L. L. Farrar jr.

Separate Peace - General Peace - Total War The Crisis in German Policy during the Spring of 1917

Introduction: Policy-making in Crisis During the winter and spring of 1917 the World War entered a new stage marked by the change of important elements. Because previous military and diplomatic policies had failed, alternatives were sought. New means of mobilization had to be developed to replenish depleted human and material resources. These compulsions forced foreign and domestic policies to become more demagogic, interdependent, polarized and radical. In a general sense policy was popularized while the populace was polit- icized. The process reflected transition from relatively limited to relatively total war. This development can be conceived as a crisis. Many observers have regarded the period as a crisis in the general course of the war. Events in Germany are frequently described as a crisis. Historians designate as crises specific events during this period, such as the German peace move in December 1916, the launching of unlimited U-boat warfare, the Russian Revolution, American entry, the strikes in Germany during April, and the change of German chancellors in July 1917. Taken together, these evaluations indicate that these months are generally regarded as a crisis. While the notions of total war and crisis are thus generally accepted, their implications are less frequently drawn. This paper argues that the transition to total war and accom- panying crisis profoundly affected German policy-making and that traditional inter- pretations require reconsideration. The focus is German policy, but more general issues are involved. The general lines of German policy are designated as "separate peace", "general peace", and "total war". In evaluating the arguments for and feasi- bility of these policies, the efficacy of wartime policy in general is questioned. These policies are associated with individuals and groups — separate peace with German Chancellor Theobald v. Bethmann Hollweg and a number of German diplomats; general peace with Austro-Hungarian Emperor Carl and Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin, as well as the German left; and total war with the German Kaiser, High Command and right. Since these individuals' assumptions and preconceptions were reflected in their policies, the general problem of individual influence is raised. The internal discussion over German policy was conducted primarily by civilian and military leaders, as a consequence of which the broader issues of civil-military relations and diplomacy-strategy interdependence are implied. The debate also drew in an allied government and domestic elements, thereby posing the problems of alliance relations and public opinion for policy-making. The intensity of debate and confluence of these disparate issues caused a crisis of leadership which in turn threat- ened to have constitutional repercussions. Germany is the focus, but the policies of the other belligerents are summarized and provide a standard for judging German decisions. It is accordingly possible to speculate about the war in general at this juncture and about the broad effects of crisis on policy-making. The Spring 1917 crisis grew out of previous strategy and policy failures. German leaders had begun the war hoping that it could be quickly won by essentially military means. Victory, however, eluded them, and they decided in November 1914 that they could win only if the enemy coalition were divided. They accordingly sought during 1915 to conclude a separate understanding above all with Russia but also with France. These efforts proved unsuccessful by the end of 1915, and 51 MGM 2/76 German policy-makers concentrated during the first six months of 1916 on forcing France to make peace by attacking Verdun. But German leaders recognized by the summer of 1916 that France would not sue for peace and reverted during the autumn to diplomatic means in pursuit of understandings with Russia and France. Each of these failures caused a more or less serious crisis. These crises generally included military, naval, diplomatic and sometimes - though not usually - domestic events. They recur with notable regularity three times each year during the spring, summer and autumn/winter, and are separated by periods of relative calm. Although unique in detail, these crises have some common features. The winter crises tend to be characterized by re-evaluation of previous events and planning the next spring's campaign. The spring crises usually are dominated by launching or repulsion of offen- sives. The summer crises generally mark final attempts for success and/or recognition of failure. These characteristics are doubtless best explained in terms of the require- ments of the campaigning season. They suggest a rough typology: Planning (winter) Crises, Confrontation (spring) Crises, Resolution (summer) Crises. The Spring 1917 Crisis consequently falls into the category of Confrontation Crisis. Another general feature of these crises is the increasing intensity and seriousness. This tendency emerges clearly in the crises of late 1916 and 1917. The Summer 1916 Crisis (June- August) was more intensive than its predecessors but led to the more serious Winter 1916-1917 Crisis (December 1916-January 1917), which was followed by the more intensive Spring 1917 Crisis (April-May) and by the even more serious Summer 1917 Crisis (July). It may be that there is a cumulative effect from crisis to crisis, each beginning at a higher level than the previous and to some extent following from it. The Spring 1917 Crisis was consequently one in a series of increasingly ominous crises, grew out of the Winter 1916-1917 Crisis, and prepared the way for the Summer 1917 Crisis.

The Winter Crisis and February Aftermath (December 1916-March 14, 1917) The Winter Crisis marked a turning point both in German policy and the war. It in- volved fundamental changes in German diplomacy, strategy, domestic affairs and control over policy-making. The crisis was a response to the failures of the previous months and indeed years, and would affect the course of German policy and strategy until the end of the war. By the end of 1916 previous German policy had proven bankrupt. Bethmann failed during the autumn to reach a separate understanding with either Russia or France through secret contacts. The replacement in August of Erich v. Falkenhayn as Chief of General Staff, which Bethmann had hoped would expedite his policy, in fact was a pyrrhic victory. Paul v. Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, the new High Com- mand, complicated Bethmann's efforts to achieve a separate peace with Russia by raising the Polish issue. Meanwhile it became clear that the High Command would demand unrestricted U-boat warfare which would probably bring the United States into the war against Germany. Bethmann consequently encouraged an American mediatory proposal with the apparent dual purpose of dividing the Entente and mol- lifying the Americans in the event of unrestricted U-boat warfare. He may also have hoped for a general peace on the basis of the existing status quo - i.e., German pre- dominance on the continent though not extensive expansion - but it is not clear and probably unlikely. When the American offer was not forthcoming by early December, Bethmann decided that the Central Powers should make their own offer. Doing so had the potential disadvantages of implying German weakness and alienating the Americans, but they were outweighed by the advantages of responding to Austro- Hungarian requests for such a move, reassuring the German people of the German government's willingness to make peace and justifying eventual recourse to un- restricted U-boat warfare. The resulting Central Powers peace offer of December 12 was in fact followed by an American offer announced by President Woodrow Wilson on December 18. All the belligerents were thereby forced to confront the peace problem as they had not since the outbreak of war. The Entente governments bluntly rejected the German offer as a tactic to divide them - a relatively accurate evaluation - but, in order not to alienate Wilson, were more responsive to his suggestion and listed their least aggressive conditions. The German reply to Wilson was likewise moderate in tone but did not include the statement of the conditions Wilson had requested. The Central Powers peace move marked the culmination of Bethmann's efforts to divide the Entente. The Entente's brusque rejection alienated most Germans and reinforced the view that peace was impossible and that victory should be sought with more extreme means1. These means were already being prepared. Hindenburg and Ludendorff had post- poned unrestricted U-i>oat warfare only until the military situation became more secure in December with the defeat of Rumania. They apparently agreed to Beth- mann's peace offer in order to justify U-boat warfare to the German people, the neu- trals and possibly the Americans; they neither expected nor desired a general peace. After the anticipated Efttente rejection, the High Command and Admiralty inten- sified their agitation. Bethmann resisted with the argument that unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring in the United States and insure German defeat. The High Com- mand contended on the contrary that German defeat was unavoidable unless radical means were employed. The U-boat would at least offer the possibility that Britain might capitulate before the United States was actually engaged. When Bethmann could present no persuasive alternative, the Kaiser decided on January 9 that unre- stricted U-boat warfare would begin on February 1. The decision was probably due less to specific arguments than to the crisis mentality which made the departure seem the only choice and therefore necessitated by circumstances2. This fundamental reorientation of German naval strategy was accompanied and partially justified by a change in German land operations and domestic policy. Luden- dorff concluded from the 1916 campaigns that Germany could win only if its in- feriority in men were offset by greater materiel; it was mandatory to postpone a major land offensive during 1917 while more effectively mobilizing German resources for a final effort in 1918. The High Command consequently developed a defensive strategy involving strategic withdrawals and strong fortifications3. At the same time - and as a precondition for agreeing to Bethmann's peace move - they forced through the Reichstag on December 5 the Auxiliary Service Law (Hilfsdienstgesetz), which was designed to organize the German economy for greater production4. To arouse public and troop support for continuing the war, the High Command launched a propaganda campaign extolling German military accomplishments, encouraging hopes in the U-boat's success, fostering expansive war aims, and justifying per- severence as necessitated by the Entente's rejection of the German peace offer5. The High Command thereby produced a program for total war. Parallel though not yet as extreme events occurred in German domestic politics. The Hilfsdienstgesetz was condemned by the left as an effort to "militarize" German life, but it had the unforeseen effect of incorporating traditional dissidents - the Social Democrats and labor unions - into the war effort as they had not previously been6. Both the removal in November of the prohibition against public discussion of war aims and the peace moves of December increasingly politicized the masses. Entente rejection of the Central Powers peace offer probably convinced most Germans that unrestricted U-boat warfare was necessary and desirable7. While moderate Socialists remained committed to the war, radical Socialists declared their opposition in January 19178. German society consequently experienced the conflicting impulses of greater coherence and increased tension. The pressures of war and departures in policy during December and January altered the power structure and personal authority of German leaders. Bethmann had advocated Falkenhayn's replacement by Hindenburg and Ludendorff both because he assumed their strategy would expedite his policy of dividing the Entente and Hindenburg's prestige would insure the German people's acceptance of whatever policy the government proposed. As Bethmann found out, however, during the U-boat debate, Hindenburg's prestige was a double-edged sword. The High Com- mand had its own ideas about policy and was willing to use the threat of resignation to impose them. The High Command's domestic prestige had been demonstrated during October when one political party (the Catholic Center) had voted to leave the U-boat decision in the High Command's hands. The view that victory depended ultimately on Germany's resources signaled future High Command intervention into domestic affairs. Previous failures ill-equiped Bethmann to defend against these inroads on his authority. The shift of authority was registered during November in personnel terms when Gottlieb v. Jagow was replaced as state secretary of foreign affairs by Arthur Zimmermann, who was more sympathetic to the High Command. Bethmann himself considered resigning as a result of the U-boat decision but did not in order to conceal the disagreements from the German public and the enemy, and perhaps also in the hope of subsequently reviving his policy of dividing the Entente9. Although Bethmann had acceded in the U-boat question, his advocacy of the peace move and efforts to postpone a break with the United States alienated the High Command and they unsuccessfully sought his dismissal10. The Winter 1917 Crisis consequently caused not only profound changes in strategy and policy but also a readjustment of authority and increase of personal antipathies among German policy-makers. Fundamental departures also were made by the other belligerents during this period. Austro-Hungarian leadership was altered when Francis Joseph was succeeded in November by Carl and Stephan Burian was replaced as foreign minister in Decem- ber by Ottokar Czernin. Although Burian had pressed during late 1916 for a Cen- tral Powers peace offer, Carl and Czernin were more committed to peace because they felt Austria-Hungary was on the verge of collapse. Carl therefore launched an effort during January to reach the French through his wife's brothers, Sixtus and Xavier, princes of Bourbon-Parma. Vienna was also responsive to American media- tory efforts. Vienna and Berlin cooperated on their joint peace offer which Bethmann seems to have hoped would consolidate the alliance, but they consulted only sporad- ically thereafter, perhaps because Carl was mildly anti-German and the Austro- Hungarians were unsympathetic toward the U-boat. Thus Austro-Hungarian policy changed hands, became more peace-oriented and threatened to cause alliance ten- sions11. The Entente meanwhile became more committed to the war. The British too changed leaders: Herbert Asquith was replaced in December by David Lloyd George, a symbolic if not actual indicator of determination to defeat Germany and centralize the war effort12. The Russian government remained but was severely criticized in the Duma for inefficient prosecution of the war13. The French govern- ment likewise continued in office but the military command passed in December from Joseph Joffre to the more confident Robert Nivelle, who persuaded the Entente governments that the war could be won in the spring by coordinated offensives14. By forcing the Entente governments to consult and coordinate their replies, the Cen- tral Power and American peace moves had the net effect of consolidating the alliance. Likewise the peace moves resulted in public statements of Entente aims designed to augment popular support for the war. Thus like Germany the Entente powers moved in the general direction of total war. The Winter Crisis was followed by a calm. The high tension and frenetic activity of German policy-making during December and January lessened notably during February and early March. This reduction of activity was relative and applied only to the top decision-makers, whereas intense energy was expended at lower levels. It was probably due to the fact that the decisions ofDecember and January set the course of German policy and strategy for the following months and no further basic decision was required until results were clear. After the peace campaign of December and January, German diplomacy was relatively inactive. Bethmann maintained contact with ostensible channels to the French government but regarded a separate peace as momentarily unlikely15. The German government worked to postpone American entry but made no serious concession16. Actual combat on both fronts was restricted. Unrestricted U-boat warfare was launched on February 1 but required time to prove itself. Intensive preparations of defensive fortifications on the western front were finally completed and strategic withdrawals conducted in the middle of March. The Hilfsdienstgesetz was meanwhile instituted with largely unfavorable results17. Some domestic political disputes flared up over reform and war aims but Bethmann managed to dampen them in a Reichstag speech of February 27 with his standard tactic of vague phrases on domestic affairs and strong words about the war18. Although Bethmann received from the right some criticism which the High Command probably sup- ported, relations between civilian and military leaders were not openly strained. The conflicts of December and January had momentarily abated. The policy-makers of the other belligerents were more active than the Germans during the period but were less active than they themselves had been during the Winter Crisis. Austro-Hungarian peace efforts were intensified. Vienna sought to avoid a break with the United States but was unsuccessful because the Americans were interested only in dividing the Central Powers. Carl's efforts to reach the French through his brother-in-law, Sixtus, were increased and supplemented by Czernin's contacts with the French through Switzerland. Although they did not yet inform the Germans and there was little consultation between the allies during this period, Carl and Czernin were probably loyal to the alliance and hoped for a general peace19. But, like the Americans, the French and their allies wanted a separate peace in order to defeat Germany. The British and French coordinated plans for their campaign, while the French encouraged a Russian offensive with the promise of ex- tensive war aims. Domestic disturbances occurred in Russia but did not become serious until early March. Although they rejected peace with Germany and planned a new offensive, British leaders were uncertain whether Germany could actually be defeated or the U-boat danger overcome and were therefore anxious to bring the United States into the war20. Like the Germans the other belligerents thus pursued policies established during the Winter Crisis, made feverish preparations, and awaited their results in the spring with a mixed sense of anticipation and anxiety.

The Spring Crisis: The Diplomatic Beginning (March 14 - April 18, 1917) A new crisis erupted during the spring of 1917. Planned actions (particularly military strategy), anticipated events (such as American entry), and unexpected eventualities (above all, the Russian revolution) suddenly altered the war. Activities and tensions radically increased. German separate peace diplomacy - largely discontinued since late 1916 - was revived but proponents of total war simultaneously intensified their efforts and a severe conflict over the direction and control of German policy resulted. This struggle was complicated by other events. Germany's allies and enemies aug- mented their own peace efforts during this period. Military and naval offensives implied the possibility of radical changes in the general situation. Domestic politics - in Germany as well as elsewhere - were suddenly in flux and threatened to encroach on governmental control over policy. Relations among allies were tested and some- times strained. An imminent break in the stalemate which had characterized the war since late 1914 seemed conceivable21. German efforts to divide the Entente resumed when the possibility of separate peace appeared to improve in mid-March. At first an understanding looked more likely with France than Russia. In preparation for another meeting with Sixtus, Czernin urged Bethmann and Zimmermann on March 16 to approve conversations and out- line minimal and maximal aims. Bethmann was sceptical: although the U-boat and Russian domestic disturbances might have made the French amenable, he doubted they would negotiate until their spring offensive had failed. Since he wished neither to jeopardize negotiations nor alienate Czernin, Bethmann nonetheless stipulated minimal conditions (border exchanges in the west and status quo ante bellum in the east) and agreed to conversations on condition that no specific terms be mentioned until Germany was included and genuine negotiations were actually underway. When Sixtus informed Czernin and Carl on March 23-24 that extensive German concessions (probably including all of Alsace-Lorraine) were mandatory for peace with France, Vienna sought to cajole, bribe and frighten them out of Berlin22. In his meeting with Czernin on March 26 Bethmann, however, not only refused but also made even the smallest border concessions in Alsace-Lorraine contingent on German acquisition of Briey-Longwy and extensive rights in Belgium; to avoid an impasse and hopefully foster negotiations, Bethmann urged that no conditions whatsoever be mentioned. Zimmermann was even more adamant: the Russian revolution, the U-boat and the anticipated failure of the Anglo-French spring offensive would force France to conclude peace without receiving concessions23. Faced with this intran- sigence, Czernin offered to make concessions to the Entente and even to Germany if Berlin would be more responsive. When this too failed, Carl and Czernin tried the ultimate threat: in a meeting with German leaders on April 3 they claimed that Austria-Hungary would collapse unless peace were concluded soon24. Because of their own information to the contrary and Vienna's unwillingness to make conces- sions to Italy, German leaders doubted the Austro-Hungarian situation was so desperate and again refused concessions in Alsace-Lorraine. Bethmann nonetheless urged the contact with the French be pursued but Czernin concluded that the German refusal precluded success25. The Germans meanwhile sought their own contacts with the French. As Botho v. Wedel, German ambassador in Vienna, observed at the end of March, "we can cook our own soup better ourselves"26. The long-anticipated fall of Aristide Briand's cabinet on March 16 seemed the propitious moment. Zimmermann informed a Swiss intermediary that "Germany is inclined to allow France a favorable peace if it asks in time"; despite distinctly inconducive conditions, Zimmermann and his contact expected a positive response27. Zimmermann meanwhile intensified anti-war pro- paganda in France28. Bethmann was less sanguine and considered somewhat more attractive conditions, but — in accordance with his operating assumption that negotia- tions would be best encouraged by not stipulating terms beforehand - he avoided any mention of France in his Reichstag speech of March 27 29. A meeting between the President of the French Chamber, Paul Deschanel, and the German political adviser in Brussels, Oskar v. Lancken-Wakenitz, was reportedly being arranged. It seemed in early April that "an understanding with France might be possible" in the near future30. A separate peace with France was in fact virtually impossible. Carl's letter of March 24 was delivered by Sixtus on March 31 to French President Raymond Poincare, who read it as a renewed Austro-Hungarian request for separate peace. Despite Sixtus' protests, Poincare conferred on April 19 with Italian Foreign Minister Giorgio Sonnino and Lloyd George, all of whom immediately rejected peace with Germany and, when Sonnino insisted on concessions from Austria-Hungary, they decided against negotiations with Austria-Hungary since they might jeopardize the Entente alliance. Lloyd George advocated maintaining contact with Sixtus but Poincare told Sixtus that negotiations were pointless31. Entente intransigence was probably rein- forced by high Anglo-French hopes for their offensive launched in early April and American entry on April 6. The Germans were consequently unlikely to divide the Entente by a separate peace with France. Instead Russia suddenly seemed the more promising candidate. Revolution had broken out during the second week of March and a Provisional Government was formed on March 14 to succeed the Tsar, who abdicated the next day. Russian domestic events immediately had profound implications for Russian diplomacy. The new Russian foreign Minister, Paul Miliukov, publicly reassured his allies on March 17 that the new government would honor its alliance obligations. But at the end of March Russian Socialists - above all, the Petrograd Soviet - precipitated a public debate with demands for peace without annexations or indemnities. The government on March 29 reaffirmed both its alliance and the objective of acquiring the German and Austro-Hungarian sections of Poland, but the Soviet countered on April 2 with a reiteration of its opposition to annexations and indemnities. Miliukov rejected the Soviet's demand as serving only German interests and advocated instead Russian control over the Dardanelles and dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Under pressure from the Soviet the government drew back, however, with a statement of April 9 that it would defend Russia but not threaten other states32. The Russian debate not only launched the peace question but established its basic outline. The Russian revolution was perceived by Entente leaders almost exclusively in terms of its implications for Russia's war effort. The Provisional Government's takeover was initially interpreted as increasing Russia's war potential. It also removed the stigma of seeming to fight for the preservation of Russian autocracy; indeed Wilson's decision to enter the war may have been reinforced by a desire to preserve Russian democracy33. The Provisional Government's announced intention of continuing the war notwithstanding, allied representatives in Petrograd soon recognized that the Russian government would have to make concessions on the peace issue to remain in power since the radicals favored rapid peace at almost any price and all parties were tired of war. They felt, however, that the statement of April 9 acceded excessively to the Soviet's pressure and were even more disturbed by rumors of separate peace between Russia and the Central Powers34. They encouraged Russian commitment to the war by justifying their own aims and sending moderate socialists and labor leaders to Russia - a tactic which backfired when some epvoys were con- verted by Russian radicals to the peace without annexations formula35. The Rus- sian situation in mid-April was consequently uncertain but not yet threatening to allied hopes for keeping Russia in the war. Like Russia's allies, the Germans viewed Russian events in terms of their effect on Russia's commitment to war. German leaders had previously hoped for a Russian revolution, had exploited the possibility as an inducement for Russian conservatives to conclude a separate peace, and had encouraged it whenever feasible. The event had nonetheless taken them by surprise since most had expected it only after Russia had concluded a disadvantageous peace (as in 1905) rather than before and as a result of national rather than social tensions. The revolution was initially interpreted by Ger- man leaders as disadvantageous - the result of British machinations - and potentially subversive for German domestic politics. They soon became inclined, however, to see the revolution as a possible advantage in at least reducing Russia's war effort and at best producing a separate peace36. What they had sought so persistently but un- successfully by military and diplomatic means might yet result from Russian domestic events. Central Power leaders soon agreed that the revolution was favorable but disagreed on how it should be exploited. According to German contacts, there existed three Russian currents of opinion toward peace. The Conservatives reportedly wanted an unfavorable peace (either immediately or after further defeats) in order to facilitate a counter-revolution. The Liberals, already dominating the Provincial Government, supposedly desired an immediate, moderate peace in order to consolidate their power. The radicals would apparently resist peace until they could use it to gain power, at which time they would seek conditions similar to those demanded by the Liberals. Center Party Reichstag delegate Matthias Erzberger, who advocated rapid under- standings with Russia and France, was informed by a Russian contact (Kolyshko) at the end of March that peace was feasible with the Provisional Government. He advo- cated a positive response because the Liberals "desired genuine friendship with Ger- many", had already achieved their major war aim in the "abolition of autocracy", and would conclude peace if openly encouraged by Berlin - an evaluation seemingly corroborated by a Bulgarian contact with Russian Foreign Minister Miliukov37. Bethmann seems to have been convinced by this argument and encouraged nego- tiations by asserting in his Reichstag speech of March 29 that Germany would neither meddle in Russian internal affairs nor attack in the near future and desired peace on "an honorable basis"38. Czernin meanwhile set a different course on which he would continue until mid-May. Like Bethmann he switched focus from France to Russia at the beginning of April but his objective was less peace with the Provisional Government than reinforcement of Russian peace forces - particularly the Petrograd Soviet - in order to facilitate a separate peace preliminary to general peace. He felt this could be achieved only by a specific, public statement of Central Power aims and accordingly followed Beth- mann's Reichstag speech with a responsive press statement of his own but failed to elicit a similar pronouncement from the Germans in their meeting of April 3—439. When the Soviet demand for peace without annexations or indemnities was reported in Vienna, he urged Central Power acceptance. These pleas were reinforced on April 12 by a lengthy memorandum arguing that peace was necessary and on April 13 with a hint that Austria-Hungary might otherwise conclude a separate peace40. A third approach to peace with Russia was advocated by the High Command, Kaiser and Zimmermann. Their perception of alternatives was probably best summarized on April 2 by Ulrich v. Brockdorff-Rantzau, German minister in Copenhagen: if Germany could not survive through 1917, war aims should be renounced and a rapid peace concluded with the Provisional Government; but, if Germany could continue, the revolution would cause Russia's collapse and allow Germany to dictate peace. If the second option were chosen, Rantzau advocated encouraging "as much chaos as possible in Russia" by aiding radicals and fostering dissension but avoiding either military operations or the appearance of intervention in Russian internal affairs41. Since they were confident that Germany could last out the year, the High Command opted for the second alternative. While recognizing that separate peace with Russia might serve as the means of inducing France and Britain to sue for peace, they also regarded Russia itself as a major end of the war, i.e., for territorial acquisitions. A choice between separate peace with Russia and war aims from Russia was therefore neither necessary nor desirable; Germany might yet win on both fronts and total war would thereby produce total victory. The High Command and Zimmermann accord- ingly pursued objectives as outlined by Rantzau. At the end of March the High Com- mand (and Bethmann) approved and Zimmermann arranged Lenin's return to Rus- sia42. Operations on the eastern front were discontinued on April 3. When depu- tations of Russian soldiers asked in early April for a guarantee of moderate terms and non-intervention in Russian internal affairs, the High Command advocated acquiescence to promote antipathy of soldiers against government and thus military collapse43. Convinced by these events and Czernin's peace campaign that negotia- tions with Russia might be imminent, the High Command - with the support of the Kaiser and Zimmermann - suggested on April 5 that they consult on war aims to be demanded of Russia44. Bethmann tried to parry these thrusts from Czernin and the High Command in order to pursue his own peace policy. On April 11 he rejected Czernin's suggestion of a public Central Power acceptance of the Russian government's peace formula45. Bethmann and Zimmermann met on April 12 with Erzberger, who was now sanguine about the imminence of confidential negotiations with the Russian government and was authorized to pursue them. In order to mollify Czernin, pacify German public opinion and perhaps buttress his own position against the High Command, Bethmann requested the Kaiser's authorization for an official reaffirmation of Central Power willingness to conclude peace. The Kaiser, however, refused and recommended instead an unofficial press statement and confidential negotiations46. Arguing that it was the best method of fostering "peace propaganda and the process of collapse in Russia", Bethmann accordingly suggested such a press announcement to Czernin, who agreed, and statements were issued by Vienna on April 14 and Berlin on April 1547. Bethmann then turned to meet the impulses from the High Command and Kaiser. In answering their request for a program of war aims, Bethmann first sought to appease the High Command by granting the desirability of consultation and aims but in fact urged return to his own policy. "Our objective will be what it has always been, namely, to achieve a separate peace with one of our enemies . . . The guiding thought will be to shatter the present enemy coalition and to bring one or more of them over to our side in future." A separate understanding would best be facilitated by allow- ing war aims to be determined by the situation when peace was concluded rather than rigid programs. Bethmann endeavored to maintain control over eventual negotiations by claiming the Kaiser's authorization to determine political and economic conditions, but tried to pacify the High Command and Admiralty by acknowledging the war aims they had demanded in December 191648. The Kaiser then jeopardized Bethmann's policy by advocating official discouragement of public discussion of peace without annexations but encouragement of a separate peace with Russia by offering relatively moderate terms. As with Czernin and the High Com- mand, Bethmann sought to reject the proposal without alienating the Kaiser. Though he agreed to restrain the public debate confidentially, he opposed official statements on war aims since general renunciation implied German weakness, renunciation toward Russia encouraged Anglo-French counter-pressure on Russia, extremism induced the Entente to fight on, and any statement heightened tension within Ger- many. Instead "it is necessary to find a reasonable middle way between these two extremes" of dictated peace and renunciatory peace, i.e., "a favorable negotiated peace" through concessions and moderation before Austria-Hungary collapsed and the United States became engaged49. Three views thus competed for control over German policy. On one extreme maximal war aims, total war and dictated peace were advocated by the High Command and Kaiser. On the other extreme official renunciation of war aims, discontinuation of war and negotiated, general peace were urged by Czernin. In between a middle way of relatively moderate war aims, limited war and negotiated, separate peace was advocated by Bethmann. The conceptions were incompatible and could co-exist only so long as their advocates avoided direct conflict.

The Spring Crisis: The Diplomatic Confrontation (April 19 - May 15, 1917) Having brewed for a month, the crisis erupted at the end of April. It became un- avoidable when the exponents of these policies insisted on acceptance by their op- ponents. In the process a brief marriage of convenience was arranged between the extremes against the middle. The crisis ended in mid-May with extremist success barely concealed by the middle's weak claim of compromise. The confrontation among German leaders occurred when the Kaiser acceded to the demands of the High Command and Admiralty for a war aims conference50. The essential issue of control over policy was thereby decided in favor of the High Com- mand even before the meeting which served only to allow the High Command to present a program of extensive war aims51. These aims were partially inspired by the High Command's favorable perception of the immediate situation. After brief anxiety about the Anglo-French attacks of mid-April, they concluded that the western front would hold, while the eastern front was secure because of the revolution. The U-boat promised imminent British collapse, whereas neither American entry nor Austro- Hungarian exit seriously concerned the High Command52. But circumstances do not explain the High Command's war aims since they made similar demands under less promising conditions. The aims reflected their mental set: because total victory and total defeat seemed the only alternatives, extreme aims followed logically. For his part, Bethmann may have made an effort to mitigate the program but did not seri- ously contest it. He rejected the recourse of resigning over what he termed "fantasies" and officially acknowledged the High Command's blueprint for a dictated peace but confidentially dismissed it as a temporary arrangement and intended to control negotiations himself53. Bethmann's reservations notwithstanding, the Kreuznach conference reaffirmed total war as German policy. The implications of the Kreuznach decision were immediately clear. The High Com- mand imposed its control over negotiations with Russia. When they discovered Erz- berger's negotiations which Bethmann had concealed from them and the Kaiser, the High Command extracted a disavowal from Zimmermann and the Kaiser insisted on approving future negotiations54. The High Command meanwhile consolidated its direction of front talks. In early April Ludendorff had requested guidelines from Zimmermann but at the end of April demanded Zimmermann's approval for their expansion55. The High Command also extended its influence to include relations with Austria-Hungary. The generals had buttressed Austro-Hungarian self-con- fidence during their meeting of April 3 and above all in the optimistic replies to Czernin's memorandum of April 12. Viewing the Kreuznach program as only a prelude, they demanded consultation on war aims with Austro-Hungarian leaders56. In short, High Command intended both to formulate and conduct policy. The divergences among German leaders were accompanied by alliance tensions. They were caused by Czernin, who felt negotiations with Russia necessitated extracting from Bethmann a more specific renunciation of annexations than the German press release of April 15. He accordingly tried to make Bethmann overcome internal resistance - above all from the High Command and Pan Germans - by using not only conventional diplomatic channels but also "paradiplomacy", i.e., contacting the German High Command and domestic elements, as well as issuing public statements himself57. Increasingly frustrated by Bethmann's refusal to renounce war aims publicly, Czernin endeavored to use the German High Command as a threat, al- though he was aware that the High Command itself favored extensive war aims. For their part, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were willing to exploit Czernin's approach to make Bethmann arrange a war aims conference with the Austro-Hungarians. Czernin meanwhile urged Erzberger and Bavarian Prime Minister Georg v. Hert- ling to persuade Bethmann to issue a renunciation of war aims. When Austro- Hungarian and German Socialists demanded peace without annexations, Czernin publicly approved and pressed the German government to do the same58. While the High Command conducted total war, Czernin pursued general peace. German civilian leaders worked against these impulses. Zimmermann initially resisted High Command and Austro-Hungarian demands for an allied war aims conference but finally acceded59. He and Bethmann meanwhile endeavored to conceal or ameliorate what they could not alter. When front talks with the Russians were apparently developing into serious negotiations at the beginning of May, they granted the desirability of territorial acquisitions but persuaded the High Command to drop the unpalatable terms "annexations" and "border corrections" in order to "dress these [border] states up as independent" although they would in actuality be "joined to us"60. A Foreign Office member was included along with a Social Demo- crat and High Command representative in a German delegation requested by the Russians for front talks with an expected envoy of the Provisional Government61. Zimmermann complained bitterly about Czernin's machinations (through the High Command, Erzberger and Herding) which jeopardized Bethmann's position. Recognizing that Bethmann's replacement by an extreme annexationist would be detrimental to his own policy, Czernin discontinued his agitation, patched up relations with Bethmann, and thereby wound down alliance tensions62. Bethmann had in the interim answered Czernin's pessimistic memorandum of April 12 with the High Command's optimistic prognostications in order to persuade Czernin that peace at any price was unnecessary63. Thus Bethmann sought to restrain and navigate between the extremists. The middle way nonetheless became narrower. The High Command publicly pro- claimed its optimism and confidentially predicted a second war, while the Kaiser urged on Bethmann aims even more extreme than those envisaged in the Kreuznach program. They exhorted Bethmann to reject publicly a peace without annexations and demanded consultation on his impending Reichstag speech. When the conference with Austro-Hungarian leaders was finally decided upon, an agenda was worked out jointly by High Command and Foreign Office representatives64. Although he dis- continued his criticism of Bethmann, Czernin rejected Bethmann's confident predic- tions and entreated him to renounce annexations in his Reichstag speech. The poten- tially most dangerous weapon in Czernin's hands, however, remained leaving the war. After Carl and Czernin met with Sixtus again, Czernin suggested to Bethmann on May 13 the possibility of an Austro-Hungarian "legitimate separate peace" pre- liminary to general peace65. At the same time Bethmann was pressed to renounce annexations by proponents of a separate peace with Russia because serious negotia- tions seemed imminent66. Domestic elements simultaneously demanded contra- dictory war aims statements67. Bethmann characteristically endeavored to reconcile the irrenconcilable in his speech on May 15. He hoped to mollify the High Command, 61 Kaiser and German right by proclaiming "complete agreement with the High Com- mand" on war aims, confidence in victory and opposition to peace without annex- ations. He sought to pacify Czernin and the German left by denying alliance discord and rejecting extreme annexations. Between these extremes he pursued his own objec- tive of a separate understanding with Russia by reaffirming Germany's willingness to conclude an "honorable peace" and by fostering dissension among tlic Entente powers. Bethmann thus proclaimed not one but three incompatible policies68. The contra- dictions were equally clear during the Austro-German war aims conference at Kreuz- nach on May 17-18. As at the previous Kreuznach conference the issue was less what war aims should be than who should project them and it had been effectively decided when the High Command and Czernin imposed their demand for the con- ference. The High Command achieved its objective of Austro-Hungarian approval for maximal German aims. Like Bethmann, Czernin regarded these aims as unlikely though desirable and himself proposed maximal aims but his main concern and per- haps the meeting's most significant result was German commitment to the Austro- Hungarian territorial integrity. Bethmann again apparently played the marginal role of scaling down aims wherever possible69. Both Bethmann's speech and the Kreuz- nach conferences were, however, less important for their details than as reflexions of the cross currents in Central Power policy and its domination by the High Command and Czernin.

The central issue in these discussions - policy toward Russia - depended on develop- ments in Russia. Evaluating the situation was complicated by a fundamental recon- struction of Russian institutions. The Petrograd Soviet was meanwhile increasingly organized, Socialist-dominated, rivaled the Provisional Government's authority and advocated peace without annexations - agitation which was intensified after Lenin's arrival in mid-April. The government and army responded with anti-peace propa- ganda which raised tension and a crisis was precipitated in early May when Miliukov secretly reassured Russia's allies that the government would continue the war and not conclude a separate peace. The Soviet opposed this statement, rejected con- tinuation of the war, and demanded Russian and Entente commitment to peace with- out annexations. Miliukov's reply constituted a classic diplomatic formulation of the issues: Russia could maintain its great power status by fulfilling alliance commit- ments or abdicate as a great power by renouncing its allies. The government tried to satisfy both the Soviet and Russia's allies by qualifying Miliukov's statement but reaffirming its commitment to the alliance and war. The Soviet was, however, con- ducting a semi-autonomous foreign policy by inaugurating front talks with the Germans and agreeing to attend a Socialist meeting in Stockholm. The government strove to re-establish its authority and Miliukov refused demands to reveal the secret treaties among the Entente powers. The crisis culminated when Miliukov (along with several other ministers) resigned and a new cabinet including Socialists was formed on May 18 and approved by the Soviet next day. Although it reaffirmed the alliance and refusal to publish the secret treaties, the new government urged peace without annexations on its allies. It was widely perceived as Soviet-controlled, in- clined to an immediate peace, and a further step in the revolutionary process70. Russian events consequently appeared more conducive to the extreme policies of the High Command and Czernin than to Bethmann's middle way or Entente hopes. Like all the belligerents except the Americans, British policy was a contradictory mixture of concern and confidence. British attention was focused on the offensives on the western and Near Eastern fronts, the U-boat, Russian developments and American entry. Because of the revolution, French military failure and American unpreparedness, Britain became Entente leader by default in May. Public and confi- dential views of military prospects diverged sharply from one another. British leaders made frequent and fervent reaffirmations of their faith in victory. In confidential dis- cussions some - such as Douglas Haig and some other generals - repeated these assur- ances but other leaders - such as Lloyd George, War Cabinet member Alfred Milner and South African leader Jan Christian Smuts - were considerably less sanguine71. The British offensive on the western front conformed to the established pattern of initial but minimal advances followed by failure to break through. British hopes for progress in the Near East were dampened by the Russian revolution which precluded a coordi- nated operation. The major concern was, however, the U-boat threat which became severe in late April when pessimism engulfed the Admiralty but the government man- aged to surmount the crisis through the convoy system and American naval coopera- tion72. Like official and confidential views of Britain's prospects, public and private war aims differed. Officially proclaimed aims included defence of democracy, perma- nent peace, defeat of Prussian militarism, rejection of peace without annexations or in- demnities, restoration of conquered areas, return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and dissolution of Austria-Hungary. Despite doubts about their feasibility, these aims were expanded in confidential discussions to include rejection of a compromise peace with Germany, German defeat, reduction of German power in Europe, confiscation of German colonies and postwar German economic exclusion from the British Empi- re. Although Lloyd George regarded a separate understanding with Austria-Hungary as necessary, he gave higher priority to the alliance with Italy and Austro-Hungarian dissolution was publicly advocated by important British leaders. Official claims that revolution would galvanize the Russian war effort contrasted with private fears that Russia would defect. Public optimism concealed actual anxieties about French and Ita- lian determination. American entry was proclaimed a turning point in the war - even world history! - as it probably was in financial, productive and morale terms but Bri- tish leaders in fact did not expect significant American military participation for "a very long time". To preserve the alliance, interallied disagreements over war aims were papered over or postponed73. Domestic affairs revealed comparable cross-currents. A feared political crisis did not occur but an effort to include former Prime Minister As- quith in the cabinet failed. The Russian revolution and American entry intensified pu- blic discussion of peace in Britain as elsewhere. A small but vocal minority organized peace demonstrations and the Independent Labour Party criticized the government for not responding to Central Power proclamations but the overwhelming rejection by the Commons and press of peace without annexations indicated general opposition to compromise peace74. The dominant feature of British domestic affairs was less politi- cal than the effort to mobilize for a longer war and survive the U-boat menace. Despite unfavorable military, naval and diplomatic conditions which caused considerable anx- iety, British leaders hoped for improvement and evidenced no inclination to conclude peace with Germany. France was probably more desperate than Britain but less than Russia. French policy was dominated by events on the western front. Serious doubts in the projected French offensive were overridden less by the persuasiveness of the French com- mander, Robert Nivelle, than by the unwillingness of his critics to risk a public discussion of strategy which might threaten the popular faith in victory. Launched in mid-April, the attack failed with high losses and threatened to precipitate a civil- military crisis which was avoided when Minister of War Paul Painleve prevailed on the cabinet to restrict operations at the end of April and to replace Nivelle in mid-May with Henri Philippe Petain, who agreed with Painleve in favoring the defensive and awaiting American forces75. French public and confidential policies varied. Con- fidence in victory, permanent peace, and Entente solidarity were officially proclaimed while confidentially negotiations with Germany were rejected and Alsace-Lorraine as well as further demands projected - even though Premier Alexandre Ribot ad- mitted that "we are approaching exhaustion". The French, like the British, were ambivalent toward Austria-Hungary: although desirous of a separate understanding, French leaders denounced the Austro-Hungarian peace offensive, would pay nothing for a separate peace and indeed envisaged Austro-Hungarian unconditional surrender. Public acclaim for the Russian revolution contradicted confidential anxieties about Russia's loyalty. The Sixtus talks demonstrated that maintaining their alliance outweighed dividing their enemies76. The cabinet crisis when Briand was replaced by Ribot in March proved less ominous than the concealed command crisis when Nivelle was succeeded by Petain in May. Excepting a few Radicals, who led demonstrations and advocated peace without annexations, most of the French public and politicians were apparently determined to continue the war. Mobilization of men, food and finances was intensified but American entry effectively resolved these problems over the long run77. The French consequently feared exhaustion even while they rejected a negotiated peace and maintained ambitious war aims. The immediate effects of American entry were less direct through military partici- pation than indirect by encouraging Entente morale, providing material and financial assistance, and - in combination with the revolution - converting the war into an ideological struggle. The Americans cooperated with the British against the U-boat and confiscated German ships in American ports and wharves but no American troops arrived during the spring of 1917. Less divergence existed between American public and confidential aims than was the case with the other belligerents. The most salient feature of American policy was the abrupt transformation from neutrality to belligerence; a Russian diplomat observed that the Americans "had forgotten peace". Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of war, to which the only op- ponents were a few isolationist congressmen and the miniscule Socialist Party. American action was overwhelmingly preparatory and thus future-oriented: man- power was mobilized and financial means for American and allied war efforts voted. The immediate effect of American entry was nonetheless significant in encouraging the Entente to continue the war78.

The Spring Crisis: German Domestic Aspects (March 14 - May 15, 1917) German policy was affected not only by Germany's enemies and allies but also by German domestic developments. The interdependence of external and internal factors had been implicit since the beginning of the war and indeed before but became more explicit during spring 1917. External events - especially the military situation, British blockade, the revolution and American entry - encroached increasingly upon domestic issues, while internal problems - reform, economic mobilization, morale, war aims and power struggles - implicated external policies. Domestic issues were likewise so closely related that a position on one virtually determined responses to the others: reformers opposed extensive war aims, while annexationists resisted reform. Tensions over these issues had existed and increased since the beginning of the war but exploded in spring 1917 and reinforced the policy crisis. The reform question erupted first. Bethmann's vague remarks on reform in the Reichstag at the end of February had caused criticism from the right which Bethmann answered in the Prussian House of Representatives {Abgeordnetenhaus) on March 14 by reiterating his view that reform was unavoidable but should be postponed until peacetime to avoid jeopardizing the war effort with internal conflict79. The revol- ution encouraged the left and center to advocate immediate reform while the right warned against it. Bethmann again endeavored to deflect these impulses in his Reichstag speech of March 29 with the device of postwar reform80. Reform pressure increased, however, as left and center press criticized Bethmann and their Reichstag representatives took the matter into their own hands by establishing a constitutional committee81. Bethmann raised the issue of immediate reform with his advisers on March 31, won the Kaiser's approval, and had a program of relatively extensive reforms worked out. The proposal was, however, radically scaled down because of resistance from members of the Prussian Ministry and the High Command; the eventual reforms (announced on April 7 as the so-called Easter Message) were con- sequently minimal82. The Easter Message constituted another effort by Bethmann to nullify the reform issue and, as usual, it satisfied no one. Since the right opposed any reform, the Message was criticized by the Conservatives, Ludendorff, the Kai- serin, General Hans George v. Plessen (the Kaiser's aide de camp and Comman- der of Headquarters), and General Moritz v. Lyncker (Chief of the Kaiser's Military Cabinet) and even normal supporters of Bethmann, such as Rudolf v. Valentini (Chief of the Kaiser's Civil Cabinet) and Hertling. The left and center were disappointed and became increasingly sceptical that Bethmann could produce reform, even if he genuinely desired it83. The net effect was more rather than less tension. Socialist Paul Lobe observed to his colleagues that "we have entered a period in which we must and can bully our opponents somewhat" on the reform issue84. Under the chair- manship of Socialist Philipp Scheidemann, the Reichstag Constitutional Committee considered means of expanding Reichstag powers, while the ripples of reform dis- seminated to the local level85. Although these efforts soon became bogged down in parliamentary debate and obscured by other problems, the reform issue had non- etheless contributed to the crisis mentality of German politics. Reform was related to economic, social and psychological issues which culminated in strikes during the third week of April. The Hilfsdienstgesetz had been designed to alleviate a variety of problems but had resolved few and complicated the situation because of conflicts between the High Command and War Office under General William Groener. The High Command attributed shortages to governmental ineffect- iveness, demanded greater centralization and advocated economic preparations for a second world war, but Groener and Karl Helfferich, State Secretary of Interior, rejected the criticism and claimed progress. They were particularly anxious to maintain union cooperation but encountered mounting resistance86. In this already tense situation complicated by severe food shortages, lower bread rations were proclaimed for mid-April. Strikes were called in a number of cities despite govern- ment and union discouragement. The workers were finally persuaded to return to their jobs with a combination of the bribe of increased bread rations and the threat of conscription. Groener, the High Command and the right condemned the strikers as traitors, whereas the left was inclined to attribute the strikes to economic con- ditions and governmental policy87. However they are explained, the strikes were symptomatic of fundamental economic problems, complicated labor-government relations, intensified social divisions, and reinforced the tensions between the High Command and War Office which would culminate in Groener's forced resignation in August 1917. War aims had been largely absent from the public discussion during March and early April. As in the case of reform, the Russian revolution forced war aims into the public arena. The Petrograd Soviet's peace without annexations formula was discussed in the Reichstag but voted down on 30 March by all parties except the Independent Socialists and Alsace-Lorraine members. Bethmann touched on the issue when he advocated German non-intervention and good relations with Russia in his Reichstag speech of March 29 88. During the next three weeks aims were seldom mentioned in public but the issue then flared up and dominated public debate until mid-May with statements at the rate of almost one per day. It was ignited by the Majority Socialists' public advocacy on April 20 of peace without annexations and the immediate reaction from the right89. After the government had sought unsuccessfully to pacify all parties with another vague press release, the Conservatives and Majority Socialists demanded in early May a clear war aims statement from Bethmann90. With support from the middle parties and the Bundesstaaten governments, Bethmann refused, however, in his May 15 Reichstag speech to commit himself publicly on war aims91. The debate thereupon died down almost as abruptly as it had begun. Most major political organizations expressed views on war aims during this debate. The Conservatives were as outspoken on war aims as on reform. Like the other parties and groups, their public statements usually listed general objectives: victory; honorable, German or strong peace; security; the fruits of war and victory; rewards worth the price paid; reparations; and rejection of conquest but extension of German power. Only infrequently did they stipulate specific aims, such as security for Germany's borders, Belgium, and the destruction of British maritime supremacy. Conservatives rejected general peace without annexations or indemnities, denounced governmental vagueness on war aims and inability to inspire popular confidence, occasionally implied criticism of the Kaiser, and stigmatized the other parties' 92 aims . Notable primarily by their virtual absence from the debate, the middle parties participated only when it seemed necessary and then in the blandest and briefest terms. They opposed public discussion of aims and urged domestic unity, espoused an honorable peace and freedom to develop, rejected peace without annexations but simultaneously disclaimed annexations or expansion. They only infrequently mentioned specific questions such as Belgium and Poland. Their most important function in the public discussion was as supporters of the government's policy of a quick separate peace with Russia and non-specificity on aims93. The Majority Socialists were active participants and the only party which changed its views on war aims during this period. Their public aims were similarly general: a defensive rather than offensive war; an honorable, acceptable and negotiated peace allowing border corrections; and security for Germany's economic future. Specific questions-such as Belgium-were seldom mentioned. They repeatedly urged a quick and general rather than separate peace. Their pronouncements were typically patriotic. The unique feature of their aims was the shift in mid-April from opposition to advocacy of peace without annexations. Before April 17 Majority Socialists had generally supported the government's war aims policy but thereafter condemned its lack of specificity94. This criticism, however, did not prevent considerable cooperation between the government and Majority Socialists. With governmental approval, they publicly greeted the revolution, secretly met in Copenhagen with Russian Socialists (whom they assured of German non-intervention in Russian affairs), worked for an international Socialist conference in Stockholm, and partici- pated in front negotiations with the Russians. Indeed this collaboration was suffi- ciently extensive to require public denial by both government and Majority Socialists as well as inclusion of the Independents in the German delegation to Stockholm to avoid the impression that the Majority members were "government tools"95. The Majority Socialists frequently drew the connections between war aims and reform. Edward David felt "it was indicative that the firebrands (Scharfmacher) in foreign affairs are also the strongest opponents of every new orientation at home" and Scheidemann argued that "he who works for democratization of our country works for peace". Majority Socialists applauded the revolution, opposed German inter- vention and regarded the Provisional Government as opposed and the Soviet as disposed to peace. They regarded a German revolution as undesirable because it would cause German defeat but warned it might occur if the government did not renounce annexations96. They criticized the right's aims as obstacles to peace and thus conducive to revolution, while rejecting the Independents' criticism of the Majority position and hoping to control them in Stockholm97. The Majority Socialists condemned the British and French governments as annexationist but suggested con- fidentially that the Entente governments might make peace if Germany renounced annexations because the Entente populations wanted peace98. The Independent Socialists were the most active and categorical in espousing their aims. They rejected a separate peace and demanded a general peace conference to achieve a quick peace without annexations. The Independents were severely critical of all other groups: of the government for not seeking peace; of the Majority Socialists for not opposing the government earlier and more strongly; of the right, Pan Ger- mans, High Command and "militarism". Like the Majority Socialists they em- phasized the link between aims and reform. Although more committed to peace than reform, they frequently argued that peace would require revolution of the German constitution and the international system. The aims of all governments were equated but Entente imperialism did not justify German expansion. Since extensive annexa- tions were unobtainable, pursuing them would cause an endless war or "second Punic War" and the ruin of all nations99. The government made frequent though usually reluctant war aims pronouncements. Most were general and involved such terms as: victory; defense; quick and honorable peace; peace worth the price paid; security; and freedom and independence to develop. The government categorically refused on a number of occasions to be more specific in public. In a few instances particular issues such as Belgium, Lithuania, Russia and Poland were nonetheless mentioned. Peace without annexations was unqualifiedly rejected and a middle way between "conquest" and "renunciation" advocated although the argument was occasionally made that conditions should be determined by the situation when peace was concluded. The government's public aims were partially defined by its reactions to the aims of other groups. Although it frequently discouraged public discussion of aims, the government sought to mollify its critics by assuring them that their aims were "necessary and useful" and being considered. Bethmann identified himself with "the German people" but refused to ally with any party. He condemned the left's aims as "renunciation and failure" CVerzicht und Versagung), while Helfferich preferred "to collapse rather than con- clude an ignominous peace". The right's aims were denounced by Bethmann as a "program of conquest" (Eroberung). Bethmann claimed publicly to be in "complete" agreement with the High Command but implied disagreement in denouncing the right's aims with which the High Command was known to sympathize. Despite his claim of non-association with any group, Bethmann's public aims were supported publicly by the middle parties and the Bundesstaaten governments. The government stigmatized Entente aims as "crazy", French aims as unqualifiedly aggressive, and England as responsible for the war but distinguished between the governments and the people of Russia and the United States100. Although he expressed himself frequently and candidly in confidential discussions, the Kaiser made few public pronouncements on aims. In these pronouncements he spoke in general terms of a happy and secure future and peace worth the price paid. He confidentially urged Bethmann to oppose officially peace without annexations and demanded extensive annexations but himself made no public statement on aims. Officially the Kaiser was optimistic and predicted Germany would dictate peace. He publicly condemned Anglo-French war aims but was sympathetic toward peace with Russia101. Perhaps even more notable than the Kaiser's non-commitment in public was the virtual silence of the High Command and the Army. Unless front propaganda or the activities of annexationist organizations are considered, the High Command made no public pronouncement on aims during spring 1917. Hindenburg projected stolid confidence in early April and greater optimism in early May, but no aim was proposed102. Groener condemned peace without annexations as shameless and advocated fighting for a "happy end" to the war but did not indicate details103. Thus the advocates of the most extreme aims in confidential discussions were non- participants in the public debate. Of those organizations which joined the parties and government in the debate, most were annexationist and conservative. Their aims remained for the most part general: security; increase of power and expansion; victory; peace worthy of the price paid; rapid and successful peace; a place in the world; and freedom to develop. Occasionally (but more often than the government or parties) they mentioned specific problems such as Poland, overseas colonies, European colonization, raw materials, food, reparations, and Mitteleuropa; only the pacifists advocated a league of nations and reduction of arms. The annexationist organizations vilified peace without annexations as "impoverishment and suppression" (Verelendung und Unterdrückung), and only the pacifists urged peace with Russia104. The infrequent public pronouncements of the Bundesstaaten governments were general and advocated German greatness, happiness, compensation for the cost of the war, victory, security, and a German peace. Alsace-Lorraine was mentioned on one occasion and peace without annexations specifically rejected by the Baden government. The governments of both Bavaria and Baden publicly supported the Imperial government's confidence in victory and non- commitment on war aims105. The views of the German masses were a potentially important - if not the most im- portant - element in the public discussion. Most historians argue that the majority of Germans favored peace at this time. Public opinion is, however, difficult to ascer- tain. Although some - particularly the proponents of peace - view the April strikes as proof of peace sentiment, it is unclear and perhaps likely that reform and above all food shortages which were more important. No serious civilian peace demon- stration or soldier mutiny occurred during this period in Germany as they did else- where. Yet precisely because public opinion was at once unfathomable and im- portant, all groups claimed to represent it. Some asserted that the German — and Entente — people favored peace. Proponents of peace argued that the masses would defend their homeland, while proponents of war contended that the German people were confident of victory. Each group asserted that the masses supported its war aims. Advocates of a public government statement claimed to be espousing a popular demand and some extremists regarded neither the government nor Reichstag as representative of mass sentiment106. Some of these assertions were probably accurate but all cannot be since they are contradictory. They are, however, less indicative of mass opinion than of ruling class perceptions of it. Mass opinion may have affected the quality and quantity of public discussion; some - most notably the Majority Socialists - altered their views because of what they perceived as popular demand. This was, however, exceptional and most - including the Majority Socialists - regarded the masses as a projection of their own views. Public opinion was thus seen in effect as clay to be molded when negotiations arrived. The discussion polarized apparent choices. This polarization was suggested by Conservative Reichstag member von Graefe's "two world views which confronted one another like fire and water", and Scheidemann's "unbridgeable conflict"107. Alternatives were presented as total and extreme: renunciatory peace (Verzichtfrieden) versus conquering peace (Eroberungsfrieden) or annexationist peace (Annexions- frieden) ; Scheidemann peace versus German, Hindenburg peace or Siegfried peace; understanding peace or negotiated peace (Verständigungsfrieden) versus victorious peace (Siegfrieden); national peace versus international peace. These dichotomies were adjusted to suit the speaker's point of view. Proponents of negotiated peace linked it with Scheidemann peace and Socialist peace but contrasted it with conquer- ing peace and equated national peace with international peace. Conversely pro- ponents of victorious peace presented Scheidemann peace and negotiated peace as international, renunciatory peace which was contrasted with national, German peace108. The peace debate was related to the perception of war. The government in its public statements and proponents of war aims generally spoke of a war of existence, star- vation or hunger war, peoples' war, and the necessity for mobilizing all human and material resources. Opponents of extensive war aims and government leaders in confidential discussions questioned the notion of total war, doubted that either side could win or dictate peace and thus urged negotiated peace108.

The Spring Crisis: The Authority Aspects (March 14 - May 15, 1917) The crises in foreign and domestic policies were accompanied by an authority crisis. At the most obvious level it took the form of a chancellor crisis focusing on Beth- mann's tenure in office but was more important as a potential shift among the power centers within German society and the Central Power alliance. The crisis developed through a series of increasingly intensive stages. It began during the second week of March when the reform issue caused Conservatives and the High Command to attack the chancellor, who was defended by the parties of the middle and left. The reform issue precipitated renewed attacks on Bethmann in late March and early April; again they were led by the right and High Command and again the middle and left supported him, although less vigorously. The crisis reached its peak in late April and the first half of May when the war aims issue produced attacks on Bethmann from virtually all sides. The crisis abated in mid-May when Bethmann managed to rescue his position by compromising with and balancing off these impulses. Among the most consistent though confidential of Bethmann's critics was the High Command. His acquiescence in the U-boat question had facilitated a modus vivendi but his lack of enthusiasm was clear and other frictions developed during January and February 1917 over economic mobilization. Accordingly the High Command intensified its campaign against Bethmann's leadership in economic mobilization, political reform, popular morale and war aims. It was conducted largely in secret through memoranda (written by Colonel Max Bauer and authorized by Ludendorff) and designed to undermine the Kaiser's confidence in Bethmann109. The High Com- mand adamantly opposed Bethmann's reform plans in early April; even though Beth- mann made considerable concessions, Ludendorff castigated the Easter Message as un- necessary and a sign of weakness110. The High Command simultaneously raised the war aims issue which Bethmann regarded as an attempt to depose him. The Kreuz- nach conference coincided with the High Command's most serious effort to displace Bethmann during the spring. While a Bauer memorandum criticized Bethmann's leadership, the High Command - with the support of Admiral Henning v. Holtzen- dorff, Chief of Naval Staff, and General Hermann v. Stein, Prussian Minister of War - used the Socialist demand for peace without annexations and Erzberger's secret negotiations as evidence to persuade the Kaiser that Bethmann could not protect the Kaiser's authority from the encroachments of domestic elements. Bethmann's sup- porters at Headquarters - Valentini and Kurt v. Grünau, Foreign Office envoy at Headquarters - were only barely able to restrain the Kaiser. The High Command's criticism was repeated in another Bauer-Ludendorff memorandum of early May111. The Conservatives and nationalist-annexationist organizations attacked Bethmann repeatedly in public. After a secret meeting in late February, they mounted a campaign against Bethmann's domestic and foreign policies in the press and Prussian House of Lords. Despite their vagueness, Bethmann's remarks on reform during March were perceived by the right as provocative and the Easter Message was opposed by Conservatives both within and outside the Prussian Ministry112. Conservatives and annexationists condemned Bethmann for both his own non-commitment on war aims and the Majority Socialist peace without annexations proclamation. Bethmann's refusal to make a war aims statement was attributed by them to insufficient "will to victory" and inability to be the "crystallization point" for the masses113. These attacks threatened to include the Kaiser: Prussian Conservative Reichstag member Ernest v. Heydebrand asked pointedly "who rules now in the German Empire? Does our Em- peror and King still or does Mr. Scheidemann rule the world?"114 The attitude of the Majority Socialists toward Bethmann altered partly because of Bethmann's reform policy and partly because of the Socialists' war aims policy. They applauded Bethmann's apparent intentions to institute immediate reform but were disappointed by the Easter Message and postponement of significant change115. The breach became wider and more public with their demand for peace without an- nexations which was published over the government's objections. As a result they found themselves in an unaccustomed accord with the Conservatives in their advocacy of an official war aims statement and condemnation of Bethmann's refusal116. The Independent Socialists were less critical of Bethmann because they perceived him as relatively insignificant. As Independent Socialist Hoffmann commented, "even if Bethmann were dismissed, no change of policy would occur. It would be the same if Tirpitz or Hindenburg were chancellor117." Independent Socialists pro- claimed their "fundamental opposition to the ruling governmental system and the war policy of the Imperial government". They sought to alter that system by advocat- ing a standing Reichstag committee to oversee the government's policy (opposed by Groener and the other parties) and establishment of a republic in Germany. Although they believed Bethmann was increasingly dominated by the High Command, they demanded an official war aims pronouncement but concluded that both Helfferich and Bethmann agreed with the High Command and Pan Germans in seeking as extensive aims as possible118. Czernin was a brief and confidential but nonetheless threatening critic of Bethmann. As long as Bethmann seemed relatively responsive on the war aims during early March, little friction occurred but, when Bethmann refused to make the more specific public statements which Czernin demanded, Czernin became critical. The possibility that his agitation might cause a change of chancellor rather than policy, however, persuaded Czernin to desist and patch up relations with Bethmann in early May119. Bethmann's supporters were not as outspoken or consistent as many of his oppon- ents but backed him at the critical juncture. His most loyal public support came from the middle parties120. In so far as they expressed themselves, the leaders of the Bundes- staaten generally agreed with Bethmann on aims though not always on reform121. Bethmann was usually supported by his closest advisers and many but not all of the Kaiser's retinue. Helfferich consistently defended governmental policies against criticism from Ludendorff and the Socialists122. Zimmermann rejected Czernin's attack, disavowed Erzberger's talks, criticized Socialist demands for peace without annexations and defended Bethmann's non-commitment on war aims123. Grünau, Valentini and to a lesser extent Admiral George Alexander v. Müller, Chief of the Kaiser's Naval Cabinet, defended Bethmann against the High Command, but Valentini, Plessen and Lyncker all opposed reform, whereas Adolf Tortilowiez v. Batocki-Friebe, Chief of the Food Office, urged more extreme reform124.

Bethmann's position became critical at the end of April not only because traditional allies - Czernin, the Moderate Socialists and Bundesstaaten - seemed to be joining his critics but above all because the Kaiser's support was apparently in jeopardy. The Kaiser was alienated by the Socialist demands for peace without annexations, Erzberger's secret negotiations and the Reichstag constitutional committee's encroachment on his military prerogatives - all of which the High Command blamed on Bethmann. At the same time the Kaiser was distressed by the disagreements between the High Command and Bethmann as well as frustrated by Bethmann's unwillingness to proclaim publicly his unanimity on aims with the High Command. These tensions caused the Kaiser to fear for his position and evidence signs of mental breakdown125. A number of observers accordingly perceived a "chancellor crisis" as imminent126. Bethmann, however, averted an open break with characteristic tactical mastery. His success was due in part to the weakness of his position. The possibility of dismissal helped rally his traditional supporters and the incompatible demands for a war aims statement allowed him to refuse commitment. His counter-attack cul- minated in the Reichstag speech of May 15. He satisfied the Kaiser and deflected the High Command's criticism by asserting his "full agreement with the High Com- mand" and mollified Czernin by denying "any differences of opinion in the peace question between us and our allies". The middle parties had already agreed to support his non-commitment on war aims. By presenting right and left with the unacceptable alternatives of conquest and renunciation, he endeavored to force them into silence. He himself meanwhile assumed the ostensibly sensible middle ground but simultane- ously reaffirmed the myth of victory. The speech was at once a tour de force and politi- cal schizophrenia, as indicated by the alternate applause and jeering by right and left127. Despite - perhaps indeed because of - these contradictions, the speech was praised by the Kaiser, Admiral Müller, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Prince Gottfried v. Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, and even grudgingly by Hindenburg128. By containing the crisis, Bethmann managed to maintain power. The crisis revealed, however, that Bethmann's position was jeopardized. His power depended above all on the Kaiser's support. The Kaiser's backing required deference to his amour-propre and at least nominal accomodation with the High Command which Bethmann managed with difficulty by significant concessions. Bethmann's tenure was also contingent on his ability to preserve the appearance of domestic unity (the so-called Burgfrieden) which was increasingly difficult not only because of discord but also because both right and left denounced the Burgfrieden; Beth- mann's only recourse was to reaffirm the Burgfrieden's desirability and thereby pos- sibly obscure its unfeasibility. Bethmann's ability to maintain Socialist support for the war was threatened by their demand for peace without annexations. Bethmann's influence in Vienna could be questioned because of Czernin's criticism. Bethmann's ultimate appeal - the lack of a suitable alternative - even began to lose its strength when he proved less effective and the office appeared less critical. The High Com- mand's criticism contained a certain validity. If he could not control the situation whereas someone else could, he was inappropriate. But, if no one could control the situation, he and the office were irrelevant. In either case, Bethmann was not critical.

Bethmann, however, viewed his role as significant. He accepted its domestic and diplomatic limits with a degree of fatalism. He nonetheless felt it was not only possible to operate within these limits but also necessary in order to obscure domestic conflicts and win the war. Domestic peace could be preserved only by the delicate mixture of moderation and bombast of which he was the master. The military stalemate could be escaped only by negotiations which required his skill in playing off enemies while obscuring German power and objectives. Because he was thus essential for domestic and diplomatic reasons, he counted on the Kaiser's support which would allow him to disregard the High Command and Pan Germans on the one hand and Socialists on the other. In effect Bethmann contemplated a coup against his domestic and diplomatic opponents when peace negotiations began129.

June Aftermath and July Crisis (May 18 - July 19, 1917) The spring crisis involved serious problems in all areas - diplomatic, military and domestic - but it caused little overt change so that the appearance of precrisis policies and relationships was maintained. As in the case of the Winter Crisis, the Spring Crisis was followed by a month of relative calm in policy-making and politics. A new crisis then broke at the end of June and culminated in mid-July. Its issues were the same as those of the Spring Crisis from which it grew. The seeds sown in spring were reaped in summer. The intensive diplomatic activity during the spring lessened during late May and early June. Prospects for separate peace with Russia proved deceptive. The new Russian government belied German hopes when, like its predecessors, it denounced separate peace and advocated general peace; indeed it immediately began planning for a new offensive which was launched in early July. These developments were accompanied by the failure of front discussions which Ludendorff had expected to foster the Russian army's disintegration and thereby a dictated peace. Zimmermann consequently encouraged the peace agitation of the Radical Socialists by communi- cating peace terms through a Swiss intermediary but the affair was discovered and exposed by the Russian government. Soon thereafter Erzberger's Russian contact man was arrested. The High Command accordingly insisted that no further "approaches" be made to Russia130. The French meanwhile displayed no willingness to make peace despite the failure of their offensive and resultant mutinies (unknown to the Germans). German leaders began to realize that retention of Alsace-Lorraine would symbolize German victory over France and thus constitute an insurmoun- table obstacle to a negotiated separate understanding with France. French and Russian contacts were maintained wherever possible but a separate peace with either seemed highly unlikely131. The advocates of general peace fared no better. Austro-Hungarian efforts through Sixtus to conclude a separate peace with France preliminary to general peace finally petered out in early June. Carl and Czernin then made another attempt in mid-June to extract a public German renunciation of war aims in order to encourage a separate peace with Russia preliminary to general peace. Bethmann shared Austro- Hungarian concern that understanding with Russia might be prejudiced by High Command war aims and Zimmermann tried both to satisfy his allies and encourage the Russians with a further vague press statement; but German leaders in fact felt the impending Russian offensive made separate peace unlikely and were opposed to general peace132. The Russian government meanwhile advocated general peace to its allies which were, however, opposed and concerned only that Russia should not leave the war133. The attempt during June of German and other Socialists to foster general peace through an international conference in Stockholm likewise proved fruitless 1,4. Simultaneous Papal soundings for a general peace were begun but had not yet developed135. Total war seemed no more promising than separate or general peace. By early June the high expectations of April for the U-boat success had begun to pale and the anticipated British collapse was postponed. Although the French spring offensive had failed, the mutinies had not only been concealed, but the Russians and British were also planning new offensives. The High Command was consequently less optimistic by mid-June136. All three lines of policy had failed. These policy failures combined with domestic problems to precipitate a new crisis. To prepare the German people for a longer war and perhaps to shift responsibility for the U-boat's non-success, the High Command demanded an intensified pro- paganda campaign. Bethmann, however, refused to assume responsibility for the U-boat and sought instead to persuade the Kaiser that the negotiations were neces- sary because dictated peace was unfeasible. He apparently contemplated a Reichstag speech critical of German annexationists (including the High Command) and with the Kaiser's implied support in order to encourage talks with Britain which he had been led to believe might now be possible. But the Kaiser refused and the High Com- mand launched a campaign to bring Bethmann down. The generals asserted that, far from being unlikely, dictated peace was the war's only conceivable outcome since no belligerent would make peace unless completely defeated. German problems were due to the "faintheartedness" of civilian leaders who lacked the "personality necessary to lead"137. These internal policy disputes were complicated by an intensified campaign on the part of the Austro-Hungarian government for a public German renunciation of aims138. German domestic tensions exploded at the same time. Socialists returning from Stockholm demanded renunciation of annexations and advocated immediate domestic reforms. Already concerned about morale, Bethmann was convinced that the reforms postponed in April were now necessary. While he apparently agreed that a more responsive statement on war aims was desirable, he opposed a Reichstag initiative in order to control negotiations himself and thereby alienated the middle and left who favored an immediate German initiative. The Reichstag leaders and High Command thereupon cooperated to cause Bethmann's demise although for contradictory reasons. The High Command wanted a more bellicose but amenable chancellor, whereas the parliamentarians desired a candidate who would be less bellicose and more susceptible to Reichstag influence. Disliking change, resisting encroachment on his authority, and lacking a compatible replacement for Bethmann, the Kaiser at first supported him but finally succumbed when the High Command threatened to resign and accepted Bethmann's resignation on July 13139. Despite resistance of High Command and Kaiser, the Reichstag passed on July 19 a peace resolution which affirmed in general terms German desire for peace though not specifically without annexations140.

Conclusion: The Spring 1917 Crisis suggests some insights into German policy, the war and the phenomenon of crisis. A major wartime discussion of German policy occurred during the spring of 1917. The three main lines - separate peace, general peace and total war- involved important differences. Separate peace assumed that the war was relatively li- mited; victory was possible; the enemy coalition was diplomatically divisible; dome- stic encroachment on policy was limitible; the resources situation was poor but irre- mediable; war aims should be flexible; peace was a tactic; and negotiations would be critical. General peace implied that the war was total; victory was impossible; the enemy coalition was indivisible; domestic influences on policy were unavoidable; re- sources were virtually exhausted; war aims should be renounced; peace was generally desired; and negotiations were not critical. Total war suggested that war was total; vic- tory of one side was inevitable; the enemy coalition was militarily divisible; domestic encroachment on policy was avoidable; the resources situation was poor but remedia- ble; extreme war aims were justified; peace would be dictated; and negotiations were not critical. Separate peace thus assumed a position between the extremes of general peace and total war. The debate tended, however, to exaggerate disagreements and obscure similarities. All participants opposed return to the status quo ante bellum, regarded war aims as desirable, believed the state system would be changed, and wanted to preserve German great power status. The basic distinctions consequently were over means rather than ends, namely, Bethmann's indirect and subtle approach, Ludendorff's blunt and uncompromising attitude, and the supposed openness of Czernin and the Majority Socialists. The victory of total war and Ludendorff is often misleadingly condemned because it is regarded as the most dangerous. To the extent that these policies actually affected events, separate peace and general peace were probably more threatening because they concealed German objectives better. But none of these policies was likely to be successful at this juncture. The most likely candidates for separate peace - Russia and Austria-Hungary - refused because it required renunciation of their great power status. General peace was unacceptable to the Entente because it implied German domination and to Germany because it left the Entente intact. Total war was unlikely to succeed because neither side could completely defeat the other. While they were thus similarly unfeasible, these policies differ in terms of con- sistency and realism. Separate peace and general peace are usually regarded as more consistent than total war but are in fact less. Separate peace employed diplomacy to achieve German victory - i.e., limited means but a total end - and general peace im- plied renunciation of victory in a total war - i.e., limited end but total means - whereas total war involved total means to a total end and is thus most consistent. Separate peace and general peace assumed moderate aims would foster peace negotiations but there is little evidence that great power policies were affected by enemy aims. Although aims may be critical in limited war, they are largely irrelevant in total war when surrender is unconditional and the result of defeat. Since total war implies the extreme alternatives of unconditional victory or surrender, extreme aims are realistic and moderation unrealistic. Thus probably none of the policies advocated during spring 1917 was feasible but total war was the least dangerous yet most consistent and realistic. Analysis of policy implies that it is historically important. This is the assumption of most statesmen and diplomatic historians and it can be defended in some senses. It explains the behavior of governments and is justified when policy decisions have significant results, such as the launching of unrestricted U-boat warfare and consequent entry of the United States. More often, however, analysis of policy indicated that policy is historically unimportant, i.e., does not significantly in- fluence events. Such influence presumes an understanding of the situation, awareness of how policy will affect it, and willingness and ability to take effective action. But these conditions seldom applied. Statesmen seldom understood the forces with which they were confronted: the expected did not happen and the unexpected often did. They infrequently foresaw the results of their actions: policies were most often in- effective, sometimes counter-productive, but seldom productive. Governments were generally unwilling to do what they could but unable to achieve what they wanted. Policy consequently influenced events only marginally. On the contrary policy responded to events. The experience of spring 1917 suggests that, while policy may influence events in relatively stable periods, events dominate policy in times of crisis. The debate over policy involved a struggle for authority among individuals and groups. The most notable was the conflict between civil and military leaders which culminated in Bethmann's resignation and Ludendorff's so-called "dictatorship". The victory of soldiers over statesmen is generally condemned by historians because they assume aggressive soldiers should be controlled by non-aggressive civilians and find Bethmann personally more appealing than Ludendorff. The change of personnel was, however, more symbolic than real since their general objectives were similar. Ludendorff's reputed dictatorship certainly existed in the area of high policy but neither in diplomatic nor domestic affairs was he much more able to control events than Bethmann had been. Domestic elements and particularly the Reichstag encroached more than ever before on policy-making and the Peace Resolution suggested that the era of parliamentary control over policy might be dawning. The appearance was, however, deceptive since the High Command dominated policy- making during the next year. This exclusion of the Reichstag was, however, insignificant since most of its members had aims similar to those of the High Com- mand, as their approval of the treaty of Brest Litovsk would demonstrate. The shift in authority accordingly involved a change of personnel, policy-making style, and policy means but not of ultimate objectives. The explosion of internal tensions during spring 1917 threatened domestic unity but did not split the country enough to make continuing the war impossible. Despite their differences over reform and specific aims, most Germans shared the myth of victory. Domestic events nonetheless had important, subtle effects on policy. They encoura- ged the pervasive atmosphere of crisis and polarization of alternatives. Ever more shrill reaffirmations of the victory myth were required. The domestic crisis fostered the in- tegration of all aspects of society into the war effort. In short they reinforced the ten- dency toward total war. German behavior should be seen in relation to the other belligerents. All re-examined diplomatic policy and military strategy during spring 1917 and some - Austria- Hungary, Russia and the United States - made radical departures. In all cases - above all in Russia and France - intense struggles over authority occurred. Both alliances were tested by internal disagreements and enemy inducements but survived. Internal and external developments everywhere - particularly in Russia and Austria- Hungary - influenced one another more than previously. Spring 1917 was universally a time of crisis. The British government changed and British survival was tested by the U-boat. The French government and chief of staff were replaced and the army's coherence threatened by mutinies. Revolution in Russia jeopardized its war effort, while economic and political problems made Austro-Hungarian perseverance questionable. Entry into the war constituted a fundamental diplomatic, military and domestic departure for the United States. Events in Germany were consequently typical. The crises of winter, spring and summer 1917 suggest some conclusions about wartime crises. They were caused by the confluence of diplomatic, strategic, domestic and personnel problems. The situation was probably complicated by actual and threatened changes in important internal and external factors, by the possibility of extreme success or failure which reinforced the sense of polarization, and by the frustration resulting from the growing gap between aspirations and ability, They were precipitated by the determination of some to seek a decision, impose a view, and clarify an uncertain situation. They evidence sufficient similarities to suggest a general pattern of development: in growing tension over existing problems an event triggers a confrontation which leads to a resolution. Each crisis is followed by reduction in tension but the next crisis begins at a higher level of tension. Crises and total war are apparently symbiotic. Total war - by increasing tension, polarizing alternatives, and integrating all elements of society - is conducive to crises which - by threatening change, exposing conflicts and expressing frustrations - encourage total war. The events of spring 1917 indicate the nature of the war at this point. The stalemate of the previous two years loosened as a result of revolutionary changes and the relatively limited, coalition war gave way to more total war. The previous focus on military and diplomatic considerations was broadened to include domestic and economic aspects. The entry of the United States and exit of Russia not only con- centrated the fighting in western Europe but also made it a genuinely world conflict and total war. The Spring 1917 Crisis reveals some paradoxical features of total war. Leaders frenetically sought the elusive key to victory but policy became less effective. Intensive struggles for authority resulted but personnel changes made little difference. Authority was centralized but control did not increase. More was promised as less became possible. The masses were mobilized but not consulted. Above all war was increasingly organized but less rational.

Notes

1 G. Ritter: Die Tragödie der Staatskunst. Bethmann Hollweg als Kriegskanzler <1914-1917>. (= Ritter: Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland. Vol. 3.) Munich 1964, pp. 299-368 (cit. Ritter: Tragödie). F. Fischer: Griff nach der Weltmacht. Düsseldorf 1964, pp. 368-393 (cit. Fischer); Κ. E. Birnbaum: Peace Moves and U-boat Warfare. Stockholm 1958, pp. 131 ff. (cit. Birnbaum); Deutschland im Ersten Weltkrieg. Ed.: W. Gutsche u.a. Vol. 2. Berlin 1970, pp. 535-554 (cit. Gutsche: Deutschland); W. Steglich: Bündnissicherung oder Verständigungs- frieden. Göttingen 1958, passim; Κ. Η. Jarausch: The Enigmatic Chancellor. New Haven, London 1973, pp. 250-255 (cit. Jarausch); P. Graf Kielmansegg: Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg. Frankfurt a.M. 1968, pp. 412-441 (cit. Kielmansegg). 2 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 368-416; Birnbaum, pp. 276-287, 304-337; Fischer, pp. 393-401; Gutsche: Deutschland, pp. 555-568; Kielmansegg, pp. 385-393. 3 Ibid., pp. 339-340; Gutsche: Deutschland, pp. 529-533, 582-588; Ε. Ludendorff: Meine Kriegs- erinnerungen 1914-1918. Vol. 2. Berlin 1919, pp. 306-313 (cit. Ludendorff); Die Kriegführung im Herbst 1916 und im Winter 1916/17. (= Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918. Bearb. v. d. Kriegsgeschicht- lichen Forschungsanstalt des Heeres. Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande. Vol. 11.) Berlin 1938, p. 496; Die Kriegführung im Frühjahr 1917. (= Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918. Bearb. v. d. Kriegs- geschichtlichen Forschungsanstalt des Heeres. Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande. Vol. 12.) Berlin 1939, pp. 138ff. (cit. Weltkrieg). 4 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 417-450; Gutsche: Deutschland, pp. 461-469; Ludendorff, pp. 258-284; Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-1918. Ed.: W. Deist. (= Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamen- tarismus und der politischen Parteien. 2. Reihe: Militär und Politik. Vol. 1, 1.2.) Düsseldorf 1970, pp. 481-546 (cit. Deist); G. D. Feldman: Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918. Princeton, Ν. J. 1966, pp. 150ff. (cit. Feldman). 5 Fischer, pp. 414-418; Gutsche: Deutschland, pp. 489-500; Deist, vol. 1,1, pp. 322-346; Luden- dorff, pp. 292ff. 6 Ritter: Tragödie, p. 432; Feldman, pp. 197ff.; Η. Holborn: A History of Germany, 1840-1945. New York 1969, pp. 462-466. 7 Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender. Ν. F. Part 1. 33 (1917) 175-177 (cit. Schulthess). 8 C. Schorske: German Social Democracy, 1905-1917. Cambridge, Mass. 1955, pp. 312f. 9 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 382-385; Birnbaum, pp. 325-327; Jarausch, pp. 300-302. 10 G. A. Müller: Regierte der Kaiser? Göttingen 1949, pp. 227, 237f. (cit. Müller). 11 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 406-411, 451 ff.; Kielmansegg, pp. 481^84; W. Steglich: Die Friedenspolitik der Mittelmächte 1917/18. Vol. 1. Wiesbaden 1964, pp. 15ff. (cit. Steglich: Friedenspolitik); R. F. Hopwood: Interalliance Diplomacy. Count Czernin and Germany 1916-1918. Stanford University, Calif., unpublished Phil. Diss. 1965, pp. 63ff. (cit. Hopwood); A. J. May: The Passing of the Habs- burg Monarchy. Vol. 1. Philadelphia 1966, pp. 459ff. 12 M. Beloff: Imperial Sunset. Vol. 1. New York 1970, pp. 233-239 (cit. Beloff); C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill: The Mirage of Power. Vol. 2. London 1972, pp. 247-256 (cit. Lowe/Dockrill); P. Guinn: British Strategy and Politics 1914 to 1918. Oxford 1965, pp. 191 ff. (cit. Guinn); V. H. Rothwell: British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy. Oxford 1971, pp. 59ff. 13 B. Pares: The Fall of the Russian Monarchy. London 1939, pp. 391 ff. 14 J. King: Generals and Politicians. Berkeley 1951, pp. 135-145 (cit. King); R. Watt: Dare Call it Treason. New York 1963, pp. 146-158 (cit. Watt); Kielmansegg, pp. 344f. IS German Foreign Office Documents, File WK 2 geh.: zu AS 4820 (1916), AS 798, zu AS 798, zu AS 825. Some of German documents cited are included in L'Allemagne et les problemes de la paix pendant la premiere guerre mondiale. Ed. A. Scherer and J. Grunewald. Vol. 1.2. Paris 1962 and 1966 (vol. 2-cit. Scherer/Grunewald). 16 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 411-416; Fischer, pp. 397f.; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 191-196; Müller, pp. 238-244. 17 Feldman, pp. 266ff. 1β Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 191-196; W. Gutsche: Bethmann Hollweg und die Politik der "Neu- orientierung". In: Zeitschrift für Geschichts-Wissenschaft. 13 (1965)209-234, herep. 230 (cit. Gutsche: Bethmann); id.: Deutschland, pp. 646ff. 19 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 406-411, 456ff.; Fischer, pp. 448ff.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 16ff. 20 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 457-459; Lowe/Dockrill, pp. 256f.; Watt, pp. 158-168; King, pp. 145f.; Guinn, pp. 209-223; Beloff, pp. 238 f. 21 AS 1254, WK 2 geh., s. Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 32-39. 22 Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 21-43. 23 AS 2150, WK 2 geh., s. Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 50-60; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 43-45. 24 AS 1268, WK 2 geh., s. Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 75f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 45-51; Hopwood, pp. 120-126. 25 567, 2112, part 10; Wedel to Investigating Committee, 2112, part 28; AS 1190, AS 1255, zu AS 1384, AS 1391, WK 2 geh.; Hopwood, pp. 118f. 26 Wedel letter to Zimmermann, 11 April, WK 2 geh. and 2112, part 10. 27 AS 1072, AS 1138, zu AS 1138, WK 2 geh. 28 Zu AS 770, AS 770, AS 1073, WK 2 geh. 29 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 369. 30 O. Lancken-Wakenitz: Meine Dreißig Dienstjahre. Berlin 1931, pp. 252ff.; Wahnschaffe to Inves- tigating Committee, 2112, part 29. 31 R. Poincare: Au Service de la France. Vol. 9. Paris 1932, pp. 85ff. (cit. Poincare); A. Ribot: Journal etcorrespondances inedites 1914-1927. Paris 1936, pp. 62-73; D. Lloyd George: War Memoirs. Vol.4. London 1938, pp. 1900ff. (cit. Lloyd George); Sixte de Bourbon: L'Offredepaixsepareedel'Autriche. Paris 1919, pp. 103 ff. (cit. Sixte). 32 Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 657-677. 33 A. J. Mayer: Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 1917-1918. New Haven 1959, pp. 83ff. (cit. Mayer). 34 Ibid., pp. 77f.; A. Ribot: Lettres ä un ami. Paris 1924, p. 228 (cit. Ribot: Lettres); Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges. Ed: E. A. Adamov. Vol. 2. Dresden 1930, pp. 429ff. (cit. Adamov); R. D. Warth: The Allies and the Russian Revolution. Durham 1954, pp. 23ff. (cit. Warth). 35 Mayer, pp. 84-93. AS 791, WK 11c secr; AS 4640 (1916), AS 345, AS 1311 (1917), WK 2 geh.; Germany and the Revo- lution in Russia, 1915-1918. Ed: Ζ. Α. B. Zeman. London 1958, pp. 24, 32 (cit. Zeman); Lenins Rück- 36 kehr nach Rußland 1917. Ed.: W. Hahlweg. Leiden 1957, p. 10 (cit. Hahlweg); Steglich: Friedens- politik, p. 59. AS 685, zu AS 685, zu AS 782, AS 806, AS 807, AS 943, AS 974, WK 2 geh.; Zimmermann to In- vestigating Committee, 2112, part 36; Erzberger to Zimmermann, 1 April, 2112, part 8; Adamov, 37 pp. 306-309; K. Epstein: Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy. Princeton 1959, pp. 164-181 (cit. Epstein). Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 369f. Ibid., part 2. 33 (1917) 55f.; Hopwood, pp. 120-122; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 45ff. 38 Ritter: Tragödie, p. 492; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 59-67; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 97f., 103-108.

39 Hahlweg, pp. 47ff. 40 Ibid., pp. 14, 28, 53, 65f., 93f. 41 AS 1346, AS 1352, AS 1399, WK2 geh., 451,464,2112, part 8; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 80-93, passim. 42 AS 1346, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, p. 80. 43 Ritter: Tragödie, p. 492. 44 AS 1404, AS 1412, AS 1456, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 94-99; Zeman, pp. 46-49; Epstein, 45 pp. 168-173. 46 47 Zu AS 1412, AS 1432, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 99-101 ;Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917)406f.; ibid., part 2. 33 (1917) 62. 48 Zu AS 1346, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Gninewald, pp. 114f. 49 AS 1487, zu AS 1487, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 120f„ 125f. 50 AS 1538, AS 1572, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 132-134. 51 AS 1600, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 149-151. 52 AS 1531, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 130f. 53 Ibid., p. 151, footnote 6; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 71 f.; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 506f.; Fischer, pp. 457f.; Müller, pp. 274ff. 54 AS 1607, zu AS 1607, AS 1613, AS 1623, zu AS 1623, AS 1625, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Gninewald, pp. 151-158; Fischer, pp. 480, 489; Ritter: Tragödie, p. 508; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 69f. 55 AS 1352, zu AS 1352, AS 1660, AS 1668, AS 1669, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 86-89, 162-165. 56 AS 1346, AS 1531, AS 1538, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 80, 130f., 133f. 57 Hopwood's term. 58 AS 1613, AS 1674, AS 1701, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Gninewald, pp. 152-154, 165f., 168; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 76ff.; Hopwood, pp. 130-150. 59 Scherer/Grunewald, p. 168, footnote 3. 60 Zu AS 1769, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, p. 179; Fischer, pp. 495-504. 61 Ibid. 62 Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 85ff. 63 Zu AS 1753, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 169-172. 64 AS 1866, WK2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 189f., 194f., 201 f.; Fischer, pp. 466-469; Μ. Erzberger: Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg. Stuttgart, Berlin 1920, p. 251. 65 Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 52-58. 66 Fischer, pp. 501-504. 67 See below, p. 65. 68 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 565-568. 69 AS 1968, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Gninewald, pp. 204-206; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 94-99. 70 Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 682-691; Mayer, pp. 58, 79-83; The Russian Provisional Government 1917. Ed.: R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky. Vol. 2. 3. Stanford 1961, here vol. 2, pp. 935-940, 1171-1173, vol. 3, pp. 1249-1285; Warth, pp. 63-65, 89-95; Adamov, pp. 436-438. 71 Guinn, pp. 209, 231; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 280f., 288-290; Beioff, pp. 239f. 72 Guinn, pp. 223, 227-232; King, p. 161; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 293 and pp. 296f. 73 Guinn, pp. 223, 232, 236; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 280-286, 294f.; Beioff, pp. 240-245, 265, 269; Lowe/Dockrill, pp. 225, 256-259. 74 Guinn, p. 240; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 280f„ 290, 294-296. 75 King, pp. 140-146, 152f., 159-169; Watt, pp. 162, 165, 169f.; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 402-404. 76 King, pp. 151 f.; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 394-397, 402; Poincare, pp. 85ff.; Ribot: Lettres, pp. 62-64, 228; Adamov, pp. 429ff. 77 Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 397-404. 78 Ibid., pp. 296f., 874-891; E. Hölzle: Das Experiment des Friedens im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1917. In: Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht. 13 (1962) 484, 486. 79 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 190f., 295-299; Gutsche: Bethmann, pp. 228-230; id.: Deutschland, pp. 646ff.; W. J. Mommsen: L Opinion allemande et la chute du gouvernement Bethmann-Hollweg en juillet 1917. In: Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine. 15 (1968) 44 (cit. Mommsen); H. Gatzke: The Drive to the West. Baltimore 1953, pp. 174f., 230 (cit. Gatzke). 80 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 496ff.; Kielmansegg, p. 447; Mommsen, p. 45; Gutsche: Bethmann, p. 229; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 371-373. 81 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 500, 542f., 546; Kielmansegg, pp. 449f.; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 349-388. 82 Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 543-547; Fischer, pp. 427, 439; Kielmansegg, p. 450; Mommsen, pp. 45f.; Gutsche: Bethmann, pp. 230f. 83 Müller, pp. 255f.; Gutsche: Bethmann, p. 230; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 546f.; Ludendorff, pp. 355f. 84 J. L. Snell: The Russian Revolution and the German Social Democratic Party in 1917. In: American Slavic and East European Review. 1956, p. 344 (cit. Snell). 85 Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 470; Ritter: Tragödie, p. 546; Kielmansegg, pp. 452f.; Fischer, p. 442. 86 Feldman, pp. 259-372; Mommsen, p. 47; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 548f.; Müller, p. 253. 87 Feldman, pp. 336-356; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 410-463, passim; Fischer, p. 438; Mommsen, pp. 122-124. 88 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 369-371, 387f. 89 Ibid., pp. 416-421; Snell, p. 343; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 504f. 90 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 455-457, 473; Mommsen, pp. 48f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 87. 91 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 565-569; Mommsen, pp. 49f.; K.-H. Janssen: Macht oder Verblendung. Göttingen 1963, pp. 125f. (cit. Janssen). 92 Hoensbroech, Prussian House of Lords, 5 March, p. 245; Schlorlemer, Prussian House of Represent- atives, 15 March, pp. 305f.; Westarp, Reichstag, 29 March, pp. 367-369; Graefe, Reichstag, 29 March, pp. 385f.; Conservative Party leader statement, 28 April, pp. 463f.; Conservative Party Reichstag interpellation, 3 May, p. 473; Kreth, Reichstag Main Committee, 3 May, p. 476; Free Conservative statement, 12 May, pp. 550f.; Roesicke, Reichstag, 15 May, pp. 557-560; Graefe, Reichstag, 15 May, pp. 574-576; Heydebrand, public meeting, 17 May, pp. 591-594; Hoensbroech, Prussian House of Lords, 19 May, pp. 596f. - all references to Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 93 Progressives: MüÜer-Meiningen, Reichstag, 29 March, p. 363; Dove, Reichstag, 30 March, p. 383; Progressive Party statement, 2 May, p. 471; Schulze-Gävernitz, Reichstag Main Committee, 3 May, pp. 474f.; Gothein, Reichstag Main Committee, 3 May, p. 475; Haas, Reichstag Main Committee, 4 May, p. 475; Warmuth, Reichstag Main Committee, 4 May, p. 477; Naumann, Reichstag Main Committee, 4 May, p. 477. Center: Erzberger, Reichstag Main Committee, 3 May, pp. 474 f.; Schirmer, Reichstag, 7 May, p. 501; Spahn (for all middle parties), Reichstag, 15 May, p. 569 - all references to Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 94 Noske, Reichstag, 29 March, p. 361; David, Reichstag, 30 March, pp. 381-383; Reichstag vote, 30 March, p. 388; Ebert, telegram to Russian Socialists, 31 March, p. 389; Scheidemann, Socialist Party Council, 17-18 April, p. 418; Socialist Party Council resolution, 19 April, p. 420; Scheidemann, Reichstag, 24 April, p. 440; Socialist Party Reichstag interpellation, 3 May, p. 473; David, Reichstag Main Committee, 3 May, pp. 476f.; Davidsohn, Reichstag, 7 May, p. 503; Scheidemann, Reichstag, 15 May, pp. 560-565; Vorwärts, 15 May, pp. 568f.; David, Reichstag, 15 May, pp. 572-574 - all references to Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 95 AS 1649, AS 1668, AS 1690, AS 1769, zu AS 1769, AS2174, WK 2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 158 f., 163, 166f., 176-179, 197f., 218-221; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 389f., 408, 572;Snell, pp. 343-346; Ph. Scheidemann: Der Zusammenbruch. Berlin 1921, pp. 149-153; id.: Memoiren eines Sozialdemo- kraten. Vol. 1. Dresden 1928, pp. 421-431. 96 Noske, 29 March; David, 30 March and 15 May; Ebert, 31 March; Scheidemann, 17-18 April and 15 May (see footnote 94 for references). 97 David, 30 March and 15 May; Party resolution; Scheidemann, 15 May (see footnote 94 for references); David to Winterfeldt, 24 May, AS 2174, WK 2 geh. (printed in Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 218-221). 98 Noske, 29 March; Scheidemann, 15 May; David, 15 and 24 May (see footnote 94). 99 Hoffmann, Prussian House of Representatives, 15 March, p. 304; Bernstein, Reichstag, 29 March, pp. 356f.; Reichstag motion, 29 March, p. 358; Haase, Reichstag, 30 March, pp. 378f.; Ledebour, Reichstag, 30 March, p. 381; Founding Party conference motion, 6-8 April, pp. 396-398; Ledebour, Founding Party conference, 6-8 April, pp. 397; Ledebour, Reichstag, 24 April, p. 441; Cohn-Nord- hausen, Reichstag, 5 May, p. 496; Ledebour, Reichstag, 7 May, pp. 506f.; Bernstein, Reichstag, 14 May, p. 555; Ledebour, Reichstag, 15 May, pp. 570f.; Party interpellation, Baden Landtag, 23 May, p. 602 - all references from Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917); Snell, p. 340. 100 Bethmann: to Flemish delegates, 3 and 5 March, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917)239-242; to party leaders, 10 March, Mommsen, p. 47; Prussian House of Representatives, 14 March, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 297-299; Reichstag, 29 March, ibid., pp. 369-371; to Kaiser, 18 April, Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 125f.; to Bundesstaaten governments, 25 April, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 455; to middle party leaders, 3 May, Mommsen, p. 50; to Bundesrats Ausschuß für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, 8 May, ibid., p. 49; Reichstag, 15 May, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 565-568. Helfferich: Reichstag, 21 March, p. 328; Reichstag Main Committee, 3 May, pp. 475,479 f.; Reichstag, 5 May, pp. 499 f.; Reichstag, 14 May, p. 556-all references Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). Zimmermann: to Lithuanian delegates, 26 March, ibid., pp. 340f.; Reichstag Main Committee, 28 April, Fischer, p. 497. Kaempf (President of the Reichstag): Reichstag, 2 May, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 469f. Köth (War Office): Reichstag, 2 May, ibid., pp. 477f. W. Τ. B. (Wolf Telegraph Bureau): 31 March and 7 April, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917)389,401. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung: 4 April, 15 April, 25 April, 25 May, 30 May, ibid., pp. 406f., 455-457, 608, 611. Kölnische Zeitung: 4 April, 15 April, 4 May, ibid., pp. 394f., 407f., 482f. 101 To Bethmann, 31 March, p. 389; to troops, 24 May and end of May, pp. 603, 605; W. Τ. B., 24 May, p. 605 - all references Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 102 Hindenburg interview for press, 9 April, ibid., p. 404; Hindenburg's letter to wife, Müller, p. 295; Ludendorff's order of day, 11 May, 2112, part 11. 103 Quoted by Cohn-Nordhausen, pp. 496f.; Reichstag Main Committee, 24 April, p. 443; public pro- clamation, 27 April, p. 460 - all references Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 104 German East Mark Association: 16 April, pp. 414f.; Independent Committee for a German Peace: 23 April, p. 438; Pan Germans: 1 May, p. 466; Economic and nationalist organizations: 3 May, p. 480; German pacifists: 3 May, pp. 481 f.; Christian labor unions: 6 May, pp. 518f.; Mitteleuropa League: 31 May, p. 613 - all references Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 105 Bavaria: Hertling, Bavarian Reichsratskammer, 10 March, pp. 283 f.; Bayerische Staatszeitung, 5 May and 12 May, pp. 517, 551. Baden: government statement, 23 May, p. 602 - all references Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917). 106 Bethmann: Reichstag, 29 March, ibid., p. 370; to Kaiser, 12 and 18 April, Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 94, 125; Reichstag, 15 May, Schulthess, pari 1. 33 (1917) 566. Helfferich: Reichstag, 5 and 14 May, ibid., pp. 500, 556. W. T.B.: 31 March, ibid., p. 389. Middle parties: Spahn speech, Reichstag, 15 May, ibid., p. 569. Conservatives: see footnote 92. Majority Socialists: see Noske, 29 March and Scheidemann, 18 April and 15 May, footnote 94. Independent Socialists: see Cohn-Nordhausen, 5 May, Ledebour, 7 and 15 May, and Dittmann, 14 May, footnote 99. Independent Committee for a German Peace and Pan Germans: see footnote 104. 107 Graefe: Reichstag, 15 May, p. 574. Scheidemann, Reichstag, 15 May, p. 561 - both references Schul- thess, part 1. 33 (1917). 108 See footnote 106. 109 Mommsen, pp. 47f.; Feldman, pp. 298f., 329f., 371 f. 110 Gutsche: Bethmann, p. 230; Feldman, p. 335; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 546f. 111 StegÜch: Friedenspolitik, pp. 67, 69, 72; Gatzke, p. 178; Mommsen, p. 48; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 508, 516; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 156f.; Müller, pp. 261 f.; Fischer, pp. 494f. 112 Gatzke, pp. 174f.; Gutsche: Bethmann, pp. 230f.; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 245, 367-369, 385f.; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 541-545; Fischer, p. 436; Kielmansegg, pp. 447, 450; Müller, pp. 255f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 60; Feldman, p. 335. 113 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 438, 463f., 473, 557-560... 114 Ibid., p. 592. us Ibid., pp. 315, 358; Fischer, pp. 436, 441; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 546f. 116 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 473 , 560-565. 117 Ibid., p. 304. 118 See Founding Party program, 6-8 April, Ledebour and Cohn-Nordhausen statements, footnote 99. 119 See footnotes 57, 62, 65. 120 Spahn: Reichstag, 15 May, Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 569. Erzberger, s. Müller, pp. 266f. 121 Gutsche: Bethmann, p. 230; Müller, pp. 255f.; Mommsen, p. 49; Janssen, pp. 125, 133. 122 Feldman, pp. 330f.; Müller, p. 268; Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 499f., 556. 123 See footnotes 54 and 57; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 158f.; Ritter: Tragödie, p. 679, footnote 63; Fischer, p. 497; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 84. 124 Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 156f.; Müller, pp. 255f., 260; Gutsche: Bethmann, p. 230; Feldman, p. 335; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 546f.; Mommsen, p. 47. 125 Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 135, 156f.; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 501, 546; Kielmansegg, pp. 452f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 73; Müller, p. 264. 126 Ibid., pp. 264-267; Janssen, p. 124; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 517, 551 f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 84; Hopwood, p. 158; Jarausch, p. 370. 127 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 565-568. 128 Ritter: Tragödie, p. 527; Müller, pp. 269f. 129 Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 79; Ritter: Tragödie, p. 507; Scherer/Grunewald, p. 151. 130 Schulthess, part 1. 33 (1917) 690-694, 698f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 92, 100-102; Fischer, pp. 505-509; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 532f.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 216f., 221-223. 131 A 16057, WK 15 geh.; AS 2101, WK2 geh.; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 207-210; Th. v. Bethmann Holl- weg: Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege. Vol. 2. Berlin 1921, p. 201. 132 Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 55f.; Sixte, pp. 165ff.; Lloyd George, pp. 2011 ff.; Ritter: Tragödie, p. 521; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 217, 224f., 234-236; Fischer, pp. 473-476. 133 Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 700-702. 134 Fischer, p. 509-511. 135 Steglich: Friedenspolitik, p. 118. 136 Fischer, pp. 512f.; Erzberger memorandum, 2112, part 12; Haeften to Investigating Committee, 2118, part 21; Epstein, p. 187; Müller, p. 292; Weltkrieg, vol. 12, pp. 376-384, 463-467. 137 Fischer, pp. 513ff.; Müller, pp. 295-299; Scherer/Grunewald, pp. 238f.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 118ff.; Schulthess, part 2. 33 (1917) 304f.; Riezler to Investigating Committee, 2118, part 18; Haeften to Investigating Committee, 2118, part 21; Deist, part 2, pp. 764ff.; E. Ludendorff: Urkunden der Obersten Heeresleitung über ihre Tätigkeit 1916/18. Vol. 1. Berlin 1921, pp. 395-400. 138 Hopwood, pp. 165ff.; Steglich: Friedenspolitik, pp. 122ff. 139 Jarausch, pp. 370-380; Fischer, pp. 516-525; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 558-584; Gutsche: Deutschland, pp. 747-757; id.: Bethmann, pp. 230-233; Mommsen, pp. 50-53. 140 Fischer, pp. 525-529; Ritter: Tragödie, pp. 562ff.; Gutsche: Deutschland, pp. 760ff.