Plurinationalism and its Effect on Independence Movements: A Case Study of and Catalonia

Senior Honors Thesis

Presented to The Faculty of the School of Arts and Sciences Brandeis University

Undergraduate Program in Politics Bernard Yack, Advisor

In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Bachelor of Arts

By Makayla Connor May 2021

Committee Members: Professor Bernard Yack Professor Chandler Rosenberger Professor Jeffrey Lenowitz

1 Abstract

Independence movements have garnered international attention in the recent years as the world has seen an increased number of minority seeking independence from their sovereign states. However, most of those living within these minority nations hold ties to their larger state as well. This was conceptualized with Michael Keating’s concept of plurinationalism in his book Plurinational Democracies, published in 2001, capturing the general sentiment of many political scientists and analysts at the time where he states people can inhabit more than one national identity. Thus, it was thought that independence movements would not be on the rise in the 21st century, moreover they would be increasing in number.

However, as seen with nations such as Scotland and Catalonia, this was not the case. This paper provides a case study of these two minority nations and how they came to seek independence from the United Kingdom and Spain, respectively, despite plurinationalism still being a relevant concept to describe national identity trends within the nations today. It suggests that while national identity is integral to independence movements, other existing social, political, or economic factors may lead a to seek independence at an accelerated rate.

2 Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee, Professor Bernard Yack,

Professor Jeffrey Lenowitz, and Professor Chandler Rosenberger, for being part of this thesis. I would like to thank Professor Bernard Yack in particular for being my thesis advisor and being an immense help throughout this year process of writing a thesis. I am also thankful for Professor

Lenowitz as director of the Honors program and holding bi-weekly thesis meeting with us students to check-in with us throughout this process and build a sense of community among other thesis writers.

I would also like to thank everyone else who has aided me throughout this thesis process.

Thank you to my family, especially my mother, grandparents, and brothers, who have always been my number one supporters throughout everything I have done. I am also very thankful to my friends who have always been there throughout the writing of this thesis. One last thank you to Aarin, who has been an immense help this part year and through this process.

3 Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction 5

Chapter Two: History of Minority Nations and Plurinationalism 12

Chapter Three: Scotland, A Case Study 32

Chapter Four: Catalonia, A Case Study 59

Chapter Five: Conclusion 86

Works Cited 93

4 Chapter I. Introduction

The past few decades have seen a worldwide uptick in the number of separatist movements of nations seeking independence from their sovereign states (Dayton 2015). Europe alone has over twenty independence movements, each varying in degree of how prominent and active they are. Nations looking to separate include those of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Eastern

Europe to Scotland and Catalonia in Western Europe. All are seeking independence for different historical, economic, and humanitarian reasons. It can be argued that the two most active and prominent independence movements in Europe right now are those of both Scotland and

Catalonia – with Scotland seeking secession from the United Kingdom and Catalonia from

Spain. These two separatist movements have garnered worldwide attention, especially in the last few years after holding their own independence referendums, prompting them to be the most widely acknowledged independence movements at the moment in Europe.

Europe is unique in the sense that its map and border lines has been ever changing while many nations remain stagnant. This means that while nations have remained in similar locations, continuing their culture and traditions, they have been bound legally to different states larger than them. This then causes rising tensions among nations within their larger states that they may feel they do not belong to. Instead of tensions growing among states that share borders or elsewhere, tensions have been growing within states among nations. What nations hope to gain varies case by case – some want more autonomy within their states, as in some form of devolution, while others seek self-determination and complete independence. There are around

100 groups in 29 different countries seeking some form of this (Campanella 2014). This thesis will focus on Scotland and Catalonia, providing a history of these two minority nations up until

5 modern times, showcasing what they want to achieve from their individual independence movements and why.

Sentiments toward national identity and garnering nationalist ideas among these nations have been particularly important in furthering promises of independence and support of such.

Many nations are trying to sustain a strong sense of national identity, one that is inclusive to prompt more to identify with the nation, thus pushing them in the direction of wanting them to have sovereignty over their people. The past few decades have seen more calls for independence with a tying in of a civic to further this agenda. This is of particular interest because in the early 2000s, a political scientist named Michael Keating coined this term

“plurinationalism.” Keating stated that “under plurinationalism, more than one national identity can pertain to a single group or even an individual, opening up the possibility of multiple which in turn may be nested or may overlap in less tidy ways” (2001, 27). This essentially means that say, in the case of Scotland, people living there may identify as being both

Scottish and British – their identities are nested and overlap.

Because of this concept of plurinationalism, Keating suspects that these nations essentially will only seek devolution or economic independence in the future, which was a popular sentiment at the time of many political scientists and analysts. This made sense in the early 2000s based on what the world order and context looked like, but that is no longer the case.

For example, he provides figures that show “a widespread liking for independence as an idea, but a willingness to recognize realities and settle for less” among Scots in the 90s. Keating also found that only “34% of Catalans answer[ed] yes to a question about whether they were in favor of Catalonia being independent” (2001, 75). This exemplifies his case and how it was relevant

6 for his studies in the 90s and the early 2000s. However, what this paper aims to find out is why things did not happen this way.

As will be seen further in the paper, Keating’s concept of plurinationalism is still applicable. In places such as Scotland and Catalonia, many in these nations still identify to varying degrees with the larger state. While there are still a portion that may identify as solely

Scottish or solely Catalan, many still hold ties to identifying as British and Spanish in addition to the minority national identity. However, it will be made clear that devolution efforts and economic autonomy are not enough for these nations as they previously may have been. They are seeking independence to be their own sovereign states, nothing less. This is made particularly clear among the independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia.

Scotland, as a nation, has had a fluctuating relationship to its larger state, the United

Kingdom. In May 1707, Scotland and England signed the Act of the Union that lead to the creation of the United Kingdom where the two nations would be ruled together as one.

Essentially what this did was merge the Scottish Kingdom into Great Britain, dissolving the

Scottish Parliament and transferring all legislative power to London. There have been unsuccessful secessionist movements by Scotland since this union in 1707 including the Jacobite

Rebellions which met its end at the Battle of Culloden in 1745 with over 2,000 Scottish

Highlanders dead. This was the end of the clan system in Scotland with the British banning the tartan and kilt as well. However, Scottish nationalism has always remained to be quite strong in the nation with Scots consistently feeling more Scottish than English throughout their history.

In 1934, the (SNP) was formed to promote a more Scotland- focused politics within Parliament, but it did not become popular until the 1950s and 1960s. It had great success in 1974, winning more than 30% of the popular vote in Scotland. In 1997, a

7 referendum was passed that would grant Scotland its own parliament which gave them even more power and influence in the nation. This Scottish devolution effort was seen as a major step in the right direction for many Scottish nationalists. As the Scottish National Party, the party promoted views of Scottish nationalism and had a long history of toying with the idea of an independent Scotland. In 2007, the party garnered more seats in parliament than the opposing

Labour Party which allowed for , the SNP leader, to be elected as the first prime minister of Scotland. An agreement was made between Salmond and the then UK Prime

Minister, , to hold an independence referendum on whether Scotland should be an independent country in 2014 after the party gained an absolute majority in in 2011. However, this referendum failed with 55% voting ‘no’ and 45% voting ‘yes’ after

Cameron and other executives dictated that they would give more powers to Scotland if the referendum failed. There were worries that should Scotland secede, what their place in the

European Union may be. However, as the UK voted on the British withdrawal from the

European Union, Scots overwhelming voted to stay, unlike their English counterparts. This has prompted the current Prime Minister of Scotland, , to ponder if another independence referendum should take place as it is believed the outcome will be very different this time.

Catalonia, on the other hand, became part of Spain through the marriage of Queen

Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragon in 1496. Like Scotland, the nation of

Catalonia has a history of separatist movements in relation to Spain. Throughout the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century, there were a series of separatist movements which were quelled in 1714 with the abolishment of the Catalan constitution and autonomy. There was another resurgence in the 1850s, which sought to revive the Catalan language and led to the

8 nation having some degree of autonomy until 1925 when the Spanish dictator, Miguel Primo de

Rivera came to power. In 1932, the statute of autonomy for Catalonia became law, which was short lived, however, due to the result of the Spanish Civil War and a repressive regime toward

Catalan nationalism. A few decades later, full autonomy was granted to the nation in 1979 with the creation of the Spanish Constitution. Approaching more modern times, in 2006, Catalonia was given nation status which was then taken away by the Spanish Constitutional Court which ruled that while Catalan was a , Catalonia was not a nation. There is a long history in this region of fighting for autonomy, being granted differing levels of autonomy, then having that autonomy taken away with that cycle repeating itself over the course of quite a few centuries, as will be explored further in the paper.

Tensions between Catalonia and the state of Spain had been growing for quite some time but were especially heightened after they were stripped away of their ability to identify as a nation. Many Catalans at this time, were pushing for further economic independence from the central government. Similar to Scotland, in 2014, the Catalan region parliament passed a motion asking to hold an independence referendum in the region. Its legality was questioned by the

Spanish Constitutional Court after the then-Spanish Prime Minister, Mariana Rajoy, challenged it. The referendum was held albeit as a poll with 80% of the 1/3 registered voters who voted expressing a want for independence. In 2015, the Catalan parliament approved a measure that would allow for a “peaceful disconnection from the Spanish state” (Rodriguez 2020). Rajoy immediately deemed this illegal, but it was still announced that in October of 2017, Catalonia would hold a binding independence referendum. There were large protests, and many pro- independence Catalans were arrested before the referendum took place with even more violence the day of the vote. The referendum was seen as illegal and illegitimate despite an overwhelming

9 majority favoring independence. There were then large protests in 2019 after nine independence leaders in Catalonia were sentenced from nine to thirteen years in prison.

This was a very brief overview of the histories of both Scotland with the United Kingdom and Catalonia with Spain, in addition to their journey to where they are today in relation to independence movements and seeking separation that will be delved deeper into through the course of this paper. It is clear, however, that devolution efforts and economic independence are not the end goal of these movements as Michael Keating predicted in the early 2000s – they want to be their own states and have full autonomy given their current political climates. However, despite this, the concept of plurinationalism is still relevant to these nations. While they may be seeking independence now, many within these nations still have overlapping and nested identities. The independence movements in these two nations came out of particular political climates, not necessarily as a result of people identifying as more Scottish nor Catalan.

This thesis will focus particularly on what happened in the 2000s until now that allowed for this concept of plurinationalism to still be relevant, while not prompting these nations to be content with devolution efforts but wishing to seek independence instead. A case study is provided of both Scotland and Catalonia to provide reason and evidence as to what happened these past two decades in relation to furthering and solidifying their independence movements.

These two movements were chosen over others as they are arguably the most salient in Europe at the moment, with the two recently holding independence referendums – whether they were deemed legal or not. I will look at feelings of national identity in both of these nations and how they have evolved since the 2000s while maintaining the feeling of being both Scottish and

British or Catalan and Spanish but not identifying more so as Scottish or Catalan, despite maintaining independence movements.

10 This information is useful as it may help explain the trajectory of the many other independence and separatist movements that are emerging across the continent. A couple decades ago, it was thought that nations were simply seeking more sovereignty but would not be looking to secede. As we know this not to be true anymore, it is important to understand what caused this shift in ideology. In understanding this shift, we will have a better grasp as to what the future of the continent may look like in relation to the number of independence movements springing up across Europe. It will help the European Union plan and learn how to better operate whilst having many smaller states that are independent instead of a few larger states with many nations operating under them.

11 Chapter II. History of Minority Nations and Plurinationalism

1. History of Minority Nations and Literature Review

The concept of the nation-state, which allows us to ponder such questions regarding nationalities, national identity, and nationalism, is a relatively new concept in our understanding of the world order. This idea of a nation-state, where cultural boundaries line up along territorial boundaries for the most part, was not created until after the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648.

This war ended in the Treaty of Westphalia which began the breaking up of the Holy Roman

Empire, by beginning to grant sovereignty to many of the regions that were under its rule. It recognized that these newly identified states were sovereign over their own people’s and had the right to rule them as they saw fit, providing the basis for international law today. What once was a very centralized power was divided up in a very decentralized manner meaning that these newly fashioned nation-states could ratify treaties, levy taxes, and declare war on their own accord (Patton, 2019, 95). The old-world order was beginning to be thrown out and nation-states were in. This is of particular relevance due to the fact that vast amounts of territories would no longer be ruled under one emperor. Instead, they would begin to be fashioned under states which had sovereignty over the people. This meant that different territories and nationalities, however, still would be ruled under one state which was not always a homogenous identity. This leads to what much of this paper will be talking about – minority nations living within nation-states.

The map of Europe has been ever changing since after the Treaty of Westphalia, with new boundaries being drawn, nation-states being created, as well as nation-states dissolving. The last three major changes the world has seen with regards to the map of Europe has been after each of the World Wars, in 1918 and 1945, in addition to after the Cold War in 1991. This led to new states being created, such as Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia after World War I with

12 others being dissolved like the Soviet Union following the Cold War. However, many nationalities with cultural and territorial ties to the land remained in these places despite the many shifts of borders. This allows us to recognize how there are many minorities nations and stateless nations comprising states within the continent. Even for those states that have not had state lines redrawn in a very long time, many have multiple nations living among them. This is the case for Scots in the United Kingdom, Catalans in Spain, and Flemish people in Belgium, among others. These states are not made up of one culturally homogenous nation that equates itself to the state. This gives reason as to why questions of nationalities, national identity, and nationalism are of particular salience, especially today, where these minority nations are seeking total sovereignty and independence increasingly in the past two decades.

There has been much focus by scholars on the ideas of nationalism and nationalities, but not as much with the question of national identity. However, more focus has been placed on this concept in recent years as notions of national identity are evoked particularly among minority nations who seek further political goals and potentially independence. Anthony Smith, a scholar, in 1991 wrote the following about national identity

what we mean by ‘national identity’ involves some sense of political

community, however tenuous. A political community in turn implies at least

some common institutions and a single code of rights and duties for the members

of the community. It also suggests a definite social space, a fairly well demarcated

and bounded territory, with which the members identify and to which they feel they

belong (19).

He explains that the “fundamental features of a national identity” are the following:

1. An historic territory, homeland

13 2. Common myths and historical memories

3. A common, mass public culture

4. Common legal rights and duties for all members

5. A common economy with territorial mobility for members. (Smith, 2001, 24).

This is an important foundation to understanding national identity. This has been deemed an essentially functionalist explanation in that individuals need a national identity to understand how to function in society while the nation, maybe even the state, needs people to identify with its symbols and institutions in order to exist. However, it is of particular importance to point out that there are many living with different national identities within the European continent and not all have a state to accompany it. Smith’s account of national identity does not paint a clear picture on how to differentiate the nation from national identity and whether or not they are distinct (McCrone, 2015). Yet, we know that nation does not equate national identity with places such as the Spain with multiple national identities living under the sole nation.

As mentioned earlier, national identity is a concept that has not been paid as much attention as its nationality and nationalist counterparts but is of particular important in understanding minority nations and their choice to seek sovereignty. Like in Scotland, national identity is important because “country of origin, where they were born and brought up, confers on them a powerful sense of who they are” (McCrone, 2015, 1). National identity, especially of those in minority nations, is deeply personal and internal – it matters because people are bound up in it. National identity is what allows for minority nations to persist because if it was no longer salient and valuable, these minority nations would simply assimilate into their nations and cease to exist except in history books. However, it is because people continue to feel connected to the land in which they live, inhabit historical memories, and have specific cultural traditions

14 they continue – some of the aspects Smith mentions as the fundamental features of national identity – these nations survive. National identity, bound up in nationalism and nationality claims, is what allows for people of these minority nations to still feel connected to these nations and allows its legacy to live on, instead of simply becoming part of the larger nation they are legally bound to.

The 1990s was a time when the world and especially the continent of Europe saw a resurgence of minority nationalism. This was simply a by-product of the current world order with the dissolution of the Soviet Union that saw many minority nationalities re-emerging to the east. While in the West, Scotland and the Scottish National Party held a referendum in the later part of the decade voting for devolution efforts which result in the creation of a Scottish

Parliament. As is noted in the introduction chapter to European Integration and the Nationalities

Question,

Since the eighteenth century, when conceptions of democracy and self-determination first

entered the public realm, it was widely assumed that these identities and boundaries

would coincide so that states would be nation-states. This did not necessarily mean that

they would be culturally homogenous, but that, at the minimum, the territory of the state

would coincide with a political identity of the people as constituting a single, sovereign

nation, to which the democratic political system was ultimately accountable (McGarry, et

al, 2006, 3).

While these minority nations may have gained more prominence in the 90s, this democratic political system was working for most of them. Given the example of Catalonia and Scotland, these nations were not seeking independence at this time and simply wanted more autonomy and devolution.

15 2. Plurinationalism

In 2001, political scientist Michael Keating published his book Plurinational

Democracies: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era which sought to explain what was happening regarding the resurgence of minority nations and nationality claims at the time. He recognizes that nationality, or national identity, is used in two different senses. One that references citizenship to a state while the other denotes a broad cultural affiliation. More importantly, he says that “nationality as a form of collective identity is neither more nor less

‘natural’ than others and is constantly made and remade in the course of the political experience”

(Keating, 2001, 2). Like many other identities, national identity is very much so politicized and used to the advantage of others to further certain agendas. He states that as a consequence, they are always changing in regard to what constitutes this specific identity, which is essential to how minority nations are able to gain prominence and potentially political traction by altering the ways in which such a nationality is constructed allowing for the identity to persist. This is a tool that will be particularly useful for these nations. The fact that identities can be fluctuating while still relaying back to that historical territory, memories, and common culture will be particularly useful in keeping minority nations alive.

Nationality claims, however, are not always legitimate. Keating states that “nationality claims should be seen as a form of politics to be argued, debated, and mediated rather than as a set of absolutes” (2001, 3). They cannot be seen as inherently reasonable and justifiable.

However, this makes the notion of national identity all the more valuable and salient. Minority nations cannot have a valid claim to autonomy or sovereignty without a secure sense of national identity amongst its inhabitants. Keating notes this process of nationality claims, stating it is a form of identity politics which then allots members of that nationality special status. Within this

16 special status, these claims to nationality are ways to assert their right to self-determination. This does not mean that they will necessarily seek self-determination and independence from the state they belong, however by making these nationality claims it creates the possibility for them to be able to assert this right to do so. While nationality claims need to be justified and proven to be legitimate before being seen as something that is absolute, by acknowledging nationality claims and national identities it allots minority nations this path to eventually seek independence or further autonomy if they wish to. While at the time this book was written in 1991, minority nations weren’t using this pathway to seek independence, it will be seen decades later that it is used as a mechanism to be able to do so.

The term multinationalism was always used as a way of describing these nations, like

Spain and the United Kingdom, which has different nations and national identities occupying it under one singular state. Multinationalism denotes the simple fact that there are distinct national communities of people living together (Keating, 2001, 27). For example, this acknowledges that there are Scots living among the English in the United Kingdom as well as Catalans living among the Spanish in Spain. These different communities of national identities live among each other to comprise of a . However, this does not always mean the state recognizes these nations or nationalities, but that there are still people who identify with such a minority nationality living among those that identify with the nationality of the state. For example, in Spain, the Spanish government does not recognize Catalonia as a nation but does recognize it as a nationality, thus making it a multinational state.

However, this concept of multinationalism may not paint the perfect picture as to what national identities and nationalities look like in the current world order. In his book Plurinational

Democracies published in the early 2000s, Keating notes that this term is inefficient for

17 understanding how minority nations and national identities interact with their larger state they are legally bound to. He states that “multinational states get closer to capturing reality, but it is still not quite satisfactory” (2001, 27). In some circumstances there are these distinct communities of national identities just cohabitating the same land and living amongst each other, but this does not take into account some communities among minority nations. Some of these communities don’t just simply cohabitate the same space, but also share similar histories and cultural traditions. This prompts them to have ties to their larger state as well and not solely just their minority nation they feel a strong sense of belonging to. This questioning of how accurate multinationalism is to precisely capture the situation of minority nations to their state is what prompts Keating to coin a term that may be more valid and of better use to describe the complexity of the relations between the two.

Keating thus takes this concept of multinationalism and pushes it a little further to create this new idea of plurinationalism that he produces to better encompass the situations of minority nations and their relationship to their state. Plurinationalism, Keating states,

is more than multinationalism, which could refer to the coexistence of discrete and

separate national groupings within a polity. Under plurinationalism, more than one

national identity can pertain to a single group or even an individual, opening up the

possibility of multiple nationalities which in turn may be nested or may overlap in less

tidy ways. The very meaning of nationality can vary according to the group or individual

and can be more or less charged with political content… It follows that we cannot make a

simple one-to-one correlation of nationality with the state, nor propose secession as a

solution to nationality conflicts in the illusion that this will do the trick. (27)

18 Some of what Keating notes here has been mentioned previously in this paper. For example, he states that it is not as straightforward as to say that every state has one nationality tied to it - it is known that this is not the case for many states. However, what is new in this idea of plurinationalism is the fact that he states people can inhabit different national identities, it need not be only one. This is what multinationalism fails to take into account by stating that communities of different nationalities/national identities will only possibly take up some space, but not overlap. Plurinationalism thus considers the fact that there are people in Scotland who feel that they are both Scottish and British, similar to those in Catalonia who feel both Catalan and Spanish, albeit to varying degrees. Intertwined with plurinationalism is the concept of the

Moreno question. The Moreno Question is a “self-identification scale expressed by citizens to clarify social mobilization in the quest for political autonomy” (Moreno, 1986). This means that while some may feel more Scottish than British or vice versa, they still consider both of these to be a salient and relevant part to understanding their identity. The Moreno Question, using

Scotland as the example, allows those within the nation to describe themselves in the five following ways 1) solely Scottish, 2) more Scottish than British, 3) equally Scottish as British 4) more British as Scottish, and 5) solely British. This exemplifies Keating’s concept of plurinationalism by showing that people within minority nations can hold ties to more than one national identity.

Plurinationalism as a concept was a way of better understanding the current situation of states at the time. Keating recognized that “citizens are prepared to have two or more politicized identities,” they don’t feel the need to only belong to one or the other identity, there are ways in which the two are intertwined (2001, 18). For example, as mentioned earlier, although Spain recognizes that Catalan is a nationality, people living in this region still must have a Spanish

19 passport and despite having higher levels of autonomy still interact with the Spanish state to high degrees. Thus, those living in these regions do not solely recognize themselves as Catalan, but also understand that being Spanish is part of their identity, no matter how large of a role it plays.

Keating describes this concept of plurinationalism to be a more complex and encompassing understanding of what is actually at play within these states and minority nations. He understands that national identities are not always monolithic and exclusive. They take up multiple spaces, mean different or similar things to different peoples based on a number of different factors. While some, using the example mentioned earlier, may only see themselves as

Catalan which falls better under this notion of multinationalism, there are many who also see themselves as taking up a Spanish identity additionally, which does not make sense under that same notion. Therefore, there is the need to address this idea of plurinationalism to be more inclusive of those who do feel as though they belong to different, and potentially at times, contrasting national identities.

As scholars have a better grasp and understanding of concepts such as nationalism, nationalities, and national identities, certain terms, like multinationalism, fail to consider all the potential and necessary components that make them up. Keating therefore says, plurinationalism

“better captures the more fluid and pluralistic nature of the social reality which presents more complex issues of recognition in some cases more than others” (2001, 161). These concepts like national identity are not a kind of one-size fits all type of situation. However, given the nature of them, any definition that seeks to make sense of it must be fluid and consider that what accounts for one may be different than what accounts for a different one. Keating dictates that

20 It is clear that in order to understand the complexities of nationality and political order in

the modern world we need to give me on the old models of statehood based on a uniform

order whether federal or unitary (2001, 160).

He calls for a rethinking of the state as a whole and to incorporate a plurinationalistic way of making sense of the current world order. Previous notions of the state and nations may be ever growing and changing. Thus, by making use of this term we are better able to recognize the ways in which states and minority nations interact and what the future may hold in store for both of these.

This concept of plurinationalism was an insightful way of understanding these state and nation relations at the time at which this book was written. While at the time, minority nations were seeing a resurgence in nationality claims, they were more or less just looking for that state recognition in a sense. While these nationalities wanted recognition, it was still very possible for those to identify with that of the minority nation while also identifying with the state, as seen with this concept of plurinationalism. Thus, Keating proposed in this book that these minority nations would be content with more autonomy and devolution efforts. This was also the general sentiment of many scholars and political scientists at the time. Citizens of these minority nations, while wanting more sovereignty would not be seeking total sovereignty nor independence in

Keating’s, as well as many others, opinion at this time. He bases this claim in polls of public opinion in certain nations which gauged both how they perceived both their national identity as well as what they, as members of a minority nation, were seeking from their larger state. At the time, people were showcasing both the complexities of their identity as well as that they did not want to seek independence from their state. Therefore, under this notion of plurinationalism not only did it acknowledge the fluidity of national identities and the plurality of them, but also

21 enforces this idea that the two identities can cohabitate and live amongst each other, not within this sort of binary. It consequentially evokes the understanding that these minority nations will continue to be able to exist under their larger states they belong to and will thus then be okay with this as they still identify with it to a certain extent. Keating calls upon specific cases such as those within the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, and Canada to exemplify this. For the purposes of this paper, we will be looking only at Scotland and Catalonia and why plurinationalism was relevant at the time in that these nations did not have larger, more positive, sentiments towards independence.

Using this concept of plurinationalism, Keating actually writes a whole chapter in his book, entitled “What do the Nations Want? Nationalist Aspirations and Transnational

Integration” which is dedicated to depicting what these minority nations will seek in means of political aspirations in the future. Although Keating coined this term of plurinationalism and used it to hypothesize its effect on the independence movement of Scotland and Catalonia, it should be noted that this captured the general sentiment of the time. Many believed that independence would not be sought within minority nations like Scotland and Catalonia due to the plurinational nature of their national identities. At the time, they were content with remaining within the larger states to which they legally belonged. Scotland and Catalonia are featured quite a bit in this book with regard to the history of these minority nations, how they exist among their larger state, and what they aspire to be. This is interesting due to the fact that a lot of the world’s attention has been focused on these two nations and their strive towards independence. However, we will see whether this is exactly what Keating predicted as a consequence of this idea of plurinationalism, or not.

22 3. Plurinationalism and the United Kingdom

Keating begins recounting the history of the United Kingdom by noting that most conservative historians hardly make note of the rich Scottish history that was there before the

Union of 1707. Most recognize Scotland as an ‘impoverished’ country that saw many new developments following the Union. However, he notes that the nation has a rich historiography.

There were some historiographies deployed shortly after the union, calling upon older documents such as that of the Declaration of Arbroath in 1320 which pronounced the sovereignty of Scottish people and their right to reject the English monarch (Keating, 2001, 36). However, by the late

1700s, there was a new Scottish unionist historiography being claimed to embrace the English and their constitutional practices. Despite this, there was the reemergence of Scottish nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries based on the contested nature of the union. Some have argued that “the union was made by men of limited vision for short-term and comparatively petty, if not squalid, ends, and only gained broader acceptance much later” (Keating 2001, 37) .

However, since the 1990s, Scottish historians have still stressed the importance of the Scottish continuing to fight for more autonomy, albeit being under the terms of the union. Thus, Scotland has a very conflicting and ever-changing history with their English counterparts and the larger state they are legally bound to. Historians recognize their alternating historiographies throughout the past few centuries, while still recognizing the need to see the union as legitimate and to remain part of it.

It was in the early twentieth century when the prospects of an independent Scotland were once again brought into consideration amongst politicians at the time. The Scottish National party was created in 1928 and the Statute of Westminster was passed in 1931, which really got the idea rolling about a separate Scottish state. However, there was much ambiguity surrounding

23 this. At this time, there was a large part of the Scottish National Party who made it clear that they wanted independence, but there were also a moderate number of members who would settle for a larger amount of home rule in Scotland (Keating, 2001, 58). However, prospects of this were hindered after British membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) became more likely.

Keating also highlights data that shows that, throughout the years, people living in

Scotland have shown higher rates of identifying British as some part of their identity. In 1986, close to 40% of those surveyed said they were only Scottish and not British. However, by 1997, only around 20% of those surveyed stated they were only Scottish, making around 80% identifying British with some part of their identity (McCrone, 1998). Large proportions of people still saw Scottish as being their more salient identity but being British was still part of their identity as well – showcasing their plurinational identities. This is important for identifying the ways in which Keating describes what it is that these nations want in terms of political aspirations.

Not only are Scots identifying at higher rates with their British counterparts, during the

80s and 90s, they also heavily sought to remain part of the union with them. Throughout this time, when given the options for sticking with the status quo, having a Scottish assembly or

Parliament within the United Kingdom, or independence the latter does not perform the best. The majority of the people surveyed answered that that they would like a Scottish Parliament within the United Kingdom, otherwise known as devolution, but were not seeking independence at the time. Devolution is seen as scoring strongly as it was a very salient issue to those residing in

Scotland. Thus, in 1997, Scots voted for devolution in a referendum and a Scottish parliament was established in .

24 Keating also notes however that if Scottish peoples were to vote on a referendum for

Scottish independence at the time, around half states that they would indeed vote yes. Keating dictates that these findings suggest “a widespread liking for independence as an idea, but a willingness to recognize realities and settle for less (60).” In addition to this, he finds that independence may not mean classical statehood for these respondents. Many still want to continue to be defended by the British Armed force, while also wanting to conduct their own negotiations directly with Europe not through the United Kingdom. Keating says these polls may actually suggest expectations rather than aspirations for the future. They are committed to self- governance and have strong aspirations towards national autonomy. Scots appreciate the fact that the constitution is always evolving, but do not specify what the end point of that evolution is – further devolution efforts, autonomy over European negotiations, or independence. However, the

Scots do show higher levels of support for European integration than do their English counterparts, seeing this as a more practical means of achieving some sort of autonomy or more devolution.

Through Keating’s understanding of Scotland at the time, with the help of his notion of plurinationalism, it is evident as to why he does not see independence, as we understand it, happening for quite some time in Scotland. He gives evidence that more and more people living in Scotland leading up to the twenty-first century, are accepting and inhabiting this plurinational identity of being both Scottish and British, no matter the degree to which one identifies with either. Keating also takes notice of the fact that, when surveyed and questioned on whether they seek no changes to their current status, devolution, or independence, a majority chooses devolution over independence. These people still identify with the larger state and being British, thus they do not want to be independent but rather seek further autonomy and self-rule while still

25 being bound to the United Kingdom in a larger sense. While he notes that this may just be people’s expectations and not aspirations, Keating still states that even when aspiring for independence, what qualifies as such may fall beyond our typical understandings of being granted classical statehood. Given the polling and general social attitudes, Keating’s analysis makes sense. As people identify more as both Scottish and British, sentiments of actual independence will weaken and no longer be sought.

4. Plurinationalism and Spain

Catalonia and their history as a minority nation in relation to Spain can be seen as having some similar trajectories and trends to Scotland in understanding what their political aspirations were at the time Keating’s Plurinational Democracies was written in 2001. “Like the United

Kingdom, Catalonia has a dominant state historiography challenged by competing historiographies in the periphery” (41). He finds that the dominant historiography, like the

United Kingdom, is that Spain remained a complex and pluralistic order for centuries with no real threat to that. Similar to the Union of 1707, Castile is seen as the backbone of Spain and unification was a process of integrating Catalonia into Castilian state and law. But also like this

Union of 1707, “Catalan writers have long stressed the peculiar constitution of the Crown of

Aragon and Catalonia within it, based on divided sovereignty, pactism, and constitutionalism”

(Keating, 2001, 41). Essentially, they question its legitimacy as they had with the Union of 1707.

Nonetheless, Catalonia has still played a large role in fostering a Spanish community and pluralism has always been at the forefront of being Catalan. This has thus informed the ways in which the people of Catalonia could go about obtaining higher degrees of sovereignty while still othering themselves and seeing themselves as distinct from others in the Spanish state.

26 In a more modern understanding of Catalonia and the Spanish state, despite having similar trends in historiographies with the United Kingdom, the nations, Scotland and Catalonia, diverge on the context of their nationality claims. While the United Kingdom recognizes itself as being plurinational, Spain does not. Thus, Keating states that it is important for Catalonia defend their existence as a minority nation but not make separatist claims that go against the constitution, which Catalan nationalism exhibits (2001, 72). Catalonia made independence claims in 1931 after the fall of the monarchy before the Spanish Civil War, which was not recognized. However, since the restoration of Spanish democracy, Catalan nationalists have made claims that they are non-separatists, especially following the formation of the

Convergencía I Unio (CiU), in the late 1970s. They recognize the importance for Catalonia to remain as part of Spain, but also recognize the want for further autonomy. Members of CiU wish for sovereignty to be divided and shared among the Spanish state, with Europe occupying a larger role. They wish to have more of a say over cultural and language matters, have symbols for their nations, occupy a fiscal regime, and be guaranteed a place in the Spanish delegates abroad. It is evident that what the party and Catalan nationalists wants is more sovereignty under the larger Spanish state.

Like Scottish figures explained previously, Keating notes the same for those living in

Catalonia. Through the 90s, those living in Catalonia and only identifying as Catalan remains overwhelmingly low, never reaching above 20% (ICPS Polls). Thus, 80% of Catalan residents see being Spanish as a salient part of their identity, albeit to varying degrees. The percentages for each remain quite stagnant over the years with many stating they feel equally Catalan and

Spanish. Once again providing evidence for Keating’s term of plurinationalism and the fact that individuals are “more than willing to have two or more politicized identities” (2001, 18).

27 However, the data does show slight increases in the number of persons who identify more as

Catalan than Spanish throughout the decade, but it is very small in degree. Keating notes this happens as Catalan consciousness begins to grow. Nonetheless, even as Catalan consciousness may begin to grow, because of their plurinational identities the people of Catalonia will not be inclined to seek independence from the Spanish state, according to Keating’s claims and hypothesis.

What is more important to consider with the data Keating provides is the way in which

Catalans respond to what they wish to see in the future. The data follows a similar time trend by giving percentages to whether Catalans wish to be a region of Spain, a state of federal Spain, an autonomous community of Spain, or an independent state from 1991-1999. Independence saw higher levels of respondents between 1993 and 1995 garnering just above 20% of those surveyed but seeing a slight decrease since then (ICPS Polls). However, being an autonomous community, meaning that the status quo would remain, is the majority option chosen throughout the decade and only growing in support towards the end of the 90s. This also is relevant to how people perceive themselves and their identities, with over 52% who responded that they were only

Catalan choosing independence over the other options. When all respondents were asked whether they were favorable to the concept of Catalan independence, still only about a third said yes.

Once again, like in Scotland, this data in Catalonia at the end of the twenty-first century really highlights Keating’s notion of plurinationalism and exemplifies it. Those living in

Catalonia still identify with the larger state as Spanish, as well as being Catalan. Thus, they are not seeking independence, but rather wish to continue being an autonomous community and receive more sovereignty among it. Even the nationalist party, CiU, at the time rejected

28 separatism and understood the need to remain part of the Spanish state based upon the political climate of the time. If they did not, this would have been seen as going against the Spanish constitution as it recognizes Catalan as a nationality, but not Catalonia as a nation. Their histories are intertwined, and Catalans understood at the time that they simply wanted the ability for more self-governance and the right to decide what happens with regards to culture and language matters, in addition to economic decisions. Thus, Keating’s notion that Catalonia will not seek independence made sense at this time, in 2001, given the analysis and data provided. Catalans were content with being part of a plurinational state and inhabiting a plurinational identity of being both Catalan and Spanish at this time, as long as they were granted more competencies over the nation.

5. Plurinationalism in the Future

Keating’s analysis of both Scotland in the United Kingdom and Catalonia in Spain was reasonable and logistical at the time Plurinational Democracies was written in 2001 which captured the general sentiment of many at the time. However, it is now known, almost two decades later, Keating’s predictions have not rung true, and this thesis seeks to find out why.

These nations were not content with devolution and further autonomy and in fact did seek independence shortly after, despite his presumptions that this would not happen for quite some time, if ever, because of this concept of plurinationalism. Keating believed that people were ready to exist under multiple politicized identities and be content as a minority nation living under a larger state. However, this was not necessarily the case, and this paper provides more context for this claim.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, there has been a resurgence of minority that go beyond the nations of Scotland and Catalonia. Given the current world order of things,

29 the geopolitical context, and constant changes due to globalization, minority nations are no longer as dependent on their larger states as they had been in the past. Some have noted the recent resurgence of these nations can be accounted by the differing processes of economic integration in the EU which has increased mobility and shifted power away from states, the lowering of international tariffs which may have shied nations away from independence, the cultural dimension of globalization, as well as global norms on human rights (McGarry, et al,

2005, 5). No matter the cause, it is clear, two decades after Keating has published this book, that nationalism is not going to go away and not all minority nations will be content with being a minority nation forever.

The two following chapters of this thesis seek to recognize the factors that led specifically Scotland and Catalonia to diverge from what looked like a growing acceptance of plurinational identities to what would lead them to seek independence only less than two decades after it was presumed that more autonomy would be sufficient. In the 1990s, Keating’s analysis was logical. More residents in both Scotland and Catalonia were responding that they shared parts of their identity with the British and Spanish. In addition to this, feelings towards independence in these two nations were not strong. They both had higher levels of support for seeking devolution or aspirations to be an autonomous community. I seek to understand what happened from the start of the new millennium, in 2000, to 2014 in Scotland and 2017 in

Catalonia which prompted them to hold their own independence referendums. Essentially, what lead these two nations to stray from Keating’s idea of plurinationalism and coexisting among their larger state to garnering strong support for independence, at least strong enough to hold a referendum for it. These questions will be explored in the following two chapters regarding both

30 Scotland and Catalonia, respectively, and their independence movements where more details and history will be provided pertaining to the two.

31 Chapter III. Scotland, A Case Study

Scotland held a referendum on independence in 2014 and may hold another one in the near future after the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union in 2016. This raises serious doubts about the widespread assumption that something like Michael Keating’s notion of plurinationalism was an adequate way of describing national identity trends for the people of

Scotland. Although the independence referendum wasn’t successful, 45% of the vote still showed support for independence – a percentage much higher than earlier levels of support for independence ( Referendum 2014: Results). This chapter asks why

Keating’s concept of plurinationalism has not proved to be nearly as attractive as a solution to the problem of Scottish identity along with independence as it was expected to be.

To begin this chapter, I provide a brief account of Scotland’s history within the United

Kingdom which came to be following the Act of the Union in 1707. Next, I look at the history of national/independence movements within the nation starting with the creation of the Scottish

National Party in the 1930s, leading up to the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, which is right around the time that Keating proposed this concept of plurinationalism with its presumed effect on independence movements. Providing history and context for the relation between

Scotland and the United Kingdom is important to understand the prevalence of Scottish national identity within the nation as well as the relation between the nation and the larger state. Then, I consider what happened from the early 2000s to the referendum held in 2014 as the Scottish

National Party gained an unprecedented amount of support during that time. A discussion follows to try and answer why Keating’s idea of plurinationalism, which captured the general sentiments of the time, did not have the effect Keating thought it would on independence movements in places like Scotland where many still felt both Scottish and British at the time of

32 the referendum in 2014. Was it just by chance that the SNP gained such support on other policy platforms of theirs other than independence, which led to them gaining a majority government in

2011 prompting them to hold the referendum on independence? Or is it that although people may have plurinational identities in Scotland, Keating’s understanding of this does not measure the salience of the multiple identities in relation to each other, thus ineffectively presuming its effect on independence movements? The chapter explores these questions in further detail.

1. within the United Kingdom

Act of the Union, 1707

There are many conflicting reports of the Act of the Union in 1707, which created the sovereign state of the United Kingdom. However, many accounts can all agree that this union was neither neat nor a fully complete one. Some of the key elements of the Union included functional integration, preservation of the old English constitution, an accommodation of

Scotland within the unitary state, a limited amount of socialization and nation-building, and the periodic reconstruction of a Scottish nation as a rival or as part of British identity (Keating,

2009). There was enough integration of the two nations so that they could co-exist in certain spheres of life, but also not enough integration so that the two nations remained still very separate from one another.

Scottish nationalists see this Act of the Union as one that happened under coercion.

While in writing, each nation’s government systems were abolished and a new one was created – what happened in reality was that the English Parliament stayed the same under a new name of the ‘British parliament’ (Ascheron, 2003). Other than that, however, many Scottish institutions remained which allowed for a strong sense of Scottishness to persist. “Unionists fully accepted national cultural diversity, administrative decentralization, and Scotland’s distinct civil

33 institutions” (Kidd, 2008). The two nations remained quite distinct from one another, while residing under the same sovereign state – the United Kingdom. The central doctrine of the Union makes it unnecessary to define the ‘people’ of the United Kingdom – an efficient secret as well as a weak point (Keating, 2009). Unlike as will be seen in the Spanish case where the state is deemed “indissoluble,” the ‘people’ of the United Kingdom need not include the people of

Scotland. Thus, it is both an efficient secret and a weak point because it grants the people of

Scotland the ability to no longer be considered as the people of the United Kingdom if they choose to seek independence in the future. It allowed Scotland to maintain its cultural and historic identity within its own civil society, but not its own Parliament. By allowing a Scottish national identity to persist, it made the Union more palatable to Scots, but may have sowed the seeds of its later demise, as it provides the foundation for later national and independence movements to take root, if they so wish. For had there been a true integration of the two states, with the emergence of a strong British identity, the United Kingdom may not be faced with the problems it does today.

Although the Scottish parliament had been removed with the Act of the Union in 1707 and its formal statehood abolished, Scots civil law, the established Church of Scotland, and the education system remained (Ascherson, 2003). This allowed for Scottish civil society to persist and remain strong. By retaining these components, the people of Scotland were able to distinguish themselves from the British. Their legal system was still Scottish, they were able to continue practicing their religion, and they were able to choose what was taught in their schools.

This all allowed for the people of Scotland to remain distinct in their identity from the British.

There was a clear separation in these aspects of society. “The Scottish elite working through these institutions, had continued to run Scotland according to their own view of the nation’s

34 needs, with only occasional and often unsuccessful interference from England” (2003). This is just another example of how both Scotland and England remained two different and distinct entities under the United Kingdom. Because these institutions remained, it allowed for Scotland to maintain its sense of self that was separate from England. They only were in union based on their government system and were ruled under the same monarchy. This lack of true integration, as mentioned earlier, allowed for the Scottish national identity to persist through centuries even as people came to identify with the United Kingdom, as British, eventually.

There were also vast transformations within the nation following the Act of the Union in

1707 and the Jacobite Rebellions which ended at Culloden Moor in 1745. After some 2,000

Scottish Highlander men died protesting the English throne and claiming Bonnie Prince

Charlie’s ‘rightful’ claim to it as heir, the Highlander culture as they knew it was gone. The

Battle of Culloden prompted vast repression of Scottish identity, including banning the tartan that was specific to each of the Highlander clans which made them distinct from one another

(Castelow). Following this, “tidal waves of transformation swept over the country, lowland and highland, drowning the way of life for hundreds of thousands of families in obliterating not only traditional societies, but the very appearance of the landscape itself” (Ascherson, 2003). Previous to this, there were stark distinctions between the highland and lowland culture in Scotland. The highlanders were seen as more savage and barbaric while lowlanders were seen as civilized.

Much of the highlander culture ended with the Battle of Culloden. However, of those highlanders that were left following Culloden eventually migrated south to the lowlands as living conditions in the highlands decreased significantly. In order to survive, many migrated south to be able to continue to make a living and provide support for their families. Despite all of this repression

35 and harsh living conditions, a separate Scottish identity, distinct from British, remained through all of this change.

The Act of the Union in 1707, changed life in many ways for both those living in

Scotland and England while many things remained the same. Those living in Scotland were able to maintain their national identity as many Scottish institutions still existed and there was no formal effort to integrate the two nations under one sovereign state socially. This does not mean that there were not challenges to the Scottish identity as noted that following the Jacobite rebellions, people living in Scotland were stripped of many of their traditional ways of life.

Nonetheless, a sense of Scottishness as a distinct identity continued strong through today where although many people living in Scotland identify to a varying degree as British, many still feel strong ties to their Scottish identity. An understanding of the history of the Act of the Union and that which follows is important when understanding Scotland’s independence movement. The

Union allowed for Scottishness to remain and they have always found a way, even when it was challenged to keep that identity moving through generations allowing for such independence movements to be a possibility now in the twenty-first century.

2. Formation of the Scottish National Party to the Creation of the Scottish Parliament

Creation of the Scottish National Party

Although ties to a Scottish national identity persisted throughout the years following the Act of the Union in 1707, there were years where it was really strong and prevalent as well as years where it was not. movement in Scotland began to gain ground again in 1934 when the Scottish National Party was formed as the merger of the National Party of Scotland and the

Scottish Party (Scottish National Party: History). Its first formal leader was John MacCormick and the party was established after he held a meeting for anyone who supported the

36 establishment of a party that supported home rule. Thus, because there were enough in attendance showing there was clear support for more autonomy in Scotland and possibly independence, the party was created. The Scottish National Party did not initially state independence as its main policy platform, but instead wanted to secure limited autonomy within the United Kingdom (A Brief History of the Scottish Nationalist Party). However, this did not remain the case for long and a few years later the party returned their primary focus onto independence. This issue though became one of contention as party leaders often differed in opinions as to whether this should be their focus or if devolution was sufficient. This question of gaining independence allowing Scotland to become its own sovereign state or simply being granted devolution efforts gaining more autonomy from the United Kingdom is one that still remains today.

Although the party was formed in the 30s, it did not gain a lot of traction until decades later.

The Scottish National Party did not even win its first seat in parliament until 1945, twelve years after the party formed, and even then, they could not hold onto the seat for long. This persisted into the 1950s where levels of support remained low. However, the party began to gain a better grasp on things by the 1960s when there were growing branches of the party throughout

Scotland. It fared better in the election into the later 1960s, but the Scottish National Party did not truly take off until the 1970s.

Growing Sense of Nationalism in the 1970s

Until the 1970s, voting for the Nationalist party in Scotland – the Scottish National Party

– was seen as deviant voting behavior, with the norm being voting for the Labour or

Conservative party (Keating, 2009). Thus, as Scottish nationalism saw a resurgence in the 1970s, it was not taken seriously by English scholars. What caused this sudden shift though as the

37 Scottish National Party began to receive more support into the decade of the 70s? It was the discovery of the North Sea Oil in Scotland that pushed people towards the nationalist party (Kidd

& Petrie, 2016). Following the Second World War, “the failure of both the major British political parties to address the stagnating economy, left the British state adrift in the 60s and 70s, unable to cope with the skill of the challenges faced” (Nairn, 1975). Thus, with the discovery of the

North Sea Oil, this proved to be a major economic advantage for Scotland – one that may have allowed it to be efficient as its own country. This discovery of what could be economic gains for

Scotland does not directly pertain to identity. However, it allowed for those who identified strongly with their Scottish identity but did not support independence because they did not find it economically feasible to be more inclined to support independence as perhaps now it was a possibility. Although this discovery of the North Sea Oil did not prompt people living in

Scotland to feel more Scottish, it increased the level of support for independence among those who already felt Scottish.

This discovery highlighted the United Kingdom’s lack of economic performance, while

Scotland’s was on the rise. The Scottish National Party took advantage of this. The party claimed that “an independent Scotland was not only now viable but could be wealthy on the scale of

Kuwait” (Ascherson, 2003). Prospects for independence became more real at that time. In fact, an opinion poll showed that “only a little over a third of voters expected the union to last more than 50 years, while half declared themselves favorable to a Scottish independence” (ICM,

2007). While Europe was proving itself to being “a modern, voluntary, genuinely multinational organization capable of further progress and influence; in contrast, the United Kingdom was none of these things” (Jackson, 2020). The people of Scotland, feeling the economic aftermath still of the Second World War and now having the means to have major economic gains from the

38 North Sea Oil, saw independence as a viable option for them. However, as we will see next, devolution was offered up as an option to the people of Scotland from the United Kingdom government – fearing that they would actually seek independence – but the devolution efforts failed despite growing national sentiments in this time.

Failure of Devolution in the Late 1970s

The Scotland Act of 1978 proposed that, if passed, a Scottish Assembly would be created granting Scotland more autonomy and some form of devolution. This would have allowed the

Scottish Assembly the power to introduce legislation within their defined areas of competence which included: education, the environment, health, home affairs, legal matters, and social services. However, in order for the bill to be passed, it had to be approved by at least 40% of the electorate in Scotland. While the Act had a majority of those who voted favoring it, the ‘yes’ vote only accounted for about 33% of the electorate so the Act did not pass (Scotland Act 1978).

This comes in the same decade where independence was favored so greatly among the people of

Scotland. If so many people favored independence, why wasn’t there greater support for devolution as a clear step towards that goal?

Devolution, which would have been provided under the Scotland Act of 1978, did not succeed because of both party loyalty and the inability of both the Labour and Scottish National

Party to take a firm stance on where they stood on the issue. For those in the Labour Party, one half strongly supported devolution, while the other half strongly opposed it. Meanwhile, although many members of the Scottish National Party saw devolution as a steppingstone to achieving independence which is their end goal, others saw it as a sell-out and took on an all-or- nothing kind of approach. Because of this, there was no clear stance taken by either of the parties

(Ascherson, 2003). However, as mentioned previously, party loyalty also played into the failure

39 of the referendum. While in reality the Scottish National Party was divided on where they stood in this matter, their party was the most associated with the referendum. Thus, even those who favored devolution or even perhaps independence itself, voted no in the referendum out of loyalty to the Labour party or others, dissing the Scottish National Party instead. While support for devolution and even independence was indeed increasing, the movements could not get very far based on party loyalties and lack of agreement between the parties themselves.

Thatcherism and Globalization in the 80s and 90s

The conservative government in the United Kingdom, which began in the late 70s and persisted through the 90s, clearly strengthened nationalist trends within Scotland. Margaret

Thatcher’s consistent lack of concern for Scotland left many Scottish people bitter towards the

United Kingdom government. That dissatisfaction within the nation spread across the whole political spectrum. It was noted that “the public persona of Margaret Thatcher appears to many

Scots to capture all the worst elements of their caricature of the English: uncaring, arrogant, always convinced of her own rightness, possessed of an accent that grates on Scottish ears, and affluent enough to afford a retirement that cost 500,000 pounds” (Dickson, 1989).

Thatcher helped make the case for independence within Scotland even more pronounced.

She paid little attention to the problems that gripped most Scots, confirming for nationalists and the Scottish National Party that only an independent people of Scotland would be able to govern with the nation’s best interests at heart. In addition to that, Thatcher’s conservatism was especially out of step with the social democratic sympathies of the majority of Scots. For a nation that already had growing interest in gaining their own sovereign entity, a Prime Minister who consistently highlighted the differences between Scots and other members of the United

Kingdom, seemed to only encourage the independence movement. Even after Thatcher resigned

40 in 1990, her successor, John Major, showed a similar attitude towards Scotland. In a speech in

1991, Major states “the Scots just feel left out of things up there, and I have a good deal of sympathy with that. I got to go there much more often and so should the rest of the cabinet. If they see us around more, they feel a lot less cut off” (Ascherson, 2003). There is no mention of actually focusing on the matters which mean most to the Scottish people, but rather if they see the Prime Minister there more often, they will be satisfied with such – severely underestimating them and their interests.

There were additional factors in the 80s and 90s that led to a growing sense of nationalism within Scotland, prompting more to think about obtaining independence. Between the Conservative politics of Margaret Thatcher at the time and the ever-changing world order, independence among the Scottish people seemed to not only be a better option, but now a more possible option. “It was amid the growing debates about European integration, globalization and devolution of that time of the goal of Scottish independence acquired much greater precision”

(Jackson, 2020). There were other nations the size of Scotland that were able to integrate themselves into the European Market and global economic structures. With the discovery of the

North Sea Oil a decade previously, prospects of independence seem much more favorable and obtainable. Placed into context with a government that does not seem well representative of the nation, it is clear why nationalism and the Scottish National Party began to grow in interest among the people of Scotland.

Devolution, Part Two?

By the 1990s, the political landscape in Scotland had changed quite a bit. Many people living in Scotland had grown strong opposing views to the conservative government in

Westminster and felt as though it did not well represent Scotland as a nation. An anecdote from

41 Neal Ascherson’s Stone Voices says that “by 1990, was it harder to be a child with an English accent in a Scottish schoolyard than it had been 20 years before? The evidence is only anecdotal, but many Scots would say that it was” (2003). During this time as well, a new Museum of

Scotland was being constructed which helped create a further sense of nationhood and reinforce ideals of what it means to be Scottish. The museum and all of its working parts “confronted the

Scots for the first time with the true magnificence of their own material culture” (Ascherson,

2003). Through creating exhibits, it provided hard evidence of Scotland’s past as an independent state and reminded the Scottish people of their history. Given the time that it was created, it allowed the Scots to imagine again what an independent Scotland could mean for them, given the political environment of the United Kingdom of the time.

However, with that being said, many Scottish people still held ties to their British identity. As of 1992, 19% of Scotland identified as being solely Scottish and not British (Scottish

Social Attitudes Survey). While this is still one-fifth of the country, this means that the vast majority still identified to some extent as British. The percentage of those identifying solely as

Scottish rose four percentage points in 1997 to 23%, but that still means most of Scotland still identifies with the larger state to which they belong. However, when being forced to choose one identity over the other, “forced choice” national identity trends show an increase of those in

Scotland as Scottish. In the early 1980s, just under 60% of those living in Scotland chose

Scottish as their sole identity if forced to choose. However, only a decade later in the 1990s, that percentage rose to over 70% (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey). This is significant because it shows the effects of the discovery of the North Sea Oil in addition to a conservative government in Westminster that did not prove favorable to Scotland and how it affected the people of

Scotland. While the discovery of the North Sea Oil may not have made those living in Scotland

42 identify as Scottish more so, it made the prospect of independence seem more economically attainable. Whereas the conservative nature of the government under Prime Minister Thatcher isolated the Scottish people from the British which did prompt more to feel Scottish over feeling

British. While many people living in Scotland holds ties to their British identity, the extent to which they do varies. In addition to that, when forced to choose a national identity, many of those living in Scotland would choose Scottish as their preferred identity.

This dissatisfaction towards the government in Westminster and growing percentages of those identifying as Scottish led to another devolution effort in 1997 and 1998. This was part of the Labour Party’s election manifesto, which they put into effect on gaining power. The White

Papers Scotland’s Parliament was a bill that was introduced that would allow Scotland to have its own Parliament in Edinburgh, granting it legislative powers over devolved matters of the nation and certain competences. The Scotland Act was passed in 1998 with 74% in favor of creating a Scottish Parliament and 63% supporting tax-varying powers for that parliament

(History of the Scottish Parliament: The Path to Devolution). The Scottish Parliament was thus created in 1999 and the people of Scotland were granted a certain sense of satisfaction knowing that certain matters were now in the hands of the people of Scotland themselves and not of those sitting in Westminster.

Despite the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 led by the Labour, the Scottish

National Party was not succeeding as one might expect it to have been. The party still held very few seats in Westminster, and no one could have predicted the success it would achieve in

Scotland in the following decade. No wonder, then, that so many people saw Keating’s plurinationalism as a stable future for Scotland. As mentioned previously, many of those living in Scotland held ties to different national identities, being both Scottish and British, albeit to

43 varying extents. In addition to that, it was thought that with the creation of the Scottish

Parliament, the people of Scotland would be content enough with that, at least for some years.

Plurinationalism thus explained the situation in Scotland well and captured the general sentiments at the time the book was published in the early 2000s. Although people were identifying more with their Scottish identity, the Scottish National Party was not being deemed more favorable thus independence was not seen to be an achievable thing nor was it a prevalent issue for Scotland for quite some years. However, as will be explained in the following section, somewhat unprecedented circumstances that Keating could not have predicted, led Scotland to the path of holding an independence referendum just over a decade later while notions of national identity have largely remained the same.

3. Early 2000s to the Independence Referendum of 2014

Early Years of the Scottish Parliament

In its early years, many speculated whether the Scottish Parliament would satisfy Scottish interests as a separate entity or would it create a slippery slope towards independence (Keating,

2017). Some stated that the question of independence had lost its urgency (Ascherson, 2003).

While others saw the creation of the Scottish Parliament as the “UK unwittingly promoting its own disintegration since such a parliament would never be content with mere devolution”

(Keating, 2017). At first, in the early 2000s talk of independence simmered down. Levels of support for independence were decreasing, so most thought that, for the moment, the Scottish

Parliament would settle the discontent in the nation for the time being, as Keating assumed in his book Plurinational Democracies.

The growing affinity for Scottish independence seemed to hit a sort of plateau at this time. When asked to choose a national identity, the percentage of those identifying solely as

44 Scottish was decreasing, even if it remained the overwhelming majority. While considering national identity on the Moreno Scale, those identifying solely as Scottish had hit its peak in

2000, following the creation of the Scottish Parliament at 36%, but that began to steadily decrease throughout the 2000s (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 1999-2010). Devolution efforts, at least for the time being, seemed to be quelling the people of Scotland’s distaste for the government in Westminster and their efforts for independence.

The Scottish National Party also did not see growing support for their party following the creation of the Scottish Parliament. For the first eight or so years, the Parliament was led by a

Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition. While the Scottish National Party still held a decent number of seats, they were not the ones in control by any means and independence, albeit still being a platform of the party, began to fall on the back burner as the party gravitated to uplift other important policy platforms that would lead to its success in 2007. Thus, for the first decade or so following the creation of the Scottish Parliament, Keating’s sentiments revolving around plurinationalism and its effect on independence movements held true. As people identified with both Scotland and the United Kingdom, as British, along with devolution efforts being achieved, independence was not something, it would seem, that the nation would be seeking for quite some time.

2007 Scottish Elections

The 2007 Scottish Elections saw major improvements to the Scottish National Party as they gained twenty seats from the previous election cycle in 2003, which led the Parliament being a SNP minority. This was an unpredicted outcome. However, other smaller parties were falling into decline which led more voters to be drawn into the Scottish National Party (Carman,

2014). In 2007, a lot of voters as well were underwhelmed by the performance of the Labour

45 Party and were increasingly impressed with the Scottish National Party. What mattered most for voters during this election was their confidence in the party “to perform well within a Scottish government and be able to manage relations with Westminster in a way that defends Scottish interests” (Carman, 2014). Because it was perceived that the Labour Party had not been doing this effectively, they lost votes while the Scottish National Party gained them. There were more similarities between the campaigns than differences. However, the people of Scotland’s discontent with Labour’s performance in addition to their negative campaign juxtaposed with the

Scottish National Party’s positive one, drew people away from Labour and towards the National

Party (Carman, 2014). Thus, the concern for Scottish voters in this election had more to do with having a good and efficient government rather than interest in independence.

Interestingly enough, despite being the National Party, the Scottish National Party’s connection to independence in 2007 was being heavily diluted by its other policy platforms.

Independence was not its main policy platform by any means. Thus, it is not as though support for independence had increased exponentially during these times which caused for the party’s success. It is not as though the people of Scotland had shown that they wanted a revolutionary break from the United Kingdom either (Curtice, et al, 2009). Rather it was the combination of smaller parties in decline and the lack of pleasure in Labour’s performance that drove people towards the party. In fact, levels of support for independence were at a particular low when the

Scottish National Party gained control of the government, so it is evident that people were not voting for the party due to their stance on independence. Thus, the party’s favor ability was not something that could have been predicted some years prior, for example when Keating coined the term plurinationalism. However, as we will see in the coming sections, the Scottish National

Party’s support would only continue to grow from their success in 2007.

46 The 2011 Election

Something even more unprecedented happened in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary elections that was not predicted to take place. In 2007, the Scottish National Party held a minority government in the Scottish Parliament. In 2011, the party gained an absolute majority in the Scottish Parliament, something that was thought impossible to achieve because of the so- called Additional Member System1. However, a little over a decade after the creation of the

Scottish Parliament the Scottish National Party did the impossible. This is especially remarkable when considering the levels of the support the party held in the early years of the Scottish

Parliament. Thus, the questions follows, how was the Scottish National Party able to achieve this absolute majority?

One might expect that a factor that influenced the party’s success in 2011 would be rising trends in Scottish identification and support for independence. Surprisingly, however, the

Scottish National Party “increased its support across the entire spectrum, especially among those who see themselves as exclusively British” (Carman, 2014). It is evident here that despite being the nationalist party, voters in Scotland were not showing support for them based on that singular platform. The Scottish National Party wanted to change its image away “from simply being a party committed to independence to one that places greater emphasis on a broader appeal and to begin to represent the Scottish interests of concern to the whole electorate, regardless of constitutional preferences” (Carman, 2014). Thus, despite being the party of independence, that was not its only focus, nor even their main one any longer, and that helps explain its success in

2011.

1 In an Additional Member System, Voters receive two ballots. On the first, the voter votes for whom they wish to be the local Member of Parliament (MP). On the second, the voter votes for a party with published candidates of whom they would like to be MPs. This provides a more proportional Parliament and was presumed to not allow any one party to gain an absolute majority within the Parliament. (Additional Member System n.d.)

47 The Scottish National Party did not achieve higher levels of support from any one particular social group, but rather grew among all of them. The party maintained most of its supporters form the 2007 election and gained support from one in five who had voted for Labour in 2007 as well (Carman, 2014). It had become this type of ‘catch-all’ party as there was no singular definition of a Scottish National Party voter (Kirchheimer,1966). People were drawn to the party and their particularly positive campaign in 2011, as they had in 2007, against Labour’s rather negative campaign. In addition to that, the Scottish National Party was seen as the best party on a number of issues, except for one: managing relations with the government in

Westminster (Carman, 2014). The people of Scotland had faith in the Scottish National Party to be able to govern their nation well, but that does not mean that they aligned with the party’s constitutional preference of independence.

Despite support for the Scottish National Party doubling between the years of 2003 and

2011, the levels of support for independence within Scotland flatlined (Scottish Social Attitudes

Survey). While still maintaining independence as part of its platform, the Scottish National Party therefore tended to focus on other parts of their policy platform which placed them as the front runner of the election in 2011. However, because independence was part of their election manifesto and the party gained the position of being the absolute majority government in

Scottish Parliament, it had to be followed through with an independence referendum, as promised. This comes after many presumed, reasonably so, that independence would not be sought within the country for some years due to stagnating trends of national identity, with many identifying as both Scottish and British, alongside the creation of the Scottish Parliament to devolve some matters and competences to the Scottish people for them to govern. It was the

48 unprecedented levels of support for the Scottish National Party on matters other than independence that prompted the referendum to be held in 2014.

The 2014 Independence Referendum

The 2014 Independence Referendum is regarded by many as an accidental referendum based on the circumstances in which it came about (Carman, 2017). Neither the Scottish National

Party, nor any party for that matter, was supposed to be able to have an absolute majority within the Scottish Parliament, due to the Additional Members System. Having gained that unexpected majority, the Party had followed through with a referendum despite lacking any clear expression of dissatisfaction of the constitution at the time. Levels of support for independence were still much lower than they had been in previous decades, so there seemed little real reason for this referendum to have taken place. However, nonetheless, it did and although it did not succeed, with the ‘yes’ vote only receiving 45% of the total vote, the ‘yes’ campaign managed to round up a surprising amount of support for their cause (Scottish Independence Referendum: Results). So, despite the referendum being unsuccessful this time, the level of turnout in support of it should be noted and not taken lightly.

The heart of the case for independence rested on three main contentions; “first, the people of Scotland will always get the government we vote for; second, we will control our own resources and make our own decisions about our economy; and third, we can decide how we use our wealth to benefit all the people in our society” (Scottish Government, 2013). Essentially, the case for independence was that the people of Scotland would then determine how they want to be governed, rather than those at Westminster. It deemed Scotland as a distinct political unit with a distinct national identity that is able to flourish even without independent statehood (Carman,

2017). However, support for independence in the nation still only hovered around 30% before

49 the referendum took place, which is quite low to imagine actually being able to achieve independence. In addition to that, trends in national identity were not proving themselves to be favorable towards independence either. In 2012, only 23% of those identified solely as Scottish a fifteen-year low for the nation. When forced to choose an identity, 70% of the nation chose

Scottish, which is still a majority, but had not been at such a low level since 1990 (Scottish

Social Attitudes Survey).

The independence referendum in 2014 was essentially set up to fail. It happened accidentally, there was no real dissatisfaction with the constitution at the time, people were identifying as Scottish at stagnating rates, and levels of independence were at a particular low for recent years. In addition to that, the 2008-2009 economic crisis still left many weary of changing the status quo and facing economic repercussions. There was no clear definition of what independence would mean for the nation, nor did the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns “pitch radically different versions of Scotland’s future against each other” (Keating, 2017). It was rather a competition over what political scientists call valence issues, in which the goal is “largely agreed but parties compete on how best to get there” (Pattie and Johnston, 2008). With this is all being said though, the ‘yes’ campaign was able to achieve far more support than was anticipated in the referendum. Before it was announced, levels of support for independence were hanging low around 30%. The results of the referendum ended with 55% for the ‘no’ vote and 45% for the

‘yes’ vote. Despite not winning the majority it needed, the ‘yes’ campaign was still able to win many people over in support of independence which is striking given previous levels of support and the trends in national identity at the time. Despite the majority in Scotland holding ties to their British identity, many of them voted for independence for their nation. This means that seeking independence is still possible for plurinational nations, which Keating presumed not to

50 be true. Indeed, it may be that there are other factors to consider when presuming that movements towards independence will or will not happen among minority nations that are plurinational and how soon they will come about.

4. Discussion

It is evident that Michael Keating’s concept of plurinationalism holds true for the minority nation of Scotland within the United Kingdom as many within the nation feel both Scottish and

British still today. Put in the simplest terms, plurinationalism recognizes that people can occupy more than one national identity and that they do not need to be in opposition with one another

(Keating, 2001). Within Scotland, people identify both as Scottish and British to varying degrees, but both of those identities are present for the majority of those living in the nation.

Only a relatively small portion identify as solely Scottish and a small sliver only identify as

British, which is the anomaly. To this extent then, plurinationalism remains a valuable term in understanding the role of national identity within Scotland. However, Keating hypothesized that because a majority of Scotland hold ties with their British identity, the minority nation would not seek independence for quite some time from when his book was published in the early 2000s. He presumed that plurinationalism would affect independence movements by not making them necessary until years down the road for minority nations. However, this presumption did not hold true as Scotland held an independence referendum a little over a decade later in 2014. I argue that while Keating’s notion of plurinationalism is a strong and important concept, it ignores a number of things that encourage independence movements in plurinationalist societies, like the in the Scottish case to take place.

51 External Factors

First of all, there is always the potential for external factors to take place that push independence efforts to happen sooner than anticipated. In Scotland, the referendum of 2014 was essentially an accident. There was no clear reason for the nation to be seeking independence at the time, nor were there high levels of support for it in that particular year. However, because the

Scottish National Party had obtained an absolute majority in Scottish Parliament, they had to follow through with holding a referendum, despite most of its voters voting for the party for other reasons than its constitutional preference. This has no real relation to how many national identities one holds so Keating’s concept of plurinationalism could not have predicted this in

2001. It was a seemingly unprecedented event that could not have been predicted prior to its happening. In addition to that, it happened despite plurinational identities remaining within

Scotland. Trends in national identity did not change really much at all in the years preceding the referendum. It was too bold of a claim to presume that because the people of Scotland hold plurinational identities, an independence movement would not take place because, as we see in this circumstance, there are other external factors that can cause independence to be sought sooner than anticipated.

There are other external factors that can arise for independence movements to take place that Keating had not pondered. Despite the expectation that Scotland would not seek independence for quite some time, which was the general sentiment at the time, simply stating that because people in Scotland hold plurinational identities does not do enough to halt these movements. When things are looking amiss in the United Kingdom and the people of Scotland do not feel well-represented by those in Westminster, trends in national identity seem to favor the Scottish (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey). Thus, Keating could not have predicted the future

52 and determined that simply because the Scottish Parliament was created, those living in Scotland would be content with the status quo and it would not lead to independence for quite some time as he did. It is impossible to presume that. While the independence referendum of 2014 did happen at a time of no real discontent of the people of Scotland, this does not mean that that could not happen which would prompt higher levels of support for independence, which actually does happen a few years down the line which will be discussed later on in within this chapter.

Keating’s hypothesis, given the general sentiment of the time, is too bold and does not concern the potential probability of external circumstances influencing independence movements, only national identity.

Valence of the Moreno question

While national identity does play a major role in determining the prospects of an independence movement, it is not the end all and be all. Furthermore, while the concept of plurinationalism does indeed have some valence to it, there is a lot missing from the concept that would allow it to determine when independence movements may or may not take place as

Keating states. Intertwined with plurinationalism is the concept of the Moreno question. The

Moreno Question is a “self-identification scale expressed by citizens to clarify social mobilization in the quest for political autonomy” (Moreno, 1986). For example, in Scotland, as mentioned previously, when asked what one’s national identity is they would be given five options: 1) Scottish only 2) More Scottish than British 3) Equally Scottish and British 4) More

British than Scottish 5) British only. The Moreno question assumes that people who inhabit more than one national identity are dealing with identities which aren’t in conflict with one another.

While this self-identification scale is useful in many regards it also falls short on gaining a clear picture of national identity within nations. It provides evidence for the fact that people can hold

53 multiple identities, but not what will happen when those identities come into conflict in some way.

Moreover, the Moreno question gives a very broad idea of trends of national identity within a nation, but it is not specific enough. While three measures of the scale, using Scotland for example, Scottish not British, equally Scottish and British, British not Scottish, give us an exact understanding of where one stands with regard to their national identity, the other two fall short. There is no way to quantify what ‘more Scottish than British’ nor ‘more British than

Scottish’ looks like for unique individuals. For example, one could feel 99% Scottish and 1%

British and fall within this category alongside some who feels 51% Scottish and 49% British.

Thus, it is not the most reliable measure when making predictions such as Keating’s. An improvement that has been suggested is using an “identification question- belong to, identify with, think of yourself, feel attached to- alongside scales that rate the salience of the identification” (Guinjoan, et al, 2015). Such an improvement would make up for what the

Moreno question is lacking – understanding the true salience of these identities which is of particular important in the case of Scotland.

Using the Moreno question as a scale, for the past few decades, those identifying as more

Scottish than British has hovered around one third. One does not get a clear picture of what that truly looks like when being more Scottish can range anywhere from 51% Scottish to 99%

Scottish. Thus, basing claims of national identity and its effect on whether the nation will hold an independence movement in the near future cannot be seen as legitimate as it is not a strong enough measure. This does not refute the concept of plurinationalism itself, but rather claims that it cannot be used to determine when independence movements will be held. In addition to that, the Moreno question does not signify why people hold these claims to the national identities that

54 they do. Thus, some may hold ties to a British identity that may no longer be relevant in the context of an independence movement. For example, they may feel British simply because they live in the United Kingdom and nothing else. It is not a strong enough tie to prevent someone from seeking independence. This may not be true for everyone, but there is no way to know given the Moreno question.

Ideas surrounding national identity and its true effect on independence movements is also particularly relevant in Scotland’s case. As mentioned in the previous section, the independence referendum took place in Scotland at a time with no real, pressing discontent over constitutional preferences. In addition to that, trends in national identity were not migrating further to a

‘Scottish only’ identity. In fact, in 2012, those choosing a ‘Scottish identity only’ was at a fifteen-year low (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey). Levels of support for independence were also at a particular low for the time. This seems to play into Keating’s presumption that an independence movement was not likely to happen soon in Scotland. However, because of the

‘accidental’ referendum, the people of Scotland were allowed to vote on the matter and despite levels of support hanging stagnant at around 30%, around 45% of voters showed out in support for independence in 2014. Although that wasn’t enough for independence to be achieved, it was still a relatively close vote given previous levels of support and the fact that the majority of

Scotland still held at least some ties to their British identity. Thus, this discredits Keating’s claims even further as even though around 20% of the electorate did not hold ties to a British identity, a further 25% of those who did, voted for independence. There is not a clear correlation between the two, at least not one significant enough to presume that independence movements would not take place because of it.

55 5. Conclusion

Provided in this chapter was a more in-depth overview of Scotland’s history within the

United Kingdom as well as their national party. It is clear that there has always been a strong sense of Scottishness within the nation, allowed by the lack of real integration following the Act of the Union in 1707. Even under the sovereign state of the United Kingdom, Scotland has always been seen as possessing its own distinct sphere of life. In addition to that, despite nationalist trends ebbing and flowing throughout its history, they have always been at least present in Scotland. Thus, when taking into consideration that, external factors that could speed up a nation’s track towards independence, and the unconvincing effect of plurinational identities on independence movements, it is hard to claim when a nation will or will not seek independence as things are constantly evolving and fluctuating. Once again, this is not to say that plurinational identities do not exist or that there is not value behind the term of plurinationalism, but rather that it cannot be used to determine the timeline of independence movements as exemplified by

Scotland.

Although the 2014 independence referendum, which was specifically focused on in this chapter, came about in an unpredictable manner due to the Scottish National Party gaining that absolute majority in Scottish Parliament, it does not mean that if this had not happened independence then would not have been sought after for quite some time. Events within the past few years have made talks of another independence referendum happening much sooner and more prevalent than would have been anticipated following the one in 2014. Unlike in 2014, there is growing discontent in the nation due to matters going on in Westminster. In simplest terms, Brexit may be the cause of Scotland leaving the Union at accelerated speeds. This is due to the fact that although the United Kingdom as a whole decided to leave the European Union

56 with 51.9%, those in Scotland voted by a decent majority to remain part of the European Union as 62% of the electorate wished to remain (Results and Turnout at the EU Referendum). This may have consequences on how the nation wishes to proceed within the United Kingdom as once again the nations views are different than that of the country. So even if the independence referendum had not taken place in 2014, independence still may have been sought much sooner than Keating would have anticipated due to a changing political environment and climate that could not have been predicted nor anticipated in the early 2000s. Thus, it was too bold of a claim to make as Keating did.

It will be interesting and worth noting to see what path Scotland winds down in the coming years with relation to seeking independence, if it will be truly sought after all, or if other options will be made available to the minority nation with relation to their constitutional preference. As we now know, the 2014 referendum turned out a great deal of voters for the ‘yes’ vote, in support for independence, even when there was no real discontent with the government of the time that it took place. Now, there is cause for discontent for the people of Scotland with the government at Westminster because a majority within the nation of Scotland wished to remain within the European Union. Thus, perhaps the odds will be in the nationalists favor the second time around. In Scotland’s case, the effect that Keating presumed plurinationalism would have on independence movements did not happen for a number of reasons. While plurinationalism remains a concept applicable to the nation, it did not stop Scotland from having an independence referendum a little over a decade after Keating coined the term and made his hypothesis that they would not do so for decades down the line. The next chapter will look at

Catalonia and the independence movement that has taken place within the nation. Albeit

57 different in many ways than Scotland, there are similarities between the two minority nations and how the concept of plurinationalism can and cannot be applied.

58 Chapter IV. Catalonia, A Case Study

As seen in the last chapter, Keating’s concept of plurinationalism did not have the expected effect on the independence movement in Scotland. While plurinationalism is still present within the nation, it did not slow down the process of seeking independence. Something similar developed in Catalonia as well, albeit for different reasons. In this chapter, as in the previous one on Scotland, I will be analyzing what led the Catalan independence movement to gain traction in the 2010s and why, despite many Catalans identifying as both Spanish and

Catalan, their plurinational identities did not slow down the momentum of the nation seeking independence. I begin by providing a history of Catalonia and how it became part of the Spanish state. Next, I discuss the Franco dictatorship that plagued Spain from the 1930s through the

1970s and how Catalan identity survived despite harsh efforts by the state to repress it. I will then look at the creation of democracy within Spain and the initial satisfaction with its role as a relatively autonomous community within a democratizing Spain. But in the years following the new millennium, the Spanish state’s unwillingness to cooperate with the Catalans led to growing discontentment with the nation and greater support for independence. Beginning with a brief history of Catalonia’s history within Spain helps us understand the relation between the two throughout the past few centuries. It sets the stage to grasp the importance of the Catalan national identity within the nation and makes the case clearer as to how they came to a place of seeking independence in the 2010s. Finally, a discussion will then follow where I will explain that while this concept of plurinationalism applies to the nation of Catalonia, it cannot be used as a sole determinant of whether an independence movement will take place in the near future or not as there are many other socioeconomic and political factors that can speed this process along.

59 As will be seen in this chapter, there are many similarities, as well as differences, between the Scottish and Catalan independence movements. Nevertheless, in both cases, while the concept of plurinationalism was and still is applicable, it did not have its expected effect on their independence movements, as both the nations held independence referendums less than two decades later. Thus, it is clear that while plurinationalism has some explanatory power it does not affect independence movements as it was presumed it would.

1. History of Catalonia within Spain

Formation of Catalonia within Spain

Like Scotland, Catalonia was an independent state before merging into a larger political unit. Catalonia became part of Spain in 1492 with the marriage of King Ferdinand of Aragon and Queen Isabella of Castile. The nation had been an independent territory historically dating as far back as 900 AD. Even following the marriage of the King and Queen, Catalonia maintained much of its autonomy for a couple centuries. However, when it was feared that there was creeping Castilian power in their territory the Catalans revolted in 1640 which led to a period of unrest until 1652 when the peace was restored, albeit under a Spanish monarchy that stripped

Catalonia of much of its autonomy (Rodriguez 2020).

In 1701, the War of the Spanish Succession began with Catalonia voicing their support for the Archduke Charles against the Bourbon dynasty within Spain. Then, in 1714, when the

Bourbon dynasty regained the throne, the Catalans formally lost their autonomy. This defeat in

1714 led to the “emergence in Catalonia of its of resistance to Bourbon domination” (Dowling 2018, 8). It led to the stationing of 6,000 troops in Barcelona alone and another 20,000 in Catalonia with “repression of the region’s linguistic and cultural heritage”

(Dowling 2019). So, it is evident that there has been a long history of Catalonia and its

60 noncompliance within the Spanish state. The traditional rights and privileges that Catalonia had maintained since the Middle Ages were now gone. With this loss of the nation’s administrative autonomy, Dowling notes that it was “subordinated to the wider Spanish polity though the

Catalan legal system remained intact until the late 1870s” (2018, 10). Like Scotland, there were some aspects of society that remained Catalan, while others were then relegated to the Spanish state.

This history of Catalonia within the Spanish state is important to grasp because it gives one an understanding of the long, historical conflicts between the larger state and the minority nation. Within Catalonia, there was a clear, differentiated political autonomy from the Crown of

Aragon. While the Crown of Aragon was ruled under a monarchy and Catalonia was united with it under that same King, they still had a great deal of autonomy. Catalonia had its own laws, tax structure, and Parliament, or cortes. There also was a literary language of Catalan in existence since the Middle Ages that differs from that of Castile. The Catalan language is of the romance languages that originated in the ninth century in the Pyrenees Mountains between Spain and

France. In addition to that, there is the existence of a common body of ideas, beliefs, practices, norms, etc., like speaking their own language, having traditions and holidays that are distinct and still relevant today to the people of Catalonia (Llobera 2004). This continual separation of

Catalonia and Spain that has been evident for centuries, as well as a strong sense of what it means to be Catalan with cultural markers, is necessary to understand how an independence movement was able to happen centuries following when the nations were combined under the same Crown of Aragon in 1492.

61 Early 1900s: Pre-Franco Dictatorship

“In contrast to the centralized monarchy of Britain, with similarities in its multinational dynamic, Spain’s trajectory from the early modern period was one of decline” (Dowling 2018,

8). Though it very much wanted to, the Spanish state did not have the means to effectively homogenize or integrate the multiple minority nations living within the sovereign state which was already weak and insufficient (Llobera 2004). One of its many problems is noted as the state’s treatment of its national minorities. There were various attempts to solve this, but “the state was too weak to implement a lasting, effective policy” (Guibernau 2004, 49). Spain had neither the “financial nor the administrative machinery to enforce the cultural and linguistic homogenization of the country” as other countries were able to (Llobera 2004, 17). In addition to that, the country had increasingly low literacy rates thus it was hard to impose a unitary culture nor single language.

Because of its inability to homogenize the state, minority nations within Spain were able to sustain their national identities, such as Catalan in Catalonia. Before the dictatorship of

Francisco Franco, migrants arriving in Catalonia were assimilated both culturally and linguistically as Catalan. They were taught the language and Catalan cultural traditions, that were similar but different enough that separated them from a Spanish identity. There was also a strong

Catalan national church which aided in defending the language and culture. Thus, with the lack of the Spanish state imposing its own national identity and cultural markers on the Catalans, their identity flourished and was not hindered in any sense in the early 1900s. It allowed for Catalan society to be “relatively modernized and socially advanced” and maintain “a stronger bourgeois sector than in any other area in Spain” (Dowling 2018, 15).

62 Within this time period, the first Catalan separatist political party came into view in 1922.

There had been others before this, but this was the first one with any real political significance.

Founded by Fransesc Macia, the party was called Estat Catalat. The party was formed in response to General Primo de Rivera’s regime and the monarchy in Spain which had banned separatist movements at the time. General Primo de Rivera, who eventually became a dictator of

Spain, wanted to restore the nation and by doing so, wanted to rid Spain of any minority national identities that may threaten the state. Hence, the creation of the Estat Catalat. The parties first big win was in 1931 within local elections. Macia used this win to declare Catalonia “a free republic which he hoped would become part of a Spanish confederation… but was later forced to settle for autonomy” (Crameri 2014, 14). Later on, he would go even further to claim Catalonia as a state within the federal republic of Spain which eventually led to his imprisonment during the

Franco dictatorship. It was Spain’s lack of authority and real grasp on its own state that allowed for the Catalan identity to flourish for quite some time. However, this weak and insufficient state is also what prompted the Spanish Civil War in 1936 that led to the dictatorship of Francisco

Franco for over two decades and the harsh repression of any minority national identities, including Catalan.

During the Franco Dictatorship

During the period of the Franco dictatorship, there was the first real sustained and very repressive burst of nation-building within Spain, something that the state had previously lacked the ability to provide (Llobera 2004). Franco’s harsh repression of any national identity other than Spanish led many to believe that the Catalan identity would disappear during this time.

Indeed, Catalan autonomy was one of the main causes of the Spanish Civil War. Franco’s victory led to a savage suppression of the Catalan identity (Greer 2007). However, the “Franco regime’s

63 policies of cultural and linguistic oppression unintentionally strengthened the collective identities of Basque, Catalan, and other regional groups within the Spanish polity” (Dowling 2018, 17).

This harsh oppression of any minority national identity meant that in order for people to sustain their identity, it had to be done within the private sphere.

Catalan identity was able to maintain itself during the dictatorship of Franco because it was preserved by families within the private sphere. “Catalan identity was preserved thanks to the dynamic and engaged action of a very small intellectual elite, but above all thanks to family circles within which Catalan was spoken and the most traditional and popular Catalan culture was maintained” (Guibernau 2004, 52). During this time, most people of Catalonia became bilingual as Castilian (Spanish), was the only language used for education, administration, and by the media. It was by keeping the Catalan identity and language present within the family that allowed for the identity to survive whilst there were many odds up against it. There were also symbolic actions that Catalans took to ensure that people knew that their identity was alive and well. Catalan flags were hung around the nation and graffiti was painted in public areas showcasing Catalan cultural markers. It was evident that despite harsh repression, Catalans did what they could to ensure that the Catalan identity would not be erased and forgotten under a homogenized Spanish state.

“The Francoist attempt at crushing of the Catalan identity led rather to it being more deeply rooted and politically powerful than was the case in 1936” (Dowling 2018, 23) Catalonia has a long history of noncompliance within the Spanish state and it is not surprising to see that they found ways to continue their Catalan traditions, language, and cultural markers within both the private sphere among families and public sphere through hanging flags and displaying

64 political graffiti. It was these actions that affected the years following the Franco dictatorship to the creation of a Spanish democracy and the Constitution that was created in 1978.

Post Franco - Leading to Spanish Democracy

Despite the dictatorship not officially ending until the middle of the 1970s, with Franco’s death in 1975, the harsh oppression of the regime began to give way in the 1960s. “Catalan cultural revival rapidly expanded in the 1960s, taking advantage of a booming economy and the gradual abandonment of the harsh repression of culture on the part of the regime” (Greer 2007,

96). For a long period of time, there was a sense of separation between Catalonia and the Spanish state due to the uneven development that took place. However, by the late 1960s the “gap between Catalonia and advanced areas in Spain had greatly narrowed” (Dowling 2012, 94) The ability of the Catalan national identity to persist during the regime along with the development of

Catalonia as a nation in the 1960s affected the way that Spain handled the nation post-Franco.

However, “The general sense of Catalanism that existed after the Franco regime [is described] as

‘non-specific, but very heartfelt” (Lores 1985, 60). This lack of specificity was not surprising given that political expressions of Catalanism had been banned for several decades, while cultural expressions were severely limited in their cope because of restrictions on the public use and institutional promotion of Catalan language.

In the early 1970s, preceding Franco’s death, the Assemblea, otherwise known as the

Assembly of Catalonia, was created. This was known as the “broadest and most unitary” Catalan movement since the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s (Guibernau 2004, 66). Their goals included receiving general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles as well as the upholding of fundamental democratic rights. Their motto was “freedom, amnesty, and statute of autonomy.”

The Assemblea as Dowling states, “would ensure that the meeting of Catalan demands became a

65 state priority in the post-Franco era. It was a tribute to the vitality of Catalan civil society, which had been reconstructed during the course of the 1960s. It also appeared to resolve divisions within the Catalan opposition that dated from the Civil War and its immediate aftermath and that had endured until the 1960s” (Dowling 2012, 96) This was vital and played an important role in what the future of Catalonia would look like following the Franco dictatorship. Because of the harsh hostility of Franco to Catalan nationalism, the “incipient Catalan political class was more united in its aims post-Franco than in other parts of the Spanish state” (2012, 99).

Franco died on November 20th, 1975, ending the long period of repression of minority nations within Spain. However, it was unclear what would be next for the nation. It was not at all evident that there would be a transition to democracy for the country, nor that it would “remain whole, that it would grant autonomy to its component nations, or that it would retain a similar state structure” (Greer 2007, 99). However, the people of Catalonia made it known that they would have a say in what that future looked like. In 1976, a year following Franco’s death and two years before the Spanish Constitution was ratified, there was a demonstration at the

Assemblea on September 11th that made clear of the strength of the Catalan people and how they would need to be included to move any progress towards a transition to democracy possible

(Crameri 2014). “It made clear that the regime would need to negotiate Catalan autonomy to make the transition continue since there were clearly well organized and popular Catalan forces organizing such displays” (Greer 2007, 100). This demonstration also improved morale within

Catalonia and solidified a strong sense of Catalan identity. This was the second demonstration that year which showcased the strength of the Catalan nation and their ability of popular mobilization. The first one took place on February 1st which amassed over 75,000 in Barcelona calling for amnesty for political prisoners (Greer 2007, 101).

66 The Spanish Constitution went into effect at the end of December in 1978, three years following the death of Franco. This re-established the Catalan Parliament, otherwise known as the Generalitat, in Barcelona. The second article of the Constitution addresses the minority nations within Spain specifically. It states that,

the Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common and

indivisible country of all Spaniards; it recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of

the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the amongst them all

(The Spanish Constitution 1978).

This strictly defines Catalonia as a demos of Spain, that is, it is not described as a nation as

Scotland is within the United Kingdom. It also did make Catalan an official language of

Catalonia, along with Spanish. Thus, the Generalitat “would promote Catalan, and had legal cover to do so, but could not tread upon the right to speak Spanish” (Greer 2007, 111). The

Constitution clearly outlined the role of Catalonia within Spain as well as the limits of what it could and could not do. In this case, it was forbidden for Catalonia to seek independence as it was part of the Spanish state which is “indissoluble.” In order for Catalonia to be independent, changes to the Spanish constitution would need to be made.

The Constitution, while still leaving most matters of the State to be very centralized, gave some powers to the autonomous communities, like Catalonia.

It was strongly geared towards devolving autonomy downwards but did not give a

significant role to autonomous communities in state politics. Regional administrations

were created and awarded powers, but the territorial infrastructure of the central state

remained intact. This shaped the debate afterward: there could be no frontal attack on the

state structure, Spain-wide civil service corps would remain intact and autonomous

67 communities would be able to shape their territorial organization as they pleased (Greer

2007, 109).

. The goal of this was to “balance citizenship rights and the interests of the central state with the autonomy of the autonomous communities through a system of majority laws, known, depending on constitutional type and function” (Greer 2007, 109). The Basque Country and Catalonia were the two autonomous communities that received the most competencies. However, the Basque

Country had the “Concierto Economico” which provided them with more power and say over their economy and financial ties, having to do with taxation, to the Spanish state. This is something that Catalonia would also seek from the Spanish state in the years to come, but without success.

The Constitution of 1978 seemed to be sufficient for Catalonia and the other autonomous communities at the time.

There is no doubt that during the process of drafting the Spanish constitution of 1978,

there was no intention of creating the generalized system of autonomy that eventually

resulted… The initial aim was to solve the specific problem of the Basque and Catalan

demands for a degree of self-rule, but what actually resulted was a complete

regionalization of Spain… It was assumed that reversing Francois centralization was the

key to solving the problem of Basque and Catalan alienation. What was missing was an

understanding that Basque and Catalan identity were ‘historical realities springing from

long processes of consolidation and reinforcement of their own personality or

differentiated cultural identity.’ Since Basque and Catalan nationalism were not simply

products of Spain’s centralizing tendencies, they would not disappear as a result of

decentralization (Crameri, 2014, 61).

68 These minority nations, while sufficient with the Constitution at the time, would not be content forever with only the decentralized matters given to them. As will be seen once entering the

2000s, there would be growing discontent, specifically in Catalonia, about the lack of power they have over certain competencies they wish to be devolved to the autonomous community.

It was Catalonia’s regional organizations, an “old, dense, and distinctive web, [that] had survived Franco because they were the texture of social life and political economy in Catalonia”

(Greer 2007, 113). Thus, once the dictatorship was over it meant that there was “a pool of resources available to defend their autonomy and build a more stable environment for them.”

This is exactly what happened, and Catalonia was able to receive some powers in the transition to democracy in 1978. Catalonia, as a nation, was a strong one and had the strength of its people to fight for what it wants. However, at this time, this want was not to be a separate entity from the Spanish state. The nation deemed being an autonomous community with devolved powers to be sufficient at that time. “Independence from Spain remained a minority strand and the focus became above all that of building a strong autonomous reality. Post-Franco Catalan nationalism sought to build the greatest level of autonomy possible without producing a rupture with Spain”

(Dowling 2012, 123). In the next section, the time period following the ratification of the

Spanish Constitution will be analyzed through to the early 2000s when Keating coined his term plurinationalism and presumed that Catalonia would not seek independence in the near future.

2. Early Democracy in Spain

In the early decades of democracy in Spain, following the ratification of the Constitution,

Catalonia seemed to hold a solid place within the sovereign Spanish state as the “original process of devolution was generally expected to stabilize with Catalonia, the Basque Country, and

Galicia at the highest level of autonomy” (Greer 2007, 119). The nationalist party, Convergencía

69 i Unío, a coalition of two other constituent parties – Convergencía Democrática de Catalunya

(CDC) and Unió Democrática de Catalunya (UDC) – thrived between the years 1980 and 2000.

The party’s leader, Jordi Pujol, stated on April 22nd, 1980, that “if there is one objective tip that a

Catalan government has to prioritize it is the defense, strengthening and projection of those things that mean that, down the centuries, Catalonia has been Catalonia: its language, its culture, the experience of its history, sentiment in the collective consciousness, the defense of its political rights, the will to be” (Pujol, 2011). This was what allowed the Catalan identity to be able to flourish during these times of harsh repression from the state. However, the coalition of the two parties were not advocating for independence at this time, unlike was the case in the Basque

Country, another autonomous community of Spain. The Basque Country had a large faction fighting for independence, especially during this time when ETA, a deemed terrorist and separatist group, was openly advocating for independence from Spain. It was never the

Catalan’s party aim to be a secessionist party or advocate for such. The only party at this time that was advocating for independence was the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC). They wanted to “achieve independence within the European Union through peaceful and democratic means” (Guibernau 2004, 88). However, independence was not the top priority of the party, despite being an advocate for it as the “vast majority of Catalans did not spouse separatist views at this time” (Crameri 2014, 14). After going through such a harsh period of repression of their identity, Catalans accepted their place in the Spanish state where they could still openly identify with the minority nation without the fear of potential repercussions.

Convergència i Unió was able to maintain its position in power for two decades due to their relations with both regional organizations as well as Catalan nationalists.

70 The ability of the Catalan leaders to aggregate and direct Catalan political resources was

crucial in expanding their ability to negotiate or compel a given outcome… CiU did this by

allying within Catalan regional organizations to win autonomy for them via the Generalitat,

while using the constant increase in competencies to rally nationalists who would otherwise

support more secessionist parties (Greer 2007, 119).

It was this dual backing of both regional organizations and Catalan nationalists that provided support for the party. CiU did not have to support independence as long as they were still providing and gaining more competencies that the nation could have rule over. This worked for a while within the party, until it didn’t.

As the years crept closer to the 2000s, there was growing discontent among Catalan nationalists and Convergència i Unió. “When the strategies born of the 1980 conjecture had ceased to produce the new competencies that nationalists wanted but had satisfied regional organizations that now only wanted stability,” stuck CiU in the middle of a rock and a hard place

(Greer 2007, 118). CiU had granted the regional elites all the competencies and autonomy that they had wished for, but the Catalan nationalists wanted more. Any decision the party made was going to upset one half of their supporters as regional elites that moved the party in a certain direction was satisfied with the level of autonomy the party was able to gain for the nation.

However, others, more specifically the Catalan nationalists, were displeased with the direction that Catalonia was headed within the state. The financial settlement that Spain had agreed upon with Catalonia left the Catalan Parliament, Generalitat, with a “relatively small budget and limited capacity to increase its own funding while Catalonia systematically funded the rest of

Spain by contributing more income tax than it received” (Greer 2007, 133). Along with this, after

1987 Catalonia began to receive lower levels of state spending. In addition to that, while it had

71 the second highest GDP in the state in 1983, that was slowly slipping as well. “CiU was trapped, part of its support came from its nationalist credentials, and those had been reinforced for over a decade by its ability to bring back new competencies. But now it could not seek greater economic or administrative powers without creating coalitions of centrally resourced independence organizations and the state against it, and it lacked the support of regional elites to win greater powers than the Generalitat already had” (Greer 2007, 135). While still not advocating for independence, the party had decisions to make on which direction it would go in and which of its supporters it would please.

While the early years of democracy in Spain saw high levels of content among the people of

Catalonia within the Spanish state, this was short lived once the nation’s nationalist party began to stop gaining new competencies, displeasing half of their party. While Catalans were not openly seeking independence, there definitely was a desire for further autonomy within the nation under the Spanish state. However, given all of this, the percentage of those feeling exclusively Catalan within the nation remained rather low throughout the 1990s, never rising above 20% and staying closer to 10% (ICPS Polls). While there was discontent among the people living in Catalonia with the Spanish state, the vast majority of them still identified to some degree as Spanish along with Catalan. Levels of independence also were quite low during that decade, remaining at around 20% throughout the years with the preferred option for most being an autonomous community within Spain with more competences. Thus, it was clear why

Keating assumed that due to Catalonia being a plurinational nation, with levels of support for independence remaining stagnant at 20%, the nation would not seek independence any time in the near future. However, we will see in the following section that this stance changed quite

72 rapidly in Catalonia as discontent began to grow quickly in the nation among the Catalan people due to the actions of the Spanish state.

3. Post 2000s

Statute of Autonomy (Estatut)

By the year 2000, there was a large number of people within Catalonia that were increasingly becoming discontent with the Spanish state. “It was hard to find visible traces of the Spanish state on the streets of Barcelona; despite the importance of the Spanish central state in issues such as taxation and social security, the aspects of government that out civil servants on the street were overwhelmingly Catalan” (Greer 2007, 181). Thus, to try and amend the relations between Catalonia and the Spanish state a Statute of Autonomy, or Estatut, was crafted during the years 2005 and 2006 to address some of the concerns of the Catalan people. This came about after Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero was running for Prime Minister of Spain as part of the

Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party in 2004. He announced that if he won the election, all of

Spain’s autonomous communities would be invited to update their status of autonomy. However, this was simply a ploy to gain Catalan votes as he apparently promised to “accept whatever might be contained in any statute passed by the Catalan parliament, although he subsequently denied that this was an unconditional promise” (Crameri 2014, 39). When Zapatero won the election later that year, the Catalan Parliament then began drafting their Statute of Autonomy which they presumed would be a hopeful solution to at least some of the discontent within the nation.

Zapatero and the Catalan parties worked together to approve a Statute that would be accepted by the Spanish government. Thus, a lot of the concerns that the people of Catalonia had were not addressed by the “watered-down” version of the statute in 2006. For example, “an

73 article in which it was stated that Catalonia was a nation was replaced by a much vaguer statement in the preamble that had no legal force, to the effect that Catalans consider Catalonia a nation” (Crameri 2014, 39). However, the Statute that was approved in 2006 still contained substantial new powers for Catalonia. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya would not accept the revised statute and when it was put to a referendum for the Catalan people to approve, there were very low levels of voter turnout and many people abstained. The Statute received enough support to be approved, but there were higher expectations for voter turnout. In addition to that, despite being approved, there were challenges to it presented by the Partido Popular, Spain’s

Conservative party, which questioned its constitutionality.

The Statute was supposed to seek remedy for some of the growing discontent in Catalonia, however, it only seemed to prompt it further. The process of negotiation of the Statute led to a lot of Anti-Catalan sentiment within Spain. It also produced further frustration and apathy among

Catalan voters who were “tired of witnessing so much political maneuvering for such little results” (Crameri 2014, 40). This was heightened even more so as the Spanish Constitutional

Courts took years to decide the constitutionality of the Statue. The Partido Popular, challenged

128 of the Statute’s 223 articles which took four years to resolve. The sentence was finally released in June of 2010 and the Courts only found 14 articles to be unconstitutional and ordered the reinterpretation of 27. The reference to Catalonia as a nation was left untouched, but it was stressed that because it was in the preamble, it had no “legal effect and Spain was the only nation recognized by the Constitution” (Crameri 2014, 44). By this point though, it was clear that the

Statute of Autonomy was not going to remedy the relation between the people of Catalonia and

Spain.

74 Along with the heightened frustration at the inability of the Spanish government and

Courts to provide a decision on an already deemed ineffective Statute of Autonomy, the situation in Catalonia was made worse with the 2008 Economic Crisis. Catalonia for a long time had been seeking to collect their own taxes and pay an agreed proportion to the state, as the Basque

Country was allowed to do. Catalonia does not have this fiscal autonomy, yet they “hand over more in taxes than the amount of taxes received back in services and investment” (Gillespie

2020), a sure recipe for social discontent. Then, with the 2008 economic crisis, the autonomous communities were the preferred targets for cuts in public spending and they were forced to take drastic measures to reduce their deficits. The people of Catalonia were angered by the need to ask Spain for extra funds to support the provision of basic services when Catalonia had long been a net contributor to Spanish coffers (Crameri 2014, 46).

With the lack of the state’s ability to help the nation during the economic crisis and its inability to make a decision on the Statute of Autonomy in a timely manner, most Catalans were fed up before the sentence was even released in 2010.

The decision of the Spanish Supreme Court concerning the Statute of Autonomy has been

portrayed as a rejection of the Catalan voice, which had been passed in the parliament

and subsequently supported in a referendum… The Catalan independence narrative has

thus created a binary choice in the political firmament: in or out of Spain… This is that

Catalans have tried to build Spain and have tried to work with Spain, but it is Spain that

has rejected these Catalan wishes and has broken the consensus, leaving Catalonia with

no alternative to separation (Dowling 2018, 107).

This decision on the Statute of Autonomy was the breaking point however for most Catalans as they realized they could no longer work within the Spanish state. It was an affront to their

75 collective identity. Thus, achieving further autonomy was no longer the goal. Many Catalans understood that the only way for Catalonia to reach its fullest potential was as its own independent state.

Following the Decision of the Statute of Autonomy

Some unofficial, local referenda began to take place within Catalonia regarding the question of independence after the decision was made regarding the Statute of Autonomy

(Gillespie 2020, 115). Then, in 2011, there was an unprecedented victory led by Convergència i

Unió and Xavier Trias became the mayor of Barcelona. This demonstrated the “availability of support in the capital for more unequivocally Catalanist political alternatives, free of affiliations with Spain'' (Gillespie 2020, 11). Also, this year, the Generalitat commissioned a cross-party study of a potential new financial model that was based on the Basque Country’s Concierto

Economico (Crameri 2014, 47). However, this was quickly rejected by Mariano Rajoy, the Prime

Minister of Spain at the time and member of Partido Popular, citing its unconstitutionality. It was evident that the tension between Catalonia and Spain was not going to be resolved. The distinct separation of the two were made succinct in this period.

It is also important to note that Catalonia, and Barcelona specifically, has a long history of “radical protest and cultural creativity” (Gillespie 2020, 5). This can be noted back to the

Spanish civil war when the people of Catalonia protested against the harsh repression of their identity and found ways through graffiti and cultural markers to make it known that the Catalan identity was persisting. A widespread protest movement broke out in 2011, called the 15-M

Movement, led by the Indignados, a group of activists against the austerity of Spain. Their demands included

76 electoral reform (to strengthen proportional representation and develop new channels for

citizen participation), total political transparency (to combat corruption), and effective

separation of powers in the creation of citizens control mechanisms, designed to ensure

political responsibility and representativeness (Gillespie 2020, 10).

Catalonia was portrayed as a victim of financial injustice through the slogan “Espanya ens roba” or “Spain is robbing us.” Civil pro-independence groups, Assemblea Nacional Catalan and

Omnium Cultural among others, were behind a lot of these protests and leading the efforts towards independence in Catalonia. It was not necessarily the political parties mobilizing the people, but civil organizations doing a lot of the work.

In May 2012, there was a motorway toll booth strike in Catalonia that was part of a growing movement towards independence. This demonstration was to show that Catalonia would be materially better off if they had their own state (Crameri 2014, 1). Then, on September 11th of that same year, there was a demonstration of 1.5 million people in the streets of Barcelona celebrating National Day of Catalonia, otherwise known as Diada. For reference, the population of Catalonia alone was around 7.5 million in 2011, which means that around 20% of those living in Catalonia showed up to the demonstration. This was “designed to constitute an unequivocal call for Catalonia’s politicians to start a process of secession” and that anyone who participated would be counted as a supporter of independence (Crameri 2014, 48). Between June and

November of 2012, support for independence within Catalonia had risen from 34% to 44.3%

(Garcia 2018). It was clear that the people of Catalonia were ready for a change and that the

Spanish state would not be the ones providing it to them. “A large segment of the Catalan public was prepared to take the extraordinary risk of moving towards independence even though the party in power had not directly encouraged such a bold step” (Crameri 2014, 49).

77 A strong sense was emerging that only Catalonia as a sovereign state can repair the damage done to the Catalan national community. Convergència i Unió, finally declared support for independence in 2012 as a result of “the impossibility of accommodating Catalan self- government demands within the Spanish state” (Marti 2013). After once again asking for fiscal autonomy and Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy shutting that down for a second time, Artur Más, leader of the CiU, called for a snap election on November 25th and if CiU were to lead the next

Catalan government they would deliver a referendum on self-determination. There was high turnout in the election due to the salience of the independence debate and CiU won the election with 30% of the vote granting them the most seats in the Parliament out of any party. Thus, an unofficial referendum took place in 2014.

The people of Catalonia – one of Europe’s oldest nations – want and deserve the

opportunity to decide for themselves whether to become a new state within Europe. The

Majority of Catalonia’s citizens have made clear, in elections and public demonstrations,

that they want to vote for their own future. A million and a half men, women, and

children took to the streets last September, joining hands to symbolize their solidarity and

freedom. No true democrat can ignore or deny the power of that popular will (Duerr

2015, 108).

The referendum took place on November 9th with a turnout of about 37% of the electorate with

80% voting in favor of independence (Dowling 2018, 115). However, this is not to say that there weren’t anti-independence sentiments as well as protests during this time as well. Those who did not support the referendum worried about Catalonia’s position within the EU and wished for more autonomy, but because they still felt Spanish, they did not want to be completely separate.

Anti-independence supporters have stated that “Spain isn’t up for discussion; Spain is to be

78 defended at all costs.” Pro-union marches proceeded with the slogan “for coexistence, democracy, and Catalonia. Enough!” (Burgen 2019). Through this lens, anti-independence supporters, or pro-unionists, are calling for democracy by staying part of Spain and citing the illegality of the referendum themselves. Pro-independence supporters, on the other hand, are calling upon their democratic right to vote in a referendum on independence. Although this was an unofficial referendum, it succeeded in providing future opportunities for supporters of Catalan independence. The referendum showcased the “democratic purity” of the Catalan independence movement which was promoted on the mere basis of Catalonia’s “right to decide” (Crameri

2014, 69).

In 2015, all of Catalonia’s nationalist parties voiced support for independence and added that as part of their parties’ platforms (Barrio and Field 2018). This comes less than two decades after only one of the national parties, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, openly advocated for independence. The results of the Catalan regional elections in 2015 also showcased that almost half of the Catalan population supported independence. Support for independence just ten years previously had been at 13.6% (Crameri 2014, 15). However, national identity remains in

Catalonia to still be split as many still share aspects of their Spanish identity, although this is decreasing slowly with more people beginning to solely identify as Catalan. In 2017, Catalonia held a second referendum that was deemed illegal and unconstitutional by the Spanish Courts which then led to many political actors and activists within the nation to be exiled or imprisoned by the Spanish state. There has been wide civil unrest and riots within Catalonia due to this alongside the Spanish state’s unwillingness to recognize the results. 43% of the electorate had turned out to vote in the referendum and 92% had voted in favor of independence, showing an increase from the referendum that was held in 2014 (Generalitat 2017). However, due to that

79 second article of the Spanish Constitution which describes the Spanish state as “indissoluble,”

Catalonia cannot legally become independent without an amendment being made to the

Constitution which the Spanish state is unwilling to do.

All of these events took place less than two decades after Keating claimed that because

Catalonia is plurinational and people within the nation identify as both Spanish and Catalan, albeit to differing degrees, independence will not be sought in the near future. This was clearly not the case. Like the Scottish independence movement, the Catalan case provides a problem for the presumption that plurinational nations will not seek independence in the near future.

However, there are some prominent differences between the Catalan and Scottish case. The following section will provide a discussion of why Catalonia sought independence despite the general expectation in the late 1990s and early 2000s that further autonomy would be sufficient to satisfy Catalans. I do not seek to disprove the notion of plurinationalism itself, just maintain that it cannot be used to determine when independence movements will or will not take place as there are clearly other socioeconomic and political factors, as made evident through the Catalan case, that can prompt an independence movement to happen.

4. Discussion

As in the case of Scotland within the United Kingdom, plurinationalism did not play out as

Keating had expected with relation to independence movements. Less than two decades after

Keating had coined the term of plurinationalism, Catalonia held two independence referenda, despite them both being declared illegitimate and unconstitutional by the Spanish state. Thus, the question is why did plurinationalism not have the expected effect on independence movements, using Catalonia as reference.

80 There are a variety of explanations as to how Catalonia came to be in its current position with Spain of wanting to seek independence which were provided in the earlier parts of this chapter. First, Catalonia has had a long history of noncompliance within Spain as was noted previously. Thus, demands for independence have risen and receded many times during the history of Catalonia’s connection with Spain. There is no reason to assume that a lull in such demands will remain stable. The strength of Catalan national identity was demonstrated by its survival of the harsh repression that the Franco dictatorship used in order to homogenize the

Spanish state.

Following the dictatorship of Franco, the goals of those living in Catalonia were to receive autonomy under the Spanish state, have their identity be recognized, and maintain the ability to speak the Catalan language and take part in Catalan cultural matters. This for the Catalans was most important at a time following such harsh repression of their identity that had happened for the last few decades. Thus, it was evident as to why independence was not being sought at the time as the state was in such disarray for the better part of the twentieth century. The last thing

Catalans wanted was to be in conflict once again. This also explains why plurinationalism was most effective in explaining the general sentiment at the time as many did identify to some degree as both Spanish and Catalan.

However, simply because those living in Catalonia occupy more than one national identity does not mean that there are other factors that might prompt them to seek independence. For example, the decision of the Statute of Autonomy in 2006 that was not announced until 2010 left a bad taste in many Catalans mouths. As noted by Hale, “it is natural for all ‘regions’ to prefer to remain within the central state” however at this time it was becoming increasingly clear that the

Spanish state was not willing to work with Catalonia to provide solutions (2008, 70).

81 The turn to independence can be interpreted as a societal response to perceived injustice,

unfairness and the failure of recognition. Collective frustration at the Spanish Supreme Court

facilitated the crafting of a new political subject. The Estatut was not just mere legislation.

As well as being passed by a consolidated majority in parliament, it had been supported in a

referendum that had legitimized it in the eyes of Catalan society (Dowling 2018, 94).

The decision of the Statute of Autonomy was a slight on the Catalan identity felt by many within

Catalonia, despite their evident sense of connection to Spain.

In addition to this, the economic crisis of 2008 was another factor that played into adding to the momentum of the Catalan independence movement. Despite giving the Spanish state a lot of revenue with taxes, Catalonia felt as though they were not seeing that returned back to them. As well, “support for fiscal autonomy has an independent and positive effect on attitudes towards independence even among groups with dual identities” (Crameri 2014, 59). This added to the fact that Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy refused to work with Catalonia at all in efforts to produce a new form of economic agreement between the nation and the larger state further solidified sentiments among Catalans and the inability of the Spanish state to work with them.

The response of the central government during the past four years has been to deny any

change in relationship between the two administrations, and to use the Constitutional Court

to try and block the Catalan aspirations to sovereignty, without negotiation. Catalans’ right to

decide their political future has also become central to not just the Catalan, but also to the

Spanish political agenda on an issue that has drawn the full attention of the media (Perales-

Garcia 2014).

Thus, it is clear why constitutional preferences have changed from the early 2000s to the 2010s.

82 Despite these sociopolitical factors having an influence on the momentum of the independence movement in Catalonia, notions of national identity have for the most part not fluctuated by large margins within the nation. This means that the vast majority of those living within Catalonia identify to varying degrees as Spanish in addition to Catalan. Thus, the concept of plurinationalism still applies to the nation throughout their independence movement. It is not as though once independence was becoming more salient within the nation, there were big shifts in national identity towards being Catalan. While there were some increases in those identifying as more Catalan than Spanish or solely Catalan, there were and are still high percentages of people identifying with their Spanish identity. Thus, it is evident that a nation being plurinational does not have as large an effect on independence as Keating proposed it would at the time of

2001.

The concept of plurinationalism uses the Moreno Question as a tool to exemplify that a person can occupy more than one national identity, solidifying its claim. As noted as a problem with the case of Scotland, the Moreno Question does not capture the salience of identities for those who identify, using the case of Catalonia, as more Catalan than Spanish nor more Spanish than Catalan. For example, someone can be 99% Catalan and 1% Spanish and fall under the same category as someone who is 51% Catalan and 49% Spanish. Therefore, it is not the best measure of one’s identity because one does not get a clear nor specific picture of what exactly is going on. While it does exemplify the fact that Catalonia is a plurinational nation, it cannot be used as an efficient tool to draw conclusions from or base hypotheses on because of its lack of specificity. For some, seeking independence was more important than their identification with the Spanish state due to the socioeconomic and political factors at that time.

83 5. Conclusion

This chapter provided a broad overview of the history of Catalonia within Spain, the time during the Franco dictatorship where the Catalan identity was able to prevail, and the time following Franco when the Spanish democracy was created. Keating coined this term of plurinationalism that well captured the feelings of the time surrounding national identity and independence movements among minority nations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Next, the chapter looked at what happened after Keating coined this term, with the Statute of Autonomy in

2006, the economic crisis in 2008, to the nation holding illegitimate independence referenda in

2014 and 2017. Then, a discussion followed looking at why plurinationalism did not have the effect on the Catalan independence movement as it was intended to. I argued that certain socioeconomic and political factors can speed up the process of independence movements within minority nations whether a large percentage of the population has plurinational identities or not.

As was seen with the case of Catalonia, many still identify to varying degrees as Spanish despite having voted for independence. Sometimes seeking independence is more important than being able to continue being a member of a state, especially when that state has refused to cooperate with the minority nation.

Unlike the Scottish case, the independence movement in Catalonia will always be seen as illegitimate and unconstitutional by the Spanish state due to the second article in the Spanish constitution. Because of the wording that the Spanish state is “indissoluble,” unless the

Constitution is amended, Catalonia is unable to seek independence constitutionally. It will be interesting to see in which direction the independence movement moves as protests have still been continuing in the nation following the verdict in 2019 of the Spanish Supreme Court which provided harsh sentences for the Catalan officials and activists who were involved with the 2017

84 independence referendum. Unrest is still present within Catalonia; however, the independence movement has lost some of its momentum that it had in previous years due to COVID-19 and impacts of the pandemic. However, it will be worth noting to see where the independence movement will go from here and if the Spanish state will ever begin to comply with Catalonia and the wants of the Catalan people.

85 Chapter V. Conclusion

Preceding the early 2000s, it was the general sentiment at the time that because individuals in minority nations within sovereign states occupied more than one national identity, that of the minority nation alongside that of the larger state, independence would not be sought in such nations for quite some time. This was particularly relevant for places such as Flanders in

Belgium, Quebec in Canada, as well as Scotland in the United Kingdom and Catalonia in Spain which were the main focus of this thesis. The majority of those living in Scotland felt both

Scottish and British, same within Catalonia of those feeling both Catalan and Spanish, albeit to varying degrees of each identity which was well captured by Michael Keating’s notion of plurinationalism. This term remained relevant to the minority nations while seeking independence and still does today. Thus, as was made evident throughout this paper, the notion of plurinationalism is useful in describing how national identity is comprised within these nations, but it does not have the effect that it was expected to have on independence movements.

While Keating coined the term in 2001, presuming that independence movements would not occur for a long while, independence movements took place within Scotland and Catalonia less than two decades later.

In Scotland, the independence referendum of 2014 was essentially an accidental referendum. There was no real discontent with the United Kingdom government at the time with regard to constitution preference, but rather the referendum took place due to the Scottish

National Party winning an absolute majority in the Scottish Parliament. Despite independence being placed on the back burner in terms of where it stood for the Scottish National Party’s platform, because it was on the party’s platform and they gained an absolute majority, a referendum had to take place. This shows that trends in national identity were not explicitly

86 relevant to independence being sought at the time. However, despite all of this, around 44% of the nation voted in favor of Scotland’s independence. This is important because levels of support had not reached that high in well over a decade. In addition to that, two years prior to the referendum being held, the percentage of those stating that they were ‘Scottish only’ was at a decade low, of only 23% describing themselves as such (Scottish Social Attitudes Survey).

Despite all of this, the independence referendum was held and did not lose at as wide of a margin that was anticipated. Thus, plurinationalism did not have the expected effect on Scotland’s independence movement as Keating though it would.

Unlike Scotland, there was growing dissatisfaction within the minority nation of

Catalonia towards Spain in the years leading up to the independence referendum which was deemed both unconstitutional and illegal. Following the Spanish Civil War and Franco dictatorship, Catalonia was eager to work within Spain and make agreements regarding competencies the autonomous community may receive. This worked for a while until Spain no longer would cooperate at all with anything Catalonia wanted. In the late 2000s and early 2010s it became clear to many within Catalonia that because the Spanish state was not willing to work with them, the only way for the nation to prosper would be as an independent state. Unlike

Scotland, the Spanish state will not recognize Catalonia’s democratic right to vote on an independence referendum, nor will the state recognize Catalonia as its own nation due to the nature of their Constitution and the language used within it. Because of this, issues of independence are much more prominent within Catalonia due to its real discontent with the

Spanish state and government and the lack of compromise being presented to them. However, despite all of this, many within Catalonia still feel at least somewhat Spanish as well as Catalan so plurinationalism remains present in the minority nation in terms of national identity. However,

87 like Scotland, their plurinational identities did not prevent independence from being sought.

Therefore, plurinationalism, while relevant as a concept, cannot be used to determine when independence movements will or will not take place as it is not the sole cause of them – they can be accelerated due to other factors.

Both Scotland and Catalonia, as explored in each of their chapters, had rich histories of their own before they became part of the larger sovereign states they are part of now. The Act of the Union of 1707 brought Scotland and England together, however due to no formal integration process of the two nations, many aspects of Scottish culture remained. The Jacobite rebellions in the first half of the 18th century led to the admonishment of the Highlander culture in Scotland, leaving many Scottish people with a distrust of the English/British. Similar in Catalonia, the marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabelle in 1492 merged Catalonia within Spain, but before that Catalonia had its own history and language dating back to the 9th century. Catalonia was able to retain its law, tax system, and court system for more than a century following its union into Spain. However, this was all repressed after the Bourbon domination in the early 18th century leading to Catalonia’s long history of noncompliance within the Spanish state.

Understanding both Scotland and Catalonia’s history before they became part of their larger states in addition to their early history within the sovereign state is important to understand how they came to seek independence centuries later. It is because they had such a rich history before their union with the United Kingdom and Spain that they were able to retain their cultural markers, and language in the case of Catalonia, which allowed for these minority national identities to be able to survive throughout the centuries and still be prevalent into the 21st century. Although it is not these national identities alone that prompted the independence

88 movements, if they were not still relevant the independence movements would not have happened at all.

Plurinationalism, as a concept, is useful and has depth behind it. It is applicable to both the case of Scotland and Catalonia. However, it just cannot be used to determine when nations will seek independence or not. As described earlier, plurinationalism heavily relies on the use of the Moreno Question to explain its concept. The Moreno Question is used to capture varying degrees of national identity. Using Scotland as an example, the national identities to choose from would be: ‘Scottish only’; ‘More Scottish than British’; ‘Equally Scottish as British’; ‘More

British than Scottish’; or ‘British only.’ Thus, the Moreno Question makes the concept of plurinationalism clear – people can inhibit more than one national identity. However, it does not gauge one’s precise understanding of national identity in all of those options. For example, both someone who feels 99% Scottish and 1% British would be categorized into the same option as someone who feels 51% Scottish and 49% British. Therefore, while it is useful to explain plurinationalism, the Moreno Question falls short on giving a precise understanding of national identity which would be more helpful in potentially determining when an independence movement may or may not take place.

National identity is a relevant concept for all those living in both Scotland and Catalonia.

However, it is just unclear how much their ties to a specific national identity influence their constitutional preferences with regard to independence. People can hold ties to national identities for a number of different reasons. However, reasons for seeking independence may outweigh those ties to their national identity prompting someone, for example, in Catalonia to want independence despite having at least somewhat significant ties to the Spanish state. This may be for economic reasons, as in the people living within the minority nation may feel they would be

89 more prosperous if they had their own tax system or had control over their nation’s spending.

This also could be for political reasons as those within the minority nation may feel they are not well represented by their government or if their government is not willing to work for them. As well, this could be for social reasons if the government is restricting the use of the minority nations language within the state or repressing certain cultural markers. This is all to say that trends in national identity are not the sole accelerator to independence movements. As we have seen in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia, trends in national identity may remain stagnant even when independence is being sought. Thus, plurinationalism is not the only thing to be considered when looking at independence movements and these movements can still happen even if nations are plurinational.

Only the minority nations of Scotland and Catalonia are looked at in this thesis because of the relevancy of their independence movements within the past decade. Catalonia has garnered international attention based on the outbreak of protests in Barcelona and the nation as a whole following the judgment and exiling of the political prisoners and those involved in the

2017 Independence Referendum that was deemed illegal and unconstitutional by the Spanish state. While Scotland held its independence referendum in 2014 and it was thought that it would take some time for another one to be held, that may no longer be the case. With the United

Kingdom voting to leave the European Union, many in Scotland are questioning if they wish to remain part of the United Kingdom. While the Brexit vote was very close in the United Kingdom as a whole, 60% of those who voted in Scotland wished to remained part of the European Union which may prompt the nation to seek independence sooner than had been anticipated following the 2014 referendum. Another instance where it is relevant that extenuating circumstances may be the reason why independence is sought at an accelerated pace. With European integration,

90 independence is becoming a less daunting thing to achieve by many European nations as it is more feasible to enter the world markets and they are overall less dependent on their larger states.

Given more time and resources, it would be interesting to look at the cases of Flanders within Belgium and Quebec in Canada to see the relevance of the independence movements in these plurinational nations. Perhaps there have been no extenuating circumstances within these nations that would have prompted them to seek independence as Scotland and Catalonia. Or perhaps it is the case that because these minority nations are plurinational, the nature of their national identities have slowed down any efforts towards independence. It would be especially interesting to look at the case of Quebec within Canada, or other minority national identities where independence is relevant outside of Europe. The European Union lowers the costs of seeking independence for many nations within Europe due to European Integration. However, without this sort of safety net, it would be interesting to look at how that affects countries decisions to potentially seek independence. It is simply relatively easier to do so within Europe than it is without.

To sum things up, Michael Keating’s notion of plurinationalism, used in Plurinational

Democracies, is a useful concept to understand the nature of national identity within minority nations, such as Scotland or Catalonia. However, it cannot be used to determine when independence movements will or will not take place. It did not have the effect it was expected to have on independence movements at the time it was written in 2001. There are other factors that can be more relevant than national identity trends which may prompt nations to seek independence from their sovereign states earlier than may have been anticipated. While independence movements cannot take place without these minority national identities still being

91 present, it is not the sole determinant of independence movements. While both Scotland and

Catalonia’s independence movements have not been successful thus far, it will be interesting to see which economic, political, or social factors may prompt either of these nations to succeed in their independence movements or perhaps lead them to determine that independence may no longer need to be sought. If either or both of these independence movements succeed, it will be worth noting the potential effects it may then have on other minority nations that may choose to seek independence in the future.

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