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Chapter Two the Zhuang-Z' 26 / Vaoism and Chinese Culture Further Readings CHAPTER TWO Csikzentmihalyi, Marc, and Philip J. Ivanhoe, eds. 1999. Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi. Albany:State University of New YorkPress. Graham, A. C. 1989. Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle,Ill.:Open Court Publishing Company. Hansen, Chad. 1992. A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Ox• THE ZHUANG-Z' ford University Press. Ivanhoe, Philip J. 1993. Confucian Moral Self-Cultivation. New York:Peter Lang. Kohn, Livia. 1998. God of the Dao; Lord Lao in History and Myth. Ann Arbor: Uni• The question of the goodness in people and of their original, natural versity ofMichigan, Center for Chinese Studies. mind rises to the forefront in succeeding generations. The two major leaders of Confucianism and Daoism after the hoary masters, Mencius (c. Kohn, Livia, and Michael LaFargue, eds. 1998. Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching. Al• 371-289 RCE.) and Zhuangzi (c. 370-290 RCE.), both place the mind at bany: State University ofNew YorkPress. the center of their speculations, moving towards an intemalization in I1II LaFargue, Michael. 1992. The Tao of the Tao-te-ching. Albany: State University of their understanding of the world. This can be seen as the logical next New YorkPress. step following the overall tendencies of the axial3!ge, or again as a gen• Schwartz, Benjamin. 1985. The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, eral tendency in the development of the ~s religions. As Paul Ri• Mass.:Harvard University Press. coeur has found in a study of Westem religions called The Symbolism of Evil (1967), humanity has tended to see the world first irl~~! then social, andJina1JY_W.p~er.s-2g~.Qr psychologicalJ~1p1.s. Evil accordingly Original Sources in Translation was understood first as defilement, incurred through the violation of a taboo, then as social infringement or shame (sin), and eventually located Henricks, Robert.1989. Lao-Tzu: Te- Tao ching. New York:Ballantine. in the individual and experienced as guilt. This transition is most visible Henricks, Robert. 2000. Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching: A Translation of the Startling New in Westem religions, but it also applies to China-although the latter Documents Found at Guodian. New York:Columbia University Press. never developed a guilt culture to the same degree a;-the West, since "It Kohn, Livia. 1993. The Taoist Experience. Albany: State University of New York aIw::'ys placed a higher emphasis on the commumty than on th"e"individ• Press. Chs. I, 2, 10, 38. ual. Lau, D. C. 1979. Confucius. Baltimore:Penguin Books. Ancient Chinese thought of the third century B.CE. can in this overall context be seen as an effort to grapple with the mind, or consciousness, Lin, Paul J. 1977. A Translation of Lao-tzu s Tao-te-ching and Wang Pi's Commentary. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Chinese Studies. as the key factor in shaping human society and the world. The need to find remedies for the social tensions of the time is never ignored, but the Roth, Harold D. 1999. Original Tao; Inward Training and the Foundations of Taoist emphasis shifts markedly to an even more intemal, psychological under• Mysticism. New York:Columbia University Press. standing. Before, then, examining the vision of the Daoist thinker Daode jing, standard edition, appears in numerous translations; for guidance, see Zhuangzi, let us look briefly at the ideas of his Confucian contemporary. the article by Lafargue and Pas in Kolmand Lafargue 1998. 27 2S / Vaolsm and chinese CuLture The Zhuangzi / 29 Mend us Learning then becomes the search for the "lost mind," an effort to re• cover what is already there naturally. This mind can be accessed through Mencius, Mengzi or "Master Meng," like Confucius, came from eastern words, but on a deeper level lies with the qi, the vital energy or life force China and was both a government official and a professional teacher and of the person, which can be controlled by will and thought or obscured thinker who spent many years traveling to local rulers to offer his advice. by outside, sensory data (2A2; 6A15). Once people have found access to He inherited Confucius's thought through the lineage of the latter's their original mind, they can begin to spread the goodness around them. grandson and followed him in the effort to find ways of restoring the Here Mencius maintains some of Confucius's social thinking by propos• idealized golden age of the mythical sage rulers. But Mencius's focus ing that the expression of innate goodness has to begin with benevolence was different in that he located the key to social harmony less in rites within the family and righteousness in the immediate community. This and etiquette than in the human mind, which he declared to be originally is different from the ideal of universal love proposed by his rivals, the {tp good. Confucius had .not made any statements regarding the nature of followers of the philosopher M£?i: From the community, moreover, as the mind, but only emphasized that learning was at the center of the en• outlined in the Daxue (Great Learning) chapter of the Liji, the good must terprise and that people had different inherent capabilities for it. spread further until it reaches the state and leads to the ideal of humane government which is for the benefit of the people and not the profit of Mencius now categorically states that the human mind is essentially the ruler. He says: good and has certain universal, natural qualities which lie at the root of all virtues, including those proposed by Confucius. He pinpoints four, If the people have a constant livelihood, they have constant which are appropriately called the" four beginnings": minds. Without a constant livelihood, they lack constant minds, and without those they will go astray, stopping at no depravity or nastiness. When they then turn criminal, to pur• f The feeling of commiseration is found in all men; the feeling of .~ shame and dislike is found in all men; the feeling of respect sue and punish them is to entrap them. How can that be possi• " \ /,and reverence is found in all men; and the feeling of right and ble under the government of a benevolent man? Therefore a wrong is found in all men. The feeling of commiseration is the good ruler will always be respectful and thrifty, courteous and I' beginning of benevolence; the feeling of shame and dislike is self-effacing,taking from the people only according to proper the beginning of righteousness; the feeling of respect and rev• regulations. (3A3; Lau,Mendus, 97) erence is the beginning of etiquette; and the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom. These four are not instilled This, in turn, will help to stabilize the country and enhance social har• in us from the outside. ~-2Eigi~ ha~~:L!h~m~i~ mony, the ideal condition for people to realize their deeper mind and (6A6; 2A6; Chan, Source Book, 54,65) find true harmony in life. His main argument for these four qualities is that in certain situations all people would instinctively do the right thing and not hesitate even to think. For example, when "one sees a child about to fall into a well," one ZhuangzL would reach out a hand and try to grab him no matter what. For Men• cius, therefore, all people possess instinctual or innate knowledge of the Master Zhuang, originally called Zhuang Zhou, was of lower aristocratic good, and have the ability to do good in all social situations. And when backgrout1.d, highly ,~sl~~, and a minor government servant. He first their naturally good mind is developed to the fullest, everyone can live worked for a local southern Chinese state, then withdrew to dedicate the ideal life in perfect harmony. Evil consequentially is no longer part of himself to his speculations, teaching his ideas to disciples and either social circumstances or interaction but rather is the result of people's writing them down himself or inspiring others to do so. The same Shiji failure to acknowledge and develop their innate goodness . chapter (ch. 63) that discusses the legendary Laozi mentions that Zhuangzi was famous for his way with words. Indeed the text associated 30 / Va01Sn1 and Chinese CuLture The Zhuangzi / 31 with him is regarded as the first document of Chinese literary fiction and extraneous materials and stories he found unworthy of Zhuang Zhou. is famous for the high quality of its language. He duly proceeded to eliminate these parts, which dealt with magic, ex• orcism, dream interpretation, ecstatic journeys, medical lore, and natural The text Zhuangzi emerged from within the same overall political envi• transformations. He then set out to streamline the rest into a division he ronment as the Oaode jing, but it has a different focus in that it is more found suitable. Both our current edition of the text and the main orienta• concerned ~~ental attitudes and condemns active politicaJj!1~ve• tion of its world view are therefore received through Guo Xiang, and his ment. Zhuang Zhou found that the ongoing arguments among the aif:. ideas of what the Zhuangzi was all about. 'ferent philosophical schools were futile and would not lead to serious improvements. He concluded that "right" and "wrong" were highly volatile categories, that all viewpoints were relative, and that the mind Early Vaoist Trends ~~e: a .:'~:_o~gcase for~h: cultivation of~nondu~ perception_dfl2 ~~~x.,) of life that is free from constraints - mental, personal, and social - and Within the existing text, then, which scholars believe still contains mate• \ .•...,.....-""-'~ ~ •.
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