Countering the terrorist threat: Social and Behavioural Science How academia and industry can play their part Contents

Understanding the economic This booklet is for everyone in and social impacts of terrorism and Section 1: Social and behavioural counter-terrorism interventions 18 academia, industry and other science in CONTEST 04 Section 3: How to get involved 19 CONTEST: International terrorism I’m in academia or industry research organisations whose and the UK 04 with a bright idea. Who should CONTEST: Science and technology 05 I contact? 20 work on social and behavioural CONTEST: Social and behavioural How does the Government science 06 gain scientific advice on science could help counter the Ethical considerations 06 counter-terrorism? 22 How is the Government communicating with academia? 24 terrorist threat to the UK. Section 2: Key challenges 07 How is Government communicating Pursue with industry? 28 Improving decision-making with Where can I look internationally International terrorism is a intelligence data 08 for information and funding? 29 Understanding capability, What should I do next? 31 vulnerability and attack complex social phenomenon. indicators in terrorist organisations. 09 Glossary 32 Prevent End notes 33 Application of social and Refining our understanding of radicalisation 10 behavioural science can Developing effective Prevent interventions 11 improve our knowledge and Protect Identifying suspicious behaviour 12 understanding of terrorism Improving protective security 13 and its consequences. Social Prepare Understanding crowd behaviour during terrorism incidents and and behavioural science can emergencies 14 directly inform strategy, policy Improving the operational effectiveness of emergency and operations and help ensure response teams 15 Cross-cutting challenges that the Government’s response Reducing false positives in our counter-terrorist work 16 is robust and effective. Communicating with the public, stakeholders and communities 17 Countering the terrorist SectionIntroduction 1 threat: Social and Section 1 behavioural science CONTEST CONTEST How academia and industry can play their part

Section 1 Social and behavioural science in CONTEST

CONTEST: International terrorism CONTEST is based on a set of principles, CONTEST is based on four workstreams, CONTEST: Science and technology and the UK reflecting our core values, the lessons each with a clear objective: In August 2009, the Government 1 we and others have drawn from our The 2010 National Security Strategy ––Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks. published the UK Science and experiences of terrorism to date, and identified international terrorism as the ––Prevent : to stop people becoming Technology Strategy for Countering the broader security principles set out in most significant immediate security terrorists or supporting violent International Terrorism3. The strategy the National Security Strategy. threat to the UK. While terrorism is not extremism. outlines how science and technology new, the current threat is different from ––We regard the protection of human ––Protect: to strengthen our protection (including social and behavioural those we have faced before in its scope, rights as central to our counter- against terrorist attack. science) can better enable us to capability and ambition. Contemporary terrorism work in this country and ––Prepare: where an attack cannot be pursue terrorists, prevent radicalisation, international terrorist organisations overseas. stopped, to mitigate its impact. protect essential services and have an international cause, plan and ––Our response to terrorism is and will be Work on Pursue and Prevent reduces infrastructure and prepare for a terrorist conduct attacks in and from a range of based upon the rule of law. the threat from terrorism while work attack. It also sets out our objectives countries and aim to inflict significant ––We will always aim to prosecute those on Protect and Prepare reduces the for the next three years: civilian casualties. Many seek to responsible for terrorist attacks in this UK’s vulnerability to attack. Together, ––To use horizon scanning to understand recruit people in this country. Some country. they reduce the overall risk from future scientific and technical threats organisations aspire to use Chemical, ––We will tackle the causes as well as international terrorism. The revised and opportunities and inform our Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) symptoms of terrorism. strategy also emphasises a number of decision making on counter-terrorism. materials as weapons*. ––We will work towards reducing support priorities common to all the four main ––To ensure the development and for terrorism and preventing people workstreams: one of these is science The nature of the threat and the delivery of effective counter-terrorism becoming terrorists: without popular and technology. Government’s response is set out in solutions by identifying and sharing support terrorism is unsustainable. the UK’s Strategy for Countering priority science and technology ––We will be responsive to the threat International Terrorism (CONTEST), requirements. that can be created by rapidly evolving published in 2009 2 a brief review of ––To enhance international collaboration technology. the first year of the revised CONTEST on counter-terrorism related science ––We recognise that partnerships in this strategy will be published shortly. and technology. country and overseas are essential The aim of CONTEST is: to our success and that these “to reduce the risk to the United partnerships depend on openness and Kingdom and its interests overseas trust. from international terrorism, so that ––The threat we face crosses our borders people can go about their lives freely and is international in scope. We will and with confidence.” depend upon our allies as they will depend on us.

*A CBRN strategy will be released shortly and published at www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2010/DEP2010-0760.pdf Countering the terrorist Section 1 threat: Social and Section 2 behavioural science CONTEST Key challenges How academia and industry can play their part

Section 2 Key challenges

The strategy commits the Government deal with numerical measurements This section outlines The section is structured around each to producing a series of brochures for whilst qualitative approaches deal challenges for UK counter- of four main workstreams of our counter- academia, industry and other research with how people understand their terrorist strategy: organisations about science and experiences. Providing the methods terrorist work that may be ––Our Pursue work depends not just on technology in counter-terrorism. The used are robust, both qualitative addressed by social and understanding terrorist intent and brochures outline our research and and quantitative approaches are behavioural science. planning, but also on effective analysis development requirements. equally valid. and decision making during complex The first of these brochures was Social and behavioural science is In each part we have identified and fast moving counter-terrorist published alongside the strategy and essential to understanding why a core challenge, some of investigations; identified counter-terrorism challenges individuals and groups behave as they ––For Prevent to make a difference that could be addressed by technical do, knowledge of which is essential its associated social and we need to understand why people science4. This brochure explains the for countering terrorism. There are behavioural features, and the become radicalised, how and where challenges that may be addressed challenges related to social and social and behavioural work we can intervene most effectively in through the application of social and behavioural science in all parts of that could help us in the future. the radicalisation process and how behavioural science. CONTEST and Section 2 of this brochure we can then assess our progress and describes these in detail. identify best practice: in this context, CONTEST: Social and behavioural radicalisation is the process by which science Ethical considerations people come to support violent extremism and, in some cases, to Social and behavioural science includes Work carried out by social and participate in terrorist groups7. many separate disciplines including behavioural scientists on behalf of ––Our work will benefit from sociology, psychology, criminology, Government is carried out in accordance Protect accurate detection of suspicious anthropology, economics, political with strong ethical principles, such as behaviour, whether from an individual science and communication studies. those laid out in the Government Office in a crowd or an employee inside The common themes of social and for Science’s Universal Ethical Code a key organisation. Our protective behavioural science are, respectively, for Scientists6 and the Government security measures depend not only “the study of society and the manner Social Research Service’s guidance. on new technology but also on a in which people behave and impact Researchers follow the guidelines and better understanding of associated the world around us”5; and the study ethical codes of their professional human factors. of the actions and reactions of people organisations and where appropriate, ––For our work we want to through observational and experimental studies have full independent Prepare understand more about crowd methods. ethical review. behaviour during an emergency Applying scientific method to such incident and about how the response complex subjects requires a range of the emergency services can then of approaches including surveys, be made more effective. questionnaires, interviews, ethnographic studies, focus groups and observations. These approaches generate both qualitative and quantitative data which can be used to draw conclusions about society and the individuals within it. In this context, quantitative approaches Countering the terrorist Section 2 threat: Social and Section 2 behavioural science Key challenges Key challenges How academia and industry can play their part

Key challenges: Pursue

The Pursue workstream aims to reduce Common features of the challenge: Understanding capability, How can industry and academia help? the terrorist threat to the UK through ––Information about terrorist activities vulnerability and attack indicators Industry and academia may be able to the detection and investigation of comes from numerous sources, in terrorist organisations. apply existing or new research to: terrorist networks and the disruption including digital (e.g. information in ––Understand how terrorist groups of their activities. Terrorists operate in official databases, phone records, The Challenge: develop the technical and psychological secret and intelligence is vital to detect online activity), human (e.g. from We also need to constantly improve capability to conduct an attack and and disrupt their activities. In the past members of the public, informants and our understanding about how terrorist how this might be influenced by five years there has been a rapid and the security agencies) and forensic. organisations work – how capability government actions. significant increase in intelligence ––Investigations are often carried out develops, what capability creates ––Identify factors which influence a resources at home and overseas, across multi-agency and sometimes most risk, what influences the choice terrorist group’s choice of method and for the intelligence agencies and the multi-national teams. of target, how behaviours may reveal target of attack (e.g. individual, social, police. These resources have been ––Decision-makers must take account intent, and what determines motivation. ideological, security and broader organised into new structures which of public safety, political, legal, ethical political factors). ensure unprecedented interagency and practical concerns. Common features of the challenge: ––Identify how terrorist behaviours collaboration, recognised internationally ––Terrorist groups operate in secret How can industry and academia help? change as they move into attack phase as a model for successful joint working. and their activities are often hard Industry and academia may be able to distinguish from those of the law and how those behaviours might be to apply existing or new research identified and distinguished from the Improving decision-making with abiding public. to develop: activities of innocent members of the intelligence data ––Terrorist attacks are usually planned public. ––Effective methods of eliciting and and conducted by groups rather than ––Understand how and why terrorists or The Challenge: assessing information. individuals. terrorist groups develop and lose the Intelligence and law enforcement ––Improved methods for recording, ––Terrorist activities are influenced both motivation to conduct an attack, what agencies identify and disrupt terrorist searching and displaying digital by factors external to the group and by the indicators of these changes might activities. But the investigation information. internal group dynamics. be and the associated implications for of individuals engaged in a covert ––Techniques that facilitate and enhance ––A terrorist group must develop and government policy. conspiracy to commit a crime is effective decision-making in multi- maintain motivation and capability, inherently challenging. Information is agency teams. whilst remaining hidden from law ambiguous, complicated, constantly ––Effective training to enhance enforcement, the attention of evolving and not always accurate. investigational skills. communities and, sometimes, Decisions must often be made in from friends and family. fast-moving and complex situations. Countering the terrorist Section 2 threat: Social and Section 2 behavioural science Key challenges Key challenges How academia and industry can play their part

Key challenges: Prevent

Preventing individuals from supporting Common features of the challenge: ––Develop an understanding of the Common features of the challenge: or engaging in terrorism is one of the key ––Radicalisation is occurring for a range comparative influence of international ––Measuring attitudinal or behavioural objectives of CONTEST. of reasons and domestic factors on the change can be difficult. ––Ideology (both extremist and violent radicalisation process. ––Evaluating outcomes is more The most significant international extremist) and ideologues play a ––Investigate the role played by new problematic than measuring process. terrorist threat to this country currently key part. and conventional media (notably the ––Many effective international comes from individuals and groups who ––But people appear to be vulnerable for internet) in the radicalisation process. interventions have developed outside attempt to justify murder by reference to reasons which are more psychological ––Understand how perceived or real governments and in some cases in a distorted interpretation of Islam and than simply political. grievances are used by radicalisers other policy areas. who try to recruit people to their cause ––And very local grievances may be as to justify violence. ––Data on the extent of radicalisation from among Muslim communities. But important as protest against global internationally and trends up and down in the recent past other international Developing effective Prevent developments. is not consistent or always reliable. terrorist groups have targeted different interventions ––Group behaviour can be a important communities here and have justified How can industry and academia help? factor: recruitment may precede killing on other grounds. The Challenge: Industry and academia may be able to radicalisation. We need to develop effective ways to apply existing or new research to: The numbers and percentiles of people ––Communities in this country are challenge the radicalisation process. who are recruited to violent extremism subject to influence from here and ––Capture best practice from around Some interventions, which have been are very small. But the impact they can overseas. the world, notably in communities and developed to address this challenge have is disproportionately large. – works in an area of high Non-Government Organisations. –Prevent in this and other countries, seek to political sensitivity: it can wrongly be ––Understand the comparative merits of Domestic violent extremist groups (e.g. change behaviours (i.e. disengagement); construed as a critique of Muslim approaches based on attitudinal and from the far right) are also active in this others aim to change attitudes (i.e. communities. behavioural change. country. They have their own message, de-radicalisation). Some aim to do ––Understand what works from other exploit a different community and seek How can industry and academia help? both. Government is already funding fields of intervention such as health a different range of targets. Industry and academia may be able to interventions and best practice is and crime, and investigate their apply existing or new research to: emerging. But we need to do more. Refining our understanding of application to preventing radicalisation. radicalisation ––Understand the reason for and ––Improve methods of outcome process involved in the transition from evaluation drawing on knowledge of The Challenge: extremism to violent extremism. successful assessments in other fields Violent extremist groups would not be ––Explore the techniques used by ––Better understand the broader global able to operate without recruiting people radicalisers and determine who and trends: how prevalent is radicalisation who are vulnerable to their extremist what makes an effective recruiter. to violent extremism? message. We need to better understand ––Develop a greater understanding of vulnerability and the processes of the needs and challenges faced by radicalisation. It is particularly important communities who are targeted by to understand the comparative influence radicalisers and establish what factors of ideological, psychological and social have made and still make communities factors operating in this country and ‘resilient’ to violent extremism. on this country from overseas8. The Government can continue to identify appropriate responses and evaluate the impact of existing counter- radicalisation projects9. Countering the terrorist Section 2 threat: Social and Section 2 behavioural science Key challenges Key challenges How academia and industry can play their part

Key challenges: Protect

One of the objectives in CONTEST Common features of the challenge: Improving protective security Common features of the challenge: is to reduce the vulnerability of the UK ––There is no unique set of behaviours ––Repetitive security procedures are often and its interests to terrorist attack. or ‘profile’ that always reveals terrorists The Challenge: poorly understood and sometimes are This is the purpose of Protect. It or their intentions. Protective security requires effective circumvented or ignored. requires protection of critical national ––Many behaviours which may be thought monitoring, detection, searching ––Operators become subject to infrastructure, crowded places, the suspicious can be entirely innocent (e.g. of people at transport hubs) and complacency, fatigue and boredom. transport system, our borders, and ––Crowded places present high-volume response (e.g. to a suspect package). ––Large numbers of people require our interests overseas; and protection movements of people. We need to improve these processes. processing at checkpoints. against threats from insiders. ––Insiders have legitimate access We also need to improve the design ––Most positives will be false. to their organisation’s assets and and management of environments to Reducing our vulnerability to terrorist How can industry and academia help? premises which they can exploit for make them harder targets for terrorists†. attack involves developing ways to Industry and academia may be able to unauthorised purposes. And we need to make it easier for identify terrorist behaviours and the apply existing or new research to: the public and employees to follow deployment of counter-measures How can industry and academia help? security instructions, ensuring minimal ––Develop techniques that promote that deter, disrupt and minimise the Industry and academia may be able to disturbance and intrusion. security awareness and vigilance harm caused by those engaging in apply existing or new research to: amongst employees, notably in terrorist activities. In responding to ––Improve understanding of the national infrastructure organisations. this challenge we need to ensure that behavioural indicators of concealment ––Develop ways to improve the security measures command public of small arms, explosives or other attention and response-time of consent, minimise intrusion and do materials associated with attack security personnel. not create disproportionate disruption planning. ––Combine the social and physical to everyday life. ––Develop methods and approaches sciences to optimise the performance that might facilitate the detection of of security personnel and improve Identifying suspicious behaviour terrorist research, reconnaissance the design and management of and attack planning, or help frustrate vulnerable sites. The Challenge: and deter such activities. ––Develop techniques that help the An individual’s behaviour may contain ––Improve systems and human public to understand and follow clues as to their intent. We need processes to automate the detection security measures. to develop techniques that enable of these indicators. identification of terrorist actions and behaviours in a range of contexts: these might include crowded places, key infrastructure locations or security checkpoints, such as the airport or UK border. Any approach must be proven, minimise intrusion and enable people to go freely about their day to day activities.

†Information about the Government’s approach to reducing the vulnerability of crowded places to terrorist attack will be published shortly and can be found at http://security. homeoffice.gov.uk Countering the terrorist Section 2 threat: Social and Section 2 behavioural science Key challenges Key challenges How academia and industry can play their part

Key challenges: Prepare

The Prepare workstream aims to mitigate Common features of the challenge: Improving the operational effectiveness Common features of the challenge: the impact of a terrorist attack where ––Multiple situations causing variable of emergency response teams ––No two emergency situations will be it cannot be stopped. This includes levels of fear and public concern (for exactly the same. There will be a work to manage an ongoing attack as example radiation, biological, chemical The Challenge: degree of uncertainty about every well as to recover from its aftermath. incidents). Emergency Response Teams (Police, emergency situation. Effective Prepare work means ensuring ––Multiple audiences, some with existing Fire and Ambulance Services), provide ––Multi-agency response teams have that capabilities are in place to deal relationships to others in the group crucial assistance during the early different priorities, training and with a range of terrorist incidents, that (e.g. families). stages of an incident and will help expectations. there is continuity or swift recovery ––Complex links between group and determine long-term recovery. We need ––Group behaviour occurs among in our critical national infrastructure individual behaviour. to understand the factors which make a those involved in an incident and in following an incident, and that crisis ––Varying levels of leadership. team effective, including coordination, Emergency Response teams. management structures are appropriately communication, command and ––There are varying levels of effective How can industry and academia help? equipped and trained. It is essential control, and training. We also need to leadership in command, control, Industry and academia may be able to that emergency services can respond understand the expectations and needs advice and coordination roles during apply existing or new research to: effectively to a wide range of incidents of people at the scene of an incident, and following an incident. Emergency and recover as quickly as possible. ––Enhance our understanding of how and the roles and actions of Emergency advice may come from multiple crowds behave in emergencies. Response Teams. sources. Understanding crowd behaviour during ––Understand the implications How can industry and academia help? terrorism incidents and emergencies of collective resilience for the Industry and academia may be able to management of crowds. apply existing or new research to: The Challenge: ––Collect evidence regarding the The behaviour of crowds following an relationship between communications ––Develop training to improve the incident can determine its impact. and crowd behaviour. effectiveness of Emergency Response Crowd behaviour may help to alleviate ––Provide clear guidance about the Teams. potential problems: members of the relative importance of pre-event and ––Understand the impact of effective public may be the first responders on post-event (early) communications. leadership, communications and the scene and appropriate action may ––Provide clear guidance about the coordination on the operational help to save life or prevent injury. But a impact of effective command and effectiveness of Emergency Response crowd may create additional problems: control on crowd behaviour. Teams. panic and chaotic behaviour may hinder ––Develop communication tools and ––Understand how the expectations of evacuation, the handling of casualties strategies for managing crowds. those affected by an incident will fit and public health interventions. We with the capabilities of Emergency need to understand the reaction of Response Teams. crowds to different situations and how to respond. Countering the terrorist Section 2 threat: Social and Section 2 behavioural science Key challenges Key challenges How academia and industry can play their part

Key challenges: Cross-cutting

Some challenges apply across more How can industry and academia help? Communicating with the public, Common features of the challenge: than one of the CONTEST work-streams Industry and academia may be able to stakeholders and communities ––Delivering clear and consistent and may impact on all aspects of apply existing or new research to: messages which are also flexible counter-terrorist work in the UK. The Challenge: enough to reach multiple audiences ––Develop ways to help security experts Communicating with the public, that ‘hear’ the same message in and front-line workers to understand Reducing false positives in our stakeholders and communities is a vital different ways and improve their own judgements counter-terrorist work part of our counter-terrorism work. Used ––measuring and influencing complex and decision making well, communications can protect the attitudes on counter-terrorism issues ––Reduce the number of false positives The Challenge public from terrorist attacks by keeping across a wide range of audiences, by improving our processes for the Many activities and characteristics them informed and alert, aware of both where these attitudes are privately detection of significant signals of terrorists are common to those the threat we face and the measures we held and sensitive ––Reduce the impact of false positives, of innocent members of the public. have in place to manage it. ––Some of the populations we need to and the chance of missing a true Methods of detecting possible terrorist understand better if we are to reach positive, by improving our processes Communications can deliver a clear and activity can produce many false alarms. them successfully are small, difficult to for investigating and reacting to persuasive statement of the reasons We need to find ways to reduce them. access and already heavily surveyed. apparently significant signals. for Government policy, in particular Common features of the challenge: around questions of balancing public How can industry and academia help? ––The number of terrorists is very small safety with the protection of individual Industry and academia may be able to compared to the number of people who human rights. apply existing or new research to: pass through any security system. Communications can also create ––Develop robust ways to understand the ––There is a very high cost (human, resilience to terrorist propaganda. relationship between communications social and financial) to the UK if a Effective communications of this kind and attitude and behaviour change, genuine positive signal is missed depend on an understanding of factors and to measure the effect of counter- ––There is also a lower but still which make violent extremism attractive terrorism communications in changing substantial cost for each false or protect communities and individuals attitudes or behaviour (for example positive to which we respond against it. public understanding of Government ––Rapid expert judgements need Different audiences can react in a counter-terrorism policy or of levels to be made repeatedly. range of ways to the same message. of threat, or community resistance Understanding how messages should to radicalisation) be constructed and the effects they ––Understand the right (and wrong) can have are vital to Government’s audiences for communications aimed continuing dialogue on counter-terrorism at changing attitudes to violent with the public. extremism ––Understand the relative importance of broadcast press, other media sources, communities, groups and individuals in communicating Government policy relating to the CONTEST strategy or shaping support for or resistance to violent extremism. Countering the terrorist threat: Social and behavioural science

How academia and industry can play their part

Section 2 SectionSection 2 3 Key challenges KeyHow challenges to get involved

In this section we explain how academia, industry and other

Understanding the economic and social ––People will experience and respond to research organisations can impacts of terrorism and counter- counter-terrorist measures in different terrorism interventions ways and have variable understanding about them. engage with Government and The Challenge: ––In common with many other policies, Calculating the wider impact of terrorist counter-terrorist work will have events is a complex problem as such unintended consequences. other relevant bodies. We set events are low-probability and high- How can industry and academia help? impact (also known as ‘shocks’). They Industry and academia may be able to can cause significant loss of life. They out what we are doing to develop apply existing or new research to: may also have financial and social impacts resulting from disruption and ––Understand the cost of shocks damage to infrastructure, from loss of (low-probability, high-impact events), our links with academia and confidence and enforced change of and how society responds to them. lifestyle and work patterns. ––Understand the priorities people industry bodies engaged in attach to privacy and security. The aim of CONTEST, the Government ––Understand how people value counter-terrorist strategy, is “to reduce protection from potential terrorist the risk to the UK and its interests social and behavioural science. attacks in different circumstances, overseas from international terrorism, from everyday commuting to attending so that people can go about their lives major events. freely and with confidence”. But counter- ––Understand how this changes with terrorism policies inevitably also have any shift in public perception of the some economic and social impact. likelihood and effect of a terrorist It is essential that we understand attack. both the effects of terrorism and ––Improve our estimates of cost-benefit counter-terrorism in order to develop ratios for individual policies. the best policies for addressing the ––Identify the direct impact of counter- threat we face. terrorist measures and policies on Common features of the challenge: individuals and communities. ––The risk from terrorism is low- ––Assess societal attitudes towards probability but high-impact which counter-terrorism measures and makes it difficult to compare to the communications. costs of tackling it. ––Understand how interventions ––A balance needs to be drawn will effect the complex dynamics between measures intended to of the social systems and predict preserve our right to security and at least some of the unintended our rights to privacy. consequences. Countering the terrorist Section 3 threat: Social and Section 3 Behavioural Science How to get involved How to get involved How academia and industry can play their part

I’m in academia or industry with a bright idea. Who should I contact?

OSCT CPNI Ministry Of Defence CT CENTRE Home Office Scientific The Office for Security and Counter The Centre for the Protection of National With terrorist threats becoming Development Branch Terrorism (OSCT) was set up as part Infrastructure (CPNI) is the Government increasingly sophisticated and diverse, The Home Office Scientific Development of the Home Office in March 2007. It body responsible for protective security science and technology is playing an Branch (HOSDB) is a core part of supports the development, direction, advice to owners and operators of the ever more important role in the planning, the Home Office that helps to apply implementation and governance of UK’s Critical National Infrastructure. preparation and prosecution of military technology to reduce crime and counter CONTEST. It also delivers those aspects CPNI aims to ensure researchers and security operations. The Counter- terrorism. It provides expert advice of CONTEST that fall to the Home Office. understand security needs in order to Terrorism Centre serves as a hub to and support to the Home Office and its In relation to science and technology, stimulate and give direction to future make the most of resources in the MOD. partners on any issue relating to science including social and behavioural research efforts. CPNI will also identify While the primary objective of the Centre and technology, creating new and science, its role is to coordinate and existing research that relates to their is to focus on MOD requirements, it can innovative technical solutions. direct research and development own research interests. CPNI works also help other government departments HOSDB helps the Home Office meet its relevant to counter-terrorism. OSCT directly with individuals and research engaged in domestic counter-terrorism. strategic objectives in policing, crime periodically releases open research groups, supporting/funding council www.ctcentre.mod.uk reduction, counter-terrorism, border calls in counter-terrorism science and activities and commissioning work security and identity management. runs the INSTINCT programme, which from university consultancies. Examples of HOSDB’s work include: aims to improve the Government’s www.cpni.gov.uk ability to be an effective customer of ––providing technical know-how to innovation. The Science and Technology improve video and CCTV operations. Team in OSCT will help academics or ––developing techniques for identifying representatives from industry access and detecting chemical and biological the relevant department and provide material. further information about research calls ––developing techniques for ensuring and INSTINCT. the physical safety of government and Email: [email protected] other key buildings. ––developing techniques for detecting hidden weapons and explosives ––evaluating methods of passenger screening. Although not directly involved in social and behavioural science, HOSDB’s work often touches upon this area, especially as regards human factors. scienceandresearch.homeoffice.gov.uk/hosdb Countering the terrorist Section 3 threat: Social and Section 3 Behavioural Science How to get involved How to get involved How academia and industry can play their part

How does the Government gain scientific advice on counter-terrorism?

The Home Office Science Advisory The Government Office for Science Social and behavioural science in Home Office’s scientists and Committee (HOSAC) The Government Office for Science Government researchers HOSAC is the overarching scientific (GO-Science) is led by the Government There are four umbrella bodies within The Home Office has skilled specialist advisory committee at the Home Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA). Government that oversee work in social staff including social researchers, Office. Chaired jointly by the Permanent GO-Science works to ensure that and behavioural science: statisticians, economists, operational Secretary and an independent member researchers, engineers, physical Government policy and decision making ––The Government Social Research of the Committee, HOSAC’s membership scientists and veterinarians who provide is underpinned by robust science and Service (GSR) provides government comprises individuals nominated by support for all aspects of the Home engineering evidence and long term with objective, reliable, relevant and learned societies from both the social Office’s remit. thinking. The GCSA reports to the Prime timely social research. It also supports and physical sciences and the Chairs of Minister and Cabinet and works with all the development, implementation, Home Office scientists and researchers the other science advisory committees Government departments. GO-Science review and evaluation of policy and provide objective, scientific advice to in the department. HOSAC currently has also supports the community of Chief delivery and ensures policy debate is help evidence-based policy decisions several sub-committees, including the Scientific Advisers (CSAs) across informed by the best research evidence and support the delivery of our policies. CBRN advisory sub-committee and the Government. There is a CSA in all major and thinking from the social sciences10. This includes high quality economic Surveys, Design and Statistics sub- science-using departments and they are ––The Government Statistical Service analysis and operational research to committee. HOSAC annually advises on responsible for the quality of science (GSS) is a decentralised community understand the costs and benefits of the Home Office’s science and research advice in their area. This includes which is spread across most Home Office policies and initiatives. plans and on a range of work across the seeking independent advice on scientific Government Departments, the Office In addition, our scientists have two department. Last year the Committee and ethical issues. CSAs have a mix of for National Statistics and the devolved important functions regulating the use advised on the Science and Technology expert backgrounds, including natural administrations in Scotland and and practice of science through the role Strategy for Countering International science, engineering and social science. Wales. The primary function of GSS of the Forensic Science Regulator and Terrorism. is to collect, analyse and disseminate implementing the Animals (Scientific) official statistics11. Procedures Act 1986. ––The Government Economic Service The Home Office carries out its own is a similar community covering (GES) research and uses external academic economists working in Government12. review to ensure quality is maintained. ––The Government Operational Research Many of the department’s social is a community of Service (GORS) researchers are embedded in policy operational researchers which seeks directorates and agencies to promote to maximise the benefits Departments close collaborative working with policy obtain from deploying OR skills in the teams. design, implementation and evaluation of their policies and strategies 13. Associated with the above umbrella bodies are professional social and behavioural scientists, who are embedded in departments across Government, and who specialise in counter-terrorism research. These scientists work collectively to enhance the evidence base for CONTEST and to improve the delivery of the CONTEST strategy. Countering the terrorist Section 3 threat: Social and Section 3 Behavioural Science How to get involved How to get involved How academia and industry can play their part

How is the Government communicating with academia?

Research Councils One of these is Global uncertainties: Councils within RCUK that undertake to social injustice and improving The Research Councils are an important security for all in a changing world. social and behavioural research include: resilience in communities. route for Government to access the The RCs will work together to address http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/index. ––The Economic and Social Research wider research community that we five interrelated global threats to aspx Council (ESRC), which is the UK’s need to deliver the science we require. security – Poverty (and Inequality and primary research council for funding ––The Arts and Humanities Research Government has, for some time, had Injustice), Conflict, Transnational Crime, economic and social science Council (AHRC), which funds research very productive relationships with a Environmental Stress and Terrorism. number of Research Councils. We also research. The ESRC strategic plan for to improve understanding of human have a long-standing concordat with the RCUK’s mission is “to optimise the ways 2009-2014 identifies security, conflict culture and creativity. Previous Economic and Social Research Council that Research Councils work together and justice as an area of particular programmes have included work (ESRC) and have recently put in place a to deliver their goals, to enhance the challenge in the social sciences. to understand how individuals and concordat with the Arts and Humanities overall performance and impact of As their plan states “The challenge communities develop their ideas and Research Council (AHRC) to formalise UK research, training and knowledge is about understanding the causes beliefs about security and insecurity, these relationships. transfer and to be recognised by of insecurity, including criminal and why some ideas and beliefs lead to academia, business and government for terrorist activity, and developing conflict, violence or criminal activity, We work with the Research Councils to excellence in research sponsorship.”14 effective means for promoting and whether there is an acceptable investigate areas of common interest security, addressing vulnerabilities and balance between national security in both research and regulatory roles encouraging resilience. Research will and the protection of civil liberties through, for example, providing expertise explore the contemporary drivers of and human rights. to contribute to research programmes or insecurity; why competition sometimes http://www.ahrc.ac.uk/Pages/default.aspx through joint funding programmes. develops into violent conflict; the ––The Medical Research Council (MRC), nature of contemporary conflicts, how Research Councils UK (RCUK) is a which promotes research into all areas they might be resolved and the effects partnership between the seven of medical and related science with mitigated; and how social injustice UK research councils (RCs). RCUK the aims of improving the health and perpetuates insecurities. It explores coordinates the delivery of multi- quality of life of the UK public and how notions of self, community rights, disciplinary research in six priority areas. contributing to the wealth of the nation. ethics and competing ideas of justice http://www.mrc.ac.uk/index.htm can be incorporated into new ways of predicting, managing and avoiding Although these are the primary research insecurity.”15 councils concerned with social and Previous work by ESRC has included behavioural science, human sciences work with AHRC (see below) and cross into the work of all the Research the FCO to better understand Councils in the UK. The remaining radicalisation and violence, and RCs are: research into new security challenges ––Biotechnology and Biological Sciences including conflict in cities, the Research Council (BBSRC). globalisation of private security, the ––Engineering and Physical Sciences role of military force in the security Research Council (EPSRC). of civil society, and psychological ––Natural Environment Research Council dimensions of human security. Future (NERC). work will include work on the causes of ––Science and Technology Facilities non-violent versus violent responses Council (STFC). Countering the terrorist Section 3 threat: Social and Section 3 Behavioural Science How to get involved How to get involved How academia and industry can play their part

UK Academic Institutions The Learned Societies AURIL UNICO The UK’s universities are renowned for We will continue to work closely with the AURIL is the Association for University Unico is the UK’s leading representative world-class research, and so have an relevant learned societies, working with Research and Industry Links. body of professionals realising the important role to play in developing the them on matters of mutual interest and Organised by university staff, its potential of university and public sector social and behavioural understanding prioritising research. The Royal Society membership comprises around 1,400 research through commercialisation. we need to protect the UK. In addition has taken a positive interest in counter- academics, nearly 100 universities, It provides a forum for the exchange to working through the research terrorism issues and we have worked and other research establishments and of best practice in knowledge transfer councils, we are keen to engage directly closely with them. With respect to social companies. We use AURIL as one route through conferences and other events. with universities and other research and behavioural sciences we will work to the research base in UK universities. Its membership includes over 90 establishments to ensure that we are with the British Academy, the Academy We encourage researchers who would universities and other public sector making the best use of research in of Social Sciences and other social like to contribute to counter-terrorism research organisations. the UK. We use a variety of informal science learned societies. research to join AURIL. http://www.unico.org.uk/ and formal contacts to achieve this, www.auril.org.uk including academic liaison, networking at conferences, issuing formal contracts for research work, open research calls and exploring opportunities for joint working on specific projects. The Government has links with many academic institutions in the UK. These institutions have a large amount of expertise, particularly in social and behavioural science. Over the last few years several have founded institutes specifically concerned with security and counter-terrorism and we will continue to work with these organisations. Countering the terrorist Section 3 threat: Social and Section 3 Behavioural Science How to get involved How to get involved How academia and industry can play their part

How is Government communicating Where can I look internationally for with Industry? information and funding?

OSCT works with industry through RISC – The UK Security and Resilience US Department of Homeland Security US National Consortium on the Study a variety of routes including trade Industry Suppliers’ Community The Department of Homeland Security of Terrorism and the Responses to RISC provides a focal point for the works to secure the United States Terrorism (START) associations, exhibitions, industry START is a US Department of Homeland Government to communicate with against threats. This includes counter- primes and the Technology Strategy Security centre of excellence based at industry about its counter-terrorism terrorism, border security, immigration, Board. In counter-terrorism, our main the University of Maryland. It uses state- route to industry is through RISC. needs. RISC is an alliance of suppliers, and disaster response. trade associations and academics, of-the-art theories, methods, and data representing over 2,000 companies The department has a Human Factors from social and behavioural science to ranging from prime contractors and Behavioural Science Projects section of improve understanding of the origins, global leaders through to small and its science and technology work. These dynamics, and social and psychological medium enterprises and start-ups. projects develop and apply the social, impacts of terrorism. behavioural, and physical sciences to START conducts cutting-edge research The trade associations are: improve identification and analysis of related to the terrorist threat and threats, to enhance societal resilience, ––A|D|S, the trade body advancing UK includes the full range of disciplines and to integrate human capabilities into AeroSpace, Defence and Security within social and behavioural science, the development of technology. industries formed from the merger of including sociology, criminology, the Association of Police and Public The UK Government is working with the political science, psychology, Security Suppliers (APPSS), the DHS on some of these projects and communication, geography, economics, Defence Manufacturers Association more information can be found on the and anthropology. The work also (DMA) and the Society of British DHS website. includes experts in public policy, history, Aerospace Companies (SBAC). http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/ public health, foreign languages, and ––the British Security Industry gc_1218480185439.shtm engineering. The research team provides Association (BSIA). the homeland-security community and ––Intellect (the UK trade association the public with insights about how and for the technology industry). why terrorist groups form, about the We will continue to work with industry decisions and behaviours of individual and academia through other routes. terrorists and terrorist groups, and These will include industry liaison, about how societies can best respond responding to enquiries, networking at to and prepare for terrorist threats. conferences, exhibitions and events http://www.start.umd.edu/start/ and through exploring opportunities in existing science and technology projects. http://www.riscuk.org/ Countering the terrorist Section 3 threat: Social and Section 3 Behavioural Science How to get involved How to get involved How academia and industry can play their part

What should I do next?

EU Research Funding EU: Framework Programme 7 We have set out in this booklet the wide range of challenges that social and The EU invests in several research Of the above EU research programmes, behavioural science can address. If you are in academia or industry and are working programmes in security and resilience. FP7 has in the past awarded most in this area or have the potential to support our security and counter-terrorism work, These include: funding to UK organisations. Security is we want to hear from you. one of the ten themes of FP7. ––Framework Programme 7 (FP7): http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/index_ The Security theme will award €1.4 If you are unsure about which is the best department or body for you to contact in the en.cfm?pg=security billion for the seven year period first instance, please get in touch with the CONTEST Science and Technology Unit in 2006-2013 for research related to a set the OSCT. We will be happy to advise you ––European Security Research and of security topics defined by the EU. The Innovation Forum (ESRIF): topics are usually announced formally Email: [email protected] www.esrif.eu in July, inviting responses by November. ––the European Justice Research Area: Most bids are from consortia; http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/ consortium members may come from intro/funding_intro_en.htm the private sector, the public sector or ––European Technology Platforms (ETPs): academia. http://cordis.europa.eu/technology-platforms The bids submitted in 2008 led to the provisional award of around €14 million to UK organisations. The UK Government contributes to the debate that leads to the selection of topics, but plays no part in determining which proposals are selected for funding. We encourage you to participate in bidding for this funding.

http://www.dius.gov.uk/dius_international/ science_and_innovation/eu_framework_ programme

cordis.europa.eu/fp7 Glossary End notes

Glossary End notes

Abbreviation Meaning 1 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security.aspx A|D|S Aerospace Defence and Security 2 security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy AHRC Arts and Humanities Research Council 3 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/Science- APPSS Association of Police and Public Security Suppliers Technology-strategy/index.html AURIL Association for University Research and Industry Links 4 http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/Science- BBSRC Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council Tech-Booklet/index.html BSIA British Security Industry Association 5 http://www.esrc.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/what_is_soc_sci/ CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 6 http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file41318.pdf CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism 7 CPNI Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy Section 5.0 CSA Chief Scientific Adviser 8 security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy Section 5.25 CT Counter-Terrorism 9 security.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism-strategy Section 9.29 DHS Department of Homeland Security 10 http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/my-civil-service/networks/professional/gsr/index.aspx DMA Defence Manufacturers Association 11 http://www.ons.gov.uk/about-statistics/ns-standard/roles/gss/index.html EPSRC Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 12 ESRC Economic and Social Research Council http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/my-civil-service/networks/professional/ges/index2.aspx ESRIF European Security Research and Innovation Forum 13 http://www.operational-research.gov.uk/recruitment ETP European Technology Platform 14 http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/aboutrcuk/org/default.htm EU European Union 15 http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/strategicplan/challenges/ FP7 Framework Programme 7 (an EU programme) securityandconflict.aspx GCSA Government Chief Scientific Adviser GES Government Economic Service GORS Government Operational Research Service GO-Science Government Office for Science GSR Government Social Research Service GSS Government Statistical Service HOSAC Home Office Science Advisory Committee HOSDB Home Office Scientific Development Branch INSTINCT INnovative Science and Technology IN Counter-Terrorism MOD Ministry of Defence MRC Medical Research Council NERC Natural Environment Research Council OSCT Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism RC Research Council RCUK Research Councils UK RISC UK UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community SBAC Society of British Aerospace Companies START US National Consortium on the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism STFC Science and Technology Facilities Council

33 © Crown copyright Produced by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, a Directorate of the Home Office, March 2010 ISBN 978-1-84987-195-2