Oligopolistic Business in Britain 1945 -C
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The Making of the Market Oligopolistic business in Britain 1945 -c. 1960 Carlo Joseph Morelli Submitted for the degree of PhD. London School of Economics, 1996. UMI Number: U615174 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615174 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 7 r£ S £ s F 7326 • Thesis Abstract The Making of the Market: Oligopolistic Business in Britain 1945 - c.1960 The theory of the firm and transaction cost analysis provide the starting point of this institutional study of business co-operation in the aftermath of World War Two. It is suggested that the market is an institution which is subject to the visible hand of business. The aim of business in this process is to control information flows and reduce uncertainty. Utilising business history case studies, of the oil industry through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., the electrical engineering industry through General Electric Co. and the grocery retailing trade through J.Sainsbury, the hypothesis that the firm aims to create market governance procedures in order to alter the structure of the market is tested. The study finds that inter-firm co-operation is central to understanding the development of markets and that co-operation is a dynamic process, which responds to changes in market conditions and government competition policy. The growth of government as a consumer is considered to be a significant factor affecting the development of co-operative agreements between firms. The study also finds that collusion and co-operation between firms, leading to a reduction of competitive pressures, was central to the development of organisational capabilities in the oil and grocery retailing industries, but hindered the emergence of organisational capabilities within the electrical engineering industry. Finally, the study finds that the internalisation of market transactions occurs when market governance procedures break down and competition becomes intense. The study concludes that firms are not primarily transaction cost minimisers but are maximisers of market power. It is suggested that the maximising of market power is the rationale behind the creation of organisational capabilities and the development of the division of labour under conditions of supervision and discipline. 2 • Contents Page Thesis Abstract 2 Contents Page 3 List of Tables 4 List of Figures 5 List of Abbreviations 6 Aknowledgements 7 1 Contextualisation, Institutions and Markets in Economic History: firms make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing. 8 2 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1945-54: Successful market governance 70 3 The General Electric Company 1945-65: Failure in market governance 147 4 J. Sainsbury 1945-64 : Challenging market governance 237 5 Governing the Market: Towards a market governance theory of the 313 firm Appendix One A Sectoral analysis of government expenditure using Input-Ouput tables 351 Appendix Two Alternative Estimates of Real Gross Profits for the Anglo Iranian Oil Co. 358 Appendix Three Text of letter from Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister for Fuel and Power to Boards of all US owned oil companies operating in Britain 360 Appendix Four Alternative Estimates of Real Gross Profits for AEI, English Electric and GEC 361 Appendix Five Reports from Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee into the German electrical engineering industry 362 Bibliography 363 3 • List of Tables Page 1.1 Public Sector Purchases of Goods and Services from Manufacturing Industry as a Proportion of Domestic Output in 1948 and 1963 63 1.2 Public Sector Orders as a Percentage of Total Domestic Output 1948-63 65 2.1 Estimated Anglo Iranian Oil Company Crude Oil Requirements 1950-54 113 2.2 Estimated Anglo Iranian Crude Oil Production by Region 1950-54 113 2.3 Estimated Iranian Crude Oil Availability 1950-53 113 2.4 Estimated Refinery Capacity 1950-54 114 2.5 Estimated Fuel Oil Price Index 1954-61 140 3.1 Growth of the Electrical Engineering Industry 1935-1968 161 3.2 Percentage of Exports of Steam and Water Turbines, Generators, Generating Sets, Motors and Transformers from Eight Principal Manufacturing Countries of the World 168 3.3 GEC Sales and the Influence of Overseas Markets 174 3.4 Local Participating Percentages of 1948 Lamp Agreement 189 3.5 GEC The allocation of Resources and Contribution to Turnover by Product Divisions 228 4.1 Total Number and Percentage of Grocers and Provision Stores by Form of Organisation 249 4.2 Concentration within the Grocery Provision Trade by Turnover at Current Prices ^ 249 4.3 Concentration in Greater London by Number of Grocers and Provision Stores by Form of Organisation 252 4.4 Concentration within the Grocery Provision Trade in Greater London by Turnover 1950-71 252 A1.1 Input-Output representation of Public Sector Purchases from Private Industry in 1948 355 A 1.2 Input-Output representation of Public Sector Purchases from Private Industry in 1963 356 4 • List of Figures Page 2.1 Log of Inland Consumption of Petroleum Products 77 2.2 Log of Petrol and Fuel Oil Consumption 78 2.3 Crude Oil Prices 1921-66 (US $/barrel) 104 2.4 AIOC Real Gross Profits £m (1952 prices) 106 2.5 Index of AIOC Real Gross Profits per ton of Crude Oil (1950=100) 107 2.6 Real Crude Oil Prices 1945-65 (US $/barrel) 143 2.7 UK Petrol Prices 1921-66 (exclusive of tax) 143 2.8 Real UK Petrol Prices (1975 prices) 144 3.1 AEI, English Electric and GEC Real Gross Profit (1952 prices) 176 3.2 Percentage of Electrical Engineering Companies Funding derived from share issues 1949-70 213 3.3 Electrical Engineering Dividend Payments as a Percentage of Total gross Trading Profits 1949-70 213 3.4 GEC and AEI Gross Profits as a Percentage of Annual Sales 218 4.1 Percentage of Retail Distribution Trades* Funds Derived from Share Issues (3 year moving average) 1951-70 271 4.2 Retail Trade Dividend Payments as a Percentage of gross Trading Profit 1949-70 271 4.3 Price Indices for the Food Industry 1947-69 274 4.4 Sainsbury’s Real Growth in Turnover per Store (1954 prices) 280 4.5 Sainsbury’s Real Gross Profit per Store (1954 prices) 282 4.6 Sainsbury’s Gross Profit as a Percentage of Turnover 286 A2.1 AIOC Real Gross Profit £m (using GDP price index 1952=100) 358 A2.2 AIOC Real Gross Profit £m (using Retail Price Index 1952=100) 359 A4.1 AEI, English Electric and GEC Real Gross Profit £m (using GDP price index 1952=100) 361 A4.2 AEI, English Electric and GEC Real Gross Profit £m (using manufacturing output price index 1954=100) 361 5 • List of Abbreviations AACP Anglo-American Council on Productivity BEAMA British Electrical and Allied Manufacturers Association BIOS British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee BTH British Thomson-Houston CFP Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles CIOS Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee COR Commonwealth Oil Refineries Ltd EIU Economist Intelligence Unit FIAT Field Intelligence Agency Technical, US Group FMF Food Manufacturers’ Association IGD Institute of Grocery Distribution JS Archive Sainsbury Archive MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Metrovick Metropolitan-Vickers MRC Modem Record Centre OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries RPM Resale Price Maintenance sq.ft Square feet 6 • Acknowledgements There are truly too many individuals to thank for the help and encouragement that I have received in the researching and writing of this work. I would therefore like to thank all those who have helped me, in however small a way, over the past four years. In particular I would like to thank Leslie Hannah and Peter Howlett for their unstinting supervision and considerable effort in reading early drafts and Tony Cliff for pioneering an approach that has been so valuable to me. Jim Bamberg, at BP, and Bridgette Williams, at Sainsbury’s, along with all the archivists and librarians at the numerous archives made available to me. Of course all views, opinions and mistakes contained within this work are mine alone in making. For other reasons I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council, for without their generous financial support, (award No. R00429234227), this PhD would without doubt not have been completed. Above all, however, thanks must go to Simone for her love and tolerance and Eleanor and Myles, who were always on hand to prevent this PhD from taking on an importance far beyond that which was necessary. 7 Chapter One • Contextualisation. Institutions and Markets in Economic History: firms make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing:1 • Introduction The two decades after the Second World War presented the British economy with its best opportunity of reversing the relative economic decline it had faced over the first half of the twentieth century. The world which emerged after 1945 was one in which demand for goods was high. British firms also had an initial advantage, over French or German rivals, due to their plant being less damaged by war. Yet by the end of the 1960s the British economy faced serious problems. Major firms within important industries, including the British Leyland Motor Corporation in mass produced car manufacturing and Rolls Royce in aero engine manufacture, were soon to need rescuing from bankruptcy.