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''The Greatest Issue of All'' ''The Greatest Issue of All'': Berlin, American National Security, and the Cold War David G. Coleman A dissertation submitted for fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Department of History University of Queensland February 2000 Abstract The Berlin problem was a constant test of wills in the early Cold War. In a contest where resolve was pre-eminent-or more specifically, the international credibility of that resolve- Berlin became in Washington's view "the greatest issue of all." The issue occupied a unique place in American foreign policy. It was at once a potent symbol of American determination to resist the encroachments of Soviet-led Communism as well as a "strategic nightmare." Militarily untenable, and yet vital to American security interests, in Washington's estimation Berlin's defence justified, at least in theory, general nuclear war. American responsibility for a sector of Berlin was the result of a nebulous process of postwar planning, much of which was conducted before U.S. troops reached Europe in June 1944. Defying all expectations, the U.S. _presence in West Berlin continued throughout the entire Cold War. During that time, Berlin was both cause and location of some of the Cold War's worst moments. Unlike earlier studies of the Berlin issue, this dissertation examines the broader view of Washington's commitment to Berlin. Drawing extensively from recently declassified primary materials, as well as important secondary sources, it attempts to fill a significant gap in our understanding of the American commitment to Berlin. In so doing, it demonstrates that Washington's view of the problem was unique. Furthermore, although presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy all faced crises over Berlin, each perceived the problem in different ways. In fact, there was an important shift in Washington's perception of the Berlin problem from the time when Truman drew the line in Berlin as part of his administration's policy of containment, to the more assertive defence of U.S. credibility under Eisenhower and Kennedy. Also, U.S. officials did not concern themselves with Berlin only in times of crisis. Rather, it was an ongoing dilemma that required constant attention. In this process the experiences from several other ostensibly unrelated Cold War issues, such as the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis, were incorporated by American administrations into their understanding of the U.S. commitment to Berlin. Through examining Washington's perception of the Berlin issue during the period from 1948 to 1963, this study concludes that until American policymakers began to direct more of their attention towards Vietnam in the mid-1960s, Berlin was their foremost concern and was a central element of how the United States waged the Cold War. In this way, the Berlin issue conditioned American ·policymakers in a manner and to an extent that has been greatly underappreciated. The immediate threat to free men is in West Berlin. But that isolated outpost is not an isolated problem. The threat is worldwide ....For West Berlin-lying 100 miles inside East Germany, surrounded by Soviet troops and close to Soviet supply lines, has many roles. It is more than a showcase of liberty, a symbol, an island of freedom in a Communist sea. It is even more than a link with the Free World, a beacon of hope behind the Iron Curtain, an escape hatch for refugees. West Berlin is all of that.. But above all it has now become -as never before-the great testing place of Western courage and · will, a focal point where our solemn commitments stretching back over the years since 1945, and Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confrontation. --John F. Kennedy, 25 July 1961 Table of Contents Preface .............................................................................. vi Ackno7.uledgements . .. xvi Abbreviations . xv111 Part One: Introduction 1. Berlin and Cold War History 1 2. The Origins of the Problem, 1943-1945 . .. 43 Part Two: Truman 3. Confirming the Worst Fears, 1948-1949 ................................... 72 4. The Berlin-Korea Parallel, 1950-1952 . .. .. ... ... ... ...... ... .. ...... .... 122 Part Three: Eisenhower 5. Changing Direction, 1953-1954 150 6. Meeting Khrushchev's Challenge, 1958-1960 . 182 Part Four: Kennedy 7. Preparing for the Showdown, 1961 ..................... ..................... 224 8. The Berlin-Cuba Nexus, 1962-1963 ....................................... .. 269 Conclusion . .. .. .... ... .. ... .. .. ...... .. .. ...... .. .... .. .. .. .. .. ... 314 Bibliography . 321 Preface In preparation for the National Security Council (NSC) meeting _ scheduled for 18 January 1962, McGeorge Bundy, John F. Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, compiled a list of talking points for the - President. Kennedy intended to take the rare step of personally providing specific, formal guidance to his top advisers on how he saw the world situation as his administration entered its second year. Together with Bundy, he expected several issues to dominate the foreign policy and defence establishments, among which were difficulties within NATO, arms control, a nuclear test ban treaty, the restructuring of the defence forces and budget, growing problems in Vietnam and Laos, and increasing ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba. But, after discussing some of these key issues, Bundy came to Berlin. "This," he said, "is the greatest issue of all."1 1 McGeorge Bundy, "Outline for Talk to NSC, January 18, 1962," 17 January 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FR US) 1961-63, 8:238. Vl Vll This value judgement had become a familiar theme in the White House. Over the previous fourteen years, Berlin had in fact become central to Washington's perception of the Cold War. Indeed, as Ernest R. May recently noted, so far as the United States was concerned, Berlin was the "heart of the Cold War."2 American troops first entered the city as occupiers in July 1945. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt had predicted that the United States would maintain a military presence in Europe for no more than two years after Germany's defeat, it was not until September 1994 that Bill Clinton declared that the mission had been accomplished, and the United States finally withdrew its military presence from the city. In the intervening period, particularly from 1948 to 1963, Berlin was both location and cause of some of the Cold War's worst moments. In response to these challenges Washington developed its own unique view of the problem. And since Washington remained the primary, if certainly not the only player on the Western side, any attempt to understand the nature of the Cold War must take into account Washington's view of the Berlin problem. Unlike most of the other crisis points of the Cold War, Berlin was repeatedly propelled to centre stage. In the so-called "high Cold War" the - American commitment to Berlin formed the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. Having defined this commitment as paramount to its national security, the United States upheld its promise in the face of repeated Soviets threats, even at the risk of nuclear war, and despite the inherent vulnerability of its position which long-serving Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright once called "a strategic nightmare." Accordingly, from 1948, when Stalin first exploited the West's vulnerability in that city, until 1963, when the issue withdrew rapidly from the forefront of the Cold War contest in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis and as U.S. officials turned their attention increasingly to Vietnam, the Berlin question posed both 2 Ernest R. May, "America's Berlin: Heart of the Cold War," Foreign Affairs, 77, 4 (July/ August 1998): 148-160_ Vlll dangers and singular opportunities. The purpose of this study is to explore the depth of Washington's concern for its commitment to Berlin and how U.S. policymakers perceived and responded to those dangers and opportunities that it posed. While the importance of Berlin to the Cold War has been well established, it is only with the wealth of new manuscript and archival materials, hitherto denied to historians, that the true depth of Washington's concern can be fully appreciated. That President Kennedy, when faced with Soviet nuclear missiles installations only ninety miles from Florida, could tell some of his chief advisers that the Soviets "don't give a damn about Cuba. But they do care about Berlin and about their own security," is testimony to the depth at which the problem permeated Washington's assessments of the Cold War.3 Yet it is not only the fly-on-the-wall revelations of the Kennedy tapes that attest to the depth of this concern. Particularly from 1948, when the Soviets first challenged the United States over Berlin, until 1963 when the issue faded quickly as a crisis flashpoint, Washington policymakers struggled with the problem. Even when the Berlin situation appeared outwardly tranquil, they produced an abundance of memoranda, studies and policy papers, held numerous meetings and discussions, and repeatedly raised the issue in international conferences and diplomatic dialogue. In recent years the great bulk of this material has become available through the diligent efforts of organizations such as the Department of State's Office of the Historian which produces the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the National Security Archive in Washington D.C., as well as through the persistent efforts of individuals taking advantage of the Freedom of Information Act and the Presidential Libraries' enhanced discretionary authority to review documents for declassification on-site through the Mandatory Review process. The result is a public record in which nearly all of the former gaps resulting from 3 Transcript of ExComm Meeting, 19 October 1962, in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., Tlze Kennedy Tapes, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997), p.175. IX security classification have now been filled. The weight of this evidence is compelling.
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