Fazlul Huq, Region and Religion in Bengal: The Forgotten Alternative of 1940-43 Author(s): Sana Aiyar Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6 (Nov., 2008), pp. 1213-1249 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20488062 Accessed: 12-09-2016 13:47 UTC

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This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms ModernAsian Studies 42,6 (2008)pp. 1213-1249. ?2007 Cambridge University Press doi: 10.101 7/S0026749X07003022 First published online 26July 2007

Fazlul Huq, Region and Religion in Bengal: The Forgotten Alternative of 1940-43

SANA AIYAR

Department of History, Harvard University, Robinson Hall, 35 Quincy Street, Cambridge MA 02 I3 8 USA E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

In the wake of the Government of India Act of 1935, provincial politics emerged as a challenge to the authority and legitimacy of all-India, centralised political parties. While the Congress and the Muslim League set up a binary opposition between secular and religious nationalism, provincial politicians refused to succumb to the singularity of either alternative. Partition historiography has been concerned with the interplay of national and communal ideologies in the 1940s, overshadowing this third trajectory of regional politics that was informed by provincial particularities. This article traces a short-lived alternative that emerged in Bengal between 1940 and 1943 under the premiership of Fazlul Huq. Huq produced a peculiar form of identity politics that appealed not only to religious sentiment but also to regional loyalty that cut across the religious divide. Significantly, he did so without resorting to secular claims. By challenging Jinnah's claim to being the sole spokesman of Muslims in India and highlighting the different concerns of a province with a Muslim majority, Huq reconciled the twin identities of religion and region within the same political paradigm, and foreshadowed the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971.

Introduction

The emergence of Pakistan and India in 1947 has been studied within the context of the interplay of national and communal ideologies in the 1940s. Partition historiography has tended to focus on West Pakistan and Punjab. The narrative of nationalism in Bengal seems to end with the success of the Swadeshi movement and picks back up in 1946-47 with the Calcutta riots, as a story of communalism. The national and communal narratives of the partition of Bengal are studied within the same ideological framework as those for Punjab--seen as a result of the Muslim League demand for a separate homeland and the politics that surrounded the transfer of power at the centre. East Pakistan,

oo026-749X/o8/$7.50+ $o. 10 1213

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1 214 SANA AIYAR however, ended up being the experiment that failed. In 1971, it not only separated from its 'mother' nation, Pakistan, but also became an independent nation with ideologies diametrically opposed to the ones claimed for its legitimacy less than two decades earlier.' Regional and cultural identity superseded the religious claims of 1947 and asserted itself in the birth of a new post-colonial nation in the Indian subcontinent-Bangladesh. This was not a volte-face caused by a change of heart among the Bengali Muslims, but rather a continuation of the identity politics that had emerged in the wake of the Government of India Act of 1935. Historically, the climax of independence and parti tion had overrun these trends in provincial politics. In a revealing par allel, historiography has been preoccupied with events leading to the partition of India, thus overshadowing various dimensions of Bengali identity politics that had emerged in the early 1940s during the exper iment with provincial autonomy. AsJoya Chatterji notes, this decade, which saw 'so many squandered opportunities', awaits its historian.2 As a modest corrective to this historiographical oversight, this article studies the provincial politics of Bengal's forgotten years from 1940 to 1943. By focusing on the particularities of a province with a Muslim political majority, it challenges the assumption that Muslim identity was constructed as a linear progression towards a highly communal, exclusive and oppositional politics at an all-India level. It shows that the Muslim politicians of Bengal did not preclude regional or partisan alternatives to the kind of community solidarity led and dictated by the Muslim League with Jinnah as its sole spokesman. By appealing to both religious and regional identity, politicians made Bengal the playground for partisan groups to seek shifting alliances and come to power. Provincial politics not only emerged as a challenge to central politics but also became a contested ground where the politics of religion, region and nation were identified, challenged and reconciled at different moments. The central argument of this study is that between 1940 and 1943 provincial politicians in Bengal did not seek to prioritise either religion or region over one another. Instead, they produced a peculiar form of identity politics that appealed not only to religious sentiment in their consolidation of community solidarity

1 East Pakistan's rejection of religious nationalism has been noted by Partha Chatterjee, 'The Second Partition of Bengal', in Ranabir Samaddar (ed), Reflections on the Partition in the East, Delhi, India, 1997, pp. 35-58. 2 Joya Chatterji, 'The Decline, Revival and Fall of Bhadralok Influence in the 1940s: A Historiographie Review', in Sekhar Bandhyopadhyay (ed), Bengal: Rethinking History, Essays in Historiography, Delhi, India, 2001, p. 297.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms FAZLUL HUQ, REGION AND RELIGION IN BENGAL 1215 but also to regional loyalty that cut across the religious divide. Most significantly, they achieved this without resorting to secular claims. The relationship between religious and regional or national identity had been presented as a paradoxical duality in Indian political discourse, which offered two possible alternatives--secular nationalism or religious communalism. This article studies a third alternative offered in Bengal in the early 1940s; an alternative that came to its logical conclusion in 1971 with the birth of Bangladesh. Between 1940 and 1943, two provincial ministries offered a reconciliation of the twin identities of region and religion within the same political paradigm. Fazlul Huq, the Bengal Premier, best epitomised the pluralistic identities that Bengali Muslims struggled to come to terms with in the 1940s. Neither the Nehruvian claims to secular politics, which prioritised the nation above any other regional or religious identity, nor Jinnah's 'communal' nationalist claims, which placed religious identity over pre-existing regional or national identity, suited the pluralism of Bengal. Huq's politics followed a third trajectory that sought to reconcile religious and regional identification within a political discourse that was not exclusionary. Huq, however, has been relegated to the footnotes of history, for his particular brand of politics does not conform to current understandings of provincial politics. Although he opposed Jinnah, he was not a secularist and believed completely in the idea of Pakistan. Although a Muslim leader, he constantly asserted his position as a Bengali Premier. Being neither a leader whose provincial imperative prevailed over a communal line as portrayed by Ayesha Jalal3 nor a mainstream communal leader envisioned by Mushirul Hasan,4 Huq has been difficult to categorise within these two recognised trends of identity politics. Historiograph ical work on Huq has thus tended to emphasise his inconsistencies without quite understanding his distinctive brand of politics. This article makes three main claims. Firstly, it suggests that the contested political arena of what has been termed by some historians as 'Muslim separatism' was challenged not only by politicians who presented themselves as secular but also by regional leaders who were

3 Ayeshajalal, 'Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia', in Sugata Bose and Ayeshajalal (eds), Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, Delhi, India, 1997, p. 90. 4 Mushirul Hasan refers to Huq as an unscrupulous politician who 'thought it fit not only to swim with the current of communalism but to revitalise it and even to perpetuate it', 'Communalism in the Provinces: A Case Study of Bengal and the Punjab, 1922-26', in Mushirul Hasan (ed), Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India, Delhi, India, 1981, p. 265.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1216 SANA AIYAR part of the Muslim political discourse. Provincial leaders' challenges to national politicians have been studied in order to highlight the ideological differences between provincial and central politics. In contrast, this article examines the type of opposition faced by the Muslim leadership that had no ideological conflict with the politics of religiosity. Huq questioned the authority of the Muslim League leader as the sole spokesman for the Muslims by challengingJinnah's politics from within. He appeared as a third alternative in Bengal politics he made no secular, nationalist claims like the Congress nor was he willing to accept Jinnah's communal politics. Instead, he based his politics quite firmly within a Muslim religious and Bengali regional political discourse, thus challenging Jinnah not only as a provincial politician but also as the leader of a religiously defined community. Secondly, the study explores the interplay between religious and regional identity in provincial politics. Huq attacked Jinnah's legitimacy on the grounds that although many of the problems faced by Muslims across India were the same, different provinces had problems particular to them. Huq was thus unwilling to let his provincial politics be subsumed by all-India concerns that were often detrimental to the province. The basis of Huq's opposition to Jinnah was the claim that as premier he represented Bengali Muslims, the protection of whose interests was necessarily different from those of Muslims in other provinces. Muslim identity politics in Bengal was recognised and articulated, but it was not moved solely by religious sentiment. In a unique alternative to the League, Huq refused to prioritise religious allegiance over regional loyalty and after his fallout withJinnah, Huq formed a coalition ministry with the Hindu Mahasabha leader Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. The basis of this coalition was regional solidarity. However, what set this coalition apart was that although it was a cross-communal alliance, it never made any secular claims. Finally, this article suggests a new approach to current understandings of the concept of communalism. Existing literature has highlighted the emergence of two main oppositional ideologies in the 1940s--nationalism and communalism. Consequently, political assertions of religious solidarity, be they Muslim or Hindu, have primarily been studied within the paradigm of communalism as an exclusionary form of identity politics that was based on the construc tion of a communal Other.5 Not all appeals to religious sentiment

5 The construction of religious identity based on the other has been explored by scholars like Hasan who identify the emergence of a self-image and self-representation

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms FAZLUL HUQ, REGION AND RELIGION IN BENGAL 1217 were, however, based on this negative notion of communalism. The peculiarity of Bengal lay in the fact that it was a Muslim-majority province and appeals to religious solidarity were therefore necessarily different in aim and appeal from those of Muslim-minority provinces. Historical research on communalism has tended to focus on the United Provinces, and with the exception of Joya Chatterji's work, the religious politics of Bengal has been under-researched.6 This article problematises the term 'communalism' and suggests that not all appeals to religious identification and protection were necessarily oppositional and exclusive. In Bengal, what made Fazlul Huq's particular brand of 'communalism' different from that of the League was its recognition of the multi-layered identities of Bengalis that sought representation without excluding any one identity. The League was concerned only with consolidating Muslim solidarity by appealing to the religious sentiment of Muslims. Huq's religious appeal allowed for a regional particularity that prevailed in spite of the existence of a publicly articulated religious solidarity. It was thus possible for him to challenge Jinnah and form political alliances across the religious divide without resorting to secular nationalist claims.

Dual Politics: Situating the Bengal Premier

The Government of India Act of 1935 provided for provincial autonomy, which allowed local politicians to come to power and contend with the central party leadership that had attempted to dominate national politics. Provincial leaders, for whom the political community was based firmly on local solidarity, appealed to both religious and regional identity, and questioned the political ideology constructed around an all-India political community by the central parties. As a result, party politics emerged as a contested ground, with regional loyalties challenging central policy. At a time when parties at the centre were attempting to force provincial politicians to

among Muslims as living in a world that they believed was dominated by the Other. See Mushirul Hasan (ed), Inventing Boundaries: Gender Politics and the Partition of India, Delhi, India, 2000, Prologue. 6 See, for example, Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Delhi, India, 1990; Sandria B. Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, California, 1989; Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India, London, 1974; and Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Province' Muslims, 1860-1923, London, 1974.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1218 SANA AIYAR make a choice between religious nationalism and secular nationalism, Premier Fazlul Huq refused to succumb to the political singularity of either of these two alternatives and instead emphasised the plurality of identity politics in Bengal. As the leader of the agrarian Krishak Praja Party, Fazlul Huq formed a coalition government with the Muslim League in Bengal in 1937 after the Congress, his original ally, failed to fulfil its pre election promises. Huq was a Bengali Muslim whose main interest was securing rights for peasants, and as the leader of the Krishak Praja Party he fought the elections of 1937 with the principal aim of abolishing the Permanent Settlement. Since most landlords were Hindu, the Krishak Praja Party's support base was predominantly Muslim. There was, therefore, a seemingly religious divide in Bengal; but in reality stratification was more economic than religious.7 Huq identified himself completely with the peasants and consequently his political rhetoric had communal elements, for he fought for a 'Muslim' cause. After the electoral debacle of 1937, Jinnah needed to make inroads into provincial politics by co-opting local leaders into the League's fold. In Bengal, Fazlul Huq, with his religious rhetoric, seemed the link through which to do this. So important was Bengal and its Muslim support to the All-India Muslim League that Huq was given the honour of introducing the now-famous Lahore Resolution of 1940, and he did so with much enthusiasm and conviction.8 In moving the resolution, Huq, like Jinnah, spoke as a Muslim politician addressing the needs of his community, and challenging the British Government. He criticised the

7 For details on the 1937 elections and the formation of the League-Krishak Praja Party's coalition, see Humaira Momen, Muslim Politics in Bengal: A Study of Krishak Praja Party and the Elections of 1937, Dacca, Bangladesh, 1972; and Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal 1937-47, Delhi, India, 1977, ch. 3. For a detailed discussion on the Krishak Praja Party's political ideology, see Shyamali Ghosh, 'Fazlul Huq and Muslim Polities', in International Studies, 13(3), July-September 1974, p. 442; Shapan Adnan, 'Fazlul Haq and the Bengali Muslim Leadership: 1937-1943', in Bangladesh Historical Studies, 1, 1976, p. 4; Amalendu De, 'Fazlul Huq and his Reaction to the Two-Nation Theory', in Bengal Past and Present, Journal of Modern Indian and Asian History, XCIII( 175), 1974, pp. 23-24; and Joya Chatterji, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge, UK, 1994, pp. 76-83. 8 There has been some argument over who drafted the resolution. See Kazi Ahmed Kamal, Politicians and Inside Stories: A Glimpse Into the Lives of Fazlul Huq, Shaheed Suhrawardy and Moulana Bhashani, Dacca, Bangladesh, 1970, p. 12; Zainul Abedin, Memorable Speeches of Sher-e-Bangla, Barisal, Bangladesh, n.d, p. 141; and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906 1947, Karachi, Pakistan, 1970, pp. xxii-iii.

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current constitution providing provincial autonomy for being 'totally unsuited to and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country' and claimed that it was altogether unacceptable to Muslim India. Addressing the Congress directly he went on to say, 'I am Muslim first and Bengali afterwards. I will take revenge on the Hindus of Bengal if Muslims are hurt in Congress-ruled provinces'.9 Finally, he called for a territorial readjustment in which 'the Muslims are numerically in a majority... grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign'.10 The Lahore Resolution was a public articulation of protest against the treatment of Muslims across India and a statement that no constitution would be workable without taking Muslim interests into consideration. As the Bengal Premier invited to move the momentous resolution, Huq was placed in a precarious position. On the one hand, he had to represent the Muslims at the all-India level and stand by the League's claims in order to show a united front to both the Congress and the British. On the other hand, he was representing Bengal and Bengali Muslims, and thus needed to play his provincial card very carefully in order to have the Bengali voice heard within the League itself. He performed this dual representation with supreme political and rhetorical skill. He compromised neither his position as a Muslim speaking on an all-India platform nor as a provincial premier seeking prominence at the centre. As a religious political leader Huq was quite openly communal, placing great rhetorical emphasis on being a 'Muslim first'. Such an assertion was meant to leave no one in doubt either about his allegiance to the League or about his position as a leader of the Muslim community. Moreover, he was addressing the All India Muslim League conference just three days after Maulana Azad's Presidential address at the Ramgarh Congress Working Committee meeting, where Azad had talked of the Muslim community not as a political minority but in terms of one sharing a 'common nationality' that needed to view independent India with courage and confidence. " I It was therefore politically expedient to disabuse his audience of the Congress claims regarding Muslims. Moreover, Huq's speech was not only a direct attack on the Congress claims of Muslim political security but also an open declaration of his intention to work for the good of his

9 H.N. Mitra (ed), Indian Annual Register (henceforth I.A.R), 1940, Vol. I, Delhi, India, 1990, p. 312. 10 Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, pp. 341-42. 11 Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 20 March 1940.

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community and he therefore appealed to the religious sentiments of his audience. The speech paid off and many Muslim Leaguers who may otherwise have been suspicious of provincial politicians came forward in hearty support of the Bengali leader. So forthcoming was public approval of Huq that he received a standing ovation of such magnitude thatJinnah humorously remarked, 'When the tiger appears, the lamb must give way'.12 Huq spoke of the Muslims as a minority, and though he conceded the fact that in Punjab and Bengal they were in a majority, he claimed it was 'not in an effective majority', for they had to 'seek the help of other interests and minorities to form coalition governments'.'3 Yet even when he was representing Muslims most prominently, Huq did not allow his religious identity to supersede his regional identity. Although Shila Sen claims that Muslim politics was subjected to the pull of all-India political forces this was not in fact the case.14 To begin with, though Huq spoke of being a Muslim first, he did not in fact speak in Urdu even though the crowds urged him to do so.15 He claimed this was because what he had to say was of vital importance and did not want it open to misinterpretation in translation. In fact, it was probably his subtle message to the League that although he was Muslim, he was not willing to give up his cultural inheritance. He thus spoke in neutral English rather than Urdu, for one of the biggest mass movements of the League in establishing Muslim unity and solidarity had been the spread of Urdu as a Muslim language.16 The significant though subtle issue of language aside, even the emphatic Muslim assertion of the Lahore Resolution was not Huq's acquiescence to a singular Muslim solidarity but a rather forceful statement in provincial autonomy. Huq's talk of 'independent states' that were autonomous and sovereign amounted to more provincial autonomy than the Act had so far provided, for it gave independence not only from the central government but also from the central policy of the Muslim League. It

12 Abur Kab,A.K. Fazlul Haq: Life and Achievements, Lahore, Pakistan, n.d., p. 120. 13 I.A.R., 1940, Vol. I, p. 312. 14 Shila Sen, 'Some Aspects of Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-46 and Fazlul Huq', in Bangladesh Historical Studies, 1, 1976, p. 53. 15 Muslim League and Lahore Resolution, Islamabad, Pakistan, 1990, p. xiv. 16 This problem of language and cultural domination plagued the Pakistani nation after 1947. In 1952, linguistic nationalism emerged, acting as a catalyst in a political crisis that culminated in the partition of East Bengal from Pakistan. In this context it is interesting to note that even in his most communally mainstream avatar, Huq as a Muslim leader remained staunchly adverse to the cultural domination of Muslims from the north-west of India.

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is thus only once we contextualise Huq's speech at the Lahore session that his later actions can be understood as a continuation of the same ideals and principles that he evoked at Lahore rather than a complete turnaround from his claims in 1940.

Authority and Legitimacy: Premier Versus Sole Spokesman in the 1941 Crisis

Across India, from 1937 onwards, the League sought to create a unified image of Muslims who needed to close ranks against the tyrannical forces of the Hindus. The League under Jinnah claimed legitimacy based on an identity politics that emerged from the construction of the Other. In religious terms this meant the Hindu, but in political terms it meant the Congress. Indeed a Muslim settlement with the Congress at this stage would have ruined Jinnah's plans, for he needed to present the League as the only political party capable of safeguarding Muslim interests. With provincial autonomy and the ascent of provincial politicians who brought with them their own brand of identity politics,Jinnah's politics lost its legitimacy and authority. It was this that ultimately caused the rift betweenJinnah and Huq. The latter with his communal politics debased the legitimacy that Jinnah claimed in the name of religion alone, and his provincial pre-eminence questionedJinnah's authority as the sole spokesman for all Muslims. It was his reconciliation of religious and regional identities into one political framework that distinguished Huq's politics. At the same time it threatened those who sought legitimacy on the grounds that religion and region were separate and oppositional identities that could not be brought into the same conceptual framework. The Muslim League privileged the religious community over pre-existing regional (or national) identities, while the Congress privileged the pre-existing nation over religion. For Huq the two were intertwined, and allegiance to one did not exclude the other on ideological grounds. Jinnah's movement for Muslim solidarity depended on a singular, united political discourse. Huq's politics lay between the uncompromising singularity of the League's 'communal' religious politics and the secularism of the Congress's nationalist political discourse. Jinnah quite wrongly interpreted Huq's alliance with the Muslim League as the latter's acquiescence to, and prioritisation of, religious solidarity over regional identity. Huq understood religion as informing one layer of several identities, a discourse that was not

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a politically constricting ideology. However, Jinnah's communalism depended entirely on the existence of a constructed communal Other that was necessarily an oppositional and exclusive political option. It could not accommodate any other identity within its framework, for the existence of a united Muslim community was the bulwark of Jinnah's politics. The recognition of any other identity would thus take away the very basis of his political legitimacy. It was ultimately this difference that made Huq so dangerous for Jinnah. Without fitting in to the communal Other as represented by the Hindus and the Congress, Huq's brand of 'communalism' offered a kind of identity politics that Jinnah, as the sole spokesman, was trying to prove could not exist in India. Huq thus emerged as the regional Other forJinnah. He could not be accommodated within the singular mould of the communalism, which had manifested itself in the political ideology of the Muslim League. Problems of authority began to surface quite soon after the famous Lahore meeting. InJuly 1940, Fazlul Huq joined Sikander Hyat Khan, the Punjab Premier, in informal talks with Congress leaders in New Delhi to discuss the communal problem. Jinnah immediately issued a statement reprimanding the two premiers, for he had 'not given permission to either of them to carry on negotiations for a Hindu Moslem settlement', and claimed they had no authority to enter such discussions. 17 Later, in 1941, the Viceroy called upon the Huq ministry tojoin the Defence Council.Jinnah immediately called for disciplinary action against Huq for not consulting the League high command in making his decision to accept this invitation. What followed was a conflict between the centralising tendencies ofJinnah and the public assertion of provincial power by Huq. By September 1941, it was clear that Huq was not ready to compromise withJinnah. Huq's continued resistance to Jinnah worried not only the Muslim League but also the British Government, which had accepted Jinnah's essentialised construction of Muslim solidarity in a singular mould. The governor of Bengal, John Herbert, warned of 'a great upheaval throughout the Muslim world all over India' if the situation were to continue.18 Huq himself, however, was confident that he would be able to muster enough support for himself even if there were a break with the Muslim

171.A.R., i940,Vol.I,p. 117. 18 Herbert to Linlithgow, 22 August 1941, L/P&J/5/148, India Office Records Library, London (henceforth IOL).

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League.19 In a letter to Liaquat Ali Khan, Huq spelt out very clearly his personal grievances againstJinnah as well as his own position as the Premier of Bengal. This letter unambiguously articulated Huq's resistance to the centralising forces of the League and the provincial concerns informing his identity politics. The letter was more than just a public listing of grievances. It made Huq's position vis-a-vis the League, Bengal and Muslims in general quite clear. Huq realised that Jinnah wanted to get rid of him and replace him with someone who could be a puppet in his hands, but in doing so Jinnah needed to discredit Huq publicly. So began a long campaign of propaganda against the premier. As Huq wrote to Liaquat, it was 'the clear duty of the President to inform us... that he disapproved... and that he would like us to resign'. But instead Jinnah waited till he could condemn Huq publicly. Huq complained that the procedure Jinnah adopted placed him in an extremely awkward position, for it was clear that the latter was 'anxious to make a public exhibition of his authority'.20 Next Huq spoke of provincial autonomy and pointed out that he was invited to the Defence Council not as a representative of the Muslim community but as the Premier of Bengal. Moreover, defending his position as the leader of the Muslim community in Bengal he emphasised the fact that there was no indication that the Bengali Muslims condemned his membership of the Council. This was the most significant part of his letter, for Huq quite clearly positioned himself as a provincial leader for whom religious solidarity was as important as it was to the League. It was Huq's unwillingness to accept Jinnah's authority outside the realm of party politics that made him so dangerous for Jinnah, for he was a provincial premier representing a key section of the Muslim community and was in no way dependent on the League for his political survival as a Muslim leader. At another level, Huq's emphatic articulation of the difference between the interests of the Muslims of minority and majority provinces brought into question Jinnah's legitimacy as the sole spokesman for Muslims. Huq showed that the Muslims were not an unconditionally united community. Huq pointed out that in provinces like Bengal and Punjab, Muslims were in a political majority, and had certain advantages and responsibilities particular to them. He

19 Herbert to Linlithgow, 8 September 1941, Ibid. See also Ghuznavi to Gilbert, 5 September 1941, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 20 The Statesman, 11 September 1941.

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said that there were obvious differences between the policies of the Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority provinces, and protested that if leaders of the minority provinces 'meddled too much with the politics of the majority provinces' it would be at the 'peril of the interest of the entire Moslem community of India'. He made a telling allegation that his position as a provincial premier, with its 'particular responsibilities and difficulties', had not been taken into consideration by the leaders of the minority provinces who wanted to 'drown my voice with meaningless slogans which may suit their own conditions of political helplessness, but which are utterly unsuited to the conditions prevailing in my province '21 Finally, Huq combined regional and religious solidarity and stated that he would never allow the interest of the Bengali Muslims to be 'put under the domination of any outside authority however eminent it may be'. He asserted that 'the genius of the Bengali race revolts against autocracy and I could not, therefore, help protesting against the autocracy of a single individual'.22 Here again his regionalism threatened Jinnah's plan, for without a united Muslim front Jinnah had no legitimate grounds for demanding a united Pakistan. In 1941, Huq had not come far from his position in 1940, he merely articulated it more clearly. Huq's evocation of Pakistan in 1940 had involved several independent states, thus safeguarding the interests of Bengali Muslims. This, of course, was quite different from Jinnah's Pakistan that after Lahore 1940 was ostensibly conceptualised as a singular, independent state.23 Huq's letter to Liaquat achieved what Jinnah had been trying to avoid. The 'paradoxical' duality of Bengali Muslim identity entered popular discourse with the Muslim camp being divided into those who supported Huq and his particular brand of regional, religious, plural identity and those who opposed him and favoured Jinnah's united, religious, singular identity.24 Although Huq had compromised insofar

21 Ibid. 22 The Statesman, 12 September 1941. 23 This difference in Jinnah and Huq's articulation of Muslims homelands has been recognised as the key to the problems faced by Pakistan. For a detailed discussion of the implications of the Lahore Resolution for Bangladesh, see Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realisation of Bengali Muslim Nationalism, Karachi, Pakistan, 1994; and Harun-ur-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics, 1936-1947, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 1987. 24 The letter was followed by public demonstrations of the two camps across Calcutta. See the Statesman, 15 September 1940, and Herbert to Linlithgow, 21 September, 1940, L/P&J/5/148, IOL.

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as he resigned from the Council, he stood by his other accusations against the League high command.25 Meanwhile, Governor Herbert reported to the Viceroy that 'the Chief Minister is still "sticky" and continues to assert that he cannot continue to work with colleagues who have been disloyal to him'.26 The British position at this point was significant, for ultimate political control remained in the hands of the governor. In an interesting parallel with Indian politics, central and provincial British policy too was being pulled in different directions. Herbert himself was unsure of which camp to support. He recognised that if the League, with its singular notion of Muslim solidarity, was to become the dominating factor in Bengal, there would be a rise in what he termed 'communalism', which would cause a spilt within the Muslim camp.27 Moreover, he was anxious to present a united front in the Bengal ministry in support of the war effort and was well aware of Jinnah's opposition to Huq on this issue.28 The Viceroy himself, however, more concerned with all-India issues, was 'at particular pains to avoid any direct criticism of Jinnah' or of the Muslim League. He warned that though the League did not at present appear to be the rallying point for the Muslim community, the moment British authorities took sides, they would 'find a very marked rally to the League banner even on the part of people who were in complete disagreement with its handling of its policy and withJinnah's general attitude'.29 Meanwhile, Huq accepted the leadership of the Progressive Coalition Party including Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, the president of the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha. The Jinnah camp in Bengal finally saw the opportunity to oust Huq and issued a statement against him accusing the premier of having been in secret consultation with Sarat Bose and Hindu Mahasabha leaders with the aim of forming an alternative ministry. Furthermore, Huq was attacked for threatening to dissociate the Muslims of Bengal from the All-India Muslim League and thus 'attempting to create serious divisions in Muslim ranks by raising the Bengali and non-Bengali question'.30 Jinnah expelled Huq from the League, expecting Herbert to call upon his candidate, Nazimuddin, to form the government. But with the arrest of the leftist

251.A.R., i94i,Vol.II,p. 220. 26 Herbert to Linlithgow, 10 October 1941, L/P&J/5/148, IOL. 27 Herbert to Linlithgow, 1 October 1941, Ibid. 28 Herbert to Linlithgow, 21 October 1941, L/P&J/5/148, IOL. 29 Linlithgow to Herbert, 10 October 1941, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 30 League Ministers' statement, 5 December 1941,1.A.R., 1941, Vol. II, p.149.

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Sarat Bose, the Progressive Coalition Party no longer posed so serious a threat to the British as initially imagined, and Huq was finally asked to form the government, which Herbert claimed 'represents a variety of views and which commands majority', but looked good on paper.31 Although he had been expelled from the Muslim League, Huq's political ideology won in 1941, for he was able to overcome Jinnah's formidable Muslim leadership without compromising his regional or religious identity politics. Although the Bengal Premier subscribed to the religious rhetoric of the League that called for Muslim unity and solidarity, he was not ready to compromise his position as a provincial chief minister. What Huq represented was not so much unanimous Muslim opinion as a dual representation of Bengali Muslim identity. This fluidity and pluralism gave him the flexibility to ally himself with both the Hindu Bengalis and the all-India Muslim organisation without necessarily sacrificing his ideology and his concerns. It was this complete identification with the unique problems of a community belonging to a particular region that made it difficult forJinnah to appropriate Huq into the greater League agenda, and it was Huq's blatant use of religion that made it so urgent and necessary for Jinnah to dismiss him. By offering Muslims a 'communal' alternative to the Congress that was not the Muslim League, Huq threatened Jinnah's pretensions to being the unchallenged leader of the Muslim qaum. With the expulsion of Huq from the Muslim League and the formation of a new ministry in alliance with Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 'the symbol of Hindu fanaticism',32 communal identity politics in Bengal took on a new form. Jinnah's supporters within the League launched a long campaign against Huq, demonising him as a traitor to all Muslims, and presented their party as the only political organisation capable of protecting their community against Hindus. Having been unable to claim a space for himself within Bengali politics, Jinnah launched a public attack on Huq for betraying the Muslim cause. He used the opportunity presented by the Huq-Mookerjee coalition to rally the League Bengali Muslims, who had been so elusive, and establish himself as the sole spokesman for Muslims, expounding his singular mould of identity politics. Thus far, the attacks of the League had been confined to the communal Other, that is, the Hindus.

31 Herbert to Linlithgow, 20 December 1941, L/P&J/5/148, IOL. 32 Ayeshajalal, Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, 1985, p. 69.

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Now they turned their energy to emphasising the equivalence of Muslim interests across India, and condemning Huq for having sold out to the Hindu minority in order to keep his 'nominal Premiership'.33 Moreover, condemnation of Huq was closely followed by a call to all Muslims to revolt against the oppression and tyranny of the coalition ministry, which did not represent Muslims.34 By challengingJinnah's legitimacy and authority, Huq had underscored his independence as a regional and religious political leader.Jinnah thus needed not only to replace Huq's leadership but also to seize this opportunity to question the credibility of the coalition, and convince the Muslim community in Bengal that its fate depended entirely on the Muslim League, for no other provincial alternative was capable of safeguarding its interests. Resolutions were moved against Huq on the grounds that he had completely forfeited the confidence of Muslims by his repeated betrayal of their cause. It was not enough to merely condemn Huq for his misconduct--the League needed to rule out the possibility of any collaboration with other political parties in order to preserve the legitimacy of their demands. They discredited Huq for being a 'mere titular head' of the coalition that was controlled by Hindus. A vigorous campaign was launched to inveigle Bengali Muslims into the League, urging them not to rest content till the present ministry, which was 'composed of various elements antagonistic to the cause of Muslims', had been overthrown.35 The dissolution of the Provincial Legislature was demanded, and appeals were made to the governor to call fresh elections on the grounds that having formed a ministry in defiance of the policy and principles of the All-India Muslim League, the present representatives had lost the confidence of the voters.36 Since the League was the only recognised Muslim organisation in India, its members claimed that the expelled Huq could not possibly deliver the goods on behalf of the community.37 Huq himself, however, continued to profess loyalty to the Muslim League, even while in coalition with the Hindu Mahasabha. He viewed the Cabinet predicament in Bengal as a crisis resulting from personal

33 Dawn, 21 December 1941. 34 Jinnah's Presidential Address, Bengal Provincial Muslim League Conference, Serajung, 15 February 1942,1.A.R., 1942, Vol. I, pp. 323-25. 35 Resolution of Muslim League Working Committee, Nagpur, 16 December 1941, LAR, 1941, Vol. II, pp. 221-22. 36 SeelA.R., 1942, Vol. I, p. 325. 37 Statement issued by Suhrawardy and Nazimuddin in January 1942, L/P&J/8/651, IOL.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1228 SANA AIYAR differences between himself and a few members of the provincial League.38 A public statement was issued to elucidate his position, making it clear that 'the domestic troubles in the Bengal Cabinet has absolutely no bearing on the Muslim League, nor has it anything to do with the question of our loyalty to the League itself.39 Deaf to the pleas of loyalty,Jinnah ostracised Huq systematically and completely, and refused him re-entry into the League. Indeed, historians have tended to emphasise this successful political campaign against Huq and the growing unpopularity of the premier within Bengal. Harun ur-Rashid believed that the success ofJinnah against Fazlul Huq, the 'son of the soil', was largely attributable to the fear among Bengali Muslims of 'impending Hindu domination' who thus rushed to the all India organisation.40 It has been assumed that the coalition ministry strengthened communalism in Bengal and caused Bengali Muslims to flock to the League and join its Pakistan movement.41 The influence of Jinnah's propaganda against Huq, which contributed to the communalised 'ideological legitimisation' of appeals to Muslim solidarity,42 cannot be denied. But it would be wrong to assume that this communal consolidation was focused solely around the League. WhileJinnah ostracised Huq, throughout the tenure of the coalition the latter continued to present himself as a Muslim leader. Marginalised by contemporaries and under-researched by historians, however, was the emergence of a more conciliatory identity politics that entered political discourse and sought to reconcile the differences between the two religious communities rather than accentuate them. In contradistinction to the attempt by the League under Jinnah to construct an exclusive Muslim identity based entirely on the perceived threat posed by the communal Other, the coalition created space for the accommodation of religion and region in the political arena. The Huq-Mookerjee coalition experimented with a type of identity politics that appealed to religious solidarity but recognised and included

38 Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 10 December 1941. 39 Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 6 December 1941. 40 Rashid, Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, p. 158. 41 See Tazeen M. Murshid, 'A House Divided: The Muslim Intelligentsia of Bengal', in D.A. Low (ed), The Political Inheritance of Pakistan, London, 1991, p. 161; and Sen, 'Some Aspects of Muslim Polities', pp. 46-47. 42 Suranjan Das, 'Propaganda and the Legitimization of Communal Ideology: Patterns and Trends in Bengal, 1905-1947', in Suranjan Das and Sekhar Bandopadhyay (eds), Caste and Communal Politics in South Asia, Calcutta, India, 1993, P- 193

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communal differences within the same paradigm. The ultimate defeat of Huq did not come at the hands of Jinnah, the Muslim League or even the electorate. It was the manoeuvrings of Governor Herbert in 1943 that ensured the political end of Huq. In spite of Jinnah's campaign against him, Huq did not vanish into political oblivion in 1941. More importantly, there was no exodus of Bengali Muslims to the League. Support for Pakistan certainly gathered ground in Bengal during this period, but at no point did Huq distance himself from the ideal he evoked in 1940. Historians have uncritically acceptedJinnah's portrayal of Huq as having moved away from the 'communal' values that he stood for,43 when in fact research reveals that the identity politics practised by Huq during the ministry had remained the same since he had first become premier in 1937. It thus becomes important to study the type of alternative that the Huq-Mookerjee coalition offered Bengal in 1941.

Forgotten Alternative: The 1941 Coalition Ministry

The formation of the Huq-Mookerjee coalition was followed by calls for communal harmony and Bengali solidarity. Huq hoped that the ministry would be an augury for the cessation of communal strife.44 In April 1941, serious riots had occurred in Dhaka with hundreds of communal killings. Emphasising regional solidarity, Huq announced that through the coalition, 'Bengal would stand united in solving her economic and other vital problems'.45 Yet even then Huq did not stop talking of the need for Muslim unity and solidarity. His politics did not suddenly embrace a secular discourse, for Huq continued to appeal to the religious sentiments of Bengali Muslims. By accommodating religious solidarity within a regional political discourse in 1941, Huq was able to overcome the apparent paradox of religious and regional identities that had been set up as a binary opposition by national leaders. While the League attacked Huq for having betrayed the Muslim cause by seeking a cross-communal alliance, the alternative that this coalition offered had not in fact distanced itself from religion. It had accommodated religious concerns within a regional coalition that was best suited to the pluralism of Bengal. By offering the

43 Rashid, Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, p. 142. 44 I.A.R., 1941, Vol. II, p. 41. 45 Ibid, p. 151.

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Bengali Muslim a political alternative that did not force a discord between either identity, Huq had shown that political pragmatism in the province did not need to forsake the bonds of the religious community in order to protect the region. In June 1942, a Hindu-Muslim Unity conference was held in Calcutta, and in his opening speech Huq explained his position vis-a-vis inter-communal relations. Without denying the need for Hindu-Muslim unity, he stated that the advancement of the Muslim community was essential for the freedom of India. Huq openly admitted that he had always been a strenuous fighter for Muslim rights but asserted that his fight was concerned with justice.46 As a Muslim leader, he complained to the governor that the interests of his community had been totally ignored by the appointing authorities in public services. Moreover, he was well aware of the impact of such a policy that could be used to exploit vulnerabilities among Bengali Muslims and warned that a 'feeling of bitter resentment' was beginning to emerge in the minds of certain Muslims who had become 'very restive'.47 Huq's political discourse thus accommodated rather than obliterated the communal element. For him, religious identity was based not on an opposition to the communal Other but rather on a recognition of the need to safeguard the community and maintain regional solidarity. Such a communal construct made it possible for him to ally with Hindu political parties without compromising his Muslim identity. Huq's rhetorical and political shift from an apparent communal voice to a secular one is thus a misinterpretation of his identity politics. During the coalition ministry he remained a Muslim leader both in theory and in practice. Moreover, the suggestion that the growth in support of the Pakistan movement reflected a defection among the Muslims from Huq toJinnah does not hold true, for Huq himself stood by the idea of Pakistan as envisioned in Lahore in 1940. Like the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha's political ideology had also based itself on an opposition to the communal Other. In a revealing parallel with Muslim politics in the province, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee spoke more tolerantly about the communal question than did V.D. Savarkar, the president of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha. Mookerjee, as a politician from a Muslim-majority province, realised the threat that an exclusive religious identity politics would pose

46/.Ai?, 1942, Vol. I, p. 335. 47 Huq to Herbert, 2 August 1942, L/P&J/8/651, IOL.

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to Bengali Hindus. He thus needed to consolidate Hindu solidarity, but not to such an extent that it would exclude cross-communal political alliances, which were the only way the Mahasabha could stake a claim in the governance of Bengal. Therefore, shortly after the Lahore Resolution had been passed, Mookerjee urged his community to recognise that India was 'the home of many peoples other than Hindus'. He reminded the Hindus of 'their past traditions of tolerance and forbearance' and called upon them to allow 'the fullest liberty to all communities residing in India'. Recognising the pluralism of identity within Bengal, he appealed for 'special application in the fields of cultural, social and religious pursuits so that the legitimate rights of other communities may be scrupulously respected'.48 Although not yet the Hindu extremist that emerged in the late 1940s, even at this point, Mookerjee was not a secularist. On the eve of the formation of the Huq-Mookerjee alliance, at the provincial Bengal Hindu Mahasabha conference, Mookerjee, like Huq, spoke in 'communal' terms. He appealed to the religious sentiments of Hindus, not in terms of an opposition to the communal Other but instead called for the recognition and reconciliation of different religious identities. He asserted the need for the Mahasabha to become stronger and more virile but was emphatic that this did not mean a transformation into an anti-Muslim organisation. He was aware of the dangers of either placating or dominating the other religious community in an irrational manner. Recognising the differences between the two communities where religious disparity was manifest, he emphasised the need for mutual respect so that neither would have any cause to suspect the other.49 Finally, like Huq, he called for regional solidarity: 'I had no illusion of the difficulties and magnitude of the task that would confront us.... Let the Chief Minister's appeal for unity find an echo in the heart of every well-wisher of the province, so that the foundation a nobler and undivided Bengal may be truly and worthily laid'.50 While all-India organisations tended to emphasise in a negative and highly politicised way that religious identity was incompatible with any political accommodation of the communal Other, in Bengal religious constructs were positive rather than negative. They created a space within communal solidarity for political pragmatism and

48 Presidential Address, Bihar Provincial Hindu Mahasabha Meeting, Ranchi, 14 April 1940,1.A.R., 1940, Vol. I, p. 61. 49 LAR, 1941, Vol. II, pp. 246-47. 50 Amrita Bazaar Patrika, 12 December 1941.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1232 SANA AIYAR accommodated communal identity within political discourse. Unlike nationalist politics where there was a call to privatise religion and disassociate the 'nation' from any pre-existing community,51 provincial leaders like Huq and Mookerjee did not find the need to secularise their politics in order to maintain regional solidarity and make cross-communal political alliances. Curiously, both secular and religious politics at the centre was concerned with creating a singular nationalism that denied legitimacy to pre-existing community solidarity. The Congress, with its secular claims, narrowed the political domain by excluding the religious political community from its realm.52 On the other hand, the League, with its religious nationalism, refused to acknowledge the validity of the regional political community. Neither option, however, suited the political requirements of provincial politics. It was this third alternative offered by the Huq-Mookerjee coalition that reconciled regional and religious identities within politics, and revealed a forgotten trajectory of provincial identity politics that was overrun, historically and in subsequent historiography, by the high politics of partition.

British Intervention

The Huq-Mookerjee coalition did not last. In November 1942, Mookerjee resigned from the ministry, while Huq's resignation letter was accepted in April 1943 amidst much controversy. The failure of the alliance has been attributed to the discord caused by communal conflict within the ministry, which made the coalition unworkable. Chatterji claims that the Huq-Mookerjee coalition disintegrated because neither leader had been able to deal with the conflicting pressures from their rank and file. Moreover, she concludes that Herbert was able to use the differences between Huq and Mookerjee to engineer the collapse of the alliance.53 Research, however, reveals a slightly different story. It was not the cross-communal alliance that had made the ministry unworkable for Mookerjee--it was British interference in government that had made provincial autonomy a charade. And it was for this reason that Mookerjee finally resigned. Provincial autonomy was precariously dependent for its success on

51 Pandey, Construction of Communalism, p. 239. 52 Ibid, p. 254. 53 Chatterji, 'Decline, Revival and Fall of Bhadralok', pp. 306-7.

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the British governors. The threat of ajapanese invasion made Bengal extremely vulnerable, and Governor Herbert was unwilling to lend any support to a coalition that was not completely under his thumb. His antipathy towards Huq was no secret, and he seized upon the opportunity presented by Mookerjee's resignation to oust Huq on the grounds that his ministry was not representative of all the political parties in Bengal. Herbert's ill-founded hostility to Huq was apparent to his superiors. As soon as the Cabinet crisis came to a head in 1941, Secretary of State Amery urged Viceroy Linlithgow to influence Herbert to bring about the coalition, which he believed would be 'instrumental in restoring harmonious relations between the Hindus and Mohammedans of Bengal'.54 Once Huq had proved his majority, Herbert had no choice but to call upon him to form the government. The governor, however, made it clear that he had only done so under duress. He dismissed all of Huq's claims to communal harmony on the grounds that the premier was a mere puppet in the hands of the Hindus. By refusing to acknowledge the equal partnership of the representatives of the two religious communities in the ministry, Herbert disseminated a communalised image of the coalition as one dominated by Mookerjee, whose sole objective was Hindu domination. Reinforcing the stance adopted by the League, he belittled Huq' position as a premier claiming that he was completely under the influence of the Hindus, and thus incapable of taking any decisions without them. Moreover, he presented Huq as the main obstacle to communal harmony, who created dissonance not only between the two communities but also among the Muslims themselves.55 Furthermore, Herbert claimed that Mookerjee resigned in order to maintain the leadership of Hindus.56 This rather distorted version of events amounted to nothing less than a policy of 'divide-and-rule' on the part of the governor. Herbert's assertions aimed at alienating Huq even further from the League so that he would lose his majority, giving the governor the chance to finally dismiss him. There is in fact no evidence to suggest that Huq was under any constraining influence from Mookerjee. Moreover, Mookerjee's resignation was not communally motivated. It was a revolt against the domination of the British governor whose interference in

54 Amery to Linlithgow, 4 December 1941, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 55 Herbert to Linlithgow, 22 March 1942, Mss Eur F 125/42. See also Herbert to Linlithgow, 9 March 1942, and 27 September 1942, Mss Eur F 125/42, IOL. 56 Herbert to Amery, 19 November 1942, L/P&J/8/651, IOL.

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the working of the ministries had exposed the constitution's facade of provincial autonomy, of which Mookerjee refused to be a part.57 In his letter of resignation, Mookerjee reiterated his belief in the need for communal harmony and co-operation. At no point did Mookerjee intimate that religious, or even political, difference had made the ministry unworkable. Far from blaming Huq for the collapse of the alliance, he criticised Herbert for deliberately rejecting the premier's advice to involve the cabinet more intimately in administrative matters. Most significantly, he blamed the governor for failing to support the ministry by refusing to respond to the co-operation offered by the two communities, both of which had put their differences aside in order to present a united political front in Bengal.58 Having first blamed Huq for creating divisions between Muslims by entering into a coalition with the Hindus, Herbert now changed his stand on the cross-communal issue and called for an all-party government that would support Britain's war efforts. He seized upon the opportunity presented by Mookerjee's resignation to dismiss the chief minister on the grounds that Huq stood as an obstacle to the formation of such a government.59 Huq, however, was in no way a hindrance to an all-party government. He had, in fact, facilitated the formation of an all-party ministry when he entered into an alliance with Mookerjee. Seeing no contradiction in his policyvis-a-vis Herbert's sudden assertion of the urgency to form an all-party government, Huq told the governor that 'if at any time I am found to be a hindrance to the formation of such a government, I shall be glad to tender resignation of my office'.60 Quite pleased with the outcome, Herbert accepted Huq's 'resignation' and justified it to his high command, who disapproved of his actions, by claiming that 'Huq's ministry existed only by consent of official Congress. No rapprochement of parties was feasible with Huq 61 in office . On dismissing Huq, Herbert's candidate Nazimuddin was unable to gather Hindu support for the formation of the famous all-party government. Little wonder, for the Mahasabha had withdrawn from the ministry in protest against Herbert, not Huq. Herbert, however, blamed Mookerjee's 'wrecking tactics' for Nazimuddin's inability to

57 Mookerjee to Linlithgow, 12 August 1942, Ibid. 58 Mookerjee to Herbert, 16 November 1942, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 59 Herbert to Linlithgow, correspondence of April-September 1942, Ibid. See also, Mss Eur F 125/42, IOL. 60 Huq to Herbert, 21 March 1943, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 61 Herbert to Linlithgow, 29 March 1943, L/P&J/8/651, IOL.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms FAZLUL HUQ, REGION AND RELIGION IN BENGAL 1235 make cross-party alliances.62 Refusing to accept any responsibility for Mookerjee's resignation, Herbert claimed that the Hindus had accepted Huq's premiership because of the latter's pliability and lack of principle, which together with the fact that he depended on the Hindus for his majority had made him the perfect candidate for Mookerjee to support.63 The implication of this assertion, of course, was that Naziumuddin, unlike Huq, had a Muslim majority and, therefore, did not necessarily desire a cross-communal political alliance. Finally, Herbert too was forced to admit that for all his claims of wanting to establish an all-party ministry he had been unable to: 'I appreciate the difficult situation produced by the avowed reason for Huq's exit--the formation of a broad-based ministry'.64 Historians have tended to emphasise the incompatibility of cross communal alliances in Bengal and accept Jinnah's and Herbert's assertions that the Huq-Mookerjee alliance was a failure.65 In reality, the alliance had been able to bring some communal peace to the province. Viceroy Linlithgow himself visited Bengal and announced that this new government had 'rather more prospects of permanence than are likely to be altogether palatable to its opponents'. 66 During the controversy surrounding Huq's resignation, Linlithgow had questioned Herbert's accusations and pointed out that the presence of Hindu elements in the Huq ministry had had 'a very real and material value in keeping communal feeling low'.67 Earlier, Huq himself had categorically refused to 'throw over his present colleagues' when Jinnah laid that down as the price for accepting him back into the Muslim League.68 Challenging the validity of Herbert's claims, Huq pointed out that Jinnah's mandate, which had been the reason for Huq's expulsion from the League, was in itself a negation of the idea of an all-parties government. Thus 'any Cabinet that Sir Nazimuddin may form would not satisfy the conditions of an all parties government'.69 The inter-communal solidarity of the coalition

62 Herbert to Linlithgow, 22 April 1943, Ibid. 63 Herbert to Linlithgow, 23 April 1943, Ibid. 64 Herbert to Linlithgow, 10 April 1943, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 65 According to Leonard Gordon, the coalition could have brought about communal harmony but it failed as its members did not work effectively enough, Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 1876-1940, New York, 1973, p. 289. 66 Linlithgow to Amery, 22 December 1941, L/P&J/8/651, IOL. 67 Linlithgow to Herbert, 2 April 1943, Ibid. 68 Linlithgow to Amery, 18 November 1942, Ibid. 69 Huq to Linlithgow, 22 April 1943, Ibid.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1236 SANA AIYAR was further reiterated in a resolution passed by the Hindu Mahasabha that condemned the actions of Herbert in securing the resignation of Huq in spite of the fact that the premier possessed a clear majority in the Assembly. Finally, the Mahasabha expressed the willingness of Hindu members of the Legislative Assembly to co-operate with an all-parties government, which was the ostensible reason given by the governor in securing Huq's resignation.70 Nevertheless, the Muslim League leader Nazimuddin had been allowed to form a ministry, which did not include any Mahasabha representative in its cabinet. The forgotten alternative of 1941 has been relegated to the footnotes of history, as a failed attempt by provincial leaders in Bengal to remain in power, a ministry that was doomed from the start because of the insincerity of its members and the communal strife that was an inevitable hurdle to any such political alliance. The collapse of the Huq-Mookerjee coalition was not caused by communal discord. Neither Huq's identification with the Muslim community nor Mookerjee's representation of Hindu interests posed an ideological obstacle to the ministry. The fluidity of provincial politics in Bengal in the early 1940S had provided a historic opportunity for the formation of an all-party government that included Hindu and Muslim political leaders. Instead of seizing this opportunity, the League and the British authorities did all they could to ostracise both Huq and Mookerjee from politics. As elucidated above, I have shown that the alliance was, in fact, a success. Huq and Mookerjee were able to reconcile their religious differences within an identity politics that privileged provincial identity but did not fall back on secular claims. Suggesting a third alternative to existing trends in politics, the alliance thus posed a formidable challenge to the exclusive singularity of identity that both religious and secular nationalism demanded. Moreover, the collapse of the ministry did not question the credibility of the coalition, for it was not internal discord that led to Mookerjee's resignation. Ultimately, it was the refusal of the British governor to acknowledge the validity of the coalition that brought about the end of the ministry. From 1943 onwards, the political situation in India changed. The transfer of power and high politics of partition overwhelmed provincial politics, and those politicians who were unable to swim with the tide were forced into abeyance. Mookerjee emerged as a national Hindu leader with all-India concerns, while Huq vanished into political oblivion and

70 Resolution passed at a meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, Delhi, 10 May 1943,1.A.R., 1943, Vol. I, p. 209.

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms FAZLUL HUQ, REGION AND RELIGION IN BENGAL 1237 re-emerged only in 1952, to continue his fight against the centralising forces of Islamabad in East Pakistan. Herbert's misjudgement of Huq and Mookerjee was inherited by his successor, Governor Casey, who also rejected the leaders' appeals to form an all-party government.71 Even while he was in opposition, Huq made it clear that he would not desert his Hindu colleagues, since they had been so loyal to him, although this cost him his membership of the Muslim League.72 More importantly, Mookerjee also emphasised the need for an all-party ministry and commented that the League was the only obstacle in the way.73 Time and again Casey refused to force Jinnah to allow Huq's inclusion in the ministry on the grounds that Huq was 'old and venal and his past record was such that I could not envisage his inclusion in any future government'. On the other hand, he excluded Mookerjee with his 'viper-like personality' on the unfounded assumption that Mookerjee was actuated 'solely by hatred of the Muslims' and merely wanted to 'put himself into a position to disrupt the administration'.74 Casey claimed that a government that included Mookerjee or Huq would be 'continually subject to conflicting groups and interested individuals' and would lead to bitter communal recrimination from the League Moslems'.75 There is, however, no evidence that such a government would in fact have been detrimental to the province.

Contextualising Hindu Separatism

Even after their dismissal, both Huq and Mookerjee continued to present a united political front to the governor, but their sincerity was constantly questioned. By complying with the Muslim League the governor denied the political leader of the Hindu community a ministerial position. This created a political vacuum in the representation of Hindu politics in government, which fostered a growing fear of exclusion among the Hindu community. It was quite natural that the Hindu minority consisting of well over 25 million

71 For details see notes taken by Governor Casey on his meetings with Huq and Mookerjee in 1944-45 m Casey Diaries, Vols I, II & III, IOL. Both stress the need for an all-party government. 72 Casey, diary entry dated 3 April 1945, Casey Diaries, Vol. Ill, IOL. 73 Casey, diary entry dated 18 February, 1944, Ibid. 74 Casey to Wavell, 26 March 1944, L/P&J/5/151, IOL. 75 Casey to Wavell, 8 April 1945, L/P&J/8/653,IOL

This content downloaded from 59.180.134.145 on Mon, 12 Sep 2016 13:47:22 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 1238 SANA AIYAR people would demand some say in the running of the province.76 Political alienation thus acted as a catalyst in the rise of Hindu separatism in Bengal. But here chronology becomes important. It was only when the movement for united independent Bengal gathered political support at the centre that Mookerjee lashed out decisively against Muslim politics. The political context had changed and as partition became inevitable by early 1947, Mookerjee's political concerns altered considerably. In an obvious break from his earlier reconciliatory position, Mookerjee now saw Hindu and Muslim interests as irreconcilable. It was in this context that he began to talk of the division of Bengal province into two separate communal homelands and it is important to distinguish this from the central forces pushing for the partition of India. By 1947, cross-communal politics had been replaced by movements for political separatism among both Hindus and Muslims. Hindu separatism resulted in the call for a Hindu Bengali homeland, while Muslim separatism from the Indian centre manifested itself in the united independent Bengal movement. A review of the causes of the communalisation of Hindu politics, which were directly related to events taking place outside of Bengal, is beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, important to explore the interplay between Hindu and Muslim political separatism in Bengal. The Hindu Mahasabha's demand for the partition of the province in 1947 leads Chatterji to conclude that it was in Bengal 'that the forces which led to the partition of the province mainly derived', and that far from launching agitation against it, the Bhadralok 'actually fought for the partition which gave them a separate homeland of their own'.7 Without any doubt, by 1947 the Hindu Mahasabhites were the chief protagonists of the movement to partition the province, and ultimately they were the main obstacle to the united, independent Bengal movement.78 But this demand was a reaction against Muslim separatism, which ironically enough posed an equal threat to Bengali Hindus--that of exclusion from the Indian nation--even though Muslim demands differed at the centre and the province. At the centre, the Muslim demand for Pakistan excluded Bengal from the Indian nation. The Bengali Muslims, however, wanted to keep Bengal united and independent--from both Nehru's India and Jinnah's Pakistan.

76 Burrows to Wavell, 4 November 1946, L/P&J/8/655, IOL. 77 Chatterji, Bengal Divided, p. 266. 78 Burrows to Wavell, 19 March 1947, L/P&J/5/154, IOL.

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In both schemes the Bengali Hindu was excluded from the Indian nation. Hindu separatism of the mid-1940s stemmed from this fear. The only solution for Hindus in the face of the reality of partition was to demand the division of the province, so as to ensure that Hindu Bengal remained part of India. Bengali Muslim politics that had hitherto been at odds with the League policy suddenly came to be accepted by Jinnah in 1947. Regional identity had remained fundamental to Muslim politics. Having resisted the formation of an all-party government that Suhrawardy had sought in April 1946, the all-India Muslim League finally came to the realisation in early 1947 that one-party rule needed to end in order to ensure the unity and independence of the province.79 The new governor of Bengal, Burrows, held talks with Congress leaders to this effect.80 But by now it was too late. As the Muslim claim to Bengal translated into the united independent Bengal movement, Hindu claims to the Indian nation resulted in the demand for the partition of Bengal. Mookerjee and the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha became more closely linked with all-India politics, and regional identity was subverted in favour of national identity, ultimately leading to the demand for the creation of a separate homeland for Bengali Hindus that would remain part of India. In April 1947, the Bengal Muslim League officially launched the united Bengal campaign, in a curious echo of Huq's identity politics, emphasising the peculiarities of the majority province and differentiating the question of Bengal's independence from the League demand for the partition of India.8' The movement was based on a sense of cultural and regional solidarity among Bengali Muslims, who wanted to preserve their particular identity and avoid submersion into a Pakistani culture that would be overwhelmingly Punjabi. Although the united Bengal movement was a failure, it is important to note that it was not an outlandish last-minute alternative that no one took seriously. Both Burrows and Mountbatten sought to keep Bengal united rather than divided, and, although grudgingly, were ready to give Bengal independence if the legislature voted in favour of this.82 More importantly, Jinnah admitted to Mountbatten

79 Burrows to Wavell, 19 March 1947, L/P&J/5/154, IOL. See also Suhrawardy's statement on 6 March 1947, IA.R., 1947, Vol. I, p. 44. 80 Burrows to Wavell, 4 November 1946, L/P&J/8/655, IOL. 81 Rashid, Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, pp. 277~7^ 82 See Mountbatten-Burrows correspondence of April-May 1947 in Nicholas Mansergh and Pendrel Moon (eds), Constitutional Relations Between Britain and India,

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that he would rather keep Bengal united and independent, even if it meant it would not be part of Pakistan.83 Once the united Bengal movement gathered ground both in Bengal and at the centre, there was a decisive shift in the Bengal Hindu Mahasabha policy. Contemporaries believed that united independent Bengal would be a puppet in the hands of Pakistan. Given Jinnah's enthusiastic support of the scheme, it is not surprising that Mookerjee concluded that independent Bengal was 'nothing but a surrender to Pakistan' and claimed that 'the Hindus of Bengal would never accept nor be deceived by the cry of "Free State of Bengal"' as it was 'a great hoax to include the whole of Bengal in Pakistan'.84 It was the threat that Bengal would be cut off from the rest of India that pushed Mookerjee to demand the division of the province. The Mahasabha demand for the partition of Bengal was prompted by the desire to 'prevent the disintegration of the nationalist element' and to 'secure a homeland for the Hindus of Bengal', for every Hindu of Bengal 'wanted to remain a citizen of the Indian union'.85 All along, Mookerjee had opposed the idea of Pakistan. In 1940, when Huq had first moved the Lahore Resolution, the possibility that India would be partitioned seemed remote. Huq's alliance with Mookerjee would only have served to confirm this belief. In 1947, as partition became inevitable, Mookerjee continued to oppose the idea, this time at the cost of dividing the province. There was, moreover, a significant difference between the centre and the province. The Bengal Hindu Mahasabha was at pains to emphasise that its demand for partition did not mean the acceptance of Pakistan. It was only in view of the League's perpetuation of the two-nation theory and its refusal to remain inside the Indian union that the scheme for a Hindu province within Bengal had been advocated as 'the best means to prevent the destruction of the fabric of Bengal's national life'.86 Mookerjee further pointed out that he was 'against the division of India, but if Pakistan is conceded against our

The Transfer of Power 1942-47 (henceforth T.O.P.), Vol. X, the Mountbatten Viceroyalty, Formulation of a Plan, London, 1980, and Mountbatten to Burrows, 28 April 1947, Mss Eur E 341/46, IOL. 83 Jinnah to Mountbatten, 26 April 1947, T.O.P., Vol. X, p. 452. 84 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee's statements on 14 May and 24 May 1947,1.A.R., 1947, Vol. I, pp. 66, 68. 85 Ibid, p. 239. 861.A.R., 1947, Vol. I, p. 240.

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will, separation of Hindu majority areas in Bengal is inescapable'.87 Governor Burrows himself realised that the 'partition agitation was in fact an anti-Pakistan movement--those who support it would rather face the division of Bengal ... than a Bengal linked with some form of Pakistan'.88 The Hindu demand for the division of Bengal was thus very different from the high politics that accompanied the partition of the nation at the centre, and it is incorrect to try to find unqualified parallels between the two. Rather than 'a reflection of a symbiotic relationship between centre and province in which policy-makers at the centre encountered a reciprocal dynamic from Bengal',89 the Bengal Mahasabha's demand for the partition of the province was a nationalist strategy of Bengali Hindus to remain within the Indian nation. At the centre, however, a very different dynamic operated, which was concerned primarily with keeping political power in the hands of the Congress even if this meant the partition of the nation. 'Communalism' in the provinces thus needs to be criticallyjuxtaposed with the religious politics of the centre, and the political expression of Hindu solidarity needs to be recognised as contingent on regional specificities.

Reassessing Communalism: Some Conclusions

With the collapse of the Huq-Mookerjee coalition, Bengal saw a growing polarisation of identity politics. The political fluidity of the early 1940s, which had allowed the formation of cross-communal alliances, was overrun by a type of politics that forced political identity into the narrow shackles of an exclusive communal rhetoric and practice. Jinnah's sustained propaganda against Huq, Mookerjee's vocal attacks on the Muslim League and the Congress high command's acquiescence in partition culminated in the division of the province, with East Bengal forming part of Pakistan. Consequently, the identity politics of the early 1940S has been viewed within the same paradigm as the 'communalism' of the late 1940s. As a corrective to such an assumption, this article disassociates the early 1940S from the run up to partition and reveals the extent to which provincial identity

87 Mookerjee to Listowel, 7 May 1947, Ibid. 88 J.D Tyson to Abell, 24 April 1947, Mss Eur E 241/46, IOL. 89 Chatter')!, Bengal Divided, p. 266.

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politics differed from the type of politics witnessed at the centre. I have shown that the religious politics of provincial politicians like Huq and Mookerjee was fundamentally different from the brand of 'communalism' practised by central organisations. Moreover, the strong sense of regional identity and solidarity that manifested itself in the coalition ministry of 1941 was not the result of the secularisation of politics. Provincial politicians were concerned with both religious and regional identity. They were able to solve the apparent contradiction of this dualism by working within a political framework that recognised the pluralism of provincial political identity and did not succumb to the singularity of, exclusively religious or secular nationalism that was being celebrated at the centre. The study of communalism in colonial India has tended to focus on the United Provinces, and it generalises religious identity politics as an ideological paradigm that is exclusionary and negative. Communal identity has been understood as a narrow and unifying construction that was necessarily opposed to identification with any alternative political community. The political expression of religious solidarity has often been quite unproblematically generalised as 'communal'. Farzana Shaikh has gone as far as to claim that the centrality of the communal group in Islam, with its exclusive orientations, meant that Muslims viewed political institutions not as 'fluid political majorities and minorities' but rather as 'conglomerations of rigidly defined, mutually exclusive communal groups, divided principally along religious lines'.90 The incompatibility of religious and nationalist identities has also been emphasised by Frietag who concludes that community-building that centred around religious solidarity led to the 'politicization of nation-as-community' and perpetuated perceptions of a profound separation between one's own community and a communal Other, thus becoming problematic in the political arena of nation-building.91 Such an understanding of identity politics essentialises the notion of religious solidarity as a linear progression towards communalised politics that theoretically excluded nationalist or regional concerns from its discourse. Religious solidarity and national identity are thus forced into exclusive paradigms, which do not recognise the different narratives within each ideology. Furthermore, it fails to recognise

90 Farzana Shaikh, 'Muslims and Political Representation in Colonial India: The Making of Pakistan', Modern Asian Studies, 20, 3, 1986, p. 543. 91 Frietag, Collective Action and Community, pp. 294-95.

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the interplay between the communal and secular discourses, thereby omitting any local or chronological contingencies. The focus on the United Provinces and theoretical generalisations arising from the specific experiences of this minority province has overshadowed the different experiences of religious communities that were minorities in some areas but majorities in others. Bengal is an obvious case in point. With Muslims in a political majority, it was more than apparent that the interests of the Indian Muslims did not 'pour neatly into all-India communal moulds'.92 Correctives to such historiography have, of course, emerged in recent years. Historians have recognised the problems inherent in secular nationalism, the most important of which being its inability to solve the problem of minority representation. While Pandey is critical of the nationalists' exclusion of problems like communalism from the realm of their politics and thereby narrowing the political domain,93 Chatterjee points out that 'the formal institutions of the state based on an undifferentiated concept of citizenship' did not allow for separate representation of minorities'.94 The creation of a national identity that decried the existence of differentiated groups based on religion, region or language has been criticised by Saxena, who emphasises the need to study the phenomenon of communalism 'from a less value loaded perspective'.95 Therein lies the key. The overarching and loaded term 'communalism' has led to a historiographical bias towards a 'statist variety of secular historiography' that has condemned any recourse to religion in nationalist thought and practice as 'communalism'.96 This need to reassess communalism has been best expressed by Jalal who criticises 'the largely arbitrary, derogatory and exclusionary nature of the term "communal" as it has been applied to individuals and political groupings claiming to represent the interests of Indian

92 Ayeshajalal, 'Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia', in Sugata Bose and Ayeshajalal (eds), Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, Delhi, India, p. 89. 93 Pandey points out that 'pure nationalists' were not concerned with the primordial pulls of the religious community, and in fact defined nationalism in opposition to what they termed communalism. Pandey, Construction of Communalism, p. 254. 94 Partha Chatterjee, 'History and the Nationalisation of Hinduism', in Vasudha Dalmia and Heinrich von Stietencorn (eds), Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity, Delhi, India, 1995, p. 126. 95 N.C. Saxena, 'Historiography of Communalism in India', in Hasan (ed), Communal and Pan Islamic Trends, pp. 303-06. 96 Sugata Bose, 'Between Monolith and Fragment: A Note on the Historiography of Nationalism in Bengal', in Bandhyopadhyay (ed), Bengal, p. 284.

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Muslims'.97 Most recently, Chitralekha Zutshi and Mridu Rai's works have highlighted the complex and changing relationship between religious and regional identity in Kashmir.98 In keeping with this new strand of historiography, this article has tried to contribute further to problematising 'communalism' by disentangling some of its dimensions from a local perspective. In rescuing Muslim politics from essentialisation within the League narrative, revisionists like Jalal have tended to project a secularised image of provincial politicians. Jalal has demonstrated the 'extent to which the provincial dynamic countered the process of "communalising" Muslim politics'.99 She, along with Pandey, emphasises the 'secular' nature of Bengali politicians.100 This study has shown that while provincial politics challenged communal ideology as epitomised by the League, it did not secularise regional identity politics. Without any doubt, provincial politics operated at various levels. But it sought to reconcile the multiple layers that it represented. It is thus incorrect to assume that provincial leaders de-communalised politics and facilitated the spread of secular ideals. Politicians like Huq did in fact take up very real Muslim causes and appealed to religious sentiment. What separated Huq from the exclusive communalism of the League was his identification with the religious community that nevertheless allowed for a regional particularity to prevail in spite of the existence of genuine communal solidarity. It was a strong sense of regional identity that situated Huq's 'communal' politics within a political discourse that did not ideologically prevent him from making cross-communal regional alliances. The Huq-Mookerjee alliance, which Broomfield has claimed to be the 'most startling event

97 Ayeshajalal, 'Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia', in Sugata Bose and Ayeshajalal (eds), Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, Delhi, India, p. 79. Other historians like Bipin Chandra have recognised that the use of religion is not communalism, though it creates an opening for communalism, Chandra, 'Communalism and the National Movement', in Hasan (ed), Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends, p. 194. 98 See Chitralekha Zutshi, Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity and the Making of Kashmir, Delhi, India, 2004; and Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir, Princeton, NJ, 2004. 99 Ayeshajalal, 'Exploding Communalism: The Politics of Muslim Identity in South Asia', in Sugata Bose and Ayeshajalal (eds), Nationalism, Democracy and Development State and Politics in India, Delhi, India, p. 89. 100 According to Pandey, the thrust towards a modernist, secular nationalism separated from its communitarian moorings gathered pace in Bengal during the Swadeshi period, which inaugurated the nationalist search for unity on a higher place. Pandey, Construction of Communalism, p. 232, footnote 52.

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in modern Indian political history','0' can only be understood when one situates Huq's religiosity within a provincial narrative that was not secular, even when in a cross-communal alliance. Huq stood out for his ability to reconcile the communal with the secular. For him the two were not in binary opposition to one another; rather they facilitated a dual level of identity formation that was something particular to Bengal. As Roy has pointed out, there emerged in Bengal two interminably contending elements in the formation of Bengali Muslim identity--regional and religious. What he has termed the 'syncretistic tradition' was the convergence of these two identities that resolved a potentially disruptive polarity.'02 Although Huq was not religiously syncretic, his identity politics did emerge from this syncretistic tradition. He forged a political identity out of his Bengali heritage by combining secular and religious ideals in his politics and preventing, for a while, a polarisation that would jeopardise regional solidarity. The Huq-Mookerjee alliance was a construction by a community that chose to identify a sub-group that was regional, not communal, but not secular-nationalist either. It thus brings into question the notion that communalism in Bengal was a derogatory, exclusionary construct that brought about the division of the province. Limitations of space have made it beyond the scope of this article to study the run-up to partition and the subsequent emergence of Bangladesh. Moreover, given the type of primary sources used, there is an obvious methodological bias in this study as it has concentrated on high politics. It has not been possible to study the actual impact of Huq's identity politics in popular terms, and the question left unanswered is how acceptable this third alternative was to the Muslims of Bengal. Without any doubt, by 1945 Huq was no longer considered a political leader of any significance. More importantly, all-India factors swept provincial politics away in the high tide of the transfer of power. In retrospect, however, moving beyond 1947, one sees certain continuities in identity politics in East Bengal that were marginalised by the events accompanying the partition of India. The same type of identity politics that had dominated Bengal in the early 1940S emerged in East Pakistan after partition. Huq had resisted Jinnah's

101 J.H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal, 1968, p. 297 102 Asim Roy, 'Being and Becoming a Muslim: A Historiographie Perspective on the Search for Muslim Identity', in Sekhar Bandhyopadhyay (ed), Bengal: Rethinking History, Essays in Historiography, Delhi, India, 2001, pp. 180-89.

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Acknowledgements Many thanks to William Gould, Raj Chandavarkar and Justin Jones for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of the article, and to Sugata Bose for his guidance and support.

Bibliography Primary Sources Private Papers

India Office Library, London. Governor's Secretariat, Bengal. MSS Eur E 341/46. Casey Diaries. Personal Diary, R.G. Casey, Vols I-IV. Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge. Linlithgow Collection: Correspondence with the Governor of Bengal and his Secretary. MSS Eur F 125/41. MSS Eur F 125/42.

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Governor of Bengal Reports, India Office Library, London. L/P&J/5/148. L/P&J/5/151. L/P&J/5/154. L/P&J/8/651. L/P&J/8/652. L/P&J/8/653. L/P&J/8/655.

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