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Rethinking the Role of Religion in Arab Antisemitic Discourses

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Rethinking the Role of Religion in Arab Antisemitic Discourses religions Religions 2019, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 17 to capture and destroy al-Aqsa,Article but also to capture Mecca and Medina. Following negotiations with King Abdallah of Jordan,Rethinking who serves as the guardian the Role of the holy of Religionsites in Jerusalem in1, and Arab with al-Aqsa leaders, the metal detectors were removed, and the previous entrance regulations were reinstated. After three weeksAntisemitic of clashes around th Discoursese Mount and across the West Bank, especially on Fridays, defined as “days of rage”, the protests and demonstrations subsided. Commenting on theseEsther events, Webman Lebanese columnist Jihad al-Khazin in the London-based al-Hayat on 22 and 28 July Thedenied Dayan any Center Jewish for connect Middle Easternion to andJerusalem African referring Studies, Tel to Aviv Israel’s University, alleged Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel; futile efforts to find [email protected] proofs to support its “lies” throughout its 70 years of history. Similar contentions were voiced by ʻAli Muhsin Hamid on 26 July, in an article in the Egyptian daily al-Ahram titled “Jerusalem Received:was never 28 Mayand 2019;will Accepted:never be 20Jewish”. June 2019; If Published:the Israeli 1 Julyclaims 2019 of Jewish connection were to be true, he claimed, the true Jewish inhabitants needed to be from Palestinian Abstract: “The Palestinian cause is not about land and soil, but it is about faith and belief,” origin and not Russians, Indians, Americans, Ethiopians, and so on. insist Islamists in their attempts to Islamize the Arab–Israeli conflict. This paper examines the Another event which triggered similar reactions a few months later was President Donald instrumentalization of religion in the conflict since its early stages, and its impact on Arab antisemitic Trump’s declaration on 6 December 2017, recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, which also discourses. It is based on an ongoing research project exploring references to the Jews in Arab, foresaw the remaining of the Wailing Wall in Israeli hands in any future agreement with the particularly the Palestinian and Egyptian, Islamist as well as nationalist media, during major Palestinians. Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who aspires to represent the whole Muslim landmarks in the conflict’s history, from the Arab Wailing Wall riots in 1929 up to US president Donald world, convened in mid-December an extraordinary summit of the Organization of Islamic Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in December 2017. It contends that despite Cooperation (OIC) in Istanbul, in which the participants reiterated the significance of Jerusalem in the intensified exploitation of Islam in the incitement against Israel, Zionism, and the Jews, and Islam and their support for the Palestinian struggle, and decided to cooperate and take action despite the traditional enmity towards the Jews as a group deriving from Islam, preliminary findings against Trump’s decision. On 12 December, Shaykh al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyib, the highest religious show that the most common themes in the Arab antisemitic discourse originate from a more modern, authority in the Sunni world, convened the council of al-Azhar scholars, which according to the exogenous vocabulary and perceptions. Classical Christian–Western tropes, such as conspiracy London-based al-Quds al-ʻArabi from 13 December, rejected Trump’s declaration and defined it as theories epitomized in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Nazi terminology, and Holocaust denial, “an injustice with no historical or legal foundations”. The public protests encompassed most Arab are extensively used and are much more pervasive. and Muslim capitals, and calls encouraging a third intifada and jihad against Israel were voiced by Muslim preachers in Arab countriesKeywords: andAntisemitism; in mosques of Islam; Muslim Arab–Israeli communities conflict; worldwide. anti-Zionism; Judeophobia; anti-Judaism Again, it was Jewish history and the so-called Israel’s and Zionism’s “invented myths” that preoccupied Arab writers and commentators, denying any Jewish ties to Palestine in general and to Jerusalem in particular. A few of them relied on the controversies among Israeli and non-Israeli historians and archeologists on the interpretation of their findings. “There is no such thing as Israel or Tel Aviv,” announced MuhammadThe Temple al-Mula Mount in an and interview Jerusalem, with whichthe Kuwaiti are considered TV on 12 December, by the Palestinians and most of the adding that “Jerusalem is ArabMuslims and Islamic. in the world Jerusalem as Muslim is the city holy of sites, Islam were … It thewill causereturn for to the Arab explosion of disturbances and and Islamic nation”. Trumpclashes adopted between “the IsraeliZionist security narrative”, forces claimed and the ʻUmar Palestinians Hilmi al-Ghul in 2017. in On the 14 July, three Israeli Arabs Palestinian al-Hayat al-Jadidafrom on Umm9 December. al-Fahm “It assassinated is not our goal two to Israeli examine police the border falsification guards of at history the exit from the Temple Mount. and Trump’s ignorance,” Inhe response, wrote. If the he Israeli wants authorities to learn the closed truth the he compound should read for worshippers what Israeli to enable the investigation archeologists wrote after “searchingof the incident, for the and past decided 70 years to for place one metal archeological detectors remnant at the entrance related to of the premise. These measures [presence] of a third templesparked [there protestswere only and two], incitement or connecting in the Arab the Jews and Muslimto Palestine worlds in general”. against what was interpreted as an Similarly, Hamas leader MuhammadIsraeli attempt Nazzal to change accused the the status Zionists quo in of the falsifying Temple Mountbiblical and remnants as a further in step in Israel’s efforts to Lebanese al-Akhbar on 13 cleanseDecember, Palestine claiming of its as Palestinians well that inhabitants,Israeli archeological take control scholars, of the Mountsuch as according to a “grand plan” Israel Finkelstein and Davidto destroyUssishkin, al-Aqsa “failed mosque to provide and build important the Third proof Temple. that the city [Jerusalem] was inhabited [by Jews] in the 10thShaykh Century Kamal BC”. Khatib, the deputy head of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel In this debate there wasaccused a tacit the agreement Israeli government between inalla Palestinian televised interview factions withHamas, al-Jazira the Muslim TV on 16 July of injecting chemical Brothers in Jordan and Palestiniansubstances Authority’s with a long-term (PA) representatives effect in al-Aqsa on mosque the perception to bring about of Trump’s its destruction. Egyptian al-Azhar declaration as a new andProfessor, worse Balfour Ahmad Declaration. Karima, called Hamas upon leader the Muslim Ismaʻ worldil Haniyya to wage described an armed jihad (holy war) against Trump’s statement at a rallythe marking Jews, whom 30 years she describedto the founding as aggressors, of Hamas thieves, on 14 December, and slayers as of even prophets during an interview more dangerous than the withBalfour the Declaration. Palestinian Authority’sFatah leaders o ffiandcial the TV PA channel considered on 20 it July. as a Imams“second in Friday sermons, such as Balfour Declaration”, whereasEgyptian-born journalist ʻAbdelilahAmr Shahin Belqaziz at the Islamicin United Center Arab of Emirates Davis in (UAE) California, daily called on 14 and 21 July to al-Khalij of 18 December described“liberate al-Aqsait as “the mosque first bitter from fruit” thefilth of the of theso-called Jews”, “Arab and“turn Spring” Jerusalem and a into a graveyard for the severe crime, exceeding “Balfour’sJews”. On crime 21 July, whic Shaykhh is Mahmudexactly one Harmush century of old”. the California-basedTrump was even Islamic Center of Riverside compared to Adolf Hitler.also Ahmad called Qadidi, for the a annihilation Tunisian politician of the Jews, and former and accused ambassador them of to plotting Qatar not only to capture and 1 Jordan was recognized byReligions Israel as2019 the, 10 guardian, 415; doi:10.3390 of the/ rel10070415holy places in Jerusalem since 1967, after its defeatwww.mdpi.com /journal/religions in the War and retreat from the West Bank. Religions 2019, 10, 415 2 of 16 Religions 2019, 10, x FOR PEER REVIEW 2 of 17 destroy al-Aqsa, but also to capture Mecca and Medina. Following negotiations with King Abdallah of to capture and destroy al-Aqsa,Jordan, but who also serves to capture as the Mecca guardian and of Medina. the holy Following sites in Jerusalem negotiations1, and with with al-Aqsa leaders, the metal King Abdallah of Jordan,detectors who serves were as removed, the guardian and the of previousthe holy entrance sites in regulationsJerusalem1,were and reinstated.with After three weeks of al-Aqsa leaders, the metalclashes detectors around were the remove Mountd, and and across the previous the West Bank,entrance especially regulations on Fridays, were defined as “days of rage”, reinstated. After three weeksthe protestsof clashes and around demonstrations the Mount subsided.and across the West Bank, especially on Fridays, defined as “days of rage”,Commenting the protests on and these demonstrations events, Lebanese subsided. columnist Jihad al-Khazin in the London-based al-Hayat Commenting on theseon 22events, and 28 Lebanese July denied column any Jewishist Jihad connection al-Khazin to Jerusalemin the London-based referring to Israel’s alleged futile efforts al-Hayat on 22 and 28 Julyto denied find archeological any Jewish proofsconnect toion support to Jerusalem its “lies” referring throughout to Israel’s its 70 years alleged of history. Similar contentions futile efforts to find archeologicalwere voiced proofs by toAli support Muhsin its Hamid “lies” onthroughout 26 July, in its an 70 article years inofthe history. Egyptian daily al-Ahram titled Similar contentions were voiced“Jerusalem by ʻAli was Muhsin never andHamid will on never 26 July, be Jewish”.
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