ARAM, 11-12 (1999-2000), 145-159V. PIACENTINI 145 MERCHANT FAMILIES IN THE GULF A MERCANTILE AND COSMOPOLITAN DIMENSION: THE WRITTEN EVIDENCE (11-13th CENTURIES AD) VALERIA PIACENTINI 1. POLITICAL CONTEXT Geographical and historical literature of the 11-13th centuries has left us a vivid picture of the banadir of the Gulf. It tells us of the opulence of their ba- zars and storehouses – crammed full of precious merchandise, natural products and artefacts of rare beauty from all parts of the world – and of the liveliness of their artistic and craft activities. These same writers also give detailed de- scriptions of the grandeur of houses and palaces, the luxurious residences of merchants who financed the immense volume of international trade for which the Gulf was one of the main centres and intermediaries of the time. And here we can see a special dimension and reality emerging. These same authors devote more than one page to the Great Merchants of Fars, who came to the fore of the political scene as the real protagonists of the life Gulf during the 9th-10th centuries AD at the time of Siraf's rise and fall.1 And it is well known that the flourishing of this splendid emporium coincides with the re-organization of traditional Iranian society under the new political and military order guaranteed by the ‘Abbasid caliphate. At the start of the 10th century this process came within a system reaching its peak under the dominion of the Buyids (320-454 AH/932-1062 AD), a military aristocracy from the Caspian Sea. Without entering into further details 1 Siraf has been brought to life again by the excavations carried out from 1966 to 1973 under the direction of David Whitehouse, and with the sponsorship and financial contributions of the British Museum, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation of Lisboa, the British Academy, the Ashmolean Museum and the Royal Scottish Museum (Edinburgh). Interim reports were pub- lished regularly in Iran from 1968 to 1975. The complete study of the excavations is still in press. The following volumes are specifically relevant: D. Whitehouse, The Congregational Mosque and other Mosques from the Ninth to the Twelfth Centuries, (The British Institute for Persian Studies, Siraf III), (London, n.d.) and annexed volume of maps; N. Löwick, The Coins and Monumental Inscriptions, (The British Institute for Persian Studies, Siraf XV) (London, 1985). See also D. Whitehouse, “Siraf: a Sasanian Port,” Antiquity, XLV (1971), pp. 262-267; D. Whitehouse, “Maritime Trade in the Arabian Sea,” (Proceedings of the South-Asian Archae- ology – 1977 – Papers from the Fourth International Conference of the Association of South Asian Archaeologists in Western Europe, held at Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 2 vols.), (Naples, 1979); D. Whitehouse – A. Williamson, “Sasanian Maritime Trade,” Iran, XI (1973); M. Tam- poe, Maritime trade between China and the West. An Archaeological Study of the Ceramics from Siraf (Persian Gulf), 8th to 15th Centuries AD, (Oxford, 1989). See also endnotes: (a). 146 MERCHANT FAMILIES IN THE GULF of the many events (military and others) which took place and interacted under these rulers, two points in particular have special relevance in the context of this subject: the emergence and predominance of a mercantile class, and the overseas military initiative of these Dailamite lords (namely ‘Imad al-Dawlah (934-), ‘Adud al-Dawlah (949-) and Abu Kalijar (1027-1048)). The Buyid overlords were a dominant military caste (to use the words of Heribert Busse)2 supported by a formidable army made up of foreign elements and mercenary troops; they had the Strength (al-Shawkah) to fight and to win, to conquer and to defend the conquered regions; yet, to rule these same regions (and to get the necessary revenues to pay the army) they needed to rely on the local popula- tion, to come to terms with the local traditional social classes, to find new deli- cate equilibriums and balances of power with the conquered peoples. The sharp political sense of ‘Imad al-Dawlah had immediate insight into and clear perception of the contingent situation;3 his successors carried out his political lines with great lucidity. It was in this precise context that the great Merchant Families were to re-emerge; public affairs and business were de facto and de jure in the hands of the traditional class who made up the traditional social and cultural milieu of urban life all along the Gulf shores. At the same time – the process of identification between merchant class, landowners and administra- tive functionaries being completed at the end of the 10th century – such fami- lies were rapidly to become – within set limits – the real shaping forces behind the fortunes and misfortunes of the provinces bordering or gravitating on this sea. They would become the true protagonists of the life of the great banadir which dominated the life of the Gulf.4 One must also recall that trade along the Arabian coast at the time was expe- riencing a period of notable decadence due both to civil wars – which were lacerating the region – and the Fatimid competition – which had diverted a large part of the mercantile traffic from the Gulf to the Red Sea.5 Therefore, 2 H. Busse, Iran under the Buyids, (The Cambridge History of Iran, IV), (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 250 ff. 3 Prince of the policy of balanced alliances with the local traditional social classes was ‘Imad al-Dawlah, who, in Fars, found his ally in a local landlord, Zaid ibn ‘Ali al-Nawbandagani. This latter possessed large estates in the mountains north of Kazirun and was on poor terms with the authorities in Baghdad. After the capture of Shiraz in May or June 934 AD – which city was to remain in the uninterrupted possession of the Buyids until 1062 – Zayd ibn ‘Ali al-Naw- bandagani would become the most direct supporter of ‘Imad al-Dawlah. Thus, we might well say that in Fars began the emergence of this typical, traditional Iranian social class with the military support of the Buyid forces. It is worth underlining also the role played by the Kazirunis in the making of such policy; we will find them again playing a no less decisive role during the 12th and 13th centuries, in the course of the struggle for supremacy between Qays – which still meant Shiraz and the supremacy of its Merchant Families – and Hormuz – which meant Kirman and the local forces of the Gulf vis-à-vis the Fars. 4 See H. Busse, Iran under the Buyids. V. Fiorani Piacentini, “Practice in medieval Persian government: the surrender of the great cities of Khurasan to the Seljuqs (428 and 429 AH/ 1038 and 1039 AD)”, Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, in press. See also endnotes: (b). 5 B. Lewis, “The Fatimids and the Route to India”, Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Econo- miques de l'Université d'Instanbul, XI (1953), pp. 50-54. V. PIACENTINI 147 although written sources do not enable us to assert that the military overseas initiative of the Dailamites had any final target of a stable occupation of the Arabian Peninsula (on the contrary, it seems that the Buyid action was not so much concerned about re-activating the ‘Umani ports in view of commercial activity as about “militarising” them – the only exception being that of Suhar, where numerous Sirafi families had migrated and settled), it is a fact that the energetic maritime policy of ‘Adud al-Dawlah and Abu Kalijar – beyond all targets of personal power and dynastic ambitions – gave a particular push to the reunification of the Gulf.6 And it is also a fact that the firm Mukramid gov- ernorship in ‘Uman positively marked progress towards greater independence of this coast from the Fars, thus signalling the rise of the Gulf centrality vis-à- vis Fars power, and giving this sea a political and mercantile dimension of its own.7 At the turn of the 10th century, the fighting mobility of the Saljuqs was to prove superior to the mercenaries of the Buyids (1038, 1040 AD). The rich and so far unspoilt province of Fars was not to escape the Türkmen lust for plunder; the region experienced the horrors of war and depredation, the coun- try being laid waste by the Oghuz tribes and other no less rapacious nomadic groups (especially Kurds, Balus and Shabankara'is); ruin and uncertainty reigned.8 While anarchy and chaos dominated in Fars, Kirman was to experi- 6 On the enterprising personality of Abu Kalijar and the Omanite events, an accurate account is given by Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, VIII, 471-420, 426, 474, 636 et infra, IX, 28, 157, 287, 310, 318-320, 344 etc. See also Ibn Miskawayh, Tajarib, VI, 277-280; Bayhaqi, Ta'rikh, I, 42 on. Omanite sources are – on the contrary – extremely imprecise; few details are given, nor is there any certain information; they are rather chronicles concerned with narrating power struggles and intestinal wars which were devastating the region. Sound evidence of the Buyids of Fars' enter- prising policy is provided also by numismatic evidence, see in this regard N. Löwick, “An elev- enth century coin hoard from Ra's al-Khaimah and the question of Sohar's decline,” (Proceed- ings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies), 16 (1986), pp. 89 ff. 7 Written texts (such as the already quoted chronicles of Ibn al-Athir, Miskawayh, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim) and archaeological evidence (numismatics, ceramics, and excava- tions) – far from being contradictory – seem to fit and complement perfectly. This permits us to review Williamson's interpretation of the story of the sack and destruction of Suhar and, there- fore, the ruinous decline of the city and its environment (A.