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The Puzzling Resilience of Transnational Organized Criminal Networks

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The Puzzling Resilience of Transnational Organized Criminal Networks Police Practice and Research An International Journal ISSN: 1561-4263 (Print) 1477-271X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gppr20 The puzzling resilience of transnational organized criminal networks Christian Leuprecht, Andrew Aulthouse & Olivier Walther To cite this article: Christian Leuprecht, Andrew Aulthouse & Olivier Walther (2016): The puzzling resilience of transnational organized criminal networks, Police Practice and Research, DOI: 10.1080/15614263.2016.1168600 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2016.1168600 Published online: 13 Apr 2016. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 83 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=gppr20 Download by: [University of Southern Denmark] Date: 15 April 2016, At: 07:04 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH, 2016 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15614263.2016.1168600 RESEARCH ARTICLE The puzzling resilience of transnational organized criminal networks Christian Leuprechta , Andrew Aulthouseb and Olivier Waltherc aDepartment of Political Science, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada; bIndependent Scholar, Munk School of Global Affairs, University ofT oronto, Toronto, Canada; cDepartment of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Sønderborg, Denmark ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Why is transnational organized crime so difficult to dismantle? While Transnational crime; organized crime networks within states have received some attention, organized crime; criminal actual transnational operations have not. In this article, we study the networks; international drug trafficking; borders transnational drug and gun trafficking operations of the Shower Posse, a violent international organized crime syndicate based in Jamaica, whose resilience proves particularly puzzling. We were curious to know whether there is any evidence that international borders have an effect on the structure of illicit networks that cross them. It turns out that transnational drug distribution networks such as the Shower Posse rely on a small number of brokers whose role is to connect otherwise distinct domestic markets. Due to the high transaction costs associated with developing and maintaining transnational movement, the role of such brokers appears particularly important in facilitating the flow of illicit commodities across national borders. These brokers coordinate their own smaller subnetworks, while still maintaining the communication and collaboration necessary to ensure that the overall aims of the network are achieved. Introduction The dramatic arrest of Christopher Coke in Kingston, Jamaica on 22 June 2010 marked the end of a criminal career forged by transnational drug trafficking and political corruption on a grand scale. Assisted by helicopters, 2000 soldiers and police took on heavily armed gunmen in the Kingston neighborhood of Tivoli Gardens. The fighting left 73 dead, and more than 500 people in custody. Downloaded by [University of Southern Denmark] at 07:04 15 April 2016 Coke was the leader of the Shower Posse, an international criminal organization based in Jamaica that had used the Jamaican diaspora to spawn a drug trafficking network across North America, with particular prominence in New York City and Toronto. The Shower Posse was no average gang. It regularly influenced Jamaican politics, and its operation was likened more to ‘a Fortune 500 Company than a street gang’ (Edmonds, 2010). American authorities had flagged Coke as one of the most dangerous drug dealers in the world. A New York court sentenced him to 23 years in prison for trafficking marijuana, cocaine, and firearms (Pilkington, 2012; United States District Court, 2010). Coke’s case raises a series of questions. How was a drug dealer of his stature able to live out in the open and avoid capture for so long? And how did the Jamaican Shower Posse that he headed extend CONTACT Christian Leuprecht [email protected] © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group 2 C. LEUPRECHT et AL. its reach all the way from Jamaica to the United States and Canada? As it turns out, transnational drug distribution networks such as the Shower Posse rely on a small number of actors whose role is to connect domestic markets. In network science, such actors are known as brokers (Morselli, 2009; Walther, 2015) because they bridge parts of networks that would otherwise be disconnected. Deeply embedded in their own community, brokers are also able to develop connections beyond their group and, by doing so, attract resources that would otherwise be unavailable locally (Spiro, Acton, & Butts, 2013). Their role, we assume, is particularly crucial when illicit commodities cross national borders, due to the high transaction costs of maintaining and developing transnational activities. Since a border imposes transaction costs on the movement of illicit goods in a network, brokers are needed on either side. This modus operandi is duplicated and increased in scope as the network confronts additional borders. Brokers need to be coordinated across countries by the network’s leadership, which increases the network’s complexity. These brokers also coordinate their own smaller subnetworks, while still maintaining the communication and collaboration necessary to ensure that the overall aims of the network are achieved. The article comprises three case studies of multiplayer networks operated by the Shower Posse. Each network supplied narcotics to the United States and Canada. The first case study maps out the broader global network of the Shower Posse, while the second and third focus on two specific cases of Shower Posse operations in Canada that were targeted by police in 2009 and 2010. Although the scope of cases is limited to Jamaica and Ontario, Canada, the broader domain encompasses other parts of the Caribbean, Latin America, and the United States. The first section of the article explains the scholarly payoff to studying drug trafficking networks and operationalizes key concepts related to the structure of criminal networks and the role of brokers. The second section discusses the method used in this study. The third section analyzes the Shower Posse’s transnational drug trafficking networks with a view to highlighting the role of certain prom- inent actors and their potential brokerage activities. Implications include a more nuanced under- standing of how to deter, detect, and dismantle different types of illicit networks. The conclusion ponders the local structure of networks around the border and discusses the implications for law enforcement agencies. Networks Networks make it possible for criminal groups to overcome inherent problems of mobilization and communication between large numbers of people over distances (Everton, 2013; Gerdes, 2015). Network structure may come about as a result of formal planning, such as in the case of a business designing an organizational chart. Many real-world networks, however, develop more organically, and are the result of the accumulation of pairwise connections between individuals. The resulting structure of such networks is often constrained by purpose, and is a good indication of ‘what works.’ If Downloaded by [University of Southern Denmark] at 07:04 15 April 2016 the network does not contain the required actors, or if those actors cannot communicate as required, the network will be unsustainable. Networks provide resiliency for criminal operations. Resilience in drug trafficking networks is defined as the ability of network participants to preserve existing levels of exchange between buyers and sellers, despite external pressure aimed at disrupting the trade (Bouchard, 2007). Duijn, Kashirin, and Sloot (2014) found that criminal networks can become even stronger after being targeted by law enforcement, meaning that police must act with care when targeting criminal networks. There is a consistent trade-off between security and efficiency in dark networks, and criminal organizations often opt for efficiency, since time is usually at a premium (Morselli, Giguère, & Petit, 2007). While one often thinks of criminal networks as rigid in structure, the extent to which they adapt is key to their survival (Morselli & Roy, 2008). In response to pressure from law enforcement, networks have been found to decentralize their structure (Morselli & Petit, 2007). Indeed, Bright and Delaney (2013) POLICE Practice AND Research 3 found that over time the centralities of nodes in a drug trafficking network changed as individuals changed roles to meet the evolving needs of the network. As a result, illicit networks are often more decentralized than commonly assumed. For example, Leuprecht, Walther, Skillicorn, and Ryde-Collins (2015) show that Hezbollah’s foreign fundraising operations are far more decentralized and autonomous than previously thought. Similarly, Kenney (2007) found that the Colombian drug trade was based on a series of small fluid networks, rather than monolithic cartels. However, just because a network is decentralized does not mean that authority is absent. While a network may take on a decentralized structure, hierarchies still exist, and a gang leader plays an important role in coordinating the activities of the network, and ensuring operational success (Varese, 2013). Decentralized or not, a key focus of transnational drug trafficking operations is the minimization of risk and the maintenance
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