ECOWAS’s Efforts at Resolving Guinea-Bissau’s Protracted Political Crisis, 2015–2019 by Brown Odigie 12 Oil Pipeline Vandalism in the Niger Delta: Need, Greed and Grievance Factors by Al Chukwuma Okoli 20 Appraising Intergroup Contact in Zambia’s Electoral Politics by Kabale Ignatius Mukunto 28 Food Aid, Village Politics and Conflict in Rural Zimbabwe: The Case of the Tandi Chiefdom by Mark Chingono 36 A Leadership Perspective for Sustainable Peace in the Central African Republic by Opeyemi Ademola Olayiwola 45 Elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Naila Salihu BOOK REVIEW 55 Conducting Track II Peacemaking: A Peacemaker’s Toolkit Book 3 – Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess by Dudziro Nhengu Cover photo: Military and police peacekeepers serving with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) patrol the Muslim enclave of PK5 in Bangui (October 2017). UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe. conflict trends I 1 EDITORIAL BY VASU GOUNDEN On 3 February 1960, the United Kingdom prime to transform our economies, social systems and political minister Harold Macmillan, addressing the South African institutions. Parliament, said: “The wind of change is blowing through this These challenges will take decades and generations to continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of national address. In the meanwhile, the immediate challenge is how consciousness is a political fact.” Five decades later, those to ensure a smooth transition from one set of leaders to winds of change led to a substantially decolonised and free another; how to ensure continuity in governance and, where it continent. However, the shackles of poverty, unemployment has broken down, how to rebuild it; how to ensure continued and inequality have still not been removed for the vast or renewed safety, security and stability; and how to ensure majority of people on the continent. economic stability and growth. This is a tall order, even for Today, we once again see those winds of change sweeping the most efficient, honest and capable leaders. It is even more across Africa, bringing a renewed national consciousness. difficult where institutions of governance have deteriorated. This time, people are not removing colonial rulers but long- The recent cases of Zimbabwe, Algeria and Sudan need standing African rulers who have failed to deal with poverty, to be closely observed for lessons and solutions to these unemployment and inequality. Leaders in Burkina Faso, Libya, challenges. These countries are relatively stable, have the Central African Republic, Zimbabwe and, more recently, in not reached the stage of being failed states, still have their Algeria and Sudan have all been removed by street protests in institutions of governance that are relatively intact, and cities where people have been rapidly urbanising for the past have economies which can be turned around. Our ability to several decades. negotiate smooth transitions in these countries will determine An exponential population growth and multitudes of the fate of our continent. The current trends in Africa young people with little prospect of employment characterise indicate that these countries are not the last to experience cities in such countries. In addition, deteriorating public such challenges. Many relatively stable countries that have services, poor governance, corruption and economic and not succeeded in transforming their economies to address social marginalisation for the majority of people to the poverty, unemployment and inequality meaningfully will find advantage of a small political and business elite, have led to themselves in similar situations. a growing national consciousness around these challenges. These complex problems require reasoned thinking Triggers such as rising food and fuel prices, impacting on and analysis of actual events that are occurring for the the daily lives of people, have converted long-term structural development of appropriate solutions. Resorting to populist challenges into immediate crises. This has resulted in poverty, rhetoric will not resolve these challenges; neither will easy unemployment and inequality becoming a reality for middle- “either/or” dichotomous problem-solving. The solutions to class citizens, too, and driving solidarity among economically the current crises in Zimbabwe, Algeria and Sudan are not marginalised, economically disadvantaged and gainfully simply a choice between the negotiations and elections based employed people. on democratic principles that the protestors are calling for, or This national consciousness and class solidarity have the stability that the military promises. The problems are more been welcomed across the continent. However, it leaves us complex than just these choices. Therefore, we cannot reduce with new challenges to which we have few, if any, answers. our analysis and problem-solving of such complex challenges Prime among these questions is how to manage such to a simple choice between democracy and stability. transitions so that life, for those who are protesting injustices and inequalities, gets better and not worse. Our record in managing transitions has not been satisfactory, and part of the answer lies in the fact that we have not dealt with the Vasu Gounden is the Founder and Executive deep structural challenges that resulted from our failure Director of ACCORD. 2 I conflict trends ECOWAS’S EFFORTS AT RESOLVING GUINEA-BISSAU’S PROTRACTED POLITICAL CRISIS, 2015–2019 BY BROWN ODIGIE UN PHOTO/KARIM TIBARI Introduction serving personal interests, and general governance deficits. Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony in West Africa The case with Guinea-Bissau, however, is peculiar. It has a long with a population of 1.8 million people,1 has been embroiled in history of political and institutional fragility dating back to its political and institutional crises since August 2015, following independence in 1974, with recurring coups and assassinations the run-off presidential elections of May 2014 that produced of political leaders.2 With the exemption of President Vaz, President José Mário Vaz. The political and institutional crises had roots in certain structural factors common to most post-colonial African states: an underdeveloped economy, overdependence on foreign aid and former colonial masters, Above: José Mário Vaz was elected president of Guinea- fractionalised and factionalised elites, a praetorian army Bissau in the April 2014 election. conflict trends I 3 GUINEA-BISSAU Kolda Kounkané Bignona S E N EGA L Wassadou Sédhiou Salikénié Koumbakara Tanaf asam Cuntima Sare Bácar Pirada C an Cambaju Kandika ce Bajocunda Dungal Jumbembem Canhâmina Canquelifá Ziguinchor Diattakounda Paunca Oussouye Farim Mpak R . bari Buruntuma Bigene di m heu Canja Sonaco Canjufa ~ Cac Sao Domingos R. Contuboel Camajábà Ingoré Kabrousse Barro Mansaina Pitche Olossato a Mansabá b Gabú a Cacheu Gamamudo ê lib Susana . G o Varela u ~ R K e a h Jolmete Bissora Uacaba s c ~ Bafatá s a o C Sao Vicente p io OIO Gêba R C A C H E U am GAB Ú Cuitá R. C Foula Mori Bula ôa Cabuca Calequisse Canchungo Binar Mansôa ns Ma B A FAT Á Encheia R. Bambadinca Safim Nhacra Galomaro Porto Gole Caió a Xime ô s BIOMBO Gêb n Rio a I. de a Ché Ché M Jeta Bissau Dulombi Béli Ilha de o Quinhámel i Enxudé Pecixe R Prábis BISSAU Koumbia ATLANTIC Iljante Fulacunda R Tite Vendu Leidi . l C a Boé a o Xitole b b ru u ê bal r G o OCEAN d o C C a n a l . QUINAR A R Buba Ilha de Kambéra Féfiné Caravela Bolama I. de Ponta I. de Maio I. de Bolama e Dabalaré nd ra Caravela G ba Quebo lha de Ilha de io u Empada Abu I. das B Carache Formosa R e Galhinas d n R o . a g Balan o B O L AMA K I. de Enu I. de Soga Madina de G UINE A I. de Baixo li Arquipélago dos Bijagós ba Bedanda Rubane m I. de Uracane o Bubaque .T Catió I. de Unhocomo Ilha de R Kandiafara Ilha de o Bubaque Tombali h Uno in Uno z I. de T OMB A L I o Ilha de om Canogo oc Roxa Sangonha nh Eticoga National capital I. de U I. de Ilha de Ilha de Meneque Orangozinho Cacine Sansalé Orango Regional capital e in IIlha I. de Melo c Town, village a Campeane I. dos Cavalos Joao Vieira C o Airport Ilhéu i R do Meio Boke i GUINEA-BISSAU International boundary n Dobali o ^ p Iles m Regional boundary o Tristao K o i Main road 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 km R Secondary road 0 10 20 30 UN PHOTO/CIA PAK whose constitutionally mandated term of office ended on 23 June 2019, no elected president has ever completed a term of office – an indicator of the gravity of the country’s political instability. This article examines the lingering political crisis that erupted in August 2015 within the leadership cadre of the country’s governing elites, following the dismissal of Prime Minister (PM) Domingos Simões Pereira by President Vaz and the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) sustained efforts to foster peace, political stability and harmonious relationships among the country’s governing members. It concludes by noting that although ECOWAS and friends of Guinea-Bissau have a responsibility to assist the country in finding enduring solutions to its political and institutional crises, the primary responsibility rests with the country’s political and military leaders and their resolve to collectively act in the best interest of the country.