Enactivism The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond Shaun Gallagher • University of Memphis, Tennessee, USA, and University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia • s.gallagher/at/memphis.edu Shaun Gallagher

> Context • In developing an enactivist phenomenology the analysis of time-consciousness needs to be pushed to- ward a fully enactivist account. > Problem • Varela proposed a neurophenomenology of time-consciousness. I attempt to push this analysis towards a more complete enactivist phenomenology of time-consciousness. > Method • I review Varela’s account of time-consciousness, which brings Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the intrinsic temporal structure of experience into contact with contemporary neuroscience and dynamical systems theory, and pushes it towards a more enactivist conception of consciousness. I argue that Varela’s analysis motivates a closer examination of the phenomenological aspects of the intrinsic temporal structure of experience, understanding it in terms of an action- oriented embodied phenomenology in its most basic manifestation. > Results • This fully enactivist phenomenology of time-consciousness continues the analysis initiated by Varela and remains consistent with but also goes beyond Husserl’s later writings on time-consciousness. > Implications • This analysis shows that the enactive character of in- tentionality in general, goes all the way down; it is embedded in the micro-structure of time-consciousness, and this has implications for understanding perception and action. > Constructivist content • This account is consistent with Varela’s constructivist approach to cognition. > Key words • Time-consciousness, enactivism, Husserl, Varela.

Introduction The past: Husserl’s analysis clear, Husserl offers a phenomenology of the intrinsic temporality of experience, bracket- « 1 » My first encounter with Francisco « 2 » How is it possible to be conscious ing or setting aside assumptions about time Varela was in 1996 when we communicated of objects such as melodies, which cannot ap- as objective or measurable by the clock. about one of my articles he reviewed for the pear all at once, but only unfold themselves « 3 » Husserl reject’s Franz Brentano’s Journal of Consciousness Studies (Gallagher over time? This is the kind of question that answer, that re-presenting (vergegenwärti- 1997). At that time we exchanged manu- Husserl (1966a) seeks to answer in his lec- gende) acts of imagining, remembering or 91 scripts that we were in the process of writ- tures on time-consciousness. Husserl’s view expecting allow us to grasp more than the ing. He was writing an article on the neu- is that perceiving succession and change now point, since that would imply that we rophenomenology of time-consciousness would be impossible if consciousness gave us are not able to perceive objects with tempo- (Varela 1999a, 1999b), and I was just put- merely a pure momentary time slice or if the ral duration (Husserl 1966a: 10–19). Rather, ting the finishing touches on a book manu- stream of consciousness were a series of un- in agreement with William James (1890), script on the same topic (Gallagher 1998). connected experiential points. If conscious- Husserl argues that the basic unit of time- Neither of these subsequently published ness were restricted to what exists right now, consciousness is not a “knife-edge” present, works, however, went far enough towards it would be impossible to perceive anything but a “duration-block,” i.e., a temporal field, an interpretation of time-consciousness with a temporal extension and duration. A or what Robert Kelly, the author of The Alter- that would fit with a fully enactivist view. In succession of isolated, punctual, conscious native: A Study in Psychology, writing under this target article I propose to review what states does not add up to a consciousness the name of E. R. Clay, had called a “specious I take to be an important development of of succession and duration. Consciousness present” (see Andersen & Grush 2009). The Edmund Husserl’s analysis of time-con- must in some way grasp more than the punc- specious present or thick duration block, sciousness in Varela’s work, and to push it tual now; it must be conscious of that which which is not equivalent to a momentary or forward to a full-fledged enactivist concep- has just been and is just about to be. How this strict present, somehow contains all three tion, informed by dynamical systems the- is possible or how a subject can be aware of temporal modes, present, past and future. ory and a more action-oriented embodied that which is no longer or not yet present – Husserl offers a phenomenological account view of experience. this is what Husserl attempts to answer. To be of this temporality.

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 92 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism cret pnes pia ipeso) to impression) (primal openness current a tomomentspast coupledis of experience to reference retentional a experience mo- of ment any at structure: temporal common ination, and of experience any kind, has this not only perception, but also memory, imag-

nected tones.nected uncon- or isolated as merely not and sion we thatsay can wereason, For this be. aboutto taneous; A is heard as just past, and C as just simul- as heard not are they since C, and A tones the of consciousness your and B tone present the of consciousness your between difference a is there however,Importantly, sequence. on-going an of part as cession, are you way Rather,some imaginationC. aboutofin act remembering A and combining that with an then and B, perceiving simply not Youare C. tone just-about-to-be-sounded the ing anticipat- are youmelody, familiar a is it if and, A tone just-past the of conscious ally perceptu- still are you B, tone the hear you When C. and B, A, sequence broader the of exclusively alone, but rather a consciousness you will not find a consciousness ofthis tone sounds, B tone instant the perception your attendtoyou If C. andB, A, sequence tonal ing three terms: technical the structure of this temporal experience us- Co ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ n the melody in its temporal succes- temporal its in melody the hear to happen progresses. as experience flective anticipation ofwhat is just about unre- and implicit an isProtention cur. - oc to aboutjust object the of phase the anticipates a way, indefinite more-or-less in that, component the Protention, event as it into sinks past. the or object the of awareness an provides Retention object. just- the of the phase of elapsed consciousness a with us provides thatcomponent the Retention, ture. anabstractcomponent of largera - struc as treated is it analysis, the in such, as and isolation, in appears never It 337f). 315, 1966b: (Husserl horizon temporal its of independently thought be cannot impression primal the Husserl, to ing Accord- object. the of now-phase the consciousness narrowly directed toward of component the impression, Primal « 6» « 5» « 4» str u ctivi In his analysis, Husserl describes describes Husserl analysis, his In sue ht o ae ern a hearing are you that Assume codn t Hsels analysis, Husserl’s to According st these tones as in suc - in as tones these hearing Fou n d ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 experience is not itself an object occurring occurring object an itself not is experience 1966a: 41,118,330). (Husserlpresent been just has what of ence present event, retention is a keeping in pres- no-longer- past, a of [Vergegenwärtigung]) “re-presenting” (or presence to bringing a is which proper), (memory recollection to ally under our voluntary control. In contrast usu- are which expectation, or recollection said to occur passively, in contrast to explicit ness. Moreover, consciousretention- and protention of are acts such of moments plicit im- componentsor structural protentionas and retention of operations the presuppose themselves which acts, intentional explicit summer.next latter The and full-fledged are beach the to forward Year,looking Newor last attended you party the recollecting and occurring, is it as melody a hearing tween differencebe- a isthere Clearly expectation. properthe cognitive of acts recollection and from distinguished areprotention and tion reflects this threefoldthis reflects structure. unified atanytemporalform– moment given the – it experience we how but moment, to ment the experiential content – changes from mo - structure this Within pression/retentionconsciousness.ofstructure the by determined is experience temporal of structure full and concrete The happen. to about just are that experience of moments the of anticipation protentional a andnow, happening is what “ ception of succession and duration. per our of possibility the for allows what is structure This pattern. gestalt a in given are which now, no-longer-now and not-yet-now in field a is it punctual, not is presence tual characterized as a constantlycoming.gradateda as characterized ‘protention,’of horizon be a to disclosed is which and a horizon of what is coming on the other side: side, one the on retentions gradated momentary is the nuclear phase of a continuity, a continuity of perception momentary such each Butpressions). im- primal (so-called perceptions momentary of system is streaming a itself as object internally structured extended temporally a of (original givenness) consciousness original as perception (Husserl 1962:202) n hs a, t eoe eiet ht concrete that evident becomes it way, this In « 9» « 8» « 7» Thus, on Husserl’s accountpercep - n otat o rnao reten- Brentano, to contrast In o e la, o Hsel temporal Husserl for clear, be To we experience – experience we what protention/primal-im- ” -

something like reverse the of retention. protentionis that suggests this of most and developed, less is protention of discussion tention, and on getting that right.aspect His re- on focuses analysisHusserl’s of original muchthat note I 378). 317, (Husserl1966b: impression/retention protention/primal is Husserl, to according presence, lived the of structure full and concrete The protention. givensionneveralone;is nor retention is or impres- Primal limit-case. theoretical and abstraction an is isolation, in taken if ment, ele- each consciousness, of temporality sic - be impression,than ratherprimal account, later this In account. tripartite original the written around 1917–1918, introduce a reframing wereof which Manuscripts, Bernau the especially time-consciousness, on texts around 1904 to 1917. enceasfound hislecturesin and notes from - experi of temporality intrinsic the of ture - struc tripartite the of depiction standard 375f). the experience itself (Husserl 1966a: 75, 333, of temporality intrinsic the as same the not intentional(as object past-present-future) is the oftemporalgivenness the red,nor cular cir neither is circle red a of experience my two different temporal domains here. Just as are There itself. consciousness of structures constituting the between exist relationsthat the protention, from impression, primal and by retention structured experience an in objects temporal as constituted are that objects the distinguishes thus Husserl ness. isof part the present structure of conscious- it past; just itself not is note just-past the of melody.retentionalawarenessMya as such way that matches up with aperceived object a in past-present-futureof relations not are protention, primal impression and retention conscious.relationsThe between is it which conscious- of events and objects temporal the and ness of stream the between phism isomor an rejects Husserl consciousness. of objects the to pertains that same temporality the not is temporality character, intrinsic this self-differentiating and namic dy- its to due consciousness of stream the to temporality of kind some ascribe we if even that means This temporality. of form ness inbuttime, itneithermerelyis conscious a - « 11» « 10» betv tm; ahr t s tef a itself is it rather time; objective of This is a brief survey of Husserl’s of survey brief a is This In Husserl’s analysis of this intrin- S ome of Husserl’s later - - Enactivism The Past,PresentandFutureofTime-Consciousness ShaunGallagher Enactivism The Past, Present and Futureof Time-Consciousness Shaun Gallagher

ing portrayed as an experiential origin, “the Husserl is moving from a static phenom- primal source of all further consciousness enology to a more genetic view. I want to and being” (Husserl 1966a: 67), is consid- argue that this shift sets the stage for a more ered the result of an interplay between re- dynamical, enactivist conception of time- tention and protention. Thus, in the Bernau consciousness. To start working towards this Manuscripts, Husserl defines primal impres- conception, I will suggest that Varela’s neu- sion as “the boundary between […] the re- rophenomenological analysis of time-con- tentions and protentions” (Husserl 2001: sciousness makes some important headway. 4). Whereas retentions and protentions in the early lectures were defined as retaining the primal impression, or projecting a new The present: primal impression, respectively, in Husserl’s The neurophenomenology later research manuscripts, the primal im- of temporal experience pression is considered the line of intersec- Figure 1 • Pyramid-Hallway tion between retentional and protentional in Varela (from Varela 1999a). tendencies that make up every present phase of consciousness. Even in his earlier « 14 » Whereas Husserl proposed a account Husserl had claimed that primal purely phenomenological account of the is able to shift the account closer to a neu- presentation is not self-sufficient, rather it intrinsic temporality of consciousness, Va- rophenomenology. The complaint is about operates only in connection with retentions rela proposes a naturalized account that Husserl’s primary example of listening to a and protentions. In the Bernau Manuscripts, integrates phenomenological and neuro- melody. As numerous commentators have however, Husserl seems to suggest that the physiological elements. Varela sees in Hus- remarked, Husserl treats listening to music complicated interlacing of retentions and serl’s account, however, a “dynamical bent,” as a very abstract experience (see, e.g., Gal- protentions is constitutive of primal impres- a leaning towards a dynamical account that lagher 1998); Varela, likewise, criticizes the sion. Not only is primal impression not self- Varela takes as opening towards a neural example and proposes to shift to a more sufficient, it is a constituted product rather dynamics, and thereby, a naturalization. He concrete, but perhaps uncommon example: than something that makes a constitutive thus wants to work out a neurophenomenol- multistable visual perception. One can think contribution of its own. ogy of time-consciousness. here of the Necker cube or the duck-rabbit « 12 » This more radical claim is ex- figure, and the shifting perspectives we ex- pressed in Husserl’s idea that the initial event “ In brief, I approach temporality by following perience as we view them. Varela offers the of experience is the empty anticipation. a general research direction I have called neuro- following image (Figure 1). phenomenology, in which lived experience and « 16 » We can see this in a first instance “ First there is an empty expectation, and then its natural biological basis are linked by mutual as from the top, where the center square is there is the point of the primary perception, itself constraints provided by their respective descrip- the top of a pyramid; our perspective can an intentional experience. But the primary pre- tions (Varela 1996) […] Given the importance of shift so that we see that same center square sentation [or impression] comes to be in the flow the topic of the experience of temporality, let it be as the back wall of a hall. The image is per- only by occurring as the fulfillment of contents clear that I consider this an acid test of the entire ceptually unstable; it can flip back and forth, 93 relative to the preceding empty intentions, there- neurophenomenological enterprise.” (Varela but we can also learn to control this shift of by changing itself into primal presenting percep- 1999a: 267) perspective. This example offers an impor- tion.” (Husserl 2001: 4; translated in Gallagher tant difference from Husserl’s example of lis- & Zahavi 2014) « 15 » Varela focuses on the “texture” or tening to the melody. Specifically, when we the three-part structure of time-conscious- learn to control the shift of perspective, we The primal impression comes on the scene ness, and he describes it as follows. First, become active perceivers rather than passive as the fulfilment of an empty protention; the there is a central “now moment with a fo- listeners. Indeed, Varela wants to emphasize, now, as the present phase of consciousness, cused intentional content” – that which is as enactivists generally want to do, the idea is constituted by way of a protentional fulfil- given by the primal impression. This central that there is a connection between percep- ment (Husserl 2001: 4, 14). moment is “bounded by a horizon or fringe tion and active movement. Here he admits that is already past” – but a past that is held that there is minimal movement involved in “ Each constituting full phase is the retention in retention. It also “projects toward an in- perceiving this unstable image. He suggests of a fulfilled protention, which is the horizonal tended next moment.” As these horizons “head adjustment, frowning and blinking, boundary of an unfulfilled and for its part contin- move, they flow into the past that I can re- and surely, in eye movements of various uously mediated protention.” (Husserl 2001: 8) tain to some limit, and then they disappear kinds” (Varela 1999a: 272). He offers anoth- out of view. Varela’s description is consistent er example that serves the same analysis, but « 13 » In shifting the emphasis from pri- with Husserl’s original phenomenology. It is would be less amenable to experimentation. mal impression to protentional fulfillment, by way of a complaint, however, that Varela I open a door and walk across the thresh-

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 94 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism enactivist emphasis on embodied cognition embodied on emphasis enactivist the reflects which movement, this on emphasis of means by enactivism and porality connection tem- intrinsic Husserl’sof analysisbetween the draws actions.Varela ied - embod and situated with coupled usually are and know-how skillful of exercises are deliberation or thinking reflective as such (ibid). porality its roots inliving itself” ofactiveside this perception that gives tem - is “It action. and perception between link the is key the enactivists, and Varela, For required to bring my friend’s face into focus. adjustment certain a is there and involved, movement obvious more is There greeting. in hand offer my I recognize.immediately I face whose friend a into bump to only old f e d c b a 2017 for discussion). further Gallagher (see propositions following the by characterized be can Enactivism agent. experiencing the from independent world not is meaningful the that and oriented, perception and much of cognition is action- oftheory embodied cognition. It argues that specific a is Enactivism enactivism. of cept Co n « 18» « 17» of the full body.of full the aspects autonomic and affective in also but coordination, sensorimotor in only not functions cognitive complex more and higher ground to aims Enactivism cognitive systems. subjective and socially situated nature of inter extended, the emphasizes proach ap- enactivist the mechanisms, internal on focus a with individualism ological which is often characterized by- method science, cognitive classic to contrast In environment. brain-body- across coordination and couplingrelevancedynamicalof the ing theory,systemsdynamical toemphasiz - The enactivist approach has strong links ofmodel world. the internal replicated or mapping tional representa- a through than rather tion, ac- of context the in role their by part in meaningacquire processes Cognitive tured by cognition and action. not pre-given or predefined, but is- struc is intentionality) (meaning, world The across brain-body-environment. distributed processes from emerges It event. brain a simply not is Cognition str u ctivi It will be helpful to clarify the con - Higher-order cognitive functions, st Fou n d ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 - logical logical events, neurophysio - characterizes which msecs), Within(of 10–100 timescale elementary the (Varela 1999a:273). IPS EPS an ofduration the (e.g., msec 100 to rons) of 10 msec (e.g., the rhythms of bursting interneu- range a within fall events integration.apticThese and in the temporal summation capacities of - syn discharges,neuronalof rhythms cellular intrinsic ing between different temporally processed temporally different between ing sync- this because example, for music, the ballerina’s the movement notisout with ofsync of experience my ballet, the At times. processing different have etc. tactile, tory, audi- visual, where modalities, sense across variations the facilitates This simultaneous. as treated and fused are but successive as onto lived the present. window the open can howweclear make to distinction between three scales of duration, threefoldview. second introducesa Herehe of point neuroscientific a to perspective cal phenomenologi- the from movingporality, duck/ rabbit), Varela (pyramid/hallway, shiftsthe perspective on tem- perspectives er “ orsod t te uain f ie present. lived of duration the to corresponds that simultaneity of window or frame a require components various these that is here pursued idea central A temporality. of root the at is that components different these integrating and ing relat- of task complex the is it neuroscientist, the of view of point the From embodiment. rimotor - senso their and brain the of regions distributed topographically and distinct functionally several of participation concurrent the by characterized processes of brain. the dynamical the and environment, and body between coupling dynamical the both ize character to theory systems dynamical and (Varela 1999a:271) ƒ ƒ ƒ From an enactive viewpoint, any mental act is act mental any viewpoint, enactive an From ƒ ƒ ƒ sqec i a otcl yaia neuron)” pyramidal cortical a in sequence P uain getr hn h specious the present). than greater durations in (measured timescale narrative The present) specious the approximating seconds, in (measured timescale integration The milliseconds) in (measured timescale elementary The 1 « 19» | “These thresholds grounded be thecan in “These S omewhat like the shifting Neck- shifting the like omewhat 1 two stimuli are not perceived ” P/ -

n erl ycrnzto (aea 1995 (Varela synchronization neural in byassembliestransientof cell locking phase underpinned is process This present. cious - spe incompressible an forms and work its does processprimal-impression/protention retention/ the where precisely is This tions. ac- basic and acts cognitive across and into phases integratesexperiential that structure in a consciousness of flow the in subsides and flourishes, arises, event experiential An 274). 1999a: (Varela time” relaxation and determination reciprocal by replaced is ity sequential- “where networks dynamical in organized brain” the of geographically regions separated and speaking] [relatively “vast across assemblies cell or connections “long-range”neuronal, reciprocalwith lates corre- This level. phenomenological sonal, a per a at action into basic oroperation cognitive integrated are events subpersonal able numbers of assemblies. cell dispersed vari- integrationof the contingenton is but period, integration fixed a or clock ticking internally or external an to tied time jective namical processes, not on the basis of an ob- This intrinsic temporality these dy- in arises memory, involve etc. would which timescale, narrative the consider temporality not need we consciousness of intrinsic the understanding of purposes For expectation. of act or tion recollec- a on depend not does experience temporal of coherence the that contention Husserl’swith consistent as this Varela sees ticular intentional content of the experience. fore as presemantic, independent of the par integration,formalthereand- or processual requires 100msecs. Varelapsy-phenomenon,notes, the as such motion, Apparent action. basic a for time reaction the or event perceptual mentary mo - the of limit This the approaches succession. timescale experienced no is there where window a within happens modalities “ the retentionalthe of experience. aspect image in Figure 1 to provide a description of followsHusserl. then multistableHeemploys the experience temporal our of enology nowness of when I saw the hallway, all temporal hallway, all the saw I when of nowness the unchanged hold still could I pyramid, a see What is preserved is also modified. If when I when If modified. also is preserved is What « 20» « 22» « 21» One could think of this as a purely aeas nlss f h phenom- the ofVarela’s analysis At the integration scale these these scale integration the At ) - - . Enactivism The Past,PresentandFutureofTime-Consciousness ShaunGallagher Enactivism The Past, Present and Futureof Time-Consciousness Shaun Gallagher

structure would disappear. The relation of the cal system he describes captures the flow ence (Gallagher 2000; 2005; Gallagher & now to the just-past is one of slippage organized structure that Husserl was after. Varela ap- Varela 2003; Jeannerod 2009). One might by very strict principles.” (Varela 1999a: 278) peals to an unstable system in which “There also think of issues related to the experi- are no attractor regions in phase space, but ence of time in subjects with major depres- In effect, the retentional aspect of conscious- rather ongoing sequences of transient visits sion (Gallagher 2012). I think the important ness presents, within the now of perception, in a complex pattern of motion, modulated point here involves the sense of agency and what is just past, not as present, but precisely only by external coupling” (ibid: 288). action, and this is consistent with Varela’s as just past – as a modified present. He also « 24 » Varela offers more detail in flesh- transition to a discussion of the notion of presents neurocognitive evidence for the ing out Husserl’s account of time-conscious- coping, transparency (or non-reflection) as distinction between memory proper and the ness, including a discussion of the double one is absorbed in action, and flow, which kind of working memory that is implied by intentionality of retention – the fact that involves a readiness disposition or proten- retention. Varela references several of Hus- it retains phases of the enduring object by tion (anticipation) that is oriented towards serl’s diagrams that indicate a source point retaining the flowing phases of conscious- where the action is going. in the primal impression, but he also notes ness itself, thus providing both a sense of the « 26 » Varela provides more analysis, dissatisfaction with the diagrams because continuity of the object and a pre-reflective especially in terms of constructing more they represent Husserl’s earlier static view, sense of the experiencing self. Citing a point dynamical diagrams of temporal experi- and he quotes favorably Maurice Merleau- I had made about the retentional-proten- ence. He also suggests there is even more Ponty’s (2012: 440) note in reference to the tional structure not being on a different to explore. As he transitions to his discus- diagrams: “Time is not a line but a network level from the flow (Gallagher 1979), Varela sion of the flow of consciousness, he asks of intentionalities.” Varela thus suggests that argues that his readers “to consider what I propose in we take a dynamical view on the structures the remainder of this text as a sketch of fu- of time-consciousness.2 “ The inseparability of these two intentionalities ture work more than anything else” (Varela « 23 » To set out this dynamical ac- here is not only descriptively accurate but part of 1999a: 289). I think, however, that we have count, however, Varela turns back to the the intrinsic logic of complex nonlinear dynamics. explored Varela’s view sufficiently to moti- neuroscience. The emergence of a transient It would be inconsistent to qualify the self-motion vate a closer look at the connection between non-linear synchrony of coupled oscilla- as a ‘deeper layer’ of the dynamical process and to protention, action and enactive perception. tors subtends the arising of structure in the describe these trajectories as mere appearance.” flow of consciousness and an integration of (Varela 1999a: 295) experiential phases into dynamical trajecto- The future: An enactivist ries. “Each emergence bifurcates [undergoes The double intentionality is more like what account of time- a phase transition] from the previous ones Merleau-Ponty would call an intertwine- consciousness4 given its initial and boundary conditions. ment or what Gibson would call an eco- Thus each emergence is still present [still logical relation (also see Gallagher & Varela « 27 » The protention/primal-impres- retained] in its successor” (Varela 1999a: 2003 and Thompson 2007: Chapter 11 for sion/retention model applies to movement 283).3 The important point for Varela is that more details of this neurophenomenologi- and non-conscious motor processes, as well the biologically based model of the dynami- cal account). For my purposes in this article, as it does to consciousness (Berthoz 2000; however, I want to shift focus to Varela’s ac- Gallagher 2005, 2011, 2016). Both human 95 count of protention. experience and human action are charac- 2 | It is interesting to note that in some in- « 25 » Rightly noting that protention is terized by a ubiquitous intrinsic temporal- terpretations of early Buddhism (prior to the de- not symmetrical to retention, Varela sug- ity. In regard to action, consider that at any velopment of the Abhidharma) one finds a simi- gests that protention is closely connected one moment the body is in some precise lar emphasis on the dynamical interconnection with affect and action. If we think that the posture, as one might capture it in a snap- “within a finite segment of time as constituting our immediate experience” (Kalupahana 1974, experiencing subject is always characterized shot, for example. That snapshot posture, 185). David Kalupahana provides a good review by an affective disposition, then the idea is however, is a complete abstraction from an of the complexity of Buddhist views on temporal- that one’s disposition modulates protention. ongoing movement. Moving is not occupy- ity. Varela was influenced by Buddhist teachings This idea finds application in considering ing a different posture from moment to mo- more generally. I thank an anonymous referee for certain pathologies that may involve the ment; rather it involves a trajectory and is pointing to this connection. sense of agency. Thus, in the case of schizo- constantly on the way, in a movement flow, 3 | He provides a simple phenomenological phrenia, where there are modulations in af- such that any abstract postural moment only example using visual perception of a figure that fect, there is also in some cases a disruption has significance as part of that process. On transitions across multiple variations of a male in the sense of agency that may be tied to third-person measurements, at any moment face to a female body. “When the ambiguity has a problem involving anticipatory experi- the body is in a specific posture. But if that increased sufficiently (when the observer has moved to a position sufficiently advanced in the transition and the emergence of a new percept be- 4 | This section is based on analyses in Gal- series), we pass through a bifurcation or phase comes possible” (1999a: 284). lagher & Zahavi (2014) and Gallagher (2016).

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 96 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism forming current protention. alreadyin- retained,is doing andin so been just have that protentions fulfill) to failing (or fulfilling already is impression primal suggests, Husserl as rather, present; the of knife-edge impression There no straction. is ab- an into runs isolation in components three the of one any such on focus a that way a in structure, impression/retention protention/primal- this in dynamic always primarily by anticipation. characterized movement a been had what ofpoint end an retention,as in only means, only itwhen is already accomplished, which is it what as moment postural abstract that define can Moreover,we heading. is action ofuct an anticipated trajectory, of where the prod- the momentanything,is itpostural is primal impressionpreviousprimal the of previous a of retention works the through way that its something always is (iB) B of impression primal The previous experience. is already qualified or modulated bythe just- of notes, A,B, primal C,the impression of B notadditiveRather,an function. forseries a current a of impression primal a to phase past a of retention a have I consciousness of phase now a in that not is It consciousness. of performance tional Primal impression is already modified theby reten- before. directly came whatever of awareness passing and just-past my by fied - modi already is perceive I melody of note protention.currentretention andby The ed unaffect- is thatstimulus (S) now-pointa of some of apprehension simple and straight direct, a is impression primal that idea the abandon should we proposes, Varela what with consistent and Manuscripts, Bernau ready implicit experience. inthe rather,“andal- the then”effected, already is note, sounded currentlyinvolvesnever a melodyhearing a it is directed forward in protention. Hearing as even stream retentional the into lapsing col- already impressionis primal in the which process a is experience of The datum retention. basic in behind leaving a ready - al is which it, beyond moving already am I melody a of note current the hearing am I when so that directed intentionally flow, a as – way same the in operates sciousness Co n « 30» « 29» « 28» str u ctivi s usr dsrbs t con- it, describes Husserl As O As Husserl had suggested in the the in suggested had Husserl As ur experience of the present is present the of experience ur st Fou moving beyond it; beyond moving then and n d ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 in additionin (iA). In (iA). S . It is It S. over text to get clarification. slow down our reading and make us go back the filled prior protention. been different sincethey would not have- ful have would impressions primal subsequent word“cases,” the ofmeaning clearlymyand the of anticipation my biased have could it then point, grammatical a about been had paragraph this preceded that paragraph of the content the If anticipation. that fulfills sentence the ofremainder the andresolved, anticipatedready ambiguitybeforethatgets - al is meaning its but pronoun); or noun a of (cases cases grammatical to or wine), of cases (e.g., container a to refer not does It example. an is sentence previous the in es” “cas - word The meaning. its of fulfillment anticipation motivatescertain towardsa the sounded, or read is it wordas itself, the that until a phrase or the sentence is complete, so deferred is sentence a wordin a of meaning the cases many In 2014). Zahavi & lagher urn mmn, t os o led con- already so does it moment, current ing aprotention of ~B. from the primal impression of B disconfirm- character, its affective of terms in different previous protention of B is different, indeed, a confirms that B impression of primal The b a primalthen, impression speaking, Generally else. something of was B, or as unfulfilled ifthe previous protention fulfillment, ifthe previous protention was of a as retained), currently now is (which tion proten- previous the by qualified already is when in the next moment iB comes along, it Furthermore, experiencing. currently am I pate must somewhatbe determined by what antici- I Whatever on. so and … C … B of protention a e.g., – is horizon protentional my what of determination a produces (iA) A, of impression primal the First, (p). tion would have to be different if it were r[iA] r[i{~A}]. retention, the as much as just i[~A], by but iA, by not preceded were it if rience - expe different a be would iB words, other « 33» « 32» « 31» ment). - non-fulfill or fulfillment its (being tion proten- previous the by constrained is tion) and - specifica (protentionalanticipating am by I what of specification providingpartial protention current the constrains Consider now the effect of proten- If primal impression intuits the the intuits impression primal If - Gal (from example an Consider S uch things often ditive kindof unity, but an enactive unity. sciousness(ornotis action) static, or anad- self-constitutingflow, coherency conthe of - a of idea the with Consistent anticipates. it what of light the in and experienced, been just has what of shadow the in meaning its constitutes it intertwining dynamical its In present. the enacts It self-affective. simply not is it present; the of reception passive a simply not is Consciousness present. the of fore)alreadyiscomplicating immediacy the - be gone just has what by shaped (already aspect anticipatory certain a that sense the in stimulus the toregard with structure tive an is structure impression/retention protention/primal- the trajectory, the ing - lead protentionWith unfold. will stimulus the of experience my how of anticipation enactive an in involved already is present curred), so that my primal impression of the an- - oc just has what of basis being the (on ticipatory already it without impression James Gibson’sJamesaffordance. of notion (1977) foreshadowed that concept can,”a “I an as experience embodied of conception serl’s with Hus - well up lines account This terms. pragmatic very in in-the-world, enactively is It things. towards directionality its plains ex- what is it action; and consciousness nature of intentional the from independent 26; see 26; Thompsonsee 2007: 356 for discussion). implication by meaning […]” (Husserl 1977: mutual and motivation intertwining, tional essence of conscious life to contain an inten- the to pertains “it that Husserl’sindication with consistent is This versa. vice and tion, proten- and retention reflecting impression it elements these of one ofprotention. Toor think tion and forlikewise any attempt included,to define reten- already protention or retention of effects the finds always itself in pression im- primal define attemptAnyto structure. same that reflects structure sion/retention protention/primal-impres- the of element Each 2014). Zahavi & (Gallagher character can say that time-consciousness has a fractal protention (and vice versa). In this sense, we and retention to relations itself its is in structured it present, living the of structure the of part is impression primal If tention. pro - retention and of effects the by strained (or with « 34» « 35» this structure is to think think to is structure this of part as hs nrni tmoaiy is not temporality intrinsic This codnl, hr i n primal no is there Accordingly, ti srcue primal – structure this having) enac- Enactivism The Past,PresentandFutureofTime-Consciousness ShaunGallagher Enactivism The Past, Present and Futureof Time-Consciousness Shaun Gallagher

Shaun Gallagher { is the Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence in Philosophy at the University of Memphis. He has a secondary research appointment at the University of Wollongong, Australia, is Honorary Professor at the University of Tromsø, Norway, and held honorary positions at the University of Copenhagen (2010–2015) and Durham University (2011–2016). Gallagher holds the Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier Research Award [Anneliese Maier-Forschungspreis] (2012–2018). His areas of research include phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, especially topics related to embodiment, self, agency and intersubjectivity, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of time. Gallagher is a founding editor and a co- editor-in-chief of the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. His publications include How the Body Shapes the Mind (2005); The Phenomenological Mind (with Dan Zahavi, 2008; second edition 2012); Phenomenology (2011); The Neurophenomenology of Awe and Wonder (2015) and Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind (2017).

As Husserl (1966a: 301; English translation: were only retentions, everything I experi- wards a more enactivist conception of con- 313) put it, “every living is living towards ence would already have just happened; we sciousness. This motivates a closer examina- (Entgegenleben).” In this anticipatory inten- would be pure witnesses without the poten- tion of the phenomenological aspects of the tionality the apprehension of the not yet is tial to engage. If there were only protentions, intrinsic temporal structure of experience,5 not an apprehension of an absence (Entge- there would only be unfulfilled promises of understanding it in terms of its enactive genwärtigung), it is rather an apprehension engagement. Meaning itself would dissipate character, in its most basic manifestation. I of the possibilities or the affordances in the under any of these conditions. have argued that this enactivist phenome- present, the anticipation of what S can be for « 37 » This means that the enactive nology of time-consciousness both remains my experience, possibilities that will be ful- character of perception, action, and inten- consistent with and goes beyond Husserl’s filled or not fulfilled as our enactive percep- tionality in general, goes all the way down; it later writings on time-consciousness. tion trails off in retention. is embedded in the micro-structure of time- « 36 » This intrinsic temporality con- consciousness; indeed, one does not get this 97 stitutes the possibility of an enactive en- enactive character without this intrinsic Acknowledgements gagement with the experienced world (the temporal integration. Experience thus has object, the melody, etc.). Nothing is an af- an enactive character, not only on the level The author received support from the fordance for my enactive engagement if it of full acts of perception or actions, but in its Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier is presented to me passively in a knife-edge most basic self-constituting, self-organizing Research Award (2012–18). present; that is, nothing would be afforded if level, in its intrinsic temporal structure. there were only primal impressions, one af- Received: 13 May 2017 ter the other, without protentional anticipa- Accepted: 30 August 2017 tion, since I cannot enactively engage with Conclusion the world if the world is not experienced as a set of possibilities, which, by definition, in- « 38 » Varela (1999a) proposed an ac- 5 | Possible approaches to this further analy- volves the not yet. And just as nothing would count of time-consciousness that brought sis, consistent with Varela’s philosophy, could in- be possible if there were only primal impres- Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the clude micro-phenomenological analysis and the sions without a retentional-protentional temporal structure of experience into con- use of mindfulness meditation as a phenomeno- structure, so too nothing would be possible tact with contemporary neuroscience and logical method (see, e.g., Bitbol & Petitmengin if there were no primal impression. If there dynamical systems theory, and pushed it to- 2017; Petitmengin 2006; Petitmengin et al. 2017).

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 98 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism > Upshot dan.lloyd/at/trincoll.edu Trinity College, Connecticut, USA Dan Lloyd of theFuture Processing: TheWave Protention andPredictive ogy. neatly to a future-oriented phenomenol- connects processing predictive of theory neuroscientific the Moreover, enactive. is general in perception that argued serl In his 1907 lectures neurophenomenologically. enhanced be ately to follow. - immedi is what of anticipation conscious features that are phenomenalnot already infused with the no has landing) (of pression im- primal The Impression(PI). Primal the called Husserl Edmund what or present, ry - senso immediate the modify protentions– tions. Thesevivid anticipations – Husserlian - expecta different two the under different very clearly is bang a with down touching gear the landing of experience The death. fiery a – pain andheat excruciating ofburst violent a stop,or towarda rolls plane the as deceleration rapid a either expect you Now by. streaking there’sshudders.plane the andclunk loud a marks skid and stripes with view, into flashes runway the second. passing each with etched sharply more details its you, rises toward ground the window, the of out look Co n « 1» str u of Time-Consciousness on Open PeerCommentaries ctivi Your land. about flight is to you As alge’ mi cam can claim main •Gallagher’s st S Fou haun Gallagher n d Thing and Space, - Hus ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 S oon the end of end the oon S uddenly ’s “T protention and thus of temporality overall. of conception enactive an toward pusher’s infusion of protention- Gallagh underwrites The 2014). Zahavi & Gallagher in veloped de- argumentswere targetalso article the in theoretical retention.(The protentionandof boundary mere a be, can as thin as is PI the that idea the develops Gallagher sion? impres- primal the is thick how sandwich, tripartite Husserlian the within But lates. - iso phenomenological than rather unified whole, a from abstractions each are tion reten- and impression, primal protention, of phases temporal the thatserl’s insistence are combined, they harmonize. combined,arethey stream.sensory But when these two streams kinaesthetic stream is just as arbitrary as the the themselves, nowadays, by Taken proprioceptive). (or kinaesthetic sensations calls motion, Husserl in bodies our of that sensation, of stream another find we ever, how- inputs, sensory jumbled these to tion addi- In them. of sense make to principle organizing an without about dancing tile) - tac auditory, (visual, images of sequences us give senses the that is scenes and objects of awareness our in inherent Husserl, problem the For movement. bodily and tion - sensa of combinations from compounded is environments their and things ter the stirring idea that the consciousness of encoun - Herewe (HusserlSpace1997). and on lectures 1907 his is source richer afterthoughts. But for Husserl’s a enactivism Husserl’s subsequent and 1905, from tures ogy of time, going first to Husserl’s Time- lec does (as « 3» « 2» ” he Past, Present and Future D Gallagher grounds his enactivism enactivism his grounds Gallagher S an alge edre Hus- endorses Gallagher haun n aai i te phenomenol - the in Zahavi) an O - kinaes ur essentially Thing are hiddenfrom view: that parts have always almost exception, without objects, visual that notes Husserl thinghood. of constitutive as emerges ence temporal but trajectories, namical dy - of coordination the from built is world the since course, of perception, of standing thatnotnonethelessappear?Wedo un- can features tactile and visible with surface a as contact, how do we experience a hidden side sensory direct without But sides. apprehendback their we wholes, enclosing as them perceive to and things other from guished distin- be can that things as objects see To “ ing configurations of scenes.objects and of agents in interaction with static and mov- works through an encyclopedia of variations In environment. visual stable a is result The eyes. the trolling con- muscles the from feedback afferent by cancelled is slide retinal the because ever, jumpy a world, how- left. see not the do We to slides image retinal the right, turn eyes world visual the (Husserl As§48). our1997: and movements eye saccadic between ship relationthe monyinformational- of is flows coming to presentation. itself without but perception, the in […] co-included is It contents. presentational lacks ‘more’ this and […] side front […] appearing the than world (Husserl 1997:§§48–57). stable a construct to us enable thereby and of view that ricochet through the sensorium, points the situateto awarenessserves thetic The thing, as given in perception, has more perception, in given as thing, The « 4» « 5» ie s seta t ti under this to essential is Time The common example of this har this example of common The Husserl Space, and Thing ” (Husserl 1997:§16) - experi - - Protention andPredictiveProcessingDanLloyd Enactivism Protention and Predictive Processing Dan Lloyd

derstand these obscurities as protentions, between the predicted and the incoming ble only for brief periods, moments whose as predictions of what we will find when we neural signal. That error signal is used to ad- durations comprise the “integrative (or ‘1’) circle the object, or turn it around: just the predictions for the next round. scale” of neurodynamics. Varela conceptu- « 10 » Neural conduction takes time, so alizes these complex patterns of oscillation “ The thing […] is in and with the stream not both the traditional bottom-up scheme and as points in a trajectory through a high di- only of its actual changes but also of its possible PP have straightforward temporal implica- mensional neural-activation space. Each changes, and the latter are indeed infinite, though tions. Simply stated, bottom-up processing trajectory is unique, and is quasi-stable long firmly delimited.” (Husserl 1997: §48) follows a stimulus; PP, being predictive and enough to embody a fringe or tail of reten- top-down, precedes the stimulus. Since the tional information. These anticipated percepts will have the predictive signal inhibits the matching in- « 14 » As Gallagher mentions, proten- same dual flow as occurrent perceptions. put, it seems that the downward-propagat- tion (in Varela’s analysis) is not simply “re- We’ll see (for example) that if we move a ing information is mainly running ahead of tention in reverse,” but an “affective dispo- certain way, we’ll see a certain image. In this the incoming stimulus, and more or less re- sition” (§25). Varela’s full proposals are too way the tangle of impressions and move- places it. The error signal, on the other hand, elaborate for consideration here, beyond ments resolves as a world of things in space. follows the input, just as in the traditional noting that he stresses the concreteness and « 6 » The world is thick with things, and bottom-up scheme. specificity of retentional content, contrasted thus is saturated with protention. Where « 11 » These temporal divisions of labor with the openness of protention. Accord- then is the primal impression? I concur with suggest intriguing phenomenological analo- ing to PP, however, it is the predictive con- Gallagher’s conclusion that to be impressed gies. PP describes systems in which the tent that is most elaborate, while retention in any way already enfolds expectations. No detailed model of the perceptual world is emerges primarily as error. Both Varela and experience is primal. Husserlian phenom- protentive. Such systems live in the world of the PP theorists face a parallel challenge: enology fully converts expectation into ac- their imagined futures until rudely contra- How in the tumult of neural activity is the tion, and thereby creates for consciousness dicted by stubborn error. The error signal, structure of temporality to be embodied? We a world. meanwhile, encodes a just-past; its content navigate the temporal landscape with great « 7 » As the above suggests, I think Gal- is most like retention. And, just as the target precision. How that temporal field of view is lagher is on solid phenomenological ground article suggests, nothing remains of a bare organized by the brain is still more conjec- in his valorization of protention, more solid “primal impression.” ture than science. even than his exposition would suggest. In « 12 » This strikes me as an attractive « 15 » Meanwhile, from two directions, a Varelian vein, we can also strengthen Gal- alignment. The seeming (illusory) plenum the phenomenological and the neuroscien- lagher’s protentive push with an appeal to of the perceived world is a complex assump- tific, I am inclined to join Gallagher in his contemporary cognitive neuroscience. tion, and we ride the wave of this future. push for an enactive temporality. Neurophe- « 8 » One theme of much recent cogni- However, the barebones PP sketched is still nomenology continues to be the wave of the tive science and neuroscience is predictive tightly bound to the phenomenal immediate future. processing (PP; for example, Friston 2005; present, as its predictions run just ahead of Friston & Stephan 2007; Hohwy 2012; Ho- inputs, and error signals just behind. As pre- Dan Lloyd is the Thomas C. Brownell Professor of hwy 2013). Andy Clark summarizes its main dictions range further into the future, their Philosophy and a Professor of Neuroscience at Trinity claim: reliability rests on intermediate predictions. College, Connecticut. Together with Valtteri Arstila he 99 This cascade of intermediate anticipations is the author/editor of Subjective Time: The Philosophy, “ To perceive the world is to meet the sensory co-occur with present perception but they Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality (2014). signal with an apt stream of multilevel predic- must be kept in their proper temporal order. Dan is also the author of Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory tions. Those predictions aim to construct the Thus, PP leads to a picture of the present of Consciousness, an exploration of consciousness incoming sensory signal ‘from the top down’ perceptual moment as a compound of ex- presented as a noir detective fiction (2004); and using stored knowledge about interacting distal pectations, ordered by their time of expecta- Simple Minds: A Philosophical Examination of causes.” (Clark 2016: 6) tion. This temporal penumbra of predictions Scientific Approaches to the Mind and Brain (1989). is analogous to Husserlian protention. « 9 » One traditional view of perception « 13 » The proposal that PP structures Received: 16 October 2017 suggests that the world drives a cascade of neural computation in alignment with Hus- Accepted: 22 October 2017 feature detectors from the bottom up (or serlian temporality can be contrasted with from the periphery inward). PP upends this similar ideas in the work of Varela (espe- picture. Instead, it imagines a cascade of cially Varela 1999a). As Gallagher describes predictions from the top down, where each (§§18–26), the centrepiece of Varela’s ac- “higher layer” projects its best guess for the count is the transient cell assembly (Varela future into the layer below, where it inhibits 1999a: 273), a distributed network of active congruent inputs. What propagates upward neurons bound temporarily by synchro- then is an error signal, the mismatch (if any) nized oscillations. These assemblies are sta-

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 100 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism and unquestioning belief in the existence existence the in belief unquestioned unquestioning and the attitude,” “natural the from away oneself wrenching whole of the question concerning But clock.” the by measurable or objective as time about tions assump aside setting or “bracketing volves in Husserl’s Edmund phenomenology that only saying §2, his in once just it al to ludes merely He reduction. nomenological briefly – briefly > Upshot veronique.havelange/at/orange.fr Compiègne, France Université de Technologie de Véronique Havelange of Naturalization Some hortcomings ments define a triple unified structure of time-experience. structure unified triple a define ments mo three These “just-about-to-happen”). is what anticipates (which protention the and perception), this of “just-elapsed” the of consciousness a contributes (which tion reten the object), an of perception the of present the in (situated impression primary the between differentiation a consolidates that structure tripartite a future, a and ent pres a past, a into structured is latter The time-consciousness. of concept Husserlian S I consider call for critical examination. forcritical call consider I that Gallagher’sof approach,characteristics characteristics two to attention draw to like would I experience. temporal of ralization” then Gallagher proceeds to propose a “natu differentiation, tripartite this and sentation subjective livedexperience. tion as well as the essential dimension of reduc- phenomenological the of method very the misses which phenomenology, of “naturalization” a to way the opens misunderstanding This linguistic intensionality. as intentionality Husserlian ical blunder of Chisholm, misinterpreting reduction, and he perpetuates the histor phenomenological the of issue central

Co haun Gallagher presents and analyses the the analyses and presents Gallagher haun n « 3 » 3 « reduction Phenomenological » 2 « » 1 « str u ctivi

too In the firstpart ofhis target article, First of all, Gallagher evokes very very evokes Gallagher all, of First O Gallagher hardly refers to the to refers hardly •Gallagher te ai o ti iiil pre initial this of basis the n briefly – the theme of the phe the of theme the – briefly st Fou n d ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 ------tion that Gallagher proposes. Gallagher that tion puts mere juxtaposi intoturn, the question in this, and §45); 1971: (Husserl world” of the pre-donation the and science between to “arise double and mutual presupposition gives intertwining This description. logical effect a addition in exerts itself, in mate legiti perfectly to consciousness), generally more (and time of experience the to proach ap naturalist the implication: major a deed in carries intertwinement of relation This elaborate. to lengths considerable (1982) to went Husserl which mind), of sciences the particular (in sciences phenom the and enology between original) German the eain of relation complex the obscures seriously which tion, oversimplifica unfortunate parallel an to amounts in approaches two these putting merely of way This naturalization. of prise enter the and approach phenomenological simply the and purely opens to it way particular, In perilous. and insufficient me to seems work) later serl’s the particular (in reduction This nothing. phenomenological of the treatment cursory practically says Gallagher persons, other and objects transcendent of enology,moredubious. is phenom “naturalizing” of enterprise the validates it whether and Husserl, of reading “enactivist” an justifies conception namic dy more this Whether correct. essentially me to seems This consciousness. temporal of conception dynamic more a to way the a a from passage the marks displacement this em that phasizing by (§§11–13) section this Gallagher concludes protentions. and retentions of stitu con being from far impression,” “primal the that is here point The experience. lived of temporality the reconfigures of analysis tripartite his himself Husserl 2001), serl Manuscripts the in particular in and 1917, ter af that noting by Husserl on section this Roderick Chisholm (1957) in his interpre his in (1957) Chisholm Roderick by committed blunder the perpetuates gher genetic « 5 » 5 « Intentionality » 4 « tive ( Rückbeziehung , is constitu is ,

phenomenology, and this opens opens this and phenomenology, y eod eak s ht Galla that is remark second My However, Gallagher concludes concludes Gallagher However, written in 1917 and 1918 (Hus intertwinement static ted ) on the phenomeno the on ) hnmnlg to phenomenology by the intertwining intertwining the by ( juxtaposing epoché Ineinander feedback in Hus in Bernau Bernau the the in in ------i.e., the phenomenological reduction. phenomenological the i.e., against the core of the approach,phenomenological directly goes thus understanding ( inten be only itself exists. It follows that this “content” can state mental the that fact the by guaranteed be) cannot (and not is object (putative) this of existence The object. physical a to refers “content”that a with endowed is state this mental a as intentionality interpreted – Quine him following and – attemptedserl to grasp. However, Chisholm Hus that correlation” “noetico-noematic (the itself to ( sense a with correlation in within, from itself transcends question. open an is enaction towards shift paradigm tive cognitivist derivatives.applies its Whetheralso this puta tothe - and mind” of theory putational ence his project of naturalizing phenomenology. naturalizing of project his for road royal “enactivism” a in sees lagher oché because he has understood neither the the neither understood has he because “non-reductionist” It stance. it as if is seems indefinable vague, a and position tionist” “elimina an between hopelessly oscillating mind, of theory materialist a confronting philosophy engender a dilemma permanent psycho-linguistic this of “naturalization” the at attemptsConsequently, mind. of phy of ten to” of the conscious in mind with linguistic “directedness- this confuses systematically Gallagher §57). 1982: (Husserl manence” im within “transcendence of notion the is this itself: leaving that all for without self, it outside something to itself directs ness an “intentional aiming” whereby conscious of consists consciousness to specific act of type distinctive the Husserl, to According “intentionality.”of concept key the of tation is that of a psychical psychical a of that is intentionality of interpretation correct The reading. his in misunderstanding serious Anglo- the to introduced Franz who historically Brentano D py 94 Hvlne 95. hs mis This 1995). Havelange 1994; upuy language s 1 » 6 « ionality ionality (with an “s”). Indeed Chisholm, 1 nor the “intentional aiming” that Gal that aiming” “intentional the nor | remains beholden to a philosophy philosophy a to beholden remains At least in its original version of the “com-

eas o ti, ontv sci cognitive this, of Because rather than a genuine philoso genuine a than rather noema s ional in the linguistic sense sense linguistic the in ional S Sinn xn ol, omte a committed world, axon ) that remains interior interior remains that ) : ec te oin of notion the hence ): act act state (the (not an act); act); an (not noesis )

that ep ------Enactivism Time As the “Acid Test” of Neurophenomenology Jean-Michel Roy

Neurophenomenology Time As the “Acid Test” cognitive faculties – is whether it successful- « 7 » Gallagher refers to Francisco Va- of Neurophenomenology ly passes this acid test. In other words: Does rela in order to further his project of natu- Varela offer a sufficiently satisfactory neuro- ralization. This is notably the case concern- Jean-Michel Roy phenomenological investigation of time, an ing the introduction of neuroscience in the inquiry that validates the general neurophe- Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon, form of “neurophenomenology.” What Gal- nomenological project to which it belongs? lagher seems not to notice, or to care about, France, and East China Normal And such is precisely the question addressed is that this introduction of neuroscience University, Shanghai, China by Gallagher in his target article. His answer and reference to brain-states leads us even jean-michel.roy/at/ens-lyon.fr can be seen as a twofold one. To the extent further away from the existential dimen- that it is a test of the soundness of the neuro- sion of Husserlian intentionality. The point > Upshot • Gallagher provides a sugges- phenomenological project at large, Gallagher is that Husserlian phenomenology lays the tive solution to the problem of articulat- agrees that the investigation of time carried basis for seriously taking into account the ing the neurophenomenological and the out by Varela validates his general ambition subjective dimension of lived experience. enactivist components of Varela’s ap- of “providing a naturalized account” of the Phenomenology engages and challenges the proach to cognition, although one that subjective side of cognition along neurophe- subject in the intimacy of their own lived ex- perpetuates a problematic understand- nomenological lines. However, as a neuro- perience. On the contrary, Gallagher waters ing of the naturalist dimension of the phenomenological account of the specific down this subjective dimension by shifting idea of neurophenomenology. phenomenon of temporality, it suffers from what is given in first-person experience to a weakness regarding an additional, and no a third-person register; this is, to be sure, « 1 » shaun Gallagher provides a con- less central, ambition of the neurophenom- much more amenable to a conventional sci- cise but remarkably comprehensive account enological project, which is to contribute to entific approach, but unfortunately misses of Francisco Varela’s application of his neu- the development of an enactivist perspective the main point. rophenomenological perspective to the topic on cognition. In other words, despite mak- of time. A topic that was undeniably crucial ing “some important headway,” Varela offers Conclusion for Varela, and the only one about which he a neurophenomenological account of time- « 8 » The theme of this special issue is had the time to offer a detailed illustration consciousness that is insufficiently enactive “Missing the Wood for the Trees.” Ironically of what a neurophenomenological inquiry in Gallagher’s eyes, and consequently does enough, this article of Gallagher is a prime looks like. This crucial role is concealed by not score on the acid test as well as it should example of how easy it is to lose one’s way the fact that in his programmatic 1996 paper in this regard. The goal of Gallagher’s contri- and to fall wide of the mark; in other words, “Neurophenomenology: A Methodological bution is precisely to improve this score by neither more nor less than to miss the wood Remedy for the Hard Problem,” time figures offering a reorientation of the idea of a neu- for the trees. only as one among four types of phenomena rophenomenology of time in a more fully mentioned as possible fields of application. and radically enactivist direction. Véronique Havelange studied philosophy at the It is interesting to note, however, that in the « 3 » Gallagher’s criticism touches on a University of Paris I – Panthéon Sorbonne. Her main initial version of the article submitted in Au- rather deep and important issue about Va- area of research is the epistemology of the social gust 1995, the investigation of temporality rela’s overall project, namely that of finding sciences and cognitive science. She was a Reader is the only case study presented under a de- a proper way of articulating its neurophe- 101 at the Technological University of Compiègne for veloped form. One might therefore reason- nomenological and enactivist dimensions. many years, where, in 1987, she set up a degree ably suppose that the phenomenon of time It is often neglected that the neurophenom- on “Philosophy, Technology, Cognition.” She is is the main source of the neurophenom- enological claim emerges late in Varela’s the- currently preparing a book on The Problem of enological project, and that Varelian neuro- oretical itinerary, and only as a complement Subjectivation and the Formation of the Social phenomenology is in this sense primarily a to the formulation of the enactivist claim, Bond in the Constitution of the Sciences of Mind. neurophenomenology of time. A hypothesis itself derived from the autopoietic one about reinforced by the fact that in the “Specious the phenomenon of life and belonging to the Received: 17 October 2017 Present” (Varela 1999a), his central work on foundations of life sciences. And although Accepted: 20 October 2017 the topic, Varela also explicitly qualifies time Varela certainly saw these three claims re- as the “acid test” (ibid: 267) of the whole neu- garding neurophenomenology, enaction rophenomenological project. and autonomy as obeying one single deep « 2 » Accordingly, the key question theoretical logic, a non-neurophenomeno- raised by his innovative approach to tem- logical enactivist theory of cognition is argu- porality – although it incarnates neither the ably conceivable, as well as a non-enactivist only nor the earliest version of the general neurophenomenological one. As a matter of idea that a rigorous descriptive account of the fact, the principles of neurophenomenology subjective dimension of cognitive processing are formulated by Varela in fairly neutral must be integrated into a scientific study of terms regarding the descriptive content and

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 102 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism sion of the disposition to act, considered asconsidered act, todisposition the of sion that protention relation has with the affective the dimen on particular in concentrates Varela temporality. of investigation the on bear to framework enactivist the of tenets muchputs,moreindeedevidently, basic the affect,”which and action in Varelawith and “closelyprotentionconnects which tention, pro of analysis his in time of nomenology phe Varela’s of dimension enactivist the (§17). ones claimiscomplemented by several additional action essentialityof thisacknowledges that fully he though even (§16), temporality to hence and cognition, to essential is action that claim the in fundamentally it locates Gallagher be. to enactivism of essence the gation depends, of course, on what one takes better into framework? this it integrate to propose he does exactly how enology of time, according to Gallagher, and neurophenom- Varelian the is framework enactivist its integratedinto Howwell lows: fol- as put be accordingly can contribution struction. Varela’s con- within theoretical connection problematic a to reason good with points Gallagher background, enactivist its with time of neurophenomenology Varelian of link the tighten to need emphasizingthe by Consequently, approaches. non-enactive in figure constitutive as also of which elements both it, with associated framework systems ral-assemblyhypothesis dynamical-and the neu - however, the enactivism, than to more is There phase-locking. on based assemblies on much more than the hypothesis of neural and the genetic analysis of temporality relies retention nowness, to dedicated discussion the of deal good a whether clear from far is the enactive approach (Varela 1999a: 272), it ground of [his] discussion of temporality” is - “back the that reiterates explicitly Varela though even Furthermore, target. main its as takes enactivism that framework nitive neurocog- classical of kind a in developed be not could constraints) mutual of ment establish- training, invariants, experiential of description intuition, of use (reduction, principles these along experience cognitive ciplinedaccount ofcontent the of conscious dis- a why reason any see to hard is it And neurocognitivecomponents.and enological phenom- its of content neurobiological the

Co n « 4 » str u ctivi

The answer tothis twofold interro S O o, the first issue raised by his raised issue first the o, st n this basis, he further locates further he basis, this n Fou n d ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 - - - - s rsl, n tp o phenomenological of type any result, a As methodology.its in not andconsciousness, contentthedescription i.e.,inthe timeof of time, of neurophenomenology the of core very particular.intotheit inscribes evenHe nology, and neurophenomenology of time in principleof enactivism into neurophenome the called be might whatmatter, inscribing the onstand radical a takes andenactivism, with neurophenomenology articulating of problemthe of heart the to right goes posal swer can be found in §34, where he writes: intrinsicallyan his core enactive?be of The structure.protentionconsider to Gallagher does Why this in participating from sion dimen enactive its inherits else everything furthermore and temporality, of structure intrinsicallyanis enactiveconstituent theof protention Gallagher, For constituent. tion proten its of nature the in specifically and itself, structure this in source ultimate its that the enactive character of cognition finds is made clear in §37, Gallagher thinks indeed temporality.experientialof structure As the in enough deeply protention of dimension enactivist the anchoring not its in consists insufficiencymain itsthat proposalown his from surmised be can it Butprotention. of of providing a satisfactory enactivist account to Varelianthis why shortspecify analysis falls as far so examination critical his push coping. of phenomenon key the of aspect central a as opposedto a“passive” or “static” one. of anticipation terms as an “active” or “dynamic” in one, experience of structure poral tem- the of analysis an characterizes lagher - Gal Indeed, acting. of form a is ticipating an- that idea further the through is: answer essential defining feature of enactivism? The most the as considered action, of sentiality es- of idea the to anticipation Gallagher for ofrelate itself notion the does how But future-oriented. therefore and anticipatory, intrinsically is it that extent the to enactive intrinsically considered thus is Protention “ the present.the of immediacy complicating the already is before) justshapedbywhatgone(alreadyhas aspect tory anticipa- certain a that sense the in stimulus the to regard with structure enactive an is structure Th poeto/rml impression/retention protention/primal [T]he « 5 »

U Itisthus clear that Gallagher’s pro fruaey Glahr os not does Gallagher nfortunately, ” - - - - - introduced as a “remedy to the hard prob- hard the to “remedy a as introduced for a neurophenomenology of time. of discussion for future debates in the search space newimportant an opensnevertheless Husserllatesource.Itsame the fromdrawn paring their respective analyses of protention comprehensivelyandticular,critically com itsofthiscommentary, itasrequires, parin The answer this to question exceedsthe lim Varela’s.thantestaciddidate passingfor the ing to what extent it is a better enactivist can gher’s proposal is naturally that of determin also applies to Husserlian phenomenology. feels, he this, And enactivism. of form a as qualifies description this accepting inquiry my opinion. in erroneousmore be could Nothing it. ing hardconfrontproblemofventsinstead the - circum- and naturalism cognitive of notion generalVarela that the gentism)transforms emer mentions explicitly that article 1996 first here trastsversionthe again thewith of con- that absence from (an absence concluded strange this have 2000) Bitbol (e.g., neurophenomenology. of definition the of inte - formulations central explicitly his into not grated is answer this that is problem However, the Varela2001). & son co-authoredEvanwithThompson (Thomp- article that was published posthumously and an in found be can defence and articulation explicit most and best whose emergentism, causal of type a of form the takes that one and problem, this to answer an provide certainly did Varela unanswered. naturalism it leaves the core of the problem of cognitive because enterprisenaturalist a as construed be cannot neurophenomenology writings, fered by Varela in 1996, and repeated in later of- neurophenomenology of definition the to stick we if that is claim The simple.quite commentary, but the bulk of the argument is this of scope the beyond also is so, is it why problematic. quite is interpretation this that and experience, of account naturalist a as neu- rophenomenology Varelian of interpretation toa standard sticks Gallagher that is difficulty The time. Varelianof neurophenomenology the of validity the concerning problem portant im- an to directly relates which proposal, Gallagher’s by elicited difficulty one tioning « 7» « 6 » « 8»

wl cnet yef ih men - with myself content will I The next question raised by Galla question raised by next The Neurophenomenology is explicitly D tiig h reasons the etailing S ome ------Enactivism Life is Intrinsically Temporal Julian Kiverstein

lem,” although one of a “methodological” Life is Intrinsically Temporal Gallagher’s enactivism sort. This means that, for Varela, contrary « 2 » Enactivism is described by a to what Chalmers thinks, we do not need a Julian Kiverstein Gallagher as a theory of embodied cogni- new naturalist principle of explanation, for University of Amsterdam, tion (§17). As such, enactivism as a theory the reason that we do have a valid one in Netherlands should apply to all cases of embodied cogni- our hands with causalist emergentism. The tion, not only to conscious episodes of expe- j.d.kiverstein/at/amc.uva.nl only thing we need, in order to eliminate rience. In his recent book, for instance, Gal- the explanatory gap, is to enrich this emer- > Upshot • In this commentary I invert lagher shows how enactivism can be applied gentist framework with the introduction Gallagher’s argument and argue that not only to action and perception but also to of a level of first-person description of the the account he gives of temporality “higher-order capabilities such as memory, explanandum as well as of some reciprocal should be applied to enactive cognition imagination, reflective judgement and so constraints between this level and the other across the board. Instead of enactiv- on” (Gallagher 2017: 186). Thus, we can see ones. In other words, the motto is: close the ising phenomenological accounts of already his argument has implications that descriptive gap, and the explanatory gap will time-consciousness, I suggest Gallagher potentially go beyond time-consciousness. go. Consequently, neurophenomenology ought also to be read as arguing for a The account of temporality he arrives at without emergentism is not a naturalist doc- temporalizing of enactive cognition. potentially applies to cognition across the trine, and cannot be a solution to the hard board, I suggest, and not only to time-con- problem. Mutual constraints per se do not Introduction sciousness. and cannot deliver the sought-for naturalist « 1 » In this important target article « 3 » Gallagher says quite rightly that explanation of consciousness. The conse- Shaun Gallagher sets about providing a enactivism is a “specific theory” of embod- quence is that if one sticks to the standard new “full-fledged” enactive interpretation ied cognition. In his list of the defining com- understanding, suggested by Varela’s own of time-consciousness. He does so by fol- mitments of enactivism, however, it was not formulations, of what neurophenomenology lowing up on the neurophenomenologi- completely clear to me what sets enactiv- is, his neurophenomenology of time scores cal account of time-consciousness Varela ism apart from other theories of embodied much worse in the acid test on the issue of developed in a series of papers in the late cognition. Anthony Chemero’s radical em- naturalism than it possibly does on the issue 1990s (Varela 1999a, 1999b). Gallagher bodied cognitive science would agree with of enactivism. One can always retort that it is argues, however, that Varela’s ideas were all the propositions Gallagher associates enough to supplement the missing element insufficiently integrated with his enactive with enactivism (Chemero 2009). Does this and assess the achievements of the Varelian theory of cognition. In this essay Gal- mean that radical embodied cognition is neurophenomenology of time in light of the lagher shows how to make Varela’s ideas just enactivism? Proponents of the extended right understanding of neurophenomenolo- truer to the spirit of his enactivism. The mind might also be able to embrace all of gy. But it is not clear whether Varela did not key move Gallagher makes is to look to the these propositions for at least some cases of somehow fall victim to his own problematic later genetic analysis of time-consciousness cognition (Clark 2008). Thus, proponents of formulations and did much more, as a re- Edmund Husserl (2001) provided in the the extended mind may embrace Gallagher’s sult, than illustrating how one can establish Bernau Manuscripts of 1917–18. In what description of enactivism but argue that it is mutual constraints, instead of relations of follows I will try to bring out the conse- restricted in scope to certain types of cogni- causal emergence, between the Husserlian quences of Gallagher’s argument, not for tive processes. 103 analysis of the structure of time-conscious- how one thinks about time-consciousness « 4 » The latter possibility raises the ness and neural-assemblies dynamics. but for the enactive approach to the mind question of the scope of Gallagher’s enac- more generally. In the next section I begin tive propositions. I take it from propositions Jean-Michel Roy collaborated with Francisco with some brief remarks about how Gal- (f) and (g) in §17 that Gallagher’s enactiv- Varela at the time Varela laid the grounds of his lagher characterises the enactive approach ism is intended as a theoretical and concep- neurophenomenological project. A co-founder of the to the mind. The middle section provides tual framework for understanding cognition Paris research group Phenomenology and Cognition, an overview of Varela’s work on time-con- across the board. It applies to both so-called he organized the 1995 Bordeaux conference that sciousness. I aim to provide just enough of “lower” processes of online sensorimotor gave birth to the collective volume Naturalizing an overview of this work to highlight what control, and to “higher-order” processes of Phenomenology (1999), of which he is a co-editor. In one might take to be missing when seen offline cognition. Perhaps, then, it is in part a series of subsequent papers, he developed his own through the lenses of Varela’s broader com- the scope of enactivism that distinguishes it view of the possible relevance of a phenomenological mitment to enactivism. The final section from other approaches to embodied cogni- investigation to contemporary cognitive science, turns to Gallagher’s treatment of time-con- tion. and of Husserlian phenomenology in particular. sciousness in his target article. I show how « 5 » In addition, I would suggest prop- the enactive account of time-consciousness osition (b) is a distinguishing feature of en- Received: 20 October 2017 Gallagher proposes can also be interpreted active theories. This is the claim that “[t]he Accepted: 28 October 2017 as an argument for the temporalizing of en- world (meaning, intentionality) is not pre- action more generally. given or pre-defined.” Exactly what Galla-

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 104 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism of cell assemblies in neural synchronisation synchronisation neural in assemblies cell of phase-locking transient the on work logical He neurophysio applied his consciousness. of flow structured temporally a to rise give to wayas a such in organise processes brain seconds, in measured timescale integration stein 2014). way of life more generally (Rietveld & Kiver in order to maintain its own viability, and its of active engagement in the niche it inhabits patterns recurrent in engages organism The the organism. to relation in defined niche, a interactions, of domain a is environment The concern. and cares living its on based environment the to relation meaningful a establishes unity self-sustaining and ducing self-pro - a as organism The determination. co- organism-environment an of terms cognition in of thinks - cogni it that is embodied science) tive radical from not (but cognition embodied of theories other from enactivism apart sets What meaning. given environment the that is activities their from is it because it in liveorganisms that to tion rela- in understood be to has environment by organisms belonging to a form of life. The experienced is it as world meaningful the – environment the or life-world the mean to tially introducing enactivism, I will take him ini- in says he what on Based parentheses. complicatedishere the bymind in has gher is dancing. is she which to music the of sound the with sync in movements ballerina’s the of sight grated, presenting me with, for instance, the inte and combined be to sense-modalities differentin for that allows experiences scale S simultaneous. as treated and sen systems by sory fused be can environment the in successively occur that events instance, for 10–100ms, of timescale elementary the in temporality of processes in the world. With the from apart come can brain the in cesses pro of temporality the how understand to us help already scales temporal three These brain. the in processes of scales temporal three between distinction a makes He ness. conscious of neurodynamics the on work his through time-consciousness of sation

Co imilarly, it is processing at this temporal temporal this at processing is it imilarly, n « 7 » 7 « » 6 « of time-consciousness Varela’s neurophenomenology str u ctivi

Varela hypothesised that at the the at that hypothesised Varela aea prahs h naturali the approaches Varela st Fou n d ati o n s vol. 13,N°1 ------shared shared by and (§27). perception both action is that temporality intrinsic the in account an such developing for clue a finds lagher Gal environment. its in embodiment otor animal’s the sensorim of context wider the in place takes brain the in integration how about story a is time-consciousness of basis biological the of treatment rela’s Va important in missing is what enactivism, of tive ecie a a “mt atcpto” that anticipation” “empty an as describes Gallagher what with arises instead ception present.” the impressionof “knife-edge Per next. heading is movement my where of anticipation an and environment, the to relation in ration configu body’s my of retention a on both based trajectory particular a along unfold from it. thusmovements My drink to coffee that anticipates my hold taking of the cup of mytime, movements are in a unfolding way same the At 2014). Kiverstein & (Rietveld adjusting and coordinating are movements my which to – action for possibilities its – cup’s ofthe presence perceptual affordances in retaining a thus is There of. hold take to moving am I cup the of because unfolding is movementmymoment At each postures. different of sequence a through my goes grasp, arm to reaching am I coffee of cup ration of the lived present” (ibid). lived the of ration that Varela “corresponds suggests to duthe time are of window a elements within together brought neural diverse These 271). 1999a: (Varela embodiment” sensorimotor their and brain the of regions distributed topographically and distinct “functionally of dynamics self-organising large-scale the of out arises thus Temporality 2005). praz Varela & e.g., (see, action for agent the readies that agent’sdisposition the affective with up bound as Varela by understood is Protention successor. its of emergence the is and present remains trajectory dynamical preceding each Thus, synchrony. neural of emergence the for conditions boundary the set activation of patterns Prior brain. the in emerges on the only basis of what has gone oscillators before coupled of synchrony non-lin ear transient The stream consciousness. the of of temporality the explain to retained « 9 » 9 « life of temporality intrinsic The » 8 «

iwd rm h wdr perspec wider the from Viewed As my hand moves towards the the towards moves hand my As s h budr cniin for condition boundary the as S imilarly, perception is not a not is perception imilarly, D e ------sciousness as enactive. He writes: enactive. as sciousness of the temporal structure the stream of con characterising his behind be to seems lines these along thought a However, structure. temporal common a sharing as perception action and of significance the on further filled or unfulfilled protention that has just has that protention unfulfilled or filled ful the just is retained is what since ever, How retention. without possible be would of possibilities perception not out whether spell does Gallagher possibilities. perceive to takes it what just is This be. could what anticipating future, the into out reach that experiences have to needs it – anticipation protentional needs animal perceiving a ties, possibili to present. sensitive be and To apprehend knife-edge a with animal an ent pres only to perception were affordances with engagement no conclu be would There this sion. for argument following the offer to proceeds then the Gallagher present.” in affordances the or possibilities the “apprehensionof an as is can”that “I an as understood be to is enactive as sciousness Con environment. the in things action towards and consciousness both of edness direct the explains what is temporality sic intrin that writes Gallagher when §35) (in “ the present”? the “enacts consciousness temporality, trinsic in its of because that, say Gallagher does Why enactive? consciousness of stream the of structure temporal the trajectory make to the suffices leading protention why is however, me, to clear entirely not is What the present. the of immediacy the complicating already is fore) be gone just has what by shaped (already aspect anticipatory certain a that sense the in stimulus an is ture struc protention-primal-impression-retention tions. proten and retentions between hold that relationships the by constituted itself is but own its on experience temporal of tution consti the to contribution a make not does impression primal The anticipated. just was what of retention a by constrained turn in is anticipation empty This pri a impression. mal by fulfilled not or fulfilled either is

With protention leading the trajectory, the the trajectory, the leading protention With « 10 » 10 « « 11 » 11 «

enactive This becomes somewhat clearer clearer somewhat becomes This ” Gallagher does not elaborate elaborate not does Gallagher (§34) structure with regard to the the to regard with structure ------Enactivism Directional Causality Between Affect, Action and Time-Consciousness? Aviva Berkovich-Ohana

past, we can infer, based on the argument What Is the Exact « 2 » Thus, there are three phenomena – that has just been given, that it would not. Directional Causality affect, action and time-consciousness – that Perception without retention would be per- seem to have a causal connection between ception that is unconstrained by what was Between Affect, Action and them. But what is the exact directional cau- previously anticipated. But we have just ar- Time-Consciousness? sality between these three phenomena? And gued that there can be no perception of pos- does empirical evidence from the study of sibilities without protention. Finally, Gal- Aviva Berkovich-Ohana certain conditions where the time-expe- lagher does consider whether there could rience, affect and action were shown to be University of Haifa, Israel be engagement with possibilities without transformed support the theoretical con- a primal impression, and answers in the avivabo/at/edu.haifa.ac.il nections? negative. “If there were only retentions, ev- « 3 » If we consider that Varela and erything I experience would have just hap- > Upshot • A triple schematic connec- Nathalie Depraz (2005: 74) refer to affect pened; we would be pure witnesses without tion between affect, action and time- as “embodiment of readiness-for-action,” the potential to engage” (§36). consciousness can be represented as fol- then the first causal connection might be lows: “affect → action (anticipation) → schematically seen as “affect → action.” Conclusion time-consciousness (protention).” Two And when considering that “It is this ac- « 12 » Gallagher’s argument has far- questions are raised: what is the exact tive side of perception that gives temporal- reaching consequences. It is not so much directional causality between these ity its roots in living itself” (Varela 1999a: the structure of time-consciousness that is three phenomena? And does empirical 272), then the second causal connection enactive. Instead it seems to me that what evidence from the study of certain con- might be schematically seen as “action → Gallagher has shown is that cognition ditions where the time-experience, time-consciousness.” Thus, theoretically, the conceived in terms of enaction (across the affect and action were shown to be schematic connections can be represented board in all of its guises from “lower” to transformed support the proposed con- as follows: “affect→ action (anticipation) → “higher-order cognition”) has a temporal nections? While psychiatric disorders time-consciousness (protention).” structure. Gallagher has found in Husserl show a similar schematic causation be- « 4 » The schematic connections can be a description of the temporality that is in- tween these phenomena, this is not the put to empirical test by using the intentional trinsic to the self-organising processes that case for meditation. One possible expla- binding paradigm as a measure of agency, unfold as the agent dynamically couples to nation of the inconsistency is the ques- as subsequently elaborated. The sense of its environment in perception and action. tion of the interplay in affect between agency (the sense that I am the one who is He has shown how intrinsic temporality has arousal and valence. causing or generating an action) is a bridg- its roots in life. ing empirical concept between action and « 1 » The thread hat passes through time-consciousness, because it is associ- Julian Kiverstein is a senior researcher working on Erik the target article by Shaun Gallagher is the ated with a subjective compression of time, Rietveld’s ERC-funded project “Skilled Intentionality enactivist account of time-consciousness, such that causal actions and their effects are for Higher Cognition.” He works on foundational understanding it in terms of action-orient- perceived as bound together across time issues in the philosophy of cognitive science. He ed embodied phenomenology, consistent (Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras 2002; Moore is currently working on a co-authored book with with Francisco Varela’s constructivist ap- & Obhi 2012). This phenomenon is known 105 Michael Kirchhoff, titled Extended Consciousness: A proach. Specifically, the author claims that as “intentional binding,” and according to Third-Wave View, which will be published in 2018. time-consciousness (the third part of the the influential “Comparator Model” it de- structure of the temporal-experience, the pends on sensorimotor prediction of ac- Received: 13 October 2017 protention – which is an implicit anticipa- tion outcomes (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith Accepted: 27 October 2017 tion of what is just about to happen) is tied 2002). Specifically, an efference copy of mo- to action (i.e., anticipatory behavior), which tor commands is used to predict the likely is closely connected with affect. In §25, the sensory consequences of a voluntary action, author writes: and the match between these predictions and the measured sensory consequences “ Rightly noting that protention is not sym- promotes the feeling of self-agency, whereas metrical to retention, Varela suggests that proten- a mismatch reduces it. tion is closely connected with affect and action. If « 5 » Yet, the question arises – is the we think that the experiencing subject is always sense of agency a cause or a consequence characterized by an affective disposition, then the of the subjective compression of time be- idea is that one’s disposition modulates proten- tween actions and their effects? While more tion. This idea finds application in considering experimental work is needed to clarify this certain pathologies that may involve the sense of relationship, one hypothesis – aligned with agency.” the proposed schematic triple connection

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 106 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism means decrease, and versa). vice ↓ schematic connection: “↓ connection: schematic following the supporting time-flow, slower and agency, of sense reduced valence, tive nega- for evidence is there patients phrenia schizo- in Thus, 2017). al. et (Cho ticipants par control healthy than emotion positive less and negative more report consistently schizophrenia with people that indicate ies stud- experience-sampling of meta-analysis recent a affect, of terms In 2001). Volzal. (e.g., et durations perceived longer towards estimation,temporal impairment in an tails en- also schizophrenianoteworthythat isIt movements. their for self-agency of feeling es. As a result, patients experience a reduced consequenc- sensory expected and rienced faultytoa - mismatchlead expe the between impairmentto said This is voluntaryaction. by impaired sensorimotor prediction during explained be can schizophrenia with - pa tients in passivity of experiences agency, of ComparatorModel the According to 2013). al. et (Moore Model Comparator the with alignment in prediction, sensorimotor in action deficits as well as (Vossbinding2010), al. et predictive of absence an show nia schizophre- with Patients 2009). Jeannerod 2003; Varela & Gallagher 2000; (Gallagher found were time-consciousness and agency experience, anticipatory in problems and affect, of modulation which in condition a schizophrenia, is relationship proposed the neutral outcomes (Yoshie &Haggard 2013). binding for negative compared to positive or intentional attenuate outcomes emotional negative that shown was it paradigm: ing bind- intentional the using provided was “affect action”connection → the forsupport Importantly,empirical 2013). al. et (Moore perceptions other to applies as expectancy, prior by modulated strongly be may time of perception that suggests This time. tive subjec- in together closer events two these calibration mechanism is activated, bringing re- a then agency), of sense (high behavior own our on dependent is outcome an that contiguous. temporally outcomes bycausedbe ourown actionswill that expect we hypothesis, this to cording Varela’swith closely Ac- view. aligns which (S consequence the than rather cause the is agency of sense that is – Co agency n « 6» str u ctivi → A good model to empirically test empirically to model good A ↑ st time time estimation” (arrow down Fou n d ati o c w recognize we Once n tetson et al. 2006), al. et tetson s vol. 13,N°1 positive affect positive → - ↓ “↓ schematic connection: “↓ connection: schematic following the supporting evidence patients, is there schizophrenia with as pression, de- in Thus, 2008). al. et (Liverant patients between varies arousal) high with valence negative (possibly anxiety and arousal) low with valence negative (i.e., sadness between proportion the although pervade, viously & (S reduced is depression in agency of sense the Phenomenologically, in meta-analysis recent a 2012; (Gallagher overestimate time to tend and time-flow of experience slowed a have subjects depressed that show studies experimental and phenomenological 2012). Both (Gallagher depression is found be tory experience and time-consciousness can anticipa- in problems and affect of ulation Berkovich-O (Ataria, agency of sense reduced a phenomenologically involve to seems meditation deep of state the versely, outcomesYet con- 2011). Gunaratana & (Gunaratana their and intentions including causal connections between different mental states, the of awareness involves practice meditation mindfulness that and processes, metacognitive in exercise an is meditation that fact the with alignment in 2016), enes intentionsmotorParkinson& (Lush,of metacognition improved reflect to argued it, caused thatintentional action toward the an outcome of timing the in shift larger a 2014). al. et Jo see findings contradicting for (but 2016) & Parkinson (Lush,non-meditators to compared binding intentional stronger a by manifested agency, of sense stronger a exhibit to seem meditators mindfulness trait, a as Indeed, estimations. time shorter and agency, of sense heightened a ticipates tion found in psychiatric conditions, this connec - an- schematic the on Building 2012). & Anderson Farb, 2015; Glicksohn (Berkovich-O non-meditators to compared affect negative reduced and tive - posi increased trait, a as show, generally meditators Mindfulness meditation. in case the not apparently is this diseases, chiatric psy- of cases in applies generallytimation” agency →↑ positive affect positive S « 7» « 8» ehn 03. eaie mtos ob - emotions Negative 2013). tephan - mod which in conditionAnother hl te ceai connection schematic the While S hana 2015), aligned with some with aligned 2015), hana pecifically, meditators showed meditators pecifically, time estimation.”time → S ageln e a. 2017). al. et tanghellini ↓ agency D positive affect positive rZdra & or-Ziderman ay Paskaleva laby, → ↑ aa & hana time es- time Dienes S egal egal Di- → sciousness, as subsequently briefly shown. time-con - on effects havevarying to known are subcomponents its as affect, of account finer-grained a is investigation direction further for possible A connections. causal the articulate better and clarify to needed is work empirical and theoretical more and understood, well not are relationships the currently,that,showspresented abovetions condi- different between relationshipmatic estimation.” ↑ & Fanget Volet, (Droit-durations ofoverestimation relative & Wittmann 2011; (Berkovich-O time of passing subjective slower a of ports re - on now,” based “extended an perience ex- meditators mindfulness that evidence meditators.in Yet, contrastsample this with outcome its and action an between interval time the of estimate shorter a report who Zoltan and Parkinson Jim Lush, Peter by met indeed is interval time ofestimates shorter of expectation the ness, in h rsls hw “↑ show results the tion & Weger low-arousal conditions, unpleasant picturesunpleasant conditions, low-arousal in Inversely, underestimated. were pictures pleasant whereas overestimated, were pic- tures unpleasant conditions, high-arousal In valence. affective their of function a as participants’judgements time the on effects different had level arousal strong a asclear, less is direction exact the However, 2001). Glicksohn 2009; Gil ac- (Droit-Volet& curacy in varies clock internal the increases, decreases/ activation physiological of level the when that namely distortion, temporal cumulating evidence for an arousal-induced ac- is There affect. of sub-components two the for effects differential shows experience time- and affect between connection piric ofpleasantness orunpleasantness). em- The feeling subjective (a “valence” and citation) ex- “arousal” bodily called of (extent be can These 2002). Marcel & Lambie by viewed (re- mental other the and bodily is one features; the phenomenal two bear to agreed evidence is scarceevidence and ambiguous. empirical current the Thus, 2014). (Hyland practice Buddhistaccounts of philosophical agency (but still controversial) still (but agency « 10» « 11» « 9» o, unn t time-conscious- to turning Now, Affective states are generally are states Affective S The inconsistency in the sche- in inconsistency The am 21) Tu, n medita - in Thus, 2013). harma aa Gikon Goldstein & Glicksohn hana, D mrn 05 Kramer, 2015; ambrun S hit 04, n a and 2014), chmidt oiie affect positive ee (2016), Dienes → ↑ time time → Enactivism Directional CausalityBetweenAffect,ctionandTime-Consciousness? A The Transcendental CharacterofTemporality StefanoPoletti viva Berkovich-Ohana Enactivism The Transcendental Character of Temporality Stefano Poletti

were underestimated and pleasant pictures The Transcendental Character “Knife-edge” present overestimated (Angrilli et al. 1997; Droit- of Temporality and the transcendental deconstruction Volet & Gil 2009). This opposite direction « 2 » Gallagher’s article sets the stage of the valence effect as a function of arousal Buddhist Contribution of the “knife-edge present” deconstruction suggests that two different mechanisms are to Time-Consciousness from its very beginning (§2): “Conscious- triggered by arousal levels: an attention- ness must in some way grasp more than driven mechanism for low arousal, and Stefano Poletti the punctual now.” Then, in his enactivist an emotion-driven mechanism for high account of time-consciousness (§§29–36), University of Padua, Italy arousal (Droit-Volet & Gil 2009). This raises Gallagher points out the interdependency the possibility that the interplay in arousal- stefano.poletti/at/phd.unipd.it of primal impression, retention, and pro- valence, and possibly also attention, is the tention: “Our experience of the present is cause of the inconsistencies in empiric evi- > Upshot • Enriching the parallel be- always dynamic […] in such a way that a dence shown above. tween transcendental phenomenol- focus on any one of the three components « 12 » To conclude, a schematic causal ogy and enactivism, I briefly discuss the in isolation runs into an abstraction” (§29). relationship between affect, action and compatibility of the Buddhist perspec- Considering each factor per se reciprocally time-consciousness was proposed and put tive with Gallagher’s contribution to presupposes the other two factors in a cir- to empirical test. While psychiatric disor- time-consciousness. Grounded in his cular way: “[I]f primal impression is part of ders show a similar schematic causation be- meditative practice and heartfelt en- the structure of the living present, it is itself tween these phenomena, this is not the case gagement with Buddhist philosophy, structured in its relations to retention and for meditation. One possible explanation Varela de-constructed representation- protention” (§33). This brings Gallagher to of the inconsistency is the question of the alism and its underpinning metaphysi- discuss time-consciousness’s phenomeno- finer-grained effect of the interplay between cal dualism, building up the generative logical “fractal character”: as each block arousal and valence. concept of enaction. His approach has is acknowledged, it collapses into the “fol- « 13 » As a response to the target article, been deeply inspired by Madhyamika lowing.” As we grasp a primal impression I outlined some interdisciplinary aspects Buddhism, which describes time-con- based on protention, it ends being held in by searching for exact causality that can be sciousness as that double illusion that retention, and so on; retention dissolves empirically tested and integrated. The em- frames phenomena as either becoming into protention, as “every living is living pirical inconsistencies presented here draw or permanent. towards” (Husserl 1991: 313). the scientific attention back to the impor- « 3 » Nowadays, Immanuel Kant’s phi- tance of affect in Varela’s account of time- « 1 » Shaun Gallagher’s target article, losophy finds little attention with respect consciousness, suggesting that while current centered around Francisco Varela’s contin- to this theme. In Kant’s framework, any work mostly focuses on understanding the uation of Edmund Husserl’s work on time- fact, to become meaningful, must match role of perception and action, more work is consciousness, elaborates on the embodied our a priori structure, which in turn pre- needed to consider the role of affect and its approach pioneered by Varela. The rigor of determines it (Kant 1990). Given that the sub-components. this analysis starts with the definition of transcendental structure constitutes only Husserlian distinguishable-yet-inseparable selected aspects of the phenomenal world, After studying Biology, Aviva Berkovich-Ohana moments: retention, primal impression, time as an inner form of intuition cannot 107 completed her PhD in Neuroscience at Bar-Ilan and protention. Then, towards the conclu- become the direct object of our conscious University, and trained as a post-doctoral fellow at sion, the author intertwines them with an attention. Nonetheless, we perceive and the lab of Rafi Malach at the Weizmann Institute. enactive approach to temporality, based conceive of things only insofar as they un- Currently a senior lecturer at the University of Haifa, on the mutual interdependence of such fold in time. Husserl relied on Kantian re- Edmond J. Safra Brain Research Center for the Study a threefold structure of time-experience. fined conception, considering time neither of Learning Disabilities, and Faculty of Education. The precision and clarity of Gallagher’s as an objective fact existing in the world Her research focuses on two main topics. One topic article leave almost no space for critiques, nor as a private, subjective projection. He is contemplative mental training effects and their re-enhancing a neglected theme in contem- inherited from Kant the view that both spa- relevance to education. Another focus is the study porary literature. Even though time shapes tiality and temporality are a priori empty of consciousness and sense of self. To this end, our lives with both intense and empty mo- intuitions permeated by sensorial, a poste- she collaborates with long-term contemplative ments, it recedes ephemerally from our riori ones. Kant argued that the properties practitioners, employing neurophenomenology. analysis, as we try to catch its essence. The that we can assign to the object are noth- implications of the target article retrieve ing but the very preconditions for know- Received: 18 October 2017 classical unadulterated philosophical ques- ing the object itself, overturning the rela- Accepted: 19 October 2017 tions and deserve some further consider- tionship between the knowing subject and ations. the experienced object. However, he did not formulate a phenomenological reduc- tion of time-consciousness, as Husserl did.

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 108 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism at i i pr o te rsn srcue of (§9). structure consciousness” present the of part is it past; just itself not is note just-passed the of ness the aware retentional “[M]y to bond: intentional immanent all components, tran sitory its in deconstructed be can cession character of experience itself. Following Following the itself. experience of character immanent passive somewhat a as time of reconstruction Husserl transcendental a conceived isomorphism, Brentano’s Franz “about-to-be.” “com and the ing-to-be” of interplay dynamic the with intertwined tone is simultaneously singular hearing of act intentional the Husserl, to outside According melody. exist that not of does time and time, in unfolds it as only melody a is melody a it: with co-originating and time in unfolding is more to form while likely create temporal Music continuation. in blocks the to listen we as protentions occurring and retentions of past interplay out of the ly, arises melody melody, independent possess if considered not do themselves, in duration-blocks, the While A-B-C. tones individual of blocks” “duration of essence punctual unitary, the (§2): melody of succession temporal the of reception of the present; it is not simply simply not is it present; the of passive reception a simply not “is itself, sciousness con that concludes author the tentionality, in through unfolds time-consciousness of access the objects objects the access we cannot that us reminds Enactivism cess. pro embodied an in situated time-consciousness then Varela this, upon Building character. invariant minimal, its to rience methods, the as such phenomenological developed Husserl Moreover, experience. the of horizon on relies that living, phenomenon a dynamic into – representation empirical non- a as – intuition pure a from time tian With Kan Husserl phenomenology, turned by its affordance possibilities. affordance its by shaped is and shapes circularly and plings, cou successful previous of all retention ied embod the in grounded is structure priori a This (§17). activity cognitive ongoing our by co-constituted are that objects of pects

Co n « 5 » 5 « » 4 « action and perception active to passive From str epoché u ctivi

Given that the threefold structure structure threefold the that Given Consider the Husserlian example example Husserlian the Consider euto, h dahoi suc diachronic the reduction, epoché st Fou , in order to reduce expe reduce to order , in n per se per d ati o but only those as those only but n s vol. 13,N°1 each O appearing appearing vercoming vercoming ------passive listeners” ( listeners” passive than rather perceivers, “active are showing we how “just-past,” the of retention the to complementary becomes thus “not-yet” the of apprehensiveness anticipatory The temporality its roots in living itself ” ( ” itself living in roots its temporality of act ( Varela action, ( porality” tem of form a itself is it rather time; tive consciousness a merely it is ther turn recruited by higher-order assemblies assemblies higher-order by recruited turn in are discharges neural These experience. ongoing the of character “pure present” the with associated scattered assemblies, within sensorimotor levels lower at occur to hypothesized first is discharges neural of synchrony al.’sphase et the mann example, Hessel Guido In scales. temporal multiple at unfold in dynamics neural process: hypothesis, his hierarchical embodied an as self-referentiality Varela’s conscious of idea Kleinschmidt (Hesselmann, figures vase-face ous Rubin’sambigu on task decision vase a a during than rather face a of detection the before subjects biases processing face with associated activity localized the For example, 2016). Allen an & (Gallagher predictive ticipation self-referential a in flow, input sensorial the of in activity the terpretative enabling contents, stored of recollec tion the in phases inertial various to affordances, and world-view. and affordances, its defining niche, cal ecologi its structures dynamically ganism or autopoietic an of architecture predetermined enactive the how perspective, tal” “embodied-transcenden an from discuss, Khachouf In retention.” in off trails perception enactive our not “as or fulfilled be will that sibilities pos enactive of full is absence, mere a ing towards ( action objects the in protention spatial embodied an as intentionality depicts gher Galla Gibson’s James affordance, of notion occurring object an itself not is experience temporal Husserl “[F]or stream: temporal the of character enactive self-referential the by succes undermined is the sion of linearity the moment, ent pres the towards is driven As attention our It self-affective. « 6 » 6 « iwn a utsal iae “gives image multistable a viewing

§35 Time-consciousness may relate relate may Time-consciousness §9 . h “o-e, fr rm be from far “not-yet,” The ). , Poletti & Pagnoni & Poletti , ). Embedding perception into into perception Embedding ). 2008). This finding fits with fits finding This 2008). 1999a enacts §16 : 272) shows how the the how shows 272) : ). ). h peet ( present” the Umwelt S imilarly, recalling recalling imilarly, in time, but nei but time, , intentional intentional , (2013), we we (2013), of of Kell & Kell objec §16 §34 ). ). ). ). ------of interactions between methodological methodological assumptions. metaphysical and reductions between interactions minimum of These the involve needed. should be paradigms might paradigms cal radi new that admits Gallagher challenge, transdisciplinary this meet However, adequately to dimensions. encompass all extra-intentional they as phenomenology, overcoming in ful use be may argues, he sciences, social and it. into integrated be should in tersubjectivity) and effect, historical embodi language, as ment, (such factors and pre-noetic hermeneutical that maintains (1998) er Gallagh methodology, Husserl’s in spots bonds with socio-cultural constructions constructions socio-cultural with bonds intentional maintains actively it that given in one’simmanent as directly sidered mind, can be con factors ers’ these In minds. fact, research out” “clearing by starting factors, transdisciplinary pre-noetic extra-intentional, of a integration encourages enology Neurophenom 2002). (Bitbol theories” ic by is described our supposedly best scientif it as nature “within consciousness describe to able being of reality,”impossibility the showing mind-independent “a on stance metaphysical objective, any dissolved cally methodologi Varela 2003). Thompson (Lutz & processes physiological situated in embedded is turn in which 2000), mersch prere ( awareness by flective accompanied is intentionality ent (Varela 1995, in in (Varela ent 1995, ofthe pres modification that constant with conjointly goes synchronization neural in assemblies cell of locking phase transient perception of act present the and modifying scales temporal multiple at unfolding synchronies phase neural der higher-or with associated protention, and “pure by of retention a horizon present” encircled pre-narrative a as present” “living (Varela present” phenomenological “living the of structure the threefold with associated stage a represent could structures dynamic larger in assemblies these of inclusion cal hierarchi The activity. their integrate that Literature, art, cognitive psychology, psychology, cognitive art, Literature, « 7 » 7 « dualism of problem the and Buddhism in Time-consciousness « 8 » 8 « 1999a

Acknowledging certain weak weak certain Acknowledging In the enactivist approach (§17), (§17), approach enactivist the In ). Thus, Varela described the the described Varela Thus, ). nrni lmttos of limitations intrinsic D §20 pa, aea Ver & Varela epraz, ). as “just past.” “just The ------Enactivism The Transcendental Character of Temporality Stefano Poletti

such as language. Incorporating these fac- time structure can be reabsorbed into min- to the constructivist approach, enriching tors as being co-produced with the experi- imal activity. Letting-go both time-impres- transdisciplinary research. Neurophenom- ence, the Buddhist contemplative practice, sion and concept, the Buddhist soteriology enology still deserves a deeper philosophi- which is grounded in body-awareness, is aims at getting rid of recorded retentions, cal integration of phenomenology and supposed to unveil the intentional char- which keep us in the threefold circle of meditation in order to access and reframe acters immanent to time-consciousness. retention-primal impression-protention, transcendental processes’ dynamics. As reported in Gallagher’s article, Bud- determining our personal worldview and « 13 » Time-consciousness shows fruit- dhism brought Varela to frame our imme- thirst/desire (Skt, trishna), marked by kar- ful connections with many research topics, diate experience as a dynamical intercon- mic influences impressed in our beliefs and e.g., the predictive confirmations of the nection “within a finite segment of time” in our dualistic worldview. Dualism starts narrative-self in integrative clinical prac- (§22). Later, in §24, referring to the double with the (pre-reflective) attitude separat- tice. Autobiographical-identity is sustained intentionality, Gallagher quotes Varela’s ing ourselves from the supposed “external by self-referential thoughts triggered by consideration of a “pre-reflective sense of world”; hence, the core sense of “I” exists past memories and consistent anticipatory the experiencing self”: certainly, Varela ac- only insofar as its evidence is supported patterns (Gallagher 2000). As reclaimed cessed it personally, scrutinizing Buddhist in its auto-confirmatory process based on by Khachouf, Poletti & Pagnoni (2013: 8), philosophy and practicing meditation. salient retention-protention cycles that de- the Default Mode Network (DMN) activa- « 9 » Following Varela’s example, neu- termine self-attachment. tion could be related to an activity that is rophenomenology can be intended as a « 11 » In both Hinduism and Bud- “being prepared for the future.” This may radical constructivist research program, dhism, primary existential craving is said be especially useful for what concerns the matching the conceptual analysis with to shape this transcendental activity, build- function of the DMN in enacting and look- a profound, embodied, existential com- ing up the condition of suffering (Skt. ing out for environmental confirmation of mitment (Vörös & Bitbol 2017, this is- dukkha), as impermanence (Skt. anitya) an autobiographical-based model of nar- sue). With respect to time-consciousness, and self-emptiness (Skt, anatman) go un- ratives. Finally, as recommended in a con- meditation seemingly suspends the self- recognised. Contemplative practices are clusive footnote (§38), the complementary confirmatory loop of the predictive, tran- supposed to allow that acknowledgement interplay of micro-phenomenology and scendental process, including Gibsonian through refined analysis of the ongoing meditation could improve Western scru- affordances (Khachouf, Poletti & Pagnoni experience. Clearly, time-consciousness is tiny of consciousness’s micro-dynamics 2013). In Buddhism, unreleased-stored radically at stake there and has to deal with (Petitmengin et al. 2017). reactions, often referred to as dispositions our ego-centered interpretative framework. (Skt, samskaras) held in deep storehouse Considering the gap between the three Stefano Poletti, a psychologist, is especially consciousness (Skt, alaya vijnana), are said components of time-consciousness, Mad- interested in phenomenology and contemplative to push forth attachments and consequent hyamika philosophers proposed a refined studies. During his PhD in Social Sciences, he existential suffering (Skt, dukkha). The re- conception of time, filling the gap between developed qualitative research on Mindfulness- tention of these salient memories is said to the act of knowing and perceiving (Garfield based Intervention with cancer and epileptic show up through individual inclinations to 1995). As in Husserlian epoché, the attempt patients in order to explore its interaction and act (Skt, vrittis and vasanas). That is why of Buddhist meditation is to collapse all in- meaning in chronic suffering. To this end, he meditation is said to help us get rid of past terpretative inclinations towards the noetic deepened patients’ metaphysical worldviews after 109 impressions, purifying the ongoing de- side of intentionality. Trying to overcome mindfulness programs, exploring in the meantime the pendent origination of time-consciousness. the subjective dimension, its endeavor is to soteriological conception of Buddhist expert meditators « 10 » Buddhist interdependent origi- abandon ego-centered action-perceptions, with respect to pain and existential suffering. nation addresses time-consciousness and a principle that was crucial in determining related problems head-on. For example, Varela’s own worldview. Received: 13 October 2017 with refined logical arguments, Nagarjuna Accepted: 20 October 2017 attempted to show how time has no self-ex- Conclusion istence, since it can never be grasped (Gar- « 12 » Considering the contemporary field 1995). In a less analytical way, Dogen recurrent naïve reduction of temporality defined being-time as a unified, co-emer- to a linear discrete process through which gent pure activity, since Being unfolds itself neurophysiological data can be interpreted, as beings, and time unfolds Being as beings time-consciousness in all its phenomeno- (Kim 2000). In Dogen, Being and time are logical complexity deserves more nuanced the activity of space-awareness, based on elucidations. In both his deconstructive and “forgetting oneself.” Such an interpretation generative intentions, Gallagher’s works takes on its full meaning only following the (e.g., Gallagher & Varela 2003; Reinerman- “letting-go” gesture, reclaimed by Varela Jones et al. 2013; Øberg, Normann & Gal- himself. Forgetting the “specious-present,” lagher 2015) bring important contributions

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 110 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism > Upshot Shaun Gallagher Internatural Relations Author’s Response it is important to keep in mind that kines- that mind in keep to important is it (e.g., contingency sensory-motor on views tivist son (1977) later developed it, and with enac - Gib- affordanceJames as of notion the with it (Husserl 1989), which in turn is consistent on act canofhow worldtermsI ceive in the per I that idea the can”– “I perceptual the of notion Husserl’s with consistent is This 2007). 2005, Lethin 1997; al. et (Gandevia preparation movement protentional/anticipatory- of part as movement, anticipates processesactivating that signal kinesthetic a control feed-forward in involved is esthesia - kin however, Importantly, kinesthesia. of aspect one clearly is This movement. that of fact the after therefore and movement, bodily of result the as generated input sory tionthoughttypicallyis of reafferentas sen- Kinesthesis/propriocepperception.- ceptive emphasized the role of kinesthesis in extero - temporality andthenatureofself. intrinsic of structure the clarification to regard with further requires that dox tal phenomenology, and I point to a para - transcenden - and processing predictive naturalism,to related is enactivism how

contrasts and connections as Igo. some highlight and turn in each to respond will I commentaries. critical and insightful Space? in found as Husserl’s enactivism what with and enology model of PP will best fitwith neurophenom- which addressed: be to needs that question further a is there such however, considerations, In time-consciousness. to proaches ap- enactivist and phenomenological together with neuroscience recent brings that model a as PP considering worth is it that with agreement general in am I tion. ofaccountprotenenactivist primacy of the - the main thesis of my with target article about the consistent nonetheless is that model alternative an provide may (PP) processing Co n « 3» « 2» « 1» str O u ’Regan & Noë 2001). In this respect, respect, this In 2001). Noë & ’Regan ctivi I thank mythank I commentators for their usr rgty n insightfully and rightly Husserl Dan I offer some clarification on clarification some offer •I st proposes that predictive that proposes Lloyd Fou n d ati o calls Edmund calls Lloyd n s vol. 13,N°1 Thing and Thing Lloyd - current exteroceptive sensory input.oth- In exteroceptivesensory current with prior experience, which integrates with associated joints and muscles, organs, from sensations” kinaesthetic] [and teroceptive - “in generating initiated, are body the out through- changes hormonal and muscular of train a and cortex frontal orbital medial the processing,perceptualactivationof liest & Bar2009:1325) “ tion hypothesis,” which - predic “affective the propose They 2016). & Barrett also (2009; Bar Moshe and Barrett Lisa by This is clearly shown, for example, in studies brain-body-environment. of coupling ical can understand priors to involve the dynam- brain. Rather, the within the PP framework, one in 79) 27, 6, 2016: (Clark knowledge” and embodied view of PP, refers to liberal as “storedmore his in even Clark, Andy what to reducible not are priors call coders tive environment. the Accordingly, predicwhat- to coupled is it as body whole the involves It brain. the to confined dynamics isolated an just not is this however, enactivist, the Forworld. the to system the adjustmentsof cal processes involved in the back-and-forth dynami- the emphasison enactivist the and temporality intrinsic of analysis Husserl’s with consistent nicely is this shows, As errors.Lloyd prediction of light the in itself correcting constantly is that model erative gen- a informing priors on based world the about guesses anticipatory making is brain the world, the from off it cuts Markov and blanket tight a in brain the wraps which view. enactivist the for needed is what of short fall (2013), Hohwy Jakob PP,by representedof models internalist that suggest also ideas these But PP.of model theoretical the by captured be moment that visual stimulation begins. very the from vision support responses affective a as separate step occur afterthe object is identified. Instead, not do value or relevance salience, ronment. envi - the coupledto is it as body the of ality moremotorthe reflects generally intention - andsystem, involves nervous peripheral the It processes. brain to reducible not is thesia mle ta rsoss inln a object’s an signaling responses that implies « 4» « 5» They showThey that along earthewith As S immons 2015; Chanes & Barrett & Chanes 2015; immons suggests, these ideas can ideas these suggests, Lloyd te nenls reading, internalist the On ” (Barrett - may “wave the be of future” the (§15). processing predictive and enactivism, ogy, phenomenol- of combination this predicts, ineberg, 2016; Friston & (Allen autopoiesis of Varela’sFrancisco with consistent as notion Principle Energy Free the of ton’s concept KarlFris- see to possible is itIndeed, 2016). Allen & (Gallagher in-the-world gagement “in-the-head,”ofform a butis “inferences”) (so-called processes brain of set internal an to reduciblePP,not is which of version enactivist an out flesh to is ever, the enactivist story. What is important, how- of capture much can that model a offers PP ception is per leanings, Husserl’senactivist with tent consis- means, This priors. the constitutes that whole a as organism the is it words, er “ visual experience. visual of part normal and necessary a as value affective dictions generated during object perception carry of an object is not computed after the fact. […T]he pre- significance or salience affective the that (with an ‘s’)” (§5). This is a view that view a is This ‘s’)”(§5). an (with inten linguistic with mind scious “‘directedness-to’ con as the tentionality of in of concept Husserl’s confuse atically” to can.”According “I operative of( aspects kinesthetic embodied, the into Husserl’s insights include not does her, for seemingly which, phenomenology, ver of classic sion the with consistent and past, the to oriented undertow reactive a offers ence” with its early Fodorian emphasis on emphasis Fodorian early its with ence” sci “cognitive term the associating be ply 2013). Myin & Hutto 2017; Gallagher (e.g., content sentational repre semantic or propositional of notion the rejects it that extent the to tentionality in for model a as notion latter the eschews Fregean intensionality.of enactivism notion Indeed, some towards than rather 2012) Merleau-Ponty 1989; (Husserl tentionality in bodily or operative towards shift a is it act-intentionality, from away emphasis the shift I If account. my in view this finds she It to me, however, (1957). not is clear where lange intrinsically infused with affective value, so value, affective with infused intrinsically « 7 » 7 « « 6» associates with Roderick Chisholm Chisholm Roderick with associates

Kiverstein & Rietveld 2016). As In contrast, contrast, In I am in agreement with agreement in am I fungierende ” (ibid: 1328) ) ) intentionality or the Havelange Havelange Havelange Véronique predictiveen- , I “system I , a sim may that Lloyd s ionality ionality Have Lloyd - Bru ------Enactivism Author’s Response Shaun Gallagher

propositional representations. The idea of terms of the classic concept of nature (Mer- activist conceptions of cognition involves naturalizing phenomenology in the context leau-Ponty1964: 201ff), but rather in terms differentiations captured by the vocabulary of cognitive science, however, does not put of a reconceptualization of nature – not as of lower-level versus higher-level processes. phenomenology to use in the service of an a collection of objects or objective relations, If, instead of a hierarchy, we think of brain- already established cognitive science. Rath- but in terms of form (structure, gestalt), or, body-environment in terms of a dynami- er, phenomenologically inspired embodied- as in his later work, “flesh” (Merleau-Ponty cal gestalt, where processes may be better enactivist approaches pose a challenge to 1968) – where nature is not independent conceived of in terms of figure-ground, it is this good-old-fashioned version of cogni- of the perceiver or the agent. Indeed, Mer- not clear how to conceive of emergentism. tive science. leau-Ponty (1995: 373) cites Niels Bohr on Indeed, the question of emergentism gets « 8 » This can be made clear by con- the harmony between phenomenology and completely caught up in Varela’s (and sidering Havelange’s more substantial claim contemporary physics (see Bohr 1999). In Thompson’s 2007) attempt to rethink the about the shortcomings of naturalization, this regard, Merleau-Ponty, and the neuro- concept of nature. This is not an issue that and Jean-Michel Roy’s remarks on issues re- phenomenology inspired by him, does not, can be resolved here, however. lated to naturalism. First, in contrast to pace Havelange, shift away from “what is « 12 » Julian Kiverstein, like Roy, raises Havelange’s worry, neurophenomenology given in first-person experience to a third- the issue about the tension between Va- does not give up the phenomenological re- person register… [or] to a conventional sci- rela’s neurophenomenological project and duction. Indeed, in Varela’s account, and in entific approach” (§7). Indeed, that would enactivism. He suggests that there is some experiments he conducted, he is careful to be to miss the main point of a naturalized element of enactivism missing in neurophe- employ a version of the phenomenological phenomenology. nomenology. This is another way to frame reduction (Varela 1996; Lutz et al. 2002). « 10 » This also addresses the worry that the issue that I attempt to address in my This is not, however, Husserl’s transcen- Roy expresses about whether Varela trans- target article. That is, by thinking further dental reduction. And, certainly, neuro- forms “the general notion of cognitive natu- along the lines that Varela already set in re- phenomenology is a different project from ralism” (§7). Roy is still looking for a solu- gard to intrinsic temporality (characterizing transcendental phenomenology. But this is tion to the hard problem of consciousness. both experience and action), we can make not something that Husserl would reject as Although Varela responds to David Chalm- the neurophenomenological analysis more heretical. In fact, Husserl, who did not in- ers (1995) by promising a “remedy” to the enactive. What is unresolved in Varela, tend that the insights provided by transcen- hard problem through neurophenomenol- however, speaks to the ongoing theoreti- dental phenomenology should be ignored ogy, this was not meant to be the solution cal struggle between the task of remaining by science, gives his imprimatur to the very for which Roy is looking (§8). Anything that scientific (which Varela certainly wanted to idea of a naturalized phenomenology. He could count as a solution to the hard prob- do) and reconceiving nature (and therefore suggested, quite clearly, that lem would have to buy into the assumptions reconceiving what science actually is). of classic naturalism, since those assump- « 13 » Kiverstein also points to nuanced “ every analysis or theory of transcendental phe- tions define precisely the framework within differences between different versions of nomenology – including […] the theory of the which the hard problem is defined, namely, embodied cognition – the differences be- transcendental constitution of an objective world that a complete scientific description of the tween ecological, extended and enactivist – can be developed in the natural realm, by giving brain will be deterministic, and completely conceptions. He wants more clarity about up the transcendental attitude.” (Husserl 1970: independent of first-person experience. To how enactivism can be distinguished from 111 §57) think that there is a solution to the problem other approaches and focuses on the idea is to accept the terms in which the problem that the world and its meaning is not pre-es- The idea that phenomenological insights is defined, and this is not something that tablished or pre-given. My own view of this could inform the natural sciences is not in- Varela, even as a scientific neurobiologist, is that there are ways to understand enactiv- consistent with the value of transcendental was willing to do. The remedy was indeed ism as including conceptions of ecological analysis. The idea of a phenomenological to circumvent the problem by reconceiving and extended cognition as long as we give psychology would follow along this line. nature. up functionalist commitments, especially « 9 » At the same time, the naturaliza- « 11 » Roy poses an important question in versions of extended mind (Gallagher tion of phenomenology does not mean that about why Varela, in his finalized version of 2017). So, my project, rather than providing phenomenology succumbs to the classic neurophenomenology, shifts away from the a clear distinction between these approach- conception of nature that still guides most of emergentist position he expressed earlier, es, is to find a way to integrate them. Kiver- contemporary science (excepting quantum and then again later in his article with Evan stein goes some distance in this direction in mechanics). It rather motivates a rethinking Thompson (Thompson & Varela 2001). This his own ecological analyses of affordances of the very idea of nature. Maurice Merleau- is a difficult question that would lead us too (Rietveld & Kiverstein 2014). Indeed, as Ponty, in pursuit of some of Husserl’s critical far afield in this short response. Although Kiverstein notes, the very relational and en- comments about scientism and the objectifi- Varela was rightly invested in the concept active structure of affordances requires the cation of nature, comes to the idea that there of different timescales, there is still a ques- kind of intrinsic temporality that I attempt is a “truth of naturalism” understood not in tion of whether the best way to think of en- to describe.

http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher 112 Philosophical Concepts in Enactivism tive sum of 150msecs. addi- an necessarily not is level) integrative (i.e., the combined event experienced on the event integrated the msec. 100 of stimulus when a stimulus of 50 ismsec. followed by a (see, e.g., Ronconi & order Melcher 2017). For same example, that of experience an or specific order to get to an integrativesecond a orputin them periods time ofelementary number a up sum simply can we that such additive or linear straightforwardly not are andintegrative the relations tary timescales, elemen- the Accordingly, between scale. tal 10 and 20 msecs as measured on the elemen- between difference experiential no is there integrative scale the of perspective the from compression. temporal tive) integra- to (elemental inter-level of form a example,for mentioned, I level. elementary the on intervals compositionadditive the of an not is experience conscious of timescale integrative The scales. these among lations re- the of significance the capture not time does objective seconds, and milliseconds in variations temporal the by indicated time, as clock objective linear on plotted be can timescales these distinguished Although Varela. by timescales different detail tion across specific timescales. specific across tion integra in dynamical a involves (Gallagher, This press). cognition of are constitutive that environment and and body body, between and brain between couplings relational are there processes, cognitive how, in explains that causality reciprocal of kind the include must system enactive the of account An suggest. to meant time- are scales different among distinctions rela’s Va what reciprocal part, in is, This non-linear relations. causal consider we that requires terms dynamical more tem in porality intrinsic and action affect, ties between the of the Thinking in approach. question enactivist in itself of is concept that linear causality a to herself confine to (§2), three phenomena” these between causality directional “exact the about asking In (§3). tention)” (pro time-consciousness → (anticipation) action → “affect is relation the that suggest that studies empirical of number a reviews time-consciousness. and between action affect, relations causal the about tions

Co n « 15» » 14 « str u ctivi

In §§18ff of my target article I article target my of §§18ff In A viva st Fou

Berkovich- n d Berkovich- ati o n O s vol. 13,N°1 hana O raises ques hana S pecifically, seems seems S he he - - - - - Frith 2002). &Gallagher (see down breaks structure this experiences in cases of meditation or psychopathological temporality trinsic priorianasa structureif whether we can consider the structure clear of in- all at not is It psychopathology. and dy - meditation of cases the relationsin andnamical parameters various these across differences pursue to important be will it Likewise, 2002). Marcel & (Lambie valence for the two sub-aspects of affect: arousal and effects differential about suggestion esting requiresmoreresearch. phenomena these of understanding good a perimental resultsperimental cited by Berkovich-Ohana. ex- the of lot a and binding intentional of phenomenon the explain to help dynamics bourne 1992; Gallagher 1998). Indeed, these see also 1975; Rudnicky & (Bregman level neuronal the on occurs that processing of sequence the or time, jective ob - in occur they as tones of sequence the match necessarily not will sequence tonal a of experience temporal the music, to ing Husserl’slisten - in of examplefavoriteeven Thus, principles. non-linear dynamical, to 2007: 432) notes that heBitbol, MichelCiting tegrativetimescale. in- the in present living Varela’s the of explanation and processing, predictive interpreta- tions, enactivist among found be to connections the appreciates He comments. - sci that objectivity mind-independent the not just is nature that view, enactivist The nature. of conception enactivist an cerning This reinforces my remarks in §8 above con- “ “ (Bitbol 2002). theories’ scientific best our by described posedly consciousness describe ‘within nature itas sup is - reality,’to able being impossibilityof showing the tive, metaphysical stance on ‘a mind-independent intervals. ponent the entire pattern, not as conjunctions of the com- temporal information is encoded in the context of Thus, object. temporal distinct a of encoding the in resulting interval, msec. 100 the of processing aea ehdlgcly isle ay objec- any dissolved methodologically Varela the with interacts stimulus earlier the Instead, « 18» « 17» « 16» I agree with agree I This brings us to us brings This The integration occurs according occurs integration The ” (§8) ” Krakr Buonomano & (Karmarkar that Berkovich-Ohana S he makes an interan makes he D eao Poletti’s Stefano ennett & Kins- & ennett - ceive world. the per we how shape that effects priming ing ongoof - Wevaluable.set a in caughtupare and the solicitations we ordinarily take to be affordances define that factors cultural and social affective, including – factors tional perceiving extra-inten- multiple in embedded the is agent But agent. perceiving the with co-relational are phenomena tivists, enac- the For 204). 2002: (Bitbol manifest” them make to used are which experiments indissolubly are nomena This is, as is, This §9). (Poletti: time-consciousness” of tion origina- dependent ongoing the purifying tohelpofsaidimpressions,is past getrid us meditation why is “That processing. dictive pre- our inform supposedly that retentions the and priors the neutralize to helps tion Medita- effects. such suspend can practices tween narrative self (NS), minimal self (MS), paradox. a motivates it time, same the at although, meditation, on studies experimental Berkovich-Ohana’s “ 148) whole experimental arrangement. experimental whole the of account an including circumstances, ified only to refer to observations obtained under - spec phenomenon word the use to appropriate more indeed is it description, objective In […]. system the of behavior future the regarding predictions properly attached” we to need include the be can reality’ ‘physical term the which to phenomenon any of “description a give to want we if Bohr,Accordingto physics. tum light of his considerations concerning quan- in Bohr by reinforced is be, to it takes ence ture, pre-reflective self-awareness would collapse into selfless this state. self-awareness pre-reflective ture, - struc retentional-protentional that absent self-awareness,pre-reflective thenof sibility - pos the explains time intrinsic of structure retentional-protentional the If states. less - self involve practices meditation Buddhist (§10). ment” protention cycles that determine self-attach- retention- salient on based process auto-confir matory its “in exists which “I” the it with along and experience, temporal our of conditions which define the possible types of types possible the define which conditions « 21» « 20» « 19» This view seems consistent with consistent seems view This As Bitbol puts it, for Bohr, for it, puts Bitbol As Poletti Poletti n this view, certain forms of forms certain view, this On suggests, a deconstruction a suggests, ugss ht meditation that suggests - be Distinguishing by the the by co-defined ” (Bohr 2014: (Bohr “ phe- - - Enactivism Combined References Shaun Gallagher

and selfless (SL) experiences, Berkovich-Oha- inate the retentional aspect of experience, and Varela, the fact that there can be a re- na (in Dor-Ziderman et al. 2013) sought to then we would expect to find meditators in port on experience seems to suggest that the identify the neural correlates of the elimina- the LO experience. The paradox, however, particular experience is not selfless, but that tion of NS and MS during meditation, and is that these meditators are seemingly able it still involves a minimal pre-reflective self- a characterization of SL. The SL condition, to describe this experience, according to awareness and sense of ownership or mine- however, seemed to involve a decentering Berkovich-Ohana (Dor-Ziderman et al. 2013; ness (Gallagher 1996). If phenomena are process where there still exists an “observer 2016). For example, one meditator reports co-relational with the experiencing agent perspective” since subjects are able to report on SL: “There was an experience but it had (§12 above), and if there is no experienc- on such states. “A careful reading … of the no address, it was not attached to a center or ing agent, then there is no phenomenon to participants’ first-person descriptions of subject ….” Another states: “Sensations of all report. Accordingly, I suggest that further their SL experiences indicated three rather kinds of things flickering. A sort of medita- clarification is needed of the “observer per- broad but distinct types of experiences”: lack tive phenomena and flickering of light and spective,” and how that perspective relates of ownership (LO); altered experience; and darkness – difficult to describe in words.” to the retentional-protentional structure of less happening (Dor-Ziderman et al. 2013) And another: “There was a feeling of a shift time-consciousness. Consider the LO experience, which was at- in alertness, a cessation of reflectivity. A dif- tained by the most experienced meditators. ferent kind of quiet” (these reports are cited Acknowledgements The sense of ownership, or what phenom- in Dor-Ziderman et al. 2013: 6). If, however, The author received support from the enologists call the experience of mineness, one’s retentional consciousness (and pre- Humboldt Foundation’s Anneliese Maier is considered to be one of the most basic reflective sense of mineness) is eliminated Research Award (2012-18). aspects of pre-reflective self-awareness (or in SL, then when asked to report the selfless the minimal self), and it can be described in experience, should the subject not say some- Received: 29 October 2017 terms of our retentional hold on our passing thing like, “I don’t know, I wasn’t there”? Accepted: 8 November 2017 experience. If Poletti is correct in suggesting « 22 » On the logic that informs the that some meditation practices help to elim- analysis of intrinsic temporality in Husserl

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