DOCSLIB.ORG

Tactics in Counterinsurgency

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM FMI 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98) I Tactics in Counterinsurgency MARCH 2009 HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited. * FMI 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98) Field Manual Interim Headquarters Department of the Army No. 3-24.2 Washington, DC,_____________ Tactics in Counterinsurgency Contents Page PREFACE ................................................................................................................. viii INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................... ix Chapter 1 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ...........................1-1 Section I—OVERVIEW.............................................................................................1-1 Insurgency...........................................................................................................1-1 Counterinsurgency..............................................................................................1-2 Influences on Current Operational Environments...............................................1-2 Section II—OPERATIONAL AND MISSION VARIABLES .....................................1-3 Operational Variables .........................................................................................1-3 Mission Variables................................................................................................1-6 Section III—ANALYSIS OF CIVIL CONSIDERATIONS USING ASCOPE.............1-8 Methodology........................................................................................................1-8 Civil Considerations Overlay.............................................................................1-10 Civil Consideration Matrixes .............................................................................1-10 Section IV—EFFECTS ...........................................................................................1-17 Prerequisites .....................................................................................................1-17 Root Causes .....................................................................................................1-18 Section V—CULTURAL COMPETENCE AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ...1-19 Culture...............................................................................................................1-19 Cultural Capability.............................................................................................1-24 Cultural Proficiency Levels................................................................................1-25 Culturally Influenced Situational Awareness ....................................................1-26 Chapter 2 FOUNDATIONS OF INSURGENCY.........................................................................2-1 Section I—OVERVIEW.............................................................................................2-1 Components........................................................................................................2-1 Manifestations.....................................................................................................2-1 Historical Insurgency...........................................................................................2-2 Section II—ELEMENTS ...........................................................................................2-2 Leaders ...............................................................................................................2-3 Guerrillas.............................................................................................................2-4 Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. * This publication supersedes FM 90-8, 29 August 1986 and FM 7-98, 19 October 1992. FMI 3-24.2 i Contents Underground....................................................................................................... 2-4 Auxiliaries ........................................................................................................... 2-4 Mass Base.......................................................................................................... 2-5 Example.............................................................................................................. 2-5 Section III—DYNAMICS .......................................................................................... 2-5 Leadership.......................................................................................................... 2-6 Objective............................................................................................................. 2-7 Ideology .............................................................................................................. 2-9 Environment and Geography ........................................................................... 2-11 External Support............................................................................................... 2-11 Internal Support ................................................................................................ 2-12 Phasing and Timing.......................................................................................... 2-15 Organizational and Operational Patterns ......................................................... 2-16 Section IV—STRATEGIES .................................................................................... 2-16 Urban Strategy ................................................................................................. 2-17 Military-Focused Strategy................................................................................. 2-17 Protracted Popular War Strategy ..................................................................... 2-17 Identity-Focused Strategy ................................................................................ 2-18 Conspiratorial Strategy..................................................................................... 2-18 Section V—TACTICS ............................................................................................ 2-20 Violent Tactics .................................................................................................. 2-20 Nonviolent Tactics ............................................................................................ 2-23 Section VI—STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES .......................................... 2-24 Strengths .......................................................................................................... 2-24 Vulnerabilities ................................................................................................... 2-25 Chapter 3 FOUNDATIONS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ...................................................... 3-1 Section I—OVERVIEW ............................................................................................ 3-1 Definition of Counterinsurgency ......................................................................... 3-1 Goal of Counterinsurgency Operations.............................................................. 3-1 Foreign Internal Defense.................................................................................... 3-2 Internal Defense and Development.................................................................... 3-2 Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational.......................................... 3-2 Interagency Coordination in COIN ..................................................................... 3-5 Lines of Effort in Counterinsurgency .................................................................. 3-7 Section II—HISTORICAL THEORIES..................................................................... 3-9 Robert Thompson's Principles for Successful COIN.......................................... 3-9 David Galula’s Four Laws for Successful COIN................................................. 3-9 Charles Callwell’s Ideas for Successful COIN ................................................. 3-10 Section III—TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS........................................................ 3-10 Terrain .............................................................................................................. 3-10 Troops .............................................................................................................. 3-14 Section IV—CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD OPERATIONS.............................................. 3-17 Overview........................................................................................................... 3-18 Clear ................................................................................................................. 3-19 Hold .................................................................................................................. 3-20 Build.................................................................................................................. 3-21 ii FMI 3-24.2 Contents Section V—OTHER MAJOR COIN TACTICAL OPERATIONS............................3-23 Strike Operations ..............................................................................................3-23 Populace and Resource Control Operations ....................................................3-24 Section VI—PHASES.............................................................................................3-27 Initial Response Phase .....................................................................................3-27
Load more

Recommended publications
  • How Technology Impacts Doctrine in Asymmetric Warfare
    0 How Technology Impacts Doctrine in Asymmetric Warfare Jeremiah Rozman Northfield Vermont Bachelors of Arts, University of Vermont, 2014 A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Foreign Affairs University of Virginia May, 2016 1 Abstract How does technology impact military doctrine, and how does this in turn impact political support for offensive, preventative or preemptive military action?1 I study defensive weapons systems, specifically focusing on missile defense in the theoretical context of technology and defense-based strategies as a whole. Through the study of Israel’s use of Iron Dome, I aim to demonstrate that technology can be an exogenous factor affecting military doctrine. Through careful case study analysis, I demonstrate that operationally successful defensive technologies can lead to the adoption of a defensive military doctrine by decreasing the political cost of inaction to the extent that allowing attrition becomes politically less costly than launching an offensive. Introduction A comparison of Israel’s two recent wars in Gaza, Operation Cast Lead in 2008/9 and Operation Protective Edge in 2014, indicates that the tactical success of Iron Dome, as a defensive military technology, can effect a change in military doctrine. The goal of this study is to demonstrate the effect of an unexpectedly successful defensive military technology on military doctrine, an effect which leads to prioritizing defense, allowing attrition, and moving away from a long-standing offense-based doctrine, specifically when dealing with asymmetric conflict. This study focuses on Israel, specifically in the Gaza theater of conflict and not in the Northern theater of conflict where Israel’s adversary, Hezbollah is 1 Preemptive war is defined as actor A launching a first strike in order to gain advantage in a situation where an attack by actor B is anticipated to be imminent.
    [Show full text]
  • Britton, Theodore R. Jr. – 1981
    The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Ralph J Bunch Legacy: Minority Officers AMBASSADOR THEODORE R. BRITTON, JR. Interviewed by: Ruth Stutts Njiiri Initial interview date: July 16, 1981 Copyri ht 2008 ADST TABLE OF CONTENTS Ambassador to Barbados and Grenada' Special Representative to Antigua, Dominica, St Christopher-,evis-Anguilla, St Lucia, and St -incent 1.70-1.77 Bac1ground of appointment Barbados environment 2S presence and facilities Relations Foreign diplomatic community Family Being a blac1 Ambassador Embassy staff Relations with State Department Marriott Corporation Consular offices Loss of son South Carolina and New 5or1 bac1ground ,omination as Ambassador H2D in South Carolina Residence in New 5or1 City Confirmation Hearing Government officials British Cubans 2S Airline problem Grenada relations Churches Personal sources of inspiration The 6ueen7s visit Family INTERVIEW 1 &: This is an interview with Ambassador Theodore R. Britton, Jr. as part of a Phelps, Sto-es Fund oral history project on former Blac- Chiefs of Mission, funded by the Ford .oundation. Ambassador Britton served in Barbados and the State of 1renada and as 2.S. Special Representative to the States of Anti ua, Dominica, St. Christopher, Nevis, An uilla, St. Lucia and St. 4incent. He served in these countries from 1977 to 1977. He is presently Actin Assistant to the Secretary for International Affairs, Department of 5ousin and 2rban Development. The interview is bein conducted on Thursday, July 16, 1981 in the
    [Show full text]
  • Highlights of Recent RAND Research on Counterinsurgency
    Highlights of Recent RAND Research on Counterinsurgency For more information, contact Shirley Ruhe, Director of Congressional Relations, at 703-413-1100, x5632 or [email protected], or Kurt Card, National Security Legislative Analyst, at 703-413-1100 x5259 or [email protected] As the leading research authority on counterinsurgency, the RAND Corporation has developed a wide selection of materials for policy makers. With multiple insurgencies operating in several theaters this research was developed to provide a historical, geographical, and functional understanding of past and present insurgencies and counterinsurgency operations. Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together Darcy Noricks et al., 2009 This report from an interdisciplinary project to survey and integrate the scholarly social- science literature relevant to counterterrorism answers questions related to why some individuals become terrorists, how terrorists generate public support, how terrorist organizations make decisions, and why individuals disengage. A Stability Police Force for the United States Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities Terrence K. Kelly et al., 2009 Establishing security is the sine qua non of stability operations, since it is a prerequisite for reconstruction and development. Security requires a mix of military and police forces to deal with a range of threats from insurgents to criminal organizations. This research examines the creation of a high-end police force, which the authors call a Stability Police Force. 1 Underkill Scalable Capabilities for Military Operations amid Populations David C. Gompert et al., 2009 The battle for Gaza revealed an extremist strategy: hiding in cities and provoking attack to cause civilian deaths that can be blamed on the attacking forces.
    [Show full text]
  • The Use of Helicopters Against Guerrillas the Israeli Model
    JEMEAA - FEATURE The Use of Helicopters against Guerrillas The Israeli Model DR. TAL TOVY ince its establishment, the State of Israel has been facing a bloody struggle against terrorism and guerrilla warfare, in addition to four conventional wars.1 The Israeli war against guerrilla fighters or terrorists began almost Simmediately after the War of Independence. Palestinian terrorists attempted to infiltrate Israel from the surrounding Arab countries and perform sabotage ac- tions near the border, which were little more than lines drawn on a map and proved wholly inadequate in stopping the infiltrations. After the 1967 war, most terrorists crossed over from Jordan. Following the “Black September” conflict in 1970 and up until 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee), most terrorists infiltrated through the Lebanese border. In the 1980s and 1990s, Israel fought against the Shiite Amal Movement and Hezbollah organization in Lebanon. Since October 2000, Israel has struggled against widespread military uprisings in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To counter these activities, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) uses various opera- tional methods. Special Forces have raided known terrorist bases and routine se- curity activities have been conducted along the borders and in the major cities. A third method has been targeting specific terrorist leaders or installations in the Middle East and in Europe. Most operations of the first and third categories are still classified. The IDF has launched a few large attacks targeting terrorist infra- structure—for example Karameh and Litany—with the most extensive one being the Lebanon War (1982), at least initially. In these large-scale operations, Israel has deployed massive infantry, armor, and artillery forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Cartoon Animals Vs. Actual Russians: Russian Television and the Dynamics of Global Cultural Exchange 2021
    Repositorium für die Medienwissenschaft Jeffrey Brassard Cartoon Animals vs. Actual Russians: Russian Television and the Dynamics of Global Cultural Exchange 2021 https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/16243 Veröffentlichungsversion / published version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Brassard, Jeffrey: Cartoon Animals vs. Actual Russians: Russian Television and the Dynamics of Global Cultural Exchange. In: VIEW. Journal of European Television History and Culture, Jg. 10 (2021), Nr. 19, S. 4– 15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25969/mediarep/16243. Erstmalig hier erschienen / Initial publication here: https://doi.org/http://doi.org/10.18146/view.252 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer Creative Commons - This document is made available under a creative commons - Namensnennung - Weitergabe unter gleichen Bedingungen 4.0/ Attribution - Share Alike 4.0/ License. For more information see: Lizenz zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu dieser Lizenz https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ finden Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ volume 10 issue 19/2021 CARTOON ANIMALS VS. ACTUAL RUSSIANS RUSSIAN TELEVISION AND THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE Jeffrey Brassard University of Alberta [email protected] Abstract: Despite continual improvements in production and writing quality, live-action Russian series have fared poorly in the global market. While many deals have been struck, Western remakes of Russian series have failed to appear, and live-action programs have failed to find mainstream audiences outside of Russia. Russian animated series, on the other hand, have enjoyed global success. The success and failure of different types of Russian series in the global media market suggests that many of the central problems of cultural exchange remain.
    [Show full text]
  • Asymmetric Warfare - the Siege of Fallujah
    ASYMMETRIC WARFARE - THE SIEGE OF FALLUJAH Csér Orsolya Abstract: Asymmetric warfare is a tactical process based on policy objectives which can be used to force our will upon the enemy. The non-traditional, inexpensive actions involving material damage and human casualties (such as terrorism, deployment of weapons of mass destruction, threat of using them, information warfare); guerrilla- and partisan-type raids implemented with simple tools and techniques are considered its basic advantages. All these are usually the weapons of the party fighting in the occupied territories (eg. bombings, suicide attacks, actions against logistics, command posts, attacks against officers, command staff, destruction of supply routes and transportation routes). The detection of these weapons and the psychological preparation of the soldiers is very difficult, because the offenders do not comply with the conventions of warfare. The siege of Fallujah in Iraq, which wrote itself into the history books as one of the most infamous and serious insurgencies and in which the media and propaganda played a major role, is regarded as an example of asymmetric warfare. Keywords: asymmetry, insurgency, guerrilla, civilians, civilian victim, propaganda, military gain 1. Introduction Asymmetry doesn't mean anything other than the lack of symmetry between the belligerents, partially or wholly. Asymmetric warfare is: "A warfare for the sake of precisely outlined political aims, often based on ideological, religious, ethnic community of several organizations, implementing military and non-military operations, tactics and techniques building upon direct and indirect effects and intensifying each other's effects, endangering different dimensions of security, mainly tactical procedures, with whose effect altogether we may force our will upon the enemy." All of this is such an activity that can be connected to asymmetric challenges, when the executors - in most cases not even sparing their own lives - execute military actions, and is usually done against a belligerent on a higher technological level.
    [Show full text]
  • Winston-Salem News SATURDAY
    Winston-Salem News SATURDAY ENDURANCE RESULTS FUN GAMES TODAY The kudos, bragging rights, and Day two is all about fun. Beginning cash prizes go to: at 1pm today in the main hall, the fun games will be held in the • Fewest throws with three following order. Each new game objects: Andrew Ruiz will begin immediately after the • Club-passing endurance (eight end of the previous game. clubs or more): Florian & Michael Canaval 1. 3-ball Simon Says • 7-ball endurance: Doug Sayers 2. Club-balance endurance • One-devil stick propeller 3. 3-club Simon Says endurance: Dylan Waickman 4. Quarters juggling • 5-ring endurance: Doug Sayers 5. 2-diabolo combat • Cigar box takeout speed race: 6. Huggling endurance (by popular Adam Kuchler request!) • Five-club endurance: Daniel 7. 3-ball blind Ledel 8. Club collect* • 1-diabolo infinite suicide 9. Club combat* endurance: Ted Joblin 10. Volley club semi-finals and • 5-ball endurance: Jack Denger finals DJ TONIGHT! *Run at the same time (they’re Tonight from 8pm till midnight, going to need a lot of clubs). come to the “Renegade room” for a par-tay! We’ll have a DJ, and a BIG TOSS UP cash bar until 12. Bring glow props After the games, bring your props if you want to rave it up, or leave to the main gym, where the IJA your toys and come dance the night will take an awesome photo of tons away. of stuff in the air. We suggest ducking before it all comes down. PEOPLE’S CHOICE Voting stays open till 2pm, and the The average two-year-old child is winner will be announced half of his or her adult height.
    [Show full text]
  • The Quandary of Allied Logistics from D-Day to the Rhine
    THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 Director: Dr. Wade G. Dudley Program in American History, Department of History This thesis analyzes the Allied campaign in Europe from the D-Day landings to the crossing of the Rhine to argue that, had American and British forces given the port of Antwerp priority over Operation Market Garden, the war may have ended sooner. This study analyzes the logistical system and the strategic decisions of the Allied forces in order to explore the possibility of a shortened European campaign. Three overall ideas are covered: logistics and the broad-front strategy, the importance of ports to military campaigns, and the consequences of the decisions of the Allied commanders at Antwerp. The analysis of these points will enforce the theory that, had Antwerp been given priority, the war in Europe may have ended sooner. THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History By Parker Andrew Roberson November, 2018 © Parker Roberson, 2018 THE QUANDARY OF ALLIED LOGISTICS FROM D-DAY TO THE RHINE By Parker Andrew Roberson APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS: Dr. Wade G. Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Gerald J. Prokopowicz, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER: Dr. Michael T. Bennett, Ph.D. CHAIR OF THE DEP ARTMENT OF HISTORY: Dr. Christopher Oakley, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL: Dr. Paul J.
    [Show full text]
  • The Crucial Development of Heavy Cavalry Under Herakleios and His Usage of Steppe Nomad Tactics Mark-Anthony Karantabias
    The Crucial Development of Heavy Cavalry under Herakleios and His Usage of Steppe Nomad Tactics Mark-Anthony Karantabias The last war between the Eastern Romans and the Sassanids was likely the most important of Late Antiquity, exhausting both sides economically and militarily, decimating the population, and lay- ing waste the land. In Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Walter Kaegi, concludes that the Romaioi1 under Herakleios (575-641) defeated the Sassanian forces with techniques from the section “Dealing with the Persians”2 in the Strategikon, a hand book for field commanders authored by the emperor Maurice (reigned 582-602). Although no direct challenge has been made to this claim, Trombley and Greatrex,3 while inclided to agree with Kaegi’s main thesis, find fault in Kaegi’s interpretation of the source material. The development of the katafraktos stands out as a determining factor in the course of the battles during Herakleios’ colossal counter-attack. Its reforms led to its superiority over its Persian counterpart, the clibonarios. Adoptions of steppe nomad equipment crystallized the Romaioi unit. Stratos4 and Bivar5 make this point, but do not expand their argument in order to explain the victory of the emperor over the Sassanian Empire. The turning point in its improvement seems to have taken 1 The Eastern Romans called themselves by this name. It is the Hellenized version of Romans, the Byzantine label attributed to the surviving East Roman Empire is artificial and is a creation of modern historians. Thus, it is more appropriate to label them by the original version or the Anglicized version of it.
    [Show full text]
  • State Defense Force Times Winter 2020
    State Defense Force Times Message from the President Winter 2020 MG Jay Coggan • Increase our external California State Guard communications to educate the public and government at all First, as we start off a new year, let me levels as to our mission congratulate BG Hayhurst and BG • Expand training opportunities Santiago for a great annual conference in across the country and online Biloxi, MS. Unfortunately, prior California State Guard commitments kept Internal communications have been me from attending, but I received great driven mostly by our web, newsletter, and feedback from our members. Your periodic announcements. We will be dedication and work is appreciated! updating our email capabilities to provide As we move into 2020 we have the more relevant and timely information to opportunity to build on our past success our members. To make this effort and make this a transformative year. My successful, I ask that each member please singular mission focus for SAGUS this go to their member profile in the SGAUS year is to improve our communications to web site make sure your contact and make us the most effective organization email information is current. We are that we can be. My key strategies to establishing a team to evaluate and accomplish this goal are: implement new strategies for internal communications. More information on • Improve our communications with this effort will be forthcoming. members 1 Now, regarding external communications, opportunity for SGAUS to SDF help our I firmly believe that this year SGAUS can respective states deal with this issue. take it to the next level in how we make It’s never too early to start planning for ourselves known outside our association the 2020 SAGUS Annual Conference.
    [Show full text]
  • Is Castro's Cuba a Budding Narcostate?
    Vol. 20, No. 4 April 2012 In the News Despite fall in U.S. food exports to Cuba, Advertising everywhere shipments of beans edge up every year Competition heats up in Cuba’s rapidly BY VITO ECHEVARRÍA It was also the same year Pat Wallesen visited decentralizing economy ................Page 3 he Cubans haven’t bought a single grain Cuba for the first time. Wallesen is managing of American rice for years. But when it partner of WestStar Food Co. in Corpus Christi, Tcomes to U.S. beans, state purchasing a major U.S. exporter of dry beans. SEC pressures Telefónica agency Alimport can’t seem to get enough. “The Cubans are opportunistic buyers,” said Spanish telecom giant is hounded over its According to USDA figures, dry bean exports Wallesen, telling CubaNews that global commo- business interests in Cuba ............Page 4 to Cuba reached $7.7 million last year, up from dity prices have fluctuated not only for beans lately, but other crops as well. He put total annu- $5.6 million in 2010 and $4.3 million in 2009. al dry bean purchases at 45,000 metric tons. Political briefs That’s still a lot less than the record $10.9 mil- “They buy when the time is right. They buy lion worth of beans sold in 2006, though dra- from the U.S. between November and Febru- Rubio lifts hold on Jacobson nomination; matically more than in 2007 and 2008, when U.S. Miami-Dade proposal under fire ...Page 5 ary,” he said. WestStar Foods sometimes sup- farmers exported only $73,000 and $68,000 plies the Cubans with its own inventory of worth of beans to Cuba (see chart, page 3).
    [Show full text]
  • The Juggler of Notre Dame and the Medievalizing of Modernity VOLUME 6: WAR and PEACE, SEX and VIOLENCE
    The Juggler of Notre Dame and the Medievalizing of Modernity VOLUME 6: WAR AND PEACE, SEX AND VIOLENCE JAN M. ZIOLKOWSKI To access digital resources including: blog posts videos online appendices and to purchase copies of this book in: hardback paperback ebook editions Go to: https://www.openbookpublishers.com/product/822 Open Book Publishers is a non-profit independent initiative. We rely on sales and donations to continue publishing high-quality academic works. THE JUGGLER OF NOTRE DAME VOLUME 6 The Juggler of Notre Dame and the Medievalizing of Modernity Vol. 6: War and Peace, Sex and Violence Jan M. Ziolkowski https://www.openbookpublishers.com © 2018 Jan M. Ziolkowski This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC BY 4.0). This license allows you to share, copy, distribute and transmit the work; to adapt the work and to make commercial use of the work providing attribution is made to the author (but not in any way that suggests that he endorses you or your use of the work). Attribution should include the following information: Jan M. Ziolkowski, The Juggler of Notre Dame and the Medievalizing of Modernity. Vol. 6: War and Peace, Sex and Violence. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2018, https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0149 Copyright and permissions for the reuse of many of the images included in this publication differ from the above. Copyright and permissions information for images is provided separately in the List of Illustrations. Every effort has been made to identify and contact copyright holders and any omission or error will be corrected if notification is made to the publisher.
    [Show full text]