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The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: from Husserl to Varela and Beyond

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The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: from Husserl to Varela and Beyond Enactivism The Past, Present and Future of Time-Consciousness: From Husserl to Varela and Beyond Shaun Gallagher • University of Memphis, Tennessee, USA, and University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia • s.gallagher/at/memphis.edu Shaun Gallagher > Context • In developing an enactivist phenomenology the analysis of time-consciousness needs to be pushed to- ward a fully enactivist account. > Problem • Varela proposed a neurophenomenology of time-consciousness. I attempt to push this analysis towards a more complete enactivist phenomenology of time-consciousness. > Method • I review Varela’s account of time-consciousness, which brings Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of the intrinsic temporal structure of experience into contact with contemporary neuroscience and dynamical systems theory, and pushes it towards a more enactivist conception of consciousness. I argue that Varela’s analysis motivates a closer examination of the phenomenological aspects of the intrinsic temporal structure of experience, understanding it in terms of an action- oriented embodied phenomenology in its most basic manifestation. > Results • This fully enactivist phenomenology of time-consciousness continues the analysis initiated by Varela and remains consistent with but also goes beyond Husserl’s later writings on time-consciousness. > Implications • This analysis shows that the enactive character of in- tentionality in general, goes all the way down; it is embedded in the micro-structure of time-consciousness, and this has implications for understanding perception and action. > Constructivist content • This account is consistent with Varela’s constructivist approach to cognition. > Key words • Time-consciousness, enactivism, Husserl, Varela. Introduction The past: Husserl’s analysis clear, Husserl offers a phenomenology of the intrinsic temporality of experience, bracket- « 1 » My first encounter with Francisco « 2 » How is it possible to be conscious ing or setting aside assumptions about time Varela was in 1996 when we communicated of objects such as melodies, which cannot ap- as objective or measurable by the clock. about one of my articles he reviewed for the pear all at once, but only unfold themselves « 3 » Husserl reject’s Franz Brentano’s Journal of Consciousness Studies (Gallagher over time? This is the kind of question that answer, that re-presenting (vergegenwärti- 1997). At that time we exchanged manu- Husserl (1966a) seeks to answer in his lec- gende) acts of imagining, remembering or 91 scripts that we were in the process of writ- tures on time-consciousness. Husserl’s view expecting allow us to grasp more than the ing. He was writing an article on the neu- is that perceiving succession and change now point, since that would imply that we rophenomenology of time-consciousness would be impossible if consciousness gave us are not able to perceive objects with tempo- (Varela 1999a, 1999b), and I was just put- merely a pure momentary time slice or if the ral duration (Husserl 1966a: 10–19). Rather, ting the finishing touches on a book manu- stream of consciousness were a series of un- in agreement with William James (1890), script on the same topic (Gallagher 1998). connected experiential points. If conscious- Husserl argues that the basic unit of time- Neither of these subsequently published ness were restricted to what exists right now, consciousness is not a “knife-edge” present, works, however, went far enough towards it would be impossible to perceive anything but a “duration-block,” i.e., a temporal field, an interpretation of time-consciousness with a temporal extension and duration. A or what Robert Kelly, the author of The Alter- that would fit with a fully enactivist view. In succession of isolated, punctual, conscious native: A Study in Psychology, writing under this target article I propose to review what states does not add up to a consciousness the name of E. R. Clay, had called a “specious I take to be an important development of of succession and duration. Consciousness present” (see Andersen & Grush 2009). The Edmund Husserl’s analysis of time-con- must in some way grasp more than the punc- specious present or thick duration block, sciousness in Varela’s work, and to push it tual now; it must be conscious of that which which is not equivalent to a momentary or forward to a full-fledged enactivist concep- has just been and is just about to be. How this strict present, somehow contains all three tion, informed by dynamical systems the- is possible or how a subject can be aware of temporal modes, present, past and future. ory and a more action-oriented embodied that which is no longer or not yet present – Husserl offers a phenomenological account view of experience. this is what Husserl attempts to answer. To be of this temporality. http://constructivist.info/13/1/091.gallagher Enactivism The Past, Present and Futureof Time-Consciousness Shaun Gallagher « 4 » Assume that you are hearing a what is happening now, and a protentional in time, but neither is it merely a conscious- tonal sequence A, B, and C. If you attend to anticipation of the moments of experience ness of objective time; rather it is itself a your perception the instant tone B sounds, that are just about to happen. The concrete form of temporality. This means that even you will not find a consciousness of this tone and full structure of temporal experience if we ascribe some kind of temporality to exclusively alone, but rather a consciousness is determined by the protention/primal-im- the stream of consciousness due to its dy- of the broader sequence A, B, and C. When pression/retention structure of consciousness. namic and self-differentiating character, you hear the tone B, you are still perceptu- Within this structure what we experience – this intrinsic temporality is not the same ally conscious of the just-past tone A and, the experiential content – changes from mo- temporality that pertains to the objects of if it is a familiar melody, you are anticipat- ment to moment, but how we experience it consciousness. Husserl rejects an isomor- ing the just-about-to-be-sounded tone C. – the temporal form – at any given moment phism between the stream of conscious- You are not simply perceiving B, and then reflects this threefold unified structure. ness and the temporal objects and events of remembering A and combining that with an which it is conscious. The relations between act of imagination about C. Rather, in some “ In this way, it becomes evident that concrete protention, primal impression and retention way you are hearing these tones as in suc- perception as original consciousness (original are not relations of past-present-future in a cession, as part of an on-going sequence. givenness) of a temporally extended object is way that matches up with a perceived object Importantly, however, there is a difference structured internally as itself a streaming system such as a melody. My retentional awareness between your consciousness of the present of momentary perceptions (so-called primal im- of the just-past note is not itself just past; it tone B and your consciousness of the tones pressions). But each such momentary perception is part of the present structure of conscious- A and C, since they are not heard as simul- is the nuclear phase of a continuity, a continuity of ness. Husserl thus distinguishes the objects M S taneous; A is heard as just past, and C as just momentary gradated retentions on the one side, that are constituted as temporal objects in about to be. For this reason, we can say that and a horizon of what is coming on the other side: an experience structured by protention, CTIVI we hear the melody in its temporal succes- a horizon of ‘protention,’ which is disclosed to be retention and primal impression, from the sion and not merely as isolated or uncon- characterized as a constantly gradated coming.” relations that exist between the constituting N ENA nected tones. (Husserl 1962: 202) structures of consciousness itself. There are I S « 5 » In his analysis, Husserl describes two different temporal domains here. Just as the structure of this temporal experience us- « 7 » Thus, on Husserl’s account percep- my experience of a red circle is neither cir- CEPT ing three technical terms: tual presence is not punctual, it is a field in cular nor red, the temporal givenness of the Primal impression, the component of which now, no-longer-now and not-yet-now intentional object (as past-present-future) is CON consciousness narrowly directed toward are given in a gestalt pattern. This structure not the same as the intrinsic temporality of AL the now-phase of the object. Accord- is what allows for the possibility of our per- the experience itself (Husserl 1966a: 75, 333, ing to Husserl, the primal impression ception of succession and duration. 375f). PHIC cannot be thought independently of its « 8 » In contrast to Brentano, reten- « 10 » In Husserl’s analysis of this intrin- temporal horizon (Husserl 1966b: 315, tion and protention are distinguished from sic temporality of consciousness, each ele- LOSO 337f). It never appears in isolation, and the proper cognitive acts of recollection and ment, if taken in isolation, is an abstraction HI P as such, in the analysis, it is treated as expectation. Clearly there is a difference be- and theoretical limit-case. Primal impres- an abstract component of a larger struc- tween hearing a melody as it is occurring, sion is never given alone; nor is retention or 92 ture. and recollecting the party you attended last protention. The concrete and full structure Retention, the component that provides New Year, or looking forward to the beach of the lived presence, according to Husserl, us with a consciousness of the just- next summer. The latter are full-fledged and is protention/primal impression/retention elapsed phase of the object.
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