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Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy Christopher C. Horner, Henry I. Miller, MS, MD, and Brett D. Schaefer

The practice of addressing inter- sizing that the process should be global resources”1 has become so national environmental concerns as narrowly participatory as is ingrained in international dis- (and, increasingly, domestic ones) practical, acceptable to those states course that individuals often recite through global forums is fraught expected to bear the largest share of variations of this cliché as if by with problems and contradicts con- the costs of implementation, fo- rote. servative principles of free markets, cused on the relevant issue(s), based property rights, individual liberty, on sound evidence rather than theo- At first blush, this “global solu- and devolution of decision-making retical conjecture, cost effective, tions” sentiment may seem sen- to the most local level possible. By and respectful of the essential role sible. After all, given that “global” agreeing to address environmental played by free markets and property problems are by definition wide- problems through global negotia- rights. spread and pervasive, should not tions, the frequently every nation have a say in how places its negotiators in a position Is it true that “global problems they are resolved? And what bet- of weakness as merely one of numer- require global solutions?” It has ter place to discuss and resolve ous “equal” participants, the goal become virtually impossible to these problems than the United of many of whom is to ensure that discuss any transboundary issue Nations or other international the U.S. assumes disproportionate involving multiple states without organizations where nearly every obligations. Another systematic someone trotting out the idea that nation is represented? As U.N. problem is that U.S. participants the issue in question would be bet- Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon often misapprehend that the object ter addressed through global nego- repeatedly assures us, not only do of the negotiation is the achieve- tiations, often under the auspices “global problems demand global ment of an agreement, rather than of the . Indeed, solutions,” but “the United Na- representing the best interests of the self-deluded or self-interested tions is, truly, the world’s only United States. The result is often proponents of the U.N. and global an ineffective, costly exercise that governance—individuals whose fails to address key U.S. concerns or livelihoods and goals depend on would inappropriately infringe on the authority of international the economic and individual liber- institutions—are eager to promote 1 Paul Wolfowitz, “Opening Address by ties of American citizens. Instead this position at every opportunity. the President of the World Bank Group,” in International Monetary Fund, Summary of this flawed approach, the United The assertion that “global prob- Proceedings of the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the States should assess environmental lems require global solutions and Board of Governors, September 19–20, 2006, p. 22, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ concerns pragmatically, empha- summary/60/summary60.pdf (accessed April 12, 2012).

Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy 1 global institution.”2 However, the effort addressed through selective ones, are being framed as global advocates for concerted global participation. issues that require global action. action through the U.N. seldom Further, issues routinely become acknowledge the shortcomings of The situation is further complicat- transmuted into “problems” with this strategy. ed by the influential role played by a breathlessness dictated by the non-governmental organizations “urgency” of the action they are Foremost among these disadvan- that advocate ideological agendas, said to require. The result is that tages is that negotiations in U.N.- allegedly on behalf of civil society, the U.S. is pressured to engage in a affiliated and other forums open to at the international level. As Jes- flawed negotiating process and to a broad swath of countries operate sica Tuchman Mathews, then vice support undesirable, unworkable principally on the idea of consensus president of the World Resources outcomes. The process takes on as the basis for legitimate action. Institute and currently president a life of its own, and reaching an Achieving consensus among dis- of the Carnegie Endowment for In- agreement becomes the goal, even parate, often strongly disagreeing ternational Peace, observed years if common sense and practical ex- parties—let alone “global” con- ago, “The United Nations charter perience indicate that an alterna- sensus—is elusive to say the least may still forbid outside interfer- tive approach—possibly any other and all too often leads to lowest- ence in the domestic affairs of approach—would be preferable. common-denominator standards, member states, but unequivocally clunky agreements weakened by ‘domestic’ concerns are becoming Evolution of Global unrelated issues, and mandates that an endangered species.”3 These Environmental Policy have been included only to elicit NGOs often find international ne- support from reluctant nations. gotiations more receptive to their Environmental policy is a recent policy preferences than domestic focus in international affairs. Moreover, the proposed responses electorates and thus embrace such Because a society must attain a frequently result in uneven com- talks as a means for circumventing particular level of wealth before mitments. Often, only a relatively domestic opposition. This circum- placing a high value on environ- small number of countries have vention can elicit opposition to the mental protection in the prevail- direct interests in a specific envi- point where even moderate pro- ing sense of the term, the current ronmental concern or are in a posi- posals are viewed as a predicate to enthusiasm for international tion to contribute substantively to more radical ones. environmental agreements and resolving the problem. These few regulation has coincided with the countries are expected to bear the Such is the paradox: Insisting on spread of wealth creation around bulk of the burden, while the pres- global solutions to global problems the world, most particularly in the ence of the rest of the “globe” often all too often weakens efforts to past 50 years.4 The use of widely serves more as a costly distrac- resolve them, dilutes focus and di- participatory multilateral tion than as a helpful addition. As verts resources away from the cen- to address shared environmental a result, the inclusion of nations tral issue, and eschews the process concerns among nations coincided with little at stake or minimal abil- critical for attaining broad-based with the emergence of a central ity to effect a solution to a problem support in democratic societies. role for the U.N. in facilitating and can impede international action in promoting global efforts to address a way that would not obstruct an Increasingly, however, more is- environmental issues. sues, particularly environmental 2 UN News Centre, “UN Best-Placed to Tackle 4 See Iain Murray, The Really Inconvenient Truths: Global Problems in Today’s World—Ban Ki- Seven Environmental Catastrophes Liberals Don’t moon,” July 26, 2007, at http://www.un.org/ 3 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Chantilly Want You to Know About—Because They Helped apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=23345 (accessed Crossroads,” The Washington Post, February 10, Caused Them (Washington, D.C.: Regnery April 12, 2012). 1991, p. C7. Publishing, 2008), esp. pp. 216–224.

2 Environmental Conservation: Eight Principles of the American Conservation Ethic The U.N.-sponsored 1972 Confer- and social health of man, in a conservative approach to envi- ence on the Human Environment the man-made environment, ronmental protection as described in Stockholm, the first major inter- particularly in the living and in Principles II and III. Specifi- national conference on environ- working environment. … cally, the international approach is mental issues, is generally consid- premised on the belief that natural ered to have been the launch point A point has been reached in resources are not resilient and for this trend. The 1972 conference history when we must shape dynamic, but delicate and limited; was established to forge a common our actions throughout the that free markets and property outlook and common principles world with a more prudent care rights represent a threat to the to “inspire and guide the peoples for their environmental conse- environment rather than creating of the world in the preservation quences. Through ignorance or incentives for prudent steward- and enhancement of the human indifference we can do massive ship; and that government must environment.”5 The 1972 Declara- and irreversible harm to the therefore intervene to cordon off tion codified the environmental earthly environment on which resources from the predations of vision for the United Nations and, our life and well being depend. human consumption. This ap- increasingly, multilateral efforts ... To defend and improve the proach to environmental protec- to address environmental issues human environment for pres- tion—alarmist, intrusive, and generally: ent and future generations has anti-market—remains the bedrock become an imperative goal for upon which current international In our time, man’s capability mankind. …6 efforts to transform his surroundings, are founded. if used wisely, can bring to all At the core of most of these mod- peoples the benefits of devel- ern environmental treaties, con- The 1972 conference was fol- opment and the opportunity ferences, regulatory instruments, lowed by the U.N. Conferences on to enhance the quality of life. and bodies is the notion that hu- Environment and Development Wrongly or heedlessly applied, man activity is harmful because of (UNCED) in (1992) the same power can do incalcu- its consumption of scarce natural and Johannesburg (2002); sev- lable harm to human beings and resources and destabilization of an eral U.N. Conferences on Human the human environment. We inherently fragile global environ- Settlements/Habitat; the U.N. see around us growing evidence ment. Therefore, human activity Conference on and De- of man-made harm in many and population growth must be velopment in Cairo; 17 meetings of regions of the : dangerous governed, regulated, and otherwise the parties to the U.N. Framework levels of in water, air, forced onto a “sustainable” path. Convention on Change; earth and living beings; major The preferred process for advanc- and a multitude of other meetings and undesirable disturbances ing this agenda is through trea- and conferences on various inter- to the ecological balance of ties, regulations, and “voluntary” national environmental issues. the ; destruction and guidelines promulgated through depletion of irreplaceable re- international conferences and The Stockholm Conference also sources; and gross deficiencies, organizations. paved the way for the creation of harmful to the physical, mental several new U.N. agencies focused In other words, the international on environmental issues, including strategy for addressing environ- the U.N. Environment Programme 5 U.N. Environment Programme, “Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human mental issues inspired by the 1972 (UNEP) in 1972 and the Global Environment,” June 16, 1972, http://www.unep. conference is the very antithesis of org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?Doc umentID=97&ArticleID=1503&l=en (accessed April 12, 2012). 6 Ibid.

Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy 3 Environment Facility (GEF) in in scope, and evenly applicable to forum that is dismissive of alter- 1991.7 However, the impact of the parties. For instance, the native approaches. The ultimate environmentalist agenda in the 1973 Convention on International endpoint of this process is predict- U.N. is by no means limited to Trade in Endangered Species of able: the criminalization of dam- these agencies. Indeed, the envi- Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) age to the environment, as defined ronmental agenda has permeated focused on a discrete issue—the by radical environmentalists. Such the U.N. system to the point that prohibition of trade in endangered criminalization has been articu- nearly every U.N. agency and pro- species or related goods—and ap- lated in a concept called “,” gram emphasizes that its actions plied treaty requirements equally which is defined as the “extensive benefit the environment. to state parties. Similarly, the 1972 destruction, damage to or loss of Convention on the Prevention of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, The purpose of these U.N. con- by Dumping of whether by human agency or by ferences and organizations is to Wastes and Other Matter governs other causes, to such an extent that codify and advance what is de- deliberate dumping of waste at sea peaceful enjoyment by the inhab- scribed (using, at best, non-rigor- from planes and aircraft. itants of that territory has been ous definitions) as “sustainable” severely diminished.”9 management of resources and the As implied by Tuchman Mathews’ safeguarding of such resources for comment, quoted above, more In other words, the intent is to the benefit of present and future recent environmental agreements make environmental damage an generations. International ex- are, however, typically broader in international crime prosecutable pressed and codified through con- scope and intrude into areas previ- by an international judicial body. ventions and treaties negotiated at ously considered the province of If this initiative succeeds—and it is these forums remains the primary domestic policy or internal affairs. clear that a sizeable constituency means for advancing this goal. Notable environmental treaties in the U.N. and NGO community drafted in the include the is favorably inclined toward such In general, these conferences and Convention on Biological Diversi- a policy—it is certain to be tested organizations reaffirm the senti- ty, the International Convention to on a range of environmentalists’ ments of the 1972 conference. Combat Desertification in Those signature issues, especially climate However, their demands upon Countries Experiencing Serious change. participating governments, par- and/or Desertification, ticularly those of developed coun- the on the Con- The Experience tries like the U.S., have become trol of Transboundary Movements increasingly strident and onerous. of Hazardous Wastes and Their Of the major multilateral environ- Until quite recently, multilat- Disposal, the U.N. Framework Con- mental agreements, none better eral environmental treaties were vention on (UN- exemplify the flaws and perils of relatively issue-specific, limited FCCC), and the Kyoto Protocol.8 the global solutions effort than the negotiations and agreements to 7 The Club of Rome guided U.N. involvement These efforts are unidirectional— address global warming. in environmental issues and in the modern creating more restrictions and . Indeed, the agendas of these U.N. organizations were driven by some more regulations in a growing In the 1980s, the environmental of that group’s stars, such as Maurice Strong. A number of areas that are set and movement increasingly asserted longtime U.N. Undersecretary-General, Strong was chief organizer and secretary-general of codified by a central negotiating both the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and 9 The Scientific Alliance, “Planetary Rights,” Development (the first “”) in Rio 8 See Terry L. Anderson and Henry I. Miller, eds., http://www.scientific-alliance.org/scientific- de Janeiro. He also served as UNEP’s founding The Greening of U.S. Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: alliance-newsletter/planetary-rights (accessed executive director. Hoover Institution Press, 2001). April 12, 2012).

4 Environmental Conservation: Eight Principles of the American Conservation Ethic that greenhouse gases (GHGs), than any other international treaty tions while attaining the political emitted through human activity … with the possible exception of benefit of claiming them: (including the use of fossil fuels the Helsinki Accords as they af- such as hydrocarbon energy sourc- fected , which led • More than 150 countries had es), contributed to increased glob- quite unexpectedly to the collapse no reduction requirement, in- al temperatures.10 Governments of the Warsaw Pact.”11 cluding , which has since convinced of the seriousness become the world’s largest of this argument supported the Indeed, when the “voluntary” GHG emitter. Excluding China creation of the Intergovernmental measure failed to elicit sufficient and other growing GHG emit- Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) policy changes in the eyes of the ters like , , South in 1988. The first IPCC report was IPCC, UNFCCC, and other advo- Korea, and from released in 1990 and, unsurpris- cates, these organizations pressed the agreement’s restrictions ingly, confirmed the global warm- for a treaty imposing binding renders the Kyoto Protocol ing theory and laid the foundation emissions targets on a select few ineffective. These developing for an international agreement to countries. The resulting 1997 countries represent almost the address the issue. The 1992 Rio Kyoto Protocol set binding GHG entirety of global GHG emis- Earth Summit produced the U.N. emissions levels for 37 industrial- sion growth. The reality is that Framework Convention on Cli- ized countries, including princi- Kyoto covers only developed mate Change, wherein countries pally the European Community, countries in which emissions pledged to consider actions to by an average of 5 percent against have essentially leveled off— limit global temperature increases 1990 levels over the five-year pe- which is not to say that actual and cope with the resulting impact riod 2008–2012. reductions are easy, given that of climate change. in fact none managed it after The pact was, under any mod- Kyoto was agreed, prior to the These efforts were presented as eled scenario, climatically current economic downturn. a voluntary process, but from the meaningless,12 weakened not advocates’ perspective, such ac- just by the enormity of such a • During the negotiations on the tions were necessary, and the “vol- task, but by its focus on forcing Kyoto Protocol, the European untary” aspect was acceptable only only select countries to, in effect, Union insisted on calculating if nations met their promises. The limit economic activity or else pay emissions reductions using climate convention was important tribute to avoid such limits. Simi- 1990 as the base year—an un- “because it is so potentially inva- larly, enormous loopholes crafted usual choice for a 1997 agree- sive of domestic sovereignty,” ob- through the consensus process ment that would not take effect served Tuchman Mathews, noting were designed to allow countries until 2008—and pooling GHG that it has the potential of “forcing to avoid the economic conse- emissions across the EU-15 governments to change domestic quences of actual emissions reduc- (the “Old Europe” bloc). Under policies to a much greater degree these two provisions, nearly all 11 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, speech to the EU-15 members were allowed Atlantic Forum, May 18, 1992. to increase GHG emissions 10 Greenhouse gases (GHGs) are atmospheric 12 It is projected that, if the Kyoto Protocol was gases that are widely assumed to absorb implemented perfectly, it would delay projected after Kyoto was agreed. The radiation, principally water vapor, , warming by an undetectable 0.07 degrees Celsius shift of the nitrous oxides, and . GHGs are necessary for just six years. This also assumes a CO forcing 2 from coal to natural gas and for life on Earth and are produced largely through effect, which has largely been disproved over natural processes in enormous, albeit varying, the past decade, when global warming halted the shuttering of East Ger- quantities from year to year. of fossil despite ongoing increases in GHG emissions. many’s dirty industrial capac-

fuels, agriculture (livestock and soil tilling), and T. M. L. Wigley, “The Kyoto Protocol: CO2, CH4 other activities produce relatively small quantities and Climate Implications,” Geophysical Research ity after reunification provided of GHGs. Letters, Vol. 25, No. 13 (1998), at pp. 2285–2288. a cushion of reductions from

Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy 5 prior, unrelated political deci- ing parochial political, social, a party to the treaty because it rec- sions for all other EU parties and economic interests. Former ognized that Kyoto would impose to ride, covering for their own French President Jacques Chirac an unequal, onerous economic often appreciable emission hailed it as “the first component of burden on American citizens while increases.13 an authentic global governance.”14 doing nothing to address the pur- Former Envi- ported crisis of global warming. • Countries could avoid reduc- ronment Commissioner Margot ing their emissions through Wallström called it an effort to The Kyoto Protocol expires at the direct wealth transfers to and/ “level the playing field” economi- end of 2012, and efforts to extend or foreign direct investment in cally.15 Numerous leaders from and, ultimately, to replace it are other nations. exempt, less-developed countries underway. These successor agree- have made it clear that they view ments continue to be the focus of Choosing to negotiate the Kyoto the agreement as something of a multiple international conferences Protocol through a global effort restitution pact and a new source and meetings. Indeed, the Durban proved fatal. It encouraged coun- of foreign aid.16 Climate Change Conference, the tries to make unrealistic demands, 17th meeting of the Conference of link tangential agendas to the Unsurprisingly, and to its credit, Parties to the UNFCCC, was held negotiations, and game the system the United States (the world’s larg- in November/December 2011 to to minimize their own responsi- est GHG emitter at the time of the “advance, in a balanced fashion, bilities. Even accepting all IPCC Kyoto negotiations) never became the implementation of the Con- model assumptions, the net result vention and the Kyoto Protocol, as of these loopholes is that the Kyoto well as the Bali Action Plan, agreed 14 Jacques Chirac, plenary address at the Sixth Protocol would do virtually noth- Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework at COP 13 in 2007, and the Cancun ing to reduce emissions in covered Convention on Climate Change, , Agreements, reached at COP 16 countries, would do nothing at all November 20, 2000. last December.”17 15 Stephen Castle, “EU Sends Strong Warning to reduce them globally, and would to Bush Over Emissions,” The have no detectable impact on Independent, March 19, 2001, p. 14. Little was expected to result from climate change. But, by assuming 16 For example, one Chinese diplomat said, the conference, and those low ex- “Negotiations on a new treaty to fight global that the climate was significantly warming will fail if rich nations are not treated as pectations were realized; the Dur- ‘culprits’ and developing countries as ‘victims.’” more sensitive to increases in CO2 ban Climate Change Conference’s Associated Press, “China: Rich ‘Culprits’ on concentrations than appears war- Climate Change,” , 2008. Brazilian grand achievement was a non- ranted, the assumptions also seem President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva weighed in, binding commitment by attend- to have been overly pessimistic. calling the Third World “victims of deforestation” ing nations to reduce greenhouse and “victims of the global warming.” “Although Lula admitted the importance of preserving the gas emissions under the Durban In the end, the treaty became environment, he said it was necessary to take Platform for Enhanced Action. less about reducing global GHG into consideration the social and economic In essence, the attending nations needs of local .” Xinhua News, emissions than about advanc- “Brazilian President Says Rich Countries Do Not agreed to continue the process Follow Kyoto Protocol,” People’s Daily (Beijing), without making any firm commit- February 22, 2008, http://english.people.com. ments to actually do anything. But 13 For a more technical discussion of these cn/90001/90777/90852/6358958.html pollution reductions, see Mark Winskel, “When (accessed April 12, 2012). Lula also complained the U.N., environmental NGOs, Systems Are Overthrown: The ‘Dash for Gas’ that “rich countries consume 80 percent of the and many countries have too much in the British Electricity Supply Industry,” natural resources of the planet. They have to Social Studies of Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (August pay a trade-off to poor countries for them to 2002), pp. 563–598, and P. Klingenberger, conserve the environment.” Reuters, “ Urges “The Electricity Supply Industry in Rich to Fund Environment Reform,” February 22, 17 United Nations, “Durban Climate Change After Unification,” IEE Colloquium on Electricity 2008, http://www.uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/ Conference—November/December 2011,” 2012, Supply Utilities—Experience Under Privatisation, idUKN2145533820080222 (accessed April 13, http://unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/ February 18, 1992. 2012). meeting/6245.php (accessed April 12, 2012).

6 Environmental Conservation: Eight Principles of the American Conservation Ethic invested in global environmental the Secretariat of the production all rights over those resources and regulation to abandon the effort, or use of DDT or the intention to to technologies, and by appropri- and they succeeded in getting a use DDT,”18 even though assertions ate funding.”20 The peril lies in the commitment to negotiate “a proto- about its destructive environmen- interpretation of “appropriate,” col, another legal instrument or an tal effects have been disproved or because the CBD also instructs agreed outcome with legal force” found to be grossly exaggerated parties to act according to the pre- by 2015 with the intention of hav- and despite its effectiveness in cautionary principle. ing it enter into force by 2020. combating malaria.19 The precautionary principle The Kyoto experience is a caution- Moreover, even though the U.S. requires that a good, substance, ary tale. Engaging in extended has yet to ratify the treaty, it has or activity be presumed harmful global negotiations on environ- provided a pathway for pressur- unless its proponents demonstrate mental agreements can lend ing the United States to expand that it will cause no harm. This legitimacy to a counterproductive America’s list of banned substanc- perniciously shifts the burden of approach for addressing interna- es. One target is to ban industrial proof and imposes a nearly impos- tional environmental issues. uses of chlorine, a building block of sible standard of proving “safety.” modern chemistry. Such a ban was For example, the 2000 Cartagena Beyond Kyoto floated in the United States early Protocol on Biosafety, which was in the Clinton Administration but produced under the auspices of Kyoto is not the only example of was rejected by Congress. Those the CBD, requires member nations multilateral environmental agree- seeking restrictions on chlorine to enact regulatory policies that ments that should raise concerns. use have sought to use the POPs are based on the precautionary Other agreements could be used treaty to circumvent congressional principle and that are specific to in unanticipated ways to influence opposition by citing the authority the products of the newest, most policy in the U.S. and, once estab- of an international treaty. precise, and predictable products lished, are difficult to reverse. of biotechnology.21 Consequently, Another example is the Conven- countries establishing such regula- One example is the Stockholm tion on Biological Diversity. This tory policies rarely approve these Convention on Persistent Organic convention cites three main goals: products because “precautionary” (POPs), which seeks promoting conservation of bio- policies provide regulators easy to ban certain chemicals that are diversity, sustainable use of its justifications to block approval— purported to damage the environ- components, and fair and equita- objections based on wholly conjec- ment. The United States signed ble sharing of benefits from using tural concerns from anti-growth, the treaty in 2001 but has not genetic resources “by appropriate anti-population, and anti-technol- ratified it. The treaty was relatively access to genetic resources and by ogy interest groups in the envi- uncontroversial at first, banning appropriate transfer of relevant ronmentalist movement. These or restricting use of 12 chemi- technologies, taking into account unsupportable, anti-innovation cals, most of which the United policies have led to trade disputes States had already prohibited or and delays in regulatory approval 18 Stockholm Convention, “Overview: Dichloro- regulated. Another nine chemi- diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT),” http://chm. of agricultural and industrial cals have since been added. Once pops.int/Implementation/DDT/Overview/ tabid/378/Default.aspx (accessed April 12, chemicals are listed by POPs, the 2012). 20 Convention on Biological Diversity, at www. action is very difficult to reverse. 19 Richard Tren and Roger Bate, Malaria and the cbd.int/convention/convention.shtml (accessed For example, DDT continues to be DDT Story (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, April 12, 2012). 2001), http://www.fightingmalaria.org/pdfs/ 21 Henry I. Miller and Greg Conko, “The Protocol’s a restricted substance under POPs, malaria_and_DDT_story_IEA.pdf (accessed Illusionary Principle,” Nature Biotechnology, Vol. and parties are “required to notify April 12, 2012). 18, No. 4 (April 2000), p. 360.

Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy 7 products and provide a real-world is often rewarded with additional U.N. reports and resolutions that example of the negative conse- resources on the basis that, if identified the problems and pro- quences of violating Principle IV, the organization is not working posed solutions. Regrettably, these which argues that the well-being of properly, it must be due to insuf- efforts are inadequate, and some real people must be given greater ficient resources. As evidence, one have been reversed.24 weight than the well-being of has only to look at the inexorable theoretical ones and that theo- upward expansion of U.N. bud- Third, lines of authority and rized threats must not be granted gets and staff over the past decade responsibility in the U.N. are equivalent stature with established without a corresponding increase generally confused, and one often ones.22 in effectiveness.23 sees multiple U.N. organizations and bodies claiming overlapping Inherent Flaws Second, oversight, transparency, jurisdiction, responsibilities, and and accountability in international purposes. For instance, dozens of Beyond the weaknesses inherent organizations is generally lacking U.N. offices, commissions, funds, in consensus-based global negotia- and often deliberately weak. The programs, agencies, and other bod- tions, the international organiza- U.N. did not have anything resem- ies claim to have environmental tions often charged with enforcing bling an inspector general until protection and sustainable devel- and overseeing the agreements 1994, when the Office of Internal opment among their key objec- are themselves flawed in ways that Oversight Services was created af- tives. They often work jointly on impede effective actions to address ter U.S. demands for such an office, projects; rarely is it evident when international problems. backed by the threat of financial a particular organization, much withholding. Even after this ac- less a particular individual, is re- First, the mechanisms established tion, however, the U.N. lacks a truly sponsible for a particular project. through international agreements independent inspector general as Even more rarely is anyone held or the international organizations it is understood in the U.S., and accountable for failure, ineffective- charged with overseeing those the member states are denied full, ness, misdeeds, or malfeasance. agreements typically operate in a unfettered access to internal U.N. Indeed, the U.N. is still restricting non-competitive, unaccountable audits and documents even though access to documents of the Inde- manner. In key ways, U.N. orga- they pay for the organization and pendent Inquiry Committee into nizations operate as a monopoly. its activities. the United Nations Oil-for-Food Inefficiency and incompetence are Programme in order to prevent not punished by “consumers” of Earlier this decade, three ma- public scrutiny.25 their products or services spurn- jor scandals—the corruption in ing the U.N. and patronizing a the Iraqi Oil-for-Food program, Finally, international organiza- more competent competitor. The sexual abuse committed by U.N. tions are insulated from the types organization, as the designated or peacekeepers, and corruption and of checks and balances that are recognized authority, is often sin- mismanagement in U.N. procure- common to democratic gover- gularly empowered to regulate the ment—spurred calls for stronger nance, particularly by the absence product or service in question. oversight and accountability. The scandals provoked a series of Failure seldom reaps conse- 24 Ibid. 25 United Nations Secretariat, “Disposition quences. On the contrary, failure 23 Brett D. Schaefer, “United Nations: Urgent of the Documents of the Independent Inquiry Problems That Need Congressional Action,” Committee into the United Nations Oil-for- Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1177, February Food Programme,” Secretary-General’s Bulletin, 22 David Adam, “UN Attempts to Boost Biosafety 3, 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/ ST/SGB/2006/16/Amend.3, November 2, in Developing World,” Nature Biotechnology, Vol. lecture/2011/02/united-nations-urgent- 2011, http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/ST- 415, No. 6870 (January 24, 2002), p. 353. problems-that-need-congressional-action. SGB-2006-16.pdf (accessed April 12, 2012).

8 Environmental Conservation: Eight Principles of the American Conservation Ethic of an electorate to change the sta- tus quo when officials act contrary to the public interest. Internation- al bureaucrats have no constitu- ency beyond their superiors. U.N. officials are rewarded for making the bureaucratic machinery run. The tangible products of their ef- forts are reports, guidelines, white papers, and meetings. Production often matters more than quality, relevance, or feasibility.

A related phenomenon is what the leader of a prominent national delegation to the Codex biotech task force called “glamour fever.” This refers to the participants becoming so enamored of the trap- pings of the meetings (the formali- ties, deferential treatment, travel, expensive hotels, media atten- tion) that they wish to prolong the experience and repeat it as often as possible. Indeed, one of the most common recommendations aris- ing from international conferences is to hold a follow-up conference. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that U.N officials, programs, and projects are characterized by egregious examples of arrogance, corruption, and incompetence.26

26 Schaefer, “United Nations: Urgent Problems That Need Congressional Action.”

Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy 9 Recommendations Preserve and defend the treaty Reduce U.S. involvement with process. By entering into treaty U.N. environmental bodies. Some U.N. organizations serve Quite simply, global negotia- commitments, the U.S. govern- limited and useful roles in ad- tions on environmental issues ment cedes some level of sover- dressing environmental issues, often move counter to the prac- eignty, as well as the checks and particularly the more technical ticalities of resolving them. balances of the U.S. constitutional agencies and treaty-monitoring The obsessive drive to address system. Thus, pursuing treaties is bodies. For instance, the Inter- international environmental a serious responsibility, a fact fur- national Maritime Organization problems—real, imagined, or ther evidenced by the Founding helps develop and monitor con- exaggerated—solely through the Fathers’ requirement that two- ventions focused on reducing U.N. or other global forums less- thirds of the Senate consent to a 27 En- marine pollution and does so in ens the effectiveness of proposed treaty prior to . vironmental advocates have long a focused and apolitical man- responses. been frustrated by the inability ner—for the most part. However, of various international environ- as discussed in the case of the This is a direct assault on Prin- mental agreements to pass Senate UNFCCC, these bodies can fall ciple VI, which articulates that muster, so they advocate avoiding victim to politicized agendas and the most effective management the supermajority requirement other flaws that undermine their will be as local as possible be- by substituting executive agree- objectivity and ability to ad- cause it will be more flexible, ments. This ploy undermines the dress environmental issues. The specialized to local concerns system of checks and balances in U.S. should reevaluate the costs and circumstances, and able to the U.S. government and mocks and benefits of membership in secure local buy-in. It enables constitutional intent. these bodies and target its sup- marginally affected parties to port on specific projects, ideally hold discussions and proposals Along these same lines, the Unit- through voluntary—rather than hostage to tangential issues, such ed States should end the practice assessed—contributions that are as wealth transfers to develop- of leaving signed but unratified demonstrably useful or vital to ing countries. It also allows some treaties unresolved. Instead, this U.S. interests. countries to game the system to nation should, as a standard prac- avoid shouldering burdens in a tice—assuming that the Senate Limit negotiating parties to key way that is commensurate with has not given its advice and con- nations. During negotiations to their passion and rhetoric. sent within a reasonable period— address an international envi- notify the treaty depository or ronmental (or any other) issue, By agreeing to address “global” other relevant authority that the the incentives, constituencies, environmental problems through United States does not intend to and alliances that could under- global negotiations, the United ratify the treaty and no longer has mine an effective negotiation States frequently places its nego- any legal obligations arising from increase with the number of ex- tiators in a position of weakness. its signature.28 traneous parties participating in The result is often an ineffective, the talks. The U.N. is not the only costly initiative that unneces- venue in which to address inter- sarily demands that the United 27 U.S. Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2. 28 The Vienna Convention and customary national environmental efforts. States cede control over some state that the signatories Other multilateral options for element of its own economic and should not undertake actions inconsistent with discussion exist including estab- individual liberties. In order to signed treaties, which gives such documents influence over U.S. foreign and domestic policy lished forums, like the G-20 and break this cycle, the U.S. must: even though they have not been ratified.

10 Environmental Conservation: Eight Principles of the American Conservation Ethic the Organization for Economic tive,” it leads countries to im- If the United States is to pursue Co-operation and Development pede approval of products based international environmental (OECD), or ad hoc efforts, which on unsubstantiated objections agreements that support—rather can bring key parties together from the anti-growth, anti- than undermine—its interests, to agree to realistic, achievable population, and anti-technology it must reevaluate its policies steps. In the context of a pur- elements of the environmental through the lens of the prin- portedly binding agreement, the movement. In addition, the ciples articulated in this volume inclusion only of parties that are precautionary principle and the and apply them to international necessary to an agreement is the treaties that incorporate it pro- environmental issues, multilat- approach most likely to yield a vide countries with an excuse to eral environmental treaties, and focused, effective outcome. shirk their General Agreement international environmental on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organizations. In some cases, Oppose the precautionary prin- and World Trade Organization environmental matters with in- ciple and other open-ended (WTO) obligations to base trade ternational implications merit principles that lend themselves regulations (e.g., sanitary and multilateral negotiation. In many to manipulation and abuse or are phytosanitary) on demonstrated instances, however, working out- otherwise flawed. The precau- scientific concerns. The United side a “global” framework may tionary principle perniciously States should challenge the va- prove more effective in address- shifts the burden of proof for lidity and application of the pre- ing international environmental restricting a substance or activ- cautionary principle and other problems, thereby benefiting ity from demonstrating that it concepts like “ecocide” that lend both the United States and the causes harm to proving that it themselves to politicization and global environment. will cause no harm. But because abuse. it is difficult to prove a “nega-

Fixing the Flawed U.N. Approach to International Environmental Policy 11