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ClCRl'D-Committee for International Cooperation iQfiHhléïfiational Organization "fòf . , .; in National Research in Demography •„ IMPACT OF MIGRATION IN THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES

Edited by LA.Kosinski

SWITZERLAND W. Leimgruber

CICRED Committee for International Cooperation IOM International Organization for Migration in National Research in Demography ISBN 92-9068-037-7

Published by: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION IOM P. O. Box 71, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland

GENEVA 1992 FOREWORD

This volume contains one of several country monographs prepared as part of a research project co-sponsored by the Committee for International Co-operation in National Research in Demography (CICRED) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

The focus of this project was to analyze the impact of international migration upon receiving countries. It was launched in 1988 when a previous project concerned with the impact of international migration upon sending countries was reaching its final stage. In response to a call by CICRED to its member-centres some thirty institutes carrying out research in demography indicated their interest in participation and sent representatives to the initial meeting held in Geneva in 1988 at IOM Headquarters. Eighteen centres/authors committed themselves to prepare country reports. It was agreed that they would follow as far as possible a common outline. The authors were asked to describe in general terms migration trends, available data sources, and existing legislation in the country under study. They were to look at the demographic, social and cultural as well as economic and political impact of migration upon receiving societies. Finally, they were encouraged to discern trends and discuss possible future scenarios. The project extended over several years and in the process some authors dropped out while other centres were added. Ultimately, ten manuscripts were received. They have been carefully edited by the co-ordinator of the project, Leszek A. Kosinski, of the University of Alberta, Canada, and are appearing in full in this series of IOM research reports. Two national reports (for France and the Netherlands) were published separately in different series, but the link between them and the rest of the project was duly acknowledged. In addition to national reports, a comparative study compiled by the co-ordinator, in co-operation with Léon Tabah and Jean-Pierre Gonnot will be published separately. In preparing their synthesis, Prof. L. A. Kosinski and his associates relied not only on these reports, but also on current literature on the subject.

Both sponsoring agencies appreciate the efforts of individual authors and their centres. We thank the co-ordinator for his effort over the years resulting in a final product which is now reaching the interested reader in presentable form. We hope that this set of reports will represent a timely and professionally competent contribution to the contemporary debate on international migration and its consequences.

James N. Purcell, Jr. Léon Tabah Director General Chairman International Organization Committee for International for Migration (IOM) Cooperation in National Geneva Research in Demography (CICRED) Paris

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Leszek A. Kosinski Co-ordinator of the Project

The importance of international migration and the public perception of this phenomenon have varied greatly over the years. Visibility of the problems associated with transnational mobility and concern among policy makers and the public at large depended not only on the changing size of the flows, but also on the perceived impact of migration, either upon receiving societies or upon sending communities, or both.

The last decade placed movement of people once again very highly on the international agenda. Massive displacements, both voluntary and involuntary, reached levels unheard of in the past. Relative ease of communication and travel as well globalization of contemporary life made long-distance moves so much easier than in the past. This has created conditions for unexpected encounters between people belonging to very distant cultures which in turn increased the potential for conflicts, particularly in periods of economic downturn.

It could be said that, as far as migration is concerned, the 'brain drain1 seems to have been the main preoccupation in the 1970's, illegal immigration was the main concern of the 1980's, influx of asylum seekers and backlash against strangers seem to be the major topic of the present decade. In addition to the old terms such as immigration quotas, displaced persons, economic refugees - the readers of both scholarly reports and popular press are likely to encounter relatively new expressions such as boat people, illegal (undocumented) migrants, environmental migrants or refugees, asylum-seekers, non-convention refugees, potential migrants etc. Expansion of terminology reflects the more complex reality of today. The media in industrial countries is full of sensational and frequently inaccurate stories. Attempts to come to terms with mounting problems and to devise policies appropriate for the present times resulted in a number of international meetings, ranging from technical seminars of experts to high-level ministerial get-togethers. These meetings generated considerable interest and produced substantial documentation (some of which appears eventually in a printed form). Some of them may result in modification of existing policies or introduction of new measures. Much of these activities were in response to mounting public concerns and the need to react rapidly or at least to be seen to be doing something.

On the other hand encouragement is being given to a long-term sustained research efforts aimed at creating a body of knowledge to be used on both national and international scales. The CICRED/IOM project represents one such attempt involving over thirty individuals from a dozen countries. It should be emphasized that both sponsoring organizations have had a long-standing interest in international migration. The IOM by definition has been involved in international movement of people and its interest has not been limited to documentation and research, but extended well into action arena (Appleyard 1991). CICRED's interests cover the whole spectrum of population study and migration is only one of many aspects to which the attention of member-centres was drawn. In fact, it was almost twenty years ago, that a special seminar was held in Buenos Aires (Tapinos 1974). More recently, a co-operative project on the impact of migration upon sending (mostly developing) countries was carried out (Appleyard 1989). The volume resulting from the latter project includes 23 chapters, some of which are of more general character, others have a very specific focus. When this project was winding up, the CICRED, in co-operation with IOM, invited member-centres to collaborate on another project in which the emphasis was to be clearly on receiving countries and the various consequences of immigration upon host societies. First feelers went out in 1986, but the project was officially launched in December 1988 at a meeting in Geneva hosted by IOM. A common outline has been drafted by the co-ordinator, and later critically reviewed with potential authors at the Geneva meeting.

It was agreed that each author will attempt to discuss overall trends at a national level, with special emphasis upon demographic, social, cultural, economic and political consequences for the host country. It was clearly understood that it would be unrealistic to expect each author to adhere strictly to the guidelines and hope that each of them will be able to cover all aspects equally thoroughly. But it was felt that enough material will be generated in comparable format to justify the effort (Kosinski, 1989, 1990).

The national reports appear separately in the IOM series, and it is likely that at least ten of them will be included (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Switzerland, UK, USA and Venezuela). Furthermore, two national monographs (France and the Netherlands) were published elsewhere, but the link between them and the rest of the project was acknowledged. In addition, the co-ordinator in cooperation with other experts, will make an attempt to compile a generalized comparative report, based mostly, but not exclusively upon case studies covered by this project. Again the focus will be on various consequences of migration, as seen from the perspective of receiving countries.

The project was carried out in a period of considerable change in migration behaviour of the global society. As well, public perceptions of what was going on and what should be done about it was changing. Hence, the results can hardly be treated as definitive answers to the problems raised in the study. It is our hope that they will represent a significant contribution to developing our understanding of the changing social reality of our times.

References

Appleyard, R.T. 1991 International Migration. Challenge for the Nineties. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.

Appleyard, R.T. (Ed.): 1989 The Impact of International Migration on Developing Countries. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris Kosinski, L.A. 1990 Impact of International Migration upon Receiving Countries, A Comprehensive Research Project, Geneva 14-16 May 1990, International Migration. 28(3): 385. 1989 "Impact of International Migration upon Receiving Countries", International Migration. 27(3): 487-488. Tapinos, G. (Ed.) 1974 International Migration: Proceedings of a Seminar on Demographic Research in Relation to International Migration. 5-11 March 1974. Committee for International Co-operation in National Research in Demography (CICRED), Paris. SWITZERLAND W. Leimgruber

CONTENTS

Preface Acknowledgements

Introduction 1 Theoretical considerations 1 Migration and spatial mobility in Switzerland 2 Definitions and data sources 3 The image of migration 4 Immigration and citizenship 6 Foreigners in Switzerland: Trends and Patterns 9 Immigration patterns prior to World War II 9 Post-war immigration in Switzerland 10 The postwar years until 1960 10 The 1960s until the present 11 Classification of immigrants 12 Spatial aspects: The countries of origin 14 Return Migration 20 Demographic Impact of Immigration 22 Population growth 22 Age and sex structure 24 Population evolution by sex 24 Distribution by age-groups 25 Aspects of natality and fertility 27 Crude birth rate 27 General fertility rate 28 Marriages 30 Spatial aspects: regional distribution of foreigners in Switzerland 31 The evolution of foreigners on the cantonal level 31 The relative importance of foreigners in the cantons 33 Conclusions 38 Social and Cultural Impacts of Immigration 39 Introduction 39 Schools and education 39 Integration and assimilation 44 Cultural Ufe and adaptation into Swiss society 47 Conclusion 50 Economic impact of immigration 51 Introduction 51 Immigrants on the labour market 52 Immigrants as consumeres 57 General economic impacts 58 Conclusion 62 Political impact of immigration 63 Introduction 63 The political reaction to immigration 32 Immigrants and their political situation in Switzerland 65 Border commuters - substitutes for immigrants? 68 The refugee problem 72 Conclusion 76 Conclusion 77 Overall impact of immigration on Switzerland: an attempt at an evaluation 77 The future? 78 References 81 Annexes 89 1 Notes on legislation 89 2 Regional types 90 3 The Cantons of Switzerland 91 4 The Swiss school system 92 5 Direct democracy 93 List of Tables 94 List of Figures 95 Abbreviations 96 PREFACE

The present report, written during late 1991 and early 1992, is an attempt to summarize the situation of immigration in Switzerland at a time when Swiss policy towards foreigners and immigrants in general is strongly debated. Although this topic has been with us for many years (as will be shown in the course of the book), it has been of increased interest as a consequence of the many changes occurring at present: the proposed European union by 1993 (the Maastricht treaty), the signing of the treaty on the EEA, the turbulences in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Yugoslavia, civil wars in Africa etc. Against this background has to be seen the continuing influx of asylum seekers from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to say nothing of potential immigration waves from Central and Eastern Europe.

Migration is a phenomenon well known to the Swiss for centuries. They have experienced the emigration of soldiers during the 17th and 18th cent., but also of architects, workers, salesmen etc., both temporarily and definitely. However, since the final decades of the 19th century, things have changed radically: within a few years, Switzerland has passed from a country of emigration to one of immigration. Until the 1880s and 1890s, thousands of Swiss emigrated to distant destinations such as Australia, North and South America. Driven from their land by the opening of the world cereal market, they tried to find new hopes in the vast areas of other continents where farming was more profitable and could be carried out under a more liberal regime than in their home country. Indus- trialization, on the other hand, called for a growing number of manpower. The construction of the railway Unes (including the piercing of numerous tunnels through the Jura and the Alps, such as the Gotthard tunnel), for example, brought about first waves of immigrant workers, chiefly from Italy. Industries in the industrial triangle (Basel - Zurich - St. Gallen) attracted manpower from Germany, and so did the growing number of service jobs available. By the turn of the century, Switzerland had almost forgotten her emigrant tradition and was becoming concerned about the growing number of resident foreigners. Even if World War I temporarily restrained immigration, the movement has been going on until the first years of World War II, when refugee policy became very strict and the borders were virtually closed.

The present report deals with a more recent period, covering immigration after World War II. This movement was first of all related to the economic growth of the country, but ultimately it has become linked to an overall movement of populations within Europe, reaching into the Mediterranean world beyond Europe. In recent years, the number of refugees and asylum seekers from extra-European countries has been growing steadily, leading to new discussions on immigration policy and Swiss attitudes towards foreigners. This process will be going on into the 1990s, and this report can only deal with its present stage.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report could only be written thanks to the contribution of a number of students at the Fribourg Geography Department. They have engaged in bibliographical and empiri- cal research, combining personal interest with certain requirements of their curriculum. Thus a number of interesting original contributions could be furnished, based on time- consuming interviews and bibliographic research. Specific thanks are due to Christine Waeber who has written most of the chapter on the demographic impact and furnished numerous other services, to Anne Dayer for compiling a first bibliography, and to Ariane Muller for her survey of the statistical sources. However, I am solely responsible for the contents.

Fribourg, October 1992

Walter Leimgruber

Introduction

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present report is on the impact of immigration, a theme which so far has evoked little theoretical interest. A framework has been provided by White & Woods (1980: 43 ff) within which such studies could be undertaken. They suggest five specific domains where migration effects may occur: 1. The migrant himself, i.e. "his way of life, his knowledge and experience of other places and his attitudes and beliefs." 2. The community left by the migrant (i.e. the region of origin) 3. The community (or region) of arrival or destination 4. The intervening space between origin and destination, i.e. effects created by the spatial flow pattern 5. The general structural context of the society within which migration takes place Following these considerations, Lewis (1982:166 ff) has developed an extended base which can be completed by the locational dimension in order to furnish a systematic framework for the study of migration impacts (i.e. change) in general (Fig. 1).

FIGURE 1 A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF MIGRATION IMPACTS (based on Lewis, 1982:168)

DIMENSIONS destination Locational

SCALE

Thematic Individual Group Community Society

Demographic Social Cultural Political Economic Ecological

In the present context, the study of impact will be limited to the destination area (Switzerland), i.e. "the community that the migrant goes to" (White & Woods, 1980:43). However, the people themselves (the migrants) will be included in the study: they do not only migrate, they are also subject to influences from the migration process and from the receiving community. For the latter, therefore, immigration signifies a reciprocal process of giving and receiving. It is not our aim to fill the gap in the migration theory. The programme as proposed by CICRED/IOM mirrors in itself Lewis' theoretical reflection insofar as it presumes a variety of effects. In particular, it demonstrates that not only economic effects are to be studied; in this point it follows Lewis' argument (1982:166). In addition, recent public debate in Switzerland begins to focus also on the ecological dimension: more immigrants signify an increasing stress on the natural resources and more problems with the environment. This latter point is not generally made in scientific discussions, and it may be difficult to dissociate it from demographic and economic growth in general - immigrants may well be considered as the scapegoats. A few Unes of thought may be opened from the guidelines to the present report. Thus immigration will have to do with selectivity, mainly on the social level. Contrary to the selectivity-process in the regions of origin (only certain categories of people will emigrate), the presence of immigrant labour may lead to social restructuring of the native population. In the political sphere, the impact of immigration can be described by the term exclusivity, meaning the marginalization of non-natives (who are taxpayers, but not voters). Economically, finally, immigration can be equalled to growth, because immigration after World War II responded to the needs of growing economies (cf. Salt & Clout, 1976). This latter argument may be of limited value, considering the new immigrants (asylum seekers): they mean a burden to the community rather than a relief for the economy - at least as far as can be judged at the moment, when this new phenomenon is growing in importance and the economy at the same time is slackening.

MIGRATION AND SPATIAL MOBILITY IN SWITZERLAND

Many segments of Swiss society have been relatively mobile for centuries. The most famous example is provided by the alpine farming community which, although restricted horizontally, moved over considerable vertical distances, labouring their land at different levels of altitude with different intensities of cultivation. It is from this population, that part of the early emigrants (soldiers, workers, salesmen) originated. Others, however, rooted in less mobile rural communities. They both were in a way victims of two contrasting inheritance systems: the division of holdings, chiefly practised in the alpine and Jura region, and the passing on of the holdings as an entity, in general common to the central plateau and the prealps. The former practice gradually reduced the land available for sustaining the growing number of families and induced the men to seek a temporary (seasonal) job elsewhere (often abroad), the latter practice allowed but one child (either the eldest or the youngest son) to continue farming, while the others were compelled to find work as farmhands unless they were willing to emigrate. The Swiss soldiers abroad (in France, Naples etc.) were largely recruited from this latter group. The massive exodus in the late 19th century can be interpreted as a sign of dete- riorating circumstances for farming. When the revolution in transportation technology enabled Switzerland to import cheap wheat from America, small fanners faced misery. Free trade made many of them redundant, and not all of them were willing to become part of the industrial workforce. Emigration to overseas countries with more space and (often im- agined) better living conditions was seen as a means to escape from poverty. - If the exodus of farmers still continues in the late 20th century, it is nowadays motivated by the lack of space, the increasing land use conflicts, and the possibility to work under freer conditions in Canada, for example. It is the spirit of enterprise which prevails, not fear of misery. Immigration, on the other hand, has been insignificant prior to the period of industrialization. However, since the 1880s, Switzerland has radically changed from a source of emigrants to a destination for immigrants, and this transformation does cause us grave problems, particularly on the psychological level. Xenophobia (see below) is based on the emotional level. This brief introduction may serve to better understand the present-day problems Switzerland faces with immigration. Swiss society has turned from farmers to white collar workers, highly mobile on a daily and weekly as well as on an annual basis. The increasing affluence has promoted a conservative attitude and hence distrust towards foreigners. It is this latter word which is a key expression in the discussion of immigration.

DEFINITIONS AND DATA SOURCES

According to Swiss legislation, there are neither migrants nor immigrants; the only reference to migration is being found in a bill dating back to 1888 and respective regulations (from 1888, 1900, 1918) on emigration agencies and the respective federal competence. The term immigration is related to foreigners who are thus by definition immigrants. However, this use of the language is not quite correct. Someone born in Switzerland may be a foreigner, but not necessarily an immigrant (the so-called second-generation foreigners). Permanently resident foreigners are not considered as immigrants because they enjoy freedom on the houising and on the labour market. Swiss citizens, holding a Swiss passport (whether born in Switzerland or abroad) are not considered immigrants when returning home after a stay abroad. A passage in the Swiss passport states: "The holder of this passport is a Swiss citizen and is entitled to return to Switzerland at any time." - As a consequence of this rather confused terminological situation, we shall use the two terms "immigrants" and "foreigners" as synonyms. The federal legislation on the temporary stay and permanent residence of foreigners in Switzerland implicitely defines immigrants as foreigners who enter Switzerland for a period exceeding three months. They have to apply for a temporary permit (which will usually be granted for one year only but which can be extended; Art. 5). Permanent residence frees a foreigner from any restrictions as to place of residence, work etc. (Art. 6): apart from the political rights he is considered equal to a Swiss. To arrive at this 'privilege', however, requires patience and/or a particular social or economic status. Migration policy is therefore intimately related to policy towards foreigners and falls into the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. Since foreigners arrive in Switzerland chiefly for two motives (as workforce and as refugees), there are, however, two minis- tries who are directly concerned; the Ministry of Public Economy (through the Federal Office of Industry, Trade and Labour) deals with questions of labour, while the Ministry of Justice keeps a more comprehensive survey through two specialized agencies:, the Federal Office for Foreigners whose domain are permits and statistical issues, and the newly created Federal Office for Refugees, handling the problem of refugees and asylum seekers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, is concerned with foreigners only to a minor degree (international aspects of refugee policy). Data on immigration into Switzerland can be obtained from a variety of sources. The official Federal Census which takes place every ten years, contains a long term record dating back to the last century and using the commune as census unit. Immigration is defined by the country of origin. This, however, is ambiguous, because it ought to be cross-checked with the country of birth (foreigners may be born in Switzerland, Swiss citizends may be born abroad). The data are useful for general comparisons, but should be dealt with carefully. The Federal Office of Statistics also publishes the Statistical Yearbook of Switzerland which contains a variety of select data on a national (and occasionally also on a cantonal) basis. The Ministry of Public Economy's monthly La Vie Economique (the German version is called Die Volkswirtschaft ) contains an account of up-to-date statistical material, usually on a national basis. These data are furnished by the various federal and cantonal agencies and compiled by the Federal Office of Industry, Trade and Labour. This review is now in its 63rd year. We are also well served by those cantonal statistical offices which keep an annual record of population movements. They are based on periodic enquiries with the communes who keep their registers of population up-to-date. Apart from tourists and clan- destine workers, everybody is registered. Cantonal statistcal yearbooks (as far as they exist) therefore contain a relatively good account. The best data source, however, is the statistical information bulletin issued by the Federal Office of Foreigners. Les Étrangers en Suisse has been published three times a year (in April, August, December) since 1974. Although this source only covers less than the last twenty years (the time since the oil-shock and the ensuing economic recession), it represents a valuable data base to follow the more recent development in immigration (asylum seekers). In addition to foreigners living in Switzerland, the bulletin includes border commuters, working in Switzerland, but resident in the neighbouring border zones (a topic to be discussed in chapter 5). As Ariane Muller has noted in her compilation of statistical sources, this bulletin "is becoming more and more the source for anything concerning foreigners, as one can see from the fact that certain publications such as ¿a Vie Economique draw essentially on this source." (1990:8 f). In brief, data on immigration (i.e. foreigners in Switzerland) from 1974 onwards can now be obtained from one single source, while the search for data prior to that year is more complicated. However, it is possible to follow the evolution of their number since the end of World War II, with one exception: border commuters and seasonal workers were not listed separately before 1956. This year is therefore crucial for anything concerned with border commuting, because it is from then onwards that their number is known.

THE IMAGE OF MIGRATION

In spite of their daily, weekly and annual mobility, the Swiss are predominantly a sedentary people. Thus, migration is not a very common phenomenon. This has been illustrated by the recent economic recessions in the 1970s and 1980s: the federal government's appeals for increased labour mobility provoked little action. Apart from a limited amount of internal migration (to larger urban centres, in particular), people generally preferred to stay where they had always lived. Since immigration is related to foreigners, it is the image of foreigners which can be discussed here briefly. Switzerland has generally been known as a haven for the persecuted, and she has tried to promote this image. Doubtlessly, the fact that the Red Cross was founded by a Swiss has promoted this view. However, the credibility of Switzerland in this domain was for the first time seriously undermined during World War II. when Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany were denied shelter in this country; the argument forwarded was that 'the boat was full.' "These words still lie heavy on the liberal and Christian conscience today, at a time when the boat does indeed show signs of fullness, with one million foreigners on Swiss soil." (Hughes, 1975:210). This rather sombre side of Swiss history has been vividly criticized in post-war years, after access to the archives had became possible (Bonjour, 1978:171; Rings, 1974:315 ff; Hasler, 1967). Xenophobia has been a characteristic of Swiss society on several occasions during the late 19th and the 20th century (see Manz, 1988). Usually it had been associated with periods of political stress: at the outbreak of World War I (15.4 % of the population was of foreign origin in 1914) and prior to and during World War II (when many Jews and other persecuted tried to escape from Nazi terrorism). When the reconstruction of Europe started in 1945/46, Switzerland obtained a good share of the orders because her economy had not suffered from military action. Very soon, foreign labour was needed, and immigrants were generally welcome. Rather uncharacteristically, xenophobia developed in the early 1960s in a period of economic boom, when no political threat from the outside existed and employers imported foreign labourers at leisure. Even if the 1914-percentage had not been reached yet, people began to feel uneasy about the continuing immigration. While political measures, promoted by the various referenda held during the 1970s and the change in economic outlook eased the pressure on the labour force-side, a new wave of immigration began to arrive: the refugees from overseas. After World War II, Switzerland had on several occasions been confronted with the problem of refugees: to a lesser degree in 1951 after the uprising in East-Berlin, more substantially, however, in 1956 after the Hungarian revolt, and in 1969 after the end of the Prague spring. On each of these two occasions, thousands of people arrived and were granted asylum. The population demonstrated solidarity, and most of these people were integrated into Swiss society. This was due to the fact that these refugees were victims to a regime classed as repressive; the reception they received was in line with Cold War philosophy (anti-communist attitude). In addition, the Hungarians and Czechs were Euro- pean refugees with a similar cultural background to our own, a recent democratic history, and considerable professional skill. The 1970s and in particular the 1980s were characterized by a new wave of refugee- immigrants: people from Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Chile, African countries etc. arrived and are arriving in growing numbers. Although it is recognized that they come from areas of tension, factors such as ethnical and cultural differences, lacking experience in democracy and low professional skill are acting in disfavour of these new immigrants. Quite obviously, refugees from overseas (and we can add to them Kurdish asylum seekers from Turkey) are resented because they are non-Europeans and are seen as a threat to our specific character. Social cleavages are opening between them and the Swiss, because they are seen as 'intruders'. It is the question of identity which dominates the attitude of Swiss people towards foreigners in general and towards recent refugees in particular (Linder 1991:152 0. IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Immigrants are foreigners, the question of naturalization is thus of importance. In fact, it is the only means to solve the statistical problem of migration. However, if it is to be efficient, it has to follow rather than preceed a process of cultural integration. Only in this way can it be the solution to the psychological problem of immigration. The process of naturalization is rather complicated and long in Switzerland, thanks to our multi-tier political structure. The commune is the basic unit not only in political Me but also in citizenship. Everybody is first and foremost citizen of a commune, then automatically also of the respective canton and, as a logical consequence, also Swiss citizen. A foreigner cannot, therefore, apply to a central office in order to become a Swiss; he has to address himself to a commune which may accept him or not. It is the importance of the local level in politics which may make this kind of procedure understandable; even though it is rooted in old poor laws and in an epoch with less mobility and less freedom of residence in general, a revision (as suggested by Hughes, 1975:214) is less than likely because it would touch communal autonomy. Citizenship to foreigners is awarded after a minimum of 12 years' residence in Swit- zerland (of which three within the last five years preceeding the demand for naturalization), and it is at the commune's discretion. The process may last for many months, and it usually includes an exam of the candidate's knowledge of Swiss history and institutions as well as payment of a special fee (fixed by the commune). As a result of this rather difficult and costly process, the percentage of naturalizations has always been very low (less than 2 % of all foreigners registered; Thali, 1988:6). - This way of calculating naturalizations is, however, not quite correct, as not all foreigners do qualify for Swiss citizenship at a given moment. Thali's figures are therefore more theoretic than those calculated by Arend (1991, see below and Table 1). Although naturalizations have been considered a remedy to an excess number of foreigners (Ueberfremdung), the range of potential candidates has been dwindling in the past few years. Until the 1970s, Swiss citizenship was considered highly desirable, and the number of naturalizations has been growing steadily (Fig. 2). However, as the Euro- pean Community (EC) is beginning to take shape and free internal mobility inside the EC becomes possible, Swiss citizenship has lost its attractiveness for people with an EC- passport, and a considerable drop in naturalizations has been registered after the climax of 1977 (14*354 naturalizations). There is nowadays a run of second-generation immigrants with Swiss citizenship to obtain their former nationality or that of their parents in order to become holders of an EC-passport). As a consequence, future candidates for naturalization will mainly be Europeans from non-EC countries and non-Europeans. It will be a long time, however, until the refugees of the 1980s and the early 1990s will become Swiss - if at all. FIGURE 2 NATURALIZATIONS IN SWITZERLAND, 1945-1990 (based on Leimgru- ber. 1987a)

15000

lO'OOO

S'000 •

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Naturalization may be seen as a remedy to an excess number of foreigners from a Swiss point of view; it is, however, not always the most desirable step envisaged by the immigrants. Differences by nationalities of origin are quite remarkable, as is shown by Table 1. Naturalization rates range from 6.5 % for Spaniards to 72.7 % for Czechs in the period 1977 - 1985. Interestingly enough, among the immigrants from our neighbouring countries it is the Germans who take the lead, whereas the Italians come far behind. This can be interpreted as a sort of North-South divide, related to the economic strength of Switzerland and her close economic ties with Germany (FRG), but also as a consequence of the dominance of German culture. As concerns Italians, Spaniards and Turks, the former two are quite obviously rooted much more deeply in their countries (and tend to maintain their nationality), whereas the latter currently face a country in turmoil and are therefore more prone to naturalization (a cautious interpretation of the results made by Arend, 1991:4 - we might in fact include the Greeks in this remark as concerns the period studied). Regional differences within Switzerland are slight, but Arend (1991:7) points to a contrast between the German and French speaking parts of the country. French citizens, for example, tend to stick to their nationality in French speaking cantons, while in Ger- man speaking ones they are more likely to become Swiss. Immigrants from countries culturally more distinct from Switzerland (e.g. Turks and Greeks) seem to prefer naturalization in the French speaking part of the country. This may be due to a more open spirit and better reception than in certain German speaking cantons, as can be concluded from his remarks. Not unexpectedly, Italians prefer Ticino for naturalization (naturalization rate 1977-85: 26 %, against a Swiss mean of 12 %) because of its Italian culture. This also holds good for the Grisons (rate 1977-85: 23 %), although Italian is a very small and rather neglected minority there. Finally, Spaniards seem to profit from latinity particularly in the Ticino where they display the highest rate of all cantons in the period under study (12 %, Swiss mean 7 %). TABLE 1 NATURALIZATION RATES IN SWITZERLAND. 1977-1985 (after Arend 1991:5)

Former Naturalization nationality rate Czechs 72.7 Germans 38.7 Austrians 32.8 Greeks 21.0 French 20.9 Yugoslavs 16.4 Italians 11.6 Portuguese 11.1 Turks 7.1 Spaniards 6.5 others 33.8 mean 19.4

Note: Arend has calculated his figures on the basis of the potential candidates, Le. immigrants resident for at least 12 years in Switzerland. His rates are therefore more realistic than those given by Thali (1988) for the reasons discussed in the text

Quite obviously, the problem of immigrants is far from being solved by naturalization. Problems of integration cannot be eliminated by simply exchanging the passport. Even after two or three generations a naturalized immigrant still stands out by his name and may be taken as not quite native (i.e. as still partly a foreigner). Prejudices persist over time, naturalization is therefore a long-lasting process. In the words of Centimes et al (1991:26), "naturalization has to be considered as a contract from which adherence and emotions and even the ritual are not absent, and in which each partner finds his advantage, a contract which implies reciprocal and continuous redefinition and readjustment of both the national society and the resident foreigners."

8 Foreigners in Switzerland: trends and patterns

IMMIGRATION PATTERNS PRIOR TO WORLD WAR n

As has been pointed out above, Switzerland had known immigration from the late 19th century onwards. For a certain period, it even paralleled emigration, which reached its climax in the 1880s, but the migration balance was negative until about 1888. Emigra- tion was encouraged by a severe economic recession between 1873 and 1890, and more than 150*000 Swiss emigrated between 1874 and 1903. Immigrants were initially both political refugees and manpower, and in the period 1888-1900 their number increased by 153'000. By 1900, 11.6 % of the resident population in Switzerland was of foreign origin (Höpflinger, 1986:97 f.). 1890 marked a turning point in the national economy, and for eign labour was urgently needed in order to keep pace with economic development - a situation not unlikely that after World War II. The progress of industrialization and urbanization in the late 19th century made Swit- zerland gradually turn from a country of emigration to one of immigration: peace in Europe and the economic challenge favoured Swiss industry and made the country attractive to foreign labour. All of a sudden, workers from Italy and Germany arrived in large numbers, and at the outbreak of World War I, 15.4 % of the country's population was foreign bom (about 40 % of them of German and 36 % of Italian origin). Within Europe, Switzerland was the country with the largest foreign population (Hagmann, 1966). The war caused some remigration, and following the general strike of 1918, quite a number of foreigners were expelled from Switzerland. Thus, by 1920 the percentage had shrunk o 10.4 %. Their number dwindled further during the interwar period and the world economic crisis, and at the outbreak of World War II their share of the total population was about 5.5 %, while the 1941 census recorded 5.2 % foreigners, and until 1950 it had increased only slightly (see Table 2). Immigrants in this early period came predominantly from the neighbouring countries, their percentages varying according to the period (Table 2.1). Until World War II, Ger- mans accounted for a substantial part of the immigrant population ever since we possess census records, and it was only as a late consequence of the Nazi regime that their number and share finally dropped sharply. The French, on the other hand, first rivalled with the Germans, but then ceded their place to the Italians who eventually managed to draw with the Germans and took the lead during the war. Thus, significant changes took place in the late 19th and in the early 20th century, and the post-World War II pattern was basically in place at the outbreak of the war. TABLE 2 FOREIGNERS RESIDENT IN SWITZERLAND, 1860-1950 (according to population census results; after Höpflinger, 1986:108 f.).

Year Immigrants % % % % % Immigrants total Germans French Austrians Italians others % total pop. 1860 114'000 41.6 40.5 3.2 12.0 2.7 4.5 1870 152'000 37.9 41.2 4.1 12.0 4.8 5.7 1880 211'000 45.1 25.4 6.3 19.7 3.5 7.4 1888 230*000 48.9 23.4 6.2 18.2 3.4 7.9 1900 383'000 43.9 15.3 6.4 30.5 3.9 11.6 1910 552'000 39.7 11.5 7.3 36.7 4.7 14.7 1920 402'000 37.2 14.2 5.4 33.5 9.8 10.4 1930 356'000 37.9 10.5 5.7 35.8 10.2 8.7 1941 224'000 *35.0 10.9 * 43.0 11.1 5.2 1950 285'000 19.4 9.6 7.8 49.1 14.0 6.0

Note: Austria until 1910 means the Hapsburg Empire; Germany 1&8O-1910 includes Alsatia and Lorraine. * = Austria included in Germany. ,

POST-WAR IMMIGRATION TO SWITZERLAND

The postwar years until 1960

After World War II the political and economic situation in Europe radically changed the immigration pattern to Switzerland. The tolerant attitude of the late 1940s and during the 1950s can be explained by the extraordinary economic growth of the country. Switzer- land benefited from the reconstruction of Europe: her own economy had remained intact and could start producing the goods required by the devastated countries almost immediately after cease-fire. The belligérants, on their part, had a manifest demand for all kinds of products in order to restore their own economies. Financial aid provided under the Marshall-Plan facilitated this reconstruction. One can, however, recognize other factors, such as the Bretton Woods agreement (1944) and the general liberalization of commerce in post-war Europe. Lehmann (1968:22) adds a psychological element: the hope and confidence in a better future, favourable economic prospects in the long run and a positive attitude of investors towards economic recovery and growth. Thus, the Swiss economy was prepared to grow at an accelerating pace. The rapid economic growth after 1950 resulted in an increasing demand for manpower which could not be met on the domestic labour market. Hence foreign workers were recruited, primarily from Italy (Table 3). Since they were urgently needed, few restrictions were imposed. The only principle applied consistently was that of 'rotation', i.e. the individual worker could obtain a work licence for a limited period only, after which he had to return home and make way for a fellow countryman. The philosophy behind this limitation was simple: no foreign worker should be allowed to work the full period of 10 years fixed in the treaty between Switzerland and Italy in 1948 which would confer the right to take up permanent residence in Switzerland. Rotation policy protected Switzer

10 land from permanent immigration and safeguarded Swiss workers against competition from foreigners (Haug 1980:52). It must be noted, that temporary workers (even if they hold an annual work licence) do not enjoy free mobility (neither geographical nor professional) on the labour market - this privilege is reserved to resident foreigners.

TABLE 3 FOREIGNERS RESIDENT IN SWITZERLAND, 1950-1990 (after Höpflinger, 1986:108 f. and Statistical Yearbooks of Switzerland)

Year Immigrants % % % % % % Immigrants total Germans French Austrians Italians Europe World % total pop. 1950 285'000 19.4 9.6 7.8 49.1 9.1 4.9 6.0 1955 340'000 ------6.8 1960 506'000 16.0 5.4 6.5 59.2 7.4 5.6 9.5 1965 825'000 ------14.1 1970 rO03'000 11.8 5.2 4.4 53.6 13.7 11.4 16.2 1975 l'038'OOO - - - - - 16.4 1980 920'000 9.7 5.2 3.6 47.1 16.9 17.5 14.5 1985 940'000 ------14.5 1990 l'180'OOO 8 5 3 34 42 8 17.4

By and large, however, the negative consequences of this policy became obvious, and in 1958, labour rotation came to an end (Braun, 1985; see below) and was replaced by limitations (first on the basis of individual plants, later of the number of total immigrants to be admitted). What was the background to this kind of immigration policy? After World War II, most people did expect economic growth; however, everybody feared the slump which would follow soon after (in analogy to the situaton after the World War I). Switzerland thus wanted to be prepared for this slump with a legal instrument permitting her to close down the labour market for foreigners as quickly as possible in order to avoid mass unemployment. Economic growth, however, continued beyond expectation, and foreigners became an essential part of the workforce. The Swiss themselves provided for the demand by a sectoral change: the tertiary sector grew while the secondary showed signs of stagnation and the primary continued its decline. More and more Swiss exchanged blue collar for white collar jobs, leaving manufacturers short of labour. Foreigners were especially needed in construction, but also in other fast growing industries which, instead of rationalizing their production lines and closing down obsolete production units, expanded by simply blowing up their workforce (Braun, 1965:101; Haug, 1980:55). Thus the 1950s laid the basis for the problems to come.

The 1960s until the present

The 1960s brought about some fundamental changes in immigration into Switzerland. First of all, the number of immigrants continued to increase, and so did their share of the total population (Table 3). Secondly, the government dropped the rotation policy. As a consequence, a foreign worker could now obtain a new work permit every year and, after 10 years, the right of residence. Immigration thus turned from temporary to definitive.

11 Thus, foreign workers arrived with their families which caused problems in fields such as the housing market, schools and other infrastructure, linguistic abilities, segregation etc. Immigration also brought about social cost, a fact unknown before 1960. In addition, the new workers were less qualified and productivity dropped. Finally, workers were increasingly recruited from countries other than Italy, in particular from Spain, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Thus socio-cultural problems tended to increase. The Swiss population did not remain indifferent, but its reaction was ambiguous. While the economic effects of immigration were generally welcome, the social and cultural 'side-effects' were viewed with suspicion. The term 'Überfremdung' (meaning the excessive number of foreigners) turned up again, although nobody ever defined what it really meant nor, what was actually not foreign, i.e. indigenous. Obviously emotional combined with rational components (spiritual, political, economic and demographic aspects) into one big fear. The growing opposition found a ready scapegoat: the 1964 treaty between Switzerland and Italy on the emigration of Italians to Switzerland. Its main function was to improve the legal and social position of Italian immigrants (Braun, 1965), and it was signed after careful reflection only. However, many people considered it as an instrument promoting Überfremdung rather than containing it, and they felt misled by the government which had been warning from Überfremdung. Although politicians had noticed the unrest in the population, they opted in favour of the agreement because of the continuing economic boom. During the 1960s and 1970s, popular unrest and political action alternated regularly, and at times social peace in Switzerland was seriously threatened. The problem of Über- fremdung was partly (and temporarily) eased in 1974 when, as a consequence of the economic recession, hundreds of thousands of workers became redundant. In a quick reaction, the federal government declared its firm will to diminish the foreign population in Switzerland. As a consequence, the annual work permits for thousands of foreign workers were not renewed, and these people were forced to emigrate (rather: they were not allowed to return to Switzerland). Statistical unemployment was thus effectively prevented - real unemployment was in a way exported (Leimgruber 1987a:63 f). Throughout the 1980s, the number of foreigners has been slightly increasing (see Table 3). The figures, however, are not quite correct: asylum seekers are missing because they are subject to a different legislation. They have no residential permit and do not belong to the foreign working population (in fact, they must not work during the first three or even six months after their arrival). The past decade has demonstrated in a drastic way that Switzerland is part of an international system of interdependent nations. The mass exodus of Tibetans, of the Vietnamese boat people, the Tamils, Kurds, Lebanese, Africans ... has shown that in the jet-age she is very close to every other country, indeed. The situation is comparable to the late 17th century (arrival of the Huguenots), considering the then means of transport and perceptions of distance (Gfeller, 1987:9 f.).

CLASSIFICATION OF IMMIGRANTS

Foreigners in Switzerland fall into two broad categories, defined by and subject to two different legislations: 'regular' immigrants arrive after having obtained a temporary working licence or hold the status of residents; this category includes refugees who have been granted asylum. They are subject to the law on foreigners. Asylum-seekers, on the other hand, are refugees whose demand is still pending or who have not yet been repatriated after their demand had been rejected. They are subject to the law on asylum.

12 These two bodies of legislation are briefly described in Annexe 1, we shall limit our com- ment below to some information on the first of the two categories. Resident foreigners are almost on an equal footing with native or naturalized Swiss: they are free to enter and leave Switzerland, to take up residence and work wherever they like, to buy land and houses etc. They are denied civil rights and certain duties (e.g. military service, not, however, taxes...). They are not subject to any control; however, the Federal Office for foreigners keeps a record of their number, and they are listed in the Office's statistical bulletin. Residence will usually be granted after a foreigners has held an annual working licence for ten years continuously. Foreigners with an annual working licence are under a very strict régime: they need permission by the Federal Office of Industry, Trade and Labour to change their job or their place of residence, permission usually not granted during their first year in Switzer- land. Only Italian immigrants in this category may change their jobs and residence freely after a minimum stay of five years (as stipulated in the bilateral treaty of 1964). A seasonal working licence allows a foreigner to take up work for a maximum of nine moths in a branch with typical seasonal activities (tourism, constructing, farming); they must not change their employer nor their residence, and they are obliged to leave the country after their period of activity. Re-entry is only permitted after a minimum stay in their home county of three months. After four years, a seasonal permit may be transformed into an annual license, provided the applicant has worked for 36 months (i.e. the maximum time allowed) within this period. Further categories of (temporary) immigrants are foreigners with a short-term working license, valid up to six months for workers and up to twelve months for au pair persons, and probationers (up to twelve months). Refugees are people who have been granted asylum because they are subject to threat in their home country. They obtain a special status which allows them to obtain a permit of residence after five years (Caloz-Tschopp, 1982:103). Asylum seekers whose case is pending or whose demand has been rejected, however, are counted as sojourning temporarily. The staff of diplomatic missions and international agencies is not subject to these regulations, given their particular function and the principle of reciprocity which usually applies in their case. The various categories have changed remarkably over time (Table 4), thanks to the restrictive measures taken by the government, but also because of the transfers from seasonal to annual and from annual to residential status. It is difficult to present a satisfactory statistical picture, because seasonal workers are mostly present from spring to early winter, while the annual population figures refer to the end of the year. This is why in table 4 the total does not include seasonal workers; their number is taken from the August computation.

13 TABLE 4 FOREIGNERS IN SWITZERLAND ACCORDING TO CATEGORY, 1965- 1990

Year Residential Annual Total Seasonal licence licence licence 1965 201*861 608*382 810*243 184'235 1970 365*795 617*092 982*887 154'732 1975 654*468 358*242 1*012*710 86'008 1980 683*527 209*280 892*807 109'873 1985 783*193 201*478 939*671 102'809 1990 830*196 270*066 1*100*262 121 '704

End of year figures, except for seasonal licence (end of August)

SPATIAL ASPECTS: THE COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN (with the collaboration of C. Waeber)

Immigrants are people arriving from a variety of countries and going to certain regions in the receiving country. Switzerland with her relatively decentralized economic structure offers an interesting example of this distribution process. The following chapter is devoted to their countries of origin, whereas their spatial distribution in Switzerland will be treated in the following chapter. As becomes apparent from table 3, most immigrants have arrived from the four neighbouring countries, although there has been a remarkable change throughout the 20th century. Until 1930, foreigners with German, French, Italian and Austrian nationality amounted to 90 % of all foreigners. In 1941, their percentage dropped below this level but, what is more significant, the number of non-Europeans began to rise: from 3.3 % in 1941 it grew to 4.9 % in 1950 and has continued to increase ever since. There is another point to be noted : the shift away from German and French to Italian and 'other' immigrants. This reflects the changing socio-economic nature of immigration: Germans, French and Austrians nowadays represent qualified professionals in leading positions, while Italians and 'others' make up a large part of the semi- and non-qualified workforce. As can be seen from Fig. 3 (on the following page), in 1950 there were essentially four countries of origin, with Italy dominant. By 1970, the Italian share has increased while the German percentage has almost halved, and new countries of origin were becoming prominent - a tendency remarkably accentuated by 1989 (latest figures available). The foreigners resident in Switzerland are a mirror of Europe and, indeed, a mirror of the world (over 1 million foreigners from 165 countries). Their evolution, however, has been rather irregular (Fig. 4). While arrivals exceeded departures for most of the period 1965-89, the five years 1975-80 were characterized by a negative migration balance, a tendency already visible in the low positive balance 1970-75. The people affected by this exodus were Germans, Italians and Spaniards.

14 FIGURE 3 RESIDENT IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN SWITZERLAND ACCORD- ING TO THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, 1950, 1970, AND 1989

1950

12.32% 17.03%

12.32% 8.44%

19 6.80%

10.15% 11.76% 1.23% 2.34% 0.92% 5.23% 43.09% 10.41%

4.39% 1989

7.81% 13.71% 4.70% 53.57%

5.71% • Federal Republic of Germany

• France 11.21% Ü Italy II Austria 36.54% 6.61% Ü Spain

§ Greece 11.01% 2.70% [H Yugoslavia ^ Turkey H Portugal

^ others

15 FIGURE 4 VARIATION OF IMMIGRANTS INTO SWITZERLAND (RESIDENTS AND ANNUAL LICENCES) ACCORDING TO THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, 1965-89 (total number)

Nationalities

Total

M 1970/65 M 1975/70

ü 1980/75 D 1985/80

• 1989/85

RFA

•150000 -100000 -50000 0 50000 100000 150000 200000

P = Portugal, TR = Turkey, E = Spain, Yü = Yugoslavia, A = Austria, I = Italiy, F = France, RFA = Federal Republic of Germany

16 Immigration from Italy has a long standing tradition, dating back to the 19th century. Italians first arrived in large numbers between 1880 and 1914; their number receeded as a consequence of the two world wars, but the traditionally good relations persisted, and after 1945, the flow was quickly re-established. With two million unemployed, the country was all too willing to favour emigration after the war, and a treaty between Switzerland and Italy was signed to this effect in 1948. Until the creation of the European Economic Communi- ty in 1957, Switzerland was one of the most important destinations of labour emigration from Italy. From about 1960 onwards, the number of Italians with annual working licenses began to drop radically, until 1979 parallel to the overall decline of this category of foreigners, afterwards even faster and contrary to the general tendency of stabilization and growth; Fig. 5). The number of resident Italians, on the other hand, has reached a very high level and has evolved almost parallel to the total of resident foreigners (Fig. 6). About 96 % of the Italians in Switzerland are nowadays resident (and enjoy complete liberty on the labour and housing markets), whereas in 1968 their share was only about 33 %. Germans, Arabians and French were, at one time, as traditional immigrants as were the Italians (see Table 2). However, their number has dramatically dwindled after World War II (the French after the 1870/71 war against Germany which entailed the loss of Alsatia and Lorraine). The number of holders of temporary (annual) working licenses has never been really significant (Fig. 5), and it has declined over time, while the number of residents from these three countries maintains itself at a relatively high level, with a declining tendency, however. During 1965-89 their overall migration balance is negative (Fig. 4).

Spaniards are more recent immigrants, filling the gaps when less workers could be recruited from Italy (EEC-effect). Although they suffered from the recession in the late 1970s, too (Fig. 4), their migration balance has become positive again. Following the more stringent policy of the federal government on the limitation of foreigners, the number of annual permit holders has declined parallel to that of the Italians, while the number of resident Spaniards is still growing, albeit slowly in the late 1980s (Figs. 5 & 6). As the proportion of immigrants from neighbouring countries diminished, and as the socio-economic situation of those immigrated and established improved, new sources for the supply of labour reserves had to be found. The Spaniards were the first group, but their number was far from sufficient. In addition, they could not be employed in all sectors which' offered jobs. Thus the area of recruitement was enlarged to countries such as Yugoslavia, Turkey and Portugal. These immigrants had in common that they were particularly needed for unattractive jobs, despised by the Swiss as well as by the 'older' immigrants. Their migration balance has been positive since the start, and the number of annual permits is still growing with the Yugoslavs and the Portuguese, but declining with the Turks (Fig. 5). In particular, the number of Portuguese with an annual working license has grown by 160 % in the period 1985-89 (from 11'802 to 30'646) - while the number of resident Portuguese is growing at a lower rate (75 % over the same period, from 4'856 to 8'530). It is the Turks who have increasingly settled in Switzerland (Fig. 6): 72 % of all Turks in this country hold a residence license, only 3 % less than the Spaniards.

17 FIGURE 5 HOLDERS OF ANNUAL WORKING LICENCES ACCORDING TO COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN. 1965-89

1000000 T

100000 -- -«- Federal Republic of Germany

-D- France

-•- lialy

•O- Austria

-A- Yugoslavia

-&• Spain

-X- Turkey

X others

1000 —-. i • • I i I I i I ! I i I I I I I I I I I i 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989

18 FIGURE 6 FOREIGN RESIDENTS IN SWITZERLAND ACCORDING TO COUN- TRIES OF ORIGIN, 1965-89

1000000 T

100000

-M- Federal Republic of Germany

•O France

-•- Italy

-O Austria 10000 -- -A- Yugoslavia

-ùr Spain

X Turkey

-X- others

1000

100 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989

19 RETURN MIGRATION

Migration is a reciprocal process of inward and outward movement. It is from this perspective that return migration can be studied in the receiving countries. As has been said above, Switzerland has for many years after World War II favoured the 'rotation* of immigrants by issuing temporary working licences only. Thus a turnover of foreigners was achieved, although the number of arrivals generally exceeded that of departures. In addition, many immigrants arrived with the manifest intention to take up work in order to earn money and obtain some form of training or experience in order to take up their own professional activity back home after a few years. Return migration is therefore a continuous phenomenon. As Borkowsky (1991:15) points out, the annual volume of migration affects about 5 % of the foreign population; this volume is composed of between 40 and 45 % emigrants and 55 to 60 % immigrants. The phenomenon of return migration in the countries of origin has hardly been studied in Switzerland so far. Evrensel (1985) refers to it in her study on Turkish workers in Zurich, Emmenegger (1991) offers a contribution on Cap Verde islanders living in Basle, and Sanz (1988) has studied a group of Spanish (Andalucian) remigrants from the Nether- lands (in particular women). The term remigration is in itself not very fortunate in this precise context: it suggests a voluntary decision to return home, but Swiss legislation often explicitely or implicitely obliges a foreigner to return home or to stay at home (see above). Indeed, Evrensel (1985:74) poses the question whether labour migration in Europe is a permanent or a temporary movement. She replies herself by pointing out that they usually began as temporary, but that the journey back home was in many cases postponed to some undefined moment - and the people gradually got used to their new 'home country'. Summing up a number of studies from Germany and Switzerland, she demonstrates that migrants generally expect to return home, but that reality often prevents them from sticking to their intention, at least within the time-frame originally considered. This reality can be wanting job opportunities in their home country, fear of social or political tension, or family reasons (p. 76 ff). She summarizes by formulating the "basic contradiction": "the majority of foreign workers intends to return some time, but does not really think of carrying out this intention." (p. 84). Similar problems as to the moment of return have been found with Capverdians in Basle (Emmenegger, 1991:46 f., Von Arx 1991:73), although the investments made show that the intention to leave Switzerland is present. In fact, several questions arise in this context: "Do the structures on the Cap Verde Islands allow to carry out the investment plans made at all, and what is the role of the State? When will one have earned enough, when will the moment be reached to stop working and return home? Is returning home not also dangerous? How will one react to the environment transformed?" (Emmenegger 1991:55). Obviously, the decision to return home may be as difficult to take as that to emigrate.

In her study, Sanz (1988) points to the problem of the cultural conflict of remigrants. Indeed, as Hoffmann-Nowotny (1973) has already stated, remigrants have not been indifferent to influences from their host society, and they will carry along with themselves new sets of values and ideas. They will even expect to obtain jobs with a higher social prestige. After all, emigration has been undertaken in order to improve conditions of living in the home country, and often considerable sums of money were saved abroad and in- vested in the region of origin (Evrensel, 1985:84, 131 ff). Remigration has meant for Sanz'

20 reference group of Andalucian women what might be called a 'double culture shock': first they were confronted with the host society into which they had to integrate to some extent (such as shopping in a new cultural setting, different attitudes to medical care, to childbirth etc.); afterwards they had to re-adapt to a traditional society where fathers, for example, were not allowed to be present during childbirth (Sanz, 1988:59).

The two studies referred to above do not do justice to the phenomenon of remigration. As Strachan & King (1982:2) point out, Italy has experienced a considerable return migration from Europe and overseas (in their estimate 4.5 million between 1946 and 1974 - a figure not to be neglected), with Switzerland ranking second after West Germany among the former immigration countries (King, 1987:169). According to Gentileschi (1983:24), about 606'000 Italians returned home between 1972 and 1977. Most of this has certainly been voluntary remigration, although 1974 may include forced repatriation as a consequence of the economic recession - a point also made by this author. Indeed, the forced reflux of Italians from Switzerland amounted to 55'000 in 1975 alone (ibid.:64, see also chapter 5.2). The principle of 'rotation' applied by the Swiss authorities in the early years after World War II has doubtlessly added largely to this figure, too. King (1985:171 f) even shows that return migration in Italy has exceeded emigration in those critical years.

Nothing more can be said at present about remigration from Switzerland: the problem has not been judged particularly important, and researchers have directed their interest to other questions, mainly concerning certain aspects of the Swiss host society. It is to these that we now turn. Equally, remigration of emigrated Swiss back to Switzerland seems to meet with little interest. Anyway, Höpflinger (1986:90 f.) points out that in the period since World War II, some 65 to 80 % of Swiss emigrants have returned home after some time of absence. This information is limited as it concerns men only: every Swiss man enroled in the army has to ask for a leave of absence if travelling or settling abroad for a period exceeding three months. From these records we see that in the period 1976-80, for example, 53'019 Swiss enroled in the Swiss army left the country, and 35*959 returned home, i.e. 68 %; Höpf- linger 1986:95). "This signifies that the majority of present-day emigrants leaves the country for a limited time only, as opposed to the 19th century when definitive emigration dominated (and an immediate return to Switzerland was excluded for financial reasons as well as because of the limited transportation facilities)."(ibid., p. 91). The absolute number since 1946 has oscillated between 34'000 and 53'000 (emigrants) and 11 '000 and 41 '000 (return migrants). However, since female migrants are not included in these figures, they are of limited value as a source of information on the return migration of the Swiss.

21 Demographic impact of immigration (by C. Waeber)

Among the various effects of immigration, those on the demography of the host country are probably the first to deserve attention. Immigrants from other societies and cultures have different attitudes in a number of fields: towards marriage and the family, repro- duction, children, old people etc. These attitudes produce a different kind of behaviour and, consequently, a different demographic patterns from the host society. This chapter shall deal with these aspects. It will also include the spatial distribution of foreigners in Switzerland. Economic and social problems originating in the size, growth, structure and spatial distribution of population will increase in the future. The number of natives has been stagnant over the past years (a phenomenon observed in most industrialized countries), and we are faced with an increasingly ageing population and a low fertility rate. As a consequence, medium- and long-term forecasts point to a population decline in the decades to come. Hence the desire of the authorities to achieve stability or even a slight growth of the number of the native population, both in view of the quality of life and ecological stability. Is it therefore necessary to appeal to imigration in order to achieve these goals, considering the low fertility of the Swiss?

POPULATION GROWTH

Population growth results from the natural balance between live births and deaths, and from the migration balance. Both these factors are subject to the political, economic and social context. In Switzerland, the natural balance has been positive since World War II, but has progressively decreased until 1980: the decline of fertility was stronger than that of mortality. At present, the natural balance is on the point of stabilizing at about 0.3 %. The other factor, migration (or more precisely, immigration) is having considerable effects on population growth. Situated in the heart of Europe, Switzerland has become a very attractive destination of migrants because of her political and economic stability. During the period in question (1945-1990), immigration accounts for about 36 % of the increase in resident population. Its relative importance has varied over time (Fig. 7), following the political control of the Confederation over foreigners. In the period between 1950 and the early 1960s, the recovery of fertility, combined with an intense immigration, resulted in the most spectacular growth of population ever experienced in Switzerland (annual mean of 1.42 %). From the 1960s onward, the annual increase of immigration diminished after the rise of xenophobia and a restrictive immigration policy by the central government (Federal Council). However, its percentage of the total population continued to grow until 1974 - due to a high fertility rate - when it reached its maximum with 16.5 % of the total population. Betweeen 1973 and 1979, the annual growth rate of foreigners was negative because of the economic recession and the newly introduced restrictions. As a consequence, total population decreased between 1974 and 1977. From 1980 onwards, however, the number of both foreigners and Swiss grew again. This increase is partly

22 due a favourable age structure and the growth in life expectancy (concerning both the Swiss and immigrants), partly to a positive migration balance and a decline in naturalizations (concerning the growth of the number of foreigners). As most foreigners are citizens of EC countries, they are loath to lose their European passport.

FIGURE 7 ANNUAL CHANGE (IN ABSOLUTE NUMBERS) OF THE FOREIGN AND OF THE TOTAL POPULATION IN SWITZERLAND, 1950-1988.

i T

L I I J l L I I -100 50/51 54/55 58/59 62/63 66/67 70/71 74/75 78/79 82/83 86/87

Note the difference in scale. Considering the importance of immigration on population growth in Switzerland as a whole, it may be interesting to look more closely at a number of demographic paramètres. Among them, age and sex structure are certainly the most important, as Olivier Blanc notes: "Of all the structural variables, age and sex are the most important. They are at any moment the result of past evolutions in natality and mortality. In turn, the present levels of fertility and mortality rate and of demographic growth of this country are influenced by modifications which have occurred in the structures of sex and age. Similarly, the ageing of the population and the growing gap between the number of men and women in the upper age classes - current problems of our society -, originate in the composition by age and sex of our population." (in: Commission "Politiques de population" 1985:7).

23 AGE AND SEX STRUCTURE

The best means to describe the age-sex-relationship is the age-pyramid. It visualizes both the masculinity-rate and the ageing process of the population. The following considerations are mainly based on a simple comparison of the two age-pyramids of 1950 and 1989 (Fig. 8). It becomes apparent that their form has changed from a spade to an urn (describing a stationary population). This transformation manifests itself in a decline of births and a growth of the upper-age classes, characteristic for Western civilization.

FIGURE 8 AGE-PYRAMIDS OF SWITZERLAND, 1950 AND 1989

>80 1950 75-79 70-74 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 male female 100 eo 60 40 20 20 40 60 80 100

• foreigners >80 • Swiss 1989 75-79 170-74 65-69 160-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4 male female 100 80 60 40 20 20 40 60 60 100 Population evolution by sex

The masculinity-rate of the Swiss population has been declining over the past 40 years (Table 5): the number of males by 100 females has shrunk from 95 to 90. The Swiss citizens are therefore predominantly women. This ratio varies over time and within the different age-categories. Usually, masculinity is high with young people (up to 24 years: 103.5 in 1950, 104.3 in 1989), but from the following age-groups onward the tendency becomes inverted, and the masculinity-rate declines with increasing age. Among the retired population (from 65 years onwards), the ratio was 66 men per 100 women in 1989 (1950: 75 per 100). This excess of females has two origins:

24 - their higher life-expectancy (in 1987/8, women had a life expectancy at birth of 80.7 years, men of 73.9 years) - marriages between Swiss men and foreign women.. Until 1990, a foreign women automatically obtained Swiss citizenship by marrying a Swiss husband.

As concerns the masculinity-rate of foreigners, it is dependent on the political situation. During the two World Wars and up to 1960, foreign women outnumbered men (Table 5). Between 1950 and 1960, however, the rate of men jumped up, and it has continued at a level well above 100 ever since. This evolution demonstrates the essentially male character of the immigration wave, characteristic for an immigrant society. It is true that 1960 marked a turning point; the subsequent decline of immigrant masculinity indicates that more and more women arrived in Switzerland after 1960. This fact can be explained by more political flexibility in order to unite families of immigrants.

TABLE 5 MASCULINITY-RATE (males per 100 females) IN SWITZERLAND, 1950-1989 Year total Swiss Foreigners population 1950 93 95 69 1960 96 93 130 1970 97 92 126 1980 ' 96 91 127 1989 95 90 126

The masculinity-rate of foreigners has continually exceeded 100 in all age groups below 60 years ever since 1960, while above 60 it falls below. However, the balance between men and women above 65 years begins to even out with time (contrary to the Swiss): while in 1950 there were 66 men by 100 women of 65+ years, the rate was 81 by 100 in 1980, and 98 by 100 in 1989. These figures reflect the sudden increase of male immigrants in the 1960s: they have proceeded through the various age-groups.

Distribution by age-groups

During the past 20 years, the proportion of young Swiss (below 15 years of age) has gradually declined, while the rate of people above 65 years has been growing constantly (Table 6). This latter group has in fact almost doubled between 1950 (9.5 %) and 1989 (16.5 %). On the other hand, the inverse phenomenon has produced itself with the foreigners: until 1970 doubling of the young age-group from 12.8 % to 24.9 % and regression of the old age-group from 11.3 % to 3.2 %; after that date their age structure followed the same process as that of the Swiss. The percentage of retired foreignerns is, however, substantially lower than that of the Swiss.

25 TABLE 6 POPULATION IN SWITZERLAND ACCORDING TO AGE-GROUPS, 1950-1989

1950 1960 1970 1980 1989 Total pop. 0-14 23.6 23.5 23.4 192 17.0 15-64 66.8 663 68.0 66.9 68.4 >65 9.6 102 11.4 13.8 14.6 31.5 32.6 37.7 51.0 62.0 0-14

Swiss 0-14 24.3 24.7 23.2 18.9 16.8 15-64 66.2 64.5 63.8 65.6 66.7 >65 9.5 10.8 13.0 15.5 16.5 >65 30.5 33.2 42.8 57.4 71.0 0-14

Foreigners 0-14 12.8 13.3 24.9 21.0 77.9 15-64 75.9 81.4 71.9 74.6 77.6 >65 11.3 5.3 3.2 4.4 4.5 >65 55.3 24.6 10.7 15.6 18.0 0-14

Most immigrants were in fact young or at the most middle-aged, and they arrived in Switzerland in search of jobs. Thus they increased the proportion of the active age- group (15-64 years). By doing so, they also disguised the ageing of the autochtonous population, because they improved the rate between young and old (the formula [>65/0- 14] in Table 6) or between gainfully employed and non-employed population. The former ratio has been increassing at an alarming rate: while in 1950, there were only 30 retired persons per 100 young, in 1989 there were 71. With a ratio of 18 in 1989, the immigrants are in a much more favourable position. The process of ageing puts an increasing strain on the active population, in particular as concerns social security: sooner or later, problems will arise with the national old-age-pension scheme (AVS-AI), stemming from the increase in life expectancy and the decline in fertility. Immigration has thus contributed to rejuvenate the age structure through the arrival of a workforce which has, in addition, often renewed itself. This labour force was of direct benefit to the Swiss economy because it entered the production process straight- away, bypassing the stage of professional training. In general, foreign workers entered active life well ahead of the Swiss. However, the higher fertility rate of the immigrants has led to an increase of children (0-14 years) to be trained, and the cost of schooling and training have risen correspondingly. Since 1970, the number of foreigners in this age- group exceeds that of the Swiss.

26 ASPECTS OF NATALITY AND FERTILITY

Since 1980, natality in Switzerland has been increasing slightly. This new tendency finds its explanation in the age structure: people born during the "baby-boom" (1955-64) have now reached the age to marry and settle down. Indeed, in the period between 1981 and 1989, the population in the age-group 20-30 years has grown from 1.938 million to 2.07 million with an annual increase of 16'000 persons. However, the number of live births per woman (Table 7) remains below the minimum value to ensure population re- placement, a value calculated as 2.1 live births per woman. The norm or fashion of two children per family have become rooted in people's minds, and large families are becoming rare. The size of a family is in fact determined by an evaluation of personal resources rather than by some abstract ideal.

TABLE 7 LIVE-BIRTHS PER WOMAN IN SWITZERLAND, 1946-89

1946 1950 1955 1960 1964 1970 1975 1981 1986 1989 2.62 2.40 2.30 2.44 2.68 2.09 1.60 1.53 1.51 1.50

In order to follow this evolution since 1945 in detail, we shall examine in turn both crude birth rate and general fertility rate.

Crude birth rate

The crude birth rate puts the absolute number of births into perspective. In fact it increases when the number of births grows more rapidly than the total population, otherwise it decreases.

FIGURE 9 CRUDE BIRTH RATE IN SWITZERLAND, 1950-89

% 40 35 30 • — Swiss 25 -- foreigners 20 15 ^ — total 10 5

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989

Until 1965, the crude birth rate of the Swiss has been declining but slowly, even increasing slightly from the mid-fifties onwards (Fig. 9); after that date, however, it fell by 0.6 percentage points until 1975, then continued its decline until 1980 when it started to stabilize and even rise, reaching 11.9 o/oo in 1989.

27 For 15 years, on the other hand, the crude birth rate of the foreign population has soared up in a spectacular way, more than trebling in that period (Fig. 9). After that year, it started to follow the tendency of the Swiss birth rate, albeit at a more pronounced rate. This is obviously a result of the economic and political circumstances. Since 1980, the two rates are running roughly parallel with that of the foreigners slightly higher than of the Swiss. Fig. 10 indicates the birth ratio between Swiss and foreign population: while foreigners born in Switzerland were a small proportion of all births in 1950, their share has been increasing in consecutive years, reaching a maximum (about 30 % of all births) in the period 1965-75. After this latter year, it started to decline, doubtlessly a consequence of naturalizations (see Fig. 2).

FIGURE 10 FOREIGNERS BORN IN SWITZERLAND AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL BIRTHS, 1950-1989

! immigrant children

I Swiss children

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989

However, the crude birth rate cannot be considered an indicator of fertility because it is calculated on the basis of the total population, and not on the number of women in the age of procreation.

General fertility rate

The general fertility rate (Table 8) is based on the number of women between 15 and 49 years of age, generally accepted as the age of procreation. Looking at births from this perspective, one notices that the fertility rate of the Swiss has been diminishing ever since 1950, in spite of a very minor rise in the last decade. Immigrant females, on the other hand, demonstrate a much higher fertility except for 1950 and 1960. The tendency in fact parallels that of the crude birth rate (Fig. 3.3). Political restrictions as well as the economic crisis have more than halved the fertility rate of foreigners in the period 1970- 1980, but afterwards it has been continuing its upward trend. Swiss and foreign females, however, seem to draw closer together. Considering this tendency, may the fertility of foreign women palliate the low Swiss fertility rate in the future?

28 TABLE 8 GENERAL FERTILITY RATE (LIVE BIRTHS PER 1000 WOMEN AGED 15-49) IN SWITZERLAND, 1950-89

Year Swiss Foreigners Total 1950 73.0 26.1 68.7 1960 72.0 65.4 71.3 1970 55.9 101.0 64.5 1980 45.5 47.8 45.9 1989 46.6 50.6 47.2

The general fertility rate, however, does not take age specifities into account Each age group has its own weight in the procreation process. We should therefore study age- specific fertility. Unfortunately there are no data available which would permit a comparison between Swiss and immigrant mothers, only global figures for all women exist. Thus, the data available allow us to affirm that the age group between 25-29 years is the most productive one (Table 9).

TABLE 9 MEDIAN AGE OF MOTHERS IN SWITZERLAND AT THEIR FIRST BIRTH

Year 1940 1949 1955 1960 1971 1975 1989 median age 28.9 27.9 27.5 27.0 25.8 26.2 28.0

The median age has been diminishing until 1970, stabilized itself afterwards, and has been rising again since. Currently, the fertility of women around 30 years and more is growing. The ideal age of procreation is thus seen in conflict with other aspirations, such as a professional career which may offer more personal satisfaction and meet the desire for emanicipation. Pursueing a professional career often requires a long-lasting training period. Apart from these wishes, women are also confronted with the rising costs of living (crisis of housing, inflation, schooling of the children etc.); they force them to exercise a profession in order to maintain a determined level of living and to allow them a certain amount of liberty and comfort. Such new aspirations as well as economic con- straints cannot easily be reconciled with family life. In addition, fertility is also influenced by the immigrant population. As has been shown in Fig. 8, their age pyramid differs from that of the Swiss. In particular, the percentage of women in the most productive age groups has evolved in quite another way (Table 10).

TABLE 10 WOMEN 20-39 YEARS OF AGE AS A PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN IN THE PROCREATIVE AGE GROUPS (15-49 YEARS)

Year 1950 I960 1970 1980 1989 Immigrant women 66.5 74.9 73.4 60.1 61.1 Swiss women 50.0 56.2 57.2 59.1 59.5

While until 1970, the proportion was very much in favour of immigrant women, the two percentages have started to approach one another since. May we conclude from this

29 that the decline in fertility in Switzerland stems from the reduced immigration of women in the procrea ti ve age-groups? This may well be the case; however this tendency may also reflect the adaptation of the Ufe style of the host society.

MARRIAGES

Marriages are not a primary field of studies in demography, and also in population geography they are only considered as a minor element. Although the study of births and deaths may suffice to know the volume of a population, the evolution of births depends on that of marriages. For a country Hice Switzerland with a weak illegitimate fertility, the study of marriages is important. After a constant decline until 1975, their number has been increasing since but has not reached the 1950-level yet. This is being illustrated by the crude marriage rate which calculates the number of marriages per l'OOO inhabitants. In Switzerland, it has oscillated considerable since 1950 (Table 11).

TABLE 11 CRUDE MARRIAGE RATE OF SWISS AND FOREIGNERS IN SWITZERLAND, 1950-1989 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 Swiss 7.0 6.7 6.1 6.2 6.6 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.9 5.5 Foreigners 2.9 4.1 9.0 6.8 4.5 2.8 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.7

Number of marriages among Swiss and among foreigners related to the respective populations

In general, the crude marriage rate is higher among the Swiss than among the immigrants (Table 11), exceptions being the years 1960 and 1965. While in 1950 90 % of all marriages were between Swiss, their share has nowadays declined to 70 %. In addition, it emerges that the number of mixed marriages and marriages between immigrants has been growing steadily over time (Fig. 3.5 on the following page). The unions between Swiss men and foreign women come second. As to marriages between Swiss women and foreign men, their number has been insignificant until 1955, since then, however, it has been growing, rivalling on certain occasions with the number of marriages between foreigners. Until 1952, by marrying a foreigner, a Swiss woman automatically lost her Swiss citizenship in favour of her husband's. Although the legislation has changed, this type of union remains comparatively rare, if compared to the high masculinity-rate of the immigrant population (Table 12).

TABLE 12 MARRIAGES BETWEEN SWISS MEN AND FOREIGN WOMEN AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL MIXED MARRIAGES, 1945-89 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 66.4 82.2 79.8 70.9 55.0 53.8 58.7 60.6 63.0 65.9

Again, the crude marriage rate is not the same in every age-group. In fact the mean age of new marriages has been mounting steadily. Young people marry later than in former years, thus contributing to keeping the number of births down (it is here that one of Thoman Malthus' postulates comes forth, albeit on a voluntary basis, not motivated by his

30 reflections). This tendency can be observed with both the Swiss and the immigrants. In order to be precise, the comparison between Swiss and foreigners should be based on a separation of the sexes. The rise of the mean age of the first marriage is largely due to two factors: the extended length of professional training and the growing popularity of other types of union, in particular simply living together. This latter type of union, however, is usually but a step to marriage.

FIGURE 11 NEW MARRIAGES 1945-89

0 10 20 30 40 50 immigrant couples

SPATIAL ASPECTS: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGNERS IN SWITZERLAND

The population is unequally distributed over the territory of Switzerland, concentra- tion and depopulation processes constituing a continuing problem for the country. Regio- nal disparities are common, and certain peripheral and mountain regions lose population to the benefit of large centres of economic activity. The question arises as to how the spatial distribution of immigrants relates to these disparities.

The evolution of foreigners on the cantonal level

Over the past four decades, the number of foreigners in the different cantons has increased at an unequal rate (Fig. 12; see annexe 3 for names and location of cantons). The mean growth amounted to 264.5 %, i.e. between 1950 and 1989 the number of foreigners in Switzerland has more than trebled. It is the cantons of Argovie and Valais which display the largest increase of immigrant population (7 and 6.5 times the 1950 number in

31 1989, i.e. more than double the increase of the country as a whole). The cantons of Berne, Zoug, Fribourg, Bâle-Campagne, Uri, Neuchâtel, Vaud and Soleure display a slightly lower growth, but still significantly above the national mean (up to four times the number of foreigners in 1989 confronted to 1950). On the other hand, the three cantons of the Grisons, Ticino and Glaris remain well below the mean.

FIGURE 12 GROWTH OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SWITZERLAND BY CAN- TONS, 1950-89 (Mean value for Switzerland: 264.5 % = 1)

0.00 to 0.50 0.50 to 1.00 1.00 to 1.50 1.50 to 2.00 2.00 to 2.50

The variations by canton have not been regular over the period in question. Values were generally higher in 1950-60 than in any other decade, and it is in this period that the canton of Argovie exceeds all others (Fig. 13). Similar high growth rates characterize cantons like Soleure, Nidwald, Bâle-Campagne, whereas Ticino and Bâle-ville did not receive many immigrants. Following restrictive measures by the federal government, the growth rates have become lower in 1960-70 (with the canton of Fribourg in the leading position). Further restrictions and the economic decline in the 1970s led to an overall decline of the foreign population, with only Obwald and Geneva displaying immigration gain, whereas the cantons of Berne, Nidwald, Neuchâtel and Soleure lost betwen 20 and 30 % of their resident foreign population. After 1980, however, the tendency has in- versed again, although a number of cantons still display a negative evolution. The growth of the foreign population in a particular canton depends on a number of factors, such as - the established quota, i.e. the legally fixed limit of the number of foreigners a canton may receive (according to federal ordinances); - the economic, political and financial situation at a given moment ;

32 - the availability of lodging (especially as concerns refugees); - the degre of tolerance of the autochtonous population towards newly arrived foreigners No study is known as to which of these factors dominate in individual cantons. How- ever, cantons with a heavy immigration rate may still display a low percentage of foreigners within their population. This point shall be dealt with below.

FIGURE 13 EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POPULATION IN SWITZERLAND BY CAN- TONS, 1950-60,1960-70,1970-80, AND 1980-89

ZHBELRUJSZCWNUGLZ3mSOBSBLEH/iRAISG(BA6TGTI WVSNEŒJU CH

Cantons (CH = Switzerland)

•30 - ZHEELRLJUSZCVNM3L23RR9OBSBLSH«AISGQR ASTGTI WV5NEŒJU CH

Cantons

For abbreviations, see annexe 3.

The relative importance of foreigners in the cantons

As has been noted above, the spatial distribution of foreigners within Switzerland has been highly variable over time. The maps compiled of the five years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1989 clearly demonstrate the variations encountered (Figs. 14-18). A central element to this process is the fact that immigrants chose their residence and place of work essentially according to socio-economic criteria and much less for linguistic or ethnic reasons. While this statement may hold good for Switzerland as a whole, one notes that it is border cantons which display a higher proportion of foreigners among their pop-

33 ulation than cantons situated in the interior, a phenomenon particularly conspicuous with reference to Ticino, the Lake Geneva basin and the Northeast. Cultural affinities do indeed play a role, apart from a high rate of industry in these cantons.

FIGURE 14 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN SWISS CANTONS, 1950 (Mean value: 6.1 % = 1)

1950 0.00 to 0.50 0.50 to 1.00 1.00 to 1.70 1.70 to 2.50 2.50 to 3.50 3.50 to 4.32

FIGURE 15 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN SWISS CANTONS, 1960 (Mean value: 10.8 % = 1)

0.00 to 0.50 0.50 to 1.00 1.00 to 1.50 1.50 to 2.00 2.00 to 2.50

34 FIGURE 16 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN SWISS CANTONS, 1970 (Mean value: 17.2 % = 1)

0.00 to 0.50 0.50 to 1.00 1.00 to 1.50 1.50 to 2.00 FIGURE 17 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN SWISS CANTONS, 1980 (Mean value: 14.8 % = 1)

1980 0.00 to 0.50 0.50 to 1.00 1.00 to 1.50 1.50 to 2.00 2.00 to 2.50

35 FIGURE 18 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS IN SWISS CANTONS, 1989 (Mean value: 15.6 % = 1)

1989

D 0.00 to 0.50 0 0.50 to 1.00 m 1.00 to 1.50 (ES 1.50 to 2.00

However, since immigration covers the needs of industry and tourism, it is the industrial and tourist regions which profit most from foreign labour, and it is the large centres which absorb most of them on their labour market. The contrast between centres and peripheries appears most clearly: centrality and economic structure act as major attractions, as can be seen from a schematic representation of regional types (Fig. 19; for an explanation of the types see annexe 2). The centres largely dominate the various peripheries, and small industrial centres attract more immigrants than tertiary ones.

FIGURE 19 PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS WITH REFERENCE TO TOTAL RESI- DENT POPULATION IN VARIOUS TYPES OF REGIONS IN SWITZER- LAND, 1980 (from Schuler et al. 1985:66)

A Z 32.3

28 0

20.0

3 12.0

CH = 14.8 V

Z = centre, P = periphery. For an explanation see annexe 2.

36 Spatial differences are quite striking: in Geneva, for example, the percentage of foreigners may attain up to a third of the resident population (1989: 30.9 %, i.e. about twice the Swiss mean), in Vaud and Ticino between a fifth and a quarter (1989: 21.7 and 23.4 % respectively), in Basle a fifth (1989: 20.3 %). Cantons like Berne (8.3 %), Lucerne (6.4 %), Obwald and Nidwald (6.7 and 5.6 % respectively, 1989 figures) are well below the national average. Over time, there have also been considerable variations: Berne ranked very high in 1950, but from 1960 onwards gradually dropped below the national mean. Geneva and Ticino have traditionally had very high rates of foreigners, whereas Lucerne, Nidwald and Obwald, Fribourg and Apenzell Rhode Intérieur have never been very attractive destinations (Table 13).

TABLE 13 POPULATION AND FOREIGNERS BY CANTON, 1990

Canton Population Foreigners Foreigners as income sFr. % of population per inhabitant Zurich l'179'044 209*505 17.8 53*127 Bern 958'192 84*987 8.9 36*349 Luzern 326*268 35*423 10.9 33*820 Uri 34*208 2*271 6.6 32*091 Schwyz 111*964 12*520 11.2 34*486 Obwalden 29*025 2*048 7.1 30*690 Nidwalden 33*044 1*981 6.0 38*944 Glarus 38*508 6*886 17.9 44*268 Zug 85*546 13*202 15.4 67*659 Fribourg 213*571 21*531 10.1 35*629 Solothurn 231*746 29'948 12.9 36*677 Baselstadt 199*411 41*642 20.9 57*552 Baselland 233*488 31'972 13.7 40'373 Schaffhausen 72'160 11*803 16.4 35'377 Appenzell Ausserrhoden 52*229 6*449 12.3 34*040 Appenzell Innerrhoden 13*870 1*133 8.2 29*766 St. Gallen 427*501 64*506 15.1 35*086 Graubünden 173*890 18*298 10.5 35*693 Aargau 507*508 76*309 15.0 38*271 Thurgau 209'362 34'291 16.4 32*431 Ticino 282*181 68'573 24.3 33*078 Vaud 601*816 133*043 22.1 38*113 Valais 249*817 33*843 13.5 30*126 Neuchâtel 163'985 32*442 19.8 34*421 Genève 379'190 119*064 31.4 53*373 Jura 66*163 6*592 10.0 30*602 Switzerland 6'873'687 1'100*262 16.0 40*702

37 Relative figures contrast with real ones and show only one side of the medal. In absolute terms, the cantons of Zurich, Geneva, Argovie, Berne, Vaud and Ticino lead the list, Zürich being at its head ever since 1950. Appenzell Rhode Interieur, on the other hand, occupies the last place, preceeded by Lucerne, Nidwald and Obwald. Once again, it is the (geometrical) centre which is least touched by the problem of immigrants, while the (geometrical) periphery entertains more frequent contacts with people beyond the border and is more industrialized, thus displaying a more attractive climate. In other terms: the 'golden triangle' (Basle - Berne - Zürich), the Lake Geneva region, and the Ticino are the most attractive areas, contrasting with the poorer cantons.

CONCLUSIONS

After the period of the 'baby-boom'in the 1950s and '60s, the decline of fertility and the ageing of the population become serious problems for Switzerland. It is true that the birth rate has been rising slightly in the past few years, but its future evolution is uncertain. As to the fertility rate, one notes that the number of live births per woman is shrinking - an intentional process largely due to the desire of couples to limit the number of children per family. This desire has two roots: the economic situation (high living cost, professional activity of many wives), and the new role of the child within the family (from an element of 'life-insurance' for the parents the children have become 'objects of affection'). A child may be an important cost factor to the household. Is immigration therefore the answer to the question: are the Swiss becoming extinct? The answer might be positive at first sight: since the end of World War II, male immigrants in the active age group have contributed to rejuvenate the age structure and to balance the sex-ratio. However, the birth rate of the immigrant population (which largely exceeded that of the Swiss in 1965) has begun to decline drastically. This change coincided with the introduction of restrictions on immigration decreed by the Federal Council (from 1963 onwards) and with the economic recession of the early 1970s. Apart from these internal reasons, however, it must be considered that the sending countries also begun to feel the consequences of declining fertility. Italy, for example, at a time the principal supplier of immigrant workers, nowadays displays a fertility rate which lies below the natural regeneration threshold. Immigration can therefore no longer play the same compensatory role as before. The question therefore arises if we should open our boundaries to immigrants from countries with higher fertility rates. The area of recruitement has widened over time: a first wave of immigrants from neighbouring countries was followed by another from countries further afield - more distant in various respects (spatial, cultural, religious). As a result, xenophobia has been rising steadily, and the integration of immigrants from this second wave in our society is meeting with increasing difficulties. The demographic future of Switzerland lies therefore with the indigenous population. If they desire a population decline, they may have it by just maintaining the procreation at the present low level and by closing the boundaries to immigrants. If they want to stabilize the number of inhabitants, they should increase the number of births slightly and adopt a more tolerant attitude to cultural 'cross-breeding' (which is being reinforced by technological progress in telecommunications and transport anyway). Above all, the authorities should adopt a clear and efficient family policy, which is actually not the case.

38 Social and cultural impacts of immigration INTRODUCTION

Apart from the quantitative side, immigration has also had qualitative consequences. Among them, social and cultural aspects may be seen as the most influential in daily life. Such impacts are visible for example in eating habits and the offer of ('exotic') food in shops and supermarkets. It is true, that this domain reflects not only immigration but also the growing spatial mobility of the Swiss (business travel, congress and holiday tourism), and it may be difficult to separate this impact from that created by the immigrants. The existence of specialized shops, however, is a visible witness to the latter effect. Equally, other fields in cultural and social Ufe have been touched: schools were confronted with pupils of mother tongues other than those known in Switzerland, the social mobility of the Swiss added a social dimension to the ethnic cleavage, and ways of life differ in general. We shall try and look at a number of these problems in turn.

SCHOOLS AND EDUCTION

One of the most crucial problems for the young generation of immigrants is their insertion into the Swiss school system. It is not only the language which poses problems, it is also the fact that there is not one but 26 Swiss school systems (see annexe 4). Cantonal independence and communal autonomy are mirrored in the way schooling is organized and teachers are trained, engaged and dismissed. Thus the number of years a pupil spends in primary school and in the two levels of secondary school varies from one canton to another. From this point of view, native and immigrant pupils follow the same rules. However, immigrant pupils are clearly disfavoured because they lack the necessary insight into the system and because they are foreign. In addition, the relative turnover of migrants can have negative consequences on the education of their children. Seventeen per cent of the pupils in Switzerland were of foreign origin in 1987/88 (OFS 1989) and 17.5 % in 1988/89 (Borkowsky, 1991:20); although their number has been declining in the 1980s (Table 14), their share has remained high owing to the low fertility of the Swiss population. Major changes have occurred within the group of foreign schoolchildren: those from Southern Europe have increased their share from two thirds to three quarter (Table 14), while the share of those from Germany, France and Austria combined was halved. Within the former group, Italians continue to be in the majority, but Spanish, Turkish and Yugoslav pupils are arriving in increasing numbers. One might argue that most of the Italian pupils would not meet with particular difficulties as Italian is an official language in this country. This, however, is only partly true: not all Italian pupils go to school in Ticino or in the few Italian speaking communes in the Grisons (where all teaching is made in Italian). Most of them face similar difficulties as all other foreigners who by their language are in a minority position. For children who want to continue living in Switzerland, there are only two possibilities: either they adapt themselves to the official school-system and the language used, or the immigrant community sets up its own schools for its children in order to guarantee a basic training and

39 facilitate integration into the host society. In practice, often both alternatives are being followed (see below).

TABLE 14 FOREIGN PUPILS IN SWISS SCHOOLS (COMPULSORY TRAINING) 1977/8 AND 1988/9

Nationality % 1977/8 % 1988/9 -Italy S3 39 -Spain 8 13 - Portugal - 6 - Turkey 2 8 - Yugoslavia 1 9 - Greece 1 1 Southern Europe 65 77 - Germany (FRG) 13 4 - France 5 4 - Austria 4 1 - others 14 14 Total number 147'000 122'000

Compulsory training = primary and lower level secondary (8 or 9 years)

Of course, the problem is not as acute in rural areas as it is in large centres. In Basle and Geneva, for example, over one quarter of the pupils in compulsory school-age are foreigners, while in Uri and other cantons of central Switzerland the percentage is 5 or less (OFS 1989). In the Geneva region, 54 % of pupils in the town are foreigners, but only 40 % in the surrounding communes (Boujon, 1989). The costs to the community are therefore unequally distributed, and the necessity for special schooling is most marked in towns. On the other hand, immigrant children in peripheral regions may suffer from isolation and lack of special classes, their chances of success in schools are therefore limited. One of the consequences of the massive arrival of immigrant schoolchildren is mixed classes between Swiss and foreigners. This does not ease the teachers' task at all. Nu- merous personal observations and private communications agree on the same point: teachers spend relatively much time with the foreign pupils, particularly if they are of non- Germanic and non-Latin language origin. Swiss pupils are thus to some extent disadvantaged, especially if their intellectual ability is high. The ensuing selection is usually to the detriment of the immigrants. This may range from simple repetiton of a year due to poor language skill to placing children into development classes as their intellectual abilities could not be developed under the given circumstances. According to data in OFS 1989, 52 % of immigrant pupils in compulsory schools in 1987/88 were in classes with 6 and more foreigners (4 % in classes without Swiss pupils!), but only 14 % of the Swiss pupils were in a similar situation. There are, however, also positive aspects to the mixing of natives and immigrants in classes. The school is a meeting-point where children of different nationalities and cultures can get to know each other. Cultural differences can be studied and experienced.

40 and the children may try to even them out. However, as Boujon (1989) notices, this is not very easy because the family and social background of the children determine how well they will be assimilated into a school class - something which may be decisive for the result of training at school.

The roots for social cleavages are therefore laid during the compulsory schooling period (up to the age of 15 or 16, depending on the individual cantons). This can be seen from the findings of a survey of second generation immigrants undertaken in Zurich 1979 and 1981/2 (Gurny et al., 1984). For the purpose of a longitudinal study, the same pupils of Italian origin were interviewed at the age of 16 (the end of compulsory training) and of 19 years (at the end of professional training or after three years of employment). The interviews revealed that the problem of schooling and professional training is less acute with boys than with girls. Although differences can be noticed between the young Swiss and the young Italians, they are much more pronounced with girls than with boys. On the whole. Italian girls display low schooling results, tend to follow lower grade schools than Swiss girls of the same age and enter professional life with no qualification at all. This can in part be explained by the fact that girls are subject to a more stringent parental control than boys: parents reproduce a social pattern inherited from their home country and often tend to idealize it, even if it no longer corresponds to the reality (in Italy, for example, customs evolve, as they do everywhere else). The authors of the study agree that the young Italians may constitute a specific case, because they form "the oldest group of immigrants, speak one of our national languages and dispose of a parallel institutional structure (their own schools etc.)" (Gurny et al., 1984:16). The findings of their study can therefore not be extended to other immigrant groups. Yugoslavs, Turks, Spaniards and Portuguese are culturally more distinct from the Swiss than Italians. We may add here, that within-differences in the Italian group may still be significant if we look at the contrast between mentalities in Northern Italy (close to Central Europe) and in the South. Lombardy has in fact experienced similar problems with immigrants from the South as has Switzerland (Leimgruber, I987a:78 ff).

While in primary school (lasting 4 years in Basle, 5 or 6 years in other cantons), all pupils receive the same kind of training. It is on the secondary school level where overt differences begin to show up. In spite of the 26 varying school systems in Switzerland, this level is organized similarly in all cantons, comprising two degrees. The first covers the years between the end of primary school and that of compulsory schooling (which usually lasts for nine years nowadays), the second leads on to a baccalauréat (General Cer- tificate of Education, Advanced level, subsequently called GCE - A) or to a diploma in professional education. As concerns the first degree, it can be subdivided into three levels (despite slight cantonal differences), termed subsequently higher, elementary and lower grade. The first grade prepares for GCE-A classes, the second for medium and higher qualifications in professional training, while the third unites pupils who may obtain but a low professional qualification if at all. Available data (Table 15) demonstrate that Swiss pupils aspire for high qualifications (GCE - A grade), while foreigners (immigrants) have to be content with elementary and lower education. However, if we break the immigrant group down into the three categories used by the OFS (Borkowsky 1991), the situation looks somewhat different.

41 TABLE 15 PUPILS IN SWISS SECONDARY SCHOOLS (FIRST DEGREE) ACCORD- ING TO SCHOOL LEVEL AND REGIONS OF ORIGIN (1988/9)

Level of first all Swiss immigrant neighbour Southern other degree secondary pupils pupils pupils countries* Europe countries Lower 9 8 13 11 13 12 Elementary 33 31 44 23 50 27 Higher 58 61 43 66 37 61

Percentage values; n = 279'320 * Neighbour countries: France, Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein

Although the Swiss are above average in the higher grade and below in the other two, they are superseeded in the former by pupils of Austrian. Liechtenstein, French and German origin (the "neighbours'). Pupils from Southern Europe (including neighbouring Italy) are clearly disadvantaged. The category of 'other countries' looks somewhat strange at first; however, it is a heterogeneous group which comprises both potential aca- demics (e.g. from the U.S., Japan ...) and future unqualified workers (e.g. from Africa, Sri Lanka ...). The future professionals in manual jobs will therefore more likely be children of immigrants from Southern Europe, future low status workers will be children from outside Europe, while the élite will be recruited from the industrialized countries. Not unexpectedly, the social cleavages of the years to come are visible here. A look at the pupils in the second degree of secondary training (Table 16) gives a similar impression. Again, the Swiss are superseded in GCE - A classes by their classmates from neighbouring and from 'other'countries, and pupils from Southern Europe fall well below average. These latter pupils are more professionally oriented - the tendency from table 15 is carried on. The two tables indicate that immigrants are indeed catching up and that the stereotype of the disadvantaged immigrants is no longer valid.

Table 16 PUPILS IN SWISS SECONDARY SCHOOLS (SECOND DEGREE) AC- CORDING TO SCHOOL LEVEL AND REGIONS OF ORIGIN (1988/9)

Level second all Swiss immigrant neighbour Southern others degree secondary pupils pupils pupils countries* Europe countries GCE -A - 17 17 17 25 11 38 Professional 77 77 78 68 85 53 Others 6 6 5 7 4 9

Percentage values, n = 309*225 * Neighbour countries: France, Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein

However, these figures refer to one moment in time, only. By way of an example, Schouwey (1990) has demonstrated the gradual decline of the number of pupils in a secondary school first degree (elementary grade) in a small bilingual (German and French) town (Morat, Canton of Fribourg) and the changing ratio between Swiss and immigrant

42 pupils over the years 1974-1989. While the percerntage of pupils in this grade has diminished, the Swiss have constituted the minority in most years (except for 1979, 1981 and 1984; Fig. 20). This case may be particular because of Morat's rural setting, with industries and intensive horticulture dominating, but the decrease of the percentages in this grade shows that less and less pupils are attracted by the simple professional career in these sectors. Indeed, as Schouwey (1990:28) shows, one quarter of all foreign pupils terminating this degree went on to a GCE - A education, and more than a quarter opted for work in the tertiary sector, while 14 % had no job at the end of their school career. Only one pupil out of 161 who left secondary school in Morat between 1974 and 1989 went into agriculture! The author interprets this job distribution as a proof for a quasi perfect integration of these young immigrants into the host society: they follow the example of the Swiss.

FIGURE 20 PUPILS HAVING TERMINATED SECONDARY SCHOOL FIRST DE- GREE (ELEMENTARY GRADE) IN THE MORAT SCHOOL DISTRICT (CANTON OF FRIBOURG), 1974-89

100- Swiss pupils foreign pupils

80-

60-

40 -

1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988

The sole presence of pupils, however, is no indication of success. As has been pointed out above, performances of Swiss and immigrants may differ significantly, even if the differences have been diminishing over time. The study by Gurny et al. (1984) also demonstrates that Italian pupils were more often faced with the problem of repeating a class than Swiss pupils (girls slightly more than boys). Repetitions may have two roots: they are either due to unsatisfactory results (the pupils are not promoted into a higher class) or they reflect a parental intention to increase the child's chance in a higher level by repeating a lower class voluntarily. It is true that sometimes the state offers assistance in the form of special (development) classes. Their image, however, is generally low, and children frequenting this kind of school are often considered mentally retarded, no matter what their nationality is. Slow learners, however, may be victims of a particular social, cultural and linguistic envi-

43 ronment, and this is particularly true for immigrants: parents who have difficulties in living up to standards imposed by the host society cannot offer the same kind of educational support to their children as can native parents (or parents from a society with roughly the same standards). Thus immigrant children are rapidly marginalized. In her study of immigrants in the canton of Fribourg, Python (1991) writes that "6 % of the Italian pupils are found in development classes, 5 % of the Spaniards, 5 % of those of other nationalities, against only 1.5 % of those with French or German as their mother tongue." (p. 15). Again, this holds good.first and foremost for the primary level, but it is here that the foun- dations for further training are laid. Pupils who do not arrive at the same standard as their mates have a considerable disadvantage on the secondary level and may finish on the lower grade, although their intelligence might originally have been superior. Immigrants have therefore to undertake particular efforts in order to improve their situation. One of these efforts has been the creation of their own schools, either running parallel to Swiss schools or completing them by specific training for their children. The results of this kind of schooling, together with in-depth information of parents has increased the percentage of children going from development classes to normal schools from 57 to 89 within a few yeayrs (Python, 1991:15, unfortunately without any precise information). Immigrant schools as such are rare. There is an Italian school in Zürich, but since the Swiss and the Italian school systems are radically different, this school does not really respond to the needs of the host society but rather to the ideals of the immigrants who are willing to return home. As a result, pupils from this school are structurally badly integrated (Gurny et al., 1984:60) and end up in jobs below their qualification. However, immigrant organizations do provide some kind of schooling in order to support the children on their difficult way of integration. This kind of coordinated activity started in the 1960s, when the catholic Spanish mission was founded in 1962, the catholic Italian mission in 1965 and finally the colonia libera italiana (free Italian colony) in 1972 (Python, 1991:11). At that time, the immigrants had acquired a certain experience with Swiss authorities, mentalities and ways of life, come to know the institutions, and displayed a high motivation of integration and assimilation. Within this framework, language courses were seen as a natural way of promoting the integration into the host society, the aim being also an amelioration of the social and economic status.

INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION

One of the main problems with immigrants is their (seemingly) temporary status: most of them arrive for a limited period of time, and many remain for various reasons over the time-frame initially envisaged. They are thus confronted with the decision to become more or less wholly integrated into the host society or even to assimilate themselves to it. Hultkrantz (1960) defines assimilation as "the complete and unilateral adjustment of a culture trait or a whole culture to a foreign culture complex or culture." (p. 33), while integration is seen as "the functional interrelations between cultural traits and systems as well as between culture and other factors (nature, for instance)." (p. 167). The former definition may help us further (because it is dynamic), but the latter has too much of a static character and should therefore be dismissed from our discussion. Instead, another definition comes closer to our purpose. In their dictionnary. Hartfiel & Hillmann (1972: 344) call integration a "processes of behavioural and conscious insertion into or adaption to value structures and behavioural patters ..." Both terms, therefore, describe change, but with different aims and results. Centl ivres et al (1991:10 f) in fact differentiate in the

44 same manner, by emphasizing the total abandonment of one's own culture in the process of assimilation (i.e. interiorization of a new value system), whereas integration does not go so far. It is this abandonment of one's culture which makes assimilation undesirable, at least in the opinion of immigrants' associations (Maillard & Ossipow 1988), whereas integration is considered positive, an enrichment of life. One must not forget, however, that these two terms have to be seen in different time-perspectives. Indeed, while assimilation can be considered from a long-term perspective, integration takes place on a short- term scale. Assimilation is a matter of several generations: the descendants of immigrants of the late 19th and early 20th centruy have perfectly assimilated into Swiss society, and usually it is but their names which recall their foreign origin. Integration, on the other hand, can take place within one and the same generation, its degree depending on the individual's intention to detach himself from his home country and to become part of the host society. The number of naturalizations may be considered an indicator of integration at a given time.

As Hagman (1966) has pointed out, assimilation (and therefore also integration) is a matter of both immigrants and host society. Each of them has a different potential for assimilation and/or integration, and they cannot be separated from one another. Even if his arguments may look somewhat dated, they are in fact still valid. Immigrants of the post-World War II period are people who arrived with the intention to return home after a certain time (even if this decision has not been carried out - see above). Therefore they were not particularly interested in anything which went beyond a minimum adaptation. If migration is undertaken for economic reasons only, the integration potential is small. - Another element which influences this potential is the region of origin and its distance from Switzerland. Distance in this context is to be understood not only in the physical but also in the cultural and social sence. It may indeed slow down or complicate the integration process. Value systems like the family, personal honour ex- pressed through the performance at work, the attitude towards the collectivity, etc. (Hag- mann 1974) render integration into a host society difficult. - The present-day situation with immigrants from countries such as Turkey or Portugal, both culturally and socially quite distinct from Switzerland, illustrates this difficulty. The distance between them and the host society is considerable, so they tend to form national groups rather than try to mingle with the host society which remains culturally alien and socially unattainable. The host society, on the other hand, adopts an attitude of caution. In spite of a long tradition of assimilation/integration of refugees (from Huguenots in the 16th cent, to the political refugees of the 19th cent.), the overall attitude of the Swiss has been rather negative: Basle denied the Huguenot refugees access to the town in 1546, except for wealthy ones. This kind of attitude can still be met with today: poor refugees are associated with social burden and potential political unrest, wealthy immigrants, on the other hand, with investment, job creation, and stability. In spite of this rather negative aspect, the overall assimilation/integration potential of Switzerland is fairly high, mainly owing to the juxtap- position of different cultures (often within a single canton). The policy chosen can therefore influence people's attitude. It presupposes, however, that the host society is prepared to receive people with a different cultural and social background and to assist them on the long way to integration and assimilation. This has certainly lacked in Switzerland for many years.

45 Immigrants meet with lots of problems in different fields (Coppini 1971): they have to adapt to their new job, to the relations between worker, foreman and management, to an unknown rhythm of work, to salaries and conditions of payment, to taxation etc. Then the search for lodging presents difficulties. Immigrants are often disadvantaged on the housing market because they do not know current practices, have little or no knowledge of the price structure, have different ideas about lodgings in general, etc. Thirdly, the immigrant is faced with new and (to him) complicated institutions. Bureaucracies are difficult to come to grips with in any country, but Switzerland with her three-tier political system (commune - canton - Confederation) is particularly difficult to understand. Even the Swiss themselves may find it complicated. As a consequence, both immigrant groups and the collectivity have started to create offices for information and assistance in order to help the immigrants to find their way through the jungle of institutions and regulations. Even trade unions have gradually rea- lized the need to defend the interests of foreign labour, a process which has taken some time. These efforts may mirror the best intentions, but the final decision as to integration lies with the immigrant. If he does not want to adapt to the host society, all efforts will be in vain.

Last but not least, integration has also a spatial aspect, and it is rather the lack of integration which manifests itself in spatial (and, of course, social) segregation. The example of Zurich, studied by Arend (1982), does not show real immigrant ghettos but marked concentrations in certain areas of the town (Fig. 21). Among the 34 individual wards, the central area (which lies just to the west of the railway station) stands out quite clearly. It is a zone which has a relatively low population and is characterized by a mixture of housing, industry and warehouses. This picture is of limited descriptive value because it does not discriminate between social groups. Conventional knowledge about Zurich tells us, however, that the lower class immigrants (i.e. many Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Yugoslavs, Turks, Greeks etc.) will be concentrating in industrial zones, whereas middle and upper class immigrants (such as Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, Ja- panese etc.) will live in the same wards and districts as their Swiss counterparts. The findings for Zurich may be generalized because they reflect a general human behaviour: that of gathering together in a specific territory in order to obtain a feeling of shelter in the host country from the influences of the society one has moved to. Similar concentrations can be discovered in other towns large and small. Apart from territorial behaviour, however, the housing market has to be considered. As Arend (1982:309 f) points out, quite a number of potential residential areas are in fact almost unaccessible to immigrants: owner-occupied houses and communal and cooperative residences are difficult to get at, and long-term tenants block part of the tenements theoretically available on the market. Landlords display a reserved attitude towards immigrants and prefer Swiss tenants, but obviously there is a certain stock of housing which is less attractive and is therefore sneered at by the Swiss. It is this kind of housing which remains on the market for immigrants. As has been demonstrated on numerous occasions in segregation studies in the U.S., the intrusion of outsiders is responsible for a self-reinforcing process of con- centration of immigrants. Even if the situation is not as acute as in US towns, the same tendency can be discovered in Switzerland. Spatial segregation is thus a consequence of the housing market in its perception by the Swiss population.

46 FIGURE 21 FOREIGNERS IN ZURICH AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULA- TION, 1977. BY TOWN WARDS (after Arend, 1982)

Finally, the search for housing is also influenced by the linguistic ability combined with an 'outsider-feeling'. Being foreign is a handicap, especially for people belonging to a lower social class who have less self-confidence and self-consciousness than members of the middle and upper classes. This factor adds up to the others just mentioned and as- sists in the process of spatial segregation.

CULTURAL LIFE AND ADAPTATION INTO SWISS SOCIETY

Life in general presents immigrants with numerous problems, and often they meet with little understanding for them on the part of the Swiss population. Family structures are not the same in Switzerland and in the Mediterranean countries, and even there, they differ between catholic and islamic countries. These differences are maintained at least in the first generation, and the social relations of immigrant girls, for example, are subject to strict parental control (Gurny et al., 1984:89 ff). Frictions within families may occur, in particular when immigrant girls realize that they are disfavoured compared to their Swiss friends. Generally, little attention is paid by immigrant parents to the training of their daughters who then finish in unqualified jobs immediately after the end of compulsory schooling. This can be interpreted both as a parental pressure (the girls are to take up re- sponsibility as quickly as possible in order to accelerate their growing-up process) and as a strategy for independence by the girls themselves (in order to escape autoritarian parental control which is increasingly perceived as illegitimate). In the last resort, however, both these processes stem from the social marginalization of the parents in the host society (ibid.:93). It is not only the relation between parents and children which suffers under the new social situation, it is family Ufe as a whole which is put to a severe test. Once a family has

47 emigrated, ii is usually only a nuclear or biological family (i.e. parents and children). This poses severe problems to people who have been used to the extended family (with grand- parents, aunts and uncles), where there was always someone about to take care of the children. With mother and father occupied (often at different times of the day), the family is breaking down and parental authority is dwindling. Immigrant children learn from and imitate their Swiss schoolmates, wives rarely receive any form of linguistic training (as opposed to husbands), therefore they become isolated. If a woman has different working hours from her husband, internal family relations will suffer strongly, and social and psychological problems will appear (Sulzer & Höhner 1984).

The origin of immigrants can also be a cause for problems of adaptation. It was found, for example, that immigrants from northern Italy generally had few problems in Switzer land. They originate from a region which is close to our country, their culture can be seen as related to Ticino culture, and they come from an area which has long been economically strong and politically and socially liberal. The arrival of immigrants from the Italian south (with its traditional latifundia structure), however, brought about serious problems of (cultural and social) understanding. They were almost equal in Lombardy (northern Italy) and in Switzerland (which indicates how close the Lombardy and the Swiss mentality are in a way). - Turkish immigrants are subject to group-internal friction between urban and rural Turks: whereas the former are predominantly qualified workers who are ready to adapt themselves to the host society, the latter are found in unqualified occupations and are not willing to integrate themselves into Switzerland (ibid.). In addition, cultural, political and ideological differences have encumbered relationships inside the Turkish community for many years. Straightforward ethnical differences (e.g. Kurds versus Turks, Serbs versus Croats), on the other hand, seem to largely absent.

Other problems arise with religion. Until the 1960s, there were few non-Christian immigrants. The arrival of Tibetan refugees after 1959 brought a large Buddhist group into this country which, however, lived in a relatively closed community and managed to maintain most of its traditions. When Yugoslav workers were recruited, the Swiss found themselves confronted with people belonging to the the Islamic faith, and Turkish immigrants (workers and refugees) added considerably to this number. Although the Swiss have gradually become fairly tolerant in religious matters, they display a critical attitude towards Islam in particular, chiefly as a consequence of the rise of fundamentalism in Iran. For many reasons, they do not want to be involved in an internal religious conflict which is at the roots of war and waves of refugees. Islamic immigrants generally suffered from this lack of attention. A firm in Winterthur with large group of Turkish workers has put a house at their disposal which contains a room which can be used as a mosque. However, other problems related to religion have to be solved, such as eating habits (factory canteens do not always consider the islamic ban on pork; ibid.).

Language is a serious problem for immigrants, im particular for those from outside Europe. While Italians speak one of our national languages and Spaniards and Portuguese have easy access to French, Yugoslavs and Greeks are already situated further apart (even if they speak Indoeuropean languages), and Turks experience considerable difficulties. Although individuals may draw advantage from their mother tongues, they will first of all have to learn at least one of the official language of Switzerland in order to cope with their employers and with the authorities, to understand the ways of life in the host

48 society, and to develop a social network beyond their contrymen. Usually immigrant organizations take care of basic linguistic training, but since not every group has such a backing, the collectivity has to step in and provide basic training. Immigrants in towns and rural centres are favoured by the existence of private schools and local initiatives providing evening classes, but people in the periphery face considerable difficulties if they want to develop their linguistic skill. The importance of language is obvious: lacking linguistic abilities is rapidly equalled with stupidity, hence the search for a qualified job becomes difficult, and people end up in occupations below their capacities. This explains why immigrants are usually willing to learn the language, and the percentages found by Schöneberg (1982:466 f) demonstrate this willingness, in spite of differences between the various immigrant groups: Italians manifest few problems with linguistic assimilation: in Switzerland, 75 % of them seem to be more or less fluent in one of the two foreign languages (German and/or French), while this percentage is distinctly lower in Germany (55 %). Spaniards face more problems, 48 % of them being able to communicate more or less fluently in one of the languages of their host country. Turks, finally, are the most handicapped group: only about one third seems to get along in German. These differences are obviously related to the way immigrants can assimilate culturally, i.e. will be viewed positively by the host society. In addition, it is also the perspectives for the future which influence the decision to learn the language of the host society. In multi- lingual Switzerland, additional problems may arise if immigrants have to migrate from one linguistic region to another. Living in a foreign country means that immigrants tend to have more intercourse among themselves than with people from the host society. Coming from a variety of countries, they need a common language to communicate. Interestingly enough, Italian has developed into the lingua franca of certain immigrant communities in Switzerland. This phenomenon, which is being studied by linguists (Berruto et al., 1990; Rovere 1974), has at least two roots. Certainly, the numerical superiority of the Italian immigrant group in the 1970s has virtually imposed their language as the universal idiom within immigrant groups, both at work and in leisure time. Besides, the fact that Italian is the third official language of Switzerland (apart from German and French) has doubtlessly influenced this choice. Using this language would facilitate access to authorities as well as the understanding of all kinds of practical information (from public notices to instructions on the washing machine) for immigrants with other mother tongues (Spanish, Portuguese, Yugoslavs, Turks, Greeks - to name but the more important).

Symptomatic for the sociocultural situation for immigrants is a collection of essays by Czech immigrants (Peschler, 1972): As emerges from the collective experience made by the various authors, Switzerland is perceived as a "cold paradise". This is the title of the book, and it reflects the almost unbounded economic possibilities the Czech refugees encountered as well as the reserved attitude of the Swiss towards foreigners. And indeed, the three particular aspects of Switzerland identified by Lochmann (1972) are ideals rather than reality: our multinational society does not necessarily favour exchange and solidarity, freedom as the chief objective of the league of 1291 seems to hold good for the pri- viledged rather than for everybody, and neutrality has led us into isolation and has lost a lot of its credibility. The arrival of immigrants is therefore a challenge to Swiss tolerance as well as to the ideals discussed above. It is not possible to defend these three ideals by cutting ourselves off a world in which people are interconnected for good and evil. It is by opening up to outside ideas that we may arrive at another form of integration, that of

49 incorporating new impulses into our identity which will thus keep its original spirit (ibid:43).

CONCLUSION

As this chapter has shown, the topic of social and cultural impact is a very delicate one, difficult to document exhaustively. This may be largely due to the fact that private life and personal convictions of immigrants (as well as of natives) are concerned. The role of traditional values, the uncertainty about the future, the feeling of inferiority in relation to the host society, but also the sheer contrast with the way of life in the home country make adaptation and integration difficult. The problem of segregation can only be eased by an open attitude of the Swiss population which, however, is rather difficult to be found. It is only over time that differences will gradually disappear: the second generation is going to have less problems than their parents. For many years, immigrants kept to themselves and hardly joined the Swiss in their leisure-time activities. According to Schöneberger (1982:469), the rate of immigrant membership in Swiss native associations is very low (8 % of all foreigners), but fairly high in their own ethno-specific societies (up to 29 %). Trade unions fare better: 30 % of a sample of 980 immigrants in Switzerland indicated that they belonged to a trade union (ibid., 486). - As with languages, Italians dominate in this field, too: 34 % of them belong to an Italians' association in Switzerland, while only 20 % of Spaniards are members of a Spaniards' association. Mixed societies (Swiss-Italian and Swiss-Spanish) are less popular with immigrants (9 and 6 % of immigrants belonging to one of them respectively). Participating in all kinds of activities is certainly a good means to counteract isolation and segregation - natives and immigrants have to cooperate in this field and throw old stereotypes over board. However, social differences and prejudices may retard this process, and current economic difficulties as well as the rise of right-wing parties (which may be seen as a potential growth of xenophobia) visible in the last months (e.g. during the parliamentary electons in November 1991) do not necessarily favour it.

50 Economic impact of immigration

INTRODUCTION

As has become apparent in the previous chapters, the impacts of migration touch many fields at the same time, and it is not possible to separate them without loss of clarity. This holds good also for the field of economic impacts which are intimately related to the political sphere, but also to culture and social life as well as demography. The economic impacts are probably the most difficult to detect. Usually, no reliable statistical base exists to measure them, and researchers often only ask about possible impacts on the sending but not on the receiving countries (e.g. Straubhaar, 1988:227). Even there, sentiments are mixed: emigration was beneficial only as long as the receiving countries were willing to continue the intake of migrants, remittances were beneficial in that they contributed to the gross domestic product, but negative because they "fueled domestic inflation" (ibid, 228). But what about the receiving countries? It is here that there is still a research deficit. Simon (1991) has studied economic impacts of immigration in the Un ted States. From his experience, he lists a wide range of fields such as the use of welfare and public services by immigrants, effects on technology and productivity, natural resources and environment, standard of living, income and prices, labour market and so on. Drawing on a wide range of material, both actual and historical, he also puts the U.S. in perspective with other immigration countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand). Unfortunately, the present context is too limited to go into the same depth. Economic impacts can be seen from a variety of angles, each of which offers a complementary view. The principal ones, which will guide our reflections, are: 1. Immigrants on the labour market. Under this heading, quantitative aspects dominate (number of workers over time and their spatial distribution), but qualitative ones enter as well (the qualification of immigrants). 2. The economic performance of immigrants looks at the profit our national economy has been drawing from immigration. What percentage of the GDP is due to the activity of foreign labour? Would it have been possible to obtain the same result without immigrants by simply rationalizing production? 3. Immigrants are consumers as well as producers. As such they spend part of their income for the purchase of all kinds of goods, for leisure activities, for transportation etc. By tending to stick to food and objects from their home countries, they create a demand for specialized shops. To what extent have they stimulated corn- sumption and, therefore, production and import trade? 4. Immigrants export part of their earnings. The question might be asked to what extent this money is lacking on the Swiss capital market. It will not be possible to go into detail on all these points and anwer all the questions; for most of them we shall have to be content with a few general remarks. Very little has indeed been written on specifically economic topics, whereas a lot of attention has been paid to the quantitative side of immigration and possible political repercussions.

51 IMMIGRANTS ON THE LABOUR MARKET

To begin with the easiest of these questions, let us recall that one of the chief reasons for the massive immigration into Switzerland after 1945 has been the demand for labour. The growth of the Swiss economy in the post-war years exceeded all expec- tations, and increasing demand for products both on the domestic and particularly on the export market forced manufacturers to increase their production capacities. At the same time, the tertiary sector began to develop considerably, draining Swiss people from productive work into all kinds of service activités. As a consequence, the industrial labour market started to dry up: the declining primary sector did not set enough labour free to compensate for this loss. The early years were characterized by the principle of labour 'rotation': the individual worker obtained a work licence for a limited period only, after which he was obliged to return home. His post could then be filled with a fellow countryman. As has been explained before, this limitation prevented foreign worker from staying in Switzerland the full period of 10 years which would confer upon them the right to settle permanently. Ro- tation policy thus protected Switzerland from durable immigration and safeguarded Swiss workers against foreign competition (Haug, 1980:52). An additional protection can be seen in the fact that temporary workers (even if they held an annual work licence) did not enjoy free mobility (neither geographical nor professional) on the labour market - this privilege was reserved to the resident foreign population. While rotation policy seemed to be the answer to all labour problems, negative aspects began to emerge. Braun (1965) lists five major drawbacks of labour rotation: 1. Firms and public administration experienced increasing cost because of the constant fluctuation of foreign workers. 2. It became increasingly difficult to replace the departing workers with equally qualified personnel. 3. Rotation delayed and concealed all the inevitable social and cultural consequences resulting from such a massive immigration. 4. Rotation prevented the assimilation process of the foreigners. 5. The workers who replaced departing manpower increasingly lacked qualification. Arriving from different and more distant areas of recruitment, they manifested difficulties in adapting to the new cultural and economic situation, and their economic performance diminished. This was in part due to the growth of the Euro- pean labour market: after 1957, the Swiss labour market began to lose its post-war advantage and entered into competition with other countries, in particular with members of the EEC. What was the background to this particular kind of immigration policy?. After World War II, most people did expect economic growth; however, everybody feared the slump which would follow soon after (in analogy to the situaton after the First World War). Switzerland thus wanted to be prepared with a legal instrument permitting her to close down the labour market for foreigners as quickly as possible in order to avoid mass unemployment (and the cost involved). Economic growth, however, continued beyond expectation, and foreigners became an essential part of the workforce. As has been said above, the Swiss themselves provided for the demand by the sectoral change: preferring white collar jobs, they left manufacturers short of labour. Foreigners were especially needed in construction, but also in other fast growing industries which, instead of rationalizing their production Unes and closing down obsolete production units, expanded by simply blowing up their workforce (Braun, 1965:101; Haug, 1980:55).

52 The result can be seen on Fig. 22 which is based on the total number of foreigners (in a way an artificial base, because seasonal workers have been included, although the total active population is taken from the census at the end of the year). The figure demonstrates the gap which has opened between Swiss and immigrants on the labour market: while at the beginning, the labour force was largely Swiss, their proportion has declined subsequently. In spite of certain fluctuations, the share of immigrants remains high, oscillating between 20 and 26 % in the 1980s (as compared to 8.8 % in 1950).

FIGURE 22 SWISS AND FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE IN SWITZERLAND, 1950 - 1980

4 -i

Total

3 -

Immigrants 1 -

0 1950 1960 1970 1980 1989

The drawbacks of labour 'rotation' and a growing unrest among the Swiss population caused the government to devise a new policy aiming at a restriction of the number of foreigners by defining an upper limit. From 1963-1965, this policy was applied to the total workforce of the individual enterprises. In the beginning, working licences for immigrants could only be obtained if the total number of workers of an enterprise did not exceed that of December 1962 (ordinance of 1963); later on, this condition was tightened: the ordinance of 1964 demanded a reduction of the total workforce to 97 % of that of March 1st, 1964. These ordinances, however, were to no effect, because Swiss workers who left a firm could be replaced by foreigners (Leimgruber, 1987a:62). Thus, in 1965, the federal government introduced a system of 'double-limitation' which remained in force until 1968. Its scope was to limit both the total and the immigrant staff of the single enterprises. The number of employees per firm remained limited as before, but immigrant workers had to be reduced by 5 % (based on their number on March 1st, 1965). Border commuters were explicitely included in this restriction, but freed from it a year later, following protests by the respective cantons. Such quantitative restrictions of the total workforce could not last for long, because they would have resultet in a structural stagnation of our economy (Schwarz, 1988:22). In

53 1966, and again in the following year, therefore, increases of the number of staff by 4 % and 10 % respectively were permitted. In 1968, further timid attempts at a liberalization were undertaken, and the number of foreigners in Switzerland immediately continued to increase. One particular reason may have been that with the new system of 1963, immigrants with an annual working licence could bring their families. The xenophobic movement reacted quickly and increased its pressure in view of a referendum (see below). The federal government acted promptly: in March 1970, three months before the first plebiscite on the problem of immigration was to be held, it issued a new ordinance which aimed at a general limitation of the number of foreigners. The date was well chosen, and this new policy has doubtlessly influenced the outcome of the referendum (see table 21).

This ordinance has become the basis for all successive measures, and its principles are still applied nowadays, despite occasional modifications to adapt it to new situations. Its most important points are: - From 1970 onwards, the number of working licences have been calculated on a zero-migration balance, i.e. arrivals had to equal departures (remigration, marriages with Swiss citizens, naturalizations, deaths). - The maximum number of working licences are fixed annually and distributed among the individual cantons following a special key. - Immigrants were free to change their employers after one year, their profession and their cantons of work after three years. In this way, they became mobile manpower; after years of administrative and political influence the labour market could again start to operate freely according to demand and offer (Schwarz, 1988:28). In the course of the 1970s, the number of foreigners decreased because of these measures and the economic recession (1973 crisis). In 1974, the cantons were asked explicitely to issue working licences only if an employer could not find a resident employee for a particular post. In this way, native labourers again enjoyed protection from unemployment (Schwarz, 1988:31). Already in 1973, and again in 1976, the mobility of the non- resident foreigners on the labour market was improved, another important step towards their integration into Swiss society (ibid., 33 f.). Nowadays, they can therefore be said to be on an almost equal footing with resident foreign and Swiss manpower, and the labour market operates almost normally. This also holds good for seasonal workers because their permit is valid for one season only, thus they may change their working region and their profession every year.

Apart from the total number of foreigners on the labour market, their impact on the different sectors is of interest. As has been emphasized before, foreign labour arrived predominantly on the industrial labour market, at first helping to increase production, later to substitute the Swiss who had left blue collar for white collar jobs. As the figures demonstrate (Table 17), immigrants tended to follow the same process as the Swiss, i.e. enter the service sector after a certain time. Competition thus not only expanded into the tertiary sector but gradually developed in the managerial levels in the Firms, i.e. in the social Held. Regional (i.e. cantonal) variations are inevitable: in 1989, 49 % of all gainfully employed in Ticino and 44.5 % in Geneva were foreigners (including a high percentage of border commuters), but only just 10 % in the Canton of Obwalden, the national mean being 23.7 %. The presence of border commuters seems to inflate the percentage, but not excessively: they will only arrive if job opportunities exist. The Canton of Jura, e.g., counts only 20.6 % foreigners among its labour force, although its chief recruitment area for commuters is neighbouring France (Belfort territory). However, there is a substantial competition on the labour market because of heavy industry in the Belfort-Montbéliard

54 region (Peugeot, Alsthom, Bull etc.) which seems to restrain the flow of manpower into the Canton of Jura where job opportunities are relatively limited.

TABLE 17 PERCENTAGE OF SWISS AND FOREIGN WORKERS BY ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1900 -1980 Subdivision by nationality and sector Swiss in % of the Swiss Foreigners Total three sectors Year I II m I n m I n m I II III 1900 34.8 42.4 22.8 6.4 60.7 32.9 31.0 44.9 24.1 97.2 81.1 81.7 1910 31.3 42.4 29.5 4.8 67.2 28.0 27.1 46.3 26.6 97.2 76.8 83.2 1920 27.6 42.9 29.5 4.9 53.9 41.2 25.0 44.2 30.8 97.7 85.9 84.6 1930 23.3 43.5 33.2 4.7 50.2 45.1 21.3 44.3 34.4 97.6 87.7 85.8 1941 21.7 43.2 35.1 5.6 50.4 44.0 20.8 43.6 35.6 98.5 93.4 92.9 1950 17.3 47.1 35.6 7.8 40.5 51.7 16.5 46.6 36.9 96.1 92.9 88.6 1960 12.5 46.4 41.1 4.3 63.7 32.0 11.2 49.3 39.5 93.5 78.3 86.5 1970 9.4 43.1 47.5 1.5 66.5 32.0 7.7 48.2 44.1 95.6 69.8 84.2 1980 7.3 35.0 57.7 1.2 55.2 43.6 6.2 38.7 55.1 96.5 73.7 83.0 I = primary sector (agriculture, forestry), II = secondary sector (manufacturing, construction), QI = tertiary sector (services)

There is but a weak relationship between immigrants on the labour market'and the economic performance of the individual cantons: in 1989, the rank correlation coeffi- cient between foreign labour ratio and national income per inhabitant amounted to 0.389 only. It is the qualitiy of jobs which determines the amount of immigrants to be employed. Thus the canton of Zurich ranks 13th with 21.8 % foreigners among its labour force, but 4th as concerns national income per inhabitant. There are a lot of jobs (in particular in banking and insurance) not to be handed over to immigrants. Ticino, on the other hand, is characterized by numerous industries relying heavily on semi- and unqualified labourers: it ranks 1st on the foreign labour force ratio, but 19th on national income per inhabitant). This statement raises a particular point: the qualification of immigrants. In general, one can say that immigrant labourers satisfy the demand for semi- and unskilled workers, i.e. that their overall qualification is low. However, this statement is too general to be true as it stands. First of all, there are numerous foreigners with a very high education (such as officers in international organizations (who are counted among foreigners, but are not subject to restrictions), national representatives, managers, university teachers etc.); secondly, immigrants who have settled for a longer period in Switzerland can benefit from numerous opportunities to improve their skills, and their children will often try and obtain a better qualification than their parents (Gurny et al., 1984). As a result of this process, they were gradually substituted by immigrants with less skill from further afield. Portuguese, Yugoslavs and others have gradually replaced those foreigners who climbed up the social ladder (Frenchmen, Germans, Italians), thereby freeing jobs on the lowest level of skill (very much as immigrants had initially substituted Swiss workers who were 'moving up' the social ladder) - a process to be observed throughout the country (see e.g. Cunha 1988:22 ff; Ratz & ROegg 1991:108 ff). The following figures (Table 18) illustrate (albeit imperfectly) the contrast in qualification between Swiss and immigrant labour, resulting in a segmentation of the labour

55 market (Körner, 1990:92). Imperfectly for two reasons: first, because immigrants may have obtained some form of professional formation in their home countries, but they may be working in quite another field outside their competence and in a much lower position than they could; second, because the data are not quite comparable. In the 1980 census, the group labelled 'collaborating family-members' has been distributed among the various categories (employees, workers, apprentices), whereas until 1970 they were listed under a separate heading. The two groups distinguished in table 18 will therefore be slightly overrepresented in 1980. It becomes obvious that immigrants are working predominantly in subordinate positions and chiefly in blue collar jobs. Similarly we can recognize that this tendency has been increasing since the end of World War II until about 1970. However, it has been pointed out before that immigrants tend to learn from the host society; consequently the evolution of their occupation after 1970 mirrors the general trend of employment, i.e. the increase of white collar jobs and the general decline of blue collar occupations, as can be seen from the evolution 1978-80 (the census figures for 1990 will not be available before 1993). However, they are even more strongly confined to subordinate positions than they were before.

TABLE 18 PROFESSIONAL STATUS (IN %) OF THE WORKFORCE RESIDENT IN SWITZERLAND, BY ORIGIN. 1950-1980 (national census results)

1950 1960 1970 1980 Professional status Swiss Immig. Swiss Immig. Swiss Immig. Swiss Immig. White collar workers 22.0 13.4 27.9 11.9 39.7 18.8 46.9 24.8 - managerial 3.4 2.4 4.1 2.5 4.6 1.9 6.5 3.5 - subordinate 18.6 11.0 23.8 9.4 35.1 16.9 40.4 21.3 Blue collar workers 47.3 73.5 44.0 83.8 36.0 78.3 35.3 68.5 - skilled 16.2 19.3 14.9 24.1 12.7 15.9 13.5 13.9 - semi- and unskilled 31.1 54.2 29.1 59.7 23.3 62.4 21.8 54.6 Others 30 7 13.1 28.1 4.3 24.3 2.9 17.8 6.7

Immigrant labour is commonly viewed as temporary, welcome in periods of economic prosperity, but superfluous in times of recession. The crisis of 1973/4 is a good illustration of this. Although it has been claimed that very few foreigners were dismissed as a consequence of recession, this is only partly true: by not renewing their temporary work- permits, the authorities forced many immigrant workers to return home: unemployment was simply exported (Castelnuovo-Frigessi, 1977:LVII; Leimgruber, 1987a:63 f). The number of workers with an annual permit, which had culminated in 1964 (465'366) and oscillated between 430'000 and 440'000 in the late 1960s, fell from 391'000 in 1971 to 322'000 in 1973 and to 196'000 in 1976. Quite clearly, this attitude would not persist for a long time, should Switzerland one day decide to join the European Community. As has been explained before, immigrants in Switzerland can have different legal status. On the labour market, resident foreigners are on an equal footing with the Swiss, while temporary permits are issued to three diffeerent categories: border commuters (who are under a relatively free régime), annual permit holders and seasonal workers. Whereas the former two categories are distributed according to the respective needs on the labour market (i.e. in all types of industry and services), the latter group is confined to certain occupations with a distinct seasonal activity pattern: construction, tourism, and farming. Because of their limited period of stay in Switzerland, they are not included in table 18;

56 in fact they mainly belong to the group of subordinate activities (semi-and unskilled blue- collar workers, subordinate white collar workers) which would therefore be somewhat larger than suggested by the simple census figures. The evolution of the number of seasonal workers therefore depends essentially on the situation in construction and tourism. In the latter sector, they play a dominant role in hotels and restaurants; in large holiday areas, the possibility to recruit foreign labour has been crucial to maintaining the services offered as the local labour markets were unable to meet the demand.

IMMIGRANTS AS CONSUMERS

Immigrants are not only part of the labour force, they also need housing, health care, education etc., they are consumers, they save money, invest and transfer part of their salaries. It would be interesting to know more about their behaviour as consumers and sa- vers than the few generalities which follow below, but these domains seem to constitute marginal fields of research interest. Doubtlessly, the arrival of foreigners has not only stimulated the production of the Swiss economy, it has also stimulated and changed consumption: the presence of one million additional people with a different cultural background among the native population signifies more goods to be purchased, but it also means a greater variety of goods: eating and dwelling habits of the individual immigrant groups differ from those of the Swiss and render the presence of specialized shops necessary. The Swiss have assisted to the successive growth of Italian, Spanish and Tur- kish food-shops, all of which have formerly catered to their countrymen, but are increasingly frequented by Swiss customers, too. As a consequence, supermarkets and department stores have enlarged their range of food. In turn, specialized .immigrant shops may lose their 'national' character and turn into ordinary food shops, cultivating their speciali- ties parallel rather than instead of the ordinary food-offer. Conversely, immigrants also dis- cover Swiss food, and this may be one of the stepping stones to cultural integration. The research situation is similar with respect to money savings and capital transfers. These are fields which are treated with great discretion. It is known that immigrant workers have been saving and transferring money to their regions of origin - indeed, the opportunity to earn good salaries in Switzerland has been a major motive to (temporary) immigration. However, next to nothing is known about these transfers, not only because of the famous bankers' secret (which is no Swiss particularity; Hughes, 1975:192) but also because these transfers are not shown specifically but get mingled with other money transactions. We therefore depend on direct surveys of immigrant groups to shed some light onto this question. Two such reports have been consulted, one concerning Turkish immigrants (Evren- sel, 1985), the other immigrants from the Cap Verde Islands (von Arx, 1991). Asd a result of her investigations, Evrensel (1985) found that a majority of respondents were actively saving money and investing it in their home country (p. 124 ff); many reported that they had achieved their goal of emigration, i.e. improved their living conditions in Turkey; further investments were, hovever, still planned (not only houses and apartments but also businesses). The economic side of employment abroad is also emphasized by Capver- dians in Basle (von Arx 1991). Their consumption pattern is almost the same as that of the native population (as measured by the presence of durable goods of daily comfort, such as TV, Videorecorders, car-ownership etc.). Savings seem to be important for all of them; part of the money will be left on savings accounts in Switzerland, part transferred monthly to the Cap Verde Islands for investment (p. 70-72). The amounts saved vary from 500 to lO'OOO Swiss francs per year; this range shows that it is not easy to decide between saving money (i.e. renounce consumption) and consuming,: "The more the Capverdians allow themselves in Switzerland, the longer they will have to wait until their savings will

57 suffice to ensure the material side of retirement at home. Balancing immediate consumption against saving for the future may not always be easy." (von Arx, 1991:73). - Both these studies are only flashes on a small segment of the immigrant community, they cannot be generalized, although they certainly stand for the overall tendency. Since interview surveys are the only means to arrive at results in this domain, the the samples questioned were small (65 Turks by Evrensel, 28 Capverdians by von Arx). The role of savings and investment has, however, been confirmed not only in the discussion on emigration motivation (Harbach, 1976:156 ff, 166) but also by a number of studies on return migration (Leib 1983, Meneghel 1983, Diglio & Bencardino 1983 and others). In Turkey, remigrant workers have founded self-help associations in order to invest their savings in a more rational way (Toepfer 1983). Breuer (1982:176) reports that the individual money transfers of Galician (Spanish) emigrants have enabled farmers in Galicia to purchase land titles and base their activities on land property instead of the traditional tenancy system. None of these studies refers to remigrants from Switzerland, but the pattern is always the same.

GENERAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS

As has been outlined above , immigrants are a problem to the Swiss, chiefly because for centuries, Switzerland has been primarily a sending and not a receiving country. The change of role since the late 19th century, coupled with an extraordinary level of well- being, is causing anxiety. And yet, the Swiss economy could never have done so well without the support of immigrant labour. This is a fact everybody knows, although there are varying theories about the real role of the foreign workforce, in particular in the period under study. Since foreigners have been strongly integrated into the production process, it is very difficult to disentangle their contribution to the economic growth in post- World War II years. One of the most effective measures would be to calculate the value added in production and distinguish between Swiss and foreign labour, but no such data exist. We therefore limit ourselves to a few general remarks on the general economic impact of immigration. Immigrant workers can be regarded as a sort of buffer: welcome in periods of economic growth, they can be sent back to their countries of origin by simply withdrawing (or not renewing) their work licences. Enterprises could thus work with two kinds of staff: a 'core' of (native) employees under a relatively fixed contract and with good qualifications, and a 'periphery', composed of short-term immigrant labour, less qualified and easily dismissed in times of recession. Körner calls these two groups "Kernbelegschaft" and "Randbelegschaff (1990:94). The segmentation of the labour market could thus be found not only in the national economy but also on the enterprise level. As a result of this elasticity, immigrants effectively protected Swiss workers from unemployment in the 1970s. The national way of reasoning outweighed emotional and rational arguments, such as the following: "Given the mutual economic dependency of the European countries, such an export of the crisis would but heighten the crisis in Switzerland. And many foreign wor kers have been living for such a long time in this country and have become integrated that it would be cruel to expel them just like that." (Flüeler & GfellerCorthesy, 1975: 152). The rotation policy in fact tried to prevent just this, but its usefulness was limited. Thus Switzerland exported unemployment 1973-75. As to the significance of foreign labour on the Swiss economy, two contradictory theories have been put forward. The first saw immigrant workers as stimulants to economic growth, helping the country to arrive at a higher degree of rationalization. The other, more cautious, considers the massive employment of cheap foreign labour an obstacle to

58 rationalization. Instead of investing in new production lines and processes, entrepre- neurs simply increased their workforce, thereby cementing obsolete workshops and machinery (FlQeler & Gfeller-Corthesy, 1975:152; Haug, 1980:55). It is difficult to judge which of the two theories is correct; doubtlessly they both contain an element of truth. On the one hand, the Swiss have for a long time dwelt on the fruits of the past and done little to innovate. The crisis of the watchmaking industry is a good example: by sticking to the traditional mechanical watch, it was superseded by the Japanese in the field of the quartz watch and lost a considerable share of its market. On the other hand, the demand for labour and economic performance increased very rapidly after the war, and there was probably not enough time to think about rationalization, in particular as most people ex- pected a slump soon afterwards, similar to the situation in the 1920s. Finally, the upward social and professional mobility of the Swiss left a vacuum on the lower level of the workforce which could only be filled by immigrants. Widmer (1978) has attempted to estimate the economic impact. He affirms that, owing to a mean annual growth of the gross national product of 2.8 % from 1948-74. immigrant labour has had a positive impact on the Swiss economy (p. 20). However, he is unable to underpin this statement with appropriate figures. Yet, at first sight, one would agree with him. Schwarz (1989), on the other hand, sees the situation in a different light: "The contribution of the immigrants to the growth of the national product per inhabitant and of productivity - contribution measured by means of a macro-economic production-function - has been negative for the period 1962-1986." (p. 19). He bases his argument on the fact, that immigrants were employed particularly in labour-intensive branches with low productivity, where they contributed to an expansion of production. "It is very likely that productivity would have grown more strongly if foreign workers had not been called in." (ibid.). Who is right? It is not our task to discuss this contradiction (relating to events of the past), because it may (at least in part) merely result from the different time-scales involved. Both authors agree that the mode of production is particular: Switzerland has chosen the way to import foreign labour as factors of production rather than simply import labour-intensive goods and export capital-intensive products. Schwarz (1989:19) criticizes this policy, not because of its contribution to the quantitative growth of the economy, but because "against international competition and in the long run one cannot base a prosperous economy solely on foreign labour whose only advantage is that they accept to work at low salaries.". Widmer (1978:31) in a way replies to this critique (i.e. he anticipates it) by stating that the presence of foreign workers does not exclude that labour can be substituted by capital, and that the decision to invest is taken by the entrepreneur. But he forgets to add that the entrepreneur also carries the risk. This appears from his survey of 100 firms which showed, that the availability of foreign labour did not necessarily determine the type of investment an enterprise would envisage (rationalization or expansion; p. 81). More important were considerations of production cost, advanced technology available, and the momentary financial situation of the firm (p. 84). One attempt to quantify the impact of foreign labour on the Swiss economy has been made by Schwarz (1984, 1988). However, even he has to confine himself to general statements rather than to precise indications because Swiss and immigrant labour are inter- twined and cannot easily be separated. Consequently, he only discusses the labour market, but yields no precise results concerning the economic performance of foreigners. However, he attempts to estimate their relative importance on the gross national income. By applying a Cobb-Douglas function, he comes to the conclusion that immigrant labour has benefited the Swiss economy only as concerns the overall economic growth, but not the per caput growth nor the increase in productivity (Table 19).

59 TABLE 19 THE IMPACT OF THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH ON THE GROSS NATIONAL INCOME (GNI) AND OVER- ALL PRODUCTIVITY OF SWITZERLAND: ANNUAL MEAN GROWTH IN % FROM 1962 - 1986 (after Schwarz 1988:143-147)

Component of overall per caput overall economic growth GNI GNI productivity Swiss workers 0.3 % - 0.1 % 0.0% Immigrant workers 0.2 % -0.2% - 0.1 % Working hours - 0.4 % -0.4% -0.4% Capital 0.7 % 0.7 % 0.7 % Technical progress 1.6 % 1.6 % 1.6 % Total growth 2.4% 1.7%* 1.9%*

* = differences caused by rounding

Schwarz' contribution goes beyond that of Widmer, but his results are still rather limited, given the scarsity of data. His research is an illustration of certain deficiencies in the Swiss statistical database, from which result that quantitative statements cannot be obtained with certainty but that tendencies can be detected through estimates. The rather negative contribution of immigrant workers to the Swiss economy is explained "by the considerable decline of their employment rate and by their low elasticity in production" (Schwarz, 1988:144). The former of these two reasons is caused by the immigration of family members, not all of whom were gainfully employed (e.g. children), the latter by the rather low qualification and the mobility restrictions. What holds good for the national level is equally valid on the regional scale. The discussion largely concerns the labour market, the mobility of manpower and the role of immigration policy. In a preliminary research report, Schwarz states: "We have to set out from a wage-level which is lower in peripheries than in centres; as a consequence, emigration from peripheral regions induced by differences in wage-levels will increase if these regions receive preferential treatment as to quotas of immigrants." (Schwarz 1984a: 88 f.). Since foreign workers have obtained more mobility over time, "one can suppose that there will be migrations of immigrant labour induced by differences in salaries" (ibid., p. 134). This statement is based on a comparison of the different cantons whereby the foreign labour rate was confronted with industrial strenght, salaries, per caput national income, productivity and income per household (primary income; ibid., p. 113 ff.). The result can be summed up as follows: "In cantons with high percentages of foreign workers, the industrial structure is relatively strong, the per caput national income relatively high, productivity and primary income are fairly elevated and salaries (slightly less pronounced) relatively high. Conspicuously, foreigners in cantons with a high national income tend to be relatively well qualified." (ibid., p. 134). While this picture seems to contradict the statement on the national level made above, it must be said that a number of cantons show 'anomalies'. Thus, Ticino deviates radically from the rest of the country, displaying a weak industrial structure, a relatively low national income as well as low salaries, primary income and productivity (Schwarz, 1984a:l 16-122). It may seem incredible that one single canton can alter the picture of a whole country, but let us illustrate this by just one example: In order to demonstrate the relationship between the various economic in- dicators, Schwarz establishes correlation coefficients between them. By cal-

60 culating them for Switzerland as a whole and for Switzerland without the canton of Ticino, he is able to demonstrate this effect described above. By way of example, let us compare the correlation coefficients between salaries and percentage of gainfully employed. Thus, male manual workers' salaries and foreign labour ratio correlated at 0.64 for Switzerland without Ticino, but at 0.36 for Switzerland as a whole; male office workers' salaries correlated with foreign labour ratio at 0.32 for Switzerland without Ticino, but at - 0.01 with Ticino included (Schwarz. 1984a: 117). These differences are certainly extreme, but they are typical for all units of measure studied.

In order to complete the information on the economic impact of immigration, a few words on qualitative aspects may be added. Immigrant labour has been most important in the building sector, and the Swiss motorway network (albeit not yet finished) has essentially been constructed by foreigners. In the boom period of the 1960s, 52 % of those employed in construction were foreigners. This percentage was exceptionnally high (in the whole of the secondary sector, foreign workers amounted to 'only' 32 %). Even if by 1975 the percentage had shrunk to 39 %, it was still above the mean of the secondary sector then (21 %), and by 1985, the situation had reverted again: 40 % of construction workers were foreigners, against 'only' 33 % in the secondary sector. - Tourism, too, owes much of its growth and importance to the availability of foreign employees. Catering trades occupy a high percentage of foreigners (one third of all employed in this domain in 1980), but this figure is misleading as not all components of this group (such as canteens and many restaurants) play a role in tourism. Indeed, tourism covers a wide range of activities, and foreigners are unequally distributed among them (e.g. most of the staff of mountain railways, cable cars, ski-lifts etc. is Swiss: these temporary jobs offer complementary income for mountain farmers). There is no such thing as tourist employment statistics. - Similarly, clothing and the textile industry owe part of their continuing existence to the presence of foreign labour. It is here, however, that the effect of the boundary and the availabilty of border commuters (as substitutes for immigrants, Schwarz, 1988:38) can be felt most (table 20), a topic to be further discussed below.

TABLE 20 GAINFULLY EMPLOYED IN SWISS CLOTHING AND TEXTILE IN- DUSTRY AND THE SHARE OF IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND BOR- DER COMMUTERS. 1965 AND 1975 (based on Leimgruber, 1987a:72 and 199)

1965 1975 Total employed 166'451 89'660 - of which foreigners 75' 178 31 '037 - foreigners in % 45.2 34.6 - border commuters in % offoreigners 8.2 29.9 - border commuters in % of total 3.7 10.4

It cannot be denied that immigration has had a considerable impact also on the public sector, although it is even more difficult to evaluate. The increase in production, in corruption, and in salaries caused an increase in tax revenue (direct and indirect taxes), but the growth of the population also led to a growth of public expenditure: transport infrastructure, infrastructure for the growth of settlement areas, health provision, old age

61 pension scheme, translators on various levels of the administrative hierarchy, schools etc. We have to add immaterial aspects to these material ones, such as the problem of intelligence disparities in school classes (which may result in a general decline of the performance of both Swiss and immigrant children), which are not easily measured but leave their imprint on the economy in some way or another. Thus, the question 'What would have been without foreigners?' is easily asked, but it cannot be answered.

CONCLUSION

This chapter leaves us in a way frustrated. Everybody knows that immigrants have primarily come as manpower, workers destined to take their place on the labour market in fixed positions. They were seen as factors of production, but, as Max Frisch wrote in 1966: "We have called for workers, and what arrived was human beings." It was only then that immigrants were also seen as consumers, i.e. also as subjects, not only objects of the economy. When they were allowed to bring their families along, the involvment of the public sector changed drastically: from looker-on, the state became actively engaged in all kinds of infrastructural provisions. As the arrival of immigrant workers went parallel with a general rise of the standard of living, of general well-being, of exchange with the world outside Switzerland, they are inextricably linked to this evolution. Therefore, we have to be content with the statement, that there has doubtlessly been an economic impact of immigration, but that it is neither absolutely clear whether it was positive or negative, not how big it has really been.

62 Political impact of immigration INTRODUCTION

Immigration is a political topic, and it is one where emotions tend to mount rapidly, whereas sober reflections are often missing. The political reaction to immigration has been referred to above; in this chapter we shall develop the theme; in addition, it shall also be viewed from the other side. Immigrants are at a comparative disadvantage. Apart from a few exceptions (officers of international organizations, diplomats), their stay is re- gulated very strictly, and it is usually considered as temporary. Even 'classical' immigration countries nowadays operate with quantitative and qualitative limits (wealthy investors will obtain an immigration licence more quickly than poor migrants who are trying to find their luck in a new environment). This is to the detriment of the most unfortunate migrants (refugees and asylum seekers) who do not have the means to become investors in the country of destination. Humanitarian motives for accepting refugees and asylum seekers may hold good during a certain period, but they may turn into mere words when their number is felt to be excessive. "The boat is full" is an abbreviated reference to a paragraph in a speech delivered by the Swiss foreign minister von Steiger in 1942; he spoke of "a crowded life-boat with a limited capacity and equally limited provisions" (Häsler, 1967:122). Even if the situation at that moment was exceptional, one must admit that it is the dark side of our attitude to foreigners which emerges from this statement. The immigrant, the foreigner, the 'other' - the political issue originates not so much in objective facts but rather in subjective judgements on and perceptions of facts. It is territorialité which is at stake: immigrants are seen as a threat to a carefully delimited space within which a carefully balanced cultural system is functioning. If migration (i.e. change of territory) causes problems to the migrants (Malmberg, 1980:111-113), it certainly also causes a headache to the native population in the immigration country, politicians included.

THE POLITICAL REACTION TO IMMIGRATION

As has been pointed out earlier, the period after 1945 has been marked by two opposing political attitudes towards foreigners: a relatively liberal régime until about 1960, and a more stringent one since the early 1960s. During the liberal period, immigrant workers could be recruited according to the needs and wants of the enterprises, the only major restriction being the 'rotation' principle which limited the duration of stay. The sheer increase of their number gradually bred feelings of hatred in certain Swiss, and xenophobia was registered as early as 1961 by a federal administration committee set up to discuss the future of Swiss immigration policy. These new feelings were not only related to the number of foreign workers and their families, but also to feelings of envy: it had become clear by then that foreign labour was essential to the Swiss economy, and that many of the immigrants were strongly motivated to improve their qualification and standard of living. In the course of the 1960s, the situation began to worsen. While the economy was progressing, immigrant workers continued to arrive in an ever increasing number. Since 1958, year when the rotation principle was abandoned, workers could bring their families. This seemed to pose a threat to the Swiss society, because families (even if the

63 wives were obliged to work) tend much more to become integrated and settle permanently than individuals who have left their parents, wives and children, boy- and girl-friends at home. Immigrants became competitors on the housing market, too. The growing fear finally led to a first political reaction in form of an 'initiative' in 1965, launched by the Zurich Democratic Party, demanding an amendment to the constitution in order to limit the number of foreigners resident in Switzerland (as to the notions of initiative and referendum, see annexe 5). The central government (Federal Council) was forced to act much more firmly than in the years before, and in 1968, this first initiative was withdrawn. However, the xenophobic movement organized itself into a party-like institution (National Action against the Overpopulation by foreigners [Ueberfremdung] of the people and the country) and launched a second initiative in 1969, mainly because the measures taken showed no immediate effect. This time, the Swiss people was called to vote, and it rejected this proposed amendment to the constitution by a fairly narrow margin (Table 21). It must be said, however, that Ueberfremdung proved to be essentially a problem of German speaking Switzerland: only 683 signatures of the 70*292 collected to promote this amendment to the Constitution came from the French speaking part of Switzerland (Montalbetti et al., 1987:16), and all French speaking cantons rejected it (exception made by the bilingual canton of Fribourg, ibid., p. 18). The negative result of the 1970 plebiscite did not discourage the xénophobe group (which subsequently transformed itself into a proper political party); it launched further initiatives as well as referenda, but as Table 21 demonstrates, the Swiss people gradually lost interest in the issue and participated to a lesser degree in the referenda, at the same time rejecting more and more clearly all attempts at fixing quantitative demographic aims in the Constitution. TABLE 21 RESULTS OF THE PLEBISCITES ON QUESTIONS OF IMMIGRATION AND FOREIGNERS, 1970-88

Year Type of plebiscite % Yes %No % Participation 1970 Constitutional 46 54 74 1974 ft 34 66 70 1977 ft 30 70 45 1977 ff 34 66 45 1981 ff 16 84 40 1982 Legislative 49,6 50,4 35 1983 Constitutional 61 39 36 1983 ft 44 56 36 1987 Legislative 67 33 42 1987 ff 66 34 42 1988 Constitutional 33 67 53

Constitutional: change of the Constitution. In order to be accepted, it requires a majority of the votes cast aod a majority of accepting cantons. Legislative: plebiscite on a Law. In order to be accepted, it requires only a majority of tbe votes cast.

The constitutional plebiscites from 1970 to 1981 all aimed at a reduction of the number of foreigners in Switzerland, to be fixed (as a percentage) in the Constitution. Dissatisfaction with federal policy was obviously great, as can be guessed from the relatively narrow margin between acceptance and refusal in 1970. In the following plebi-

64 scites, however, the effect of the general economic situation can be felt, which has contributed to calm down emotions. The departure of more than 200*000 foreign workers in the recession 1973-75 temporarily lifted the spectre of Switzerland becoming dominated by foreigners, and all further attempts by the xénophobe party to gain its cause failed. Disinterest with this issue manifested itself in the declining percentage of people cast- ing votes. However, uncertainty remained the prevailing feeling: on the one hand, foreign workers were still an essential part of our labour force, on the other, the fear of dominance persisted. As a consequence of this ambiguity, the attempt at a new and relatively liberal law on foreigners was rejected in 1982 by a very narrow margin (9'864 votes!). This close result was a demonstration of the contoversies surrounding all legislation on foreigners (in 1987, a revision of the law on foreigners was approved of, mainly because it was more severe than the 1982 proposal). The situation is becoming more critical at present, given the increase in the number of refugees and asylum-seekers (see below), but nevertheless, the people and all cantons refused an amendment to the Constitution in 1988 which attempted to fix an upper limit to immigration - the participation of 53 % tes- tifies to the importance the population attributed to this issue. Yet, the two referenda of 1983 on naturalization illustrate the Swiss dilemma: formal modifications were voted by a large majority of the people and all but 3 cantons, whereas a more liberal proceeding for second generation immigrants, refugees and people without nationality was refused by a strong majority and 20 of the 26 cantons. Despite a rising tide of xenophobia since the late 1980s, the Swiss in general still abhorr anything which would discriminate foreigners in the long run (i.e. by establishing limitations in the Constitution), as the ill fate of all initiatives launched by the extreme right-wing party has shown. The relatively narrow issue in 1970 can be interpreted as a clear warning to politicians and economic leaders to modify their policy towards immigrant labourers (for attempts at an explanation, see Johnston & White, 1977; Johnston, 1980). Interestingly enough, however, also the 'solidarity' initiative of 1981, launched by the Left and Trade Unions which demanded a new attitude and more openness towards immigrants, was rejected with a spectacular result. To this, there is another, rather unexpected explanation: amendments to the Constitution which have been proposed by the people (initiative), rarely stand a chance in a plebiscite; however, they may trigger off political action and a government proposal for an amendment to the Constitution or at least for a new law or a modification of a law. Indeed, legislation is a field where action can take place more quickly, where the government can therefore modify its policy. Laws may be adapted to a new situation through ordinances which take less time to go through Parliament and can be implemented rapidly.

IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR POLITICAL SITUATION IN SWITZERLAND

Having offered shelter to numerous immigrants for centuries (the French Huguenots and Prostestant refugees from Ticino and Lombardy in the 17th cent., Liberals and Irre- dentists from various European countries with conservative régimes in the 19th), Switzerland has often been faced with the problem of the political activity and of the place of immigrants in political life. Whereas in the 19th century, political refugees could act quite freely (because they were in Une with the liberal tendency in Switzerland), the situation began to change in this century. By emphasizing her neutrality in the 1914-18 War, Switzerland adopted a more stringent attitude towards foreigners. In 1917, the Police on Foreigners (Police des étrangers) was created in order to survey immigrants, deserters, spies and political agitators more closely . At the same time, it was to become an instrument in the fight against overpopulation by foreigners.

65 In 1931, a law on foreigners was adopted by Parliament, furnishing the legal base for state action in this domain. This law, which is still in force nowadays, regularizes the entry into Switzerland, the stay and the eventual settlement of foreigners in the country. As the date suggests, it was an instrument influenced by the economic depression after 1929, destined (among other things) to protect the Swiss population from excessive consequences of unemployment. As has been shown in previous chapters, these measures have had quite an effect on the number of foreigners present. In addition, the law also allowed the authorities to exercise a certain control on the political activity of immigrants. They in particular feared "the risk emanating from Italian workers who might go on strike and from the presence of communist and socialist extre- mists expelled from their home countries." (Dayer, 1991:3). As a consequence, a federal decree of 1948 stated, that only foreigners who were residents, could obtain a permission to speak publicly on political issues. Immigrants were therefore denied any participation in the evolution of political thinking, and they could be expelled if they did not stick to this rule. Tlds strict policy was slightly modified towards the end of the 1960s, when foreigners were authorized to participate in political activities (concerning internal and external affairs) which did not endanger Switzerland, and when Italian and Spanish immigrants were allowed to organize meetings (under the umbrella of their respective communist parties; ibid., p. 4). It is true that immigrants are always disadvantaged in political üfe. Possessing a foreign passport, they are 'second class citizens', i.e. they have certain obligations but lack corresponding privileges. Thus they have to pay taxes, but they must not vote on the use of this money nor elect representatives to a parliament who decide on its use. They have to comply with the general rules as set down in constitutions and legislations, but their influence on modifications is inexistent (at best indirect, via friends and colleagues). They are exempt from army service in their host country, but in Switzerland, they are eligible for the fire-brigade (or have to pay the tax which frees them from this obligation). Since 1970, they benefit from certain ¡dividual liberties (of the press, of associations, of expression of opinion, of public meetings) and have the right to hand in petitions. "All these liberties are granted to the foreigners as long as they guarantee peace and security within the country and in her external relations." (Dayer, 1991:6). They leave the government still a certain latitude to control the use and abuse of these liberties. One of the most strongly debated issues of the past years has been that of the right to vote. Only Swiss citizens may vote in plebiscites and elect representatives to communal assemblies, cantonal and federal parliaments. An immigrant has to become naturalized in order to benefit from these rights. As has been shown in the first chapter of this book, this process is a lengthy one, and as a result, many immigrants renounce it. The question whether immigrants should be granted the right to vote on communal affairs, has been discussed for quite a time, and it is an issue also in other European countries. There are a number of countries with a relatively liberal attitude in this field (such as Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries; Dayer, 1991:5 f.), but all with certain specifications (e.g. the country of origin). The right to vote may be attributed on two levels. First, there is the spatio-political hierarchy. No doubt has been left that foreigners would at the utmost be allowed to vote in communal affairs only. Any direct influence on cantonal or even more on Swiss politics was therefore to be excluded. Second, there is the range of issues for which foreigners could be granted the right to vote. Ecclesiastical, school and social affairs seem to be the most harmless and hence the most likely, whereas financial and politically sen- sitive affairs (amendments to the Constitution, questions relating to defence, international treaties etc.) as well as elections would be exclueded.

66 This is the theory; the reality, as Dayer (1991:11 ff.) describes it, currently looks as follows: A number of cantons have introduced the right to vote in Church affairs, mainly on the parish level, in some cases also on cantonal levels (elections of the cantonal synods). Among these, there are all six French speaking cantons. Since Religion is fundamental to man, this right ought not to be questioned. Problems may however arise because the Church (as an institution) is also involved in social and even economic matters. As concerns political participation, foreigners are excluded from it by the federal Constitution. The cantons of Neuchâtel and Jura, however, have introduced the right to vote on the communal level; these two cases are particular and merit to be presented briefly (after Dayer, 1991:15 f.). The canton of Jura introduced this right when it obtained independence in 1979, i.e. when the cantonal Constitution came into force. However, it applies only to foreigners resident for at least 10 years in the canton and 30 days in the respective commune, and it is a passive right (i.e. immigrants are not eligible into political positions). - The canton of Neuchâtel has been the first Swiss canton (and indeed the first State in Europe) to introduce this civil right, way back in 1849 in his law on communes and citizenship. Foreigners resident for five years in the canton and one year in the respective commune benefited from it. Although it was subsequently revoked, it reappeared in 1874. An amendment was passed in 1980, fixing the minimum stay of immigrants in Switzerland at 15 years, before they may vote. In a number of cantons, proposals to include immigrants in the political decision process of the communes have been put forward, but to little effect. In Fribourg, the law on the communes and parishes (1984) allows immigrants to be represented on the communal level during the debate on the annual budget, but only by persons having the right to vote (i.e. Swiss). In Thurgovie, they may be consulted in all communal affairs (amendment to the cantonal Constitution in 1987). Since immigration policy should be working towards integration, one may wonder how this goal can be attained if immigrants are banned from the political process. It is true that a number of roads are open, and if they may be of little effect, they still offer a first glance on the political reality in this country. Foreigners will be accepted as members by almost all political parties. Equally, they may participate in trade unions, and they may be called to sit on communal, cantonal and even federal committees. This all sounds encouraging, but the interest of the immigrants is usually limited, given the fact that their role is essentially passive. If political parties, trade unions and committees may offer insight into the political process in Switzerland, this demands particular enthusiasm by the immigrant, because his will be an advisory voice only, he has no power of decision. Thus, his participation looks like an alibi function rather than being a real contribution to political life and towards his integration into the host society.

Immigrants may show little interest in the political life of Switzerland, but this is not a particularity of foreigners (just look at the participation rates in table 21). It can be explained by two reasons (Dayer, 1991:23): "- The first generation of immigrants remains attached to their country of origin for a considerable period. Therefore, foreigners will be less preoccupied with Swiss politics than with the politics of their own country. They will return home to participate in the elections. - Immigrants of the second generation are well integrated and have become adapted on the social, cultural and economic level. Enquiries with young people of 20-25 years of age demonstrate, however, that this age-group often abstains from voting; this attitude concerns both native Swiss and foreigners."

67 Immigrants are therefore not very much different from Swiss citizens as concerns political participation; there may therefore be little reason to distrust them and their eventual participation in local (and maybe even regional) politics. However, this might be perceived by the Swiss as a first step to full political participation, a point where the Consti- tution and public opinion (of the native population) set clear limits. As a glance at other countries shows, this holds good for immigrants almost everywhere, therefore, the Swiss are no exception.

BORDER COMMUTERS - SUBSTITUTES FOR IMMIGRANTS?

On several occasions, reference has been made to the presence of border commuters on the labour market. Although they are not immigrants, they have to be mentioned in this context because their presence at least in the Swiss economy is partly related to the problem of immigration. Border regions may profit from the proximity of a labour market on one side and a job market on the other side of the boundary, and these two markets may be complementary. If conditions of exchange are favourable, a regional disparity (in job opportunities or wage levels) may be balanced by transborder commuting. This phenomenon is fairly common in Europe, although it does not concern a great number of people. Ricq (1981) estimated it at about 250'000 in 1975, a figure which is likely to be higher nowadays but obviously difficult to verify (Ricq [1988] sticks to it, but Hussy [1991:100] puts it up to about 350'000). Of these, about 40-50 % work in Switzerland. It is not so much their number which is interesting (it will fluctuate according to the rhythm of the economy) but rather their evolution and their spatial distribution. Before turning to these two aspects, let me introduce the topic in a more general way. Transborder commuting depends on open boundaries, i.e. the possibility to cross an international border freely. It also presupposes an open labour market, i.e. the absence of discriminations against foreigners. Border commuting is essentially a phenomenon of the period after World War II. It is true that it existed before to a limited extent, but it was the growth of the economy, the hope for a new Europe, characterized by peaceful development and international cooperation rather than competition that laid the foundation for its growth after 1945. Switzerland found herself in a particular situation: large urban centres such as Basle and Geneva expanded rapidly close to and even beyond the boundary, the decentralized Swiss industry offered jobs close to neighbouring countries, the growth of the economy provided more jobs than native manpower was available, and old regional links and 'identities' were rediscovered. Border commuters benefited from the generally liberal attitude towards foreign labour and from the disparities in wages and salaries. However, border commuters need a working licence, as do all immigrant workers, and they were submitted to the same restrictions in 1963 as everybody else, when the federal government introduced measures to control the intake of foreign workers. Three years later, however, the government exempted them from all restrictions, and their number began to increase. As a consequence of immigration policy in the 1960s and '70s, they left their traditonal role of local manpower and began to replace immigrant workers with annual work licences. The limitations imposed on immigrant labour promoted internal migration in neighbouring countries (especially France and Italy) and induced many potential foreign workers to settle close to the Swiss boundary in order to be able to work in Switzerland as a border commuter. It would lead too far to discuss the economic, infrastructural and psychological problems which arose in the neighbouring border regions because of this sudden internal immigration (see Leimgruber, 1987a:82-88; 1987b:261). Thus, this category increasingly comprised not only people from the border region itself but also (internal) migrants, e.g. from the Mezzogiorno or from central France. The share of border commuters gradually increased from 6.8 % in 1963-65 to 33.7 % of all foreign

68 workers (excluding resident foreigners) in 1985 and to 39.4 % in 1991 (Fig. 23). Their number has grown steadily, too: in 1980 it exceeded lOO'OOO, and it has gone far beyond since (182*641 at the end of August 1991). The few restrictions that have been introduced in 1973 (a special work- and border commuter-permit, the obligation to return to the home country daily, and a proof of a minimum residence in the border zone of six months) have had little effect. Border commuters were of an obvious advantage to Switzerland: their number was not limited, working licences were easily available, they did not live in Switzerland, thus caused little cost for infrastructure and did not interfere with the housing market. Nor was there a problem of cultural conflict: originating from neighbouring regions they were part of the regional population. Coming from countries with lower wages than Switzer- land and being often unqualified (or at best semiqualified), they were welcome in labour- intensive industries (machinery, metallurgy, textiles and clothing, chemical industry, watchmaking), constructing and in specific services (trade, catering). Compared to immigrant workers, border commuters dominate in manufacturing (50 % of the total as against 30 % of the workers with an annual work-licence), whereas 'annual' immigrants dominate in service industries (50 % against 35 % among border commuters - all these figures as of December 1989, they are subject to annual and seasonal variation). On the whole, border commuters offer a positive contribution to the Swiss economy (as the Swiss see it) because they prevent certain regions from a total loss of jobs in the secondary sector, and because they also belong to the 'buffer'-group of workers protect- ing the Swiss from excessive unemployment (Schwarz, 1984b: 191 f.). There may be regional problems (e.g. Ticino) which are masked because statistical data are avilable by canton only, but on a national scale, border commuters can be seen as a valuable substitute to immigrant workers. Even if they occupy a relatively low percentage of posts, their share of the foreign labour force is considerable (table 22). Current legislation and bilateral international treaties limit the occupation of border commuters to a border zone 10 or 20 kms wide; they have to be resident within an equally defined zone in their country of origin (in both cases, communal boundaries are the real limits). Thus, only the 18 cantons bordering on our neighbours may issue working licences to them, and only regions close to the boundary can benefit directly. Of the more than 167*000 border commuters who arrived daily in Switzerland in December 1989, the three Cantons of Basle (town), Geneva and Ticino received 96*700 (57 %), i.e. 18.5 % of their total labour force and 41 % of the total number of foreigners employed in them (table 22). The substitution hypothesis is underpinned by the steady growth of their number: from 1983 onwards (lowest figure in the 1980s: 105*479) it has been increasing at a mean annual rate of 7.1 %, reaching 186*641 in 1991 (end of August). The final support for this hypothesis, however, is furnished by fig. 23 which shows the remarkable trend away from seasonal and annual workers to border commuters on the Swiss labour market. Any attempts to limit the number of border commuters (as has been done with annual permit holders) have so far been successfully averted, and the efforts to promote transborder cooperation (regions of Basle, Geneva, Ticino, but also Jura and St. Gallen) will act in favour of this kind of mobility. Anyhow, the question of foreign labour will have to be discussed in depth during negotiations on an eventual EC-membership of Switzerland. If the European Economic Area will come into operation, Switzerland will have to abolish the category of border commuters in 1997 or 1998 (HUSSY 1991:100).

69 TABLE 22 IMMIGRANT LABOUR AND BORDER COMMUTERS IN SWISS CAN- TONS. DECEMBER 1989

Canton total jobs foreign border com- 1989 in'000 manpower muters 1989 1989 in '000 total % of jobs % of foreigners Zurich 664.4 144.6 2'330 0.4 1.6 Berne 482.0 59.8 1-455 03 2.4 Solothurn 115.1 17.8 1*177 1.0 6.6 Basle (town) 131.5 52.2 26'363 20.0 50.5 Basle (country) 125.9 27.9 10'993 8.7 39.4 Schaffhausen 38.0 11.0 4*418 11.6 40.2 Appenzell (exterior) 24.3 4.4 273 1.1 6.2 Appenzell (interior) 6.4 0.9 22 0.3 2.4 St. Gallen 216.6 49.4 10*671 4.9 21.6 Grisons 95.8 22.2 2'196 23.3 9.9 Aargau 257.8 51.3 9'751 3.8 19.0 Thurgau 103.1 24.9 5*303 5.1 21.3 Ticino 165.1 81.0 40*015 24.2 49.4 Vaud 301.2 88.5 12*095 4.0 13.7 Valais 119.8 27.0 2*921 2.4 10.8 Neuchâtel 85.2 23.0 3*873 4.6 16.8 Geneva 227.4 102.1 30*342 13.3 29.7 Jura 33.0 608 3*061 9.3 45.0 Total 18 cantons 3192.6 794.8 167*259 5.2 21.0 Switzerland 3614.4 855.3 16T259 4.6 19.6

This table omits those cantons which do not receive border commuters. 1989 had to be chosen because no more recent data are available on the number of jobs.

Among the various areas interested in border commuting, Basle. Geneva and Ticino are by far the most significant. In the case of Basle, the chemical industry has a particular interest in recruiting staff from any of the three countries which form the region, as it has also constructed its works and other installations on Swiss, French and German territory (Richterich, 1987) - a sign that it has never really considered the international boundary as an obstacle. Basle is in a particular situation because border commuters are generally better qualified than elsewhere (with the possible exception of Geneva; Meyer, 1986:90 ff.: 1987:52; Mohr, 1986:109 ff.). They cannot therefore be considered as a substitute for immigrant workers in this case but they belong to the regional mass of commuters, resident in the umland of a large city (Teleki, 1987). Proof to this is the wage level in Basle which is one of the highest in Switzerland, despite the presence of border commuters. This fact might induce us to put forward the economic factor as an explanation for the high percentage of border commuters, but there is doubtlessly a deeper reason: the attraction of Basle as a centre with a large range of jobs, qualification possibilities and a high rank as a central place combines with a positive perception of the transborder region as shared by inhabitants of the three countries which meet in the northwestern corner of Switzerland (Leimgruber, 1981). Similar arguments have been put forward for Geneva (Hussy, 1991:102). From this enlarged perspective, border commuting is one of

70 many relationships between a centre and its hinterland, reflecting at the same time a traditional regional identity.

FIGURE 23 FOREIGN WORKERS SUBJECT TO CONTROL , 1955-91

These workers need an annual, seasonal or border commuting work-licence. The values for 1963 and 1964 could not be separated graphically. The small triangle in the upper right band corner shows the enlarged section of the triangular graph.

However, the local aspect of border commuting is nowadays due to the legal situation (the 10 or 20 kms wide residential border zone). The reality corresponds to this legal situation fairly well, although a certain percentage of border commuters live further afield. There are e.g. people living in Mulhouse and working in Basle (30 kms), border commuters travel from Annecy to work in Geneva (some 25 kms away) and occasional commuters to the southern Ticino come from Milan and communes on her northern periphery, a distance of up to 60 kms). Most of the border commuters, however, live close to the boundary. In the southern Ticino, e.g., 80 % of the border commuters lived within 5 kms of the Swiss boundary, and 53 % in communes bordering directly on Switzerland (Leimgru- ber, 1987a: 142). As for every commuter, the journey to work is a major constraint as to the choice of the commune of residence; border commuters have to bear the additional burden of crossing the boundary with ito usual customs and police checks. Border crossings are bottlenecks, and they increase the time needed for the journey to and from work: the distance between home and work increases in a relative sense.

71 THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

In the past few years, Switzerland has been confronted with an increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers. The reputation of this country as a haven of security, as a model in humanitarian thinking (symbolized by the Red Cross), and as a well- off society has certainly contributed to this vague of 'new' immigrants. Contrary to the immigration of workers (and their families), refugees and asylum seekers are not called but present themselves at the border and expect to find shelter. After World War II, Switzerland had been confronted a number of times with this problem. In 1956, between H'OOO and 16'000 Hungarians were received, of which 7'000 were granted the status of refugees (Caloz-Tschopp, 1982:37), while eventually lO'OOO remained in Switzerland (Ruffieux, 1965:17). They have gradually adapted to life in their host country, although "the level of adaptation or even integration varies according to the individual temperament" (ibid., p. 62). In 1968-69, 14*000 Czechs were admitted and granted work licences. These people, too, have gradually adapted to the Swiss society. 1500 Poles entered Switzerland in 1981 and 1982 (Caloz-Tschopp, 1982:60 f.; Weber, 1991), to say nothing of smaller numbers of people who had managed to evade from other countries of the former Soviet block. All these refugees had one thing in common: their cultural background was European, i.e. they were not too different from the Swiss. Not only could they integrate themselves into the society, they were also somehow accepted by the Swiss. Their qualification was generally good and permitted them to find their place in the economy. Being victims of communism even gave them a certain advantage in public opinion (they were almost seen as martyrs). Things had begun to change at the end of the 1950s already. In 1959, about 1300 Tibetans were granted asylum, following the Chinese conquest of Tibet. (Weber, 1991). After 1973, Chilian refugees began to arrive. This posed political problems because, contrary to the Tibetans, who fled from a communist régime, the Chilean refugees tended to be left-wing rather, fleeing from a right-wing government. In this affair, the traditional Swiss hospitality was put to a test, and demands for asylum by Chileans and other Latino- american refugees were carefully examined. By 1981, just over 1100 requests for asylum had been answered in the affirmative, one hundred had been refused, and over 500 were still pending (Caloz-Tschopp, 1982:45), but in 1982 and 1983. more than 2*400 additional refugees arrived from Chile. - After 1975, over 6*000 refugees from Vietnam found a new home in Switzerland, equally over 1400 Cambodians and 400 people from Laos. At the end of the 1970s, African refugees began to arrive, first from Ethiopia and Eritrea, later on from Zaire (climax in 1983 with l'OOO arrivals). From 1982 onwards, Turkish refugees (in particular Kurds) became more and more numerous (from l'300 in 1982, their number rose to 5*800 in 1987). and in 1983, refugees from Sri Lanka began to enter Switzerland (maximum in 1985 with 2*700). Contrary to European refugees, peole from Africa and Asia arrived with a radically different cultural background. Linguistic problems, different religious practices, 'clan' disputes, a certain helplessness in view of the opulent Swiss lifestyle - these factors created increasing problems in the relationship between the natives and the new immigrants. The fact that they were physically different and therefore easily to be recognized as foreigners may have been an additional factor. The 'new immigrant* faces a difficult situation in Switzerland. He is not only marginalized by the very fact of being an asylum-seeker, he has also to go through a difficult process of examination before he may be granted the status of refugee. He or she is confronted with an efficiently organized bureaucracy (which cannot be bribed), using a foreign (and strange) language and countering his or her request with arguments, he or she would never have thought of. The way is complicated, as fig. 24 demonstrates. Notions like 'economic'or 'false refugee' cause uneasiness: may it not be legitimate to emigrate if the politi-

72 cal situation menaces not the person but the economic activity? But will this argument convince an immigration officer who has to deal with many similar cases every day?

FIGURE 24 OUTLINE OF THE PROCEDURE REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM HAVE TO TAKE

Request for asylum I ( r r I Reception centre I Refusal i c Cantonal centres J i ( Interrogation I 1 Selection 1 ^ Non con- ruiuici sideration enquiries (= refusal) r Ç Decis Refusal i i f ermit ^ V to sojourn Temp»orary sojourn Asylum L Commission of appeal

As a result of the steady increase of the number of asylum-seekers during the 1980s, a new federal office has been created in October 1990, dealing exclusively with refugees. Hence, detailed statistical data on requests for asylum are comparatively recent. In earlier years, when refugees arrived either as large groups from specific countries (Tibet, Hun- gary etc.) or trickled ionto Switzerland as individuals, requests for asylum were dealt with administratively by the competent office in the Department of Justice. Thus no continuous record has been published; precise and exhaustive figures are largely missing. Things changed with the new Federal Office for Refugees which deals with the requests for asylum and which has also compiled a few data as far back as the 1960s. From these records it has been possible to establish table 23 which shows the situation from the mid- 80s up to present. The figures concern officially registered asylum-seekers, excluding illegal immigrants (whose number is unknown - several thousand, at any rate). Since the procedure may last for months, the figures do not all add up, only columns 4 to 7 are a unit. The table shows that in 1984 the number of requests was relatively low (but still more than twise the number of 1980 [3'020D, but that after 1986 figures began to soar up. It was only in 1969 that a comparable number of requests had been registered (7'877), of which 7'341 (93 %) were Czechs.

73 TABLE 23 REQUESTS FOR ASYLUM, 1984-92

Year new requests requests requests asylum requests others pending settled granted refused 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1984 7'435 13*470 4*078 640 1*982 1*456 1985 9'703 15*387 8*083 939 5*658 1*486 1986 8'546 15*007 8*879 820 5*781 2278 1987 10*913 14*700 11*239 829 8*292 2*118 1988 16*726 18*866 12*354 680 8*844 2*830 1989 24*425 27*179 16*186 654 12*708 2*824 1990 35*836 46*484 16*379 571 11*149 4*659 1991 AY 629 51*284 36*963 872 28*533 7*558 1992* 12*739 36*500 27*386 848 21*902 4*636

* January to end of June

A more detailed analysis of the few data available would allow us to draw a series of maps showing the various areas of conflict or violation of human rights around the globe. Space prohibits such an analysis, but table 24 summarizes the areas of origin of asylum seekers for three select years.

TABLE 24 AREAS OF ORIGIN OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN SWITZERLAND. 1971, 1981, AND 1991, in %

Origin 1971 1981 1991 Africa 0.5 11.5 11.8 Asia 2.9 9.4 40.2 Chile - 9.3 0.0 'Eastern' Europe 88.7 60.5 41.3 others 7.9 9.3 6.7 total number ri3i 4'226 4V629

Note: Asia including Turkey, 'Eastern' Europe including Yugoslavia, no other country of South America has been listed separately. Total number refers to requests for asylum handed in to the authorities.

It may be added that in 1982 and 1983, Chilean asylum seekers (1'244 in each of the two years) accounted for 17 and 16 % respectively of all requests for asylum. Yugoslav asylum seekers have been present in small numbers (less than 100) ever since the late 1960s; in 1984, 102 requests were registered, but until 1987 their number remained below 150. In 1988. however, it rose to 818, in 1989 to 1*365. In 1990, 5*645 Yugoslavs handed in requests for asylum, and in 1991, this figure had risen to 14*205. No other group has exceeded the threshold of 10*000 in the ordinary process of requests for asylum (the 13*000 Czechs in 1969 were granted asylum following a special decree of the Federal Council). A similar picture could be painted for other areas of origin: the sudden increase in the number of requests for asylum indicates as period of (political) crisis (Turkey,Vietnam, Zaire etc.) which induced many people to flee their countries.

74 Obtaining asylum is therefore not easy, as the elevated figures of refused requests demonstrate. The category 'others' refers to asylum-seekers who have either disappeared or withdrawn their request or departed for some other destination. Since the procedure may last for months, people may change their minds or be driven away by the sheer feeling of not being welcome at all. In response to the hardening attitude of certain segments of the population, the authorities are becoming even stricter in applying the rules abount granting asylum, their aim being to décourage potential asylum-seekers from trying their luck in Switzerland. On the other hand, recent events in Yugoslavia as well as in other parts of the world favour a milder attitude to refugees from those areas: even if their request has been rejected, they are allowed to prolong their sojourn in Switzerland temporarily until (it is hoped) hostilities will have ceased. Switzerland is thus a temporary haven for several thousand people (their exact number is unknown) from critical regions of the world.

As all immigrants, refugees are faced with considerable problems in the social and cultural fields. Originating from countries with other religions (e.g. islam) and customs (concerning e.g. the role of women), they meet with little comprehension for their particular requirements (e.g. prayer-time) in their host country. By allocating asylum-seekers to cantonal reception centres, the Swiss authorities render contacts between groups of the same country or culture difficult, especially as the financial basis of asylum-seekers is extremely narrow (three Swiss francs of pocket money per day, no work permit during the first three months; David, 1992:6). Contrary to 'ordinary'immigrants they do not usually plan to remigrate, thus their situation is very precarious indeed. Asylum-seekers are currently living in a critical political environment. The success of extreme nationalist groups and parties, which can be observed all over Europe, gives rise to anxiety. Direct action against immigrants have so far been rare in Switzerland, but serious menaces and material damages are becoming common: setting fire to and shooting at refugee-centres are among the most frequent; even if they may be the work of a few handfuls of persons, they are symptomatic for the growing tensions between the Swiss population and asylum-seekers. Indeed, xenophobia has never quite died out after it first appearance in the 1960s; it had declined in the 1970s and early '80s, and the xenophobic party had in fact lost its raison d'être. The question is now, if this partywill be able to channel the (seemingly unorganized) violence into a more tolerable political movement, or if it will just be overridden by events. At any rate, opposition against immigrants often originates in feelings of frustration (because of economic and social problems, unemployment etc.), i.e. it is personal, not objectively défendable. If in the 1960s, the 'scape-goats' were the Italians and Spaniards, this role was later handed over to the Turks, and now it is the asylum-seekers in general who have to play it. The refugee question is first and all a human problem. Refugees are defined by the law on asylum as foreigners who are subject to inconveniences in their home country (or in the country they last lived in) because of race, religon, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion or who have reason to fear such inconveniences. 'Inconveniences' are to be understood as menaces to physical integrity, threat to life or liberty or measures exercising intolerable psychological pressure. The law also recog- nizes husbands/wives as well as minor children of such persons as refugees. This definition compares well with that used by the UNHCR, but it mirrors only part of the refugee reality (Black, 1991:283). Thus persons may be victims to settlement policies, to natural catastrophes, to belligérant action, but they may also lose their economic base of survival because of intolerance, discrimination (which need not be physical nor intolerably psychological), seeing their human dignity in danger. There may also be forced migration and emigration for ecological reasons. The Swiss law does not provide for such cases,

75 which makes it extremely difficult for asylum-seekers to plead their cause, and very easy to decide for the bureaucracy which has a clear definition in the law. Refugees and asylum-seekers are therefore a challenge to our present society which is under quite a stress: environmental pollution and its control, social problems such as drugs and Aids, economic difficulties (rising unemployment, closure of factories), political 'headaches' (decision on Europe). It is understandable that both politicians and members of the public see immigration as undesirable because it adds another set of problems. On the other hand, Switzerland is still a well-off country, and the number of refugees and asylum-seekers is low compared to other regions of the world (Black 1991: 282), whether confronted with the number of inhabitants or with the gross national product. It is a problem of perception, but also of social disparity: doubtlessly, it is not possible to house a large number of asylum-seekers under the same conditions as they are housed in Africa. The present attitude to render Switzerland a less attractive country may well be a good policy to the immediate solution of the flow of refugees, but more important would be corresponding measures to render emigration unnecessary in the sending countries. It is here that Switzerland could certainly do a lot, otherwise we shall experience in the future the 'explosion of the demographic time-bomb' in the Third World.

CONCLUSION

The present chapter has discussed political consequences of immigration as purely interior affairs in Swiss politics: measures to reduce the number of foreigners in Switzer- land, attempts to integrate them not only economically, socially and culturally but also politically, and the delicate question of the 'new' immigrants, i.e. refugees and asylum-seekers from overseas. One must not forget that immigrants into Switzerland are in fact emigrants elsewhere. This latter aspect is often overlooked, mainly because the receiving countries (in general) adopt a selfish, egocentric attitude when approaching the question of immigrants. Looking at it from the position of a student of boundaries, I should say that in this case the centripetal role of the border is put forward. This view allocates the boundary a protective role: the national territory has to be kept free from undesired foreigners. While the decision to reinforce border controls is basically a domestic. affairs, it does overlap with foreign policy: all regulations which become effective on the boundary are directed towards the exterior. In this way, problems may conveniently be passed over to the neighbour instead of being solved on the spot. Bi- and multilateral discussions and treaties will be needed in order to distribute the problems evenly (an imperative in the last decade of the 20th century). Thus, immigration policy is indeed only part of a wider approach which should be migration policy. If migrating is considered a fundamental human right, politicians will have to think about how to deal with this right in practice. Equally, they ought to help tackle the problem in the sending countries, in particular as concerns refugees. The demographic 'time-bomb' in the South, however, is likely to aggravate the situation and lead to a growing South-North migration, whether we like it or not. It is at best questionable if our boundaries will still be able to play their centripetal role.

76 Conclusion

Immigration has been one of the major topics of Swiss politics after World War II. It has also been one of the longest lasting. Its importance stems from several roots, but contrary to what one could believe from occasional voices, it has not only been negative. In- deed, if we want to judge it from some distance, we even might attribute greater weight to the positive side. This report does not go deep enough to allow a well founded balance, but in spite of this weakness.we shall attempt such an evaluation.

OVERALL IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON SWITZERLAND: AN ATTEMPT AT AN EVALUATION

On the previous pages, we have discussed demographic, social and cultural, economic, and political impacts of immigration. As to the first of these fields, immigration has resulted in a considerable growth of the population of Switzerland. The sudden drop of the birth rate of the Swiss in the mid-'60s could thus be compensated to some extent, and the process of ageing was slowed down. One may question the positive side of population growth, because it requires more housing, infrastructure, consumer goods, food etc., and it also produces more pollution, but there are quite a few people who profit from a growing population. Hence, maintaining a certain flow of immigrants equalled a steady growth of the economy. Population decline, on the other hand, was seen as leading into economic recession. Important positive influences could be found in culture. It is true that the confronta- tion between immigrants and Swiss did not simply produce enthusiasm. Prejudices were widespread in the early years, fostered by the memories of the war, but also by the lack of first hand knowledge of the sending countries. In the course of time, many Swiss have begun to travel around Europe and the world, and they have thereby developed a more differentiated attitude towards foreign cultures. However, problems remain, particularly in schools, where immigrant children from different cultures and languages have to be integrated among themselves and into the host society. The economy was the starting-point to the large scale immigration of workers. Here, it is almost a matter of credo to tell the benefits from the losses. Certainly, immigration has facilitated the transition from an industrial to a service society, and it has at the same time helped to maintain industry. In how far rationalization has been retarded, is subject to dispute. Through a strict policy (after a period of laxism and thanks to the general economic situation) it became possible to contain the number of foreign workers living (temporarily or more or less regularly) in Switzerland. As to the political sphere, the presence of immigrants has doubtlessly contributed to a hardening of opposing positions: the contrast between nationalistic and liberal opin- ions towards immigrants threatens to polarize the society. Since the constitutional way to the limitation of the number of foreigners is practically barred (as is shown by the results of the plebiscites on immigrant matters), xénophobes tend to try and 'solve' the question by violence, although this has never been a long-term solution to a problem. The conti-

77 nuous flow of asylum seekers from areas outside Europe confronts us with additional problems because of their different cultural background. The present situation therefore renders any attempts at improving the immigrants' political situation virtually impossible.

THE FUTURE?

Switzerland is about to discuss her attitude towards a united Europe. Adhering to the European Community may one day be the last option open to us, whether we like it or not. The European Economic Area, temporary solution to overcome total isolation, may be the first step to it. This is not the place to discuss this issue; it is a question which rouses many controversies in Switzerland (and in the European Community as well), and which will ultimately be decided by way of a plebiscite. But a few thoughts as to the future of immigration may be permitted. A policy of 'splendid isolation' would allow Switzerland to maintain her present-day restrictions in order to safeguard her identity. If we consider Europe as an essentially economic unit (which is the current tendency - all other values are being played down), this can hardly be a realistic perspective: it is likely that her economy would have difficulties to resist international competition in the long run. An open and flexible policy will therefore be demanded. A first framework is being provided by the agreement on the EEA (European Economic Area) which requires a number of liberalizations (Kind, 1992): - regulations have to conform to the EEA jurisdiction from 1993 onwards (no restrictions are possible outside EEA norms) - relief for seasonal workers, beginning in 1993: - automatic renewal of their contracts every year - annual permit after 30 months' activity within 4 years (instead of 36) - border commuters are a category which will completely disapear by 1997: no more working licence will be needed from 1995 onwards, no daily return home required from 19% onwards, elimination of the border zones in 1997. In addition, the Swiss attitude to immigration has been more clearly defined (ibid.). The federal government is proposing a spatial model to regulate immigration. It comprises three zones (Fig. 25): - The EEA, where labour mobility will be practically unrestricted (apart from the few exceptions mentioned above). - The traditional recruiting countries, including the United States, Canada, Austra- lia, New Zealand and Yugoslavia (until 1995; nothing can be said as to the future concerning the individual republics). Certain facilities will be envisaged in the field of job rotation. - The rest of the world, which is not a recruiting area of manpower, but from which refugees and asylum seekers will arrive. These are to be separated into economic, politic, ethnic and religious refugees. The notion of "safe country" will be a decisive instrument in the handling of this kind of immigrants. Many questions remain open, however, and while pessimists fear the worst, opti- mists look towards the future with confidence. Will the liberalization of the European labour market invite everybody to rush into Switzerland and try to profit from the (once) high wages? Or will a 'natural' inertia prevent people from leaving their usual surround- ings for an uncertain future? May it not even be reasonable to open up the European

78 labour market and resume a tradition from before 1914 (Thomma, 1992)7 Half a century of hostilies, distrust and fierce competition have torn the European peoples apart. Bringing them together is not only a matter of tourism, congresses and students' exchange but also of a more liberal labour market. It does not signify that people are obliged to move, but it would ease their mobility by abolishing all sorts of barriers. Straubhaar (1989:25) does not expect substantial immigration in the case of Switzerland entering the European Commu- nity, because the situation of demand and supply, but also of information will not change drastically. More serious consequences could occur to our economy if, by restructuring the labour market, the principle of the seasonal work licences were abolished. This would entail the loss of cheap, unqualified labour in tourism, for example, causing considerable structural transformations in this sector with far reaching consequences for regional development policy (ibid., p. 28).

FIGURE 25 THE THREE ZONES OF THE SWISS IMMIGRATION MODEL (after Kind, 1992)

EEA Rest of the world Traditional recruiting countries

As long as national considerations and jurisdiction prevail, Switzerland does indeed have a few options to carry through an immigration policy of her own. Straubhaar (1989: 29 ff) proposes a number of measures, a few of which merit to be mentioned briefly: - A more liberal immigration policy would have to promote the integration of foreigners by facilitating the right to settle permanently and to obtain Swiss citizenship more easily and within shorter time than at present. This view also considers

79 the demographic process: if we maintained a strict "rotation* of foreigners (zero migration balance), the population (and with it the native workforce) would decrease rapidly. Immigration is therefore necessary to maintain the population at a given level. - Economically, a liberal régime would contribute to an increase in the qualification of the workforce. In this context, he pleads the cause of a selective migration policy (practiced by the U.S., Canada, Australia etc.) in order to fill gaps in certain segments of the labour market. - The idea to replace the 'buffer' strategy by a long-term integration strategy points into the same direction as has been outlined above. It would reinforce the aspect of qualification and favour the climate in the enterprises which could organize themselves with the perspective of a stable labour force. - Switzerland should exchange her insular outlook for a more global and liberal perspective. This postulate can be frequently heard: the 'cosmopolitan society', the global aspects of the economy as are manifest by transnational companies, the migration of capital and technology, the international division of labour etc. (see DICKEN 1992), the mutual dependence and relationships on a worldwide scale are realities. This should help us to take a wider view and enter - international cooperation at least on a European scale in questions relating to immigration from outside Europe. The problem of asylum-seekers is demonstrating that an individual country can no longer cope with the 'new' migration, but that it has to collaborate with her neighbours, the rest of Europe and even with the rest of the world. The legal situation is contradictory: "The international declaration of the Human Rights does not permit the sending countries to morally prevent potential emigrants from departing, nor does it offer most western receiving countries a legal instrument to prevent them from seeking refuge. On the other hand, potential receiving countries have the unwritten power to decide whom they would like to accept and for how many immigrants they would open their boundaries." (free translation of Straubhaar, 1989:42 f.). This latter point may indeed be a cause of concern. In a recent article, the same author (Straubhaar, 1992:6) estimates that there are in 1992 between 100 and 500 million potential emigrants in the Third World (depending on their propensity to migrate), a figure which may increase by about 10 % until the year 2000. In the extreme case, this immigration wave could double the population of Western Europe (to say nothing of the ensuing demographic and other consequences). Quite obviously, migration policy is a long-term undertaking. For many years, it re- sembled an 'action by the fire-brigade': short-term, destined to bring a remedy to a momentary critical situation like the lack of or excess of manpower, political pressure from the street, outcry from neighbouring states. Maybe the double threat of the EC and the 'new1 migration will bring about a change in thinking. Indeed, it is already taking place, as em- anated from a press conference of the Minister of Justice, A. Koller, on April 4, 1989, and as can be seen from the 'three-zone-model' which is its material expression. How- ever, real solutions cannot be found in defensive action but by influencing the causes of migration. "Here is the key to attack the problem of migration successfully and to find a durable solution" (Straubhaar, 1992:9). Will Switzerland be able to do so?

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The legal basis for questions dealing with immigration is contained in two sections of the Swiss legislation: that on residence and sojourn (law code number 142) and that on the labour market (law code number 823). All these regulations are updated periodically. The law on immigration dates from 1931; it should have been replaced by a new law on foreigners in 1982, but failed to obtain the majority of votes during the referendum (see p. 63). Although partial amendments have been made, it does not offer the necessary margin for action, and the government has to base its policy essentially on ordinances (which are easier to formulate and change, but of limited duration). - This law states that residence permits have no temporal limits (Art. 6), but that they are valid only in the Canton which has issued them (Art. 8). Although this looks like a restriction of mobility, resident foreigners can move freely; however, they have to obtain a new residential permit if they move from one canton to another. The law on asylum came into force in 1979. It provided the basis for the creation of the Federal Office for Refugees (1990), a step which became inevitable as the number of requests for asylum began to exceed the federal office for foreigners' working capacity. This law defines the notions of refugees, the conditions of admission and refusal and the procedure all requests have to go through. Refugees are defined as people who in their home country or in another country are threatened and persecuted because they belong to a particular social group or because of their political opinion. Their life and personal integrity (physical safety, liberty) must be in danger, they may also be subject to excessive psychic pressure (Art. 3). The ordinance limiting the number of foreigners is the most important instrument to regulate the intake of foreign labour. Its last revision dates back to 1986, but the number of work-permits is reviewed annually and the text adapted accordingly. It defines the various categories of work licences (annual, seasonal, short-term and border- com- muter licences) and states the number of new permits issued any given year for the first three categories. Thus, in 1989, there were lO'OOO new annual permits to be released, while in 1990 their number was increased to 12*006 (!). Seasonal permits, on the other hand, have so far been maintained on the same level (llO'OOO). The aims of this ordinance are defined in art. 1: - to ensure an equilibrium between the Swiss population and resident foreigners - to create conditions favourable towards the integration of foreign workers and resident foreigners - to improve the structure of the labour market and ensure an optimum equilibrium as concerns occupation. It applies to foreigners arriving from abroad, foreigners living in Switzerland without a residential permit, and foreigners living abroad but working in Switzerland (Art. 2). How- ever, there are a number of persons who are exempt from such restrictions, such as diplomats and the staff of diplomatic missions, officers of international organizations, journa- lists (Art. 4). In fact, officers of international organizations are on an equal footing with immigrants possessing a residential permit (Art. 5).

The application of the various laws is subject to further ordinances which, as has been noted above, are of limited duration and have to be reviewed by the government and Parliament from time to time.

89 Annex 2: Regional types

Since the subdivision of Switzerland into 26 cantons (see below) is unsatisfactory for many issues (such as regional planning, regional policy etc.), a number of attempts have been undertaken since the 1960ies to arrive at a more functional division of the country. One of the most useful has been developed in the course of a research programme on spatial mobility and regional problems. It has been used by Schuler et al. (1986) in a statistical atlas on Switzerland. According to this subdivision, the authors distinguish 12 different types of regions in Switzerland, based on the three economic sectors (I = Primary, II œ Secondary, and III = Tertiary) and the Centre-Periphery dychotomy. The twelve types are defined on a regional basis, irrespective of cantonal or district boundaries (MS- regions, mobilité spatiale, spatial mobility regions, equivalent to the hinterland of a small central place); on the diagram they are placed according to their economic structure in 1980. The only concession made to the political subdivision is the use of communal territories as the basis for all regions, since the commune is the smallest unit for which data are available. A medium tertiary centre-region may therefore also contain industrial and rural communes.

Central

-IT) * V • \ \ 8> / /

Peripheral

The size of the rectangles is relative to their demiographic weight.

1 Large urban centres 7 Industrial periphery 2 Residential umland of large centres 8 Small tertiary centres 3. Industrial/commercial umland of centres 9 Tourist centres 4 Medium tertiary centres 10 Agricultural-tourist periphery 5 Medium industrial centres 11 Agricultural periphery 6 Small industrial centres 12 Agricultural-industrial periphery

90 Annex 3: The cantons of Switzerland

Currently, Switzerland consists of 26 cantons, all of which are in fact small states with a large degree of independence. They are organized according to their own Constitution and legislation (which must not contradict the federal Constitution and legislation), and they dispose of their own elected government, parliament and courts of justice, their own taxation system, police force and school system. Although recent years have witnessed a tendency towards centralization and uniformization, the Cantons have so far successfully defended their particularities. Indeed, the cultural variety of Switzerland partly depends on this political diversity. Each canton pursues its own economic policy and thereby en- ters into competition with the other cantons.

ZH Zurich (g) FR Fribourg (f) GR Grisons(g) BE Berne (g) SO Soleure (g) AG Argovie (g) LU Lucerne (g) BS Bale-Ville (g) TG Thurgovie (g) UR Uri(g) BL Bâle-Campagne (g) TI Ticino (i) SZ Schwyz (g) SH Schaffhouse (g) VD Vaud (f ) NW Nidwald (g) AR Appenzell exterior (g) VS Valais (f) ow Obwald (g) AI Appenzell interior (g) NE Neuchâtel (f) GL Glarus (g) SG St-GaU (g) GE Geneva (f) ZG Zug (g) JU Jura (f) Dominant language (letter after name): g = German, f = French, i = Italian The map shows a small number of cantonal exclaves.

91 Annex 4: The Swiss school system

It is not easy to describe the Swiss school system in a few words because it varies from one Canton to another. Together with the income tax system and the police force, the schools are one of the pillars of cantonal independence. However, there are a number of common traits which shall be sketched. Compulsory schooling is laid down in the federal Constitution, but neither the types of schools nor the duration are determined. Article 27 of the Constitutions just obliges the Cantons to ensure sufficient primary training. In article 27quater, the cantonal autonomy in matters of teaching is explicitely guaranteed. Thus all legislation on schools is cantonal. However, a certain amount of coordination has been achieved over time through the permanent conference of the cantonal education ministers. Thus the three-tier-system (primary school, secondary school first degree and secondary school second degree) has been adopted by all Cantons, albeit with variations in terminology and duration of the three phases. Compulsory schooling usually lasts for eight or nine years and comprises primary education and the first degree of the secondary school. Thus the following structures may be found (among others):

Primary 6 years 5 years Secondary first degree 3 years 4 years Secondary second degree 4 years 4 years

While primary schools are a unitary school type, the secondary grade falls into a number of levels, depending on the pupils' intentions and abilities. In brief, it looks as follows:

Secondary school first degree: - lower level: continuation of primary school up to the end of compulsory schooling - elementary level: preparation of professional training (leading up to an apprenticeship and the school attached to it: secondary school second degree) - higher level: preparations for college (GCE - A level in secondary school second degree) Secondary school second degree: - GCE -A: preparation of studies at a university or a polytechnic - professional: schools to be visited in context with an apprenticeship (manual or office profession)

Federal influence is present in the secondary school second degree in professional schools through the length of an apprenticeship (2 to 4 years, according to the regulations emanating from the Federal Office for Industry, Trade, and Labour) and in the GCE - A - level as concerns the different choices for the final examination.

As to higher education, it has to be noted that universities are cantonal (although they only survive thanks to federal subsidies). However, the two polytechnics of university status (Lausanne and Zurich) are federal. In addition, there are a number of cantonal technical schools which offer training after a regular apprenticeship.

92 Annex 5: Direct democracy

It may be useful to add a few explanations on terms used in the chapter on the political impacts, in particular the referendum and the initiative. They both carry a specific significance which is defined by the Constitution. They are cornerstones of the Swiss state, and theywill be a formidable challenge to the European Community in case Switzerland decided to join it.

The initiative refers to the Constitution. Swiss citizens are entitled to demand an amendment to the Constitution (a new paragraph or the modification of an existing one) by formulating a proposal and obtaining the support of at least lOO'OOO citizens (through the collection of signatures). Such a popular initiative has to be discussed in Parliament and submitted to a plebiscite. If both the People and the majority of Cantons accept it (simple majority), it will be enforced, if, however, the majority of Cantons refuses it, it is declared rejected. The Cantons therefore play the decisive role. Constitutional amendments may also be demanded by the Government or by deputies in Parliament, but also in these cases the same procedure as above applies.

The referendum concerns legislation. A law or an ordinance may be submitted to a popular vote, either automatically or following a parliamentary decision or through a petition bearing at least 50'000 signatures. It has to be submitted to the people, but in this case, it is the majority of voters which decides, the Cantons do not enter as in the case of the initiative.

Both initiative and referendum also exist on the cantonal level, concerning the cantonal Constitutions and legislations. The minimum number of signatures required vary from one canton to another, depending on the number of registered voters. As concerns the referendum, in certain cantons, expenses beyond an established limit have to be voted.

93 List of Tables

1 Naturalization quotas in Switzerland, 1977-85 8 2 Foreigners resident in Switzerland, 1860-1950 10 3 Foreigners resident in Switzerland, 1950-1990 11 4 Foreigners in Switzerland according to category, 1965-1990 14 5 Masculinity-rate in Switzerland, 1950-1989 25 6 Population in Switzerland according to age-groups, 1950-1989 26 7 Live-births per woman in Switzerland, 1946-89 27 8 General fertility rate in Switzerland, 1950-89 29 9 Median age of mothers at their first birth 29 10 Women 20-39 years of age 29 11 Crude marriage rate of Swiss and foreigners 30 12 Marriages between Swiss men and foreign women 30 13 Population and foreigners by canton, 1990 37 14 Foreign pupils in Swiss schools, 1977/8 and 1988/9 40 15 Pupils in Swiss secondary schools (first degree), 1988/9 42 16 Pupils in Swiss secondary schools (second degree), 1988/9 42 17 Percentage of Swiss and foreign workers by economic sector, 1900-1980 55 18 Professional status of the workforce resident in Switzerland, 1950-1980 56 19 Impact of components of economic growth on GNI 60 20 Gainfully employed in Swiss clothing and textile industry, 1965 and 1975 61 21 Results of the referenda on questions of immigration and foreigners 64 22 Immigrant labour and border commuters in Swiss cantons, 1989 70 23 Requests for asylum, 1984-92 74 24 Areas of origin of asylum seekers in Switzerland, 1971, 1981, and 1991 74

94 List of Figures

1 A framework for the study of migration impacts 1 2 Naturalizations in Switzerland, 1945-1990 7 3 Resident immigrant population by origin, 1950,1970,1989 15 4 Variation of immigrants according to their origin, 1965-89 16 5 Holders of annual working licences by origin, 1965-89 18 6 Foreign residents by origin, 1965-89 19 7 Annual growth of foreign and of total population in Switzerland, 1950-88 23 8 Age-pyramids of Switzerland, 1950 and 1989 24 9 Crude birth rate in Switzerland, 1950-89 27 10 Foreigners born in Switzerland 28 11 New marriages 1945-89 31 12 Growth of foreign population in Switzerland by cantons, 1950-89 32 13 Evolution of foreign population by cantons 33 14 Percentage of foreigners in Swiss cantons, 1950 34 15 Percentage of foreigners in Swiss cantons, 1960 34 16 Percentage of foreigners in Swiss cantons, 1970 35 17 Percentage of foreigners in Swiss cantons, 1980 35 18 Percentage of foreigners in Swiss cantons, 1989 36 19 Percentage of foreigners in various types of regions, 1980 36 20 Pupils having terminated secondary school first degree, Morat 1974-89 43 21 Foreigners in Zurich 1977 47 22 Swiss and foreign labour force in Switzerland, 1950-80 53 23 Foreign workers subject to control, 1955-91 71 24 Outline of the procedure requests for asylum have to take 73 25 The three zones of the Swiss immigration model 79

95 Abbreviations

A VS-AI Assurance vieillesse, survivants et invalidité CICRED Committee for international cooperation in national research in demography EC European Community EEA European Economic Area EEC European Economic Community GDP Gross Domestic Product GCE -A General Certificate of Education, Advanced level IOM International Organization for Migration OFS Office Federal de Statistique UNHCR United Nations High Commissariate for Refugees

96 '" The-lnternationat Organization for Migration. Ï1DM) wàs'estabiisrïèd-ort 5 December 1*951 irr Brussels io deai with the migration and resettlement of displaced persons in Europe, and with the orderly migration, oí nationals to overseas countries. - • ' ' "•':

rr vVhÜe the early activities of the Organization were limited to population movements from Europe,to America. Lettin America and Oceania, international developments gradually led to an extension of the Organization's activities on a worid-w.idebasis. Likewise, ¡Is globai role and mandate were reinforced. •;.*.

EEH:;: IÖM'S matn objective is to ensure, throughout fhe-wo-rid, the migration o.f persons who are in : need-of interngtí3Íiai:mte|ra'rJon sefv¡ces, To meet this objective, the ganization

the-'handUng of orderly and planned m gration df haiioriäöjiio:meet specific ¡reeds of emigration and1 immigration countries; the transfer of qualified human to >romòte'the economic, swarah(ioMòrài; advancement : QÍ the'receiving -countries: -' . - ' - '[' "]"•" [' ' ' "... •. . {;] litalctçgàriized transfer of refugees, displaced persons and other individuáis compelled to leave-theiii:

the provision-of a forum to States and other partners to .discuss experiences, exchange views, devis*

measures and promote cooperation and coordination of efforts on migration issues...';;:;.-..•.•;:;:;;.::

; " ' iörVI is an intergovernmental organization. At présent, it is of 48 tates *ancf 33' 'Observer: Stales' .Since .its création in 1951, IOM has assisted more 5 million i including 3-.9-miliion refugees and 1.1'million national migrants. publishes a re-view,

CfCRED

'•"•Tue öörnmittee "for'International Cooperation in National-Researc'h in Demography (C'iCREDj was created as a resuif of the meeting of directors of national population research irigmute-.s. organized by the Division oí the- United Nations Secretarial in Lyons (France) from 3ítatT:Juné 1971. ;:

* "::" Ai thaï time, the United Nations was preparing the World Popuiation Conference, foreseen for 1974V arrd the Population Division was seeking a means.of establishing-some-kind of ¡ink with ine worid community of national population research institutes. Moreover,'during thetyons meeting, a number of participants emphasized the necessity for providing support to national research and of developing mutual; collaboration, ' . • - ' - - ..•'.-'•;>

::W CtCRED is a non-profit association, its members are all the 300 centres conducting population' research inthe world. The'btidget is jointly shared by UNFPÂ and Jhe.French Government. The activities, are currentiy covering 'ipiiHH^UH^

i) population literature storage, retrieval ánd «}:;:" promotion of inter-institutional cooperative research on population'topics; in}": -'-assessment of population research poteniiairîies.^,^.^-;..:^.;.;.;;--;;-:;;;;

CtCRED publishes a quarterly, the Review of Population Reviews, and several books Q-ä-thering the. -findings of its various collaborative'research projects. -:::::::;'::i:h::~.:::\:''.':'• ••:;.:. .' -'-.,.. - . i;;:;;-,;.,;:;:;;:;;