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RevistaRevista d’Estudisd’Estudis AutonòmicsAutonòmics ii FederalsFederals JournalJournal ofof 28 Self-GovernmentSelf-Government Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals — Journal of Self-Government Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals — Journal

Unitary Federalism – Germany ignores the original spirit 28 I Desembre 2018 December of its Constitution Roland Sturm 2 The Decentralization of Poland 1989-2018: From Partisan 8 Disagreement to a Vehicle for Successful Absorption of EU Cohesion Funding Adam Holesch

Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria Peter Bussjäger, Christoph Schramek, Mirella M. Johler

Autonomías indígenas en América Latina. Una mirada comparada a partir de las dificultades para la construcción de un Derecho intercultural Asier Martínez de Bringas 8 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 6 2 6 8 8 1 7 7 9 ISSN 1886-2632

Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals – Journal of Self-Government Núm. 28 I Desembre 2018 Revista semestral / Biannual journal

Per presentar manuscrits a la REAF–JSG consulteu al web de l’IEA: Guia per a autors i presentació d’originals Guía para autores y presentación de originales Guide for authors and submission of manuscripts

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Disseny gràfic: Marquès Art Gràfic, SL i Addenda Maquetació: Entitat Autònoma del Diari Oficial i de Publicacions

ISSN 1886-2632 eISSN 2014-8658 Dipòsit legal: B 32644-2012

La REAF–JSG està indexada a Scopus, Academic Search Premier, Fuente Académica Plus, Directory of Open Access Journals, DIALNET; avaluada a CARHUS Plus+2018 (Dret: A; Sociologia i Política: C), DOAJ i LATINDEX (Catálogo); ICDS 9.6. Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals Journal of Self-Government

28 I Desembre 2018 December Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals Journal of Self-Government

Director Comitè Científic Ferran Requejo Eliseo Aja Fernández Catedràtic de Ciència Política de la Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional Universitat Pompeu Fabra i director de de la Universitat de Barcelona l’Institut d’Estudis de l’Autogovern Enoch Albertí Rovira Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional Secretària de la Universitat de Barcelona Mireia Grau Creus Miguel Ángel Aparicio Pérez Cap de l’Àrea de Recerca de l’Institut Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional d’Estudis de l’Autogovern de la Universitat de Barcelona Xavier Arbós Marín Comitè de Redacció Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional Miguel Ángel Cabellos Espiérrez de la Universitat de Barcelona Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional Enric Argullol Murgadas de la Universitat de Girona Catedràtic de Dret Administratiu de Mercè Corretja i Torrens la Universitat Pompeu Fabra Directora general de Contractació Pública Mercè Barceló Serramalera del Departament d’Acció Exterior, Relacions Catedràtica de Dret Constitucional de Institucionals i Transparència la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Alfons González Bondia Antoni Bayona Rocamora Professor titular de Dret Internacional Públic Professor titular de Dret Administratiu de de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili la Universitat Pompeu Fabra i lletrat del Klaus-Jürgen Nagel Parlament de Catalunya Professor agregat de Ciències Polítiques Francesc de Carreras Serra de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Marc Sanjaume Calvet Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Assessor de l’Àrea de Recerca de l’Institut Marc Carrillo d’Estudis de l’Autogovern en Matèria de Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Polítiques Comparades d’Autogovern i Universitat Pompeu Fabra i conseller del professor associat de Ciència Política de la Consell de Garanties Estatutàries de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Generalitat de Catalunya i de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra Manuel Cienfuegos Mateo Joan Vintró i Castells Catedràtic acreditat de Dret Internacional Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Públic i Dret Comunitari de la Universitat Universitat de Barcelona Pompeu Fabra Carlos Closa Montero Guillem López Casasnovas Investigador de l’lnstituto de Políticas Catedràtic d’Economia Aplicada de la y Bienes Públicos del CSIC Universitat Pompeu Fabra Pedro Cruz Villalón Ramón Máiz Suárez Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Catedràtic de Ciència Política de la Universitat Autònoma de Madrid Universitat de Santiago de Compostel·la Víctor Ferreres Comella Isidre Molas Batllori Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la de la Universitat Pompeu Fabra Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Joaquim Ferret Jacas Jordi Muñoz Catedràtic de Dret Administratiu de la Investigador Ramón y Cajal a la Universitat Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona de Barcelona Tomàs Font Llovet Cesáreo Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat Catedràtic de Dret Administratiu de Catedràtic de Ciència Política de la la Universitat de Barcelona Universitat de Barcelona Enric Fossas Espadaler Eduard Roig Molés Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Professor titular de Dret Constitucional Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona de la Universitat de Barcelona Alain-G. Gagnon Cheryl A. Saunders Professor titular al Departament de Professora emèrita de la Universitat de Ciència Política de la Universitat Melbourne del Quebec a Mont-real Joaquín Tornos Mas Alfredo Galán Galán Catedràtic de Dret Administratiu de la Catedràtic acreditat de Dret Administratiu Universitat de Barcelona de la Universitat de Barcelona Josep M. Vallès Casadevall Manuel Gerpe Landín Catedràtic de Ciència Política de la Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Jaume Vernet Llobet Markus González Beilfuss Catedràtic de Dret Constitucional de la Professor titular de Dret Constitucional Universitat Rovira i Virgili i conseller del de la Universitat de Barcelona Consell de Garanties Estatutàries de la Tania Groppi Generalitat de Catalunya Catedràtica d’Institucions de Dret Públic Jacques Ziller de la Universitat de Siena Catedràtic de Dret de la Unió Europea de la Montserrat Guibernau Universitat de Pavia Investigadora afiliada al Departament de Sociologia, POLIS Universitat de Cambridge Coordinació editorial John Kincaid Jesús Solé-Farràs Director del Meyner Center for the Responsable de Comunicació, Publicacions Study of State and Local Government i Documentació de l’Institut d’Estudis de del Lafayette College de Filadèlfia l’Autogovern

Sumari

Presentation / Presentació Ferran Requejo ...... 9

Unitary Federalism—Germany Ignores the Original Spirit of its Constitution Roland Sturm...... 17

The Decentralization of Poland 1989-2018: From Partisan Disagreement to a Vehicle for Successful Absorption of EU Cohesion Funding Adam Holesch...... 47

Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria Peter Bussjäger, Christoph Schramek, Mirella M. Johler...... 74

Autonomías indígenas en América Latina. Una mirada comparada a partir de las dificultades para la construcción de un Derecho intercultural Asier Martínez de Bringas ...... 101

Presentation

With this issue, the Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals embarks on a new phase. This is illustrated by the journal’s complementary title Journal of Self-Government, which underlines its intention to have a greater presence and impact in the international academic world. The content of the articles will remain open to all those fields of research that are related to issues of self-government—political science, law, economics, linguistics, communication, culture, etc.—both from an analytical perspective of a theoretical and comparative political nature, and from an applied research perspective related to specific cases in contemporary democracies.

In this issue, readers will find four research articles. Firstly, the articles by Peter Bussjäger-Christoph Schramek-Mirella Johler and by Roland Sturm analyse the current situation of Central-European federalism illustrated by the cases of Austria and Germany. The point of view adopted is that of the role played by some of the dynamic elements that affect federal practices. These elements often lead these practices away from what is established in their respective constitutions with regard to the federalization of political decisions or the distribution of powers among the different levels of government. Secondly, Adam Holesch analyses the process of decentralization in Poland over the last three decades, that is, since the collapse of the socialist systems in Eastern Europe. A prominent feature of the analysis is the effect that Poland’s accession to the European Union has had on the country’s different regions and the perception Polish citizens have of European policies. The conclusions highlight a number of paradoxical aspects. Finally, Asier Martínez de Bringas analyses the case of indigenous autonomies in Latin America based on a comparative political study of four significant cases: Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. These cases display elements of “non-territorial federalism” which have been expressed through laws of an intercultural nature, which nevertheless encounter significant obstacles to their implementation within the framework of the normative structures of traditional constitutionalism. Let us now take a slightly more detailed look at these four contributions.

9 Presentation

It is well known that political, economic, social and cultural dynamics influence the practices of federal or regional states beyond what is established by constitutional and legislative rules; often far beyond. The Austrian and German cases are usually presented as examples of “executive federalism” or “administrative federalism”. This is a kind of federalism, usually uninational in nature, in which discussions about federalism are normally associated with objectives related to the “efficiency” of the system. This is a technical-functional objective that often lies outside the moral, political and institutional values of federalism. Thus, efficiency often serves as an ideological tool for implementing centralizing practices while maintaining a pro-federal rhetor- ical discourse of a legitimizing nature. In comparative political analyses, the link between this centralizing, technocratic dynamic and the socioeconomic policies of governing parties is not very conclusive: sometimes it is conservative forces that most favour centralization, while on other occasions it is social-democratic forces that do so; or both together, when they govern the federation in coalition. These are dynamics that the Austrian and German cases have shown to be structural tendencies in recent years.

In the Austrian case, the authors of the article highlight the ambivalences and discontinuities of the current government, which uses federal rhetoric in contrast to recentralizing policies, especially in the educational and social spheres. This confirms the overlapping nature of the two levels of government which characterises this federation, as well as its hierarchical nature. This benefits the central power in relation to the länder, whose powers are mainly limited to implementing federal legislation, and with regard to demands for “subsidiarity” directed, above all, at the European Union. The Austrian party system reinforces these trends. Additionally, the article shows how some informal relationships of a cooperative nature (e.g. the conference of presidents) have the effect of limiting the inherently centralizing tendencies of Austrian federalism.

The German case, on the other hand, which has been extensively analysed by scholars, was characterised by a tension between federal and “cooperative” logics virtually since the constitutional reforms of the 1970s. This tension continues to exist today. Roland Sturm’s article shows how the most recent reforms of German federalism (2006, 2009 and 2017) have eroded the practical capacity for self-government of the federated länder and reinforced the “unitary” dimensions of the state. Although the German case bears little resemblance to that of Austria, we once again encounter centralizing dynamics. The analysis shows the role played in these dynamics by the political culture of policy-makers who are

10 Presentation

looking to maximise efficiency and show results in areas of greatest electoral dispute. In addition to the effects associated with “executive federalism”, the analysis highlights the loss of power of the parliaments of the länder resulting from the last three reforms and perpetuating the effect of “cooperative” reforms of earlier decades. The habitual absence of a common ground among the federated states also favours the dynamics of practical recentralization that characterise the current German system as a paradoxical case of “unitary federalism”. On the one hand, executive powers are dominant, thus marginalising legislative powers. On the other hand, the federal states observe how the central power—the federation—begins to regulate aspects that are in theory the exclusive competence of the federated states themselves (budgets, education). As in the Austrian case, the German party system is not immune to these dynamics, which reinforce the increasingly administrative character of the länder. In its most extreme form, it has been a recurring trend in recent decades that tends to dilute federal principles and subsidiarity in the German uni-national federal state for the benefit of a central power that puts forward practical arguments for controlling finance above the principle of representation and, especially, the principle of self-government of the federated states.

Poland exemplifies the effects of transition processes to a market economy and European integration on the decentralization of a former socialist state. The original constitutional structure was that of a highly centralized unitary state that was forced to deal with a desire for decentralization following the 1999 reform. The cultural background was that of a state that had had no democratic tradition for decades. In this way, the processes of democratization and decentralization—both regional and local—could theoretically develop side by side, in addition to the process of integration into the EU. In his analysis, Adam Holesch stresses the influence of EU cohesion policies, which paradoxically reveal an increase in the Eurosceptic attitudes of part of the citizenship, above all in regions with high poverty indexes that were the recipients of specific European funds; areas in which the current governing party, which is not particularly pro-European, enjoys a strong electoral position. In contrast to what one would expect from an economic or technocratic approach, the economy is revealed in this case to be of little value when one is attempting to explain political phenomena. More revealing variables are related to the country’s political culture and to strictly political processes. The result has been a form of decentralization that is mainly administrative in nature and in which the demands of the Silesian minority have acted as a spur to incentivize the unity of the state.

11 Presentation

The case of indigenous autonomies represents a different type of normative and institutional treatment within federalism. In the four cases analysed in the article by Asier Martínez de Bringas, issues involving, at least to some extent, “non-territorial federalism” stand out. The societies in question are characterised by a high degree of cultural pluralism and are at the same time historically linked to the former Spanish empire and to institutional frameworks that have traditionally been controlled by non-indigenous sectors. In recent decades, above all since the beginning of the 21st century, there is no doubt that it has been considered important to establish fairer political relations with regard to the diversity of some Latin American states. It is well known that cultural and national justice rarely coincide with socioeconomic justice, despite the fact that these two spheres are interrelated at an empirical level. Efforts were made to reflect this fact in the constituent processes of the countries in question, especially Bolivia and Ecuador, although little progress has subsequently been made. The case of Colombia, on the other hand, dis- plays elements of decentralization with the transfer of funds and a number of powers (Resguardos). Based on a comparative analysis, the article reveals, on the one hand, the difficulty of establishing an intercultural law between the state and the different indigenous peoples (which do not always display shared characteristics). On the other hand, the article shows the different meaning that the term “autonomy” acquires in this context in relation to other studies in “territorial federalism”, as well as the difficulty of implementing it practically according to the premises of traditional constitutionalism. Thus, one conclusion that one might draw is the gulf that exists between practical approaches to a form of decentralization of an administrative and financial nature and the approach taken by diverse indigenous collectives that demand a new approach to how one should understand a democratic system in contexts that are characterised by a high degree of cultural pluralism. The gulf between these two visions of “autonomy” is glaringly apparent when one is attempting to manage the institutional expectations and the decision-making processes of two very different normative visions. At the institutional level, these differences highlight some of the limitations of traditional constitutionalism, which is exemplified in the electoral system and municipal structure in these contexts.

Barcelona, December 2018

Ferran Requejo Director of the Institute of Self-Government Studies

12 Presentació

A partir d’aquest número, la Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals inicia una nova etapa que es visualitza en el títol complementari Journal of Self-Govern- ment, que aprofundeix la seva vocació de presència i d’impacte en el món acadèmic internacional. El contingut dels articles seguirà obert a tots aquells camps de recerca vinculats als temes d’autogovern —politològics, jurídics, econòmics, lingüístics, comunicatius, culturals, etc.— tant des d’una perspectiva analítica de caràcter teòric i de política comparada com de recerca aplicada vinculada a casos concrets de les democràcies contemporànies.

En aquest número els lectors podran trobar quatre articles de recerca. En primer lloc, els articles de Peter Bussjäger, Christoph Schramek, i Mirella Johler, i de Roland Sturm analitzen la situació actual del federalisme centre- europeu dels casos austríac i alemany. La perspectiva adoptada és la del paper d’alguns elements dinàmics que incideixen en la pràctica federal. Aquests elements allunyen sovint aquesta pràctica d’allò que estableixen les constitu- cions respectives en relació amb la federalització de les decisions polítiques o el repartiment de poders entre els diferents nivells de govern. En segon lloc, Adam Holesch analitza el procés de descentralització de Polònia en les tres darreres dècades; és a dir, des del col·lapse dels sistemes socialistes de l’Europa de l’Est. Un lloc destacat en l’anàlisi l’ocupen els efectes que la incorporació a la Unió Europea ha tingut sobre les diverses regions i sobre la percepció de les polítiques europees en els ciutadans polonesos. Les conclusions presenten alguns aspectes paradoxals. Finalment, Asier Martínez de Bringas analitza el cas de les autonomies indígenes a Amèrica llatina a partir del que ofereix la política comparada de quatre casos rellevants: Bolívia, Equador, Colòmbia i Perú. Es tracta de casos amb elements de “federalisme no territorial” que es volen concretar en lleis de caràcter intercultural, les quals, tanmateix, troben clares dificultats d’implementació en el marc de les estructures normatives del constitucionalisme tradicional. Vegem aquestes quatre aportacions amb una mica més de detall.

13 Presentació

És conegut que les dinàmiques polítiques, econòmiques, socials i culturals incideixen en la pràctica dels estats federals o regionals més enllà del que estableixen les normes constitucionals i legislatives. A vegades, molt més enllà. Els casos austríac i alemany són habitualment presentats com a exemples de “federalisme executiu” o de “federalisme administratiu”. Es tracta d’un tipus de federalisme, normalment de caràcter uninacional, en el qual les discussions sobre federalisme acostumen a anar associades a objectius vinculats a “l’efici- ència” dels sistemes. Aquest és un objectiu de caràcter tecnicofuncional que se situa sovint al marge dels valors morals, polítics i institucionals del federalisme. Així, l’eficiència suposa sovint un recurs ideològic per implementar pràctiques centralitzadores malgrat que es mantingui un llenguatge retòric profederal de vocació legitimadora. En les anàlisis de política comparada, la relació d’aquesta dinàmica centralitzadora de caràcter tecnocràtic amb el color polític socioeconòmic dels partits de govern resulta poc conclusiva: a vegades són les forces conservadores les més favorables a la centralització, mentre que en altres ocasions ho són les de caràcter socialdemòcrata. O totes dues en conjunt quan governen en coalició la federació. Es tracta de dinàmiques que els casos austríac i alemany mostren com a tendències estructurals en les darrers anys.

En el cas austríac, els autors de l’article destaquen les ambivalències i discon- tinuïtats del govern actual, el qual aposta per una retòrica federal en contrast amb polítiques de recentralització, especialment en els àmbits educatiu i social. Es confirma la naturalesa molt imbricada dels dos nivells de govern, caracte- rística d’aquesta federació, així com el caràcter jeràrquic en benefici del poder central davant d’uns länder amb poders predominantment d’implementació de la legislació federal i davant d’unes demandes de “subsidiarietat” dirigides, sobretot, a la Unió Europea. El sistema austríac de partits reforça aquestes ten- dències. D’altra banda, es constata com algunes relacions informals de caràcter cooperatiu (p. ex., la conferència de presidents) actuen com a limitadors de les tendències inherentment centralitzadores del federalisme austríac.

Al seu torn, el cas alemany, un dels més analitzats per part dels acadèmics, mostra una tensió entre les lògiques federal i de “cooperació” pràcticament des de les reformes constitucionals dels anys setanta; una tensió que es manté en l’actualitat. L’article de Roland Sturm incideix en com les darreres reformes del federalisme alemany (2006, 2009 i 2017) han erosionat la capacitat d’autogovern pràctic dels länder federats, reforçant les dimensions “unitàries” de l’estat. Amb característiques no coincidents amb el cas austríac ens trobem, però, amb un altre cas amb dinàmiques de centralització. L’anàlisi mostra el

14 Presentació

paper que té en aquestes dinàmiques la cultura política d’uns policy-makers guiats per objectius d’eficiència i per la voluntat de mostrar resultats en els àmbits de més disputa electoral. Al costat dels efectes associats també al “federalisme executiu”, l’anàlisi insisteix en la pèrdua de poder dels parlaments dels länder associada a aquelles tres últimes reformes, en continuïtat amb reformes “cooperatives” de dècades anteriors. La manca habitual d’una po- sició compartida pels estats federats incideix també en aquestes dinàmiques de recentralització pràctica que caracteritzen el sistema alemany actual com un cas de paradoxal “federalisme unitari”. D’una banda, els poders executius predominen tot marginant els poders legislatius. D’altra banda, els estats federals veuen com el poder central, la federació, entra a regular aspectes que en principi són competència exclusiva dels estats federats (pressupostos, educació). Com en el cas austríac, el sistema de partits alemany no és aliè a aquestes dinàmiques que reforcen el caràcter creixentment administratiu dels länder. En l’extrem es tracta d’una tendència recurrent en les darreres dècades que tendeix a diluir els principis federal i de subsidiarietat en l’estat federal uninacional alemany, en benefici d’un poder central que manté els arguments pràctics del control del finançament per sobre del principi de representativitat i, sobretot, del principi d’autogovern dels estats federats.

Polònia exemplifica la incidència dels processos de transició a una economia de mercat i d’integració europea sobre la descentralització d’un estat exsocialista. L’estructura constitucional de partida és la d’un estat unitari fortament centralitzat que afrontà una voluntat de descentralització a partir de la reforma de 1999. L’estructura cultural remet a un estat sense tradició de- mocràtica durant dècades. Així, els processos de democratització i de descen- tralització —regional i local— podien, en principi, caminar junts, als quals s’afegia el procés d’integració a la UE. Adam Holesch incideix en l’anàlisi en la influència de les polítiques europees de cohesió, les quals mostren, tanmateix, un augment de les actituds euroescèptiques per part de la ciutadania; especialment, en aquelles regions amb índexs de pobresa elevats que foren objecte de fons europeus específics. Unes àrees en què el partit governant actual, no precisament proeuropeu, és electoralment fort. En contrast amb el que faria pensar un plantejament economicista o tecnocràtic, l’economia es revela aquí com un factor poc explicatiu de fenòmens polítics. Altres variables explicatives estan relacionades amb la cultura política i amb processos estrictament polítics. El resultat ha estat una descentralització bàsicament de caràcter administratiu, actuant les reivindicacions de la minoria de Silèsia com un factor reactiu que incentiva la unitat de l’estat.

15 Presentació

El cas de les autonomies indígenes suposa un tipus diferent de tractament normatiu i institucional dins del federalisme. En els quatre casos analitzats en l’article d’Asier Martínez de Bringas apareixen d’una manera clara qüestions de “federalisme no territorial”. Es tracta d’unes societats caracteritzades per un fort pluralisme cultural i que alhora estan històricament vinculades al passat imperial espanyol i a uns marcs institucionals que han estat controlats històricament per sectors no indígenes. En les darreres dècades, especialment a partir del segle xxi, és clar que s’ha donat importància a establir unes relacions polítiques més justes en el si de la diversitat d’alguns estats llatinoameri- cans. És conegut que la justícia de caràcter cultural i nacional està lluny de coincidir amb la justícia socioeconòmica, tot i les interrelacions que actuen en el pla empíric entre aquests dos àmbits. Una qüestió que s’ha tractat de reflectir en els processos constituents d’aquests països, especialment a Bolívia i Equador, però que no ha experimentat gaires avenços posteriorment. El cas de Colòmbia ofereix, per contra, elements de descentralització amb la trans- ferència de fons i d’algunes competències (Resguardos). A partir de l’anàlisi comparada, l’article constata, d’una banda, les dificultats d’establir un dret intercultural entre l’estat i els diversos pobles indígenes (els quals no sempre presenten unes característiques compartides). D’altra banda, també es mostra el sentit diferent que el terme “autonomia” adquireix en aquest context amb relació als estudis de “federalisme territorial”, així com les dificultats de la seva implementació pràctica a partir de les premisses del constitucionalisme tradicional. Així, una conclusió seria la distància que hi ha entre els planteja- ments pràctics d’una descentralització pensada en termes administratius i de finançament amb el planejament de diverses col·lectivitats indígenes que impulsen un replantejament de com s’ha d’entendre una democràcia i un estat de dret en contextos presidits per un fort pluralisme cultural. La distancia entre aquestes dues visions de “l’autonomia” resulten flagrants quan es confronten les expectatives institucionals i dels processos de decisió de dues visions normatives clarament contrastades. A nivell institucional, aquest contrast posa en relleu alguns dels límits del constitucionalisme tradicional, exemplificat en el sistema electoral i en l’estructura municipal en aquests contextos.

Barcelona, desembre de 2018

Ferran Requejo Director de l’Institut d’Estudis de l’Autogovern

16 Unitary Federalism–Germany Ignores the Original Spirit of its Constitution

Roland Sturm Professor of Political Science at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremburg

abstract Contrary to a federalism based on the subsidiarity principle, German federalism is now unitary in nature. Three reforms of federalism have contributed to undermining Länder self-rule (2006, 2009, and 2017). The governments on the federal and regional level dominate political decision-making. Parliaments suffer from neglect. Executive bargaining knows no limits. Even core competences of the Länder, such as their budgetary autonomy or education, have experienced federal intrusion. Länder initiatives, just as the federal government’s interventions, are not guided by a federal vision. What counts is political control and the expected efficiency of national solutions for policy problems (especially from the perspective of the federal government), improved policy outputs (especially as seen by the Länder), and electoral success, an aim of all parties on all political levels. What has no place in decision-making in Germany is proximity to the promise federalism makes, namely more regional autonomy, bringing politics closer to the people, regional participation, accountability and transparency. keywords coalitions; parties; financial equalization; unitary federalism; competences; constitution; autonomy; self-rule.

The type of federalism we find in Germany is unitary. It developed from co-operative federalism in the post-war years to the joint policy-making of the federal level and the Länder levels in the late 1960s, and became ever more unitary in nature with the last two federalism reforms of 2009 and 2017. The short-lived counter-movement of the 2006 federalism reform that tried to give Länder autonomy a (limited) chance, soon lost momentum. Ultimately, it did not make much difference.

This contribution is based on the text of the 1949 constitution that clearly stresses the subsidiarity principle. We find both a weak constitutional role

Article received on 18/06/2018; approved on 02/08/2018.

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 DOI: 10.2436/20.8080.01.29 17 Roland Sturm

of federal politics and in practical terms an influential role of theLänder , which came into existence before the federation. In 1949, the Länder decided on the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany and its constitution. With regard to federalism, this constitution was not changed significantly until the late 1960s. Other factors, such as the development of the “mass society” and the growth of the “welfare state” were responsible for the loss of societal support for the subsidiarity principle and a general preference for equality over diversity.1 The federal spirit had disappeared before constitutional change set in.

The most interesting recent developments are the three federalism reforms of 2006, 2009 and 2017 that changed the German constitution profoundly with the most far-reaching revisions to date and finally anchored unitary federalism in the constitution. These reforms will be analyzed in detail. The argument made here is not that constitutional engineering defines the realities of German federalism. The formal degree of autonomy for the Länder was certainly reduced by these reforms, but there was hardly any resistance by the Länder. No extensive use of Länder powers was made to block federal intrusion. In most cases, the limited possibilities for diversity in German federalism that the constitution allows were ignored by regional decision-makers, as one would expect in a federal country without federalists. The lack of resistance against uniformity in German federalism also has to do with access to political power for regional executives. Constitutional change meant a severe loss of autonomy for the Länder parliaments, but it empowered regional executives, and gave them more political influence, for example, via the Bundesrat (second chamber in national legislation). Länder governments (not parliaments) are now more than ever involved in national politics, even at the early stage of national coalition talks. Länder prime ministers can have opinions on every policy on the national level. They do not distinguish between policies that fall into Länder jurisdictions and national policies. Their approach is unitary for reasons of the dominance of national party competition that defines the relevant political arena and the role of Länder prime ministers in national legislation, i.e. they act as if federal autonomy had a very limited role in German politics. For Länder prime ministers policy coordination with the federal executive is much more the rule than policy coordination in regional parliaments that have

1. Hesse, “Unitarischer Bundesstaat”.

18 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

hardly any autonomy, when it comes to the right to decide as opposed to policy implementation, the right to act.2

1. The subsidiarity principle in the German constitution and in German society

Federalism is a cornerstone of Germany’s constitution. Article 79 even prohibits any kind of constitutional engineering that leads to the end of federalism. Only a new constitution could bury federalism. The principle of subsidiarity has inspired the Parliamentary Council, which decided on the draft of the Basic Law, the German Constitution, in 1949. Article 30 of the Constitution gives all competences of the state to the Länder (the regions), as long as there are no exceptions made for this rule by the Constitution. The same goes for legislative powers (Article 70). In other words, the centre needs a special justification for its political role in decision-making. This summary of constitutional provisions sounds like a strong guarantee for a wealth of autonomy rights of the Länder—but currently the truth could not be further removed from such expectations.

From the outset there was less autonomy and more co-operation in German federalism than these articles of the German Constitution might imply. From its very beginnings German federalism was devised as cooperative federalism based on federal-state interest intermediation. Over time, the German Constitution of 1949 was interpreted in a manner that today allo- cates the lion’s share of legislative competences to the federal government (often as shared competences with the Länder). Shared competences have the additional effect of tending to constitute a permanent system of State- Länder co-operation. The resulting interlocking federalism lacks transparency and accountability. It benefits decision-makers (the executives) and handicaps those that are not at the negotiation table, the people and parliaments. TheLänder have most of their competences when it comes to the administration of law (including federal law). On the Länder level, only a few competences of the Länder parliaments are left, and none of these competences can be used by the Länder completely without a certain federal influence. The remaining fields Länderof autonomy cover the regulation of

2. For this distinction see for example, Keman, “Federalism and Policy Performance”.

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the media, support for small and medium-sized enterprises, and the politics of culture, police and education.

German civil society often organizes interests with reference to the country’s territorial units, the Länder. This is, however not an expression of a wish for regional autonomy. It simply reflects the administrative divisions of Germany. Empirical research3 has shown time and again that Germany is a federal country without federalists. When asked which of the following political levels, the European, the national, the regional (Länder), and the local, commands their loyalty, respondents identify least with theLänder level. With regard to the centralization or decentralization of policy-making, for example, 91 per cent of those interviewed wanted equal standards for nursery schools, schools, and universities all over Germany. Opinion polls show a general aversion to diversity in policy outputs and an implicit orientation that gives preference to equality of living conditions all over Germany. This is a federalism paradox, because Germans do not advocate an end to federalism, but when it comes to problem-solving, they trust, above all, the national government (or do not know the distribution of competences in their federal state).

Germany is a country without a federal culture. It lacks strong regionalist movements that could have fought for a different form of federalism. Still, in recent decades, we have witnessed far-reaching reforms of German federalism. These reforms included constitutional change for which two-third majorities in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (in both legislative chambers) are necessary. Why should one “modernize” German federalism when the electorate is not interested in reforms of federalism, and does not care about who does what in German politics?4 The answer is, to solve management problems political decision-makers have. Federalism reform has degenerated into an elite effort of administrative adjustment, an observation that is hardly understandable if one bears in mind the original idea of German federalism as an expression of democratic participation not filtered by other considera- tions. Federalism reform in Germany has been “functional”, not responsive to democratic pressures; it has been top down, not bottom up.

3. Bertelsmann-Stiftung,Bürger und Föderalismus; Oberhofer, et al., “Citizenship im unita- rischen Bundesstaat”. 4. Oberhofer, et al., Regional Citizenship.

20 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

Recently, federalism in Germany has gone through three steps of constitutional adaptation to political challenges: the reforms of 2006, 2009 and 2017. The background to all these reforms consisted of three topics: (1) the division of responsibilities between the Länder and the federal government and the role of the Bundesrat in decision-making, (2) finance, including financial equalization arrangements between the Länder and surprisingly, because it is not a federalism question, but the result of the European fiscal pact, balanced budget requirements on the federal and the Länder level, and (3) a redefining of Länder boundaries. None of the three federalism reforms mentioned above touched upon the latter problem, although it was on the political agenda of influential politicians.5 The idea to reduce the number of the Länder, to merge some of them for reasons of efficiency, is deeply unpopular with the Länder electorates that would potentially be affected, and therefore the political incentives to get involved in reform efforts in this field are weak.

2. 2006: So far, the last conflict between supporters of more regional autonomy and the power pragmatists

The Commission of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat that prepared the 2006 federalism reform approached its task in a relatively open-minded way.6 The political advice of scientists was supposed to play a prominent role, and it was hoped that the Commission’s deliberations would produce a greater re- sponsiveness of German federalism. The federal government did not expect much of the Commission’s work. It was above all interested in a reduction of the veto powers of the Bundesrat in federal legislation. On the side of the West German Länder, and here, above all, the more affluent Länder, some Länder representatives saw the Commission as a golden opportunity to strengthen regional autonomy. From the outset, however, pragmatists among the politicians had a decisive role. They preferred political compromises, and bargaining, and had no deep longing to strengthen self-rule in German federalism, not least because self-rule could imply greater financial responsibilities for most of the Länder. When political bargaining in the

5. Hrbek, “Neugliederung”. 6. Scharpf, Föderalismusreform; Schneider, Der neue deutsche Bundesstaat; Sturm, “More courageous”. These publications cover all the details of the 2006 reform discussed here.

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Commission started, scientists no longer played a role. Their advice was seen as too principled when it came to decision-making. Only very few Länder prime ministers agreed that Länder parliaments needed more meaningful tasks. Most Länder representatives saw their role to be the reduction of (financial) obligations for theirLänder . This explains the decision to post- pone deliberations on the financial equalization arrangements between the Länder and between the Länder and the federal level at a later date, although everybody in German politics saw the need for reform. But it was also obvious that a reform of the financial equalization formula would create winners and losers.

There was consensus that the 2006 federalism reform had to have six major aims:

1. The separation and reallocation of a considerable number of joint competences of the federal level and the Länder level.

2. Greater transparency of political decision-making and of constitutional rules in order to increase the legitimacy of federalism and to make its institutions more popular.

3. TheLänder Parliaments were supposed to become more autonomous.

4. The centralized tax system should to some degree be reformed to give the Länder greater responsibilities for raising taxes. The provisions for joint financial responsibilities of the federal level and the Länder should be reduced to make the Länder less dependent on federal subsidies.

5. A political majority for opposition parties in the Bundesrat should in the future have fewer opportunities to stop federal legislation.

6. German federalism should be made fitter for the challenges of European integration.

What happened to this consensus, and how stable were the solutions for the six federalism problems the Commission identified?

22 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

2.1. Joint competences

A first step to separate federal and Länder competences was to eliminate a special type of legislation in the constitution—the so-called framework legislation. This type of legislation worked like an EU directive. The federal parliament legislated a policy framework, and it was up to theLänder to find Länder solutions in the context of this predefined set of rules. The problem with framework legislation was, however, that federal legislation tended to define the set of rules for the Länder so narrowly that no policy options were left open to them. For example, a federal framework law was passed that made student fees illegal. Obviously, this left no alternative options for the Länder parliaments. The Federal Constitutional Court, by the way, ruled that this federal framework law was for this very reason unconstitutional. The role of federal judges is an important aspect of federalism reform. This ruling and others of the Federal Constitutional Court provided strong incentives for political decision-makers to invest in federalism reform.

In the past, framework legislation covered a certain area of legislative competences defined by the German Constitution. After the reform, these competences were not given exclusively to the federal or the Länder level, a decision that would have been in the spirit of disentanglement of competences or possibly greater Länder autonomy. Instead, joint decision-making was strengthened by moving competences to the category of joint federal-Länder legislation. This type of mixed responsibility legislation is based on the assumption that if the constitution does not explicitly list a certain competence as belonging exclusively to the federal level, this competence is a Länder competence. There is a list of competences in the German constitution for which this is the case, but with a major restriction. Whenever the federal parliament, in order to secure the social, legal and economic unity of the state, wants to legislate for a Länder competence on the list, the federal parliament is entitled to do so. This kind of intervention of the federal level in Länder affairs, however, did not remain the exception, as the subsidiarity principle would demand; it has become the rule. In other words, all the competences listed in the constitution to which the federal government has access when arguing that this serves the common good have by now become de facto federal competences. Instead of creating more transparency in the legislative process by regrouping competences and separating federal from Länder competences, the 2006 federalism reform, by creating more formal joint decision-making, in fact strengthened the centre.

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Before the 2006 federalism reform, the decision of the federal parliament to legislate in policy fields originally reserved for the Länder meant, however, that a majority of the Bundesrat, where the Länder executives sit, was required to pass this kind of legislation. This potential control was lost to some extent. After federalism reform some competences were exempted from Bundesrat approval (the reduction of the veto power of the Bundesrat was an important aim for the federal government), while others remained under this rule. A third category of legislation was created in this context, a kind of opt-out legislation. What does this mean? It means that with regard to six competences concerning legislation on environmental issues and some issues connected with university education, the federal level may claim its competence and pass a law. Each of the Länder , however, thus has the right to pass its own legislation that can differ from federal law. This was in principle an enormous innovation, which could have strengthened the autonomy of the Länder, especially if it had covered a wide range of policies, which it did not. Länder law took legal precedence over federal law. The consequences of this innovation were, however, minimal, because of the limited number of policies affected and the unwillingness of most of the Länder to use their newly available, but very marginal independence. Constitutional change was relevant for only six policy fields of mostly minor importance (for legislation concerning hunting, for example), or which are not exclusively under national control, because of EU competences (as is the case with environmental policies). Länder opt-outs were not in a category the German public would even notice, and certainly not of a quality to revitalise the subsidiarity principle. The Länder that decide to opt out have their own rules; for the others the federal law is binding. The federal level is entitled to legislate again in the same policy field where a Land has chosen to deviate. The federal law is then binding for the whole country. If a Land wants to opt out again, it can pass a new law. The last law passed in a certain policy field marked in the constitution for opt-outs is binding for a Land, be it the federal or the Länder law (lex posterior rule).

2.2. The reform of theBundesrat

More important with regard to the separation of competences of the federal level and the Länder were the new rules for Germany’s institutional federalism framework. TheBundesrat often had a veto on federal legislation (though it rarely used it), because of the responsibility of the Länder for public

24 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

administration. The Bundesrat worked on the assumption that whenever the Länder were involved in the administration of a law, their consent to federal legislation in the Bundesrat was necessary. This was even assumed when the part on administration in a revised bill remained the same, and changes to the bill were only made in its policy part, and the policy part referred to an exclusive competence of the federal parliament (Bundestag).

The 2006 federalism reform intended to separate more precisely federal and Länder responsibilities with regard to the administration of federal laws. Now, only in exceptional cases the federal level, when making laws, also makes rules for the organization of the execution of this law. This reduces the role of the Länder in federal legislation. The Länder have become more autonomous in the organization of their public administration. The price they pay is: they have less influence on federal legislation, because they lose their voice in the Bundesrat. Should the federal level still decide to make laws that infringe on the autonomy of the Länder when executing federal law, the Länder are entitled to opt out and make their own rules. This is a device that works in parallel to the opt-out legislation described above, and which includes the lex posterior rule.

2.3. A short-term loosening of federal financial steering

A long-standing complaint of the supporters of regional autonomy has been the indirect policy control of Länder affairs by the federal government. This was organized in the context of a political abuse of financial instruments (subsidies/co-financing) by the federal government. After 2006, it was forbid- den for the federal government to co-finance policies that are in the exclusive competence of the Länder (the so-called no co-operation rule. The enemies of this rule dubbed it: the disallowance of political co-operation rule). Why was federal- Länder co-operation a problem? In the past the federal level had used financial incentives even in policy fields were it had no competences to steer Länder policies and thereby reduced Länder autonomy even further. The new rule became a mixed blessing for the Länder. They gained some formal autonomy, but because of their budgetary problems and the lack of federal funds, new policy problems (such as the maintenance of schools) developed. From the outset, much criticism was directed against a separation of Länder and federal responsibilities. Those wanting better policy results did not see

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any benefit in keeping the federal money out of local and regional affairs. They campaigned for an end to the no co-operation rule.

The democratic credentials of federalism, such as self-rule, did not bear much weight in their eyes. After all, another strategy to end the underfinancing of the Länder has always been available: give them fewer tasks or, much better: give them more money. The general public remained uninterested in who does what in German federalism. No German politician tried to connect the 2006 reforms with the idea of bringing democracy closer to the people via the Länder. Though the Bavarian Prime Minister, Edmund Stoiber, who spoke for the Conservatives, called the 2006 reforms the “mother of all reforms”, the result of the reforms remained modest, if one remembers the original demands: more Länder autonomy and a clear separation of responsibilities of the federal government and the Länder. The 2006 reform was a typical political compromise with package deals that look ugly from the outside, but are seen as political works of art by insiders. Just how seriously the German political elite took the reform project as a step to more democracy was best illustrated by the fact that the reform went through Parliament when the whole of Germany was enjoying the 2006 soccer world cup in Germany—a good time to bury news rather than spread it.

2.4. Meagre results7

Not only was the communication of the 2006 reform characterized by a lack of transparency, there was also a great amount of distrust between the political parties involved in the reform process, especially with regard to the financial consequences of the reform. The result was that even agreements on limited payments whenever federal-Länder co-financing was to be phased out were given constitutional status. They were written into the constitution so that no government with a majority in parliament and Bundesrat could alter them. Changes of the constitution need a two-thirds majority in both institutions, which in this case guarantees the status quo. The victim of this

7. By the self-defined standards of the federalism reformers who had announced the “mother of all reforms” and by the standard of greater diversity of policy outputs and more autonomy of the Länder parliaments.

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kind of search for safeguards is the constitution. Its article 143 now looks like a collection of left-overs.

Länder parliaments were probably most disappointed by the 2006 federalism reform. The political executives (in the case of theLänder , the Bundesrat) achieved greater influence. The new legislative powers of theLänder were marginal and the decisive question of their autonomy was hardly dealt with. Some of the new Länder competences are highly visible, but visibility is not the same as importance. These new competences include the rights to decide on shop closing hours, the administration of prisons, legislation concerning meetings in public, homes for old age pensioners and other social groups, restaurants (including no-smoking rules), gambling halls, fairs, exhibitions, markets, some aspects of housing policies, the purchase of agricultural land and land lease, “social” noise of children, sports events etc., the salaries of Länder civil servants and their career patterns, university law and the building of universities, and laws concerning journalism.

For a short period of time Germany went through hot public debates concerning no-smoking rules and shop closing hours. For budgetary reasons the autonomy that the Länder now have with regard to the salaries and pensions of their civil servants is of major importance to them. Unsurprisingly in a federal country without federalists, the first reaction of theLänder governments and Länder parliaments, when they got their new competences, was a preference for uniformity. They seriously asked the question, should we not co-ordinate our legislation with that of the other Länder to avoid differences between the Länder. Diversity, the very essence of federalism, was seen as a threat. Though at present different no-smoking rules in the Länder exist, most Germans believe that this is a bad thing, and that there should be the same rules for the whole of Germany. One could even hear the argument that vis- itors to Germany could get confused by too much diversity of non-smoking rules.8 Competition of policy-making in a federal state is seen as violating the norms of unitary federalism. There was a public outcry when the Land of Hesse offered better salaries than the neighbouringLänder to attract teachers whose supply was short everywhere.

8. See for example, Wiesel, Nichtraucherschutz.

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2.5. No increased financial autonomy for theLänder

At the heart of political autonomy in federalism is financial autonomy. The German Länder were (until 2009) free in their spending decisions, but have never been able to control their income. In Germany, tax laws are almost exclusively made on the federal level. About 75 per cent of all tax income is created by taxes jointly administered by the federal and the Länder level (income tax, corporate tax and VAT). This tax income is then shared by the federal government and the Länder according to certain formulas laid down in the constitution. The system as such, as well as the details of this system, are virtually unknown to ordinary citizens. If it wanted to achieve more Länder autonomy, the 2006 reform would have needed to allocate tax income to the Länder, or at least to define independent resources forLänder taxes.

The 2006 reformers tried to avoid this difficult question. The poorer Länder have no incentives to shoulder responsibility for their income, because they need federal co-financing in any case. Some minor adjustments of symbolic value that overburdened the poorer Länder were still made by the 2006 reform. It has been agreed that after federalism reform and a long wait- ing period until 2019, the co-financing of the construction of universities and university hospitals and the building of local streets, out of the federal budget, will end, and that the federal government will no longer provide incentives for the building of council houses. After 2019 theLänder will shoulder these new financial responsibilities, but without a corresponding sum of money provided by the federal budget. A more profound fiscal reform was postponed to the next reform of federalism, de facto to 2009. What the reform clarified was the problem of unfunded mandates, i.e. the fact that the federal level legislates and then local government has to cover the cost of legislation. The federal level is now no longer allowed to create mandates with financial consequences for local government.

2.6. Less veto power for the Bundesrat?

For the federal government the most important incentive for the 2006 federalism reform and for compromises with the Länder was the chance to reform the Bundesrat and to reduce its veto power. Federal governments want to govern with their parliamentary majorities, and do not want to take an opposition

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majority of Länder executives in the Bundesrat into account. As mentioned above, one important device the reform used to come closer to this goal was to allow an autonomous administration of federal law by the Länder. This was supposed to reduce the number of bills for which the Länder could claim a role for the Bundesrat in federal decision-making. Whether this reform reached its quantitative goal, i.e. to reduce the share of bills for which the Bundesrat has a veto from about 60% to about 30%, is—when we look at the data we have for the years after the reform—not exactly clear. A quantitative reduction of the number of bills that need the consent of the Bundesrat is, however, undisputed.9

But does this matter? The answer is no, because a quantitative reduction of bills that need the consent of the Bundesrat is of secondary importance. Such bills include many policies or changes of law of minor importance or policies that are uncontroversial. What really matters is that because of interlocking policy-making in Germany, very important policy fields with a high political profile, such as health policies or tax policies, still need the consent of the Bundesrat. With regard to the aim of a diminished role of the Bundesrat in federal legislation, however, the 2006 reform also had adverse effects. It widened the field for a Bundesrat veto, because now the Bundesrat has to agree to federal legislation when federal legislation implies the transfer of money or money equivalents, including services, to a third party. Most laws have such financial consequences. All in all, the 2006 reform took only tentative steps in the direction of a separation and disentanglement of central government and Länder competences. Joint decision-making in the Bundesrat remained the rule. The federal government was in part successful in improving top down, “efficient” government, because it reduced the number of bills for which the consent of the Bundesrat was needed.

2.7. Fit for Europe?

The federal government can also be seen as the winner with regard to the decisions of the 2006 federalism reform that concerned European integration. One of its aims was to solve the “German question”, a question that seems to have been invented by the federal government, because it sees the Länder as unwelcome competitors in Brussels. Germany confuses its partners and

9. See for example, Risse, “Zur Entwicklung der Zustimmungsbedürftigkeit”.

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the EU institutions by speaking with too many voices in Brussels, the government argued. From the government’s perspective federalism reform was supposed to reduce the role of the Länder in Brussels. TheLänder had, however, hoped that federalism reform would provide a chance to improve their influence. Their justification was the principle of subsidiarity. The Länder argued that much needed to be done. But even today the German Länder are still not part of the permanent representation of Germany in Brussels. They have their own offices, which they regard as quasi-embassies, and which the federal government sees more as information offices. The Länder compete with one another and the federal government for the attention of EU institutions. German federalism remains uncoordinated in Brussels, and the Länder have not found a way to stop the transfer of their powers to Brussels. Wheth- er subsidiarity control and/or legal proceedings at the European Court, as guaranteed by the Lisbon Treaty, will bring some relief here, is disputable. In many cases, for example with regard to the media competence of the Länder, the Lisbon Treaty comes much too late.

The 2006 federalism reform was crystal clear, when it came to new financial consequences of Germany’s EU-membership for the Länder. TheLänder now have to share the financial burden, if Germany is punished by the EU for violating the Maastricht criteria, or if the European Court fines Germany for non-compliance with a directive or an order. Federalism reform was also explicit with regard to the few occasions when the Länder have the right to speak for Germany in the EU Council of Ministers. The role of theLänder was diminished. Instead of being able to claim a European role whenever Länder competences are on the European agenda, as the old paragraph in the Ger- man constitution read, the Länder now have a more restricted role. The new paragraph in the German constitution is precise and allows a representation of Germany by the Länder only when the following policy fields are on the agenda of the EU Council of Ministers: education in schools, culture, and the media. The reform Commission did not produce the fresh approach for German multi-level government in the EU the Länder had hoped for.

2.8. Where did German federalism stand after 2006?

The 2006 federalism reform was certainly not a very bold step to trans- form Germany’s federalism. It adjusted some minor rules of federal- Länder

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co-operation and had the new idea of a very limited possible policy opt-out for the Länder with regard to federal legislation. The reform changed very little with regard to the unitary nature of German federalism. What started as a promise to re-federalize German federalism ended in marginal reforms that found neither political nor societal support. TheLänder took what they could get, because some changes looked as if they were advantageous. What they did not do—though some of them paid lip service to this idea—was to open a debate on the original spirit of the constitution. Some were content that they can now vary tax rates for the purchase of real estate. The rate was two per cent before 2006 for all the Länder, and it was raised by most Länder governments (especially the left-wing governments) to up to 6.5 per cent in 2017.10

Underlying the 2006 reform process, there was always the question: why should politicians invest political capital in a reform the population was not interested in, and which does not win them elections? Federalism reform was in its essence and methodologically a top-down reform organized by the political executives of the national and Länder governments, although officially negotiations were held between the federal parliament and the Länder executives. In the end, two civil servants, as ghost writers of the leading politicians of the two major political camps, the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, which were about to form a grand coalition, wrote down the compromises found for the reforms.11 More than the wish to reform federalism the intention to form a grand coalition made the reform possible, because only the grand coalition could guarantee the necessary two-third majorities in the Bundesrat and in parliament. Before it was decided that the grand coalition would be formed, an education issue was brought forward by the Social Democrats to justify their opposition to any reform.

The belief among segments of the political elite that the 2006 reform was supposed to be a turning point for German federalism soon lost the weak support it had. The idea that a more pronounced vertical separation of powers would be good for federalism, that it would increase democratic responsive- ness and would give the Länder parliaments new strength, was confronted with the most serious obstacle of all, the lack of financial resources on the

10. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 21, 16. 11. Holtschneider and Schön, Die Reform.

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Länder level. There are several examples for this problem and parallel to the Commission’s work on federalism reform, the federal government and the Länder executives negotiated new policies co-financed by theLänder and the federal government.12 This is proof that the decision-makers themselves took the separation of competences of the Länder and the federal level, which they praised as a tool for a new era of German federalism, not very seriously.

The political guarantee of access to nursery schools for all children in Ger- many is one example of business as usual when the Commission debated the disentanglement of federal and regional tasks. Nursery schools are the responsibility of local governments. As the 2006 reform no longer allowed unfunded mandates, in theory the federal parliament could not make a law that forces local government to provide funds for nursery schools. Again in theory, the federal parliament was also unable to make such a law for another reason: it infringes on Länder competences. But all political parties wanted such a guarantee of general access to nursery schools for German children. Both the Länder and local governments were, however, unable to cover the costs this decision was to cause. The federal level was willing to pay, but federalism reform no longer allowed federal intervention.

Instead of a new initiative to revise the 2006 constitutional reform and its principles, the political decision-makers found a way around the very reform they had just agreed upon. Pragmatism was more important than the strengthening of the Länder autonomy. How was the constitution side- stepped? Step 1: the federal government creates a special budget for public investments. The Länder can apply for subsidies to invest in buildings. When the Länder receive this money, they pass it on to their local governments that now have the resources to build nursery schools. Step 2: School buildings without staff are nonsense. One has to find a way to pay the staff’s salaries. So, the federal government transfers VAT income to the fiscal equalization fund that provides financial resources for the Länder. In theory and from a legal point-of-view, the Länder were free to do whatever they wanted with a greater share of federal tax income as part of the fiscal equalization process. To prevent the Länder from using this freedom, an administrative agreement between the federal government and the Länder was signed that forces the latter to use the new money for the salaries of the nursery school staff. This

12. Scharpf, Föderalismusreform.

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agreement was, of course, in a legal sense, void, but as all parties involved accepted it, it will not be challenged in the Federal Administrative Court. After all, everybody involved knew that the only purpose of this whole procedure was to break constitutional law.

The example shows that for politicians (and the population) in Germany only policy outputs count. The input side of politics, the questions of political participation, Länder autonomy, regional democracy or an adequate role of the Länder parliaments in German democracy, is not on anybody’s agenda anymore. The dominant role of the federal government and the strengthening of unitary federalism is accepted without political opposition. The few voices that in 2006 could still be heard in favour of a more decentralized federalism are no longer of any importance.

3. 2009: A federalism reform with almost no federal content13

The great hope with regard to the 2009 federalism reform was that it would add the separation of financial powers to the separation of competences aimed at with the 2006 federalism reform. In 2009, federalism reform was also initiated to settle financial equalization disputes between theLänder and the federal government and among the Länder. The horizontal equalization model used so far created no positive incentives for fiscal prudence of a single Land. TheLänder that were successful, had to transfer the lion’s share of their above average income to the poorer ones, and if the poorer Länder made no efforts to improve their lot, the otherLänder and the federal government ensured that at the end of the day they had just as many resources and in some cases even more resources than the economically more successful Länder. Plans were also made for a new system with regard to the beneficiary (Länder or federal level) of tax receipts.

As there was a general fear in each of the Länder (and especially in the poorer ones) that it could be one of the losers if the problems just mentioned came to the conference table, in 2009 the reform of the horizontal financial equalization model was (again) postponed. Instead—inspired by pressures from

13. Sturm, “Föderalismusreform II”; Sturm, “Verfassungsrechtliche Schuldenbremsen”.

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Brussels—the idea of a mechanism to avoid annual budget deficits moved into the reformers’ focus of attention. This is, of course, at least at first sight, no federalism issue. The only federal aspect deficit controls have is that Länder deficits matter. In Germany the public deficit in the Eurostat definition is made up of the federal deficit, theLänder and local government deficits and the deficits of all types of social insurance.

It is telling that this time the Commission that prepared the reform from the outset worked with no outside expertise. Political decision-makers did not want to involve “outsiders” when their most important interest, their financial resources, were discussed. A lesson from the 2006 reform effort was—at least for the politicians involved—that non-politicians only create obstacles in their deliberations and lack a proper understanding of how the game of politics is played.14 The result of the Commission’s work was a balanced budget proposal for both the federal and all Länder budgets. This was written into the federal constitution with two-third majorities of the federal parliament and the Bundesrat.

There was no outcry from the Länder parliaments. This tells us a lot about Germany’s unitary interpretation of federalism. In other countries with federal constitutions and balanced budget rules on the state/provincial level, such as the US or Canada, the respective state or provincial parliament decides on a balanced budget rule for the state/province. In federalism, regions have budgetary autonomy, they are sovereign in this respect, and the same goes, of course, for the German Länder. Political decision-makers in Germany turned federalism upside-down and decided on the national level to limit regional budgetary autonomy without the consent of any regional parliament, but with the support of regional executives in the Bundesrat. This goes against constitutional provisions on the Länder level and violates the principle of a separation of powers. Regional executives cannot come together and restrict the autonomy of Länder legislatives. Not all the Länder parliaments, but most of them, just a few years later (shamefully) changed their Länder constitutions and included a balanced budget requirement. The German public did not even take notice of this obvious attack on the spirit of federalism. Unitary solutions in themselves seemed convincing, the disregard of Länder constitutions did not matter.

14. Sturm, Wie funktioniert Politik?

34 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

With the 2009 federalism reform, German politicians invented a device that was supposed to help them overcome their own inability to balance the annual budget without creating new debt. It is based on Keynesian assumptions and relies heavily on mathematical models of economists. From the perspective of German federalism four aspects of the 2009 reform are important:

1. There is an imbalance regarding the right to go into debt when the federal level and the Länder are compared.

2. A permanent subsidy for those Länder too poor to balance their budgets on time is possible.

3. The amount of joint policy-making of the federal and theLänder governments increased again.

4. No convincing mechanism to enforce the deficit rules exists.

The 2009 federalism reform assumes that a budget is balanced when it is balanced over the economic cycle. However, for the federal budget, by definition, a balance is already achieved when the budget decision produces a moderate deficit of 0.35% of the GDP. The argument is that the federal government needs to be able to start new political initiatives for which public debt may be a suitable instrument, and for this reason it should be allowed to declare an imbalanced budget as balanced. The Länder are not seen in the same category. They, as well as the federal government, may ignore the balanced budget rule, if a downturn of the economic cycle forces them to do so, but in principle they have the obligation of a zero deficit. The richer Länder had made the point that Länder already in debt today should not have the right to go into deeper debt (however limited the size of new financial obligations may be), because finally the richer Länder will have to bail out the poorer ones via the horizontal financial equalization mechanism. The federal government had to balance its budget by 2016, the Länder have to do so by 2020, if no catastrophic circumstances or natural disasters beyond their control arise that force them to make an exception to this rule.

Four Länder: Saarland, Berlin, Sachsen-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein, receive 800 Million Euro annually from the otherLänder and the federal government to enable them to balance their budgets by 2020. This aid will be monitored annually by a Stability Council. The Council can sanction any

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 35 Roland Sturm

of the four Länder if they do not make use of their resources according to the rules. Sanctions include the repayment of money received. The newly invented Stability Council, a joint federal- Länder institution, is exactly the opposite of an institution that would be based on a separation of competences. It strengthens the unitary character of Germany’s federalism. The Council consists of the Federal Finance Minister, the Länder Finance Ministers and the Federal Economics Minister. It is jointly chaired by the Federal Finance Minister and the current chairperson of the assembly of Länder Finance Ministers. Instead of making progress with a separation of political responsibilities, we are back in the mainstream of German joint policy-making. After 2016 or 2020 the Stability Council may criticize theLänder or even the federal government when they produce budget deficits, but it has less power of enforcement than the European Stability and Growth Pact on which it was modelled. It can ask for reports and multiyear budget plans, it can decide that a Länder is breaking the rules, but ultimately it can only ask the respective Länder to do better in the future. In other words, it can raise its voice, but nothing spectacular happens if no one listens.

So far, the Stability Council (an important federal institution, but unknown to the general public) has taken the control of the four Länder singled out for special treatment seriously. There are, however, severe doubts whether all the Länder will be able to balance their budgets by 2020. The 2009 federalism reform did not make the Länder better off. But it certainly further reduced their autonomy. As mentioned, the Länder do not control (most of) their income, and now—without the right to go into debt, and still underfinanced —their capacity to decide on expenditure was severely restricted. If Länder are in financial need, there is only one way to go: ask for federal money, and if necessary give up more Länder competences in exchange.

4. The 2017 reform: the Länder sell out15

The 2009 reform did not provide a solution for the most pressing problem of Germany’s federalism: the imminent end of three co-financing agreements between the federal government and the Länder. In 2019 the financial equal-

15. Renzsch, “Vom ‘brüderlichen’ zum ‘väterlichen’ Föderalismus”; Hennecke, “Auf der In- tensivstation”, 6.

36 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

ization formula will come to its legal conclusion. The same will be true for transfers to the East German Länder in the framework of the so-called Sol- idarity Pact and for the federal subsidies regarding the tasks that became exclusive Länder competences after the 2006 federalism reform and were still co-financed by the federal budget for a limited time to facilitate the necessary adjustments in the Länder.

In contrast to 2009, the Länder prime ministers got together and found a solution in December 2015 that—not surprisingly—was based on a formula that demanded more money from the federal government. In 2016 the federal government entered into negotiations, but with the precondition that the Länder had to trade autonomy and competences for the financial aid they expected. Only a handful of politicians took part in the negotiations, the federal parliament was not substantially involved, although its budget committee organized some hearings that did not change, however, the compromise reached. In June 2017 parliament and the Bundesrat accepted thirteen changes of the constitution and additional legislation—the most profound revision of German federalism in the history of the post-war German constitution.

The 2017 reform ended the horizontal equalization arrangements between the Länder. It is hoped that this limits budgetary conflicts between richer and poorer Länder. Horizontal equalization, though in the past not the most important source of income for the poorer Länder, was always defended as an essential feature of German federalism. It was seen as a symbol of federal solidarity and had a quasi-ideological status. Overnight the Länder buried this ideology, because they believed there was a better way to organize financial resources. The federal government will increase the Länder share of the VAT income as of 2020. Richer Länder will get less than their share from this enlarged pool of resources, poorer ones will get more. At least this was the plan. A forecast by KPMG showed, however, that the redistributive effect expected has limits. All in all the richer Länder get richer and most of the poorer ones get poorer.16 This may create new conflicts. But what is more important, most of the Länder now fully depend on the goodwill of the federal government to secure the financial resources they need. The federal government takes control. It even offers money for policy failures. Those

16. Results published in Der Spiegel, December 3, 2016, 37.

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 37 Roland Sturm

Länder with weak research performance in their universities, for example, can expect special federal aid.

The new federal architecture is further illustrated by the considerable price the Länder had to pay for the federal government’s financial largesse. Article 104b of the Constitution now gives the federal government a say in those Länder policies it co-finances. This is exactly the opposite of the intention of the 2006 federalism reform that wanted to keep the federal level out of Länder decisions. The new Article 104c even allows the federal government a role in local affairs when it comes to local educational infrastructure. And the federal government can provide local governments with adequate financial means, if their respective Land does not make the financial provisions it should. There seems to be no limit for federal influence any more as long as the federal government is able to provide the necessary financial resources. An all-party consensus concluded (the Bavarian Conservatives of the CSU, and two independent-minded Länder prime ministers,17 Armin Laschet (Con- servative, North Rhine-Westphalia) and Winfried Kretschmann (Greens, Baden-Württemberg) seem to be the only ones that still hesitate) that we soon need a revision of the 2006 constitutional reform and an end to the no co-operation rule that prohibits federal interventions in Länder affairs. The 2017 reform also contradicts the 2009 reform, because it assumes that two Länder will not be able to balance their budgets as planned. Bremen and the Saarland are guaranteed an additional sum of 400 million Euro of federal money annually to help them balance their budgets. This kind of subsidization may go on forever, because no time limit is mentioned in the constitution.

The federal government also asked for the transfer of other Länder competences to the federal level. TheLänder agreed to a federal control for the administration of taxes. The federal government assumes that richerLänder treat their taxpayers with more caution to attract investors. It hopes to avoid differences in the quality of regional supervision. The federal government widened its competences with the 2017 reform. There is, for example, a federal responsibility for motorways and long-distance roads, but the task of keeping this infrastructure in good shape was administered by the Länder

17. Kretschmann, Winfried and Armin Laschet, “Der Bund soll die Länder angemessen ausstatten”, 8.

38 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

(obviously because of their proximity to infrastructure problems). TheLänder had to give up this task. The federal government will take over in 2020 and has already announced that it will privatize road infrastructure maintenance. Privatization is seen as a convenient way to keep the costs of infrastructure maintenance off the books to avoid them making it more difficult to balance the federal budget. The specifics of privatization led to a conflict between the anti-market Social Democrats and the pro-market Conservatives in the federal government. The compromise found allows public-private partner- ships for specific parts of the motorways and limits the ability of the new company to raise money on the markets.

The new financial arrangements of German federalism will come into force in 2020. A most peculiar article (143f) was added to the Constitution. It allows the federal government or three Länder governments to demand a renego- tiation of the 2017 reform as of January 2031. If in five years (after 2031) no compromise is found, the 2020 arrangements must come to an end. This is a piece of unconstitutional law in the constitution. The legislator (the parliament(s)) does not decide upon legislative and even constitutional change, but governments (the executive should have no role in law-making). Germany’s federalism is increasingly dominated by the arrangements of political executives. A comparable problem is the fact that the new arrangement for the administration of the motorways that was given constitutional status can be changed by routine Bundestag legislation. Without a revision of the constitution, where the responsibility is given to the federal level, and the necessary two-thirds majorities in the Bundestag and in the Bundesrat for constitutional change, administrative tasks in this field can be re-transferred to a Land. When he signed the 2017 reform bill into law, the Federal President—though he accepted the bill as a whole—remarked in a letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel and to the President of the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) that in his view this provision is breaking the constitution. Nothing has followed, so far, from the President’s advice. The 2017 reform not only strengthened unitary federalism in Germany, but also executive federalism. The driving force behind the reform were the Länder prime ministers who acted as super pragmatists, even disregarding constitutional rules, as long as they could secure additional income for their Länder.

With regard to its dependence on federal financial largesse, Berlin is in a special position. As a Land it is poor, and it profited in the past from the solidarity of the other Länder. The new financial equalization agreement

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 39 Roland Sturm

broadens its financial base. In addition, Berlin gets special federal aid for being the German capital. This aid is legitimized by a special treaty with the federal government. The current arrangement started in 2018 and will be in force till 2027. Berlin receives 50 million Euro annually, a total of two billion Euro.18

5. Executive federalism

As the experience of the three most recent reforms of federalism in Germany shows, the decisions on the future of Germany’s federalism were made by executive bargaining processes. Executive dominance sidelined regional parliaments. Executives of all political levels took on the role of legislators who dictated the future role of subnational governments via national constitutional change. With few exceptions, federalism reform was, surprisingly, not a topic that had a high profile in regional parliamentary debates, especially regarding the 2006 reform.

What explains the dominant role of political executives in German federalism? At least three interpretations can be offered: (1) the party political colonization of political institutions. The bargaining position with regard to federalism reforms was less dependent on regional preferences than on the logic of national party politics. Both the representatives of the federal level and the Länder representatives often put party discipline first. The most telling example is the 2006 federalism reform that only came into existence because the formation of a grand coalition after the 2005 national election allowed a political compromise between the Conservatives and the Social Democrats.19 (2) The German coalition state. Coalitions on all levels of government can only work if parliaments guarantee majority support. They themselves are no longer the place where political compromises are ham- mered out. Bargaining in coalitions and between coalitions of different color puts political executives in the driver’s seat when decisions are made. (3) The office-seeking logic. Political executives seek re-election. German political parties define their priorities with an eye on impending elections, even if this means a disregard for the constitutional order of competences. Länder

18. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 9, 2017, 6. 19. Sturm, “Die Föderalismusreform”.

40 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

executives, thanks to their party political majority in the Länder parliaments, are able to silence regional parliaments; sometimes they do not bother to involve them in decision-making. One should not forget that the loss of regional autonomy of parliaments and the increase of federal- Länder joint decisions is only a disadvantage for Länder parliaments, not Länder governments, which increase their influence in national politics via the Bundesrat in this process.

In addition to the Bundesrat, the conferences of regional ministers and heads of regional governments are coordinating regional executives, mostly with their federal counterparts. One of the last strongholds of Länder autonomy is education. All political parties agree that the future of education is essential for Germany’s future. In 2006, some Länder executives still thought they could defend their regional autonomy by making education an exclusive core competence of the Länder. Twelve years later, during the negotiations of the political parties for a national coalition in 2018, education was dealt with by federal decision-makers of all parties, although this topic is still formally ultra vires for them. Whatever the constitutional status of a policy field, national decision-makers (with the consent of regional heads of state that were for example involved in the negotiations to form a national coalition in Germa- ny) do not hesitate to intervene.

6. Output orientation of German politics

German political discourse has a strong output orientation that works in favor of unitary federalism. The yardstick for a successful output orientation of German politics nowadays is social justice (mostly understood as additional social expenditure). The German constitution characterizes Germany as a social federal state (sozialer Bundesstaat). Political decision-makers often see this constitutional precondition of German politics as justification for the welfare state in Germany. A problem with German federalism may arise, however, if the respect for the welfare state leads to a contempt for diversity. It is quite understandable that welfare provisions should be similar or equal all over Germany (although federalism in theory allows diversity here), but it is a misconception of the opportunities federal states have if each expression of federal diversity of social policies is seen as problematic. Political executives, trapped in the logic of a very broad-based coalition state, tend to look for consensus in German politics, even if this means opting for the lowest

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 41 Roland Sturm

common denominator. So, it has become hard to defend diversity of political outputs in the German political context. Still, as public administration relies on the Länder, there remains a federal element—reduced, however, primarily to political decision-making procedures. For this reason, unitary federalism in Germany is often seen in policy-making as an over-complicated way to make simple decisions. Complexity, so the argument goes, can be reduced by a national solution; in other words, more unitary federalism.

7. The case of Bavaria: A party tries to play the autonomy card20

The case of Bavaria demonstrates the contradictions unitary federalism produces. On the one hand, Bavarian political executives fight hard for a leading role in national politics and accept a reduction in regional autonomy as the price to be paid. On the other hand, whenever this seems politically useful, the Bavarian government claims that it has the right to act on its own. For this Bavarian strategy, unitary federalism has now set up major obstacles, however. Nevertheless, regional decision-makers tend to communicate a regional ability to act.

Bavaria is a special case in German politics. The Land has developed a strong regional identity. And this regional identity finds its political expression not only on the Land level, but also on the federal level. There is a widespread misunderstanding that what the governing Conservatives of the CSU want is more autonomy for Bavaria or a greater decentralization of state powers in Germany. This misunderstanding is nurtured by the party itself and its self-styled role as champion of federalism. The CSU as political party is, indeed, a separate political entity, but its purpose is to play a role in national politics. To secure such a role it uses its regional base. Here it needs to be successful. No matter what the CSU’s allies in its conservative sister party CDU outside Bavaria want, the CSU will always have only one priority: an absolute majority of seats in the Bavarian parliament. This makes the CSU an awkward partner for the Conservatives in the rest of Germany, at least as long as the Bavarian electorate has preferences different from those of Germany as a whole. Symbolic gestures of anti-Berlin politics may help to

20. Sturm, “Counter-Secessionism”.

42 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

close the regional ranks, but should not be misunderstood as an expression of autonomist politics. The overarching aim of the CSU is not to strengthen the separate political existence of a Bavarian polity.

In 2018, in the context of an impending Bavarian election, the CSU felt forced to test the limits of the remaining autonomy of the German Länder. It started its own initiative to deal with asylum-seekers and refugees, a topic of decisive influence on the 2018 election in Bavaria. The “Bavarian” plan included among other ideas, the hiring of smaller planes to fly illegal immi- grants, accompanied by Bavarian police, back home (and not to wait for a bigger national flight organized by the national border police), to support asylum-seekers with non-monetary aid instead of cash, and to work with the federal government in the preparation of centres for incoming refugees. Here, fast decisions are supposed to be made as to whether refugees get the permission to stay or whether they have to go back to their home countries. The federal home secretary is the chairman of the CSU, which facilitates Ba- varian-federal co-operation. But, even under these favourable circumstances the intention of the Bavarian government to opt for its own strategy in the politically contested refugee question does not create many opportunities. Unitary federalism does not leave much room for regional autonomy. It is an open legal question as to whether Bavarian police should be allowed to go abroad. In fact, everything the Bavarian state can do is limited to the field of public administration. Bavaria invented some new procedures to implement federal law, but immigration law is national and international law. Whatev- er the further-reaching intentions of the Bavarian government may imply, nothing more than executing national law is possible.

8. Conclusion

In recent decades, Germany’s federalism has become more unitary. Simple models of path dependency do not suffice to explain the profound constitutional change we are witnessing. The nearest thing to a convincing expla- nation is a political culture argument that refers to the mindset of German policy-makers and their priorities. Very rarely do they prioritize participation and democracy. Most of the time they think about efficiency, results, and electoral success. Now and then there is a policy window that allows the re-federalization of German politics, as parts of the 2006 federalism reform

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 43 Roland Sturm

did. And one can never predict when the Länder prime ministers will get together to protest against the intrusion of the federal government, as they did in January 2017, for example, when the Federal Home Secretary wanted to centralize the internal security apparatus, or, when the Federal Minister of Economy started to subsidize regional electricity grids for green electric power, in the same month.

Just like the federal government’s interventions, the political initiatives of the Länder are not guided by a federal vision. What counts is political control and the expected efficiency of national solutions for policy problems (especially from the perspective of the federal government), improved policy outputs (especially in the view of the Länder), and electoral success, an aim of all parties on all political levels. What has no influence on decision-making in Germany is proximity to the promise federalism makes, namely more regional autonomy, bringing politics closer to the people, regional participation, accountability and transparency. German federalism may at first sight not look like a unitary state; in day-to-day politics it has developed many political equivalents. With the almost complete loss of control over their budgets, the Länder developed into administrative units of the nation-state. This is not the end of conflicts between the national and the federal level. As the Bavarian effort to develop a regional refugee policy demonstrates, such conflict may have a high profile, but in essence, it can only be about the administration of a policy.

The 2017 federal coalition treaty (a coalition of Conservatives and Social Democrats) announced a National Council with the task of planning education. This is in line with executive federalism, and the assumption that more unitary federalism is the solution for policy problems. The aim of the coalition partners is to create an institution that streamlines the Länder educational systems and raises their standards. A higher quality and a comparable level of educational achievement all over Germany is the goal. Typically, the debate on how to set up such a National Council that looks after a core competence of the Länder did not focus either on education or on the democratic implications of centralizing education policies. The decisive question seems to be who is in control, the federal government that wants to shape Länder policies or the representatives of the Länder who try to defend at least some autonomy in this field.

44 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 Unitary Federalism

Federalism is the battleground of political executives on the Länder and the national level. The federal government is in the best position, because it has the financial means that win arguments. Increasingly, shared rule means de facto not equality of partners but the dominance of the federal level. Self-rule has been sidelined. Germany’s federalism, not least because the Germans do not mind, has become a prime example of unitary federalism.

Cited references

Bertelsmann-Stiftung. Bürger und Föderalismus. Eine Umfrage zur Rolle der Bundesländer. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann-Stiftung, 2008. Hennecke, Hans-Günter. “Auf der Intensivstation”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (October 27, 2016). Hesse, Konrad. Der unitarische Bundesstaat. Karlsruhe: C.F. Müller, 1962. Holtschneider, Rainer, and Walter Schön. Die Reform des Bundesstaates. Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2007. Hrbek, Rudolf. “Neugliederung: Ein (fast) folgenloses Dauerthema deutscher Politik”. Jahrbuch des Föderalismus, vol. 10 (2009): 173-188. Keman, Hans. “Federalism and Policy Performance. A Conceptual and Em- pirical Inquiry”. In: Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt (Ed.). Federalism and Political Performance. London: Routledge, 2000, 196-227. Kretschmann, Winfried, and Armin Laschet. “Der Bund soll die Länder angemessen ausstatten”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (November 16, 2017). Oberhofer, Julia, Julia Stehlin, and Roland Sturm. “Citizenship im unita- rischen Bundesstaat”. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 52, n. 2 (2011): 163-194. Oberhofer, Julia, Dieter Roth, Roland Sturm, and Felix Wille. “Regional Cit- izenship in Germany: Solidarity and Participation in a Unitary Federal State”. In: Alisa Henderson, Charlie Jeffery, and Daniel Wincott (Eds.). Citizenship after the Nation State. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014, 80-108. Renzsch, Wolfgang. “Vom ‘brüderlichen’ zum ‘väterlichen’ Föderalismus: Zur Neuordnung der Bund-Länder-Finanzbeziehungen ab 2020”. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 48, n. 4 (2017): 764-772. Risse, Horst, “Zur Entwicklung der Zustimmungsbedürftigkeit von Bun- desgesetzen nach der Föderalismusreform 2006”. Zeitschrift für Parla- mentsfragen 38, n. 4 (2007): 707-712. Scharpf, Fritz W. Föderalismusreform. Kein Ausweg aus der Politikverflechtungs- falle? Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 2009.

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Schneider, Hans-Peter. Der neue deutsche Bundesstaat. Bericht über die Umsetzu- ng der Föderalismusreform I. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013. Sturm, Roland. “Die Föderalismusreform: Gelingt der große Wurf”. In: Ro- land Sturm, and Heinrich Pehle (Eds.). Wege aus der Krise? Die Agenda der zweiten Großen Koalition. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 2006, 113- 132. . “Föderalismusreform II: ‘Schuldenbremse’, neokeynesianischer Glaube an die Steuerbarkeit der Wirtschaft und das altbekannte Instrument der Politikverflechtung”.Gesellschaft-Wirtschaft-Politik 58, n. 4 (2009): 487-499. . “More courageous than expected? The 2006 reform of German federalism”. In: Jan Erk, and Wilfried Swenden (Eds.). New Directions in Federalism Studies. London / New York: Routledge, 2010, 34-49. . “Verfassungsrechtliche Schuldenbremsen im Föderalismus”. Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 42, n. 3 (2011): 648-662. . “Counter-secessionism and autonomy in the Federal System of Ger- many: The Case of Bavaria”. In: Diego Muro, and Eckart Woertz (Eds.). Secession and Counter-secession. An International Relations Perspective. Bar- celona: CIDOB, 2018, 91-98. . Wie funktioniert Politik? Die Beweggründe des Politischen in den Nation- alstaaten und der EU. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2018. Wiesel, Christian. Nichtraucherschutz in Deutschland: Überblick und Entstehung der Rauchverbote in der Gastronomie. Baden-Baden: Nomos 2014.

46 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 17-46 The Decentralization of Poland 1989-2018: From Partisan Disagreement to a Vehicle for Successful Absorption of EU Cohesion Funding

Adam Holesch Post-doctoral fellow at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)

abstract This article draws the main lines of development of the territoriality of the Polish state, taking into account the divergent dynamics of its regional evolution. Building on a historical account, it describes how the decentralization process unfolded, leading to the reform in 1998/1999, which administratively decentralized the state without, however, changing its unitary nature. By analysing the complexity and diversity of the EU’s cohesion policy, the paper also addresses questions that are central to theoretical arguments about EU influence on the divergence of regions. It concludes that even if the EU cohesion policy can be seen as a success in Poland, the amount of funding was not sufficient to reduce the differences between the Polish voivodships, which have been growing in recent decades. Paradoxically, the successful use of EU funding did not prevent the massive electoral wins of an EU-sceptic party in the poorer eastern regions, which were supported by a special EU fund. keywords Poland; decentralization; regionalization; EU cohesion policy; PIS; voivodship funding; unitary state.

Introduction

When in December 2017 the European Commission initiated the so-called Article 7 proceedings against Poland, experts started to look more closely at the “rebel” member state. The Polish development was surprising, because before the Eurosceptic Law and Justice (PiS) government came to power in 2015, Poland had been seen as an exemplary accession candidate and quickly

Article received on 17/09/2018; approved on 29/10/2018.

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 47-73 DOI: 10.2436/20.8080.01.30 47 Adam Holesch

became a trustworthy partner after joining the EU in 2004. In the following decade, it was the top performer economically among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries; one of the reasons for this was its efficient use of the EU cohesion policy.

Not only its insistence on the “Polish” way to reform the judicial system and the Constitutional Court—which went against EU law and values— surprised the Europeans; the EU also denounced Poland’s lack of solidarity in the refugee crisis. Suddenly, Poland was seen as a state which, while taking advantage of EU funding, did not comply with EU values or rules. This new-found tension between a successful absorption of EU funds and open infringement of EU law provoked a discussion about the future distribution of EU funds and possible punishment mechanisms for “non-compliant” member states.

While an analysis of all the reasons for the Polish “rebellion” is beyond the scope of this article, by examining the regional development and decentralization process, this paper is one of the first to solve at least part of the puzzle. The decentralization of Poland and its integration into European structures may have produced losers during the transition who later supported Euro- sceptic parties. With good reason some authors point out that the eastern Polish voivodships have been the electoral stronghold of the PiS government since 2005. The voting patterns in the east, which is also called “Poland B”, stand in opposition to the economically successful “Poland A” in central and southern/western Poland, which widely disapproves of EU-sceptic policies.

In this article I will analyse the political and territorial development of Po- land into a strong unitary, albeit administratively decentralized, state. I will then examine the reasons for the current territorial differences. I will go on to examine the state structure, placing emphasis on the process of decentralization and how this process influenced the regionalization of Poland and the role the EU played in that process. I will then show the different political decentralization preferences of the actors after 1989 and examine how these preferences have changed. By taking a closer look at the European- ization of Polish regional policy, I will show that after an unruly beginning to the decentralization process, the EU became an important player, strongly influencing Polish regional policy. Nonetheless, EU funds were not able to close the gap between the regions. Finally, I will analyze these developments against the background of the recent EU-Poland crisis.

48 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 47-73 The Decentralization of Poland 1989-2018

This article will draw the main lines of development of the territoriality of the Polish state, focusing on all the divergent dynamics of its regional evolution. By analysing the complexity and diversity of the EU cohesion policy, the paper also addresses questions that are central to theoretical arguments about EU influence on the divergence of the regions. The answers to this puzzle may enrich research on territorial politics, regionalism, EU cohesion policies and EU studies.

Decentralization and regionalization in the literature

In a unitary state sovereignty remains at the centre. The sub-state regions have only those powers which the centre transfers to them and which the central government can withdraw at any time. This transfer of political powers to a regional unit has been called “devolution”. The non-division of sovereignty makes the conceptual definition of a unitary state relatively sharp. However, unitary states may differ, especially in terms of their degree of decentralization. They can take many forms, such as centralized unitary states (Greece, Portugal) or decentralized unitary states (the Netherlands, France).

Compared to the term “unitary”, “decentralization” is more difficult to -de fine. Examining the distinction between federal and unitary states, Falleti suggests subdividing decentralization by analysing how many fields of authority transfer it covers. In line with this approach, we are able to distinguish three types of decentralization: administrative, fiscal and political.

Administrative decentralization refers to the range of policies that have been transferred to the sub-state units in the form of social services such as education, health or social welfare. Fiscal decentralization refers to the set of policies which have been designed to increase the revenues and fiscal autonomy of the sub-state units. Political decentralization has been defined as a “set of constitutional amendments and electoral reforms designed to open new or activate existing, but dormant or ineffective, spaces for the representation of subnational polities”.

The distinction offered by Hicks & Kaminski focuses more on Eastern -Eu rope where, during the transition years after 1989, a unitary version of the state with some of the traits of decentralization prevailed. They distinguish

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between three modes of decentralization: devolution, deconcentration and delegation.

Seen from this “unitary” viewpoint, devolution is the greatest division of powers and is defined as a transfer of authority to moderately autonomous bodies which are not under the control of central authorities. In this case, the regional authority is a legal self-governing entity, where the people elect the regional council and the executive bodies are either elected or appointed by the central government. The other two types of decentralization are weaker. Delegation is defined as the allocation of managerial responsibilities for specific tasks to public bodies. These may include local governments or special agencies, which act as agents of the central government. Similarly, deconcentration entails only the transfer of limited responsibility to lower levels of administration. In brief, while devolution refers to a transfer of powers to an independent body, the terms deconcentration and delegation are used by a strong central government which delegates power to organs completely dependent on them.

In contrast to decentralization, in the literature the term “regionalization” describes a procedure or an action which has as its goal the establishment of territorial divisions for the purposes of practical action, i.e. the organization of the state. This process is usually led by the government, which debates and studies proposals, legislates and implements reforms which are founded on endogenous or exogenous conditions such as history, current territorial divisions or socioeconomic dynamics. Bachtler & McMaster argue that the deconcentration of central government responsibilities to regional offices is the most common form of regionalization.

Literature review

From the beginning of the 1990s, scholars argued for an administrative reform of Poland, which finally took place from 1998 to 1999. Gwiazda has divided the accompanying decentralization process into five phases, which will also form the backbone of this analysis. The first two phases are the stage before the administrative reform, which coincides with the EU pre-accession period from 1990 to 1998 and the stage after the reform or the “EU accession stage” from 1998 to 2004. The third period is after Poland joined the EU in

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2004 and before the start of the first Regional Operational Program (ROP) (2004-2006). The final two phases are related to the EU cohesion policy and the ROPs, which were developed by the member states for the programming periods of 2007-2013 and 2014-2020. This cross-fertilization between national and European factors is a permanent feature of any analysis of Poland’s decentralization.

The discussion about the conditions which influenced the administrative reform has been lively, with many actors arguing whether national, European or both factors were decisive in its final shape. In this literature, Gorzelak & Kozak and Brusis point to the pre-communist and communist past as the most important factor. Also Hughes, Sasse and Gordon contend that historical factors are more relevant than EU conditionality when explaining regional policy. Sturm & Dieringer see the Polish model as a “compromise between acceptance of the requirements of EU accession, the logic of democratization including the principle of self-governance, and the striving for government control in order to secure Polish statehood”.

Tending to favour EU conditionality as the most significant factor, authors such as Yoder, Pitschel and Bauer argue that it was primarily the EU which influenced the regionalization processes. Swianiewicz claims that European- ization was one of the crucial factors during the Polish reform. The literature agrees that in the run up to accession, the Commission may have influenced policy and institutional development in Poland in several ways, both directly and obliquely.

However, a critical evaluation of the administrative reform has barely been undertaken in the literature. This is surprising given the major impact the reform has had. At the same time, it might imply that Polish or international experts such as the European Commission or the OECD did not see larger problems in the territorial reform. Since Poland’s accession to the EU, some contributions on Poland and the evaluation of the EU cohesion policy have emerged, albeit with cautious evaluations. Surprisingly, it is hard to find an accurate account of the impact of EU cohesion policy on Polish institutions.

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The political system of Poland

The semi-presidential system in place was established by the 1997 Constitu- tion. The head of state is the president, who since 2015 has been Andrzej Duda from Law and Justice (PiS). The president is elected directly by a popular vote for a five-year term. However, the powers of the president are weak and in fact limited to his or her power of veto, which may be overruled by a three- fifths majority of the lower chamber, the Sejm, where the real power lies. The parliament has 460 MPs, which are elected by a proportional system. The upper chamber is the Senate with 100 senators elected by a majority system. The Senate is not a territorial chamber, and there is little inclination to make it one.

The development of the political party system could be divided into two parts. The first is the period of “instability” between 1991 and 2005-2007 when governments took the form of coalitions, which lost all of the subsequent national elections. In this period, the main ideological cleavage was between the post-communist leftist coalitions and the post-Solidarność parties. They were, roughly speaking, divided into a liberal side, with parties such as the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), the Freedom Union (UW) and the Civic Platform (PO); and the conservative-nationalists, which unified first in the Centre Agreement (PC) or Christian National Union (ZChD), and later in parties such as Law and Justice (PiS). During this period no political party won enough votes to govern independently and usually needed a coalition partner. Before 2005, this partner was often the farmers’ party, the Polish People’s Party (PSL). In this unstable period, support for individual parties was very volatile, with old parties disappearing and new ones emerging.

In 2001, a corruption scandal, the so-called Rywin affair, shook Polish politics. It involved efforts by the Polish film mogul Lew Rywin to bribe the editor of Poland’s most popular newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, Adam Mich- nik. This scandal not only revealed major flaws in democratic rule in Poland, but also discredited the governing post-communist party Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and led to its electoral defeat in 2005. After this scandal some of the characteristics of the party system changed. Since the 2005 elections, the post-Solidarność Civic Platform and Law and Justice have divided the political stage between them. These are the only parties to have provided a prime minister or president since 2005. During this period we have also

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seen a rise in populist parties, such as Self-Defence (Samoobrona), the League of Polish Families (LPR), Klub Palikota or Kukiz’15, all of which have won representation in the Polish parliament. The first two were able to form government coalitions and the others had a major influence on Polish politics.

If we examine president-parliamentary relations, we find several periods of “cohabitation” between the president and the parliamentary majority. These were especially important before the reform of the presidential system in 1997, when the president had more powers. The first period was between 1993 and 1995 with Lech Wałęsa as president (1990-1995) and several different prime ministers led the SLD/PSL government (1993-1997). The second “cohabitation” period is of particular interest for this analysis. It began when Alek- sander Kwaśniewski (1995-2000) from the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which was part of the SLD coalition, became president. However, the Prime Minister, Jerzy Buzek, came from the Solidarność camp (Solidarity Electoral Action/AWS). This second “cohabitation” played a major role in the decentralization reform.

The history of decentralization in Poland

The partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia and the Austrian Habsburg Em- pire between 1772 and 1795 is still considered a major event and plays a similar role in Polish collective memory as the French revolution for the French. After the partition, the three divided parts developed differently. In the part controlled by Prussia in the west there was rapid industrialization and Germanization. A liberal approach was taken and there was some autonomy under the Aus- tro-Hungarian Empire in the south. Under Tsarist Russia in the east there was less industrialization and Russification.

These development patterns were a challenge for the unification of Poland after it gained its independence in 1918. In the Interwar Period, 1918-1939, Poland was a multi-national state with minorities such as the Lithuanians, Belarusians, Germans and Ukrainians. It also allowed Upper Silesian autonomy in the south. This period would influence the future perception of territorial organization. The conflicts between Poles, Germans and Silesians in Upper Silesia and between different national minorities in the east were the basis for a future fear of radical decentralization and any kind of strong regional autonomy.

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After the end of World War II in 1945, Poland did not regain full sovereignty and became a part of the Warsaw Pact under the direct control of the Soviet Union and the country’s borders shifted dramatically. In accordance with the agreements reached at the conferences in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam, the eastern lands of pre-war Poland with Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities were incorporated into the Soviet Union while the German regions east of the rivers Oder and Neisse remained in Poland. The new authorities took the form of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), which was established in July 1944. One of its first measures was to abolish the administrative structure introduced by Nazi Germany and initially restore the pre-war administrative division of Poland. Many adjustments followed, among them the cancellation of Upper Silesian autonomy.

Throughout socialist rule the Polish state was unitary with a strongly centralized government. This did not represent a Polish preference, but rather the nature of the regime in power. Built on “democratic centralism”, the state was controlled directly by the Politburo of the United Polish Workers Party (PZPR). Between 1950 and 1975 the administrative division of the state was based on three layers: 17 voivodships (województwo), nearly 400 poviats (powiat) and a changing number of municipalities (gromady).

The centralization of the state increased with the reform of 1975, when a two- tier system was introduced. The reform increased the number of voivodships from 17 to 49, abolished the poviats, and reduced the number of municipalities to 2,500, changing their name back from gromady to gmina (see Table 1).

Table 1. Territorial administrative structures in Poland after 1918

Number of: Period voivodships/województwa poviats municipalities/gminy 1918-1939 16 (plus 1 city) 279 + 13 3,195 gminy 1944-1950 14 (plus 2 cities) 299 3,005 gminy 1950-1975 17 (plus between 2 and 5 cities) 391 from 8,800gromady in 1954 to some 4,500 in 1973, 2,366 gminy in 1973 1975 49 abolished from 2,327 to 2,343gminy since 1999 16 307 (314) + 66 2,478 (2018) gminy Source: Gorzelak (2011), modified by the author

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This reform left the new voivodships even more dependent on the control of the central government, and the administrative units become agents of central power.

Decentralization of Poland after 1989

After the crisis in the 1980s, the future shape of the state was decided at the Round Table Talks held in 1989 between the communists and the opposition forces of Solidarność. This was the first opportunity to discuss regime -re forms and among them the question of decentralization. While the communists were in favour of a centralized state, the Solidarność members favoured decentralization and regional autonomy on the grounds of democracy, efficiency and accountability. In this first meeting, the discrepancies between the two camps were so great that a “statement of disagreement” had to be signed in the chapter on local government.

The poor condition of the Polish regions inherited from the socialist economy was a serious obstacle to the transformation of Poland in the 1990s. Poland was on the brink of an economic crisis with high unemployment rates. For- eign companies were reluctant to invest in this high-risk scenario. Under these circumstances, only a few attempts at an active, or even defensive, Polish regional policy were made. The first defensive measures were directed at neutralizing possible political time bombs in the region around Lodz with its heavy textile industry and the industrial coalmines of Upper Silesia, which suffered during the transition to a capitalist economy.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the two-tier administrative division was maintained. However, while the 49 voivodships worked well as a control mechanism of the socialist party, they were not the optimal solution for the new liberal-democratic Poland. The surviving voivodships were considered to be too small and too weak to become important regional actors. They were also bereft of academic and scientific centres, which could have helped to create regional strategies and programs.

The adoption of the Local Government Act in 1990 introduced elected local government at the municipal level, while the upper tiers of territorial divisions continued to be managed by the state administration. The chief of

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regional administration (wojewoda or governor) was appointed by the prime minister. The 1990 reform was the first step towards decentralization, which was expected to stabilize the democratic structures and minimize the danger that state reforms would be sabotaged by a local post-communist administration.

The 1990 reform was followed by a period of reflection about the future shape of Polish territorial division. While most actors agreed that some kind of decentralization was necessary, opinions regarding the potential autonomy of some regions were more divided.

In parts of the Solidarność camp, regional reforms were seen as part of their “self-limiting revolution”, where the most important value for the future state was liberty (wolność) and the development of a civil society. The strongest advocates for a decentralized state with some regional autonomy were regional organizations in the Regional Social Movement (SRR), which included the Upper Silesian Association (USAS), Kashubian-Pomeranian Association (ZKP), Great Polish Union (UWi) and the Silesian Autonomy Movement (RAŚ).

The only significant non-regional organization that participated was the liberal circle around the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), in whose ranks could be found the future Polish prime minister and current President of the European Council, Donald Tusk. At the beginning of the 1990s, when in the EU the idea of a “Europe of the Regions” was gaining strength, this liberal circle argued in favour of strong and effective regions. However, in the following years, the liberals slowly slipped into a position similar to that of the other Poland-wide parties, which were reluctant to grant requests for autonomy.

For most of the centre-right parties, regionalization was also of some interest, albeit in a very limited way. The conservative-nationalist arm of Solidarność, such as the Christian National Union (ZChD), or other nationalist forces such as the Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), were against decentralization reforms because they would trigger cross-border collaboration between Polish voivodships and their western regions which would threaten the Polish nation and its values. The Polish People’s Party (PSL) also wanted to maintain the status quo. They were in favour of the old two-tier government, arguing that new voivodships in Western Poland would eventually

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connect with the German Länder and destabilize the integrity of the Polish state. PSL’s other worry was that it would lose power at the local level in the agricultural regions, where the party had important electoral strongholds.

Though generally supportive of decentralization in theory, the post-communist party maintained the position that it had defended at the Round Table, arguing that any regionalization of the country would weaken the Polish state. This position was supported by several interest groups, such as members of the central bureaucracy and of the regional administrative elites, who felt threatened by the prospect of regional reform.

The decentralization process came to a halt in 1993, when the post-communist camp regained control of the government. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL), as the junior coalition partner, was the main driver of the pause. The post-communists, as the senior partner, were reluctant to break the coalition due to the decentralization reform and supported the PSL’s position.

At the same time as the discussion on decentralization was occurring, the political actors were working on a new constitution, which would replace the “small constitution” of 1992. The final version was a compromise between the ruling government of the SLD-PSL (1993-1997) and part of the opposition within the Freedom Union (UW).

The constitution clearly establishes the limits of decentralization with Art. 3, where Poland is declared a unitary state. However, it also states in Art. 15.1 that “the territorial system of the Republic of Poland ensures the decentralization of public authority”. The second part of this article (15.2) states that all further decisions are to be specified in a new law. We find another reference to local government in Article 16.1 of the constitution, which says that “the general population of the units of the basic territorial division is by law the self-governing community”.

Even though the articles referring to decentralization were not considered to be unduly controversial, the constitution as a whole was highly contentious and was rejected by most of the conservative forces. It was subsequently approved by a small majority of Polish citizens in a nationwide referendum.

Compared to other states such as Italy or Spain, which position themselves in between a unitary and a federal state and permit regional autonomy, or

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Great Britain, which allows the devolution of legislative and executive power, in Poland the main transfer is of administrative power. The principle that the local government holds only administrative power was strengthened by a Constitutional Court (CC) sentence in 2000. The CC declared that local government is not sovereign, that it should follow central state laws and that it is controlled by central state institutions. In a subsequent ruling in 2005, the Constitutional Court declared that the Polish state is based on the principle of decentralization and not regional autonomy.

The subsequent decentralization reform had to be carried out in accordance with these constitutional rules of the game. The reform began in 1997, when a Solidarność-based coalition formed by Solidarity Elected Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW) came to power and passed a large reform package, including not only administration, but also education, pensions and the health system. The decentralization reform was based on a draft by a policy research institute with ties to the first Solidarność government called the Institute of Public Affairs.

The political conflict between the new post-Solidarność government and the former post-communist block, represented by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995-2000), was not about the possible depth of decentralization, but was limited to the discussion about the number of future voivodships. The government advocated around 11-13 voivodships, which should be based on the network of large metropolises or bigger cities of national importance such as Białystok, Bydgoszcz, Gdańsk, Katowice, Krakow, Lu- blin, Lodz, Poznań, Szczecin, Warsaw and Wrocław. Smaller cities such as Rzeszów or Olsztyn could be included to fill the relatively empty spaces in some parts of the country. The idea to create around a dozen large and strong regions was influenced not only by the ideas of the liberal and conservative circles of the government, but was also in line with the Commission’s criteria for the purposes of administering regional aid and developing strategies for regional development that complied with the NUTS II classification.

The Buzek government’s proposal produced losers among the former 49 voivodship capitals, many of which would lose their regional capital status. Even though not all of them fought to recover their autonomy, President Kwaśniewski (SLD), who had the power of veto, offered an alternative which involved creating 17 voivodships, including some of the unhappiest regions. The final compromise was closer to the president’s suggestion.

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Figure 1. The 16 voivodships in Poland after the reform in 1999

Source: www.nationsonline.org

The Regional Reform of 5 June 1998, which came into force on 1 January 1999, created 16 voivodships. The reform also divided the territory of Poland into 308 (after January 2003, 314) poviats and 2,489 (in 2018, 2,478) municipalities. In the new system, the municipalities (gminy) constitute the basic level of public administration, protected by the constitution and endowed with all the powers not specifically reserved for other levels. The poviats became the middle layers and were responsible for local issues which, based on the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, could not be granted to the municipalities.

Apart from transferring local and regional powers, an important element of the administrative reform was the implementation at the voivodship level of a combined administration concept. In this case, the regional government is represented by the regional councils (sejmiki), which are elected in direct proportional elections. This organ elects the chief executive officer (marshal)

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who represents the region. These regional units of self-governance have formal responsibility for, among other things, planning a regional development strategy. Thesejmiki are responsible for higher education, specialized health services and cultural activities at the voivodship level. They can also collab- orate with foreign governments, regions or private companies.

In this dual system, the regional councils are counterbalanced by the governor (wojewoda), who is appointed by the prime minister and represents the central state. The governor checks the legality of decisions made by all three tiers of the territorial governments and ensures the unity of the state. As a representative of the state treasury, he or she also controls finances. While Swianiewicz argues that the functions of the central state and self-government institutions are separate and that there is no hierarchical subordination between them, other authors argue that the regional level is subordinate to the central level.

Influence of the EU on Polish regional policy

The dispute about the administrative reform of 1998/1999 was the last big debate about decentralization in Polish politics. With EU funding within its reach, all political parties accepted the new administrative order. A good example of a partisan agreement is the National Development Plan for 2000- 2002, where a new regional policy was presented. The voting showed that all parties voted in favour: 394 deputies supported the bill, nobody voted against it and six abstained. Apparently, the possible paybacks from fulfilling EU cohesion policy compensated for the immediate costs for all actors.

Another example of the new paradigm of cooperation was that although the post-communists regained power after the 2001 elections, the new government did not review the administrative reform. The Polish government focused on EU integration by adopting EU principles of regionalization and subsidiarity.

Since the early 2000s, the EU has had a major influence on regional policies in Poland and the development of Polish regions. From the start of accession preparations, Ferry identifies a conditionality of EU membership obligations. Other authors argue that in the pre-accession period, Poland and other CEE countries underwent a process of external governance. Being part of the EU club meant submitting to EU rules. That allowed the EU to influence the

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restructuring of domestic institutions and the entire range of public policies in these states.

Poland and other candidate states must meet two requirements: first, adopt the entire body of EU legislation, and second, decentralize power. Chapter 21 of the acquis communautaire dealt with the field of “Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments”, focusing on launching a “suitable” form of territorial organization for the implementation of Structural Funds. The candidate states concluded that the Commission preferred the establishment of democratically elected, regional self-government. Even though before 1998 there were no formal written exchanges between the Commission and Poland on the content of regional policy, the Commission’s preferences were conveyed through other informal means. The pre-accession EU funding programmes, such as PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD, gave direct assistance to Poland and established the necessary informal channels. Other informal methods were through bilateral meetings at the ministerial and expert level or working papers, where the European Commission created an incentive structure for reforms. From 1997 onwards, the Commission’s formal views were set out in regular reports.

The decentralization reform of 1998/1999 met most of the EU requirements laid down in Chapter 21, however, suddenly it was not clear if the Commission itself sticks to its decentralization goals. From early 2001, the Commission proactively emphasized a clear preference for the centralized management of structural funds in the CEE, which resulted in Poland pushing regional authorities to the side. Apparently, the Commission doubted the ability of regional authorities to cope with programme management responsibilities, and only some tasks were decentralized.

The EU has gradually come to dominate Polish regional policy since 2000. National, regional and local elections started to be driven by the motivation to obtain the largest possible amount of pre- and post-accession structural and cohesion funds. Swianiewicz went so far as to ironically call the Ministry for Regional Development, established in 2005, the “Ministry of EU Funds”.

Besides that, the need to comply with EU standards in many policy fields influenced local political discourse. Poland willingly followed the logic of fulfilling theacquis conditions because these were balanced by the opportunities offered by EU membership and participation in EU Cohesion policy

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programmes. By issuing regular reports on progress, the Commission assumed a “gate-keeping” role, exercising considerable influence over policy development and governance. The weight of the Commission was also different. Despite the fact that, following the failure of the European Constitution in the 2000s and the economic crisis in the 2010s, the Commission lost most of its strength, the Commission of the 2000s has been a strong institution, driven by the intention not only of widening but also deepening the EU.

Nonetheless, once Poland became a member state of the EU, even the “strong” Commission lost its gate-keeping role. Since 2004, the EU’s cohesion policy has been decided during the bargaining about the European Union budget for 2007-2014 and 2014-2020, where the Commission is only one of the actors.

Surprisingly, only one year after joining the EU, Poland turned slightly Eu- rosceptic. The elections in 2005 were won by the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), which formed a coalition with other Eurosceptic parties such as the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defence (Samoobrona) for a short period of time. Despite its partially anti-EU narrative, this coalition did not renege on the commitment to take full advantage of the EU cohesion policy. In the 2005 election manifesto, the PiS underlined the importance of EU structural funds for Poland’s economic development and was critical of limiting the EU budget and structural funds. The liberal opposition of the Civic Platform did not dispute these policies.

The development of the Polish regions before 2004

At the beginning of the 1990s we see few differences between Polish regions. This is mainly due to the centrally planned communist economy, which led to a cohesion policy based on the centralist state approach. It tried to divide economic resources equally amongst most regions. Nonetheless, at the same time, the communist state, following the doctrine of heavy industrialization, created new regional “champions” or strengthened some of the old economic powerhouses. These were in the big steel and industrial complexes of Gdańsk, Warsaw, Upper Silesia, Lodz and Krakow. With the transition, the rules of the game totally changed. In the newly introduced democratic-capitalist system, one of the main divergent factors was the flow of foreign capital. This capital tended to choose well-developed regions with human capital and an appealing infrastructure or geographic position.

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Following the creation of the 16 voivodships in 1999, it is possible to start to compare Polish regions. Between 1998 and 2004 Poland in total grew steadily in per capita/GDP terms. While in 1998 per capita income in Poland was 36% the EU-15 average, by 2004 it had grown to 50.7% the EU-25 average. Nonetheless, development was not even. While all Polish voivodships made progress, some voivodships took bigger steps than others (Table 2). The big- gest development took place in the Masovian voivodship with its capital Warsaw (+24), then Silesian (+17), Lower Silesian (+16), Greater Poland (+16) and Łódzkie (+15). The regions in the east also grew, albeit at a much slower pace, with Subcarpathian (+8) and Lubelskie (+2) closing the list.

Table 2. The development of Polish voivodships 1998-2004 (GDP/capita in PPS)

GDP/capita GDP/capita in (+) Difference in PPS (Index, Voivodship/Polish name Capital PPS (Index, EU- between EU - 25 = 100), 15 = 100), 1998 1998-2004 2004 Masovian/Mazowieckie Warszawa 53 77 24 Silesian/Śląskie Katowice 40 57 17 Lower Silesian/Dolnośląskie Wrocław 36 52 16 Greater Poland/Wielkopolskie Poznań 38 54 16 Łódz/Łódzkie Łódź 32 47 15 Pomeranian/Pomorskie Gdańsk 36 50 14 Lubusz/Lubuskie Gorzów W./Zielona 33 45 12 Góra Opole/Opolskie Opole 32 44 12 Kuyavian-Pomeranian/ Bydgoszcz/Toruń 33 45 12 Kujawsko-Pomorskie Świetokrzyskie/Świetokrzyskie Kielce 27 39 12 Western Pomeranian/Zachodnio- Szczecin 35 47 12 pomorskie Podlaskie/Podlaskie Białystok 27 38 11 Warmian-Masurian/ Olsztyn 28 39 11 Warmińsko-Mazurskie Lesser Poland/Małopolskie Kraków 33 43 10 Subcarpathian/Podkarpackie Rzeszów 27 35 8 Lublin/Lubelskie Lublin 33 35 2

Note: PPS, purchasing power standard. Source: Eurostat (2007)

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There are different explanations for this development. There is no doubt that Warsaw, as a metropolitan capital, was the primary beneficiary of “networkization”, which allowed it to integrate successfully into the global economy. Besides that, cities with a population of over 500,000 such as Poznań, Wrocław, Kraków, Gdańsk and Lodz have grown thanks to newly emerged service companies, which triggered a surge in development in their surrounding areas, pushing their voivodships to the top of the table, when one analyses GDP/capita in PPS. While these more developed regions experienced greater inflows of foreign capital, economically weaker regions had to cope with major structural difficulties. In the eastern part of Poland these regions have fused into a large macro-region sharing similar economic difficulties.

The development of the Polish regions after 2004

The regional debate after the Polish accession to the EU in 2004 dealt above all with questions relating to how to implement EU cohesion policy successfully. While some experts called for the need to invest in the innovative and knowledge-based economy, political elites were interested in policies with an immediate effect, such as infrastructure reform. In the end, the second approach prevailed. Besides that, we find a discussion over which regions to support. While some experts wanted to focus on the most developed regions by creating “growth engines” others preferred an equal division of the funds to decrease the gap between poor and rich regions.

Following the two years of the Law and Justice (PiS) government, which did not question the necessity of absorbing EU funds, in 2007 the Civic Platform (PO) under Prime Minister Donald Tusk came to power. Ruling in coalition with the Polish People’s Party (PSL), the PO maintained the territorial division.

Donald Tusk, born in Kaszuby, a region with a slightly different ethnic make-up from the rest of Poland, had expressed sympathy in the 1990s for the regionalization of Poland, with possible autonomy for some of the regions. Tusk moderated his preferences a decade later, partly because of the radicalization of his former partner in the Social Regional Movement (SRR), the Upper Silesian autonomist party Silesian Autonomy Movement

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(RAŚ), which asked for asymmetrical decentralization for Upper Silesia. Tusk and the PO favoured symmetrical decentralization but refused any form of asymmetry.

Since 2004, Poland’s economic development has been remarkable. It was the only country in the EU which did not suffer the recession after 2008 and whose GDP has grown steadily, at least until 2018. However, focusing on regional development, we can see that the polarization of the voivodships has increased. We see the outstanding performance of the Masovian voivodship, which grew by +32 points from 2004 to 2016. The next six voivodships are the same regions which were already better off in 1998. In this group, the Lower Silesian and Greater Poland voivodships grew by more than 20 PPS points, while the Lesser Poland, Pomeranian, Łódzkie and Silesian voivodships grew by between 19 and 14 points. The Subcarpathian voivodship, with a growth of 13, is the first of the Eastern voivodships and occupies the TH8 position. Despite constant growth in all Polish voivodships, the east and the north have fallen back compared to the western and southern regions.

The differences have grown, despite the fact that the EU launched a unique supra-regional programme for less developed regions in the EU (at that time five eastern Polish voivodships) in the form of the Operational Development Programme of Eastern Poland (Program Operacyjny Rozwój Polski Wschod- niej) between 2007 and 2013 with around 2.4 billion euro. When that ended, a follow-up programme called the Eastern Poland Programme (Program Wschodnia Polska) with a budget of 2 billion was set up between 2014 and 2020. It focused on supporting entrepreneurship, the development of road infrastructure and urban transport and improving the quality of railway infrastructure in the Eastern macro-region.

While the east has been included in EU funding and there are some positive trends in some of the regions, such as the Subcarpathian voivodship, the north is becoming the new loser in regional development, with Podlaskie, the Western Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian voivodships at the bottom of the table. Only the Pomeranian voivodship with the Gdańsk/Sopot/Gdynia metropolitan centre is developing positively in the north (+16).

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 47-73 65 Adam Holesch

Table 3. The development of Polish voivodships 2004-2016 (GDP/capita in PPS)

GDP/capita in PPS GDP/capita in PPS (+) Difference since Voivodship/Polish name (Index, EU - 25 = 100), (Index, EU - 28 = 100), becoming a member of 2004 2016 the EU, 2004 - 2016

Masovian/Mazowieckie 77 109 32 Lower Silesian/Dolnośląskie 52 76 24 Greater Poland/Wielkopolskie 54 75 21 Lesser Poland/Małopolskie 43 62 19 Łódz/Łódzkie 47 64 17 Pomeranian/Pomorskie 50 66 16 Silesian/Śląskie 57 71 14 Subcarpathian/Podkarpackie 35 48 13 Lublin/Lubelskie 35 47 12 Lubusz/Lubuskie 45 57 12 Opole/Opolskie 44 55 11 Kuyavian-Pomeranian/ 45 56 11 Kujawsko-Pomorskie Świetokrzyskie/Świetokrzyskie 39 49 10 Podlaskie/Podlaskie 38 48 10 Western Pomeranian/Zachodnio- 47 57 10 pomorskie Warmian-Masurian/ 39 49 10 Warmińsko-Mazurskie Note: PPS, purchasing power standard. Source: Eurostat (2007, 2018)

Regional policy after the change of government in 2015

In 2015, Law and Justice (PiS) won the parliamentary and the presidential elections, taking over the institutions of the Polish state. This electoral success was not thanks to special promises for the eastern voivodships, but on electoral promises for all Poles, such as child support, the so-called 500+ (award- ing 500 złoty for every second child, and also for the first child if the family income is less than 800 złoty/person) or lowering the retirement age to 65 years for men and 60 for women. Nonetheless, during the electoral campaign

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in 2015, the PiS politicians warned about the growing divergences between east and west, claiming that more funds for eastern Poland were necessary.

The electoral result came as a surprise to many Western experts, who did not understand how Poland, as the main beneficiary of the EU cohesion policy, could vote for a party that many had defined as Eurosceptic. If we look at the territorial support for PiS we see that its strongholds are in the eastern regions, which have grown at a much slower pace than other voivodships over the last two decades. PiS got the most support in the eastern part of Poland, taking Subcarpathian (53.1%) and Lubelskie (49.9%) with an absolute majority and Podlaskie with 47.4%. The Catholic east stayed loyal to PiS, which during the campaign presented itself as opposed to the liberal establishment in Warsaw and the western part of the country. However, PiS’ electoral win should not be reduced to its strongholds. They won in 14 out of 16 voivodships, although in the western voivodships they did so by a smaller margin. PiS won in most of the cities against the Civic Platform (PO) and in the villages against the Polish Peoples Party (PSL).

Apparently, the EU cohesion policy, which brought modern infrastructure and some economic growth to the eastern voivodships was not sufficient to change existing voting preferences. Experts analysing EU cohesion policy argue that while the EU funds reduced some of the differences between the voivodships, they were insufficient to eliminate all inequalities. Following this reasoning, although the state and the EU provide conditions that en- courage the development of activities and the creation of new jobs through private capital, any increase in income and general wellbeing of the community in a free market economy depends on private investment. Apparently, the Eastern or Nordic voivodships have yet to attract this investment.

The PiS government has barely touched the territorial division since 2015, mainly because the proposal to separate the capital, Warsaw, from the Mas- ovian voivodship failed due to resistance from some municipalities around Warsaw. Nonetheless, there was a division, but of a more statistical nature. While in recent decades Warsaw has attained high development levels very quickly compared to the EU average and will lose access to EU cohesion funds, the lack of administrative separation of Warsaw and its metropolitan area from the surrounding Mazovian voivodship has become a problem for the rest of the voivodship, which is poorer. Therefore, the Polish government submitted a proposal to divide the voivodship into two statistical second level

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units (NUTS-2) at the beginning of 2016, which would allow the voivodship to use full EU funds after 2020.

The PiS government is planning territorial adjustments. It wants to create two new voivodships, one in the north, the so-called Middle-Pomeranian voivodship with two capitals, Koszalin and Słupsk, and the Częstochowian voivodships in the south of Poland. Already in 2015, the councillors from Częstochowa stated that the city and its surroundings have the potential to “meet all the challenges posed by the new province”. An economic argument has recently emerged as well. Being part of the Silesian voivodship, Często- chowa could soon exceed the EU average, which would result in important cuts of EU money.

Conclusions

With virtually no tradition of democracy in the past and after decades of suppression of regionalism under communism, Poland has taken significant steps toward decentralization and regionalization. It has reversed the centralist past with the introduction of democratic governance at the local level, mainly due to the sudden need to integrate into the global economy and the European Union.

In Poland, the process of democratization and possible decentralization took place at the same time. The tension between consolidating the nation-state and decentralizing authority to the regions finally led to a “light” form of decentralization, which was administrative in nature. In this period, the requests of regional minorities (Upper Silesia) for more autonomy negatively influenced the debate. Even politicians from the post-Solidarność camp -ar gued that the decentralization reform should not endanger the unity of the reborn liberal-democratic state.

The administrative reform from 1998-1999 administratively decentralized the state but did not affect its unitary nature. Since the reform, structurally it resembles the French model of regionalization. The concerns about the cohesion of the state, advanced in the period preceding the introduction of the reform as the main argument against large voivodships, is not on the table any more.

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The territorial redistribution has been widely accepted, with only a few crit- ics. These usually focus on the excessive concentration of the development potential in Warsaw and other metropolitan areas, such as Wrocław, Krakow, Poznań and Gdańsk. Poland is not likely to move toward full regionalization or federalism. Such a development would be contrary to its historical tradition as well as public opinion.

The effectiveness of the territorial division introduced by the 1998/1999 -re form had a great impact on the absorption of the EU cohesion policy. The reform created large voivodships, which became perfect containers for absorbing most of the EU funding. The decentralization of some of the regional functions of the state has largely contributed to the success in absorbing EU funds at the regional and local level. This success led to the perception of Poland as the country that best used EU funding.

Nonetheless, although Poland as a whole has grown, discrepancies between the regions have too. Even if the EU cohesion policy can be seen as a success in the eastern part of Poland, there has not yet been sufficient funding to -re duce the differences and attract more foreign investment. Nor has it changed voting behaviour in this part of Poland, which is the electoral stronghold of the Law and Justice (PiS) government. Paradoxically, the successful use of EU funding did not prevent the electoral win of an EU-sceptic party, whose legal reforms triggered the so-called Article 7 proceedings against Poland. The position of the EU in this conflict is anything but easy.

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REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 47-73 73 Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria

Peter Bussjäger Professor at the Institute of Public Law, State and Administrative Science at the University of Innsbruck, and Director of the Institute of Federalism in Innsbruck Christoph Schramek Research associate (post doc) at the Institute of Federalism in Innsbruck Mirella M. Johler Project assistant at the Institute of Public Law, State and Administrative Science at the University of Innsbruck and the Liechtenstein Institute

abstract From a comparative perspective, the Austrian Federal Constitution appears rather centralized, given that the majority of legislative competences are allocated at the federal level. However, a closer look indicates that the Länder (the federal units) gain considerable political weight by serving as the administrative centre of gravity; namely, the Länder execute their own laws and most of the laws based on the federation’s subject-matters. Hence, one might speak of “administrative federalism”. History shows that Austrian politics resemble a tug-of-war over the federal division of (legislative) competences. The newly elected coalition government’s program joins the ranks of long-winded discussions on how to make Austrian federalism more efficient. Even if pro-federal by rhetoric, the actual content of the government program is either conceptually ambivalent or substantially in favour of increased (legislative) centralization, especially in the realm of social and educational policy. keywords Administrative Federalism; Austria; Coalition Government; Distribution of Competences; Education; Federal Constitution; Federalism; Federation; Government Program; Parliament; Reform; Government Program; Social Policy.

Article received on 13/08/2018, approved on 06/11/2018.

74 DOI: 10.2436/20.8080.01.31 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 74-100 Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria

A. General Features of Austrian Federalism1

1. History and Development of Federalism

The Federal Republic of Austria was created in 1920 and can thus be ranked among the “old “European federal systems. After the breakdown of the Aus- trian-Hungarian Monarchy in 1918, the federation’s constituent units (here- inafterLänder ) played an important role in building up the new state, as they declared their will to join the new Republic. At that time, seven of today‘s nine Länder, which are mentioned in Art. 2 para. 2 of the Austrian Feder- al Constitution (hereinafter B-VG“ ”), were territories which had survived as entities of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The Burgenland was part of Hungary and only became part of Austria in 1921. The capital, Vienna, was part of Lower Austria and became a separate Länder (federal unit) in 1922.

As a consequence of their rather independent position, the Länder participated in the drafting of the Federal Constitution within the framework of the so-called Länder conferences (Länderkonferenzen). The Länder played a crucial role during the drafting process given that the young Austrian Republic seemingly needed the Länder to establish itself and implement laws. Yet, as time went by, the federal government managed to consolidate its power and thus, the political influence of the Länder decreased. Finally, the B-VG was adopted in 1920. It was based on a compromise between the Social Democrats (hereinafter SPÖ) and the Christian-Social-Party (hereinafterÖVP ). While the former preferred a strong unitary state, the latter supported the formation of a federation similar to Switzerland. These entirely different attitudes towards federalism resulted in the Austrian Federation being a federation by principle, yet a technically rather centralized one. From the outset, the B-VG was thus characterized by significant elements of unitarism and a clear imbalance of power in favour of the federal government.

Since its promulgation, the B-VG, which had been primarily conceptualized by the famous legal scholar Hans Kelsen, has been amended on numerous

1. Part A of this essay is based on a contribution by Bussjaeger/Schramek for the 3RD edition of the Handbook on Federations. The contribution has not been published yet due to editorial delays.

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occasions. These amendments have largely accentuated the B-VG’s unitary tendency by transferring additional powers to the federal level. This approach also applies to the two amendment acts of 1925 and 1929, especially with respect to the issue-areas of “security administration” and “police organization”. Moreover, the amendment of 1925 is of particular importance because it brought the distribution of competences into force as of October 1, 1925. However, public education was only constitutionally regulated in 1962, given that this issue-area had been the subject of longstanding and severe political disagreement.

After the Second World War, the Federal Constitution of 1920 was reinstated with all its amendments. Once again, Länder conferences took place. At the first conference in September 1945, agreement was reached that theB-VG should be reestablished and that Austria should become a federal republic once again. In the following years, under the federal government of a grand coalition between the ÖVP and the SPÖ, a far-reaching process of centralization started, which culminated in the amendment of the 1962 B-VG. Through this amendment, several of the Länder’s competences with regard to “public education” were eliminated while the federation received a residual competence for all respective matters which had not been listed explicitly in favour of the Länder (Art.14 para. 1 B-VG). The second chamber of the Austrian Federal Parliament, the Federal Council (“Bundesrat”), has never been able to counteract any such centralization processes—neither constitutionally nor politically—despite its mandate to represent the interests of the Länder at the level of federal legislation.

In response, the Länder began to formulate programs to strengthen the principle of federalism. These efforts led to one far-reaching (1974) and several smaller amendments to the Federal Constitution; namely, in 1977, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, and 1990. These amendments can be described as amendments in favour of federalism because they equipped the Länder with an enlarged sphere of influence, with reservations. However, this development affected the distribution of (legislative) competences: smaller amendments in favour of the Länder were then followed by centralizations in significant areas such as “air pollution control” and “waste management” in 1988.2

2. Sturm, “Austria“, 51.

76 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 74-100 Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria

At the end of the 1980s and in view of Austria’s forthcoming accession to the European Union, the Länder called for a fundamental redistribution of competences within the federal system. To this end, a political agreement on the reorganization of the federal state was signed in 1992 by the Fed- eral Chancellor and the chairman of the Conference of Länder Governors (Landeshauptleutekonferenz), the so-called Perchtoldsdorfer Paktum. The agreement contained a schedule for a reform bill, which was drafted in June 1994. However, this draft did not address all contents of the agreement. Despite intense efforts, the reform project could not be realized. Partly, the stand- still was caused by the fact that the SPÖ and the ÖVP had lost the necessary two-thirds majority at the general election in October 1994, which would have been necessary to pass legislation, and thus, the two aforementioned parties would have needed the unattainable support of the opposition to pass bills on a broader reform of the federal system. As a result, the initial draft was further downsized into a compromise formula. Subsequently, the Länder rejected the new compromise. This result turned the reform project into a wasted chance for more federalism, as hardly any new reform projects have emerged in the following years. However, federalism in Austria witnessed a new spin when the system of administrative justice was amended in 2012. The nine administrative courts of the Länder (Art. 129-136 B-VG) enable the Länder to participate in the federation’s power of (administrative) justice.3

The theoretical construction of the Austrian Federation has been the subject of controversial debates for a long time. Basically, three theories exist thereon. According to the monistic decentralization theory, which had been conceptualized by the Viennese School of Legal Positivism, the constituent units are neither federal component units nor sovereign states, but merely decentralized units. The theory of three-circle-federalism by Hans Kelsen differs from the decentralization theory insofar as Kelsen recognizes the legal order of the Republic as the entire state in addition to the legal orders of the federation and its constituent units. By contrast, proponents of the dualistic theory claim that the constituent parts of a federal state are (gen- uinely sovereign) states themselves. This theory can be ascribed to the so- called “Innsbruck doctrine”.4 Although the 1990s witnessed further legal and political debates over various theories, the scholarly dispute on the nature of

3. See below and additionally: Schramek, Gerichtsbarkeit im Bundesstaat. 4. Pernthaler, Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 294-298.

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federalism in Austria underwent a loss of relevance. At the time of writing, the future of federalism in a small state (such as Austria) in the context of the European multi-level system continues to be discussed, especially within the scheme of “regionalism”.

2. Constitutional Provisions Relating to Federalism

Art. 2 B-VG explicitly stipulates that Austria is a federal state consisting of nine autonomous constituent units, the so-called Länder, namely Burgenland, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, and Vienna (Art. 2 para. 2 B-VG). The prevailing doctrine regards Art. 2 B-VG as a provision of a solely programmatic nature. However, federalism is classified as one of the basic principles of theB-VG along with the democratic principle, the republican principle, the liberal principle, the principle of the rule of law, and the principle of the separation of powers. According to Art. 44 para. 3 B-VG, an abolishment or a substantial modification of one of these basic principles is considered as a total revision of the federal constitution which needs to be approved by a referendum.5

According to the jurisdiction of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court,6 the content of the federal principle comprises at least four substantive elements: the distribution of legislative and administrative competences, the participation of the Länder in federal legislation, the constitutional autonomy of the Länder, and the participation of the Länder in the federal administration. However, federal theory suggests that an additional element needs to be taken into account; namely, the autonomy of the Länder in budgeting and spending.

Basically, the distribution of competences is entrenched in Art. 10-15 B-VG. These Articles differentiate between four types of distribution of legislative and executive powers: exclusive federal legislation and execution (Art. 10 B-VG), federal legislation executed by the Länder (Art. 11 B-VG), framework legislation by the federation which is implemented and executed by the Länder (Art. 12 B-VG), and exclusive Länder legislation and execution

5. Bussjaeger, “Between Europeanization”, 12-13. 6. See in this regard: VfSlg 2455/1952; 11.403/1987 and 16.241/2001.

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(Art. 15 para 1 B-VG). The latter is designed as a residual competence, which means that the Länder are responsible for all matters which have not been listed explicitly in favour of the federation. Certainly, the clear majority of competences can be found in Art. 10 B-VG. This provision contains fundamental competences such as the Federal Constitution, foreign affairs, civil law affairs, matters pertaining to trade and industry, labour legislation and public health with certain exceptions. Among others, the Länder remain competent for the issue-areas of building, nature protection and regional planning. Furthermore, the Länder have lost powers in terms of financial matters. According to Art. 13 para. 1 B-VG, the competences of the Federation and the Länder in the issue-area of taxation are regulated by a separate federal constitutional act; namely, the Financial Constitutional Act. This act defines abstract types of taxes and vests the federal legislator with the power to legislate on the distribution of tax-raising powers which are then incorporated into the Financial Adjustment Act (Finanzausgleichsgesetz). The latter is negotiated between the Federation, the Länder, and the municipalities. Against this background, the distribution of financial competences is shaped in a largely centralistic way. In fact, the Länder own almost no independent tax income. As with the finance sector, competences with regard to legislation on schools and education are regulated separately in Art. 14 and 14(a) B-VG.

The Federal Council7 serves as the most important instrument of the Länder to participate in federal legislation. Even though its role as the representative of the interests of the Länder at the level of federal legislation is not explicitly anchored in the B-VG, the organization and functions of the Federal Council clearly indicate the rationale of representing the federal units. Art. 34-37 B-VG contains the provisions governing the organization of the Federal Council. The representatives of the Federal Council are elected by the parliaments of the Länder. According to Art. 34 para. 1 B-VG, the Länder are represented in the Federal Council in proportion to their respective population.

Generally speaking, Austria’s Federal Council is perceived as institutionally weak. This assessment stems from its limited function during the legislation process (constitutional weakness) as well as from the fact that the Federal Council rarely uses its existing functions (political weakness). The so-called suspensive veto serves as the most important function of the federal dimen-

7. See in this regard: Gamper, “Imperfect Bicameralism in Austria”, 46-65.

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sion of national legislation: according to Art. 42 para. 2 B-VG, the Federal Council may challenge a bill proposed by the National Council. However, the National Council can override this veto by repeating a vote on the bill. In addition to the option of suspending federal legislation, an absolute veto is granted to the Federal Council for a limited number of cases. First and foremost, Art. 44 para. 2 B-VG grants the Federal Council an absolute veto in cases in which the Länder’s legislative or executive competences are in danger of being restricted by amendments to the Federal Constitution or constitutional provisions enshrined in ordinary laws.

Besides the Federal Council and its representative functions, the Länder’s right of consent (Art. 3 para. 2, 14(b) para. 4, 94 para. 2, 102 para. 1 and 4, 131 para. 4, and 135 para. 4 B-VG) represents an additional instrument of participation in federal legislation. Art. 42(a) B-VG contains the proceeding through which the Länder can issue (or withhold) their consent to a federal bill.

The constitutional autonomy of theLänder 8 adds a third substantive building block to the federal principle. According to Art. 99 para. 1 B-VG, the Länder’s constitutions can be amended by Länder constitutional law provided the B-VG is not affected thereby. In the past, the meaning of this provision and the word “affected” were debated extensively. The Federal Constitutional Court has clarified this matter by stating that subnational constitutions must not contradict the Federal Constitution.9 This implies that the constitutions of the Länder may codify anything provided they do not contradict federal constitutional law. Therefore, scholars have characterized the constitutional autonomy of the Austrian Länder as a “relative” constitutional autonomy.10

The so-called “indirect federal administration” constitutes the last substantive element. This form of administration is characterized by theLänder’s execution of federal affairs even though they remain a matter of federal legislative competence. The authorities competent in this regard are theLänder Governors who must follow through the directives of the respective federal minister, in their role as indirect federal administrators. Art. 102 para. 1 B-VG stipulates the indirect federal administration as a general rule. However, Art.

8. Bussjäger, “Sub-national Constitutions and the Federal Constitution in Austria”, 88-106. 9. For example: VfSlg 16.241/2001. 10. Compare in this regard: Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der österreichischen Bundesländer, 17.

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102 para. 2 B-VG contains an extensive catalogue of exceptions which can be directly executed by federal authorities. Given that a number of federal laws are based on Art. 102 para. 2 B-VG, the impact of the indirect federal administration is considered to have been outweighed. Beside these four provisions of substantive elements of federalism, the B-VG contains several other provisions which directly affect the Länder:

In general, formal and informal cooperation play an important role in Austri- an federalism.11 In particular, this applies to agreements concluded pursuant to Art. 15(a) B-VG, which are probably the most far-reaching instruments of cooperative federalism in Austria. These agreements may be concluded either between the Länder or between the Federation and all or only selected Länder, to the extent that the agreements are covered by respective competences. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, agreements based on Art. 15(a) B-VG are not directly applicable. In fact, they require an act of implementation by the respective legislative or executive body. Furthermore, contracts between the Federation and the Länder may be based on private law because Art. 17 B-VG determines that the distribution of competences does not affect the ability of the federation and theLänder to act under private law.

Informal cooperation works alongside the Conference of Länder Gover- nors. This horizontal mode of cooperation functions as a relatively efficient counterbalance to the weight of the federal government. Indeed, despite a continuous process of centralization of legislative powers, the Conference of the Länder Governors has developed into an important platform of the Länder, especially with regard to financial equalization and negotiations concerning cost-sharing for the execution of federal law by the Länder and municipalities.

In its first chapter, theB-VG contains a separate section with provisions regarding the European Union (Art. 23(a)-23(k) B-VG). These provisions were implemented with a federal constitutional act prior to Austria’s accession to the European Union. For the Länder, Art. 23(d) B-VG is of particular importance as it entails rules regulating the participation of the Länder and municipalities in the decision-making process of the European Union. This provision states that the Federation must inform the Länder without delay

11. See in this regard: Bussjäger, “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism”, 11-33.

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about all projects within the framework of the European Union which affect the autonomous sphere of Länder competences or could otherwise be of interest to them. Furthermore, the Federation must give the Länder the opportunity to present their views within a reasonable timeframe. Similar proceedings are envisioned by Art. 23(g) para. 3 B-VG with regard to subsidiarity monitoring. According to this provision, the Federal Council must inform the Länder parliaments without delay about all drafts proposed by the European Union and must provide them with an opportunity to state their opinions. Furthermore, Art. 23(a)-23(k) B-VG contains several rights of participation for the Federal Council.

Provisions of fundamental importance with respect to legislation and execution by the Länder are embodied in chapter 4 of the B-VG. The provisions of Art. 95-Art. 112 B-VG are formulated in a fairly detailed manner. They contain regulations concerning the Länder parliaments (Landtag), which affect the legislation of the Länder (Art. 95 B-VG), the constitution and the Länder’s governments (Landesregierung). These governments exercise executive powers in each of the nine Länder (Art. 101 B-VG). The federal capital, Vienna, is governed by separate provisions of Art. 108-Art. 112 B-VG. Vienna is both a municipality (a town with its own charter according to Art. 116 para. 3 B-VG) and a Länd. Therefore, the municipal council also functions as aLänd parliament, the city senate as a Länd government, and the mayor as a Länd Governor. In addition to the aforementioned provisions in chapter 4 of the B-VG, the Federal Constitutional Act of 1925 concerning the Principles for the Establishment and Operation of the Offices of the Länder governments except Vienna serves as a legal basis for the executive measures implemented by the Länder.

Provisions regarding the Federal Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichts hof ) are found in Art. 137-148 B-VG. The Federal Constitutional Court has a wide range of jurisdictional responsibilities, some of which also affect the Länder. Thus, one might argue that the Court has been established as a joint institution of the federation and the Länder. First and foremost, the Federal Constitutional Court reviews and repeals laws promulgated by the federal or sub-national parliament(s). Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court may overrule administrative acts, both of the federal and Länder executives. According to Art. 138 para. 2 B-VG, the Federal Constitutional Court is also responsible for deciding upon competence disputes. Finally, the Court decides

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whether an agreement according to Art. 15(a) para. 1 or 2 B-VG is valid and whether the obligations arising from such an agreement have been fulfilled.

3. Reform Projects

After a structural reform of competences had failed in the 1990s, a new attempt to achieve structural reform took place between June 2003 and Jan- uary 2005, namely the Austrian Convention. This convention was commis- sioned to submit proposals and draft bills for a reform of the Austrian political system and its federal constitution. Whereas the aims of the project were ambitious, the convention finished its work without reaching consent over the most intensively debated matters. These contentious matters concerned the division of competences, the restructuring of the financial relationships between the federal level, the Länder, and municipalities, as well as the creation of a new charter of fundamental rights including social guarantees.

In the following years, further attempts to reform the complicated division of competences also failed. Nevertheless, the Länder have lost further legislative competences, for example with regard to “animal protection” in 2004.

After more than twenty years of reform discussions, a completely reorgan- ized system of administrative legal review was enacted in 2012 and 2013, when Austria’s federal legislator adopted a so-called “9+2 model” with which a Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), a Federal Fiscal Court (Bundesfinanzgericht), and nine Administrative Courts of the Länder (Landesverwaltungsgerichte) were established. Generally, these courts decide upon administrative matters at the second stage, i.e. if decisions by administrative authorities are impugned. From the perspective of federal theory, the reform is of interest insofar as the Länder have become endowed with their own (administrative) courts and thus not only participate in legislating or administrating on behalf of the Republic, but also within the Republic’s ju- diciary branch. In view of the fact that the B-VG created a highly centralized federation, the nine administrative Courts of the Länder can be considered as a substantive move of federalization. This reform became comprehensively effective on January 1, 2014.

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B. Recent Political Dynamics—Federalism and the Subsidiarity Principle within the Government Program 2017-2022

1. Introduction

“We will judge the new Austrian government by their deeds”, said German Chancellor Angela Merkel when Austria’s Chancellor Sebastian Kurz visited her in Berlin on January 17, 2018. Earlier, the latter had remarked himself that his government should be judged by their actions.

Both statements stem from the undeniable scepticism with which the current Austrian government was met, especially by international spectators. Yet, the statements do undoubtedly contain general views since every government needs to be held against their actions. Thus, if the programmatic outlines on federal reforms, as envisioned by the program of the coalition government, are analyzed, it shall not be forgotten that programs need to be implemented. The analysis hereinafter shall scrutinize the feasibility of the announced amendments.

2. Welcome Gifts

When the 25TH legislative period ended prematurely in 2017, the departing government rolled up their sleeves and passed a number of resolutions, some of which had rather far-reaching consequences for Austrian federalism. These legislative acts became political “welcome gifts” for the new coalition government.

The Federal Act on Education Reform Bildungsreformgesetz( 2017)12 established a completely new structure for the administration of schools. Whereas the past system had been characterized by a dualist arrangement of federal and state authorities, the new law envisions educational directorates (Bildungsdi- rektionen) which function as concurrent federal and state authorities. Given

12. BGBl I 138/2017.

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that Austrian federal constitutional law has not foreseen any such administrative authority, one can expect a number of practical as well as theoretical questions within the process of implementing13 the educational directorates, especially given that they will become part of Austria’s federal constitutional law (Art. 113 B-VG).

The abolition of the nursing and care clawback Pflegeregress( ) entered into force by January 1, 201814 and is considered to be even more problematic. The nursing and care clawback was a social policy tool which allowed the Länder to claw back from income and/or property of those in need of care or from third parties (relatives) in order to disburden social security agencies. The abolition was cemented into Austrian federal constitutional law by so- called constitutional norms within ordinary laws: Sec. 330(a) of the Federal Act on General Social Security (hereinafterASVG ) prohibits social security agencies to access property of hospitalized persons, their relatives, heirs, and legatees in order to cover nursing fees. Sec. 707(a) ASVG stipulates that any such ongoing proceedings were to be closed and the respective legislations by the Länder were thereby overruled. As a compensatory means, transfer payments were planned. Yet, it was clear from the outset that those transfer payments would never cover the actual amount of the expenses. Needless to say, the new regulations were heavily criticized by the Länder;15 and the latter attempted to counterbalance the regulations.16 As a consequence, the respective debates also bothered the new coalition government.17 In May 2018, an agreement was reached at the conference of Länder Governors: the federation shall cover fixed and variable costs up to EUR 340 million throughout 2018, while the Länder undertake to refrain from using the consultation mecha-

13. The educational directorates will replace the existing school boards of the Austrian Länder and the federation by January 2019 (Sec. 32 para. 1 Federal Act on the Establishment of Educational Directorates in the Länder). 14. BGBl I 125/2017. 15. “Pflegeregress-Aus: Ersatzfinanzierung ‚zu gering‘“,salzburg.orf.at , 29-06-2018; “Pflegere- gress: Verzicht kostet Vorarlberg 60 Millionen Euro“, der Standard, 01-07-2017; “Pflegere- gress-Abschaffung kommt Land teuer“, vorarlberg.orf.at, 03-08-2017; “Pflegeregress: Die abenteuerliche Kostenschätzung des Sozialministeriums“, OÖNachrichten, 19-10-2017;“Wir fühlen uns nur als Ausfallshafter“, Wiener Zeitung, 04-11-2017. 16. Decision by the Conference of the Land Governors, November 10, 2017 (VSt-7714/4). 17. “Stelzer zu Pflegeregress: ‘Da gibt es nichts zu verhandeln‘“,kurier.at , 16-05-2018.

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nism. From 2019 onwards, payments shall be calculated on the basis of the data collected in 2018.18

One could argue that the Länder would have easily achieved a reimbursement of costs by the federation if proceedings before the Austrian Federal Con- stitutional Court had been initiated. Against this background, it becomes apparent that the new coalition government needed to be willing to compromise with the Länder. In any event, the agreement of May 18, 2018 can be seen as an acid test for Austria’s “cooperative federalism” which is often described as particularly characterized by financial arrangements.19

3. Election Campaign and Election to the National Council 2017

Federalism did not play an important role during the election campaign. On the contrary, election manifestos were characterized by vague statements such as “let’s envision a new distribution of competences”, “clear distribution of competences and financial responsibilities”. Furthermore, increased tax autonomy for the Länder and communities was portrayed as necessary to amplify their room for manoeuvre and responsibilities towards citizens.20 Likewise, the strengthening of regional development was demanded.21

Nevertheless, discussions did not reach beyond the level of commonplace statements. From the perspective of political psychology, the federation was portrayed as in need of reform and reduced influence by the Länder. In this context, the fact that the new chairman of the ÖVP and later Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, had been vested with a sort of general power over party-matters was interpreted as a debilitation of the Länder which are traditionally dominated by the ÖVP.

18. “Länder bekommen heuer 340 Millionen Euro für Pflegeregress-Aus“, Die Presse, 18- 05-2018. 19. Bussjäger, “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism“, 11-35. Fallend, Vom Konsens zum Konflikt?, 6. 20. See in this regard: [Consulted: 22-05-2018]. 21. Ibid.

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4. The Government Program 2017-2022

4.1. Overview

The government program was presented on December 16, 2017 and includes 182 pages. The program is named “Together for our Austria” Zusammen( für unser Österreich).22 With regard to the federal agenda, Chapter I “State and Europe” is of particular importance, as well as the sub-chapters “administrative reform and [federal] constitution”23 and “modern federal state”.24 However, other chapters contain further provisions of importance to the Länder. Thus, the program is characterized by unclear statements which are open to interpretation. As mentioned earlier, the federal government will be judged by its deeds.

In sum, tendencies in favour of centralization overweigh commitments to subsidiarity which can most often be found in the context of the European Union.25 With respect to Austrian federalism, the subsidiarity principle is named along with the re-distribution of competences (p. 17), as well as in the context of legal frameworks for civil protection (p. 35). The rhetoric of the program does not value federal arrangements; on the contrary, one can read that outdated structures need to be overcome.26

As with earlier federal government programs, the cooperative nature of Austrian federalism and the envisioned understanding between the federation and the Länder is accentuated. In this regard, the program suggests that the Länder need to be integrated into the policy/law-making process and that the federation and the Länder need to customize their actions mutually. Furthermore, the need to evaluate planned measures is pointed out.27 However, these provisions can be considered as fairly typical of the

22. “Zusammen. Für unser Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017 bis 2022“, available at [Consulted: 22-05-2018]. 23. Regierungsprogramm, 13-16. 24. Regierungsprogramm, 17. 25. See Chapter 4.2. 26. Regierungsprogramm, 13, 17. 27. Bussjäger, ”’Change‘ auf Österreichisch“, 144-145.

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cooperative dynamic of unitary federations and thus taste of new wine in old skins. Various issue areas have already been detailed by follow-up positions by the federal government—hence, the nature and form of the respective actions can be imagined.

4.2. The Subsidiarity Principle in the Government Program 2017-2022

The federation’s coalition government submits itself to the European Union and promises to contribute as a “reliable and active partner in the development of the European Union”. In doing so, the subsidiarity principle will prevail. Subsidiarity is defined as “the primacy of self-responsibility and smaller units” (p. 9). This definition contradicts the interpretation of subsidiarity in the context of the division of competences (p. 17), according to which tasks should be carried out at the level of the federal government to “ensure that the regulation enfolds efficiency in terms of the citizens”. Certainly, the latter interpretation of subsidiarity does not coincide with the definition of subsidiarity as envisioned by Art. 5 TEU; namely, the stated negative criterion (insufficient implementation on the level of member states, their units, and communities) and positive criterion (added value by implementation on the EU level).28

The future development of the European Union should follow the TH4 scenario of the White Book on the Future of Europe (“less, but more efficient”).29 In addition, the federal government program emphasizes that the presidency of the European Council should be used as a change to actively shape future developments.30

28. Schröder, Grundkurs Europarecht, Munich, 121. 29. European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe, COM (2017) 2025, 01- 03-2017. 30. Regierungsprogramm, 22-23.

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4.3. The Government Program 2017-2022 under the Federal Perspective

4.3.1. Framework Legislation

Set against the backdrop of the envisioned re-distribution of competences, the federal government program envisions the abolition of the framework legislation of Art. 12 B-VG.31 Notably, one can read on page 18 of the program that the normative regulation of social welfare (guaranteed minimum income) shall be completed through framework legislations. This obvious contradiction will be discussed below.

The framework legislation allows the federation to outline general principles and provisions which shall be specified by theLänder through implementation laws (Ausführungsgesetze). Therefore, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court has ruled that the federation is compelled to restrict itself to principles, but must not legislate on details. The Länder must be endowed with a certain content-based design scope.32 Thus, framework legislation is characterized by a “restrained determination of the content of states’ law”.33 On the other hand, the Länder’s implementation laws must not contradict the framework legislation and/or change and/or impede their effectiveness.34

In theory, any such legislation could be an effective instrument for the federal distribution of power.35 Specifically, this type of distribution of competences could help to decrease the federation’s overweight vis-à-vis the Länder. In other words, the idea of combining regional differences with centralized minimum standards would be equivalent to the federal principle of “unity in diversity”. 36

31. Regierungsprogramm, 17 32. VfSlg 2087/1951, VfSlg 3853/1960, and recently VfSlg 17.232/2004. 33. Kröll, “Grundsatzgesetzgebung und Richtlinienrechtsetzung”, 115. 34. Compare in this regard VfSlg 19.658/2012 and Kröll, Grundsatzgesetzgebung, 116-123. 35. Hierzu schon Bussjäger/Schramek, “Catch22: Das föderalistische Paradoxon in Öster- reich”, 336. 36. Pernthaler/Esterbauer, “Der Föderalismus”, 325. Wallnöfer, “Bundesstaatlicher Wert und Unwert von”, 287.

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Up to now, legislative practice in Austria does not match up with the theory. This situation stems from the fact that no justifiable criteria for the required degree of definition by framework legislation exist. Furthermore, many of the laws passed under framework legislation appear rather too detailed; and finally, theLänder are reluctant to use the theoretical scope of formative capacity.37

The situation in Austria seems to be paralleled by similar constellations abroad: the arrangement of Spanish framework legislation faces similar impediments,38 while the respective constellation (Art. 75 Basic Law) was abolished in Germany39 or was scheduled for abolishment as in Italy (the abolishment did not work out due to a negative vote at a referendum on De- cember 4, 2016). As a consequence, the literature does not foresee a promising future for framework legislation.

If the Austrian arrangement of framework legislation was abolished, the respective subject-matters would have to be transferred to the competences of the federation (Art. 10 or 11 B-VG) or to the competences of the Länder (the residual clause of Art. 15 para. 1 B-VG). Subject-matters such as “poverty welfare”, “nursing care institutions” and “electricity” are regarded as critical subjects if such a federal constitutional transformation took place. Thus, a draft assessment on constitutional amendments, which was published on May 30, 2018,40 foresees an entanglement of Art. 12 B-VG, but disregards the controversial topics of social security, nursing care, and electricity. At the time of writing, a respective bill scheduled by the government41 has been submitted to the National Assembly. The bill involves a transfer of subject-matters from Art. 12 B-VG to Art. 10, 11,42 and 15 para. 1 B-VG.

37. Pürgy, “Bundesverfassungsrecht und Landesrecht”, 293-294. 38. Colino/Hombrado, “Machtteilung in Spanien”, 349. 39. Bussjäger, “Schlussfolgerungen und Handlungsempfehlungen”, 807. 40. 57/ME 26. GP. 41. The government bill “RV 301 BlgNR 26. GP” is available at [Consulted: 06-11-2018]. 42. Art. 11 B-VG stipulates the legislation by the federation and administrative implementation by the Länder. Compared to Art. 11 B-VG, Art. 12 B-VG contains substantial benefits for federalism to prevail, namely the prevention of over-regulation and the competence of the Länder to pass executive decrees (“Durchführungsverordnungen”).

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4.3.2. Guaranteed Minimum Income and Social Welfare

The so-called “guaranteed minimum income” is considered to be the Austrian variant of social welfare and is based on Art. 12 para. 1 clause 1 B-VG. Given that the federation had not made use of the competence to legislate guiding principles, the Länder enjoyed considerable freedom to establish their own social welfare programs. Over time, the diverse programs were criticized and led to a 2010 agreement between the federation and the Länder: Under the provisions of Art. 15(a) B-VG, a respective harmonization was agreed upon.43 The agreement ceased to be in force on December 31, 2016, and a new agreement had not yet been reached.

As a consequence, the Länder once again started to establish programs on social welfare autonomously.44 Burgenland,45 Lower46 and Upper47 Austria established a maximum amount of EUR 1,500 with an additional qualifying period of five years of lawful residence in Austria within six years.

Hence, the government program (p. 118) announces the remittal of a framework legislation on social welfare in accordance with Art. 12 B-VG. Whereas this plan contradicts the aforementioned idea to abolish Art. 12 B-VG, it is clear that any such framework legislation on social welfare would seek to curb the rocketing costs of social security and is thus directed against the social-democratic government of the city of Vienna.

The Austrian Federal Constitutional Court has recently annulled parts of Lower Austria’s social security model.48 The ceiling which limited payments to EUR 1,500 for multi-person households and the requirement to account for five years of permanent residence in Austria were regarded as anti-constitutional. As a consequence, the Austrian federation’s coalition government could not model their framework bill on social welfare on the Lower Austri-

43. The agreement was extended in 2013 and 2014 for another year each time. See in this regard: Institut für Föderalismus, 41. Bericht über den Föderalismus in Österreich 2016, 56. 44. This is the case for Tyrol (LGBl 52/2017) and Vorarlberg (LGBl 37/2017). 45. Sec. 10(b) Social Security Act of Burgenland (LGBl 20/2017, Bgld. MSG). 46. Sec. 11(b) Social Security Act of Lower Austria (LGBl 103/20169), (Nö. MSG). 47. Sec 13(a) Social Security Act of Lower Austria (LGBl 41/2017), (Oö MSG). 48. Constitutional Court, G136/2017, March 7, 2018. As a consequence, Sec. 10 para 4, 11(a), and 11(b) of the Social Security Act of Lower Austria were abolished by LGBl 19/2018.

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an model, but presented a different model at the end of May 2018: EUR 863 are programmed as federation-wide unified guaranteed minimum income combined with a leeway for the Länder to adjust subsidies for housing costs. The maximum sum of EUR 863 contains a so-called “work-qualifying bonus” which will be granted if the applicant can verify mandatory school-leaving qualification, or sufficient knowledge of German or English.

4.3.3. Reduction of Blockades?

P. 17 of the government program announces an elimination of mutual blockades between the federation and the Länder. The respective text passage refers to a motion by the Federal Council which was raised during the 25TH legislative period.49 According to the principle of discontinuity, any such motion is regarded as invalid and thus needs to be raised again.50 The respective motion called for a withdrawal of the state governments’ rights of approval over decisions by the federal government on how to adapt the district courts’ parishes.51 These rights of approval have succeeded in hindering reforms on court organization given that state governments were pressured by local communities to sustain their district courts.

In return, the motion foresaw the omission of the federation’s rights of approval on a number of subject-matters which are programmed by the Fed- eral Constitution as subject-matters of the Länder (such as adaptation of the boundaries of political parishes, the organization of the state governments and the appointment of the state chancellor’s deputy [Landesamtsdirektor]).

In line with federal theory, the initiative by the Federal Council appeared to be desirable: first of all, a respective implementation could have entangled administrative interdependencies (which are considerably high compared to international standards). Secondly, motions for legislation by the Federal Council contain a scarcity value and are thus of particular (political) interest. However, it remains to be seen whether the aforementioned text passage of

49. “Regierung einigt sich auf Mindestsicherung neu: Maximal 863 Euro und Nachteile für Ausländer”, in: der Standard, 28-05-2018. 50. 869 BlgNR 25. GP. 51. Id. See also: Institut für Föderalismus, 16

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the government program will be used only to entangle interdependences in the respective issue-areas, or if entanglement will be expanded to other provisions of mutual rights of approval between the federation and the Länder. In other words, as far as the Länder are concerned, the rights of approval gained prominence with the 2012 Federal Act on Administrative Courts52 (Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeitsnovelle 2012) and the recent educational reform.53

The aforementioned government bill (RV 301, BlgNr. 26. GP) does not foresee any further entanglements than those presented in the motion issued earlier by the Federal Council. An overall analysis suggests that the bill’s content—also with regard to the envisioned changes of Art. 12 B-VG’s distribution of competences—might be seen as a slight improvement in favour of federalism.

If all circumstances are taken into account and arguments are built in accordance with the federalist point of view, one might assess the bill’s content as acceptable. At least the bill addresses several dispensable rights of approval with regard to the organization of the Länder’s administrations. It remains to be seen whether the bill is approved by the necessary majorities in both chambers of the Austrian Parliament.

Nonetheless, the government program’s description of the rights of approval as “blocking powers” does not capture the significance of the rights of approval. In fact, the required approval by the Länder for certain bills passed at the federal level depicts an important form of direct participation in federal law-making.54 Thereby, the Länder compensate the political weakness of the Federal Council. From a functionalist perspective, the rights of approval can be classified as acts of federal legislation. Furthermore, these rights serve as instruments of preventive judicial review.55 Up until now, the Länder have not shown any significant intention to block legislative endeavours. If entanglement of the competences exceeded the proposals by the Federal Council

52. Art. 94 . 2, 130 para. 2, 131 para. 4 clause 1, clause 2 lit b, and 135 para. 1 B-VG. 53. Art. 113 para. 10 B-VG (applicable as of 01-01-2019). 54. Bussjäger, “Art 42(a) B-VG”. Lienbacher/Pürgy, “Kooperativer Bundesstaat”, 561. 55. Sonntag, Präventive Normenkontrolle in Österreich, 159-162.

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and the current government bill, they would cause a far-reaching dilution of the Länder’s participatory rights.

Of equal importance is the right of approval of the Federal Council as provided by Art. 44 para. 2 B-VG. This provision allows the Länder to participate indirectly in the so-called competence-competence.56 Even though this instrument was only introduced in 1984, the literature has qualified the latter’s abolition as an overall change/amendment of the Federal Constitution.57

4.3.4. Merger of Social Security Agents

Ironically, the reform of the social security agents which would be targeted only by federal law is of considerable significance for Austrian federalism.58

Currently, Austria has 21 social security agents, which cover the medical, casualty and retirement insurance of diverse policy holders. Due to their modus operandi of self-government, the nine regional (one per federal unit) health insurance funds play a key role within regional healthcare, even though they have been established by federal law (Art. 10 para. 1 clause 11 B-VG).

The federation’s coalition government plans to merge these regional health insurance funds into one single and unified Austrian insurance fund.59 With regard to Art. 10 para. 1 clause 11 B-VG, the Länder might only opt for a lim- itation of damage by demanding that each of the field offices of the future insurance fund would be endowed with fairly far-reaching competences of self-government. Specifically, a certain degree of budget autonomy and the competence of conclusion of general contracts with the regional branches of the medical associations are needed in order to ensure the medical care of (remote) regions.

56. Bussjäger, Die Zustimmungsrechte des Bundesrates, 3. 57. Bussjäger, Zustimmungsrechte, 71-74. 58. Bussjäger, “Unterlage zum Positionspapier über die Reform der Sozialversicherungen (2017)”, available at [Consulted: 08-08-2018]. 59. See in this regard the government bill “RV 329 BlgNR 26. GP”, as available at [Consulted: 06-11-2018].

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4.3.5. Further Demands by the Länder

An entanglement of competences is not only mentioned with regard to Art. 12 B-VG, but generally promised throughout the government program.60 These announcements resemble programs which have already been introduced by the current financial compensation agreement.61 Thus, a recent trend seems to have been prolonged.62

The government program’s concrete proposals contain shifts of competences in favour of the federation. Examples thereof include a “unification of the law of construction technology (p. 17, 47), a “unified youth protection” (p.17, 103), an “arrangement of competences for cross-state civil protection” (p.17, 35), an “adjustment of competences in the subject-matter of gambling” (p. 18), and a “federal legislative competence on matters of energy law” (p. 179).

The program’s most conspicuous proposals are the ideas promulgated under the chapter “efficiency gains within the indirect federal administration” on p. 17: certain tasks of federal administrative authorities should be incorporated into the administrative apparatus of the Länder, but they might remain under the supervision and control of the federation (indirect federal administration). Eligible matters are the Federal Monuments Office, the Federal Social Office, as well as torrent control and spatial planning. On the other hand, one might question the severity of the suggestions in view of the program’s other provisions: the labour inspectorate which would be taken into consideration for any such transfer is named on p. 17 to be incorporated into an agency. Moreover, one can read on p. 95 that the Federal Monuments Office shall be adapted—any dissolution of the latter is thus unlikely.

In addition, the program envisions the establishment of subordinated federal administrative authorities in rural areas; the respective proceedings shall take place in accordance with the Länder (p. 163). However, it remains questionable if this quest for decentralization of federal administrative authorities will be implemented.

60. Regierungsprogramm, 17. 61. On page 17, the agreement names the entanglement of competences as an interim goal. 62. Bussjäger/Schramek, Catch22, 338.

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4.3.6. Deregulation and Adjustment of Laws

Since the Austria Convent, the process of deregulation and adjustment of federal acts63 is considered relevant for federal theory only if the respective matters are federal matters.64 This initiative was widely covered by the media at the beginning of the federation’s coalition government’s tenure.65 The publication of a draft federal act at the end of April 2018 served as a first implementation step.66 The Second Federal Legislation Adjustment Act enters into force on January 1, 2019.67 In addition, the often-mentioned over-fulfilment of EU regulations (“golden plating”) has been tackled in November 2018 (100/ME 26.GP).68

5. Conclusions

Austria’s federal system is commonly described as highly centralized with a dominant role played by the federation and restricted fields of legislative competences exercised by the Länder. Moreover, participation of the Länder in federal lawmaking is—officially—weak because the second chamber has limited competences.

This description, which refers to the legal basis of the B-VG, seems to contradict the prominent role of certain instruments of informal cooperation within the Austrian federation, specifically the Conference of theLänder Governors. Obviously, there is a discrepancy between the provisions of the B-VG and the country’s political reality. In fact, cooperative federalism, with its long tradition, shapes the practical operation of the Austrian federal system, thereby acting as a counterweight to centralizing forces.

In general, Austrian federalism is characterized by a high degree of entanglement between the Länder and the federal order, as well as by a certain

63. Bussjäger/Schramek, “Föderalismus durch Behördendezentralisierung?”, 172-183. 64. Regierungsprogramm, p. 21. 65. “Moser pocht auf großflächige Gesetzesaufhebung”, in: kurier.at, 08-01-2018. 66. Entwurf eines Zweiten Bundesrechtsbereinigungsgesetzes, 42/ME 26. GP. 67. BGBl I 61/2018. 68. See Schröder, “Der Abbau von ‘Goldplating’ durch nationale Deregulierung und das Eu- ropäische Unionsrecht”, ÖGfE Policy Brief No. 22, 2018, available at https://oegfe.at/2018/10/ konkrete-faelle-von-gold-plating/ [Consulted: 06-11-2018].

96 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 74-100 Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria

subordination of the Länder under the auspices of the federation. Several factors explain this fact: first of all, the complexity of the division of competences needs to be mentioned. Another circumstance is the role played by the Federal Council. Thirdly, one should take into account the fact that Länder Governors are responsible for executing federal legislation. Finally, cooperation and hierarchical relations derive from party politics because Austria’s party system is largely integrated across jurisdictional lines, and party politics at the federal level may influence politics at the Länder level, and vice versa.

From the perspective of federal theory, the program of the current Federal Government includes a number of interesting passages. Overall, the program does not suggest that federalism will be strengthened, but rather the opposite scenario is evoked. Demands for more subsidiarity are directed towards the European Union rather than towards Austria’s internal policy. Even though the federation’s coalition government has not yet faced serious conflicts with the Länder, such conflicts of interests are likely to arise, especially if the envisioned reform of the social security agents is to be implemented throughout 2019.

Select Bibliography

Colino, César, and Angustias Hombrado. “Machtteilung in Spanien – For- melle und informelle Prozesse, gegenwirkende Kräfte und impliziter Wandel”. In: Gamper, et al. (eds.). Föderale Kompetenzverteilung in Eu- ropa. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016. P. 349-375. Bussjaeger, Peter. Die Zustimmungsrechte des Bundesrates. Vienna: Braumüller Verlag, 2001. . “‘Change’ auf Österreichisch: Föderalistische Bemerkungen zum Re- gierungsprogramm der SPÖ-ÖVP-Koalition vom November 2008”. In: Kärntner Verwaltungsakademie (eds.). Bildungsprotokolle, 7. 6TH Klagenfurter Legistik Gespräche 2008. Klagenfurt: K-Verlag, 2009. P. 144-145. . “Between Europeanization, Unitarism and Autonomy. Remarks on the Current Situation of Federalism in Austria”. Revista d`Estudis Autonòmics i Federals, 10 (April 2010): 11-39. . “Art 42(a) B-VG”. In: Kneihs Benjamin, and Georg Lienbacher (eds.). Rill-Schäffer-Kommentar Bundesverfassungsrecht. Vol. 11, Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2013.

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. “Sub-national Constitutions and the Federal Constitution in Austria”. In: Michael Burgess, and Alan Tarr (eds.). Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems. Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012. P. 88-106. . “Austria’s Cooperative Federalism”. In: Günter Bischof, and Ferdinand Karlhofer (eds.). Austrian Federalism in Comparative Perspective. Inns- bruck: University Press, 2015. P. 11-33. . “Schlussfolgerungen und Handlungsempfehlungen für die Diskussion über die Reform der bundesstaatlichen Kompetenzordnung in Öster- reich”. In: Anna Gamper, et al. (eds.). Föderale Kompetenzverteilung in Europa. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2016. P. 807-819. Bussjaeger, Peter, and Christoph Schramek. Föderalismus im 21. Jahrhundert. Innsbruck: Institut für Föderalismus, 2012. . “Föderalismus durch Behördendezentralisierung?”. In: Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen (eds.). Jah rb u ch d es Föderalismus. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017. P. 172-183. . “Catch22: Das föderalistische Paradoxon in Österreich”. In: Europäis- ches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung Tübingen (eds.). Jahrbuch des Föderalismus. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2017. P. 336-346. European Commission. White Paper on the Future of Europe. COM (2017) 2025, 01-03-2017. Available at < https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/be- ta-political/files/white_paper_on_the_future_of_europe_en.pdf> [Con- sulted: 23-05-2918]. Fallend, Franz. “Vom Konsens zum Konflikt? Treibende Kräfte, Entschei- dungsmuster und aktuelle Entwicklungen der Bund-Länder-Beziehun- gen in Österreich”. In: Peter Bussjäger (ed.). Kooperativer Föderalismus in Österreich. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2010. P. 1-17. Gamper, Anna. “Imperfect Bicameralism in Austria: The Role of the Bun- desrat”. In: Rudolf Hrbek (ed.). Legislatures in Federal Systems and Mul- ti-Level Governance. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010. P. 46-65. Government Program by the Austrian Coalition Government. “Zusammen. Für unser Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017 bis 2022”. Available at [Consulted: 22-05-2018]. Institut Für Foederalismus. 41. Bericht über den Föderalismus in Österreich 2016. Innsbruck: New Academic Press, 2017. Koja, Friedrich. Das Verfassungsrecht der österreichischen Bundesländer. 2ND edition. Vienna-New York: Springer, 1998.

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Kroell, Thomas. “Grundsatzgesetzgebung und Richtliniensetzung – Zweis- tufige Rechtserzeugung im österreichischen Bundesstaat und im eu- ropäischen Staatenverbund”. Zeitschrift für Verwaltung 2 (2016): 115-127. Lienbacher, Georg, and Erich Puergy. “Kooperativer Bundesstaat”. In: Erich Pürgy (ed.). Das Recht der Länder, Vol. I. Vienna: Jan Sramek Verlag, 2012. P. 561-592. Pernthaler, Peter. Österreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht. Vienna: Verlag Österreich, 2004. Pernthaler, Peter, and Fried Esterbauer. “Der Föderalismus”. In: Herbert Schambeck Herbert (ed.). Das österreichische Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz und seine Entwicklung. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1980. P. 325-345. Puergy, Erich. “Bundesverfassungsrecht und Landesrecht”. In: Erich Pürgy (ed.). Das Recht der Länder, Vol. I. Vienna: Jan Sramek Verlag, 2012. P. 1-60. Schramek, Christoph. Gerichtsbarkeit im Bundesstaat. Vienna: New Academic Press, 2017. Schroeder, Werner. Grundkurs Europarecht. Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2012. . “Der Abbau von ‘Goldplating’ durch nationale Deregulierung und das Europäische Unionsrecht”, ÖGfE Policy Brief 22 (2018). Sonntag, Niklas. Präventive Normenkontrolle in Österreich. Vienna: Facultas wuv, 2011. Sturm Roland. “Austria”. In: Ann L. Griffiths (ed.). Handbook of Federal Coun- tries. Montreal & Kingston London Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005. P. 45-58. Wallnoefer, Klaus. “Bundesstaatlicher Wert und Unwert von Art. 12 B-VG am Beispiel des Elektrizitätsrechts”. In: Festschrift Karl Korinek. Vienna: Springer Verlag, 2010. P. 287-312.

Cases

VfSlg 2455/1952; Constitutional Court of Austria, G17/52, December 12, 1952. VfSlg 11.403/1987, Constitutional Court of Austria, G78/87, July 1, 1987. VfSlg 16.241/2001, Constitutional Court of Austria, G103/00, June 28, 2001. VfSlg 2087/1951, Constitutional Court of Austria, G89/00, December 13, 2000. VfSlg 3853/1960, Constitutional Court of Austria, B 4876/59, December 15, 1960. VfSlg 17.232/2004, Constitutional Court of Austria, B136/03, June 21, 2004.

REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 74-100 99 Peter Bussjäger, Christoph Schramek, Mirella M. Johler

VfSlg 19.658/2012, Constitutional Court of Austria, G206/10 ua, June 29, 2012. Constitutional Court of Austria, G136/2017 ua, March 7, 2018.

100 REAF-JSG 28, December 2018, p. 74-100 Autonomías indígenas en América Latina. Una mirada comparada a partir de las dificultades para la construcción de un Derecho intercultural

Asier Martínez de Bringas Profesor encargado de Derecho Constitucional en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Deusto

Indigenous autonomy in Latin America. A comparative look based on the difficulties in creating an Intercultural Law abstract Indigenous autonomy, as a right, is expressed and projected as a political process through which indigenous peoples exercise their right to self-determination within the framework of the State. This is concretized as the ability to freely determine their political status as peoples, their own economic development, as well as their social and cultural structures for the production, reproduction and development of individual and collective life. In this essay we will proceed to carry out a comparative analysis in Latin America (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru) of the difficulties that arise for the construction of the indigenous autonomous processes and how this greatly hinders the creation of an intercultural law between the State and the indigenous peoples. keywords Autonomy; Interculturality; Territoriality; Jurisdiction; Rights. resumen La autonomía indígena, en cuanto derecho, se expresa y proyecta como proceso político a través del cual los pueblos indígenas ejercen su derecho a la libre determinación en el marco del Estado. Ello se concreta como la capacidad para determinar libremente su condición política como pueblos, su propio desarrollo económico, así como sus estructuras sociales y culturales para la producción, reproducción y desarrollo de la vida individual y colectiva. En este ensayo procederemos a realizar un análisis comparativo en América Latina (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia y Perú) de las dificultades que se presentan en la construcción de los procesos autonómicos indígenas, y cómo dificultan enormemente la construcción de un Derecho intercultural entre el Estado y los pueblos indígenas. palabras clave autonomía indígena; interculturalidad; territorialidad; jurisdicción; derechos.

Artículo recibido el 07/07/2018; aceptado el 14/09/2018.

REAF-JSG 28, diciembre 2018, p. 101-138 DOI: 10.2436/20.8080.01.32 101 Asier Martínez de Bringas

1. Introducción

La autonomía indígena, en cuanto derecho, se expresa y proyecta como proceso político a través del cual los pueblos indígenas ejercen su derecho a la libre determinación en el marco del Estado. Ello se concreta como la capacidad para determinar libremente su condición política como pueblos, su propio desarrollo económico, así como sus estructuras sociales y culturales para la producción, reproducción y desarrollo de la vida individual y colectiva. Para todo ello resulta fundamental el reconocimiento de la subjetividad política colectiva —pueblo indígena— en el marco del Estado.1

Sin embargo, la subjetividad política indígena tiene un carácter eminentemente relacional2 que resulta fundamental para explicar y comprender los procesos autonómicos. La autonomía indígena no es un proceso autorreflexivo, racio- nalmente teorizado, construido a partir de los parámetros que la teoría del Estado oferta y propone; es más bien un proceso y dinámica que se construye y formaliza a través de las relaciones corporales; de las interacciones comunitarias; del modo de relación, construcción y confrontación con la naturaleza, el territorio y los recursos que tienen los pueblos indígenas; de las formas de expresión y articulación que la organización política indígena expresa, y un largo etc. Posee, además, una densa raigambre en los vínculos comunita-

1. James Anaya delimita el contenido y perfil delderecho a la autodeterminación indígena a partir de las posibilidades que abre la Declaración de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, de la siguiente manera: “…la Declaración, por sus propios términos, reconoce que los pueblos indígenas tienen el mismo derecho a la libre determinación que el que disfrutan otros pueblos. La libre determinación se interpreta, adecuadamente, como surgida del marco de los derechos humanos del derecho internacional contemporáneo, más que del marco tradicional de los derechos de los estados. (…) La Declaración identifica a los pueblos indígenas ahora como ‘pueblos’ libremente determinados sin calificación, en un marco de derechos humanos en oposición a los derechos de los estados. Al pertenecer a los ‘pueblos’, el derecho de libre determinación, y otros derechos afirmados en la Declaración, son derechos colectivos pero, en cualquier caso, son en el fondo derechos humanos o, al menos, se derivan de ellos o son instrumentales para los mismos. (…) Entendida como un derecho humano, la idea esencial de la libre determinación es que los seres humanos, individualmente o como grupos, tienen por igual el derecho de ejercer el control sobre sus propios destinos y de vivir en los órdenes institucionales de gobierno que se diseñen de acuerdo con ese derecho. (…) La libre determinación se fundamenta en los preceptos de libertad e igualdad que pueden encontrarse enraizados, a lo largo del tiempo y el espacio, en diferentes tradiciones culturales en todo el mundo. Anaya, El derecho de los pueblos indígenas, 194-209. 2. Hernando, “¿Por qué la arqueología oculta la importancia de la comunidad?”, 22-40; “Iden- tidad relacional y orden patriarcal”, 83-124.

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rios, más que en la racionalidad teórica —tan propia de la ciencia política y constitucional en la manera de pensar los modelos autonómicos, y que se ha venido imponiendo como patrón paradigmático para entender y construir la autonomía en el marco del Estado—. De ahí los desfases teóricos y prácticos (cosmovisionales, diríamos) entre el derecho de autodeterminación —tal y como es entendido por el Derecho Internacional— y la autonomía indígena.

Como se ha expresado, la pertenencia colectiva y los vínculos comunitarios constituyen la base de la seguridad ontológica de los pueblos indígenas, siendo la función última de las autonomías garantizar y dar protección a dicha seguridad, a esa manera relacional de entender el mundo, la vida y los procesos sociales, cuestión dífilamente comprensible desde la razón de estado como soporte último para entender y dar solución a la integración intercultural de las autonomías indígenas en el marco del Estado.

La autonomía indígena se actualiza constantemente a partir de las maneras de estructuración en que se expresan las cosmovisiones de cada pueblo; por tanto, no existe un patrón ni un paradigma estático y concreto en el que apoyarse y desde el que construir el modelo autonómico indígena. Esta es una realidad dinámica, compleja, estrictamente vinculada a la cosmovisión y a la espiritualidad, que propone maneras diferentes de entender las relaciones sociales, las formas de representación y el poder político. Es una ten- sión intercultural fundamental que complica y hace difícilmente traducible el modelo indígena de autonomía a las maneras estatales de comprenderla, formalizarla y normativizarla. Es de esta dificultad intercultural, que genera fuertes tensiones en las relaciones pueblos indígenas-Estado, de la que queremos dar medida en este escrito.

Por otro lado, el manejo ideológico de la categoría “autonomía indígena” que se viene haciendo desde instancias discursivas de poder-saber, a partir de su flamante recepción en textos de derechos humanos, como laDeclaración de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, o como muchos otros textos constitucionales en América Latina que han intentado dar recepción a los reclamos indígenas de autonomía y otros derechos asociados a esta, nos ubica ante la dialéctica —derivado lógico de la tensión intercultural anticipada— de dos presupuestos irreconciliables: i) ¿sirve y se presta la autonomía indígena como instrumento necesario para revitalizar el modo de gobernanza estatal, a la vez que coadyuva a reconstituir la maltrecha legitimidad del Estado en su tratamiento con los pueblos indígenas? ii) ¿o

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está orientada realmente a la construcción, capacitación y fortalecimiento del sujeto pueblo indígena? Esto es, el tratamiento que se está haciendo de la autonomía indígena en el marco de los Estados, ¿ayuda a la construcción de los reclamos indígenas en forma de derechos, o más bien coadyuva a su dependencia y subordinación a las lógicas del Estado? ¿Constituye, por tanto, la autonomía indígena una mediación instrumental necesaria para consolidar la dimensión democrática en los Estados, pero sin derechos para los pueblos indígenas? O por el contrario, ¿podemos asistir a la construcción de procesos autonómicos indígenas que permitan la consolidación política del concepto pueblo indígena, a la vez que el desarrollo y coagulación de sus formas y expectativas de vida, lo que implicaría un límite al poder de los Estados y a sus deseos de implacable expansión sobre la territorialidad indígena?

Esta tensión entre la dimensión emancipadora-crítica de la autonomía indíge- na y la dimensión legitimadora de las formas de gobernanza estatal es el pre- supuesto -incontestado y de difícil respuesta- que va a interrogarnos a lo largo de todo este ensayo. Esta dialéctica ambivalente y conflictiva ha marcado la construcción teórica y práctica del término autonomía indígena en América Latina produciendo dos maneras antitéticas de entender este proceso: auto- nomía entendida y expresada como razón de Estado, desactivadora de luchas, reclamos y reivindicaciones indígenas; o autonomía como proceso y límite a los excesos del poder estatal en su tratamiento a los pueblos indígenas.3

Teniendo en cuenta cómo se está afrontando y se pueda afrontar en el -fu turo esta tensión, inmanente a la autonomía indígena, nos asomaremos a otros interrogantes que despliegan y complementan los dos presupuestos anteriormente citados. En este sentido, a partir del estado de la cuestión de las autonomías indígenas en América Latina, nos podemos preguntar: ¿es la autonomía indígena una alternativa real a los pueblos indígenas?; si fuese así, ¿cómo da respuesta —jurídica, política y social— a los anhelos de autodeterminación indígena?; ¿qué impacto produce el reconocimiento y desarrollo de la autonomía indígena en las estructuras políticas del Estado y cuáles son las consecuencias reales de todo ello?

3. Ortiz, Dilemas y desafíos, 10-129; González, Autonomías territoriales indígenas, 35-62; Fuka- saku, y Hausmann, Democracy, Decentralization and Deficits in Latin America; Montero y Samuels, Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America; Kingstone, After the Washington Consensus, 153-164.

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Todas estas preguntas, que apuntan a las razones políticas últimas de la au- tonomía indígena, encierran una complejidad a la que no pretendemos dar respuesta en este escrito; pero sí las mantendremos como una tensión inmanente, una interpelación crítica necesaria para afrontar las dificultades y las dinámicas de instrumentalización que acompañan los procesos de autonomía indígena, conscientes de que cualquier alternativa a una implementación ven- tajosa y beneficiosa para los pueblos indígenas debe tenerlas como fundamento último para poder entender el para qué de estos procesos y proyectos.

La complejidad referida se hace más intensa si tenemos en cuenta que el concepto de autonomía es interpretado normativamente de manera polifacética y dispersa, sin criterios homogéneos de armonización entre los diferentes Estados que la han regulado constitucionalmente y que han intentado dar un desarrollo de la misma en su legislación interna.4 A ello habría que sumar el hecho —problemático— de que cada pueblo indígena posee una diferente comprensión de la autonomía y sus procesos, lo que hace difícil llegar a consensos sobre los contenidos mínimos que podrían identificar y delimitar la autonomía indígena en el marco del Estado, así como de sus condiciones de realización práctica.

Partiendo de este enmarque, el objetivo último de este ensayo es presentar una pequeña radiografía de los procesos autonómicos indígenas en algunos países de América Latina, aquellos en los que hemos considerado que los procesos de construcción autonómica han tenido mayor protagonismo, rele- vancia e intensidad política, como Bolivia, Ecuador, Perú y Colombia. No es pretensión de este estudio hacer un análisis en profundidad de los países refe- ridos,5 sino presentar una serie de elementos problemáticos que irrumpen de

4. Una reformulación política y crítica de estas complejidades puede verse en Rosales, Auto- nomía indígena en Bolivia, 143-179; Prada, Articulaciones de la complejidad, Mimeo. 5. En este sentido son muchos los estudios que analizan en profundidad y de manera sistemá- tica la problemática de la autonomía indígena en estos países. No nos ha interesado la orogra- fía y etnografía de estos procesos; tampoco el arduo detalle en la consolidación de los mismos; antes bien hemos querido poner el foco de atención en la cualidad problemática que irrumpe y se reitera sistemáticamente en los procesos de construcción de las autonomías indígenas. Pueden consultarse como sólidas exposiciones y estudios de lo que decimos: Schavelzon, El nacimiento del Estado plurinacional de Bolivia; Tomaselli, Autonomía Indígena, 5-56; Romero y Albó, Autonomías indígenas; Mayorga, Bolivia; Albó y Barrios, Por una Bolivia…; Fundación Tierra, Bolivia, Territorios Indígenas; Chirif, Estudio Regional; González et al., La autonomía a debate; Tamburini, Contexto constitucional y legal…; Roldán y Sánchez, La problemática de tierras y territorios…,189-273; Ortiz, Dilemas y desafíos,10-129; Houghton, Los territorios indígenas.

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manera sistemática y continua en la construcción de los procesos autonómicos en América Latina. Estas dificultades emergen como una variable constante y repetitiva en la construcción de muchos de los procesos autonómicos que vamos a analizar. Para ello, la mirada metodológica con la que avanzaremos partirá de lo que consideramos elementos esenciales de la autonomía indíge- na, algunas de sus notas constitutivas sin las cuales esta no podría existir ni desarrollarse, para hacernos cargo y presentar algunas de las limitaciones estructurales con las que dichos procesos se están encontrado, lugares comunes desde los que partir para sugerir y encontrar alternativas a esas dificultades.

2. Elementos de la autonomía indígena

Cuando hablamos de autonomía desde la perspectiva de los pueblos indígenas es necesario referir la existencia de una serie de componentes o elementos básicos de la misma sin los cuales la autonomía indígena queda troceada, recortada e instrumentalizada. Dichos componentes se deducen de la comprensión territorial que los propios pueblos indígenas han venido expresando, así como de la implementación de planes de manejo territorial y de recursos naturales que algunos pueblos han venido desarrollando y exponiendo.6

Por otro lado, la tendencia de los Estados es suprimir (negociadamente) o reprimir (violentamente) algunos de estos componentes esenciales de los procesos autonómicos, sin los cuáles no podríamos acercarnos a una comprensión plena de la autonomía indígena. El resultado final sería la puesta en escena de procesos autonómicos fragmentados, profundamente limitados en sus aspira- ciones, recortados según los propósitos y de acuerdo a la comprensión estatal del territorio, así como de las necesidades de administración del mismo.

El gran peligro de las autonomías indígenas —por supresión de algunos de esos elementos fundamentales que afectan a derechos indígenas— es la puesta en escena de una dinámica unilateral y coercitiva de adaptación del territorio

6. En el caso de Bolivia, hablaríamos de Raqaypampa o Monte Verde; en Ecuador, el supuesto del manejo territorial del pueblo indígena Sarayacu, o del pueblo Shuar Arutam; en Perú, la iniciativa territorial de los pueblos indígenas de la provincia Datem del Marañón, o la plataforma de asociaciones indígenas coaguladas en torno a Puinamudt, como estrategia para luchar contra la invasiva y tóxica acción de las petroleras; o la situación del Resguardo Karmata Rua en Cristianía o del Resguardo Putumayo en Colombia, entre muchas otras.

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indígena al territorio del Estado, a sus marcos de posibilidad y de gestión, rompiendo el carácter intercultural —basado en la bilateralidad, la reciproci- dad y simetría— que los procesos de autonomía exigirían desde la perspectiva de los pueblos indígenas.

Hablar de elementos esenciales de la autonomía indígena implica un proceso de racionalización, de comprensión estatalizada del Derecho, que pueda descomponer la parte vital, cosmovisional y existencial de las autonomías indígenas. De hecho, como ha ocurrido en Bolivia y Ecuador, la incorporación de la autonomía indígena al aparato normativo del Estado, su subsunción bajo el paraguas normativo estatal, ha implicado en gran medida el vaciamiento de un concepto, de su contenido originario y existencial. La implementación de los nuevos textos constitucionales de Bolivia y Ecuador ha supuesto y su- ponen una reducción de la densidad creativa y de los ricos contenidos que el concepto de autonomía indígena mantuvo en los procesos constituyentes. Esta es una limitación de la que necesariamente hay que hacerse cargo para poder entender y gestionar el proceso político de construcción autonómica. Por ello, antes de que el poder constituido limara a contrapelo las reivindicaciones y enunciaciones de autonomía indígena en Bolivia y Ecuador, ésta se enunciaba y explicaba a partir de una matriz trinitaria como es: i) la autonomía indí- gena exige la desconcentración territorial del poder para poder dar cabida a los modos de autoorganización indígena como pueblos y naciones; ii) exige la plurinacionalidad,7 lo que implica la habilitación intercultural de pueblos y naciones como sujetos políticos con soberanía, dimensiones hasta ahora desconocidas en el marco del Estado; iii) y exige también el reconocimiento de economía plural, tensionada como pluralismo jurídico, lo que implicaba la coexistencia articulada en el Estado de diferentes modos de producción y organización de la vida, así como de una plural comprensión de lo jurídico para su desarrollo e implementación.8

La autonomía indígena ha sido polimórfica en sus formas de expresión y re- presentación en muchos países de América Latina, especialmente en Bolivia, Ecuador y Colombia. La estrategia política ha llevado a que las diferentes formas en que se expresaba la autonomía adquirieran dominancia en función de criterios de oportunidad política. Unas veces la autonomía se expresaba

7. Bautista, Pensar Bolivia; Núñez del Prado, Utopía indígena truncada, 252 y ss. 8. García Linera, Geopolítica de la Amazonia.

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—como en el proceso constituyente boliviano— como un pétreo bloque con liderazgo nacional. Una suerte de coagulación estratégica del movimiento indígena para poder generar una organización política consistente, sólida y consensuada, que pudiera funcionar como fuerza social emergente frente a otros bloques sociales del país con talante netamente antindígena. Una propuesta de federalismo indígena, combinado con movimientos sociales del país para la construcción de formas de democracia comunitarias no liberales (ayllus, juntas vecinales, parroquias, resguardos…).9

Otras veces se expresaba como un movimiento accionado y promocionado por líderes indígenas locales. La autonomía aquí era concebida fundamentalmente como un mecanismo para la recuperación de espacios políticos per- didos; como medio para la reconstitución de territorios ancestrales, como el el Qollasuyu o el Tawantinsuyu. Se trataba de lograr una conciencia de sí y para sí como pueblos y naciones originarias, de reivindicar el sujeto político indígena como agente independiente y autoafirmativo, con fuerte conciencia de pueblo y de territorio. Esta ha sido una estrategia muy fértil para la institucionalización del movimiento indígena en lucha por sus derechos en toda América Latina.

Y otras veces, la autonomía se expresaba como una experiencia plena de vida, como reivindicación enérgica de la cosmovisión indígena en su relación con el territorio y la vida. Autonomía como proceso en construcción.10

Teniendo en cuenta estas consideraciones como precondiciones para acercarse a la comprensión indígena de la autonomía, podemos referir algunos componentes esenciales de la autonomía que muchas veces han sido abordados de manera aislada, pero no sistémica e interdependiente, como un cuerpo inconsútil que solo en estricta unidad e interrelación constituye la gramática de la autonomía indígena. En este sentido hablamos de:

1. Territorio integral asegurado, lo que implicaría la configuración de territorios con un claro contenido jurisdiccional a través del cual los pueblos indí- genas puedan ejercer el autogobierno y la justica, siendo la jurisdicción la base material desde la que desplegar formas y expresiones de pluralismo jurídico

9. Hylton, El federalismo insurgente, 99-118. 10. Tapia. Política Salvaje, 25 y ss.

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entre el derecho indígena y el derecho estatal. La autonomía se afirma como estrategia para defender y arraigar los derechos de los pueblos indígenas.11 Sin embargo, es necesario tener en cuenta que no todas las organizaciones y movimientos indígenas en América Latina asocian de manera interdependiente la defensa del territorio con la autonomía indígena, separando dichos elementos como si se trataran de reclamos disociados, a partir de la definición restrictiva de territorio que se produce en el Convenio 169 de la OIT, en su artículo 13.2, poniendo el énfasis en la “totalidad del hábitat de las regiones que los pueblos interesados ocupan”. Una comprensión así del territorio tiene una pretensión fuertemente despolitizadora, puesto que la concepción de hábitat no tiene implicaciones políticas ni jurisdiccionales. Esta es también una constante en el tratamiento y comprensión del territorio por parte de los Estados en su modulación normativa. Desligar el territorio de sus funciones jurisdiccionales supone instrumentalizar un derecho como la autonomía y vaciarlo de contenido básico. En los procesos de autonomía, el territorio guarda una función política, jurisdiccional, económica, cultural, simbólica y ecológica fundamental.12 Para poder ejercer los derechos indígenas se hace necesario que el territorio indígena funcione como territorio autónomo. En definitiva, se trataría de construir una base política territorial para lo que la autonomía es un complemento garantista indispensable. El territorio autóno- mo indígena permite exponer una nueva lógica en la distribución y configu- ración del poder estatal; sugiere una nueva comprensión en la configuración del ordenamiento político territorial estatal y esa es, en última instancia, la pretensión fundamental de la autonomía indígena. El sentido de la procla- mación de algunas “autonomías indígenas de hecho”, “sin permiso”, como en México o en Perú, tiene que ver con esta disfunción: la despolitización del contenido fundamental del derecho indígena a la autonomía. Derechos territoriales sin autonomía son procesos y dinámicas arrojadas y expuestas a la explotación y al despojo, como estamos viviendo recientemente en América Latina. Solo se puede hablar genuinamente de territorios indígenas si estos incluyen control colectivo del mismo, junto con procesos de autogobierno en los que se evidencien formas de organización y gestión indígena que expresen sus modos de vida colectivos.13

11. Mamani, Pablo. Memoria y geoestrategia social, 165-194. 12. Tamburini, La importancia del territorio y el autogobierno, 177-186. 13. Como expresa el voto razonado del Juez Sergio García Ramírez con respecto a la sentencia de la Corte IDH, Caso Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa contra Paraguay, de 29 de marzo de 2006, los derechos comunitarios que forman parte de la cultura de los pueblos indígenas

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2. Competencias, en cuanto conjunto de poderes y capacidades que se otor- gan a los pueblos indígenas para habitar y gobernar el territorio. Ello impli- cará necesariamente competencias sobre medio ambiente, conocimientos tradicionales, tierras, patrimonio cultural e intelectual, soberanía y seguridad alimentaria, educación intercultural, prácticas medicinales indígenas y un largo etcétera. Para el ejercicio de estas competencias se exige, como con- dición previa, que la territorialidad indígena incluya derechos de titulación colectiva, así como el control efectivo de sus recursos naturales de propiedad común. Un ramal importante de esas competencias, en conexión con la esencia del pluralismo jurídico, sería el establecimiento de un nuevo marco de relaciones con el Estado, con sus diferentes regiones y ámbitos territoriales.

3. La participación y representación política en la vida del Estado.14 Esta es la base de la interculturalidad: la participación de los pueblos indígenas en procesos institucionales y políticos con el Estado que les permita tomar y asumir decisiones como prolongación necesaria y concluyente del régimen de autonomía. Todo ello reclama una reorganización del poder, de las insti- tuciones y de los sujetos en clave plurinacional. La esencia de la plurinacionalidad reposa, por tanto, en una comprensión centrífuga del poder a partir del reclamo de las autonomías indígenas, lo que implica una transformación de la estructura política, administrativa, territorial, jurídica y económica del Estado mediante la creación de entidades territoriales indígenas autónomas, por las cuales la territorialidad se adapta al Estado y este a las entidades territoriales indígenas, produciéndose una transformación estructural de la distribución territorial del poder dentro del Estado en su relación con los pueblos indígenas.15

son, a su vez, fundamento y amparo de los derechos subjetivos individuales. La sentencia de la Corte IDH, Caso del Pueblo Indígena Kichwa de Sarayaku contra Ecuador (Fondo y Reparaciones), sentencia de 27 de junio de 2012, Corte IDH, Serie C n.º 245, 2012, párrafo 231, también fundamenta esta dimensión al afirmar: “…la normativa internacional relativa a los pueblos y comunidades indígenas o tribales reconoce derechos a los pueblos como sujetos colectivos del Derecho Internacional y no únicamente a sus miembros”. En el caso de Saramaka contra Surinam se es más categórico, a este respecto, al expresar que el titular del derecho de la consulta son los pueblos o comunidades, en cuanto sujetos del derecho de propiedad comunal, Cf. Corte IDH. Caso del Pueblo Saramaka contra Surinam, Interpretación de la Sentencia de Excepciones Preliminares, Fondo, Reparaciones y Costas, Sentencia de 12 de agosto de 2008, Corte IDH, Serie C n.º 185, 2008, párrafo 22. 14. ONIC, Proyecto de capacitación. 15. Prada, Antecedentes y objetivos, 21-30.

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Teniendo en cuenta todo lo anterior, una mirada retrospectiva sobre los diferentes modelos y prácticas desarrolladas en América Latina para la imple- mentación de la autonomía indígena nos permite constatar algunas variables conflictivas,16 pero relevantes, para poder determinar las problemáticas y las necesidades que los modelos de autonomía indígena presentan para su implementación.

1. Mientras algunos proyectos de autonomía han intentado incorporar todos los elementos que se consideran esenciales para poder hablar de autonomía indígena, otros proyectos solo incorporan, de manera fragmentaria, algunos de ellos.

2. Los mecanismos para garantizar e implementar la autonomía indígena han sido entendidos y afrontados de manera diversa, tanto por Estados como por pueblos indígenas. Algunos modelos se han entendido exclusivamente como un régimen de regulación jurídico-político en el marco del Estado, mientras otros proyectos, más anclados en el movimiento indígena, han interpretado la autonomía como un proceso, una mediación necesaria para la construcción y consolidación de otros derechos.

3. Una cuestión fundamental es la consideración de los diferentes niveles o estratos territoriales para la aplicación de la autonomía indígena. En este sentido, se puede hablar de construcción multinivel de la autonomía indígena a través de los diferentes estratos en los que se articula administrativamente la organización territorial de un Estado; o se puede hablar de autonomía indígena como algo que afecta al territorio (indígena) de manera sistémica y estructural, una dimensión que no entiende de niveles y que escapa a la regu- lación administrativa del territorio, y a la manera de estructurar y regular el mismo en el marco del Estado. Así, se puede hablar de autonomía comunal, municipal, regional, territorial indígena, intentando desarrollar dinámicas de autonomía en todos o en algunos de esos niveles, o podemos comprender que no se puede construir la autonomía indígena sin una comprensión transversal y estructural del territorio, lo que transciende esa manera de “administrati- vizar”, regular y tasar el territorio.

16. Estas variables las proyectaremos y servirán de guía y brújula para detectar y comprender la problemática en los países elegidos como experiencia de análisis de las autonomías.

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4. Una última cuestión relevante tiene que ver con las precondiciones para la implementación de los procesos de creación de autonomía. En este sentido, el reconocimiento y regulación normativa de los procesos autonómicos indígenas, en el contexto de América Latina, puede implicar: a) la creación de nuevas constituciones que afronten el tema autonómico, al menos progra- máticamente, como un elemento nuclear en los procesos de transformación constitucional del Estado, como ha sido el caso de las nuevas constituciones de Bolivia y Ecuador; b) la realización de profundas transformaciones y reformas políticas, con el despliegue de toda una arquitectura normativa complemen- taria que permita el desarrollo de los procesos autonómicos, como pueda ser el caso de Colombia, Panamá, Nicaragua, México o Perú, entre otros; c) la regulación de mínimos cambios en la estructura del Estado para dar cabida a la autonomía indígena, lo que nos pone, de nuevo, ante un formato de asimi- lación blanda de la cuestión indígena, sin cambios estructurales en el Estado, como es el caso de Chile, Brasil o Argentina, entre otros.

3. Una mirada comparada sobre las Autonomías indígenas

En este epígrafe desarrollaremos un breve análisis comparado a partir del estudio de algunos de los procesos de creación de autonomía indígena en América Latina. Para dicho análisis hemos tenido en cuenta aquellos países en los que la construcción del proceso autonómico ha resultado más prolífico e intenso desde un punto de vista normativo, tanto en sede constitucional como en el desarrollo de legislación secundaria (como es el caso de Bolivia y Ecuador), lo que se ha traducido en avances técnico-jurídicos, en la imple- mentación de una importante arquitectura procesal para su desarrollo. Ten- dremos en cuenta también procesos en los que la autonomía se ha construido de manera más fáctica que normativa, permitiendo otras estrategias políticas para la consolidación de una concepción fuerte de los derechos territoriales indígenas, como es el caso de Colombia. Finalmente, haremos alusión a supuestos en donde la agresión y vulneración a los derechos indígenas ha sido una manera sistemática de entender y acercarse a la realidad de los pueblos indígenas, lo que ha dificultado en todo momento no solo la construcción del proceso autonómico, sino la consolidación mínima de los derechos indígenas, como es el caso de Perú.

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La mirada metodológica está orientada a desvelar las dificultades estructurales que los procesos de construcción autonómica indígena están sufriendo en estos países por la intervención de múltiples actores. Desde ahí obtendremos un material político interesante para trabajar y afrontar esas dificultades, y vislumbrar vías de salida al estancado y estatalizado proceso de construcción de las autonomías en América Latina.

3.1. Bolivia

La regulación de los procesos de construcción autonómica en Bolivia —sujetos de autonomía, junto con la base territorial que los contiene y sustenta— vienen recogidos en la Constitución Política del Estado (CPE) y en la Ley Marco de Autonomía y Descentralización (LMAD). En Bolivia, las vías de acceso a la autonomía indígena a partir de estos presupuestos normativos han sido tres: i) la vía de los Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos (TIOC); ii) la de los municipios (indígenas); iii) y la de las regiones. Las vías de acceso a la autonomía indígena en Bolivia vienen desarrolladas en la LMAD con un lenguaje complejo, densamente normativo, diseñando una arquitectura jurídica y procesal de difícil comprensión para los pueblos in- dígenas.

La vía de acceso a las autonomías a partir de los TIOC tiene como base para su construcción las Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO), que existían en Bolivia desde los cambios constitucionales de 1994 y desde la Ley INRA de 1996. En el entramado de esta Ley se crean las TCO, un modo de propiedad colectiva —aunque no de jurisdicción—17 que introduce ya el concepto de au- tonomía indígena al hablar del control de recursos renovables y la posibilidad

17. Cuando hablamos aquí de jurisdicción nos estamos refiriendo al reconocimiento de los sistemas de justicia propios de los pueblos indígenas, a las posibilidades de desplegar sus propias formas de organización, articulación y desempeño jurídico, en confrontación dialéctica con los sistemas de justicia que propone el Estado. Estos eran ya un proceso en construcción, no reconocido pero sí reclamado. En el marco de la Nueva Constitución Política, el Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional reconoce que la Autonomía indígena es cualitativamente diferente a otras formas de autonomía reconocidas en la Constitución, y uno de los destellos de ese plus de cualidad es el reconocimiento de los sistemas de justicia indígena. Esta reivindicación estaba ya en barbecho en esta primera manera de estructurar la territorialidad indígena con dimensión colectiva. Cf. Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional, Declaración Constitucional Plurinacional 9/2013, 27 de junio del 2013, 11 y ss.

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de consulta sobre los no renovables. Las TCO constituyen el medio de entrada y consideración de las autonomías indígenas en la agenda pública del Estado boliviano. Las TCO funcionaron como la antesala de los TIOC a través de un doble proceso: por un lado, las TCO ya tituladas como propiedad colectiva pasan a convertirse en TIOC; por otro lado estos pueden, además, adoptar la cualidad de Autonomía Indígena (AI) a partir de la manifestación de la voluntad de su población (indígena) de conformidad con sus propias normas y procedimientos (art. 293-I de la CPE). El término TIOC sin embargo resulta ambiguo, pues refiere tanto a una forma particular de propiedad agraria, que puede constituirse en AI, como a una categoría de estructuración y estrati- ficación del ordenamiento territorial del Estado.18

La vía de acceso municipal, por el contrario, ha sido utilizada en aquellos supuestos de municipios con composición poblacional fundamentalmente indígena, lo que implica la ventaja de disponer de las competencias propias de los municipios así como de los medios de financiación de los que estos disponen. La vía del TIOC permitía disponer de una base material de titu- lación territorial colectiva. La vía regional de acceso a la autonomía ha sido, sin embargo, la vía más extraña y artificial para acceder a la autonomía, e implicaba la existencia de varios municipios o provincias con continuidad geográfica, pero que no superaban los límites departamentales.19

En este marco arquitectónico complejo se presentan una serie de problemáti- cas para la construcción de la autonomía indígena que resultan ser un lugar común en la manera en que se expresan las dificultades en la construcción de los procesos autonómicos indígenas en otros lugares de América Latina. Estas dificultades son:

– Los TIOC no se ajustan ni corresponden con la disposición político-administrativa del Estado boliviano, lo que como punto de partida, implica una dificultad grande para ajustar el territorio indígena a los marcos adminis- trativos del Estado. Muchos TIOC van más allá de los marcos municipales y departamentales, resultando enormemente extensos, lo que implica una dificultad para la constitución de una unidad territorial compacta y ho-

18. Albó y Romero, Autonomías indígenas, cap. I. 19. Albó, Las flamantes autonomías, 355-390.

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mogénea, orgánicamente indígena. El resultado es: TIOC sin continuidad territorial, enormemente atomizados y fragmentados.20

– La superposición de derechos sobre recursos naturales entre los TIOC y el Estado. Los pueblos indígenas tienen derechos sobre tierras, bosques, y recursos mineros e hidrocarburos, aunque también el Estado los reclama para sí como competencias propias.21 En este sentido, resulta paradójico que se defina como competencia exclusiva del Estado la política general sobre tierras y territorios, siendo este elemento la base, uno de los núcleos esenciales para la constitución de la autonomía indígena (art. 298-II-38, CPE).

– Las superposición de derechos entre los TIOC y las áreas protegidas,22 estableciendo una suerte de confrontación paradójica entre la manera indígena de entender la sostenibilidad, el desarrollo y la protección del medio ambiente, y la manera estatal de articular esta protección. Nuevamente nos encontramos ante un choque de cosmovisiones, ante el gran reto de la interculturalidad: la confrontación de la razón de estado con la comprensión indígena de la vida.

– Superposición de TIOC y concesiones mineras. En el 2008, el 32% de las concesiones mineras se encontraban dentro de los territorios indígenas del altiplano y de los valles interandinos.23

20. Tres de cada diez TIOC no tienen continuidad territorial, lo que constituye un fuerte impedimento para la constitución de las autonomías indígenas. El caso del TIOC Guaraní del Isoso, en el Chaco, es discontinuo en 35 bloques. En tierras bajas, el 58% de los TIOC son discontinuos. Según la Fundación Tierra, aunque esto expresa la voluntad estatal por proteger territorios y comunidades indígenas en medio de tierras de propiedad de terceros, elimina las posibilidades de que los TIOC se conviertan en unidades territoriales viables para la for- mación de autogobiernos indígenas. La discontinuidad es, por tanto, una forma de fractura y diseminación de la autonomía indígena. Fundación Tierra Bolivia, Territorios Indígenas,40 y ss. Resulta, sin embargo, peligrosamente paradójico que la LMAD establezca que la presencia de terceros no implique discontinuidad (Art. 47, VII), siendo esta reconocida solo en aquellos supuestos en los que las TCO han sido fraccionadas en dos o más bloques. 21. El 20% de las concesiones forestales, que asciende a 1,2 millones de hectáreas, está dentro de las áreas demandadas por los indígenas pero que, en general, han sido excluidos de sus derechos. Ibídem, 326. 22. Cerca de 3,2 millones de hectáreas de las 20.70 tituladas como TCO son a su vez ANP. Es el caso de los parques Eduardo Abaroa en Potosí, TIPNIS en Beni y Cochabamba, Madidi en La Paz y San Matías en Santa Cruz, y de la Reserva de Biosfera Pilón Lajas en La Paz y Beni. Ibídem. 23. Chirif, Pueblos indígenas, 35.

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Son múltiples los retos y dificultades que el proceso de construcción de la autonomía indígena en Bolivia está implicando. Entre ellos, a modo de vector crítico para poder mejorar la implementación de las autonomías indígenas, destacaremos las siguientes:

– Las Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO) —en cuanto primer estrato normativo para el reconocimiento y asentamiento de la propiedad colectiva en Bolivia— no se construyeron con la intención estratégica de consolidar sistemas de justicia indígenas. Esta dificultad originaria, vital para nuestros intereses, se traslada y proyecta también como problema a la LMAD, así como al proceso actual de construcción de las autonomías indígenas.

– La falta de voluntad política por parte del Estado boliviano para el desarrollo e implementación de las autonomías indígenas. La autonomía indígena no es una prioridad para el actual gobierno boliviano, sino más bien un conflicto estructural para el desarrollo productivo del país.24

– Los complejos y burocráticos protocolos diseñados para el acceso a la auto- nomía indígena han desincentivado a los pueblos indígenas para la consolida- ción de sus derechos a través de esta vía. Un análisis funcional y estructural de la LMAD nos da medida del tedioso grado de tecnificación y sofisticación que soporta el espíritu de la Ley, ininteligible en muchos aspectos para los principales destinatarios de la autonomía indígena, los pueblos indígenas.

– La construcción de las autonomías indígenas implica una reconfiguración estructural del Derecho Público boliviano, de la articulación territorial del país y del ámbito competencial de los diferentes sujetos de autonomía que se reconocen. En este sentido, si la municipalidad (indígena) es una de las vías privilegiadas de acceso a la autonomía, al encontrarnos con TIOC que transcienden y van más allá de la base municipal, ocupando varios municipios, las estrategias que se abren para la construcción de la autonomía son varias: o reforzar la municipalidad como base territorial de la autonomía, o priorizar los TIOC como estructura nominal desde la que la LMAD permite la conso- lidación de territorios indígenas con el reconocimiento de sistema de justicia propios. Sin embargo, esta última alternativa plantea un problema al Estado en términos competenciales: si se disuelven los municipios, en cuanto soporte

24. Ibídem, 36 y ss.

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administrativo del Estado, ello tiene serias consecuencias desde el punto de vista del Estado. Por un lado, la pérdida del caudal electoral existente en los municipios indígenas; por otro lado, la disolución del protagonismo que hasta ahora han tenido los partidos políticos —en cuantos medios privilegiados para la canalización de la participación política— en los municipios. Las dos vías a través de los cuales se hace presente la huella del Estado en territorialidad indígena —como es la base municipal y la presencia de partidos políticos— quedarían muy minimizados. Ello evidencia la dificultad para establecer un Derecho intercultural que permita una fluida coordinación entre jurisdicciones territoriales estatal e indígena, con la consecuente dificultad para la construcción de las autonomías. La complejidad intercultural se encuentra en cómo las formas indígenas de organización interna, de articulación, de participación y de canalización de sus formas de gobierno y autonomía, chocan frontalmente con las maneras que tiene el Estado de entender estas cuestiones y gestionarlas.

– Otra importante dificultad sería el carácter asimétrico que comportan las jurisdicciones territoriales indígenas, lo que impide establecer protocolos simplificados de acceso a las autonomías, multiplicando exponencialmente la casuística y las problemáticas. Ello implica una multiplicación de las formas en las que puede expresarse la autonomía, con su complejidad concreta y específica, impidiendo establecer procedimientos relativamente simétricos y homogéneos de acceso a la misma. El resultado de todo ello son demarcaciones indígenas muy desproporcionadas en territorio y geografía, desbordando los límites departamentales,25 con composición de población muy variadas (unas

25. La LMAD establece que: “podrán constituir autonomías indígenas originarias campesinas dentro de los límites de cada uno de los departamentos, estableciendo mancomunidades entre sí, a fin de preservar su unidad de gestión” (Art. 29, III). Por tanto, si la jurisdicción indígena trasciende los límites departamentales —esto es, desborda la demarcación territorial establecida por el Estado desde un punto de vista administrativo—, la solución legal es establecer AIOC dentro del ámbito y de los límites departamentales, para luego proceder a establecer mancomunidades indígenas, a fin de preservar la unidad de gestión. Pero el problema radical de fondo no es un cuestión de gestión (administrativa), sino de soberanía territorial indígena, conscientes de que los ámbitos de jurisdicción territorial indígena difí- cilmente son trasladables a un mapa estatal. La gestión no puede subsumir un tema de sobe- ranía territorial colectiva; la soberanía trasciende materialmente la gestión, siendo la gestión un mero recurso, una herramienta para la canalización de la soberanía. Sin embargo, aquí se invierten los procesos y la gestión es utilizada como una vía de expropiación territorial, jurisdiccional y de soberanía indígena. Este era un problema ya avistado desde el principio: cómo traducir interculturalmente la territorialidad indígena al territorio estatal, y cómo

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más esencialmente indígenas y otras más mixtas y menos indígenas, lo que genera enormes conflictos a la hora de delimitar competencias jurisdiccionales).

– Una última dificultad sería de índole económico, esto es, el diseño de au- tonomías indígenas sin presupuestos que las respalden e impulsen, así como la ausencia de reconocimientos competenciales fundamentales para el afian- zamiento y consolidación de la autonomía indígena, como son la educación intercultural, o la capacidad de control, gestión y regulación territorial, base material de cualquier forma de autonomía indígena. A todo ello habría que añadir las dificultades procedimentales y procesales que el complejo sistema de construcción de las autonomías ha diseñado en Bolivia.26

3.2. Ecuador

La regulación de los procesos de construcción autonómica en Ecuador queda recogida en la nueva Constitución del 2008, complementando dicha regulación el Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización, de 19 de octubre de 2010, que se encarga de desarrollar la parte más procedimen- tal de este proceso.

El origen político de los procesos autonómicos en Ecuador hay que localizar- los en la acción proactiva del movimiento indígena ecuatoriano, movilizado por influencia política de la Constitución colombiana de 1991. Ello llevó a introducir la categoría de Circunscripciones Territoriales Indígenas (CTI) como

amoldar a este los reclamos soberanos de aquella. Para una consideración en profundidad de todas estas cuestiones, puede consultarse de la Fundación Tierra Bolivia Territorios Indígenas, 2011, 321-333; Tamburini, “Contexto constitucional y legal”, 10-31. 26. La autonomía, tal y como es entendida en la LMAD, exige la elaboración de un Estatuto en el caso de los Departamentos, y de una Carta Orgánica en el supuesto de los municipios. Estos instrumentos normativos para poder acceder a la autonomía deben pasar por el control de constitucionalidad del Tribunal Constitucional Pluricultural (TPC). En el marco del proceso autonómico boliviano, más de 15 municipios han puesto en vigencia sus cartas orgánicas, mientras que dos departamentos (Tarija y Pando, Estatutos Departamentales), tres pueblos indígenas (Estatutos IOC) y la autonomía regional del Gran Chaco (Estatuto Regional) hi- cieron lo mismo con la aprobación de sus estatutos autonómicos jurisdiccionales. A ello hay que sumar que una cuantía muy amplia de municipios con sus Cartas Orgánicas redactadas están esperando el referendo de los mismos; muchas Cartas Orgánicas municipales están sometidas a control de constitucionalidad parcial, y otras tantas han sido rechazadas, tanto por cuestiones formales como materiales.

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expresión que pudiese reflejar, expresar y contener las formas autónomas de gobierno territorial indígena, los regímenes especiales de gobierno, así como otras formas específicas de administración del territorio indígena. Otras jurisdicciones incluidas en dichos regímenes fueron las circunscripciones territoriales afroecuatorianas y montubias, así como la provincia de Galápagos. Sin embargo las CTI, en cuanto expresión normativa-administrativa para la articulación de la autonomía indígena en Ecuador, no llegaron a fraguar ni a funcionar por múltiples factores. Algunos tienen que ver con la falta de compromiso estatal con este proceso. Así, puede hablarse de la falta de desarrollo de toda una legislación secundaria que creara los procedimientos y las mediaciones necesarias para la articulación de la autonomía indígena, de la ausencia de las competencias necesarias para la implementación real de un modelo autonómico, así como la carencia de financiación suficiente para llevar a buen término la construcción de las autonomías indígenas.

Otros factores, sin embargo, son imputables al propio movimiento indígena. Así, el temor y el recelo que las propias organizaciones indígenas han mostra- do sistemáticamente ante las CTI tenía que ver con la posibilidad de perder el poder conquistado por ciertos pueblos indígenas, a partir de su especial capacidad de negociación para la instauración de “autonomías de hecho”, lo que refería a la fortaleza y la articulación interna de estos pueblos para negociar con el Estado; o la recelosa actitud de cierto liderazgo indígena a la cooptación estatal, lo que podría traducirse en una incómoda dependencia normativa y financiera del Estado y de su estructura jurídica, orientada más a la recentralización estatal, que a una consideración plurinacional de las autonomías indígenas.

Las CTI fueron diseñadas normativamente por primera vez en la Constitu- ción de 1998, y retomadas como posibilidad real en la Constitución de 2008. En el 2010 se promulgó el Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y Descentralización (COOTAD) que aborda cuestiones más espe- cíficas y concretas sobre la construcción e implementación de las autonomías indígenas.27

27. Una mirada más profunda y dilatada de estos procesos puede verse en Martínez de Bringas, Tierras, territorios y recursos naturales en el Ecuador, 329-362.

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Sin embargo, son varios los elementos y circunstancias que determinan que este espectacular intento de construcción de las autonomías (indígenas), a partir de la carcasa administrativa de las CTI, no solo no fraguara, sino que fracasara.28 Entre ellos están:

1. La debilidad del movimiento indígena ecuatoriano, seccionado por múlti- ples luchas y fracturas internas, así como por estrategias políticas mal diseña- das. Toda negociación autonómica seria requiere fortaleza interna, así como una buena estructuración orgánica del movimiento indígena (ecuatoriano).29 Aquí se produce una tensión interna, de difícil manejo y gestión, entre la dimensión táctica y estratégica, ambas necesarias para la construcción e im- plementación de las autonomías por parte del movimiento indígena. Lo estra- tégico es la imperiosa necesidad de caminar hacia procesos de construcción autonómica; lo táctico pasa por la valoración de criterios de oportunidad política, entre los que resulta clave la fortaleza del sujeto político indígena para movilizar y accionar un proceso que exige solidez y entereza.

2. La excesiva atomización del territorio indígena, escindido y fragmentado entre población indígena y no indígena, así como por múltiples intereses en conflicto sobre los territorios indígenas, imposibilitan la construcción de procesos con continuidad territorial y jurisdiccional netamente indígenas.

3. El tendente proceso de urbanización y abandono del territorio ancestral por parte de los pueblos indígenas está produciendo una relocalización y reor- ganización en las formas de entender y ejercitar el territorio y la jurisdicción, y en definitiva, de la propia autonomía indígena.

4. La existencia de una fuerte fractura dentro del propio movimiento indíge- na ecuatoriano para desarrollar estrategias que coadyuven a la construcción de las autonomías. Por un lado, irrumpe una concepción densa y férrea de la

28. Ortiz, “Dilemas y desafíos de la autonomía territorial”; Territorialidades, autonomía y conflictos, 60-85; “Entre la cooptación y el simulacro: la lucha por el derecho de autodeter- minación de las nacionalidades indígenas del centro sur amazónico del Ecuador”, 455-508. 29. En palabras de Patricia Gualinga, lideresa del Pueblo Kichwa de Sarayaku, “las CTI no pueden funcionar si los pueblos indígenas se encuentran débiles y se estima que ahora la mayoría de ellos están endebles. Si la CTI se construye solo en los papeles pero sin la partici- pación de los pueblos, sin su aporte, será una propuesta frágil. Para que las cosas prosperen debe basarse en una estructura colectiva”. Chirif, Estudio Regional, 101.

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autonomía, orientada a la profundización en modelos de gestión territorial y jurisdiccional (sistema de justicia indígena), proponiendo estrategias que implican cambios radicales en la distribución del poder en el marco del Esta- do. La construcción de la autonomía indígena exige redistribución del poder territorial y de la soberanía del Estado, lo que implica una reconfiguración territorial, normativa y administrativa de la estructura del Estado. Para ello se rescata la idea de la plurinacionalidad como elemento nuclear y fundamental de este reclamo autonómico (el ejemplo de Sarayacu). Por otro lado, aparecen procesos de construcción autonómica más tenues, orientados a la negociación y la concertación del poder en el marco del Estado, poniendo énfasis en la descentralización competencial entre el Estado y las autonomías indígenas.

5. La existencia de un fuerte vacío en la legislación ecuatoriana que otorgue claridad para entender y allanar el camino hacia la implementación de las autonomías indígenas. Como consecuencia de todo ello —la desconfianza estructural y la falta de una legislación garantista al respecto— es necesario interrogarse sobre la viabilidad y factibilidad concreta y real de las CTI como instrumento normativo necesario para la construcción de la autonomía indí- gena. Cabe preguntarse problemáticamente: ¿quién tiene el poder para constituir, en última instancia, una CTI? ¿Es ello una cuestión que corresponde determinar a los poderes del Estado?, ¿o es algo que forma parte consustancial de las formas de organización política del movimiento indígena, elemento esencial en la negociación con el Estado?; ¿qué medios para la explotación del territorio van a corresponder realmente a los pueblos indígenas, en cuanto habilitación normativa para ejercer el derecho a la autonomía?; el reconocimiento de las autonomías, con sus formas de gestión territorial, ¿implica, también, reconocimiento superpuesto de los sistemas de justicia indígena?, ¿o esta es una competencia exclusiva del Estado de imposible transferencia y adjudicación a las autonomías?; ¿la autonomía indígena implica la disposi- ción y gestión de los recursos naturales del subsuelo territorial, o esta es una competencia del Estado, en ningún momento susceptible de ser compartida o cogestionada por las dos partes implicadas en la negociación?. Todas estas cuestiones no han sido planteadas ni afrontadas en toda su radicalidad.

6. Otra problemática nuclear en todos los procesos de construcción autonó- mica en América Latina, y que se reitera como una transversal, con diferentes formatos, en los diferentes países que venimos analizando, es el supuesto de la existencia de territorios indígenas fragmentados por jurisdicciones estatales. En el caso de Ecuador, si tomamos como ejemplo la sierra, nos encontramos

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con enormes dificultades para la implantación de CTI con base municipal, ya que los municipios en la sierra tienen una composición netamente indíge- na, lo que ha permitido la construcción de facto de procesos de autogestión y autonomía, más allá de las posibilidades que podrían otorgar las CTI. Las CTI resultarían ser una imposición administrativa que se agrega a una manera indígena de habitar el territorio que ya funciona de manera autónoma. Se trata de una imposición del procedimiento normativo sobre procesos de autonomía ya en curso. La base municipal de la autonomía indígena en la sierra está consolidada, siendo superflua la estructura de las CTI. Sin embargo, en la costa, la situación es justo la contraria. En este caso, las CTI tampoco podrían funcionar debido a la baja densidad de población indígena en esta parte del país, lo que daría territorios enormemente fragmentados a nivel poblacional. Por último, en la Amazonía, existen territorios indígenas contiguos que, sin embargo, están fragmentados por múltiples jurisdicciones, estatales e indígenas.30

7. Finalmente, no existe una comprensión territorial global que permita una consideración sostenible y estructural de los procesos ambientales. Esa es otra de las grandes dificultades para la construcción de procesos autonómicos en el Ecuador.

3.3. Colombia

Colombia es el país que ha consolidado más tierras y territorios a los pueblos indígenas. Hablaríamos de más de un 35% del territorio nacional colom-

30. En el caso de los Huaroani, estos se encuentran ubicados en tres provincias, ocho canto- nes y un número grande de parroquias. En el caso de los pueblos Shuar, Achuar y Kichwa la situación es diferente y las CTI podrían funcionar como una herramienta útil para avanzar en los procesos autonómicos. A los Shuar, hace años lo que les interesaba era legalizar su territorio de manera contigua, ya que sus territorios habían sido titulados como comunas separadas. Ahora las cosas han cambiado y los Shuar pueden legalizar sus territorios e incluso ampliarlos. El tema de la autonomía, tal y como es planteada desde el Estado, no les interesa, ya que disponen de ella de facto; son fuertes como pueblos en su implantación y en la manera de expresar sus formas de lucha. La presencia del Estado en sus territorios es débil, con lo cual la amenaza para estos pueblos es de menor intensidad. Sin embargo, estas condiciones no son así para otros pueblos. Lo que sí es una constante en todo Ecuador son los continuos cambios de perspectiva y de enfoque en la manera de afrontar las cuestiones autonómicas por parte de los diferentes pueblos indígenas, y ello forma parte de la dificultad a la hora de entender y afrontar la cuestión autonómica. Chirif,Estudio Regional, 104 y ss.

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biano titulado. Varios son los factores que han influido favorablemente en el reconocimiento de derechos indígenas y que han impulsado los procesos normativos para la consolidación de la autonomía indígena: i) el carácter receptivo y generoso de esta cuestión en la Constitución de 1991, y la incor- poración a la misma, y a leyes secundarias que la desarrollan, de los derechos indígenas establecidos en el Convenio 169 de la OIT; ii) el desarrollo de una jurisprudencia muy favorable para los pueblos indígenas —a partir de la incorporación de los derechos colectivos indígenas reconocidos en tratados internacionales— por parte de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia; iii) la definición de los territorios indígenas como Entidades Territoriales Indígenas (ETI),31 funcionando con gobiernos indígenas autónomos y recibiendo fondos del Estado para su consolidación y conformación.

Sin embargo, la conformación de territorios indígenas como ETI no ha tenido desarrollo legal posterior. En los primeros años de entrada en vigor de la Constitución se planteó como un proyecto revolucionario importante darle participación activa a los pueblos indígenas para que pudieran asumir el control y manejo de sus territorios. Esto no se ha cumplido por falta de com- promisos explícitos del Estado, tanto en un nivel de gobierno central como regional.32 A día de hoy, los resguardos indígenas ocupan más de 400 municipios y, de crearse las ETI, esas áreas serían segregadas de los municipios, lo que implicaría que estos perderían su capacidad impositiva y, por tanto, su capacidad de gestión económica. Además, no se ha pensado qué pasaría con territorios indígenas que están en más de un departamento, esto es, aquellos que tengan una implantación territorial y jurisdiccional que desborda el mar-

31. La Constitución de Colombia establece: “Son entidades territoriales los departamentos, los distritos, los municipios y los territorios indígenas”, señalando que estas “gozan de autonomía para la gestión de sus intereses, dentro de los límites de la Constitución y la ley”, atribuyén- doles una serie de derechos importantes para la consolidación de las autonomías, como son gobierno propio, ejercicio de competencias, capacidad para administrar recursos y establecer los tributos necesarios, así como participar en las rentas nacionales para el desarrollo de las competencias suficientes para la consolidación de las ETI (artículos 286-287). Posteriormente establece que las Entidades Territoriales Indígenas se conformarán de acuerdo a lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial (Art. 329) y da pautas generales sobre los Consejos que deberán gobernar esas Entidades, los cuales estarán “conformados y reglamen- tados según los usos y costumbres de sus comunidades” (Arts. 329-330). 32. Roldán, y Sánchez, La problemática de tierras y territorios, 189-273; Houghton, “Desterri- torialización”, 15-55; y Los territorios indígenas colombianos.

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co y la estructura administrativa del Estado.33 Las ETI proyectan a los pueblos indígenas en Colombia una problemática similar a la analizada en Bolivia y Ecuador: el miedo a que su reconocimiento e implementación pueda implicar una pérdida de la autonomía de facto que han conseguido y que disfrutan algunos pueblos indígenas.34

Pese a ello, Colombia ha consolidado el resguardo35 como categoría normativa para el reconocimiento de la propiedad colectiva indígena no enajenable (art. 329 de la Constitución Política de Colombia, CPC), cualificada desde este marco de protección como inalienable, imprescriptible e inembargable (art. 63 CPC).

En Colombia, la Consulta36 —en cuanto factor coadyuvante a la consolidación de las autonomías indígenas —, no ha desarrollado una legislación propia,

33. El territorio del Resguardo Predio Putumayo ocupa más de seis millones de hectáreas, espacio que desborda el territorio de muchos departamentos del Estado. ¿Cómo proceder en supuestos como este? De nuevo nos encontramos ante una problemática común, transversal a muchos países en América Latina en su manera de gestionar la autonomía indígena. Esto es, cómo adaptar el territorio indígena al territorio estatal, y éste al territorio indígena. 34. La territorialidad indígena, anclada eminentemente en base municipal, corre el peligro de diluirse, de perder contenido y competencias, si transita hacia la conformación de ETI. Las problemáticas que asisten a los pueblos indígenas en relación a esta cuestión —problemática que es estructural a toda comprensión de la autonomía indígena— son: si las ETI tuvieran una implantación transmunicipal, ¿cómo se gestionaría la autonomía en estos supuestos?; ¿Todas las ETI se configurarán normativamente a partir de un patrón común, lo que implica un sistema de competencias homogéneos para todas ellas?; ¿O asistiremos a una construcción asimétrica e irregular, en contenido y funciones, de las diferentes ETI?; ¿Qué pasaría con aquellas ETI que transcienden el ámbito territorial de más de un resguardo?; ¿o de aquellas que se constituyen sobre la base de resguardos todavía no titulados? Todas estas cuestiones flotan como dudas fantasmales que no hacen más que alimentar el escepticismo de las organizaciones indígenas ante la viabilidad y efectividad de las ETI como modo de construir y gestionar la autonomía indígena. 35. El resguardo es una figura legal reconocida por la ley 89 de 1890, donde se establecían las condiciones necesarias para la protección de los salvajes hasta que pudieran civilizarse. El Estado pondría en manos de la Iglesia Católica esta misión civilizadora. En este sentido, la gran movilización indígena de los años 80, abanderada por el Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC) se orientaron a la recuperación de los resguardos en cuanto categorías normativas que ayudarían a la construcción y consolidación de la autonomía indígena, lo que implicaba competencias en materia de educación indígena, salud e igualdad, entre otras. Chirif, y García, Marcando territorio, 71 y ss. 36. La Consulta previa libre e informada se ha convertido en un elemento nuclear para el ejercicio y aplicación de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas. El Convenio 169 de la OIT —en sus artículos 6, 7, 15 y 16— establece que los Estados deben consultar todas las medidas

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ni dispone de un mecanismo específico para su implementación, pero se ha venido configurado como una acción constitucional de tutela, recogido así en la CPC. Como se ha anticipado, la Corte de Constitucionalidad ha venido jugando un papel importante en la innovación y creación de instrumentos normativos de protección para los pueblos indígenas, a partir de las exigen- cias que la Consulta establece y propone, tanto en el Convenio 169 como en la Declaración, o en los pronunciamientos del Relator Especial sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas.37 La Corte ha recreado un contenido material concreto para poder entender el derecho a la consulta como un dere-

administrativas y legislativas que afecten a los pueblos indígenas y tribales (arts. 6 y 7), así como los proyectos de prospección y explotación de los recursos naturales existentes en sus tierras (art. 15). Asimismo, el Convenio menciona específicamente que las comunidades in- dígenas deberán ser tenidas en cuenta en la formulación, aplicación y evaluación de planes y programas nacionales y regionales de desarrollo (arts. 6 y 7), y que cuando por circunstancias excepcionales sea necesario el traslado y la reubicación de pueblos indígenas, este solo podrá llevarse a cabo con su consentimiento dado libremente y con pleno conocimiento de causa (art. 16.2). De la misma manera la Declaración de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas establece que los pueblos indígenas deben ser consultados antes de adoptar medidas legislativas y administrativas que les afecten, antes de aprobar cualquier proyecto que impacte sobre sus tierras o territorios y los recursos existentes en ellas. En el mismo orden de ideas, establece que el consentimiento libre, previo e informado es imprescindible en casos de traslados o reubicaciones de comunidades (arts. 10, 19, 30 y 32). Adicionalmente se incluyen algunas situaciones no contempladas por el Convenio 169 y se especifica con mayor precisión el tipo de medidas que deben ser consultadas. Se establece, por ejemplo, el deber de realizar consultas antes de utilizar las tierras o territorios de las comunidades indígenas para actividades militares (art. 30), provisión que no está específicamente contemplada en el Convenio 169. La Consulta, tal como ha ido evolucionando, ha pasado de ser un mero recurso administrativo, potestativo para empresas y Estados, a un elemento nuclear para garantizar el reconocimiento y aplicación de muchos derechos indígenas reconocidos en el Convenio 169 de la OIT y en la Declaración de Naciones Unidas. Es por ello que se está hablando cada vez más y de forma generalizada de la consulta indígena como derecho, tanto en el ámbito de Naciones Unidas como en el de los pueblos indígenas y el movimiento de derechos. El discurso de la Consulta como derecho está implicando un desplazamiento del lugar de enunciación de la misma: se pugna dialécticamente para que esta pase a ser una capacidad de los pueblos indígenas, co- rrespondiendo a ellos fijar el contenido material de la misma, sus condiciones de legitimidad y ejercicio, así como la validación de su efectividad y resultado. Para ampliar estas cuestiones consúltese Martínez de Bringas El derecho a la consulta en la Declaración de las Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, 127-150. 37. Anaya, Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 15 July 2009, para. 41; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people; Report of the former Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples; Report of the former Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples; The situation of the indigenous peoples affected by the El Diquís hydroelectric project in Costa Rica.

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cho-instrumento para la protección de los territorios, la jurisdicción y los modos de autonomía indígena.38 Todo ello hay que considerarlo junto con la matización garantista que establece el artículo 330 de la CPC, al establecer que la explotación de los recursos naturales en territorio indígena se hará siempre teniendo en cuenta la “integridad cultural, social y económica” de los pueblos indígenas, fomentando en dichos procesos la participación indígena.

Además de todo ello, hay que considerar la actividad desarrollada por el Go- bierno colombiano para el reconocimiento e implementación de la consulta como derecho. Con la Directiva Presidencial 01 del 2010, el Presidente de la República ordenó al gobierno aplicar ciertas directrices e instrucciones que ayudaran a garantizar este derecho. Otra Directiva Presidencial, 10 del 2013, estableció la Guía para la Realización de la Consulta Previa, instrumento legal vinculante para funcionarios del Ejecutivo. Ambas directivas fueron retomadas por el Documento Conpes 3762 del 2013, que recomendó establecer protocolos para la optimización del funcionamiento de la Dirección de Con- sulta Previa del Ministerio del Interior. Así, a través del Decreto 2613 del 2013, dicho ministerio adoptó un protocolo de coordinación interinstitucional para la consulta previa, con el propósito de coordinar las responsabilidades de las entidades públicas en todo lo relacionado con este tema. Sin embargo, pese a estos esfuerzos, aún no se ha regulado el derecho a la consulta indígena a tra- vés de una Ley Estatutaria, que sería el instrumento normativo necesario para darle forma. Las demoras en su negociación se dilatan en el tiempo, carecien- do por tanto todavía de un dispositivo normativo que regule íntegramente

38. La Corte Constitucional de Colombia (CCC) ha desarrollado una jurisprudencia singu- larmente rica y progresista sobre el derecho a la consulta de los pueblos indígenas. Destaca el desarrollo jurisprudencial del derecho al consentimiento previo, libre e informado, y su compatibilidad con lo señalado por la Corte IDH en el Caso del Pueblo Saramaka contra Surinam. Cf. Sentencia T-769 de 2009, Sentencia T-129 de 2011 y Sentencia T-376 de 2012. La CCC ha señalado que “si bien el deber general del Estado en materia de consulta previa consiste en asegurar una participación activa y efectiva de las comunidades con el objeto de obtener su consentimiento, cuando la medida representa una afectación intensa del derecho al territorio colectivo, es obligatoria la obtención del consentimiento de la comunidad previa a la implantación de la medida política, plan o proyecto”, Cf. Sentencia T-376 de 2012, párr. 25. En un sentido parecido, la CCC ha declarado la violación del derecho a la Consulta porque los planes o proyectos no han sido previamente consultados con los pueblos indígenas. El caso del proyecto Mandé Norte en los departamentos de Antioquia y Chocó, Sentencia T-769 de 2009); el Proyecto de Puerto Multipropósito de Brisa de la Sierra Nevada, Sentencia T-547 de 2010; el proyecto para la construcción y mejoramiento de la vía transversal de Barú de Consorcio Vial Barú, Sentencia T-745 de 2010; la construcción de la carretera Unguía-Acandí o Titumate-Balboa-San Miguel-Acandí, Sentencia T-129 de 2011, entre otras.

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el derecho a la Consulta previa. Recientemente, la Corte Constitucional ha emitido una sentencia, SU-217 del 2017, en donde se establece la necesidad de obtener el consentimiento de la comunidad consultada si las disposiciones normativas pudieran implicar la extinción física y cultural de la comunidad, o implicase el uso de materiales peligrosos en sus territorios.

Sin embargo, como también ha venido informando la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH), existe en Colombia una estrecha conexión entre los intereses extractivos y los desplazamientos de los pueblos indígenas fuera de sus territorios. De hecho, el desplazamiento es promovido como una estrategia de despojo territorial y desarraigo comunitario para garantizar el acceso a las tierras a los mega-proyectos,39 descomponiendo con ello todo proceso de construcción de la autonomía indígena.

3.4. Perú

Perú es posiblemente, del marco comparativo que aquí proponemos, el país más regresivo en cuanto a instauración y reconocimiento de procesos de autonomía indígena. En relación al reconocimiento y protección del suje- to jurídico-político de las autonomías indígenas, se reconoce el concepto de comunidad nativa y comunidad campesina, expurgando de su contenido normativo el estatus de “pueblo indígena”. El propio Comité de Expertos de la OIT llamó la atención sobre la necesidad de un reconocimiento formal y jurídico de “pueblos indígenas”, concepto normativo que transciende la idea de mera comunidad.

Siendo esto así, el espacio de gobierno y control territorial indígena es más bien un espacio atomizado, segregado en islas, ofertándose la territorialidad indígena como un espacio discontinuo, fragmentado y desconectado que no permite establecer un vínculo estructural entre el territorio y los pueblos indígenas. De ahí la utilización meditada del concepto de comunidad por parte del Estado, orientado a fracturar y segmentar una consideración sólida, colectiva y continua de territorio como proponen los pueblos indígenas.

39. CIDH, Pueblos indígenas, comunidades afrodescendientes y recursos naturales: protección- de rechos humanos en el contexto de actividad de extracción, explotación y desarrollo, 170.

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En Perú fue una ley de 1974 la primera en reconocer derechos de propiedad a los pueblos indígenas en la Amazonía, llamados oficialmente comunidades nativas. Esta ley se modificaría más tarde por otra aún vigente, la Ley de Comunidades Nativas, aunque esta se encuentra parcialmente recortada a partir de las políticas neoliberales implementadas por Fujimori. En esta Ley se reconoce la integridad de la propiedad territorial de las “comunidades nativas”, que tienen un carácter inalienable, imprescriptible e inembargable. Sin embargo, estas garantías se han ido diluyendo, permaneciendo tan solo el carácter de imprescriptibilidad de los territorios en la Constitución del 1993. Todos estos derechos colectivos se han ido recortando como consecuencia de la legislación antiindígena desarrollada a partir de 1995 por Fujimori. Eran leyes que limitaban y amenazaban la integridad y seguridad de los territorios indígenas, proponiendo la total supresión de un concepto de titularidad territorial colectiva propuesto por las comunidades indígenas.40

El derecho social agrario peruano ha procedido a una fragmentación de la propiedad colectiva indígena al diferenciar entre tierras agropecuarias, sobre las que sí cabe la propiedad y la titulación, y tierras forestales, sobre las que solo cabe el uso.41 Aunque la Ley reconoce que tanto unas como otras son parte de los territorios comunales, y por tanto, solo estas comunidades (nativas) podrán determinar su uso, en la práctica todo ello se presta a in- terpretaciones arbitrarias y abusivas por parte de los miembros del Estado y otros operadores jurídicos.

Desde el año 2000, con la promulgación de la nueva Ley Forestal y de Fauna Silvestre, se han dejado de otorgar contratos de cesión de uso sobre territorios comunales clasificados como forestales. Ello se fundamenta en una práctica política desarrollada en el Perú, cada vez más limitativa de los derechos de los pueblos indígenas, y orientada a la promoción e incentivación de la actividad privada en territorialidad indígena. Ilegalidad, junto con promoción estatal de la misma, son las dos variables necesarias para poder entender el recorte sistemático en las formas de posesión y gestión de la territorialidad indígena en Perú, y por extensión, de las formas de autonomía. Además de la exclusión de territorios de cualidad forestal del ámbito de la territorialidad

40. García, Territorio, autogestión territorial y derechos. 41. García, Territorios indígenas y la nueva legislación; Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, Análisis de la normatividad.

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indígena, se ha venido produciendo la exclusión de los pueblos indígenas sobre la propiedad de los recursos del subsuelo. Esta es una cuestión fundamental para la consolidación y sostenibilidad de los procesos de autonomía, o para su descomposición. Actualmente, más del 75% de la región amazónica peruana está dividida en lotes, con situaciones y regímenes diferenciados, unos en procesos de negociación, otros en prospección y explotación,42 etc. Solo han escapado a esta dramática situación áreas naturales de protección estricta, como parques y santuarios nacionales–, aunque con intentos de explotación por parte del capital privado.43

La tendencia en Perú ha sido el no reconocimiento de los derechos de propiedad-posesión sobre territorialidad indígena, junto con un incremento, en paralelo, de la inversión privada en estos territorios. Existe una estrategia legislativa, con carácter estructural, que apunta a fraccionar, dividir y ato- mizar la propiedad comunal a partir de la modificación de su estructura organizativa, esto es, afectando medularmente a las formas de autonomía y gestión indígena. Diluir los vínculos ancestrales, la dimensión colectiva del territorio indígena, para convertirlo en espacios territoriales de personas y empresas, un espacio fracturado, donde lo comunitario —y sus modos ancestrales de cosmovisión en la comprensión de los usos y gestión del territorio — da paso a una interpretación individualizante de la tierra, por asociación de personas e intereses productivos y empresariales. Los Decretos de Gobierno de la época de Alán García vienen a apuntillar todo este proceso, descomponiendo los reconocimientos territoriales de los derechos indígenas que se habían venido produciendo por mediación del Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos (Convenio 169 de la OIT). Esta legislación institucionaliza una dinámica que tiene que ver con la utilización de los procesos de consulta de manera regresiva, recortando drásticamente los intereses de los derechos indígenas.

Finalmente, la Ley de consulta previa, aprobada en agosto de 2011, constituye el paroxismo de este proceso de retroceso y limitación de los derechos indí- genas a través de la consulta, al introducir una serie de medidas que implican una auténtica inversión de cómo estaba regulada la misma en el Convenio 169 de la OIT. Mientras las organizaciones indígenas plantearon que la consulta debería ser previa a la celebración de contratos que otorguen derechos para

42. Chirif y García, Marcando territorio, 75 y ss. 43. Chirif, Estudio Regional, 124.

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explorar o explotar recursos naturales, al igual que los estudios de impacto ambiental deberían ser sometidos a procesos de consulta antes de su aproba- ción, el Estado impuso en la Ley que la consulta debería realizarse después de la firma de los contratos de exploración y explotación. La Ley también excluye la consulta en la construcción de grandes infraestructuras (salud, educación, servicios públicos, etc.) que, en coordinación con los pueblos indígenas, estén orientadas al beneficio de los mismos, bajo la ingenua afirmación de que estos proyectos no producen impactos sobre los pueblos, en contra de lo reconocido en el artículo 6 del Convenio 169. Tampoco requiere el consentimiento en aquellos proyectos de inversión que, afectando al desarrollo de los pueblos, impliquen un gran impacto sobre sus formas de vida. La consulta, que fun- cionaba como una estructura garantista en favor de los pueblos indígenas, se convirtió por arte de la negociación estatal en un mecanismo para la instru- mentalización de los derechos indígenas (Samon, 2012: 121 y s.). A ello habría que añadir que el Estado condicionó quién podría ser sujeto del derecho a la Consulta, dejando fuera de esta condición a las comunidades campesinas y excluyendo situaciones de desposesión territorial, análogas a la situación de los pueblos indígenas, de este mecanismo de protección, y proyectando el conflicto sobre la titularidad del derecho a la consulta a los pueblos indígenas, invirtiendo lo que era en principio un derecho en un privilegio conflictivo.

Finalmente es importante destacar que el reconocimiento de Parques Na- turales en Perú se había utilizado como elemento estratégico fundamental para la protección de los derechos indígenas. En el caso del Parque Nacional Ichigkat Muja, en la Cordillera del Cóndor, su creación fue objeto de consulta a la población Awajún, a través de sus organizaciones representativas. Sin embargo, una vez que las partes llegaron a un acuerdo, el gobierno procedió arbitrariamente a recortar el Parque Nacional, que constituía para los Awa- jún garantía de que en ese espacio territorial no se realizarían actividades extractivas, entregando la parte recortada a empresas mineras.

4. A modo de conclusión

Este texto trataba de dar medida de las dificultades que los procesos de cons- trucción de autonomía indígena expresan para la consolidación de un Dere- cho intercultural entre el Estado y los pueblos indígenas en América Latina. Como se anticipó, el texto exponía una orientación dialéctica-conflictiva y

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eminentemente política, para poder dar medida de las dificultades que de manera genérica y sistemática afectan a muchos procesos de autonomía in- dígena. Procederemos ahora a sintetizar algunas de esas dificultades, junto con las dimensiones positivas encontradas, para poder articular, en el futuro, una estrategia política real para la construcción de las autonomías.

1. De los países analizados, ninguno de ellos ha culminado, en cuanto proceso articulado en el marco del Estado, la declaración formal (mucho menos material) para la construcción de las Autonomías Indígenas Originarias Campesinas (Bolivia), de las Entidades Territoriales Indígenas (Colombia), ni de las Circunscripciones Territoriales Indígenas (Ecuador). Ha habido avances significativos que han implicado transformaciones importantes en la organización territorial de los Estados. Sin embargo, ello no es suficiente. Es paradigmático, además, que pese al gran giro constituyente y constitucional operado en Bolivia y en Ecuador, el proceso en estos países está absolutamente estancado. En Colombia, en cambio, el Estado, en coordinación con las organizaciones indígenas, ha dado pasos en los procesos de descentralización autonómica indígena, transfiriendo fondos y competencias a los resguardos para poder avanzar en este aspecto.

2. En algunos Estados (Ecuador y Colombia), y de la mano de algunos pueblos, las organizaciones indígenas no comprenden la autonomía como un simple traspaso de funciones y fondos del Estado, esto es, como una mera descentra- lización que no conlleve serias trasformaciones en la manera de organizar y estructurar el Estado, así como de entender las relaciones entre el Estado y los pueblos indígenas. Las autonomías indígenas tienen que ver con un salto cualitativo en las maneras de comprender el Estado de Derecho y las relaciones de poder. La simple transformación administrativa, con ribetes de des- centralización, está muy lejos del proceso autonómico diseñado por algunas organizaciones indígenas. Ello genera fractura entre pueblos indígenas pues implica una forma muy polarizada y poco unificada de entender los procesos autonómicos —desde el punto de vista ideológico y funcional—, lo que deja un marco de negociación general para el consenso muy bajo con el Estado, siendo más bien las opciones de pueblos concretos, dentro de cada Estado, lo que está permitiendo constituir procesos autonómicos, muchas veces sin permiso y sin el aval de la dimensión normativa, así como sin diálogos inter- jurisdiccionales e interculturales con el Estado.

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3. La atomización y fragmentación de los territorios indígenas ha sido una estrategia instituida para descomponer y fracturar la dimensión colectiva indígena en su manera de habitar y apropiar el territorio —lo que ha sido una transversal en los cuatro países analizados—, así como para diluir pau- latinamente otros elementos nucleares de la autonomía que tenían su condi- ción de posibilidad y su fundamento último en la territorialidad indígena. A ello hay que añadir el alto grado de urbanización indígena que se viene produciendo en estos países, fragmentando las maneras clásicas de entender los derechos indígenas, fundamentalmente la territorialidad, la autonomía y la jurisdicción; deslocalizando las formas indígenas de entender la política (modos de organización y participación); recolocando el énfasis, en el proceso de construcción de las autonomías, en las entidades administrativas del Esta- do (la municipal), y en las formas estatales de participación y organización (sistema electoral estatal). Todo ello fragiliza las fuerzas necesarias para la construcción de autonomías indígenas a partir de una manera no indígena de entender la política y sus procesos.

4. La creación de circunscripciones indígenas, con base municipal, viene ge- nerando fuertes tensiones y conflictos (Bolivia, Ecuador), ya que el proceso indígena de construcción autonómica supone una redimensión de la orga- nización territorial del Estado, lo que implica que la jurisdicción indígena y sus formas de demarcación y asiento superen y transcienden las maneras estatales de entender el territorio, la jurisdicción y el ámbito local de gobierno municipal. Ello genera una lógica diferente en la manera de entender el poder, los procesos electorales y las maneras de organización y representación en el marco del Estado.

5. A ello habría que sumar un fuerte retroceso en las dinámicas de construc- ción autonómica y de fortalecimiento del poder indígena en algunos países (Bolivia, Ecuador), a partir de un proceso complejo de tecnificación y buro- cratización en la manera de entender el proceso autonómico. A ello se suma una seria limitación en el reconocimiento de los derechos indígenas que se había venido produciendo por la influencia del Derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, como la ratificación del Convenio 169 de la OIT y la aprobación de la Declaración de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de los pueblos indígenas.

6. Se han venido desarrollando formas y modos para construir la autono- mía indígena sin reconocimiento estatal, como una interesante salida a las vías

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estancadas y paralizadas de implementación de la autonomía en América Latina. Proyectos como los de Raqaypampa en Bolivia han constituido un impulso interesante para ejercer la autonomía, saliendo del bloqueo oficial y el entrampamiento en el que ha caído el Estado boliviano. Ello no significa abandonar la vía legal de construcción autonómica, sino buscar alternativas ante un proceso generalizado de estancamiento. De manera análoga podría hablarse en Perú del proyecto de Datem Marañón, en cuanto necesidad de buscar una vía autonómica alternativa a la falta de propuestas y a la falta de disposición del Estado para construirlas. Este proyecto pretendía crear unas condiciones de gobierno territorial indígena que sintetice una constelación rica de pueblos, entendiendo el proceso autonómico como una dinámica en construcción que reclama múltiples consensos intraindígenas, con indepen- dencia del reconocimiento estatal. Una situación parecida, fuertemente es- tructurada, puede verse en Ecuador con el pueblo de Sarayacu, donde se ha procedido a la construcción de planes de gestión territorial y modelos de autonomía propios sin reconocimiento y apoyo por parte del Estado.

7. La calidad y cualidad normativa, en el reconocimiento de las autonomías indígenas, es muy diferente en los diferentes países objeto de comparación. Colombia ha desarrollado una normativa propicia para el reconocimiento indígena en materia autonómica, a lo que habría que añadir todo el trabajo de construcción y facilitación desarrollado por muchos operadores jurídicos, entre los que estaría la Corte de Constitucionalidad y la CIDH. Bolivia y Ecuador mantienen una situación paradigmática: siendo los dos países cuyas regulaciones constitucionales son las más avanzadas en materia de reconocimiento de derechos indígenas, y cuya legislación secundaria y de desarrollo permitía crear, en un principio, un renovado y cualitativo avance en el reconocimiento de las autonomías, la práctica y voluntad política años después ha configurado una situación fuertemente polarizada y conflictiva: fuertes y sólidos reconocimientos normativos en sede constitucional, junto con una ausencia de desarrollo de legislación primaria y secundaria que permita implementar esos reconocimientos constitucionales. En Perú, por contraposición, el atropello y apabullamiento de los derechos indígenas desde sede legislativa ha sido una práctica sistemática y continuada. Las autonomías indígenas son unas de las dimensiones sacrificadas en estos países.

8. En relación con los Parques Naturales, estos se han utilizado como estrategia de protección o desprotección según los países. La normativa de Parques Naturales ha sido interpretada de manera flexible, selectiva y táctica según

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procesos y momentos. Colombia y Perú han desarrollado una praxis de res- peto a la intangibilidad de los Parques Naturales y de protección territorial, con la excepción comentada de los Awajún en Perú, y la tendencia a delimitar y constituir estos espacios de intangibilidad con población no indígena. En Bolivia (Isiboro Sécure) y Ecuador (Yasuní) la debilidad de los Parques Na- turales como estrategia para la protección de la territorialidad indígena ha sido clamorosa y creciente. Teniendo todo ello en cuenta, es fácil interpretar que la construcción de los procesos de autonomía no haya fructificado, sino más bien declinado, teniendo en cuenta que no ha habido una estrategia garantista para la protección de elementos fundamentales de la autonomía, como la territorialidad y la jurisdicción indígena.

9. Finalmente, ha sido común a los cuatro países analizados la inexistencia de una comprensión territorial que incluyera la totalidad cosmovisional del espacio-territorio reclamado por los pueblos indígenas. No se ha producido una reflexión global sobre estas cuestiones; más bien se ha procedido, por vía legislativa y administrativa, a descomponer la comprensión cosmovisional y colectiva de los pueblos indígenas en relación con el territorio, para proceder a una consideración desterritorializada, fragmentada e individualizante de la autonomía. La lógica de comprensiones territoriales sustentadas por títulos individuales, o por dinámicas territoriales en la que se da confluencia de una multiplicidad de propietarios (comuneros, páramos fiscales, propiedades agrícolas privadas, etc.) ha hecho imposible caminar hacia una comprensión holística y compleja de las autonomías indígenas.

Bibliografía

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138 REAF-JSG 28, diciembre 2018, p. 101-138 Col·laboracions en aquest número

Peter Bussjäger Professor titular de l’Institut de Dret Públic, Estat i Ciència Administra- tiva de la Universitat d’Innsbruck, i director de l’Institut de Federalisme a Innsbruck (Àustria). És membre del Tribunal Suprem de Liechtenstein i, com a exfuncionari del Land de Vorarlberg (Àustria) i investigador en Dret a l’Institut Liechtenstein de Bendern (Liechtenstein), és membre de la Comissió de Venècia i del Grup d’Experts Independents sobre la Carta Europea de l’autogovern local. Entre els seus principals interessos de recerca s’inclouen el federalisme, el sistema multinivell europeu, el dret constitucional, el dret administratiu, amb especial atenció a la protecció del medi ambient, i el govern electrònic.

Adam Holesch Investigador postdoctoral de l’Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), en l’actualitat és director del projecte H2020, finançat per la Unió Europea, “El futur de la governança global”. És màster per la Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität de Bonn i doctor per la Universitat Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona. La seva recerca segueix un enfocament interdisciplinari que combina coneixements de teoria política, política comparada i economia política, tot estudiant qualsevol qüestió relacionada amb el nacionalisme, el federalisme, el regionalisme i la UE. Ha publicat dos llibres sobre les relacions germanopoloneses i la UE.

Mirella M. Johler Ajudant de recerca a la Facultat de Dret del Departament de Dret Públic, Estat i Teoria Administrativa de la Universitat d’Innsbruck i del Lichtenstein Institute, és estudiant de postgrau de Dret a la Universitat d’Innsbruck i lli- cenciada en Ciències Polítiques per la mateixa universitat. Els seus interessos principals pel que fa a recerca són el dret públic, el dret mediambiental i de l’energia, i el dret comparat.

139 Asier Martínez de Bringas Professor de Dret Constitucional de la Facultat de Dret de la Universitat de Deusto i investigador a l’Instituto de Derechos Humanos Pedro Arrupe. La seva activitat investigadora s’ha enfocat al camp de la teoria crítica dels drets, els drets dels pobles indígenes, la interculturalitat, el pluralisme jurídic, els drets socials, així com l’enfocament de drets humans en la cooperació internacional al desenvolupament. Ha dut a terme la seva activitat docent en diferents universitats espanyoles i d’Amèrica Llatina. Ha desenvolupat també una intensa activitat política en nombroses organitzacions.

Christoph Schramek Doctor en Dret, és investigador associat a l’Institut de Federalisme a Inns- bruck (Àustria). Ha estat professor i investigador associat a l’Institut de Dret Públic, Estat i Ciència Administrativa de la Universitat d’Innsbruck (2013- 2016). Els seus principals interessos de recerca inclouen el federalisme, el dret constitucional austríac, el dret administratiu i el sistema judicial administratiu. El seu darrer llibre aborda la qüestió jurisdiccional en un estat federal ba- sada en la reforma integral de la jurisdicció administrativa de 2012 a Àustria.

Roland Sturm Catedràtic de Ciències Polítiques a la Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Er- langen-Nürnberg. Ha publicat extensament en els àmbits de la integració europea, la política alemanya (federalisme), la política comparada i la política pública comparada, i l’economia política. Els seus projectes de recerca més recents se centren en l’austeritat com a repte polític, la segona cambra federal a Alemanya, la descentralització en el món àrab, i la racionalitat política. Ha estat professor visitant a Seattle (Universitat de Washington), Pequín (Uni- versitat de Pequín) i Barcelona (Universitat Pompeu Fabra).

140 RevistaRevista d’Estudisd’Estudis AutonòmicsAutonòmics ii FederalsFederals JournalJournal ofof 28 Self-GovernmentSelf-Government Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals — Journal of Self-Government Revista d’Estudis Autonòmics i Federals — Journal

Unitary Federalism—Germany Ignores the Original Spirit 28 I Desembre 2018 December of its Constitution Roland Sturm 2 The Decentralization of Poland 1989-2018: From Partisan 8 Disagreement to a Vehicle for Successful Absorption of EU Cohesion Funding Adam Holesch

Federalism and Recent Political Dynamics in Austria Peter Bussjäger, Christoph Schramek, Mirella M. Johler