Helmut Kurth/Iris Kempe (Eds.) Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’s Transition KYIV “ZAPOVIT” 2005 CONTENTS Helmut Kurth/Iris Kempe Preface ................................................................... Olaf Hillenbrand Good Governance and the Need for Consensus- Building – A Framework for Democratic Transition............................................................... Oleksandr Derhachov Democratic Consensus Development.................... Timm Beichelt/Rostyslav Pavlenko The Presidential Election and Constitutional Reform................................................................... Oleksandr Sushko/Oles Lisnychuk The Election Campaign and Ukraine’s Political Evolution ................................................. Iris Kempe/Iryna Solonenko International Orientation and Foreign Support...... Helmut Kurth Comments.............................................................. 5 Preface 5 6 7 Good Governance and the Need for Consensus Building – A Framework for Democratic Transition Olaf Hillenbrand* 1. Introduction: Ukraine Beyond the Crossroads The year 2004 was a decisive, historical year for Ukraine. After 10 years of transition, Ukraine stood at a crossroads between democracy and authoritarianism. The presidential election was seen as the key for the development of democracy. In the beginning, the key actors were not only the two presidential candidates, with quite different views about Ukraine’s future, but also the former president, including his administration, whose efforts to influence the election have inherently damaged and endangered democratic development. After the manipulated ballot on Nov. 21, 2004, with the population demonstrating in the streets, a further participant entered the political arena whose courage and persistence finally forced a repeat of the second round of the elections and a democratic change of power. In Ukraine, this victory for democracy created high expectations. President Viktor Yushchenko represents a departure to the West, a liberal democracy and the renewal of free market structures. After he suffered a poisoning attempt in September 2004, he transformed into a charismatic martyr. As a reformer he already enjoyed a good reputation because of his record as a prime minister. However, in trying to modernize the country, he had also experienced intense resistance from the eastern and southern regions. Furthermore, the “Orange Revolution” received strong attention beyond Ukraine’s borders. Actually, in order to receive attention, support and sympathy in the European neighborhood, its timing and its staging could hardly have been better. The whole of Europe stared with amazement at the situation in Ukraine. During this time, it became particularly clear to the European Union that, after the victory of the democrats, the country needs a European perspective to be able to continue on its way towards democracy and a market economy. The Decisive Role of Elections For every democracy, elections are an indispensable constituent element. In Ukraine, authoritarian tendencies were established during recent years. Democratic procedures and institutions were set up; however, words must be matched with deeds in the coming years in * Olaf Hillenbrand, Center for Applied Policy Research, University of Munich. 6 7 order to establish an appropriate political culture and accompanying democratic consolidation. On the one hand it was possible that a defective, illiberal democracy similar to Russia’s could be consolidated in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine still had the opportunity to advance step-by-step toward a Western-style liberal democracy. In this respect, the presidential election played a decisive role at these crossroads of Ukrainian development: - As a litmus test, the election process is a very strong indicator that can provide information about the status of any given democracy. Democracy in Ukraine had to assess whether and to what extent the ruling party and related interest groups accepted common rules for the division of political power. Other questions included: How free and fair were the elections? Were there equal opportunities for each candidate? Was there a free flow of public information? Were there attempts at manipulation? Was there already a sustainable political culture? - In the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, elections are categorized as an important step toward implementing the rules and procedures of a democratic system, and also as the mechanism for the democratic division of power. In the special situation of defective democracies, free and fair elections are the most probable opportunity to put stagnating reform policy back on track. They force political actors to seek legitimacy, enable a broad discussion on reform perspectives, and allow people and civil society to articulate their demands. In this sense, the deficits of the Ukrainian political system could be best overcome if voters demanded change. - Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych were two candidates who could be counted within the democratic camp. It has to be emphasized that this election was thus a kind of victory for democracy, because there was—in contrast to other CIS countries—a real democratic alternative. Citizens of Ukraine thus had democratic choices available and had to carefully consider the direction of further reform. In earlier presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the character and results of the process indicated and reflected the state of affairs of the political system. The same was true for the run-up to the 2004 campaign, which was as dramatic as a good thriller: President Leonid Kuchma tried in 2000 to extend his powers and was stopped by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament). In 2003 he tried to extend his second presidential term to 2006, but due to growing criticism he withdrew his proposal. In 2004, Kuchma proposed a new election law and later came up with a constitutional reform package that would have led towards parliamentary democracy. Both were responses to the demands of the opposition and both were also cancelled by parliament. Foreign observers assumed in advance that Ukraine would undergo the “hardest and dirtiest elections in her short history as an independent country.”1 As a matter of fact, these expectations were fulfilled during the campaign, and after the first ballot.2 They hit their peak in the attempt to poison the most important opposition candidate 1 See: Ralf Wachsmuth, Sebastian Fiebrig: Die Ukraine sechs Monate vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen. Die Reform der ukrainischen Verfassung: eine endlose Geschichte, Kyiv, May 2004, p. 12. 2 See: Thomas Urban: Wettkampf mit unfairen Mitteln; Peter Hilkes: Die Opposition lebt gefährlich, both in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, Oct. 30, 2004, p. 2; See: Massive Behinderungen bei der Ukraine-Wahl, in: www.spiegel-online.de, download Nov. 1, 2004. 8 9 as well as in the manipulation of election results. Yushchenko did indeed win the first ballot, but in the second ballot on Nov. 21, 2004, suddenly the administration candidate pulled ahead, leading by three percent at the polls. Numerous election observers reported massive and systematic irregularities, clearly indicating massive shortcomings in Ukrainian democracy. On the one hand, the second ballot could be seen as a farce and clearly demonstrated that many important political agents were “playing with the rules instead of playing by the rules.” However, the reaction after this development came to display positive aspects of current civil society in Ukraine. Already in the run-up of the election it had become clear that the power of outgoing President Kuchma was not sufficient to implement his reform ideas against the will of his opponents. As in other young democracies in similar situations, it seemed that the current president was fighting with his back against the wall. Also, in light of its weak legitimacy, the old regime could not resist the well-organized mass protests, against a continuous crumbling of its power structures, and against an emboldened population. Its attempts to manufacture political facts, and later to starve out protests by skillful delaying negotiations and decisions, no longer worked. Fortunately, the old administration abandoned the option to conserve the old structures by force. In the end, Kuchma’s power was reduced to the option of implementing a compromise with the opposition. It linked both a reform of the election law and a constitutional reform with the early repeat of the second ballot on Dec. 26, 2004. As expected, Yushchenko won this election. Shortly after, he was even able to install radical reformer Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister with the support of a majority in Parliament. During his first days as president, Yushchenko has acted prudently and outlined his reform agenda. In some respects, Ukraine has changed its face and is already a different country. Structure of this Paper The symbolic victory of democracy in Ukraine should not suggest, however, that this is already the end of a long transformation process. Like any transition country, Ukraine has special problems and unique power constellations. However, in a comparative perspective we can see that countries in transition share many characteristics as they proceed from authoritarian to democratic structures. Beyond this background, section two empirically analyzes important factors and key elements along the path to a liberal democracy. In section three, the framework for good governance will be sketched