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Rachel T. Howes

The Qadi, the Wazir and the Da‘i: Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz in the Eleventh Century

Shiraz’s importance as a Buyid political capitol during the late Buyid period has been mentioned but not thoroughly analyzed. This article attempts to understand Shirazi politics under the late Buyid Abu Kalijar (r. 415/1024 to 440AH/1048CE) by tracing the careers of three prominent figures in his court: the Ismaili propagandist Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al-Shirazi, the Sunni Qadi Abdallah al-Fazari, and Abu Kalijar’s Wazir Bahram ibn Mafanna al-‘Adil. Using material from a variety of different narrative sources, it becomes clear that all three individuals used their understanding of court politics and their connections to one or more factions, preferably military factions, to gain sufficient intimacy with King Abu Kalijar to present their own point of view and to exclude other individuals from doing the same. Abu Kalijar was able to maintain sufficient contact with a variety of different factions to prevent the kind of factional warfare that was evident in Baghdad in the same period. By tracing the political strategies of these three men, the article sketches the structure of Shirazi politics and highlights the inclusiveness of Abu Kalijar’s court and its relative stability compared to the Baghdad court of the same period.

Shiraz has little to teach of the art of wise, just and stable government; it has bequeathed us no pattern of prosperous politics, no blueprint for a better society. Its legacy is in no way material, but rather exclusively spiritual and artistic; and have we the right to say that it is less precious on that account?1

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 In one of the few monographs in English on the history of the city of Shiraz, A. J. Arberry, the distinguished scholar of Arabic and Persian literature, downplays the political history of Shiraz and builds up its artistic and religious legacy. Arberry’s focus on the cultural legacy of the city is important, and Shiraz’s impact on literature and religion is undeniable. However, Shiraz also had political importance. In the Buyid period, at least, Shiraz was in fact a major center of political activity. It was one of the three most important Buyid cities along with Rayy and Baghdad. Most

Rachel T. Howes is Associate Professor, Department of History, California State University, Northridge, USA.

1Arthur J. Arberry, Shiraz: Persian City of Saints and Poets (Norman, OK, 1960), vii.

ISSN 0021-0862 print/ISSN 1475-4819 online/11/060875–20 ©2011 The International Society for Iranian Studies http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00210862.2011.570526 876 Howes

of the major Buyid princes, including ‘Adud al-Dawla and Baha’ al-Dawla, made Shiraz their capital at one time or another, and less famous Buyids such as Abu Kalijar spent most of their time there. This article will examine Shirazi politics under the Buyid King Abu Kalijar who ruled Shiraz from 415/1024 to 440AH/ 1048CE in order to examine the way in which politics in the Buyid period outside of Baghdad worked. While Shirazi politics in the mid-eleventh century may well bear out Arberry’s assertion that Shirazi government was not wise, just or stable, it should certainly serve to help us understand how government that was less than perfect actually functioned. Arberry’s choice not to focus on Shirazi politics is representative of scholarship on Buyid-era Shiraz and Iran in general. Most studies on the Buyids have focused on Baghdad. These same studies acknowledge that the Buyids had more than one capital city, but, having said that, they usually move on to focus on Baghdad.2 There are only a few studies on other cities or other regimes in the region.3 In addition to limiting their attention to Baghdad, most studies on the Buyids deal only cursorily, if at all, with the period after the death of Baha’ al-Dawla in 403/1012, and the few studies that there are on Iran in the eleventh century focus only on the period after the

2The most important study of the Buyids is still Heribert Busse, Chalif und Grosskönig Die Buyuden im Iraq (945–1055) (Beirut and Wiesbaden, 1969); more recent studies include John Donohue, The Buwayhid Dynasty in Iraq 334 H./945 to 403 H./1012: Shaping Institutions for the Future (Leiden, 2003); Mustafa Tawati, al-Muthaqqafun wa-al-sultah fi al-hadarah al-‘Arabiyah: al-dawlah al-Buway- hiyah namudhajan, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 2004); Older studies include M. Kabir The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad 334/976–447/1055 (Calcutta, 1964); V. Minorsky, La domination des Dailamites (Paris, 1932). There are a number of other studies that deal with Buyid era Baghdad see Eric Hanne, Putting the Caliph in his Place: Power, Authority, and the Late Abbasid Caliphate (Madison, NJ, 2007); Joel Kraemer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age (Leiden, 1992); Roy P. Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society, 2nd ed. (New York, 2001); Georges Makdisi, Ibn Aqil et la résurgence de l’Islam: Traditionaliste au XIe siècle (Ve siècle de l’hegire) (Damascus and Beirut, 1963). Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 3There are two studies of the Buyids in Iran: Hasa Munaymanah, Ta’rikh al-dawlah al-Buwayhiyah: al-siyasi wa-al-iqtisadi wa-al-ijtima‘I wa-al-thaqafi: muqata’ al Faris 334–447 H, 945–1055 M (Beirut, 1987); and Heribert Busse, “Iran under the Buyids,” in Cambridge History of Iran, vol. IV The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Seljuks (Cambridge, 1975), 298–301; a new article by Elizabeth R. Alexandrin deals specifically with Abu Kalijar and his relationship to Ismailis, “Studying Ismaili Texts in 11th Century Shiraz: al-Mu’ayyad and the ‘Conversion’ of the Buyid Amir Abu Kalijar,” Iranian Studies, 44, no. 1 (2011), 99–115. In terms of other regimes in the area the most comprehensive work are the two volumes by C. E. Bosworth on the Ghaznavids, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran (Edinburgh, 1963) and The later Ghaznavids: Splendour and Decay: The Dynasty in Afghanistan and Northern India, 1040–1186 (New York, 1977); V. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasions, 3rd ed. (London, 1977). On the Hamdanids Marius Canard, Histoire de la Dynastie des Hamdanides de Jazira et de Syrie, Publications de la Faculte? des lettres d’Alger, vol. 2 (Algiers, 1951); on the Mazyadids see Georges Makdisi, “Notes on Hilla and the Mazyadids in Medieval Islam,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, lxxvi (1954): 119–33. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 877

Seljuk conquest of Baghdad.4 Likewise, studies on other regimes focus on the tenth rather than the eleventh century. There is no doubt that the source material for Baghdad, especially in the tenth century, is much richer than for the other Buyid courts, but there are enough sources that deal with Shiraz to allow us a glimpse into its political workings in a pivotal period. Through this usually scattered material, we can pick out the outlines of this court and its workings, and focusing on a court other than Baghdad leads to a better understanding of how politics and administration worked in this crucial period. Within Shiraz under the Buyid King Abu Kalijar there was a delicate balance between individuals of different religious and ethnic backgrounds and the Buyid state. The position of Shiraz relative to other Buyid principalities and non-Buyid states such as Fatimid Egypt and Ghaznavid Central Asia made the political balance that much more precarious. The Buyids had come to power in 334/945 under three brothers who took control of the Caspian provinces of Iran, Fars, and eventually Baghdad. The head of the Buyid household, however, remained at Shiraz. What developed was a loose family confed- eration with major heads at Shiraz, Baghdad and Rayy, and with minor capitals at Kerman and Wasit. The period of Buyid glory was really the late tenth century when the formidable Sultan ‘Adud al-Dawla (367–72/978–83) was able to dominate his relatives and force them to support him. However, after his death, this coalition was never again as unified, although Abu Kalijar’s grandfather, Baha’ al-Dawla, had made a credible attempt. By the period we are discussing the family was really more a collection of related kingdoms in shifting conflict and alliance with each other rather than a unified coalition. Abu Kalijar ruled in Fars 415–40/1024–48 and in Iraq 435–40/1044–48. In addition to Shiraz, he came to control most of Fars and Khuzistan, including the major cities of Kerman, Wasit and Ahvaz. Abu Kalijar’s reign, and indeed the history of the entire Buyid clan, was marked by internecine strife. He spent most of his time struggling with his uncles, the sons of Baha’ al-Dawla. He was first in conflict with Abu al-Fawaris for control of Fars and Kirman and eventually with Jalal al-Dawla for control over Basra, Wasit and Baghdad. This warfare was encouraged and exacer- bated by the armies of the Buyid princes, particularly that of Baghdad, who played the

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 princes off against one another to achieve their own ends. The two main groups within the Buyid armies, the Daylamis and the Turks, engaged in an ongoing ethnic rivalry. These army rivalries often became entangled in the religious and ethnic warfare that erupted periodically in the cities of the Buyid empire.5 After

4The exceptions are Harold Bowen, “The Last Buyids.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1929): 76–90; Busse, Chalif und Grosskönig; Hanne, Putting the Caliph in his Place; and Munaymanah, Ta’rikh al-dawlah al-Buwayhiyah; for Iran after the Seljuks see Ann Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th–14th Century, vol. 2, Columbia Lectures on Iranian Studies, (Albany, NY, 1988). 5C. E. Bosworth, "Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq," Oriens,18–19 (1965– 66): 143–67, gives a detailed discussion of the multi-ethnic military of the Buyids; see pp. 153–59 for a discussion of Daylami–Turkish rivalry under earlier Buyids. 878 Howes

the death of Jalal al-Dawla and his establishment as head of the family, Abu Kalijar made an attempt to return to the days of ‘Adud al-Dawla. However, the internecine warfare had allowed first the Ghaznavids and then the Seljuks to encroach upon Buyid territory. Most of the four years that Abu Kalijar was in undisputed control of the Buyid holdings were spent fending off Seljuk attacks. His death in 440/1048 reignited inter-Buyid warfare and allowed the Seljuks to strike the Buyids a death blow. This insecure situation meant that individuals themselves had more power to command space for their own interests. One passage from a work by an Isma‘ili Shi‘i propagandist can serve to illustrate some of the issues involved in the politics of Buyid Shiraz. Around the year 435AH/1043–44CE, the Abbasid Wazir, Ibn al-Muslima, came to Shiraz to persuade the Fatimid propagandist al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al-Shirazi to consider changing his allegiance from the Fatimid Caliph to the Abbasids.6 According to al-Mu’ayyad, the line of argument with which Ibn al-Muslima tried to persuade him was as follows:

He stated: The account of your superiority of personality, knowledge, and compo- sure is beyond doubt. However, you yourself appear in broad daylight knowingly fighting and pursuing [the Turks] with diligence in your hostility. You fight with the [Abbasid] Caliph on behalf of people in Egypt who cannot hurt you and who are of no use to you. It is not a reasonable path and not appropriate for a reasonable and understanding heart like [yours]. It is proper that you give up this opinion and turn away from it, so that I can write to the Caliph’s council about your case, conciliate [the Caliph], and ask for his letter to the court of the King [Abu Kalijar] which will put your affairs in order and return to you to your place in his close circle and his service.7

Al-Mu’ayyad replied to this:

You are thanked for this concern. However, the matter that I face calls me to profess [belief in God], and belief in Him acquires the satisfaction of God. My belief is not [just] in this man who is in Egypt. You said in your letter that he does not harm me and does not help me, as you believe. I do not because of that Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 take up the position [you] insist upon. If I were to be killed one thousand times

6Ibn al-Balkhi, G. le Strange and R. A. Nicholson, ed. and trans., The Farsnama of Ibnu’l-Balkhi, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, new series no. 1 (London, 1962), 119; Abu al-‘Abbas Ahmad Abi al-Khayr Zarkub Shirazi, Shiraznama (Tehran, 1310–50/1893–31), 35–36; Ibn al-Athir mentions cor- respondence between the army of Baghdad and Abu Kalijar but not specifically ibn al-Muslima or the Caliph. He also mentions that the Caliph sent Qadi Abu al-Hasan ‘Ali Muhammad ibn Habib al-Mawardi to Tughril Bak asking him to make peace with both Abu Kalijar and Jalal al-Dawla, so it is reasonable to assume that a messenger might also have been sent to Abu Kalijar to inform him of this as well; ‘Izz al-Din ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil fi al-Ta’rikh, vol. 9 (Beirut, 1966), 516–517, 522. 7Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al-Shirazi, Mudhakkirat Da‘i al-Du‘at al-Dawlah al-Fatimiyah (Beirut, 1983), 91. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 879

and there were no advantage for me in the service of the King then [the Fatimid Imams] would direct my heart to return to that benefit.8

In the passage above, al-Mu’ayyad was dangerous enough to warrant the attention of a person as important as the Wazir of the Abbasid Caliph. So what one man believed must have been of intense interest, even though it was, in theory at least, poss- ible to change that belief from unacceptable to acceptable simply by a word from Ibn al-Muslima to the Caliph. The above passage thus reveals the situation in the Buyid court with regard to the many individuals like al-Mu’ayyad who held religious beliefs that deviated from the pro-Abbasid norm. While the Buyids were at least nominally twelver Shi‘i, they were not in a position to dispense with the Abbasid Caliphate. Therefore, they could not and would not wholeheartedly support an Isma‘ili Shi‘i such as al-Mu’ayyad who represented the Fatimid Caliph, and yet they could not dispense with people like him either. The ambiguous attitude of the Buyids meant that al-Mu’ayyad could put his case forward, but it also meant that other individuals could as well. The central question for this paper then is how did individuals and groups in the Buyid court of Shiraz exploit the opportunities afforded by the ambiguity and weak- ness of the Buyid prince Abu Kalijar? How did different individuals and groups attempt to forward their own interests? How did Abu Kalijar attempt to assure his own power and position? In relation to the above example, how did an Isma‘ili pro- pagandist such as al-Mu’ayyad manage to make himself dangerous enough to warrant the attention of individuals such as Ibn al-Muslima? While these questions focus on Shiraz and Abu Kalijar, there is one other question lurking in the background. How does this compare to the situation in Buyid Baghdad and to earlier periods in Buyid history? This essay will examine three individuals that stand out in various accounts of the Buyid court of Shiraz under Abu Kalijar: the above-mentioned Isma‘ili agent al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al-Shirazi, Abu Kalijar’s Wazir al-‘Adil, and a sunni Qadi by the name of ‘Abd Allah. This essay will attempt to trace the careers of these three people and their relationships with Abu Kalijar, each other and other groups in Shiraz. I hope through tracing these three people’s activities in Abu Kalijar’s Shiraz

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 court to show that politics in Shiraz in the early to mid-eleventh century was inclusive rather than exclusive, and, while not a political pattern card, less volatile than Baghdad in the same period. The first and easiest to describe of these three characters is al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al- Shirazi. Al-Mu’ayyad wrote an autobiographical account of his encounter with Abu Kalijar. In it he describes his fleetingly successful attempt to gain access to Abu Kalijar and to sway him to Isma‘ili Shi‘ism and the Fatimid Caliph. This is one of the most engaging accounts of Shiraz in this period that we have available to us.

8Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 92. 880 Howes

Through this work we get a relatively clear account of al-Mu’ayyad’s career in Shiraz and of his attempts to promote himself within the Buyid context. A brief description of al-Mu’ayyad’s story becomes necessary at this point. This account is found in the first part of al-Mu’ayyad’s Mudhakkirat. The focus is on al- Mu’ayyad’s initial attempt to gain access to the Buyid prince with the help of Abu Kalijar’s wazir, Bahram ibn Mafanna, al-‘Adil, sometime in the year 430/1039. He succeeded in gaining Abu Kalijar’s support through a debate with the Qadi ‘Abd Allah. Unfortunately, there were those in court who plotted against him, and even- tually the king distanced himself from al-Mu’ayyad. The final nail in al-Mu’ayyad’s relationship with Abu Kalijar was the death of the Buyid prince of Baghdad, Jalal al-Dawla in 435/1044. Abu Kalijar had ambitions to take over Jalal al-Dawla’s pos- ition, and he could not do this without the help of the Abbasid Caliph. Abu Kalijar thus turned his back on al-Mu’ayyad, a representative of the rival Fatimid Caliph. Al-Mu’ayyad went into exile and ultimately ended up in Cairo in 436–37/ 1045–46.9 Al-Mu’ayyad’s account illustrates several points about the structure of politics in Shiraz. The first question that we need to ask is how al-Mu’ayyad was in a position to become influential in court in the first place. There is little or no discussion of his background in his autobiography or in any other source. There is one brief mention in the autobiography of his father’s connection to the previous Buyid wazir. He states that his father was not as closely connected to the Buyid king as he himself is.10 We can take this to mean that al-Mu’ayyad came from a family that went back at least a generation in Shiraz and had connections to the Buyid court, but were not intimates of Abu Kalijar’s predecessor. Other sources state that his father was chief Da‘i in Shiraz, and there are also some hints of Isma‘ilis in Shiraz at an earlier date as well.11 So we can surmise that al-Mu’ayyad emerged from a family with some political connections to the Buyid state and also connections to a pre-existing Isma‘ili community.

9For a more complete discussion of al-Mu’ayyad’s life and works see Verena Klemm, Memoirs of a Mission: The Ismaili Scholar, Statesman, and Poet al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al-Shirazi (New York, 2003); Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 idem, Die Mission des Fatimidschen Agenten al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din in Shiraz (Frankfurt, 1989). For al-Mu’ayyad’s life through his poetry, Tahera Qutbuddin, al-Mu’ayyad al-Shirazi and Fatimid Da`wa Poetry: A Case of Commitment in Classical Arabic Literature (Boston, 2005); for a different discussion of the section of al-Mu’ayyad’s life described here see Alexandrin, “Studying Ismaili Texts.” 10Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat,32–33. 11Klemm, Memoirs of a Mission,2–3, n. 2; Bazat-Tahera Qutbuddin, “Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din al-Shir- azi: Founder of a New Tradition of Fatimid Da‘wa Poetry” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1999), 20– 23. Qutb al-Din also points out that al-Mu’ayyad was appointed Da‘i himself before 427/1035; Ibn Sina, The Life of Ibn Sina: A Critical Edition and Translation, trans. by William E. Gohlman (Albany, NY, 1974), 77 . A copy of Ibn Sina’s major philosophical work the Kitab al-Najat arrived in Shiraz and a number of learned men studied it according to Ibn Sina: “The Qadi of Shiraz was one of this group of people, so he sent the quire to Abu al-Qasim al-Kirmani, a friend of Ibrahim ibn Baba al-Daylami a devotee of the esoteric interpretation, and he added it to a letter to Shaykh Abu al-Qasim … Shaykh Abu al-Qasim came to the master’s house and presented the letter and the quire to him.” Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 881

Perhaps the most prominent feature of al-Mu’ayyad’s participation in Abu Kalijar’s court is that he had connections to the Daylamis. Throughout his own account he presents himself as the spiritual guide of the Daylamis of Shiraz. In his account, also, al-Mu’ayyad’s supporters, including the Wazir al-‘Adil and the King Abu Kalijar, and his opponents, such as the Qadi ‘Abd Allah, see him as having an influence over these troops. From the very beginning of this account al-Mu’ayyad’s influence over the Daylamis is the key factor in his ability to manipulate events. A fracas over the breaking of the Ramadan fast led the Wazir to attempt to convince al-Mu’ayyad to leave Shiraz. Al-Mu’ayyad agreed, but warned the Wazir that, “There is no doubt that [the Daylamis], when they know my plan clearly, will clamor, shout, rise up, and renounce my plan.”12 Al-Mu’ayyad’s prediction turned out to be true, and a compro- mise was made in which al-Mu’ayyad went a few miles away to the heavily Daylami town of Fasa with an escort of Daylamis in 429/1038.13 Al-Mu’ayyad was not beloved by all Daylamis; those in Fasa did not want him.14 However, the Shirazis seem to have supported him, and those in al-Ahwaz flocked to his call to prayer when he restored a mosque.15 A year or so later al-Mu’ayyad’s connections again caused concern to various members of the court. According to his account, al-Mu’ayyad succeeded in developing a close connection to Abu Kalijar. This aroused the jealousy of various members of the court including a man who al-Mu’ayyad calls “the heretic” (al-Mariq). The heretic, who had once been an Isma‘ili, accused al-Mu’ayyad of inciting the Daylamis to riot. Abu Kalijar sent a letter warning al-Mu’ayyad to keep them from exploding and suggested that he himself should retire; al-Mu’ayyad rejected this suggestion.16 It is also clear that al-Mu’ayyad in turn represented or at least claimed to represent Daylami interests to procure his own ends. Immediately upon his return from Fasa he met with the Daylamis who were companions and soldiers to the Sultan. He told them he thought it was wrong that the king should turn away the representatives of Daylamis because:

Verily the state is Daylami, the sultan is Daylami, and his entourage is entirely Daylami. God [al-Qiyama] guards me from fear and dread since the whole kingdom is surrounded by peace and guarded by justice … If I were in the state 17 Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 of Mahmud ibn Sabuktegin, this [security] would not be mine. For the Daylamis’

12Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 26. 13Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat,29–30; Basa or Fasa was a town with a large Daylami popu- lation. Busse, Cambridge History of Iran, 282; Bosworth states from Miskawaih that Fasa was where many Daylami troops had their iqtas; Bosworth, "Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq," 153. Ibn al-Athir states that al-Basasiri, a Turkish mamluk who occupied Baghdad in the name of the Fatimids in 450/1058, was connected to Fasa through his first master, ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 650. 14Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 29. 15Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 79. 16Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 86. 17This is Abu al-Qasim Mahmud ibn Nasir al-Dawla ibn Mansur Sabuktegin, often known as Mahmud of Ghazna, who controlled Khurasan and Central Asia from 388/998 to 421/1030, who is 882 Howes

principles [of state] all but require of you to form a community that is unique in guarding me from his [Mahmud ibn Sabuktegin’s] tyranny, drawing [the state] nearer to God and to the people of the house of the prophet, blessings and peace of God upon him.18

The point that al-Mu’ayyad stresses here is that the Daylamis are the backbone of the Buyid state and that their principles are Shi‘i at base. Thus they should protect their representative, al-Mu’ayyad, and make sure that he has direct access to Abu Kalijar. The Daylamis were unable to procure an audience for Al-Mu’ayyad, and he had to resort to other tactics to gain access to Abu Kalijar. Whether or not this was a manipulation, Al-Mu’ayyad indicates that the Daylamis saw him as their leader. An attempt to put Al-Mu’ayyad under house arrest in 433/ 1042 caused a riot among the Daylamis. When he was housebound for some months, there was a constant stream of Daylami visitors checking on his welfare.19 The few sources that mention Al-Mu’ayyad in Shiraz also mention the Daylamis in connection with events surrounding him. The one specific confirmation of al- Mu’ayyad’s account is in the Farsnama of the Persian geographer Ibn al-Balkhi.20 He does not specifically mention Al-Mu’ayyad by name, but he does mention Abu Nasr ibn ‘Imran, a very close approximation of al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din Hibat Allah ibn Abi ‘Imran Musa al-Shirazi. Ibn al-Balkhi says of this man, whom I take to be al-Mu’ayyad, that he was able to build his influence over the Daylamis and to get close to Abu Kalijar. Other Persian and Arabic sources for Shiraz do not mention Al-Mu’ayyad by name, but it is very clear in Ibn al-Athir’s account of the years 415–40/1024–48 how trou- blesome the Daylamis were for Abu Kalijar.21 A later Persian text concerned solely with Shiraz, the Shiraznama by Zarkub, while writing the Isma‘ilis out of the court circles of Persia, shows Abu Kalijar fighting with the Isma‘ilis and driving them out of Fars in cooperation with Mas‘ud b. Mahmud of Ghazna.22 These sources,

generally seen as a militant Sunni. On the Ghaznavids, see C. E. Bosworth, “Mahmud ibn Sabüktegin,” Encylopaedia of Islam, second edition. Mahmud himself had been dead for at least seven years when these event took place, and his son Mas‘ud was the ruler of the Ghazanavid state. Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 18Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat,30–31; see Bosworth’s comments on the importance of the Daylamis for the Buyids; Bosworth, "Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq," 154–56. 19Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 89, 26. 20Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 117–21. The author, whose full name is unknown, was writing in the time of the Seljuk Sultan Muhammad Tapar b. Malik Shah, Abu Shuja’ Ghiyath al-Dunya wa al-Din (498–511/1104–17). From the text it appears that his grandfather was a tax accountant in Fars in about 492/1098. See the introduction to the Persian text, x–xi. The geographical part has been translated G. Le Strange. “Description of the Province of Fars, in Persia, at the beginning of the Twelfth Century AD,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1912): 1–30, 311–39, 865–89. 21Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 335–552 passim. 22Zarkub, Shiraznama, 36. Zarkub died in 834/1431, and his account is clearly much more concerned with the later periods. The Buyids are given very short, although glowing, shrift. Zarkub follows Nizam al-Mulk in describing the Isma‘ilis as following a Zoroastrian heresy. Nizam al-Mulk, The Book of Government: or Rules for Kings: the Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk, 2nd ed., trans. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 883

without mentioning al-Mu’ayyad, make clear reference to the importance of both the Daylamis and Isma‘ilis like al-Mu’ayyad. It is reasonable to assume that al-Mu’ayyad’s connections to the Daylamis allowed him to access political circles in a way that his father was never able to do. The third aspect of al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din’s career in Shiraz that provokes notice is that his Isma‘ili ideology was to some extent tolerated, as long as he was at a distance from King Abu Kalijar. Once al-Mu’ayyad became an intimate of Abu Kalijar in 430/ 1039, he was the target of a great deal of court maneuvering.23 According to al-Mu’ayyad, Abu Kalijar accepted Isma‘ilism after hearing al-Mu’ayyad in a debate with the Qadi ‘Abd Allah. The King’s acceptance of the Isma‘ili doctrine allowed Al-Mu’ayyad to have greater access to him. He was allowed to have weekly private con- versations on Thursday evenings with Abu Kalijar concerning Isma‘ili doctrine. According to al-Mu’ayyad, he and Abu Kalijar developed a very close relationship. The King listened to Al-Mu’ayyad and believed him over others to such an extent that the King said to his wazir:

Verily we are companions, and whenever we find people participating in the slander of a man and tying him to unbelief and error, we incur no censure if we tell them the truth and submit it to them. We thank God who warned us away from this negligent path, and turned us upon our heels [away] from specious argument. [We thank God that] he formed in our souls [the thought] that [such] people are liars and windbags.24

This indicates the degree of closeness which al-Mu’ayyad claimed to enjoy with the King. He was defending al-Mu’ayyad from the slanders of other courtiers. According to al-Mu’ayyad, his very intimacy with Abu Kalijar became part and parcel of his downfall. Al-Mu’ayyad’s initial success with Abu Kalijar was greeted with envy and enmity from all sides. It brought him a host of new enemies. The courtiers were worried

by Hubert Darke (Boston, 1978), 166. However, Zarkub’s text has serious problems. It confuses Abu Kalijar with his grandfather Samsam al-Dawla, who lived about thirty years earlier and who bore the Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 same given name. This Abu Kalijar is described as being contemporary to Mas`ud ibn Mahmud and as building the walls around Shiraz, but another man by the name of ‘Izz al-Mulk (one of our Abu Kali- jar’s titles) is described as fighting Jalal al-Dawla and as having al-‘Adil as his wazir. It is also not clear at all whether the Isma‘ilis discussed here are Isma‘ilis in the Shi‘i sense or the members of a Kurdish tribe who are descendants from one Isma‘il. The author certainly accuses these people of heresy in such a way as to indicate that they are in fact Shi‘i, but the usual medieval word for this sect is Batini rather than Isma‘ili. The first part of the text is dedicated to a history of the Kurdish tribes of Shabankara, one of which is made up of the descendants of one Isma‘il. In any case this text, although it seems to have some light to shed on later period in Persian history, should be used with extreme caution for our period. On earlier connections between the Ismailis and Daylamis see Bosworth, “Military Organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq,” 147. 23For a slightly different interpretation of the reaction to Abu Kalijar’s close relationship with al- Mu’ayyad, see Alexandrin, “Studying Ismaili Texts,” 3. 24Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 69. 884 Howes

that al-Mu’ayyad would usurp their positions and undermine their influence. The leader of the opposition to al-Mu’ayyad was the courtier al-Mu’ayyad refers to as the heretic. According to al-Mu’ayyad, he did not believe in any religion: “Among them was one who was devoid of religion. [He was] a disgrace to imperfection and completely steeped in fraud, corruption, and treachery. This man was one of those who participate in a prayer which is not God’s and not that of a true religion.”25 This man proceeded to attempt to poison the King against al-Mu’ayyad. While some courtiers tried to poison the King’s mind, al-Mu’ayyad also describes attempts to sway him to other causes than the Isma‘ili one which was his main concern. We saw the attempt by Ibn al-Muslima to turn al-Mu’ayyad towards the Abbasid Caliph earlier in this essay. Ibn al-Muslima was not working to remove al- Mu’ayyad, just to make him their client. Al-Mu’ayyad also worried in his account about imposters and people who were deceptive.26 This suggests that there were people who were being friendly to al-Mu’ayyad in order to further their own ends. So, just as al-Mu’ayyad worked to make himself a client first of the Wazir al-‘Adil and then of Abu Kalijar himself, others were trying to do the same to him. Eventually, a series of plots hatched by al-Mu’ayyad’s enemies including, among others, the Qadi ‘Abd Allah, the heretic, a Zaydi Shi‘i of some renown, a former Isma‘ili, the Wazir al-Fasawi (al-‘Adil died earlier in 433/1041–42), and the Abbasid Wazir, Ibn al-Muslima, weakened his position at court, and he was forced into exile later in 433/1042.27 An example of these plots is one that was hatched by the abovementioned Abbasid Wazir Ibn al-Muslima and al-Mu’ayyad’s enemies in court, including “the heretic,” wherein al-Mu’ayyad was accused of stealing a book that refuted the Fatimid lineage and their claims to leadership of the Muslim community. He was told that he must return it to the King, or else he and the man who was supposed to have brought it to him would suffer the punishment for thieves. Al-Mu’ayyad was able to foil this plot. He was able to prove that the book had never left the household of the man to whom it belonged. He had given it to a slave girl for safe-keeping and she eventually spoke up revealing its location.28 The aim of all of the plots that al-Mu’ayyad describes was not really to physically harm him, but to destroy his credibility and his intimacy with Abu Kalijar. Likewise, al-Mu’ayyad tried to do the same to his opponents. For instance, al-Mu’ayyad portrays

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 himself as the face of the masses and his opponents as only concerned about wealth and power. For instance, he describes the Qadi as only concerned about his estates.29 He also describes Abu Kalijar’s companions as dissolute and drunkards.30 Finally, he refers to Abu Kalijar’s companions, especially a eunuch called Sa‘ada, giving him drink to dull his wits.31 As noted above, he describes those who disagree

25Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat. 26Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 71, 78. 27Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat. 28Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 95. 29Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 24. 30Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 69. 31Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 103. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 885

with him as godless. The point here is that direct physical action does not seem to have been the preferred way to remove enemies, probably because that might have provoked retaliation from the Daylamis or perhaps even the King himself. Smearing someone’s reputation was quite effective, as is evidenced by the fact that al-Mu’ayyad was put under house arrest after one of these plots.32 We can begin to answer the questions that were asked at the beginning of this essay. Al-Mu’ayyad gained the ability to put forward his agenda through his connections to the Daylamis in the military and through his intimacy with Abu Kalijar. He used his influence over the Daylamis to get close to Abu Kalijar and then attempted to promote his cause to the King. He also attempted to distance the King from individ- uals who held other points of view. This seems to jibe with the accounts of Isma‘ilis and Daylamis told in sources other than al-Mu’ayyad’s autobiography. However, he lost that influence when Abu Kalijar was persuaded by others that he was a disruptive influence over the Daylamis. Like al-Mu’ayyad, his opponent in his autobiography, the Qadi ‘Abd Allah, is relatively easy to find in the sources for this period in Shiraz. He is described in al-Mu’ayyad’s account and also in Ibn al-Balkhi’s Farsnama. The Qadi’s story is much less complete than al-Mu’ayyad’s; he did not write his own account of events. However, in many ways his story seems to parallel that of al-Mu’ayyad. He, like al-Mu’ayyad, was from a Shirazi family. In ‘Abd Allah’s case, the family was an Arab family from the Banu Fazara tribe, which Ibn al-Balkhi describes as dating to the Arab conquest.33 However, the first name that Ibn al-Balkhi mentions is ‘Abd Allah’s grandfather, Abu Muhammad ‘Abd Allah ibn Ahmad ibn Sulayman ibn Ibrahim ibn Abi Burda al-Fazari, around the time of the Buyid conquest in 322/934. According to Ibn al-Balkhi, this was a family of judges and religious scholars that held official positions in Shiraz and kept Shiraz strictly Sunni.34 The family’s influence continued under the Buyids, and al-Fazari’s five sons were judges and deputy judges in various areas of Fars, and two of them served as messengers to Baghdad and Ghazna. The son who went to Ghazna, Abu al-Hasan, was recruited by Mahmud of Ghazna and stayed there.35 Abu Nasr, ‘Abd Allah’s father, inherited the position of judge of Fars. One Abu Tahir Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allah ibn al-Hu- Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 32Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 87, 93. 33Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 117; Nicholson’s edition calls them the “Bani Faraza” here, but this must be an error, as the man’s name is given as “al-Fazari.” See also Ibn al-Balkhi, Farsnama, ed. by Ali Naqi Bihruzi (Shiraz, 1343/1964), 136, which edition gives Abu Muhammad’s name as “Infaradi” but calls the family “Bani Fazara.” 34Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 117; D. G. Tor, Violent Order: Religious Warfare, Chivalry, and the ‘Ayyar Phenomenon in the Medieval Islamic World (Würzburg, 2007), 44, 52, mentions two Fazaris as part of the mutatawwi‘/‘ayyarun: Abu Ishaq Ibrahim b. Muhammad b. al-Harith b. Uthman b. Usama al-Fazari and his uncle Marwan b. Mu’wiyya al-Fazari. It is unclear whether these Fazaris are related to ‘Abd Allah, although their opposition to Shi‘is and “heretics” appears consistent with Abd Allah’s. If they are, then there is a clear Hanbali connection in the family. 35Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 118; for some of Abu al-Hasan’s activities on behalf of Ghaznavid interests in India see Abu al-Fadl Muhammad ibn Husayn Bayhaqi, ‘Ali A. Fayyad and Q. Ghani, 886 Howes

sayn ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Fazari is given an entry by Junayd al-Shirazi. Junayd mentions him traveling to Iraq and the Hijaz, and Ibn al-Balkhi mentions a Qadi Muhammad from this family going to Iraq, so it is possible that they are one and the same. Junayd also mentions this man as having been Shafi‘i and having died in 492. If this man is related to ‘Abd Allah, it is possible that the family was Shafi‘i also, but there is other- wise no mention of his madhhab.36 The family, though Arab, seems to have cultivated ties to local Persian nobility. Several of the sons were married to daughters of the Mard-Asa family.37 Qadi ‘Abd Allah’s mother was one of these, and Ibn al-Balkhi says that he inherited political as well as religious power from her side of the family. So, like al-Mu’ayyad, the Qadi came from a local family with a history of governmental connections. Qadi ‘Abd Allah’s family would seem to have deeper roots than al-Mu’ayyad’s, but since al-Mu’ayyad’s background is more obscure, that is difficult to determine.38 The second thing that must be mentioned about Qadi ‘Abd Allah is that he, like al-Mu’ayyad, was beholden to a military force, in this case the Turks. In al-Mu’ayyad’s account, the Wazir described the Qadi as egging on the Turkish troops to violence just as al-Mu’ayyad was egging the Daylamis on.39 Ibn al-Balkhi also shows ‘Abd Allah’s connections to the Turks as well. This account mentions the hostility of the Daylamis to ‘Abd Allah and the fact that those who helped exile Al-Mu’ayyad were Turkish cavalry. He states that after ‘Abd Allah had spoken with Abu Kalijar, Abu Kalijar orga- nized one hundred Iranian horsemen and one hundred Turkish horsemen to remove al-Mu’ayyad.40 However, ‘Abd Allah seems to have had ties to other groups beyond the Turkish soldiers. Al-Mu’ayyad portrays the Qadi as whipping up opposition to him,

He said to [the Wazir al-‘Adil] that he was meeting with the storytellers (Qussas) and the people of the mosques, and they said: “He has lost patience with [the infractions] so-and-so, your servant, [al-Mu’ayyad] has committed of spreading innovations and rejecting the Sunna … We will invade his house with extermina- tion, burning, killing, and all the discord we can do.41

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 eds., Tarikh-I Bayhaqi, reprint (Tehran, 1984), 267–68, 400–02, 406, 409, 23, 432–33; Bayhaqi refers to him as Qadi Shiraz Bu al-Hasan. 36Mu‘in al-Din Abu al-Qasim Junayd al-Shirazi, Muhammad Qazwini and ‘Abbas Qabal, eds., Shadd al-’Izar fi Hatt al-Awzar ‘an wazar al-mazar (Tehran, 1328/1910), 358–60. Many Shirazis seem to have been Shafi‘i. See Wilfred Madelung, Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran (Albany, NY, 1988), 27; S. H. Nasr and M. Mutahhari, “The Religious Sciences,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 4: From the Arab Invasions to the Seljuks ed, by R. N. Frye (Cambridge, 1975), 476–477. 37On the Mard-Asa see John W. Limbert, “City Administration in Hafez’s Shiraz,” in Views from the Edge: Studies in Honor of Richard W. Bulliet, ed. by Neguin Yavari, Lawrence G. Potter and Jean-Marc Ran Oppenheim (New York, 2004), 121, 123. 38Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 117. 39Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 23. 40Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 119. 41Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 23. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 887

While this is a singularly violent representation of the Qadi’s actions, it does show that the Qadi was drawing on a larger Sunni religious establishment. Likewise, we see the Qadi connected to Sufis and Zaydis in al-Mu’ayyad’s account.42 In addition to religious figures, we see al-Mu’ayyad connecting the Qadi to the wealthy merchants in the town.43 Al-Mu’ayyad constantly portrays the Qadi as the aggressor. We should perhaps use caution when depending on an account that is as negative as al-Mu’ayyad’s, but the connections that al-Mu’ayyad mentions would certainly explain why the Qadi was as prominent as he was. Like al-Mu’ayyad, intimacy with the King seems to be the key to Qadi ‘Abd Allah’s political power. In Ibn al-Balkhi’s account, ‘Abd Allah, who is certainly the hero of the story for Ibn al-Balkhi, was able get a private audience with Abu Kalijar and convinced him to exile Abu Nasr.44 The sense of court intrigue is also maintained. The Qadi ‘Abd Allah resorted to a trick to get a private audience with Abu Kalijar. Once he got a private audience, he convinced Abu Kalijar to exile al-Mu’ayyad and to issue a proclamation making al-Mu’ayyad’s blood legal if he should return to Fars. In many ways the Qadi uses the same strategies to gain position in Shiraz that al-Mu’ayyad did. He was connected to a military faction, in this case the Turks, and he used that faction to gain an intimate audience with the King. Closeness to the King enabled ‘Abd Allah to oust his enemy, al-Mu’ayyad. The one difference between the two men, and possibly the reason for ‘Abd Allah’s ultimate success, was that ‘Abd Allah had allies in more segments of the community than Al-Mu’ayyad did. His connections to the Sunni and non-Isma‘ili Shi‘i segments of the town, as well as the merchants, seem to have been important. The Wazir Bahram ibn Mafanna al-‘Adil was in a different position than either of the other two characters mentioned here. Some of the details of Al-‘Adil’s life are more transparent that either al-Mu’ayyad’s or Qadi ‘Abd Allah’s. According to Ibn al-Athir and Ibn al-Jawzi, he was born in Kazarun in either 360/970–71 or 366/976–77.45 Al-‘Adil appears in Abu Kalijar’s train in 415/1024–25, along with his predecessor in the wazirate, Abu Muhammad ibn al-Makram.46 Ibn Mafanna was appointed wazir in 416/1025–26 upon the death of Ibn al-Makram. Al-‘Adil remained Abu Kalijar’s wazir until he died in 433/1041–42. He was succeeded by Muhadhdhib al-Dawla Abu Mansur Hibat Allah b. Ahmad al-Fasawi.47

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 Like the two other men discussed in this essay, al- ‘Adil was involved with the mili- tary. However, he served as a military leader rather than as a spiritual guide. Through- out the sources we see al-‘Adil leading troops and fighting battles. For instance, in 421/ 1030 al-‘Adil brought relief troops to Abu Kalijar’s in a battle against Jalal al-Dawla in

42Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 23, 27, 81. 43Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 24, 87. 44Ibn al-Balkhi et al., Farsnama, 119. This is in the section on the Qadis of Fars since the days of Islam. 45Ibn al-‘Athir, Al-Kamil, 9: 360, 502; ‘Abd al-Rahman ibn ‘Ali Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam fi tarikh al-Muluk wal-’Umam, vol. 15 (Beirut, 1992), 282; for Kazarun see G. Le Strange, Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge, 1930), 266–67. 46Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337. 47Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 502. 888 Howes

al-Ahwaz. Abu Kalijar had been severely defeated when Jalal al-Dawla had entered the city with Kurdish, Arab and other troops. They plundered the city and captured Abu Kalijar’s mother, children, Umm Walads and wives. His mother died on the journey to Baghdad. Abu Kalijar fought Jalal al-Dawla and lost 1,000 men. At this point al- ‘Adil showed up with troops and sent Jalal al-Dawla back to Wasit.48 In 429/ 1037–38, we see him at the head of an army again. He and Abu Kalijar intervened in a succession crisis in Oman, and al-‘Adil led an army there.49 He then led the same army back to Basra to take possession of that city in 431/1039–40.50 Al-‘Adil’s position as a wazir with the duties of a general meant that, unlike the Da‘i and the Qadi, his job was to balance the interests of the different factions of the army. So rather than acting as a partisan for any one section of the army, as Al-Mu’ayyad and Qadi ‘Abd Allah did, al-‘Adil spent inordinate amounts of time appeasing both Turks and Daylamis. This is particularly evident in al-Mu’ayyad’s account where he is alternately appeasing al-Mu’ayyad’s Daylami constituents and chastising them.51 Al-Mu’ayyad also shows him alternately dressing down Qadi ‘Abd Allah and the Turks and negotiat- ing with them.52 While Al-Mu’ayyad is almost entirely focused on his own relationships with al-‘Adil, he does mention that the Daylamis have direct contact with the Wazir.53 Al-Mu’ayyad complains in his autobiography that he did not get the same access to the Wazir that others did: There is no mention of a [stipend] for me in the enumeration of your gifts, and there is no friendship for me in any situation on your part. I see all the judges, jurists, ‘ulema, and scribes who crawl and creep, and all the factions among them who have entry into your house meet at your session (majlis) fortunate in your [patronage]. They give a signature to get a livelihood and a stipend. My page is blank of all of these things.54

However, this complaint itself points to the role that al-‘Adil played as a patron and political mediator among both the troops and other important groups in Shirazi society. Another of al-Mu’ayyad’s complaints about the Wazir seems to indicate that he was responsible for balancing the interests of a larger group of people:

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 Things reached a point where they [the Daylamis] were constrained in the exercise of their religion and forbidden from holding fast to their creed, even though the

48Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 376. 49Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 468–469. 50Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 467–468. 51Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat,27–29. 52Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 23, 27; Dwight F. Reynolds et al., “The Autobiography of al- Mu’ayyad fi al-Din Hibat Allah al-Shirazi,” in Interpreting the Self: Autobiography in the Arabic Literary Tradition, ed. by Dwight F. Reynolds (Berkeley, CA, 2001), http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ ft2c6004x0/, 139. 53Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 27; Reynolds et al., “The Autobiography of al-Mu’ayyad fi al- Din Hibat Allah al-Shirazi,” 139. 54Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat,23–24. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 889

Christians and Jews were kept neither from practicing their religion nor from attending their churches and synagogues.55

While this might just be a standard complaint, it does seem to indicate that the Wazir was also responsible for the welfare of the Christians and Jews in Shiraz as well as its Muslim inhabitants. The importance of this balancing act is well-illustrated by the descriptions of the con- flict between Abu al-Fawaris ibn Baha’ al-Dawla, Abu Kalijar’s uncle and Abu Kalijar after the death of his father Sultan al-Dawla in Shiraz in 415/1024.56 Abu al-Fawaris was the lord of Kerman and was favored by the Turks, according to Ibn al-Athir, while the Wazir to the young Abu Kalijar, Abu Muhammad ibn al-Makram, was sup- ported largely by Daylamis.57 Abu Kalijar, his Wazir, and Al-‘Adil were in Fars when Sultan al-Dawla died. They went to Fars to meet Abu al-Fawaris in battle. Abu al- Fawaris demanded that Abu Kalijar, his officials and his soldiers become his tributaries.58 The then Wazir Ibn Makram did not want to do this, but the calmer head of Ibn Maffana prevailed, and they agreed to pay tribute.59 Unfortunately this did not work out well for them; “Ibn Makram procrastinated in delivering money to the soldiers. They expressed doubts about Ibn Makram to Abu al-Fawaris, and he seized Ibn Makram and al-‘Adil ibn Maffana. He killed Ibn Makram and detained Ibn Maffana.”60 The other problem that al-‘Adil and Abu Kalijar faced was that the people of Shiraz hated Abu Kalijar, and they had to spend a great deal of time and energy appeasing them.61 Most of the Daylamis went over to Abu al-Fawaris because Ibn Makram did, but when he took control of Fars and Shiraz in 415/1024, Abu Kalijar wooed what Daylamis were there. He even sent some Daylamis back to Abu al-Fawaris, enjoining them to stay loyal to him. Despite his honesty, this was largely unsuccessful,

55Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 26; Reynolds et al., “The Autobiography of al-Mu’ayyad fi al- Din Hibat Allah al-Shirazi,” 139. 56Sultan al-Dawla Abu Shuja‘ ibn Firuz Baha’ al-Dawla Abu Nasr ibn ‘Adud al-Dawla. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 165. 57Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337. Abu Kalijar cannot have been very old at this point. Although Ibn al- Athir’s date does not quite make sense, his father was only twenty-two when he died in 415/1024. See Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337, and according to Ibn al-Athir’s later obituary Abu Kalijar was 40 years old when Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 he died in 440/1048, see Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 547–548. This would mean that Abu Kalijar was born in 400/1009 when his father was only seven, which seems unlikely. Ibn al-Jawzi gives the date of 399/1008 for Abu Kalijar’s birth in his death notice, Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 317, but he gives Sultan al-Dawla’s age as thirty-two when he died, Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 165, which is young but not impossible. I expect that Ibn al-Athir’s age for Sultan al-Dawla is wrong because twenty-two is easily confused with thirty-two in Hindi numerals. Also given that Abu Kalijar is clearly a player in his own court by the time al-Mu’ayyad’s account begins in 429/1037, fifteen or sixteen sounds better than younger. 58Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337. 59Al-‘Adil says to Ibn Makram “the opinion is that you should exchange your goods and our money until events move forward and he is driven away.” Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337. Ibn Mafana must have been counting on Abu al-Fawaris’ nasty nature to alienate the nobles in short order which it did, see Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 368. 60Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337. 61Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 339. 890 Howes

and he was forced by the Daylamis to leave Shiraz for Nubandajan, giving Abu al- Fawaris room to attack. However, Abu al-Fawaris’ new wazir alienated the people with his taxes. He invited Ibn Mafanna and Sandal to come to Shiraz and eventually fled to Abu Kalijar’s camp taking a large number of Daylamis with him later in 415/ 1029.62 The basis of Abu Kalijar’s rule, then, was a balance between Daylamis and Turks, and this balancing act continued throughout his reign. There is little sense in the sources of the intimacy between al-‘Adil and Abu Kalijar as there is with Al-Mu’ayyad and ‘Abd Allah. There are no descriptions of face to face meetings or personal conversations. However, the connection between the two men is clear in all the sources, even if it is not described. Al-‘Adil’s constituency was Abu Kalijar in the same way that al-Mu’ayyad’s was the Daylamis and ‘Abd Allah’swas the Turks. Thus, he had to find the supporters of whatever stripe that would further Abu Kalijar’s interests and thus his own. In effect this meant balancing a variety of different groups against one another. Al-‘Adil’s position as Abu Kalijar’s advocate also meant balancing a number of differ- ent outside interests. In particular the conflicts with Abu al-Fawaris and Jalal al-Dawla took inordinate time.63 In some cases this meant giving advice that was probably diffi- cult for Abu Kalijar to follow. In 423/1032 al-‘Adil advised Abu Kalijar not to heed the calls of the Turks of Baghdad to come to them until they came to his court.64 This was a wise decision since these same Turks almost immediately turned back to Jalal al-Dawla. Like his conflicts with his relatives, the conflict between Abu Kalijar and the Ghazna- vids also required attention. This meant leading troops, as well as giving sage advice. In 422/1031 Abu Kalijar sent al-‘Adil to Kerman with a force of heavy troops including Daylamis to fend off an attack by Mas‘ud ibn Mahmud of Ghazna. They succeeded and chased the Khurasani troops back to Khurasan.65 In addition to larger conflicts there were smaller issues to deal with. In 429/1037– 38 al-‘Adil and Abu Kalijar got word of a succession crisis in Oman. Al-‘Adil was vehe- ment in opposing the Wazir Ibn Hattal who had engineered the deaths of two of the sons of Abu al-Qasim ibn Makram, the previous ruler, in order to control the affairs of the kingdom through a younger son, Abu Muhammad. They supported a deputy of Abu al-Qasim, al-Murtada. Al-‘Adil eventually intervened personally to guarantee Abu Muhammad’s succession without Ibn Hattal’s interference.66 Here we see

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 al-‘Adil acting as both counselor and general. After al-‘Adil’s death, the Seljuks became Abu Kalijar’s main concern, and Abu Kalijar’s relatively successful negotiations with them may be due to learning at al- ‘Adil’s knee. Abu Kalijar, recognizing his inability to defeat them, was able to negotiate a truce which he solidified through marriage ties in 439/1048–49. This allowed him

62Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 338–39. 63For flare ups of this conflict see Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 374–76, 403. 64Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 423; Ibn al-Jawzi relates more or less the same story although he gives al-‘Adil’s name as Abu Mansur ibn Fina, Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 224–25. 65Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 414. 66Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 468–69. Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 891

to keep control of his territories and to consolidate control over Iraq and most of Iran through the sacrifice of Rayy. His successors were not able to manage even that much.67 The key to al-‘Adil’s successful balancing act seems to have been his charm and honesty. Almost all the sources have something nice to say. Al-Mu’ayyad, for instance, had a good relationship with al-‘Adil. He describes him as “of consum- mate reason, superior in his graces, piousinallhisattitudes,well-manneredin hisconductandactions.”68 He seems to have supported Al-Mu’ayyad despite opposition to Al-Mu’ayyad among other courtiers. Ibn al-Athir credits al-‘Adil with having a good way of behaving and of building a 7,000 volume library in Fayr- uzabadh, while Ibn al-Jawzi says he was excellent and left a 19,000 volume library including 4,000 papers in the script of the Banu Muqla.69 There is one dissenting voice; in Zarkub’s Shiraznama there is mention of a charge of heresy against al- ‘Adil.70 This almost unanimous chorus of praise is in contrast to the comments on other wazirs for Abu Kalijar and others. We have already seen negative comments about the Wazir al-Fasawi and Ibn al-Fawaris’ unnamed wazir. We have also seen Abu Kalijar restraining the impulses of Ibn Makram, his first wazir. Another one of Abu Kalijar’s wazirs, Muhammad b. Babashadh, had stirred up the people of al-Batiha by acting unjustly and confiscating property.71 Likewise, the Eunuch Sandal, who was Abu Kalijar’s wazir prior to Ibn Makram, comes in for some criticism.72 There are numerous other examples, but al-‘Adil was well-liked. In looking at three figures in Abu Kalijar’s court, several things stand out. All three had military connections. All three achieved intimacy with the King, and all three were able to use this intimacy to further their own ends. In looking at these three we get a sense of what Abu Kalijar had to do to run his state. Firstly, he had to find a competent wazir like Bahram ibn Mafanna al-‘Adil.Secondly,hehadto spend inordinate amounts of time catering to his military forces, and ensuring that their representatives were heard. Lastly, we can see that Abu Kalijar had to give a hearing to a wide variety of different religious and ethnic groups. These last two points meant that a number of different interests were represented at Abu Kalijar’s court. Individuals such as al-Mu’ayyad, Qadi ‘AbdAllah,andotherscouldtake

Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 advantage of the balancing act that Abu Kalijar and his wazir were engaged in to present their own ideas. At the same time, they could not eliminate their

67Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 536; Busse, Chalif und Grosskönig, 115–16; idem, “Iran under the Buyids,” 300; for the script invented by Abu Ali Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Muqla see Encylopaedia of Islam, second edition, “Ibn Mukla.” 68Al-Mu’ayyad fi al-Din, Mudhakkirat, 22. 69Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 502; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 225, 282. 70Zarkub, Shiraznama, 38. 71Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 359. 72Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 337, 339, 427; Sandal was also his tutor, see Busse, Chalif und Grosskönig, 110; idem, “Iran under the Buyids,” 298. 892 Howes

competition effectively, since the King and his wazir had to maintain contact with their opponents as well. This situation is reminiscent of the ideal described in Roy Mottahedeh’s work Loyalty and Leadership in an Early Islamic Society. Mottahedeh points to a conception of a king as a distant arbiter among different loyalties in societies, which, if left to their own devices, would pull society apart. The King in Mottahedeh’s work must be above all the different loyalties and categories in society in order to prevent them from taking control and sinking into tyranny.73 There is no doubt that the various groups in Shiraz were inclined to dispute with each other to the detriment of societal stability. However, the way that Abu Kalijar dealt with them was somewhat different from Mottahedeh’s ideal. He had to be intimately involved with each of the different groups. If any one group felt snubbed, they would remove themselves from the court and move towards violence. ‘Abd Allah and Mu’ayyad fi al-Din desired intimacy with Abu Kalijar, and he had to be able to give it to them at some level at least. Abu Kalijar and his representative had to develop relationships with all the groups; unlike the ideal of kingly distance that Mottahedeh outlines, Abu Kalijar had to have close ties to all groups. While Abu Kalijar’s government in Shiraz comes across as weak, it is instructive to compare it briefly to Baghdad of this same period. The end of Buyid rule is well- known for its chaotic character. Jalal al-Dawla’s rule in Iraq was characterized by riots and disturbances. Both Ibn al-Jawzi and Ibn al-Athir vividly portray the degree to which Jalal al-Dawla was vulnerable to his own troops. No less than four times, the Turkish troops that were the mainstay of Jalal al-Dawla’s army threatened to remove their allegiance to him and go over to Abu Kalijar.74 These threats were accompanied by violence that went so far as to impinge upon Jalal al-Dawla’s harem.75 When his troops were not revolting against him, Jalal al-Dawla faced violence in the city of Baghdad. There were serious riots between Sunnis and Shi‘is.76 Jalal al-Dawla’s own troops often participated in these disturb- ances.77 Other military groups got involved as well; Arab and Kurdish tribesmen entered Baghdad and participated in the burning and the looting.78 Finally, the ‘Ayyarun, who can be characterized alternately as para-military groups representing either Sunnis or the populace of Baghdad, bandits or common rioters depending on 79 Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 which scholar you follow, were part of the fray. The result of all of this was a

73Mottahedeh, Loyalty and Leadership, 175, 177–78. 74Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 346, 419, 423, 431–32, 453; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 170, 223–24, 254, 256. 75Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 431–432; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 191, 235. 76Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 418–419; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 200, 204, 208, 212. 77Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 353, 393, 419; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 200, 218, 223. 78Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 209, 245, 253. 79Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 349, 353, 418–19, 431–32, 438; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 170, 201, 204, 208, 212, 219, 223, 226, 240, 246, 253; for various discussions of the ‘Ayyarun see Tor, Violent Order, 34–35, 286–87, 296–97; Simha Sabari, Mouvements Populaires à Baghdad à l’Époque `Abbaside, IXe– XIe Siècles (Paris, 1981), 81–85, 97–100, 121–22, 126; Claude Cahen, “Mouvements populaires et Religious and Ethnic Relations in Buyid Shiraz 893

chaotic scenario in which large parts of the city were burned and people’s homes were invaded and destroyed.80 The politics surrounding Jalal al-Dawla and his court as well as the politics surrounding the Abbasid Caliph al-Qa’im were equally disturbed. Jalal al-Dawla had contact with many different scholars of several different religious stripes.81 However, this does not seem to have improved his relationships with his troops. Likewise, the Abbasid Caliph’s more limited intellectual circle does not seem to have allowed him to bring the army to his side. There was perhaps less room for negotiation in Baghdad since the Turkish troops predominated, and there were fewer Daylamis in Baghdad to balance them out. Finally, it is noteworthy that Jalal al-Dawla’s and the Caliph’s wazirs were many and seemingly less competent than Abu Kalijar’s; certainly they were not credited by our sources with good character and with building libraries, as al-‘Adil was. It is clear from the sources that in Baghdad, as in Shiraz, there was a balancing act to be played, but it is also clear that neither of the leaders in Baghdad, Jalal al-Dawla and al-Qa’im, were able to maintain that balance. The politics of Baghdad leaned too much to the side of the Turkish troops and their Sunni allies. The Caliph and Jalal al-Dawla were not able to integrate other groups into the political scene to provide a balance for them. Thus Baghdadi politics seems particularly difficult. In comparison, Shirazi politics looks remarkably calm. Abu Kalijar and Ibn Mafanna appear to have been able to find a balance that kept the army in check and the townspeople in order. Certainly, there is no evidence of the wide-scale rioting that plagued Baghdad in the same period. The interconfessional conflicts that took place in Baghdad were muted in Shiraz. That Sunni/Shi‘i tensions existed is evident from several of our sources for the period, but there is evidence that there were other groups involved that made these tensions too multifaceted to explode in the way that they did in Baghdad. The method that Abu Kalijar and al- ‘Adil used to keep these tensions under control seems to have been to give all sides access to the court, but not to favor any one above the rest. Daylamis, Turks, Sunnis, Isma‘ilis, Zaydis, “Heretics,” Christians and Jews all appear in al-Mu’ayyad’s account. Other sources place Turks, Daylamis, Kurds, Sunnis, Twelvers, Isma‘ilis,

autonomisme urbain dans l’Asie musulmane du moyen âge, II,” Arabica, T. 6, Fasc. 1 (January 1959), 35, Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014 39–41, 47–48, 56; Cahen and Sabari both see the ‘Ayyarun as manifestations of popular discontent. Cahen connects them to the futuwwa and sees them as the activist branch of these organizations. Sabari, who is most directly concerned with Baghdad itself, sees them as a popular reaction to the econ- omic problems of the day separate both from the Hanbalis and from the futuwwa, although at times tied to both groups. Tor sees them as directly connected to the Hanbalis and to a kind of Sunni anti-govern- ment spirit. The accounts available to me (which have been rightly been questioned as written by elites generally unfriendly to popular revolts of any kind) portray the ‘Ayyarun as opportunists during Jalal al- Dawla’s reign. They do not appear as the instigators of Sunni/Shii violence, but rather as latecomers who took advantage of the chaos to raid markets and people’s homes. Cahen suggests that they may have been linked to Abu Kalijar, but there is no direct evidence for this beyond the problems that they cause for Jalal al-Dawla. 80Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 431–432; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 200, 204, 213–14, 233–34, 246, 274, 277. See also Busse, Chalif und Grosskönig, 150–63. 81Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 459; Ibn al-Jawzi, Al-Muntazam, 204, 265, 272. 894 Howes

and Zaydis in proximity to Abu Kalijar. The result was a relatively inclusive court that allowed different points of view an airing, but at the same time kept any one group from opting out and engaging in violence. The inclusive nature of the court politics also kept one group from becoming too closely associated with the state and thus putting too much pressure on the leader. Al-‘Adil’s skill at the balancing act trumped al-Mu’ayyad and ‘Abd Allah’s skills at gaining unfettered access to Abu Kalijar. The end result was certainly not a model for other governments; the balance was far too precarious. Shirazi politics under Abu Kalijar does however seem to represent a relatively successful if idiosyncratic attempt to manage the tensions of the later Buyid period. Downloaded by [Harvard Library] at 17:36 22 December 2014