The Black Sea Peacebuilding Network

BULLETIN # 12 www.bspn.gfsis.org DECEMBER 2013 BSPN THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK

CONTENTS

MEETINGS & EVENTS

Black Sea Peacebuilding Net- P. 1 work Georgian experts meeting

OPINION PAPERS

Vasil Sikharulidze P. 2 Recommendations on Foreign and security Policy of Georgia BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK GEORGIAN Prospects of cooperation in the EXPERTS MEETING Black Sea Region On July 23, 2013 a meeting of experts of the Black Sea Peacebuilding Alexander Rusetski Network was held at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and Inter- P. 3 Economic Dimensions of Con- national Studies. The meeting was attended by experts of the BSPN, flicts and Peace Processes the team working on the project, and representatives of the civil society.

Ivlian Haindrava At the meeting reports were presented by Vasil Sikharulidze, Georgian P. 7 Theory of Attitude and Set Council on Foreign Relations and Alexander Rusetski, South Cauca- sus Center for International and Regional Security. Vasil Sikharuli- dze’s report was Recommendations on Foreign and security Policy Nino Samvelidze of Georgia Prospects of cooperation in the Black Sea Region. Al- P. 9 Perspectives of Separatist Re- exander Rusetski had a report on Economic Dimensions of Conflicts gions’ Participation in DCFTA and Peace Processes. On October 15, 2013 Georgian Foundation for Strategic and Interna- tional Studies hosted another meeting of experts of the BSPN - Fore- sight for Conflict Prevention in the Black Sea Region - Recommenda- SPECIAL ADDITION tions Workshop. The Workshop was held by Mikheil Mirziashvili, Senior Project Manager, Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and Erno Miettinen, Project Officer, Crisis Management Initia- Ivlian Haindrava tive (CMI). The meeting was opened by Kakha Gogolashvili. P. 11 SOCHI-2014: BEFORE AND AFTER BULLETIN # 12 2 DECEMBER 2013

RECOMMENDATIONS ON FOREIGN AND elaborated by the government should be avoided. Such ap- SECURITY POLICY OF GEORGIA PROSPECTS OF proaches, on the one hand, will weaken the opportunities COOPERATION IN THE BLACK SEA REGION of Georgia’s foreign policy and, on the other, will make Vasil Sikharulidze seriousness of the Georgian government questionable and undermine confidence towards it on the international arena. Georgia’s Council on Foreign Relations is working on a Relations with Russia. Weakening the rhetoric of the Geor- document dealing with general possibilities, challenges, gian side and adding a new format of negotiations will not and risks of Georgia’s foreign and national safety policy in bring about any changes to Russia’s position regarding short and middle term per- Vasil Sikharulidze - Georgian Georgia’s occupied territories and to Russia’s attitude to- diplomat and politician. Chairman spective and recommenda- wards the European and Euro-Atlantic course of our coun- of Atlantic Council tions concerning responses try. There is likelihood, that Russia will continue its pres- of Georgia, 1996- to them. Here are some of sure on Georgia with the view to receiving as much com- 2000 he worked for the theses that will be pre- promise as possible. At the same time, it will encourage the Parliament of sented in this document. some of the radical groups in order to promote marginal Georgia as a leading specialist on defense Elections of 1 October tendencies in the internal politics of Georgia. It will also and security issues, 2000 to 2002 - and the change of power continue making efforts to persuade the third countries to headed the NATO division at the in a constitutional way recognize independence of the occupied territories. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Geor- made the image of Geor- Absence of a well-formulated safety and foreign strategy, gia from and served as a deputy head gian democratic state even of the Georgian Mission of NATO illusions of certain communities with regard to changes stronger. Change of power in relations with Russia and inadequate expectations, the in Brussels. 2004-2005 - Deputy through elections is posi- Minister of Defense, 2005-2008 - process of reorganization of the institutes coordinating na- the Ambassador Extraordinary and tively reflected on Geor- tional security policy generates the risk of weakening of Plenipotentiary of Georgia to the gia’s international posi- Georgia’s foreign political activity in international organi- United States, Canada and Mexico. tions and allows Georgia zations and bilateral relations. It especially concerns pur- 2008-2010 - foreign affairs advisor to continue its foreign po- poseful and consistent activities in the field of de-occupa- to the President of Georgia, 2009 litical course towards Eu- tion and reintegration of Georgia’s occupied territories as - Georgia’s Minister of Defence ropean and Euro-Atlantic well as Euro-Atlantic integration. (2008-2009). integration and towards de-occupation of the occu- Recommendations pied territories more efficiently. The country’s foreign-political strategy should be worked In the given situation taking pro-active and right steps out with the emphasis on main directions and priorities. It is makes it possible to achieve substantial and practical prog- equally necessary for the government to submit two strate- ress in the direction of Georgia’s European and Euro-At- gic documents: one about de-occupation and reintegration, lantic integration in a short period of time. Furthermore, and another - about the strategy of the country’s integra- it is possible to make certain progress with regard to the tion in the NATO. Both documents should be based on the occupied regions and to reinforce the country’s positions national safety conception. It is important that strategies of for the future success of de-occupation policy. Euro-Atlantic integration as well as those of de-occupation and the integration of the occupied regions should be clear- Georgia faces certain hazards, challenges and risks. It is ly demarcated. There should not be the impression that any necessary to understand these and to react on them ade- of these strategies depend on the other, or that there is a quately. Declaration of strategic goals is just the first step. clear consecutiveness in their accomplishment. It is essential that there is the government’s clearly formulated strategy and policy towards the declared goals and It is essential that the action plan of the activities to be tasks – European and Euro-Atlantic integration, peaceful implemented by the government in the period before the de-occupation of the occupied territories and their reinte- NATO summit of 2014 are worked out. It will involve gration. It does not necessarily have to be a new strategy; plans for intensive bilateral consultations with international it may concur with the already existing one or may make academic communities aimed at consolidating supporters some modifications to it. However, no departments, except and intensifying dialogues with sceptics. The action plan for the Defense Ministry, neither the government on the should also include concrete steps to be taken in the direc- whole have submitted any document of this kind. There tion of carrying out internal reforms before the summit of exist only fragmented, in some cases even inter-conflicting 2014, which should make allies more confident about the statements on strategic issues. loyalty of Georgian government to the course of democratic development of the country. Declaration of a new policy, new approaches or political initiatives without being properly conceptualized and In the process of elaborating the strategies and making de- BULLETIN # 12 3 DECEMBER 2013 cisions on important international issues it is necessary to ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICTS AND conduct more intensive consultations with basic allies. It is PEACE PROCESSES appropriate to create a standing consultation format with basic partners where issues of foreign and safety policies Alexander Rusetski will be discussed. It is particularly important to create such a format with Germany. Main objective of this article is to draw public’s attention to the fact that one of the important components of con- The recently declared policy of ‘arranging’ relations with tinuous unsettled state of existing conflicts and inefficiency Russia is unlikely to lead to any result with regard to solving of peace processes is ig- Alexander Rusetski - Psycholo- strategically significant problems for Georgia. It is obvious noring economic interests gist, political scientist, Director of that Russia does not intend to fulfill its obligations under and motivations of conflict the Caucasus ceasefire agreement; neither does it intend toconstructively sides and participants of Institute of Re- engage itself in the Geneva negotiations. It is also unlikely peace processes or overes- gional Security (2002-2012), that Russia will lead any firm and stable economic relations timation of the importance Director of with Georgia and that it will not employ these relations for of this factor. Economic Innovations political pressure and a mechanism of manipulation. Rus- dimension of the conflict and Strategic sia has already started using these bilateral activities in the is an extremely important Development field of economics and culture for making the issue of oc- multi-component system Department of Caucasus cupation of Georgian territories weaker on the international which is actually impos- International arena. In this situation, in order to carry out efficient foreign sible to describe in just one University (since 2012). For years policy, Georgia should take pro-active diplomatic steps in article. Nevertheless, in was a lecturer at the Georgian Tech- international organizations in parallel with demonstrating our opinion, the problems nical University, coordinator of Hel- our constructive approaches and attempts made for settling listed below will incite sinki Citizens’ Assembly in Georgia (1991-2012), head of the National relations: initiate resolutions against occupation, represent new researches which will Consensus Association and found- the topic of occupation in ultimate documents of summits cause opportunities of our er of the newspaper ‘Resonance’ and ministerial councils, consolidate international support cooperation to increase (1989-1991). Participant of vari- against Russia’s illegal activities (arresting Georgia’s citi- and will affect the percep- ous research projects and author of zens in the area of the occupation line and building barriers tion of conflicts in general works in psychology and political along the occupation line), intensify bilateral consultations and their accompanying sciences. in order to strengthen support of our positions, intensely processes as well as the participate in international forums, activate work with in- stereotypes preventing us from regulating them. ternational academic communities, etc. The uniqueness of the article lies in the fact that the analy- Loyalty to the course of the country’s democratic devel- sis takes place in four dimensions at the same time, which opment, the development of democratic institutions and creates an even more complete picture. steadfast protection of supremacy of law has particular importance for Georgia’s foreign and safety policy. Georgia’s 1. Conflict economics being a democratic state is the crucial precondition for the 2. Pseudo-conflict economics (economic interests of success of the country’s foreign course. pseudo-sides) It is equally important to demonstrate the consensus on ba- 3. Economics of quasi-peacekeeping process sic foreign and political directions of development existing between the main political forces of the country and to pro- 4. Economics of peace processes vide engagement in elaboration strategies. This approach was first represented in the book ‘Pseudo- The development of the trans-Caucasian corridor and the Conflicts and Quasi-Peacekeeping Processes in Caucasia’, trans-Caspian transport communications are Georgia’s ba- published by the Caucasus Institute for Regional Safety in sic and vital interests. In order to intensify the role of the 2009. corridor it is important that Georgia should encourage the It is also important that we are the first to use the term ‘in- transit of energy carriers and loads among Central Asia, tegrated reparation’ in this article, which aims to conduct a Caucasia and Europe, the development of transit infrastruc- new type of cooperation and peace process at an interna- ture. In terms of foreign policy, it is essential that Georgian tional level. diplomacy should take care of activating this conception and of increasing Georgia’s role in its implementation. The article may also incite economic analysis and creation From this viewpoint it is necessary to deepen contacts and of documents evaluating armed conflicts of 2008 as well as to make joint efforts both with European institutions and those starting from 1989. With regard to this point, there the countries of Central Asia. is an opinion, that there should be held a special confer- ence which will represent evaluation of conflicts in differ- BULLETIN # 12 4 DECEMBER 2013 ent economic contexts. It is not excluded that this process • Pseudo-conflict creates the sides artificially and is might expand to regional South-Caucasian or even Cauca- equipped with relevant economic service sian scale. • Examples of pseudo-conflict are the so called ‘Geor- Economic Analysis and Methodological Inventorying of gia-Abkhazia’ and ‘Georgia-Ossetia’ conflicts Conflicts and Peace Processes Quasi-peacekeeping process In June 2012 the Center for Evaluation of Conflicts and Peace Initiatives was created on the initiative of the Cau- • It is also an economic process which ‘serves’ regula- casus International University and the Caucasus Regional tion of a ‘pseudo-conflict’ Institute for Safety. One of the aims of the Institute is to • Quasi-peacekeeping process engulfs much economic study economic dimension of conflicts. Such surveys were resource which is not recorded conducted from time to time, but they were spontaneous and not systemic. • Sums of money assigned for regulating the so called ‘Georgia-Abkhazia’ and ‘Georgia-Ossetia’ conflicts It is necessary to carry out relevant interdisciplinary inves- reaches tens of millions of dollars. The majority of the tigation in order to reinforce peace processes and acceler- expenses went not on conflict regulation, but on its ‘ce- ate processes of conflict regulation. mentation’ It is particularly important to employ a model of the so • Billions of dollars were spent on official processes. Ex- called ‘three-sector’ economics, which implies studying penses of the UN observation mission only went up to systems of the state, business and civil society. 350 million dollars. 15 million dollars were spent on the It is important to make active use of resources of econom- process of their (!) withdrawal. And it happened when ic psychology. Major opportunities and resources may be everyone was aware of the fact that Russian Federation discovered in the psychology of thinking. It is impossible was a well-defined side of the conflict and, at the same to think about resolution of serious conflicts if we do not time, the mediator, which is impermissible. However, include elements of psychology of thinking in the studies. the UN, the OSCE and all the other international or- For example, its result is the above mentioned model of ganizations engaged both directly and indirectly in the 4-dimensional analysis, which allows us to look at the ex- problem of regulation of Caucasian conflict turned a isting situation in a different way. Or, the further-to-be-dis- blind eye to this fact... cussed ‘matrix of new economic thinking’, which is based Peace process economics on the famous principle of ‘Win and Win’. • If we analyze the situation, we will realize that the Study of methodological resources of various scientific di- resources used on real peacekeeping process are very rections would enable us to apply these methods efficiently short in solving the set task. • Actually, no real peacekeeping process is taking place By itself, this methodological system is a strategic eco- in Caucasus conflicts nomic resource which is absolutely necessary to use. • Here we might be dealing with certain peacekeeping What is Conflict Economics initiatives • The process of conflict economics is related to many • The sum of money assigned for certain peacekeeping economic factors, e.g. according to some authors, pos- initiatives is probably far less than that spent on quasi- sibility of conflict development is more expected in an peacekeeping negotiations and initiatives. The real cor- economically less developed society relation has to be estimated by a special investigation, • It can be said, that conflict is a kind of economic rela- which, hopefully, will be carried out some day. tions Economic loss • Various kinds of economic resources serve the process It is obvious, that in all of these four dimensions we (inter- of a conflict national community) suffer loss which has a certain eco- Pseudo-Conflict Economics nomic equivalent. However, it is difficult to estimate such a loss as human life by means of economic parameters. The • Pseudo-conflict arises by means of inadequate percep- process of loss calculation usually was, on the one hand, an tion or special manipulation of a conflict; it is repre- ideological information instrument, and, on the other, an sented by appropriate symbols and terminology which attempt to receive contributions or reparations, which cre- hides the picture and trace of a real conflict ated grounds for major corruptive deals. A classic example for it is the topic of reparations of Germany after World BULLETIN # 12 5 DECEMBER 2013

War I, which was settled quite recently. It was only on 4 American sources beyond the budget which was dis- October 2010 that Germany gained economic freedom. tributed through foundations and non-commercial, non-government organizations. This is a subject of sep- Estimation of the loss received as a result of conflicts under arate investigation and it concerns conflict zones too. way in Caucasia is particularly difficult. Just take calculation of the loss caused by fratricidal wars on the territory of 13. Rehabilitation sources spent from Russian Federation Georgia! The war of August 2008 makes a substantial part also caused great social-political tension in Tskhinva- of this loss. li, which still continues because large sums of money were spent improperly. As a consequence of calculation of the loss caused by the war of August 2008 we may receive a unique picture. It 14. Nearly 5 billion Georgian laris was spent on satisfy- seems that such a systemic study has not even been con- ing the needs of the refugees. This is the sum that was ducted so far, because we could not find systemic data assigned in the budget and which was managed by a anywhere. Here is a list of some kinds of loss which the particular ministry. international system (not just Georgia) suffered as a result of hostilities: 15. European Union gave away 1.700 000 euros for com- pilation of the document of political evaluation of the 1. The loss caused by the explosion of the Baku-Tbilisi- conflict, which was worked on by ‘Tagliavini group’. Ceyhan pipeline on August 5 (the pipeline was out of At the same time, this is a document which does not order between August 6 and 21); reflect the real picture of the conflict; it does not show clearly either the sides of the conflict, or the basic eco- 2. Loss of military equipment (a visit of the NATO special nomic values which represented the real economic sub- commission was held in Georgia in September 2008 in ject of the conflict. Therefore, such documents are an order to estimate the military loss, mainly concerning inseparable part of the quasi-peacekeeping process and military equipment). This analysis must apply to the serve the interests of specific political groups rather analysis of the loss of all sides; than the process of establishing strategic peace. 3. Ruined agricultural sector; Categories of the Conflict Victims, Their Cooperation 4. Mined territories; and the Policy of Integrated Reparation 5. Territories with uncertain jurisdiction; It is necessary to form an international commission which will estimate the damage caused by the war of August to 6. Ruined infrastructure; the international community. 7. Seized real estate and movable property; It is interesting to estimate sub-categories of those who suf- 8. Damage to the environment caused by war; fered loss, e.g.: 9. Damage to the cultural heritage caused by war; • Citizens 10. Moral damage whose economic equivalent is impos- • Private entrepreneurs sible to estimate. • Farmers Inefficient, often non-transparent distribution of assistance • Transnational corporations granted for recovering the loss during post-conflict rehabilitation, and, in some cases, misappropriation of large sums • State organizations of money became an ordinary phenomenon in the present • Civil society organizations world and there are no adequate civil and international mechanisms which would conduct monitoring, control and • Religious institutions, etc. evaluation of these resources. I would like to draw readers’ attention to the fact that in 11. International assistance rendered to Georgia from Eu- this work we are trying not to admit differentiation of the ropean and American sources amounts to 4.55 billion victims according to whose side they represented during dollars. At the same time, it is unclear where all this the war. huge assistance went, what it was spent on. It is particularly interesting whether the previous political power Accordingly, our strategic task should be to point out the made progress in using this sum to the full, and, if not, damaged and speak about the ways of defending their eco- what the present government’s policy is with regard to nomic rights and interests. We are also dealing with the this issue. point that the categories that suffered economic loss should be added those who suffered indirect economic loss, e.g. 12. Besides, huge assistance came from European and those exploded on mines, wounded, raped, kidnapped, vic- BULLETIN # 12 6 DECEMBER 2013 tims of trafficking, etc. erty principle or that of mutually profitable distribution. Thus, it should not be the reparation of traditional type, Matrix of Thinking of Problem and Conflict Resolution but the joint international reparation to the victims. It is a complex mechanism, but administration of such a type This is a principle of new economic thinking. It is not easy of policy would create grounds for confidence and prevent to apply it today. Stereotypical economic thinking which is new conflicts. based on maximum profit and on the defeat of the enemy (opponent) will lose sooner or later. Humans can apply the It is interesting that in this case reparation does not imply new matrix of thinking far more efficiently. escalation of economic conflict, but is part of the peacekeeping process. For example, victims from both sides be- This is a transition process of ruining two-cell thinking and come allies rather than opponents. There is a possibility discovering new opportunities. In terms of economics, this of our becoming initiators and those who implements this thinking is more profitable. It is oriented on general victory. unique mechanism and set an example to the rest of the Today it is difficult for a Christian to see and understand world. St. Augustine’s prayer - “O, Lord, protect me from poverty It will definitely encourage strengthening of civil society and wealth”, because it is based on the two-cell preaching institutions and their active engagement in the rehabilita- which implies the following: if one is wealthy, he cannot tion process. go through the needle hole and the poor are a priori bur- dened with less sin. Thus, the policy of integrated reparation could lead to starting a new phase of the peacekeeping process and, accord- Creative thinking oriented on ‘Win and Win’ does not dom- ingly, to minimizing the quasi-peacekeeping one. inate today and many find it difficult to believe that this pattern will work in practice. But it’s not like that. Economic Interests and National Dignity Dilemma In the coat of arms of the family of Ravich, who I have All the attempts made for ‘our’ becoming economically the honor to represent, there is an interesting phrase –‘Turn strong which will help us to attract ‘them’, is utopia. Be- confusion into victory’. It can be read in a different way side economic interests, there are issues of personal and too – consider the problem as a resource. They have been national dignity. We insult our present opponents by mak- working on regulating the problem of the Duruji River for ing this approach popular, which will not help us to create 200 years, but it has not been settled yet. It happens so an atmosphere of confidence. because stone and gravel were considered to be garbage which had to be withdrawn and millions of laris have been Pointing out common economic interests, taking measures spent on withdrawing this ‘garbage’ every year. According for creating common economic space, equal participation to general calculation of the experts of our institute, the in the process of planning economic strategy – could be price of this ‘garbage’ is 2 billion dollars. I believe, it is a the real alternative to the ‘theory of economic gravitation’. serious resource for a small country like Georgia. Principle ‘Win and Win’ and Strategies of Development This type of technology of thinking will enable us to appre- and Regulation of Economic and Geo-Economic Con- ciate our environment in a different way and to draw a conflicts clusion that the problem is not anywhere else but inside us. (Monopoly – Diversification – Internationalization) Furthermore, we should be delighted to the fact that we We are facing the choice: either we choose an egotistical might find ourselves on a non-rectilinear paradigm of eco- way of reaching the maximum results, which is, as a rule, nomic development in case we correctly perceive the idea accompanied by various kinds of fights and tragedies (it represented in this article. is the way of geo-extremism and monopolization), or we choose the way which is an alternative to the process of monopolization, which is an attempt of diversification, not allowing a single monopoly to exist. This is a fair strategy, but, at the same time, a confrontational one. Both of these strategies represent some kind of threat. A clear example of this type of threat is the project of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. There exists the third way too. We are trying to create the world of different thinking which is oriented on the ‘Win and Win’ principle. This way allows us to carry out internationalization of various units by means of common prop- BULLETIN # 12 7 DECEMBER 2013

THEORY OF ATTITUDE AND SET tor that made them presently unresolved problems of international scale. At the same time, neither the superficial Ivlian Haindrava approach of those who consider the Abkhazia and Ossetia conflicts symmetrically on a single plane and ignore nu- Existing Facts merous, including fundamental, differences, can be shared. I will allow myself to start with citing the final passage of It is sufficient to say that South Ossetia national project (if the material published by me in Bulletin N6 of the Black it is correct at all for a minor part of one nation to speak Sea Peacebuilding Network two years ago: ‘The route to about a ‘national project’) is irredentist in its essence and resolving Georgia-Abkha- South Ossetia’s ‘independence’ is not conceived seriously Ivlian Haindrava – Director of the zia conflict is thorny and not only in Moscow, but in Tskhinvali either.2 Republican Institute; Member of the rather long. Moreover, However, national project of Abkhazians (the national board of the Geor- there exists no guarantee gian Politician Sci- project of ethnical Abkhazians, which is attached critical that this route will lead ence Association. significance in the context to be discussed) has the aim of Author of consid- us to an optimal result. building the independent state of the Abkhazians, as much We had been moving in erable number of independent as it is possible in the modern world. Over de- the opposite direction for publications on na- cades (since as early as the Soviet period, when, every now tional and regional so long and had made so and then, the Abkhazians addressed the Soviet authorities security, conflicts many mistakes that we with the petition to move them from the membership of and democracy related issues in did not leave the right Georgian and foreign electronic edi- to ourselves for making Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic to the one of Russian tions; Participant and key panelist to any more.’1 The year that Soviet Federal Socialist Republic) the Abkhazians’ aspira- big number of international confer- passed after the change tion had been explained as follows: they wanted to get rid ences and seminars; Editor and co- of power in Georgia con- of Georgia by means of Russia with the hope that some author of the selection of papers (in time and somehow they would break away from Russia German and Georgian): “Diaspora, firmed the correctness of this opinion. Despite the too. For the given moment the first part of this program Oil and Roses”. Was twice elected as has been implemented in some ways - they managed to a member of the Parliament of Geor- fact, that the approach of gia (1992-95 and 2004-08), Member the new government to the banish about three quarters of Georgians who had lived in of the State constitutional Commis- conflict-related problems Abkhazia, Russian Federation recognized Abkhazia’s inde- sion (1993-95); Took part in the Par- is fundamentally, so to say, pendence after the war in August 2008 (they were followed liamentary and Presidential election philosophically, different by Nicaragua, Venezuela, Tuvalu and Nauru) and it gives monitoring missions in Ukraine, Ar- from the course taken by rather firm guarantees for Abkhazia’s secession from Geor- menia, Azerbaijan. In 2002 he was its predecessor, externally gia. invited as a visiting researcher to the no changes have been ob- However, at least two insurmountable obstacles stand on National Endowment for Democracy served (and they were not (US, Washington D.C.). the way to implementing the Abkhaz national project. expected in the burden- Firstly, Russia did take Abkhazia away from Georgia by some one-year term of means of war and it did not happen so in order to provide cohabitation). If we go further than specifically the -sub real independence for Abkhazia, including the one from ject of Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Ossetia relations, Russia. It spends huge amount of money on Abkhazia – these conflicts represent very serious political and the most Russia’s share in the budget of Abkhazia accounts for 70% substantial emotional obstacle on the way to normalizing on average 3 (in the case of South Ossetia it exceeds 90%4). Georgia-Russia relations and they also make the situation However, it has its own interests while doing so. Abkhazia more complicated from the point of view of Euro-Atlantic integration. and South Ossetia are Russia’s military bases in Georgia (in South Caucasus, in the ‘near overseas’, in the immedi- It should be mentioned, that I never shared the simplified ate proximity of Turkey – the NATO member-state); at the approach taken by Georgia’s previous (Saakashvili’s) gov- same time, Abkhazia is an attractive coastline of the Black ernment, according to which Georgia as though had just Sea bordering the places where the 2014 Sochi Olympic one - total- conflict with Russia, while all the rest of the Games are to be held, while the port of Ochamchire is used problems (including Georgia-Abkhazia and Georgia-Osse- as a military base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Russia dom- tia conflicts too) were consequences of this total conflict. Not by any means – the above mentioned conflicts have 2 For more extensive information see: Ivliane Khaindrava, ‘Two their own history, roots, and genesis, and even if we live to Ossetias in the Context of Georgia-Russia Relations’ in the collection the day when the Russian factor disappears miraculously, ‘Russia and Georgia in Search for the Way Out’, Georgian Foundation these conflicts are not going to be resolved automatically. for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi, 2011. gfsis.org/media/ download/library/articles/RUSSIA_AND_GEORGIA_SEARCHING_ However, it is also obvious, that it was the Russian fac- THE_WAY_OUT_Georgian_Publication.pdf 1 gfsis.org/media/download/BSPN/Bulletins/BSPN_Bulletin_6.pdf 3 grani.ru/Politics/World/Europe/Georgia/m.212474.html October, 2011 4 izvestia.ru/news/549114 BULLETIN # 12 8 DECEMBER 2013 inates in Abkhazia in military-political, economic and any prolonging ethnocratic governance in Abkhazia will only other (cultural, information) terms and it is unclear how aggravate relationships in Abkhazia. However, an imagi- the Abkhazian elite is going to break loose of such an ‘em- nary denial of ethnocracy (readiness for which is not yet brace’; Russia has traditionally been in a hurry to ‘help’, revealed by the Abkhazians), will also undermine the Ab- but later it is always ‘forgetting’ to leave. The recent his- khaz national project.6 tory of the closest relatives of the Abkhazians – Shapsugs and Ubikhs – confirms how difficult it is to maintain origi- Attitude and Set nality in the Russian monopolistic environment. As we do not have grounds for speaking about feasible, ex- From the point of view of at least softening Russian domi- tensive changes in Georgia-Abkhazia relations, we should nation, the position of Sokhumi’s authorities towards Eu- be confined to looking at the dynamics existing at the lev- rope seems rather strange. It sounds as follows: ‘As you el of mindset and tendencies. From this point of view it (European Union) do not recognize us, we are not going should be taken into account that irritation between Sokhu- to have any dealings with you either.’ Such an ambition is mi and Moscow towards each other increases, which can really amazing in the situation, when Abkhazia is far more be easily observed in the words expressed by politicians in need of Europe than Europe – in need of Abkhazia. In and experts. The Abkhazians are concerned that since the the situation of this kind of approaches, the Abkhazian’s recognition of their independence by Russians the degree desire to acquire the right of unlimited entry into the west- of independence has been falling and their space for mak- ern countries, moreover, given the background of putting ing unrestricted decisions has become even more limited. up ‘Berlin Wall’ and self-isolation from the rest of Georgia, On the foreign arena, too, Russia does not make much ef- contains an insurmountable obstacle. It must be understood, fort to provide Abkhazia’s recognition by other countries, that trying to implement the idea of engagement,5 the Eu- just like the Abkhazians had imagined would happen. ropean Union remains devoted to the non-recognition prin- Moreover, their hopes associated with the Sochi Olympics (in terms of activating the local economy) largely turned ciple, which is based on a completely logical calculation: it 7 is inadmissible to undermine Georgia’s confidence towards out to be vain, and harsh restrictions placed to ensure the the policy of the European Union by Abkhazia’s engage- safety of the Olympic Games will immediately concern ment, as, otherwise, the loss might appear immeasurably them too. However, Russia is annoyed by Sokhumi’s at- huge, rather than the gain. However, it should also be men- tempt to behave independently in the situation when Russia tioned, that sources for such ‘strangeness’ of the Abkhaz not only provides Abkhazia’s breaking off Georgia, but, in leaders should supposedly be sought in the above men- fact, supports it at its own expense. Bilateral relations were tioned circumstance, when the space of their making deci- negatively affected by two double terroristic attacks that sions independently has been reduced to a greater extent; took place in Sokhumi recently – assassination of a Rus- consequently, therefore, their rhetoric does not include the sian entrepreneur S. Klemantovich and his companion O. concept of ‘multi-vectorality’ any more. Skarednova was followed by murdering D. Vishnerev, first secretary of the Russian ambassador in Sokhumi, and his Another obstacle: it would be wrong to consider the Ab- wife (the latter died in the hospital from the wounds later). khaz national project as a subject of general consensus at Despite the fact that these occurrences did not cause Rus- least among the current residents of this republic. Pres- sia’s particular rage (we can imagine what would happen ently the population of Abkhazia (which makes about 40% if a Russian diplomat was killed in Tbilisi), at least accu- of that before the armed conflict of 1992-93) consists of mulation of negative potential was definitely encouraged three commensurate groups – specifically Abkhazians, by them. Georgians and Armenians; it may be presumed that if the existing tendencies are retained, Russian community will It is premature to claim that Sokhumi’s worry about Rus- gradually catch up with them in terms of number. Spatial sian domination is revealed in the increase of the inter- and political orientations of these basic groups are differ- est towards Georgia, as a possible alternative. Sokhumi ent: the Abkhazians set themselves the super-goal to gain has steadily been drifting away from Tbilisi for 20 years independence; the Georgians that remained in Abkhazia, now, has been building ‘Berlin Wall’ on the line separating naturally, see their future in the same space with Georgia, Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia with the hands of Rus- while the Russian community – also naturally – sees it in sia, has been trying to ignore any positive processes and the same space with Russia. The problem of the orientation tendencies taking place in Georgia. ‘Instead’, it listens to of the Armenians in Abkhazia is less straightforward. Up to now they managed to keep balance between the loyalty to- 6 See: e.g. Сергей Маркедонов «Параллельно противоположные wards the Abkhaz national project and the need for unlim- проекты» www.ekhokavkaza.ru/content/article/25122058.html 30 Sep- ited contact with the Russian space. One way or another, tember 2013 г. 7 See the decree of the President of the Russian Federation issued on 5 The policy of the European Union towards Abkhazia and South 19 August 2013 (in Russian): www.rg.ru/2013/08/23/bezopasnost-dok. Ossetia is determined by the formula: ‘non-recognition and engage- html ment) - author’s note. BULLETIN # 12 9 DECEMBER 2013 and retains in mind all the negative things about Georgia eagerly and with great pleasure. In its turn, Russian dis- * * * comfort, which it got because of the additional problems, caused by Abkhazia and South Ossetia, also in the context And, finally, about the title of the present article. According of the approach “it’s high time to stop feeding Caucasia”, to the theory of attitude and set, which is associated with rooted in various social classes of the population, cannot the name of Dimitri Uznadze, the founder of the Georgian be transformed into the idea of ‘returning’ them to Georgia scientific school of psychology, mindset is the condition of in order to let Georgia and Abkhazia clarify relationships a body as a whole, its primary response to the impact of the between each other. The fact is that distrust towards each environment in which it has to exist and has to solve the other’s real intentions is increasing both in Sokhumi and in problems as they arouse.9 Moscow. It is also remarkable, that Abkhazia and, moreover, South Ossetia, found themselves aligned with Russian Federa- tion’s North Caucasian subjects and, if there is still some- thing that links them with South Caucasia, it is unresolved PERSPECTIVES OF SEPARATIST REGIONS’ P conflicts with Georgia and problems of hundreds of thou- ARTICIPATION IN DCFTA sands of refugees and internally displaced persons. At the same time, it is possible to speak about North Caucasia Nino Samvelidze ‘flowing’ to the south just in the direction of these forma- tions. It is testified by the project of ‘united Ossetia’ as Georgia’s aspiration for Europe is the link connecting the well as by the fact, that in the general Adyghe (Cherkez) country’s long-term development with democratization, discourse Abkhazia is considered as an inseparable part while safety and conflict regulation are the most important of their subsistence space despite the Abkhazians’ opinion tasks on the way to Geor- about this problem. It should also be mentioned, that this gia’s European integration. Nino Samvelidze is EU pro- circumstance was promoted by the Abkhazians and South Given the present political grams manager at Georgian Institute for Strategic Stud- Ossetians themselves as early as the 1980s-1990s, when and geo-political situation, progress of Georgia’s Eu- ies (GISS). Her main they took part in founding the Confederation of Moun- area of expertise is tain Peoples of the Caucasus (later the word ‘mountain’ ro-integration is directly EU foreign Policy, was taken out of the title). By the way, it was Sokhumi, linked to the future of the European integration which became memorable only by its hostilities carried out occupied territories. Mech- and conflict resolu- against Georgians during the war phase in Georgia-Abkha- anisms and agreements tion. Prior to that, zia conflict in 1992-1993, that was chosen as a place where of the EU with Georgian she worked as Program Officer at the organization’s head quarter had to be located. The ques- participation (Association International Republican Institute tion “how much hopeful is it for the Abkhazians and the Agreement, agreement on (IRI) Georgia and as an EU Expert in Deep and Comprehensive the project “Georgia in Europe”, fi- Ossetians to establish themselves in the North Caucasian nanced by the European Partnership setting?” is not a rhetorical one at all. Free Trade Area, visa lib- eralization, etc.) create for Democracy (EPD). She has spent Presently, Abkhazia is ‘floating’ in the triangle of Abkhazia several months in Brussels, working the potential for Georgia as Robert Schuman Trainee at the - North Caucasia – Georgia; it is considered part of Georgia to become more attractive European Parliament, dealing with by a vast majority of the world states, but, actually, it is and to make the occupied Eastern Partnership agenda and Eu- becoming part of Russia, part of its most specific, problem- regions become interested ronest Parliamentary Assembly. She atic region – North Caucasia, where they have their own in participating in these holds MA from Central European points of view on Abkhazia. The place and preconditions formats; this process will University and MA in EU Interna- for implementing the Abkhaz national project here seems accelerate the one of their tional Relations and Diplomacy from unclear. As the Russian analyst A. Tokarev remarked, the reintegration in the long- College of Europe in Brugge. Abkhazians suffer from shortage of the “great national term perspective. Howev- project”, the one without which it is impossible to form a er, there are a number of challenges which hinder the scale new post-Soviet nation-state.8 of implementation of these agreements, in particular, their dissemination across the occupied territories. From this Anyway, the ‘flow’ of two territories of South Caucasia to viewpoint, we have to take Moldova’s experience into con- the north and the counter process of North Caucasia flow- sideration, as it is one of the member countries of Eastern ing into South Caucasia involves geopolitical factor and Partnership. It has similar problems with regard to Trans- calls for Georgian (and Russian) experts to conduct pro- nistria regions, so it has to be analyzed what perspectives found analysis. and challenges exist in this direction. 8 А.Токарев «Национальный проект Абхазии», www.politcom. ru/16510.html 07.10.2013 9 education.ge/index.php?do=definition/view&id=1816 BULLETIN # 12 10 DECEMBER 2013

On 28 October 2013, at the Summit in Vilnius, the Asso- Transnistria is a region oriented on export and in case it ciation Agreement between Georgia and European Union loses access to the European market, it will seriously harm was initialed, which includes the agreement on Deep and its economy. Today Transnistria is unbalanced in structural Comprehensive Free Trade Area (further mentioned as and financial terms and its system is based on Russia’s di- DCFTA). This agreement regulates export and import of rect or indirect assistance.14 In order to save the region’s goods and services on the EU market. In 2012 Georgia’s economy, it is necessary to integrate it with the country’s foreign trade turnover with the EU countries increased by economy. Consequently, the DCFTA agreement can bring 12 % and amounted to 27% of the whole trade turnover.10 substantial changes and stability to the region’s economy Accordingly, in future, accessibility to the market of 500 and create the possibility for the region to go into closer million people with and without tariff barriers through the cooperation with Kishinev. As for Abkhazia and Tskhinvali DCFTA agreement is an important incentive for Georgia’s region, the situation there is different, as these regions do developing economy. Apart from trade with goods, this not have geographic and, accordingly, economic proxim- agreement implies trade with service, capital turnover, ap- ity to the EU market and their economic condition is far proximation of state procurement procedures and invest- worse. Major part of Abkhazia budget is subsidized by ment legislation, protection of consumer rights and intel- Russia. Furthermore, Russia sponsors infrastructural proj- lectual property, as well as provision of competition and ects, construction and agriculture.15 Abkhazia’s basic trade protection of labor standards. partners are Turkey and Russia, although goods produced there can also be found in Trans-Baltic countries, Moldova It is obvious, that Georgia is bringing about harmonization and Ukraine. As for Tskhinvali region, economic activity of trade-related EU acquis at a legislative and institutional is very low there and it is completely depended on Russian level; however, it is still unclear how this agreement will subsidies. be implemented on the occupied territories. So far, several versions approved in other countries have been considered, Russia’s role and influence in separatist regions is the ba- although the agreement between Georgia and the EU con- sic hindering factor against their independent development cerning concrete measures directed to gradually making and, probably, their reintegration. Recent occurrences in Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia beneficiaries of this agree- Ukraine showed that Russia will do its best to stop the ment has not been concluded yet. process of extending the region’s ties with the European Union and also to reinforce its influence on the separatist Moldova faces the same problem, but the situation here is territories in order to obstruct the development of institu- a little different. European Union is Moldova’s number one tional ties. Given the regional and geo-political situation, trade partner, whose share amounts to 54% in the trade of in which, first of all, activated Russia is implied, Georgia the country. EU export in Moldova reaches 2 billion euros, 11 should intensify generating engagement elements in these while the EU import is 940 million euros. Moreover, over regions in order to continue the perspective of engagement 50% of Transnistria production goes into the EU market. of the separatist regions in the mentioned mechanisms, as It is remarkable, that together with Moldova, Transnistria Russian factor makes it unreal to accomplish more serious benefits from the so called Autonomous Trade Preferences deeds. Taking the current situation into account, DCFTA and these preferences, together with GSP+ mechanism re- will not be able to expand on these territories unless Geor- sult in accessibility to the EU market without restrictions 12 gia has total control on the borders of these regions and and tax dues. In Transnistria hundreds of companies have the same situation may continue endlessly, because conflict been registered in Moldovan state departments in order to regulation is not a short-term perspective. entitle themselves to the mentioned system, which helped these companies substantially to expand and develop their Resulting from all the above mentioned, it is necessary market.13 However, these companies will not be able to to elaborate sustainable measures and mechanisms which make use of this system, which obstructs them as well as will encourage extension of ties with the regions. Georgian the perspective of these companies to be motivated to lobe government should be proactive and should create more participation in the DCFTA agreement. means for exchanging information between the sides. From this viewpoint, it is essential to engage civil society in the process in order to give it a chance to affect the process; 10 Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia, it is important to popularize DCFTA and raise awareness www.economy.ge/uploads/files/sagareo_vachroba/trade_turn- over_2012.pdf about it as well as to provide Abkhazian and Ossetian sides with basic information about the benefit they might receive 11 DG TRADE, trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ tradoc_113419.pdf 14 Budget deficit of this region is 70% and it is balanced by means 12 EC - Trade - Moldova, ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and- of Tiraspol not paying for Russian gas. Freedom House www.freedom- regions/countries/moldova/ house.org/report/freedom-world/2013/transnistria 13 BE Berlin Economics GmbH, The Impact of the EU-Moldova 15 Thomas de Waal ‘Abkhazia as a Comfortable Conflict Region’ DCFTA on the Transnistrian Economy: - carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/28/abkhazia-comfortable-conflict- Quantitative Assessment under Three Scenarios, June, 2013 zone/g75v BULLETIN # 12 11 DECEMBER 2013 from this agreement. Georgia should also see to it that the impossible without considering Russia’s role and that ac- European Union make active use of diplomatic discourse tivation of engagement mechanisms with the occupied in order to emphasize Georgia’s success and let it become territories must be a systemic process. It is also important attractive to the separatist regions. Civil sector should that this problem is not weakened in the discourse of the also be actively engaged in generating ideas and mecha- international community and that the representatives of the nisms which encourage the regions’ gradual engagement government air it at international forums. Activation of the in DCFTA. engagement policy with the regions, which will also encourage the perspective of their participation in DCFTA, In order to work out the above mentioned measures, it is should not be linked to the schedule and occurrences of necessary to make the process open and transparent so that internal politics and should be a permanent process of sys- both the civil sector and the wide public have access to the temic nature. current occurrences. It is important, that the government of Georgia understands that regulation of this problem is

SPECIAL ADDITION

SOCHI-2014: BEFORE AND AFTER stated that the principal objective was “to organize outstand- ing, the most memorable and the most spectacular Games Ivlian Haindrava in the history of the Olympic movement.”2 In addition, he noted that in order to achieve this objective resources would The topic of the Winter Olympics-2014 in Sochi has been be mobilized not only in the city and region (Krasnodar significantly politicized. The broad context of the Olympics Krai) but across the country. Thus, the significance of the includes the “Georgian” component which is why the pres- upcoming Olympics for Russia, and Vladimir Putin person- ent paper is dedicated to Georgian-Russian relations through ally, is evident, and it is regarded by him as an opportunity the prism of Sochi-2014. An analysis of various factors that to strengthen his authority within the country and abroad. have a direct impact on the dynamics and content of the process suggests that the set of issues related to the Sochi However, the Olympic Games in Sochi in February 2014 Olympics and the challenge of ensuring its security - spe- are admittedly destined to become unique in themselves cifically, contains both positive and negative potential for due to a number of other circumstances: the future of Georgian-Russian relations. 1. These are the first Winter Olympic Games to be held in Sochi’s Triumph in Guatemala the subtropics; On July 4, 2007, at the IOC session in Guatemala, the city 2. Well before their commencement it became clear that of Sochi was selected as the host of the Olympic Winter they will become the most expensive Games in history, in- Games in 2014. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, cluding the much more large-scale (and, hence, more cost- personally arrived in Guatemala and, within the framework ly) Summer Games; of presenting the application, delivered a speech before the delegates of the IOC. It was as if, with his presence, he “at- 3. The Olympics will take place in the immediate vicinity tached” to himself both the positive decision of the IOC and of the troubled North Caucasus republics and thus security the Winter Olympics as such. Despite the fact that in the issues take on particular significance; following year, 2008, Putin was scheduled to lay down his 4. Olympic venues are located in areas where tragic inci- presidential powers, it was also no great secret that in time dents took place during Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus for the Olympics in Sochi, he, once more as the President of (the Russian-Caucasian War which lasted for half of the the Russian Federation, would be prepared to reap the lau- nineteenth century) which increases risks associated with rels of the chief inspirer and organizer of such a prestigious the security of the Games; event. Shortly after the IOC decision, listing the achieve- ments of Russia (read - his own), which tipped the scales in 5. The Olympics will be held not in one of the internal re- Guatemala in favor of Sochi, Putin primarily named the res- gions of Russia but near the disputed border, viewed by toration of the territorial integrity of the country.1 His own Russia as the border with Abkhazia, recognized by the for- country, clearly, rather than some neighbor. mer, while by Georgia (as well as by the vast majority of the world) - as an interstate border of Georgia and the Russian In an interview with the BBC, the Head of the Sochi-2014 Federation. Olympic Organizing Committee, Dmitry Chernyshenko, 2 www.bbc.co.uk/russian/sport/2011/12/111220_sochi2014_cher- 1 www.newsru.com/russia/24jul2007/myaso.html nyshenko_interview.shtml BULLETIN # 12 12 DECEMBER 2013

In the work “Sochi-2014: Ethno-Political Dimension”3 Ser- Among other things, two international conferences held gei Markedonov identifies several problematic points of the in Tbilisi in March 2010 can be highlighted: “Unknown forthcoming Olympic Games, namely: a) the situation in Peoples. Enduring Crimes: the Circassians and the Peoples the Krasnodar Krai, b) the “Circassian question” and its dy- of the Caucasus between the Past and Future” organized namics, c) the factor of the volatility of the North Caucasus, by Ilia State University of Tbilisi in cooperation with the d) Olympics in the context of Georgian-Russian relations Jamestown Foundation (United States). The first of these and e) the asymmetrical partnership of Russia and Abkha- conferences adopted an appeal to the Georgian Parliament zia. Similar motives in the “Olympic saga” are captured by to recognize the Circassian genocide and the second called other well-known Russian analysts.4 Thus, the “Georgian for a boycott of the Olympic Games in Sochi. topic” is undoubtedly present in the Olympic context and, On May 20, 2011, the recognition of the Circassian geno- under current conditions of a rather limited menu of direct 9 interaction between Georgia and Russia, is capable of im- cide by the Parliament of Georgia indeed ensued. Relegat- pacting the further development of bilateral relations. ing this step to the level of one of the elements of the cam- paign aimed at the boycott of the Sochi Olympics would Georgia’s Reaction be incorrect; its consequences were conceived as more far-reaching. However, the “Sochi” segment in this step is Despite the fact that by July 2007 Georgian-Russian re- undeniably present. It will suffice to recall that already in lations were already quite strained, several hours prior to June, the aforementioned Jamestown Foundation conduct- the decision in Guatemala, Georgian President Mikheil ed a round table on the subject “Sochi 2014: Can the Olym- Saakashvili once again gave full support to Russia’s bid pics take place at the site of the expulsion of the Circassians to hold the Olympic Games in Sochi, expressing hope that 150 years ago?”, laying the ideological foundation for the they would contribute to stability, peace and mutual under- 5 idea of boycotting the Sochi Olympics. The then-President standing among the peoples of the Caucasus. He then per- of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, thus answered a question sonally telephoned Putin to congratulate him on “Russia’s 6 of the Czech TV channel ČT24 on whether or not Georgia great success.” However, the President’s optimism was not would boycott the Games in Sochi: „This is an ethnically shared by everyone in Georgia. Thus, Paata Zakareishvili cleansed territory. And this is the area where the Circassian (currently the State Minister for Reintegration) was inclined genocide took place. Sochi indeed has a complicated his- to believe that holding the Olympics in Sochi - in the im- tory. In addition, there are security issues. The North Cauca- mediate vicinity of Abkhazia - would “bind” the latter to sus is a difficult area. The year 2014 is fast approaching but Russia even more and hope for progress in the resolution of the resolution of these issues will require time. I am unable the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict would be futile for at least the to say what will transpire by 2014.”10 following seven years.7 However, already in February 2011, Saakashvili said that Further on, the situation became worse than even Zakare- the creation of a “physical threat” to the Olympic Games ishvili’s pessimistic forecasts. The Russian- Georgian war, in Sochi “is not only not in our plans but also outside our which broke out in August 2008 (it should be noted here that capabilities.”11 But, traditionally, Moscow did not believe Georgia did not conduct military operations in Abkhazia), him. Thus, the Plenipotentiary Envoy of the Russian Presi- led to the displacement of the Georgian population from the dent to the North Caucasian Federal District, Alexander Kodori Gorge (there was no other population there), the rec- Khloponin, called Georgia’s recognition of the Circassian ognition of Abkhazia’s (and South Ossetia’s) independence genocide an attempt “to play the Circassian card for the by the Russian Federation, the severing of diplomatic rela- Olympic games”12 and when in May 2012 weapons and tions between Georgia and Russia and the actual continua- ammunition caches were discovered in Abkhazia intended, tion of war by other means (“All diplomacy is a continua- presumably, to conduct terrorist attacks during the prepa- tion of war by other means” - Zhou Enlai). It is the post-war ration and conduction of the Olympics in Sochi, many in period that witnessed the intensification of Georgian policy 8 Moscow accused the Georgian special services of collabo- towards the North Caucasus which was directly linked to rating with the terrorists and the Russian press blossomed the Sochi Olympics. 3 magazines.russ.ru/nz/2013/2/m11.html 4 See e.g., Alexey Malashenko: “Controversy and Concern Over the 9 For details, see Ivlian Haindrava: “Georgia’s Recognition of the Sochi Olympics” April 10, 2013, carnegie.ru/2013/04/10/controversy- Circassian Genocide in the Context of Georgian-Abkhaz-Russian Rela- and-concern-over-sochi-olympics/fyyc# tions” 3view.az/articles/12558/1/ June 13, 2011. 5 www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=13854&search= 10 www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/exkluzivne-na-ct24/osobnosti-na-ct 6 izvestia.ru/news/4036516 July 2007. 24/139360-cilem-ruska-bylo-prevzeti-gruzie-rika-michail-saakasvili/ 7 www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=13854&search= October 12, 2011. 8 See Ivlian Haindrava: “A Caucasian Home as Designed by Tbili- 11 www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23182 February 25, 2011. si” Russia in the Global Affairs, June 22, 2012, eng.globalaffairs.ru/ 12 “Khloponin: Georgia Plays the ‘Circassian Card’ for the Olympic number/A-Caucasian-Home-as-Designed-by-Tbilisi-15581 Games” The View, July 14, 2011. BULLETIN # 12 13 DECEMBER 2013 with corresponding headlines.13 But no evidence confirming security of the Games, as stated by the Minister of Defense Georgia’s involvement in the incident was presented, either of Georgia, Irakli Alasania, during his visit to the United then or later.14 States (the location seems not to have been selected by chance).17 Earlier, in June 2013, Russian President, Vladi- Up until the change of power in Georgia as a result of mir Putin, spoke of the same from the Russian side, wel- the Parliamentary elections in October 2012, bilateral ten- comed the actions of the new Georgian authorities in regard sions surrounding the Sochi Olympics (and not only, of to the Olympics and even mentioned that the establishment course) were mutually maintained: Saakashvili sustained of cooperation between the special services of the two the idea of boycotting the Games (failing to acquire, how- countries to counter terrorism could bring about the abo- ever, supporters of this notion in the international arena) lition of the visa regime for Georgian citizens.18 It would while Russia attempted to portray Georgia as the principal seem that the political will from both sides was evident source of threat to the security of the Olympics (also, inci- and the process might have commenced. And it was com- dentally, without any success in the international arena). menced from the Georgian side - on September 13, 2013, a Tbilisi Changes Attitudes Russian citizen and a native of Chechnya, Yusuf Lakayev, was detained. Lakayev, who was present on the Russian list Following the change of power in Georgia, Tbilisi’s at- of persons posing a threat to the 2014 Olympics,19 is sus- titude towards the Sochi Olympics shifted 180 degrees. pected of involvement in the murder of a Russian diplo- Even before taking office, the future Prime Minister, Bid- mat (and his spouse who later succumbed to her injuries in zina Ivanishvili, stated that Georgia should take part in the hospital) in Sukhumi. In his commentary on this occasion, 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi.15 At its session on May 2, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Davit 2013, the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of the coun- Jalaghania, stated that several months prior, official Tbilisi try took the decision to send Georgian Olympians to Sochi, offered Moscow to cooperate on ensuring the security of the citing the fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter. Sochi Olympics; however, “unfortunately, this proposal to Incidentally, in September 2013, 76% of surveyed citizens this day remains without a response on the part of Russia. of Georgia were in favor of participation in the Olympics, Therefore, any claims will be unfounded.”20 while 11% of respondents were against, and others did not have a clear opinion on the issue.16 However, no claims were officially voiced by Russia during the period of time following the change of power in Geor- The decision, however, should be regarded in a broader gia. Although, the submission of documents for the extradi- context, rather than purely sports. Even prior to winning the tion of Lakayev can hardly be regarded as an equivalent elections, the Georgian Dream Coalition, represented by its step towards cooperation. For instance, issues of Russian- leader Ivanishvili, had declared that putting relations with Turkish cooperation in the field of security at the - Olym Russia in order was one of its priorities and the step towards pics were discussed during the meeting between Putin and Sochi should be seen precisely as part of this course. Fur- Erdoğan in late November.21 Earlier, the Federal Security thermore, behind the decision to participate in the Olympics Service (FSB) confirmed the resumption of contacts- be there is a readiness to review the North Caucasian policy of tween Russian and UK special services on the grounds of the former authorities in general, stripping it of elements ensuring the safety of the upcoming Olympics (the ties were causing Russia’s irritation and concern (thus, the broadcast- previously severed following the scandalous murder of an ing of the PIK TV channel was terminated, Circassian and ex-officer of the FSB, Alexander Litvinenko).22 However, other North Caucasian topics are no longer being discussed the circumstances of Georgian-Russian relations today are at the official level and conferences, such as the above, are even more complex and the interaction of special services no longer taking place). (if any has indeed initiated) is not necessarily subject to Georgia has even offered Russia assistance in ensuring the broadcasting. At the same time, several actions of the Kremlin, follow- 13 See e.g.: “Georgia Wanted to Blast Sochi with the Hands of ing the fundamental shift of official Tbilisi’s approach to Umarov?” Argumenty i Fakty, May 10, 2012. www.sz.aif.ru/crime/ar- the Sochi Olympics, should not at all be viewed in terms of ticle/26923; “The State Duma Believes that Doku Umarov may be Sup- steps aimed at the improvement of the climate in bilateral ported by Georgian Special Services” United Russia, May 10, 2012, er.ru/ news/2012/5/10/umarova-mogut-podderzhivat-gruzinskie-specsluzh- 17 www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/25083440.html August by-schitayut-v-gosdume/; “Gamarjoba, Umarov” Rossijskaya gazeta, 22, 2013. May 11, 2012, www.rg.ru/2012/05/10/terrorizm-site.html 18 www.politrus.com/2013/06/13/putin-georgia/ June 13, 2013. 14 See e.g., Sergei Markedonov: “In Search of a ‘Georgian Trace’” May 13, 2012. www.ekhokavkaza.com/archive/programs/latest/2737/2737. 19 www.ekhokavkaza.mobi/a/25107977.html html 20 www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/25107977.html Septem- 15 ria.ru/sport/20121016/902899284.html October 16, 2012. ber 16, 2013. 16 Survey conducted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI): 21 izvestia.ru/news/561355 www.ndi.org/node/20641 22 newsru.com/russia/08nov2013/rus_brit.html BULLETIN # 12 14 DECEMBER 2013 relations. This relates to the “borderization” of Abkhazia Consequently, the Olympics in Sochi provides opportu- and South Ossetia along the dividing lines between them nities for interaction between the Georgian and Russian and the rest of Georgia with the tightening of the regime sides in the fight against terrorism - in particular and of movement of citizens. In the case of South Ossetia, this more broadly - in terms of ensuring security and stability is realized via scandalous and provocative means where along the entire length of their common border. Russian border guards stretch barbed wire straight through villages leaving neighbors and relatives, houses and plots What will happen at the Olympics? of land on opposite sides of the thus demarcated “state However, subsequently, a number of questions arise whose border.”23 In Georgia such actions are viewed, at best, as convincing answers are very hard to find ahead of time. inappropriate and contrary to the spirit of the new devel- So, for instance, Georgia participates in the Olympics, the opments in bilateral relations.24 Russian political scientist, Games proceed successfully and security excesses do not Andrey Sushentsov, also acknowledged that the so-called occur. The issue of concern to Georgia is whether or not borderization of South Ossetia carried out against the back- Russia will aspire to use Olympic and adjacent events for ground of the planned normalization of the Georgian-Rus- propaganda of Abkhazia as a state recognized by it. The sian relations, serves as an irritant.25 now-former president of Georgia said on this occasion: Another irritant is the fact that a Russian pilot, who man- “We need to know the political cost of participation in the aged to land his aircraft on his own base after taking a hit Sochi Olympics. There, meetings will certainly be arranged in Georgian airspace during a combat flight in August 2008, with the so-called South Ossetian and Abkhaz delegations has been granted the privilege of being one of the first bear- and their flags will undoubtedly be raised. Putin will cer- ers of the Olympic torch. This was also seen by many in tainly employ all of the circus tricks at which he is so apt. Georgia as a direct challenge which entailed demonstrations Tours of the territory of Abkhazia will certainly be arranged for the participants of the Olympics. In short, we will be demanding a boycott of the Sochi Olympics. Curiously, in 27 an interview with a popular weekly newspaper, the German largely neglected.” If this occurs, the political cost for the ambassador to Georgia stated that if he were a Georgian, he current Georgian government can be very high indeed and would also oppose the participation in the Olympics follow- Saakashvili and Co. will obtain a strong argument in favor ing the incident with the torchbearer as he would interpret it of their persuasion that putting relations with today’s Russia as a provocation and an insult.26 The Government, however, in order is impossible by any means. continues to support the NOC’s decision regarding partici- Option Two. In the course of the Olympics, there are set- pation in the Olympics but if over the remaining time the backs in the provision of security and in search of a scape- number of irritants increases, it may find itself in a difficult goat, Russian officials, due to the force of habit, or for other position. reasons, point to Georgia as the culprit. This has already On the whole, it seems (and most observers share this view) occurred (see above the incident involving the ammunition that before the conclusion of the Olympics, no abrupt, de- caches in Abkhazia) and developments in this scenario will stabilizing steps should be expected either from the Russian inevitably lead to new tensions in the bilateral relations with or, especially, the Georgian sides. The successful conduc- consequences that are difficult to predict. tion of the Games in safety is a matter of prestige for the Option Three. Georgians participate in the Olympics, Rus- Russian Federation and its president personally, and keep- sia refrains from organizing the presentation of an “Inde- ing the peace, including - political peace, surrounding the pendent Abkhazia”, no security issues arise, Vladimir Putin Olympics, is essential. Georgia, under its present leadership reaps the laurels of the organizer and inspirer of the event in any case, is genuinely interested in detente in relations and his positions strengthen even further within and outside with Moscow and will not cause it any wiles on the eve of the country. A favorable situation emerges for the provision the Olympics. If the number of irritants on the part of Rus- of specific content to the process of detente between Russia sia will cease to grow, failing to reach a critical point, the and Georgia, a platform for mutual trust for the purpose of Georgian delegation will travel to Sochi. collaboration on cross-interests is established (e.g., security along the Georgian-Russian border). 23 The decision was taken earlier but the demonstrative part of the Other scenarios could also take place; e.g., in the case of process somehow took place in the course of the improvement of Geor- Georgia’s non-participation in the Olympics. In general, gian-Russian dialogue – author’s note. however, there are grounds to assert that the Winter Olym- 24 See e.g.: www.interpressnews.ge/ru/2010-05-25-09-32-40/52551- pic Games in Sochi in February 2014 entail both oppor- 2013-09-25-09-06-56.html tunities and risks for putting Georgian-Russian rela- 25 www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/25136848.html October tions in order and all depends on the political will of the 14, 2013. sides and, primarily - of Russia. 26 Kviris Palitra, October 28, 2013, www.kvirispalitra.ge/ politic/19254-qevropis-stabilurobas-saqarthvelos-gulisthvisac-ver- 27 www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/georgia/1714109.html October shevelevithq-eqskluzivi.html (in Georgian) 1, 2013. BULLETIN # 12 15 DECEMBER 2013

But then, shifted to the foreground are issues of a geopoliti- a whole to Russia, ultimately ousting the West, will be open. cal dimension, objectively present on the bilateral agenda over the last fifteen years, and which will not disappear fol- However Russia’s levers of political and economic pressure lowing the conclusion of the Olympics in Sochi. The issues on Georgia, following its recognition of Abkhazia and South concern the conflicting interests of Georgia and the Russian Ossetia, have somehow become rather scarce. The embargo Federation on the following fundamental parameters of for- on Georgian products can be re-imposed, however, as prac- eign policy and national security: tice has demonstrated this will not lead to the collapse of the Georgian economy. Within the framework of “bringing into a) Georgia aspires to join NATO; Russia opposes NATO’s order” or “optimization” of the migration policy, Georgian expansion; labor migrants (together with the Moldovans, for example) can be expelled from Russia, which would negatively affect b) Georgia seeks to integrate into the EU; Russia promotes the current situation, where Georgian citizens, who have a competing integration project within the framework of found work in Russia, transfer more money to their home- the Customs Union, the Eurasian Economic Community 28 land than from the rest of the world’s countries combined. (EurAsEC), with an exit to the Eurasian Union, and Geor- The process of the Geneva consultations - the only platform gia’s course towards the EU is perceived as a hindrance in which fosters an exchange of views between officials from the realization of Russia’s project; Tbilisi - on the one hand, and Sukhumi and Tskhinvali - on c) Georgia is committed to reconciliation with the Abkhaz the other hand, can be dismantled. Although, in Georgia, this and the South Ossetians and the restoration of the unity of will also not be perceived as a disaster since these consulta- the country; Russia ensures the cessation and independence tions produce little real impact and illusions of a quick re- of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia. integration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia are no longer nourished. The “borderization” of South Ossetia What will happen after the Olympics? can be continued, seizing on the way segments of adjacent Since neither Georgia nor Russia are going to revise their Georgian regions; but this idea is costly, not only politically interests and positions, a breakthrough in relations after but also financially: approximately 75% of the South Os- the Olympics should not be expected; this opinion is main- setian perimeter falls on the rest of Georgian territory while tained by PACE co-rapporteurs on Georgia and Russia.29 human resources for the development and protection of Furthermore, there are fears that following the Olympics, these areas are neither available nor envisioned. Problems Russia’s pressure on Georgia will increase; since the nearest in the energy sector of Georgia can be instigated - depen- post-Olympic future brings forth events which will not at all dence on Russian import in the recent years is not substan- contribute to the alleviation of contradictions between the tial but the positions of Russian companies (including with two countries but, rather - the opposite. Suffice it to men- regard to state-owned capital) in Georgia are strong, both in tion the signing of the Association Agreement between the the generation and distribution of electricity. Attempts can EU and Georgia scheduled for 2014 and Georgia’s joining be made to destabilize the situation in the country or one the NATO Response Force in 2015 (at the Vilnius Summit, of its regions but this requires a conducive socio-political Georgia signed a framework agreement on engagement in background which can only be established by the Georgian EU’s civilian missions and military operations). Based on authorities themselves through their negligent actions. Ukraine’s experience, it is likely that Russia’s position will Neither of these threats, individually, is lethal to Georgia al- toughen in an effort to prevent the signing of the Agree- though their compounded involvement is capable of deliv- ment between Georgia and the EU. In addition, there is also ering a great deal of trouble. In parallel with the “policy of the topic of Armenia, which is being actively drawn into the stick” it is possible to employ the “policy of the carrot” the Customs Union, but the “customs” relations with which although here, Russia’s resources are also limited. Special figuratively and literally are suspended in the air without representatives of the parties, Zurab Abashidze and Grigory communication by land. And subsequently, perhaps, it will Karasin, while welcoming the outcome of the first year of be possible to “engage” Georgia itself by introducing it to dialogue, find it difficult to specify the areas where, in the the idea of the Eurasian Union.30 Thus, the way to complete presence of well-known “red lines” bright prospects for fu- removal from the agenda of the already mirage-like notion ture cooperation would open. For the most part, Georgians of Georgia’s accession to NATO, complicating Azerbaijan’s expect nothing from Russia apart from the easing of the visa position, gaining control over its (and Central Asia’s) en- regime (on December 19, Vladimir Putin stated that “we ergy resources and firmly “affixing” the South Caucasus as might well go for a return to the visa-free regime”31) and it 28 Vladimir Putin: “New Integration Project for Eurasia - a Future is unlikely that this factor will outweigh further liberaliza- Born Today” www.izvestia.ru/news/502761 October 3, 2011. tion of the visa regime with the EU if it comes to a choice. Talk of how beneficial a meeting with Abkhazia (and South 29 www.assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2013/amondoc1 4rev_2013.pdf June 27, 2013. Ossetia) will be for Georgia within the Eurasian Union for 30 See e.g., Dmitry Trenin: “Georgia on Russia’s Mind?” carnegie.ru/ eurasiaoutlook/?fa=53627 November 18, 2013. 31 newsru.com/russia/19dec2013/pressputin13.html#15 BULLETIN # 12 16 DECEMBER 2013 the purposes of restoration of the unity of the country, for (not only Armenia but Azerbaijan as well), attributing it to instance, via a confederation, can deceive only those who the need to maintain military parity in the region.38 At the are naive or those pretending to be so. same time, however, glossed over is the fact that with such a development of affairs, Georgia “falls out of” the regional However, there remains a military resource, e.g., the threat parity.39 All of this seems particularly disturbing against the of force (an excuse can be forged) and even its actual use backdrop of Russia’s persistent refusal to commit to the (although it is said that a threat is more effective than the non-use of force vis-à-vis Georgia.40 actual use). Writing about this issue against the background of reducing tensions in Georgian-Russian relations is even Thus, based on the analysis of the realities, the following awkward, nevertheless... A Russian military expert states conclusions can be drawn: that in case of resumption of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (which he considers 1. Over the period of time since the change of power in “almost inevitable”), Russia will have to “break through Georgia, tensions in Georgian-Russian relations began Georgia” to assist the 102nd military base. “If a need will to decline and within the framework of the postulate arise to advance by themselves, and at the same time main- “politics - the art of the possible” positive results were tain long-term control over a part of Georgian territory and achieved; communication through it with Armenia (emphasis added 2. Prior to the completion of the Sochi Olympics, we - IH) - it will be a much more difficult task, the SMD32 is should not expect drastic steps aimed at undermining unlikely to manage without the assistance of other Dis- progress with the threat of large-scale destabilization; tricts,” - the expert believes.33 Previously, considering the scenario of a Western military operation against Iran,34 an- 3. The bilateral relations will be subject to further trials other Russian military expert speculated on the necessity following the conclusion of the Winter Olympics when to “ensure the viability” of Russian troops in Armenia. Ac- Russian will attempt to “lead Georgia away” from the cording to him, the Russian General Staff will plan some path to Euro-Atlantic integration in the opposite direc- proactive measures aimed at the rear support of its troops in tion - towards the Customs Union, EurAsEC and, sub- critical conditions.35 For the Russian 102nd base in Gyumri, sequently - the Eurasian Union; the “rear” is Georgia. It is noteworthy that the viewpoint 4. The dynamics of political confrontation of the two dis- of Georgia on this development is ignored while offensive proportionate sides will largely depend on whether or weapons are being deployed at the Russian military bases th th 36 not European “soft power” will prove capable of ex- in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (7 and 4 , respectively). pressing itself with real power, rather than impotence. Colonel Andrey Ruzinsky, commander of a Russian military compound in Armenia, also openly speaks about the “entry into armed conflict” of the Russian military base in Armenia “in case of a decision of Azerbaijan’s authorities to restore jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh by force.”37 In this context, it should be noted that Russia has been strengthening its military presence in Armenia, extending, in the process, the area where military facilities are deployed. It is significant that in his state visit to Armenia on December 2, 2013, Russian President Putin commenced with a visit to the Russian military base, landing not in Yerevan but in Gyumri. Generally, Moscow has been intensively arming two immediate neighbors of Georgia in the South Caucasus 32 Southern Military District - editor’s note. 33 Alexander Khramchikhin: “The Southern District: Russia Not Afraid of Opponents in the Caucasus,” rusplt.ru/policy/yujnyiy-okrug- 38 regnum.ru/news/russia/1676314.html June 26, 2013. protivniki-na-kavkaze-rossii-ne-strashnyi.html October 7, 2013. 39 In the ranking of the Global Militarization Index-2013, compiled 34 By the time the article was completed, the danger of such a de- by the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), Armenia is velopment of affairs was low as ever in the recent years but no one will ranked fourth in the list of the most militarized countries in the world, undertake to vouch for the future - author’s note. Azerbaijan – 9th and Georgia - 54th (Russia ranks 3rd, Turkey - 23rd and 35 “Maneuvers of Special Significance” www.ng.ru/politics/2012- Iran - 28th), www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/georgia/1730118.html No- 01-16/3_kartblansh.html January 16, 2012. vember 8, 2013. 36 The Armies of Russia and Georgia: 5 Years Later, www.belvpo. 40 “Attempts to seek certain commitments from Russia regarding com/ru/28815.html August 8, 2013. the non-use of force against Georgia make no sense: Permanent Rep- 37 www.redstar.ru/index.php/news-menu/vesti/iz-vmf/item/12045- resentative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE” www.regnum.ru/ yuzhnyj-forpost-rossii October 10, 2013. news/1719901.html October 15, 2013. THE BLACK SEA PEACEBUILDING NETWORK (BSPN) MISSION

The Black Sea Peacebuilding Network represents a first attempt to focus on robust civil society involvement in conflict resolution process in the Black Sea region. The project is implemented by the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) in partnership with the Crisis Management Institute (CMI) and supported by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. The project targets seven wider Black Sea region countries facing domestic conflicts and aims at empowering civil society to promote mediation and dialogue for effective conflict management. The project’s purpose is to strengthen civil society peacebuilding at various levels (community, local, regional, national or international) to influence the understanding or attitude of conflict parties with new ideas and approaches. Furthermore, the establishment of the Black Sea NGO Forum provides the basis for a series of region-wide, broad-based initiatives such as creation of regional civil society platforms for linking local NGOs and civil society groups that are already involved and those that would like to engage for multiplying the peacebuilding efforts across the region. Moreover, the national forums have greater incentives to facilitate regional cooperation in crisis management and ensure close ties between NGOs, governments and the EU. GFSIS, as a local partner of CMI is responsible to create a forum of NGOs in Georgia and to organize meetings for the interested organizations and groups. The project comprises of three key components:

- Meetings, presentations, discussions organized on a regular basis with the participation of Georgian civil society actors and the Experts’ Coun- cil, preparation of consecutive reports with the meeting findings and outcomes.

- The project web page created to post the project information, updates, experts’ opinions, and data.

- The BSPN bulletin produced to familiarize the wider society with the project’s work and to disseminate analytical papers about conflict resolution, peacebuidling, regional security, and stability, as well as about the EU’s contribution and its role in peacebuidling prepared by the project’s Georgian and foreign experts.

The project intends to increase the public’s interest in conflict prevention, conflict management, transformation, and peaceful resolution, to contribute to wider public debates on these issues and to promote dialogue between all interested parties at the national and regional levels.

BSPN Team CONTACT Project Director: Kakha Gogolashvili GFSIS Project Coordinator: Rusudan Margishvili 3a Shio Chitadze Street Advisory Council: Giorgi Volski, Tbilisi, 0108 GEORGIA Naira Bepievi, Julia Kharashvili, TEL: (995 32) 2473555 Natela Sakhokia, Aleksander Rusetsky, FAX: (995 32) 2985265 Aleksander Kukhianidze www.bspn.gfsis.org / [email protected]