Ethnographic Studies, No 11, Autumn 2009

Perennial arguments about intelligibility and rationality in the philosophy of the social sciences.

Wes Sharrock, School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester

I focus on that aspect of Peter Winch’s ‘Understanding a primitive society’ was work for which he is most notorious and intended to explain further the arguments which is most directly relevant to these from the book The Idea of a Social Science proceedings, namely his supposed (1958). It is also worth bearing in mind reflections on ‘understanding other that Winch’s discussion of the Azande case cultures’. At a recent meeting, Gavin is part of a reply to Alasdair MacIntyre’s Kitching delivered a heartfelt protest criticism of the book. With these things in against Wittgensteinians who endlessly mind, I will do my best to dispel the idea witter on about the Azande, which they do that Winch’s thought was about method in because of Winch’s use of that tribe’s the social sciences, a legislative magical practices [or, at least, Edward prescription of a correct procedure for Evans-Pritchard’s description and sociological researchers, when it was evaluation of these in his Witchcraft, essentially descriptive of what people-in- Oracles and Magic among the Azande of society commonly do. Insofar as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (1937)] as an ‘understanding’ is the issue, then Winch example in ‘Understanding a primitive tries to draw attention to what counts as society’ (1964). It is not just ‘understanding’ in various contexts of Wittgensteinians who repeatedly invoke human life. One such context is that of this example, for it is at least as often understanding (or failing to understand) invoked by critics of the supposed people whose ways are impossible for us implications of Wittgenstein’s philosophy to accept and difficult to comprehend and/or Winch’s applications of it for the (which is where the example of the Azande philosophy of social science, very comes in, but not as an instance of any commonly in the context of arguments necessarily generic problem of about ‘relativism’. More than half-a- understanding one culture from the point century after publication, Winch’s paper is of view of another1). Far from drawing still debated, though the intervening years out how the difference between someone have seen little real progress. Whilst else’s concepts and ours makes it difficult Winch’s work is cited as a source of for us to grasp those concepts, Winch is in contentious views, the argument over it fact more concerned with how such only seldom discusses directly and in detail difficulties can be compounded by the issues that Winch raised. If so, then gratuitous philosophical preconceptions. despite Gavin Kitching’s protest (not then Both Evans-Pritchard and MacIntyre are directed at me), it may be worth reminding accused of misunderstanding the Azande’s what Winch’s concerns actually were, magical practices, and in each case, compared with those commonly attributed Winch’s argument is not that those to him through much of the now extensive misunderstandings arise from the inherent – though characteristically superficial - difficulty in following the ways in which literature.

1 First, two things need to be recognised. If there is a general problem in the background, One, the derivation of Winch’s thought I’d suggest it is more with the idea of a ‘scientistic’ obtuseness to the meaning of religious language (cf. from his understanding of Wittgenstein’s ‘Darwin Genesis and Contradiction’; Winch, 1987, philosophy, and two, that the paper pp. 133 – 39)

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the Azande’s distinctive magical practices mistaking of philosophical for empirical work, but are self-inflicted, produced more problems and consequent attempts to solve by misconceptions about the home culture them through (inappropriate) empirical than by intrinsic opacities in the forms of investigations. One way of untangling a magical practice. Indeed, they are not philosophical confusion is by rearranging genuine problems at all, but rather uncontested facts in order to display them philosophical confusions. This should perspicuously and show them as less explain what would otherwise be ironies puzzling than they have come to seem. about Winch’s work: he, with no first hand Whatever facts those are, they cannot be experience of Azande life, would be trying proprietary to the philosopher because to put right an anthropologist who had at philosophy has no fact-gathering methods least lived among them; even more of its own. strangely (given his supposed relativism), he would be trying to put the Understood as an application of this anthropologist right about the place of conception of philosophy, Winch’s work some magical practices in the lives of on the social studies just can’t propound their users. any doctrines (let alone any doctrines about the nature of reality) and so just Here is where the connection with can’t be either the idealism or the Wittgenstein’s philosophy comes to the relativism for which it has so often been fore. Though often packaged up with condemned as (any more than Wittgenstein others involved in the great reaction could espouse or imply the ‘linguistic against positivist (mis)conceptions, Winch idealism’ attributed to him)2. is not, like most of them, arguing for an alternative form of empirical inquiry to one There is plenty of factual matter in Evans- modelled on natural science, but is arguing Pritchard’s (1937) anthropological report that in the key respects that concern him, on ‘witchcraft, oracles, and magic among the ‘social studies’ (as he would prefer) are the Azande’ which goes, as it must if the not empirical at all. previous paragraph is correct, uncontested. Winch must depend on the factual details For Wittgenstein the difference between of Evans-Pritchard’s account if he is to philosophy and ‘science’ (broadly challenge Evans-Pritchard as he does; not construed as empirical investigation) is in least because rearranging some of those the nature of their problems. There is details shows that the objectionable empirical content to scientific questions, elements in Evans-Pritchard are but none to philosophical ones which, as inconsistent with his own materials. Thus, mentioned above, are not really questions Winch just can’t be assuming, implying or at all, but have only superficial concluding that each society lives within resemblance to genuine (factual) questions. its own closed circle of intelligibility, Philosophy involves no factual inaccessible to the understanding of all but investigations, since philosophical its fully fledged members. investigations arise not from ignorance but from lack of a clear view. Facts do figure 2 In another attempt (Winch, 1987, p. 194) to in the untangling of philosophical explain to some of his more severe critics how confusions, but those facts are already badly they had got him wrong, Winch wrote ‘It is known and must be uncontroversial one thing for a man to think something is so and (otherwise there would be room for quite another thing for what he thinks to be so’, then shortly he appends: ‘however, it is empirical inquiry, meaning the problem considerably easier to recognize this as a truism wasn’t a philosophical one). Philosophical than it is to understand exactly how it is to be confusions are compounded by the applied in different areas of human thinking’ (p. 195).

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not see, as we so plainly do, that their Best, perhaps, to think of the paper’s title, practices cannot possibly work? How can ‘Understanding a primitive society’, not as they go in for these practices with a voicing a general problem of straight face when it is apparent that in understanding any society with a culture many cases they will be let down? differing from ‘our own’, but as asking a Compatible with the assumption of their specific question, how is a specific society, intelligence, the explanation is to be found i.e. this one, to be (correctly) understood? in the structure of the beliefs organizing the magical practices. Evans-Pritchard At least for purposes of discussion, just divides these into two kinds, those stating assuming that his fieldwork was sound, the central principles of witchcraft, the Evans-Pritchard successfully understood nature of the witchcraft substance and its what I’ll call ‘the mechanics’ of Azande capacities to cause harm, and those practices, down to a detailed understanding protecting those core beliefs against of which ritual rattle is used and when; has empirical refutation by explaining away understood when and where witchcraft (through the system’s terms) those accusations are made; what the causality of occasions when the practices let people bewitchment is; how witches are identified down. by the oracle, amongst many other things (the full edition is some 550 pages long!) Note that ‘Understanding a primitive Winch’s criticism is focused on a section society’ gets down to its business with an of the book where Evans-Pritchard creates opening statement that ‘like many other a problem for himself. Evans-Pritchard, primitive people, the African Azande hold unlike some of his predecessors, did not beliefs that we cannot possibly share and suppose that engaging in ‘primitive magic’ engage in practices which it is peculiarly was a symptom of some comparative difficult for us to comprehend’ (p. 307), so mental deficiency. He assumed, rather, the Winch just can’t be trying to persuade us tribe’s intellectual equivalence. It was that there is no limit to our capacity to thought that ‘primitive magic’ revealed an understand their magic, and his inability to comprehend causal connections disagreement with Evans-Pritchard (and amongst empirical phenomena, the with Alasdair MacIntyre) is over the nature symptomatic form of mental inferiority, and location of that limit. In his valedictory but the Azande showed as good a grasp of return to the topic in ‘Can we understand basic ideas of empirical causality as we ourselves?’ (1997) Winch regretted that his do3. Nor were they any less intellectually chosen example had misled so many of his questing than we are, for their magical readers, giving the impression that he was practices were to be understood as interested primarily in the problem of expressing the same desire for an understanding other cultures by putting understanding of the fundamental nature of that to the fore. As a result, his reality as our own sciences express. commentators and critics had taken the key words in ‘understanding another culture’ to Here is where Evans-Pritchard finds his be ‘another culture’ whereas that identity problem: given that these people are no was incidental to the main purpose which less intelligent than we are, why can they was with (the concept of) ‘understanding’. That there are, sometimes, problems in

3 understanding another culture is It would be tiresome for writer and reader to keep uncontroversial, and Winch’s argument putting ‘them’, ’us’, ‘our’, ‘their’, ‘they’ and ‘we’ in scare quotes, though that is where they often neither requires nor entails more than that. should go, so I will largely refrain from doing so Nor does it suppose the absence of and assume that readers will understand where the comparable problems within one and the use of quotes would be appropriate

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same culture. On the contrary. language and reality overlook the fact that ‘reality’ belongs to the English language, Winch thinks that Evans-Pritchard’s not to philosophy. It has its own use in mistakes are with respect to assessing the practical affairs. The case against Evans- place of magical practices within the lives Pritchard boils down to this, that he treats of the Azande; the mistakes derive very the expression ‘reality’ as though science much from Evans-Pritchard’s (now used in a narrow sense referring to philosophical confusion about the place of the natural sciences) had sole and science in our own society. If Winch is proprietary possession of it when it has right in this, then it just can’t be that intelligible use in other contexts than Evans-Pritchard has run up against some scientific ones. intrinsic obstacle in understanding the alien culture, for he has put the obstacle Winch’s philosophy, like Wittgenstein’s, is there himself. Evans-Pritchard is in a concerned with intelligibility or sense, familiar philosophical morass, the rather than with questions of truth (since confusion of thinking that the question saying whether empirical assertions are ‘What is the relationship between language true is the business of empirical inquiry and reality?’ can be intelligible as a and outside the remit of philosophy). general question. ‘Reality’ has intelligible uses within law, religion, and history, as well as in There is something of an inconsistency philosophy, and these uses are not between the different criticisms of necessarily coordinate with one another. Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy, if not within some of these criticisms. On Winch certainly regards the concept the one hand, this philosophy is damned ‘reality’ as more than just-another-concept, for only talking about nuances in the use of but rather as one indispensable to any words at the expense of a concern with language and thereby to pretty much any reality itself. On the other, it is damned for practice. 4 One can imagine a language purveying false doctrines about the nature without the concept of ‘television’ but of reality (idealism, for example). If, without that of ‘reality’? As we will see he though, the question ‘What is the makes the same point about ‘rationality’. relationship between language and reality’ Winch’s treatment of the word ‘reality’ is makes no sense if asked in a general way, not very far from J.L. Austin’s treatment of that it can’t be given any sensible general it as a ‘trouser word’ (Austin, 1972 p. 70). answer., So if idealism is a supposedly Once upon a time, the one who ‘wore the general answer to the general question, trousers’ bossed the rest of the household. then it can’t have genuine sense either. Comparably, it is the implicit or explicit Consequently the argument can’t be that contrast term with which the word ‘real’ is Evans-Pritchard has given the wrong associated in use that ‘wears the trousers’ general answer to the question, leaving the and thus bosses the meaning of ‘real’ in way open for Winch to produce the right that context. The question ‘Is that real?’ one. requires some context for its intelligibility. ‘Is that a real fiver?’ has the contrast One of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic moves is ‘forgery’ to hand, with associated ways of to bring the ordinary words that are checking the validity of the note, whilst ‘Is seemingly so troublesome to philosophy that a real leg?’ contrasts with ‘artificial’ back to their home environment, that of and its ways of finding an answer. The their use in ordinary affairs. Winch does this with the word ‘reality’. General 4 It is a matter of registering the possibility of some questions about the relationship between sort of ‘an external check’ on assertions people make.

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word ‘reality’ is ubiquitous across important, if not generally definitive. departments of social life but that does not signify a generality in the kind of contrast Winch’s point requires no more than the made across all occasions, only the observation that it is intelligible (to us as multifariousness of the contrasts made on well as to the Azande) that the oracle different occasion. There can be no makes a difference between people who general question ‘What is real?’ to be are in reality bewitched and people who asked independently of some contrast- are not (though, since they suffered bearing context. Thus the word ‘reality’ is misfortune, it may have seemed that they used both in science and religion, making were). The application of ‘reality’ is tied contrasts in each case, but the lines it is to very different procedures in oracular used to draw are very different in science consultations and in scientific experiments, from those in religion. and Evans-Pritchard effectively underestimates the further differences that Winch’s difference from most of his critics this makes, to the extent of coming into is surely due to the fact that he does not see conflict with his own descriptive portrayal science as having any especially close of the mechanics of magical practice. relationship to philosophy. As the contrast Evans-Pritchard’s own descriptions of of empirical with conceptual inquiries witchcraft diagnoses show that the oracle’s should make plain, philosophy and science deliverances are not treated as hypothetical are in different and quite independent predictions which are to be tested to see if businesses. Philosophy can reflect upon they are fulfilled – they do not have a language use in science (for purposes of comparable place in the life of the Azande disentangling philosophical confusions) as to that which hypotheses have in the lives it can on language use in any area of life, of laboratory scientists. At the same time, but it does not need, for its purposes, to Evans-Pritchard exaggerates the pre- endorse or question the results of science. eminence of scientific hypotheses in our There is no necessary animosity toward own culture6. They do have a prominent science in this (though critics sometimes place in our lives, but that does not imagine that not only is there animosity, preclude there being other aspects of our but that is intense), it is simply that there culture that are closer to the ways of the is no need to endorse or question the Azande than they are to the model of results of science for these purposes (not to hypothesis-testing science. The way in mention that philosophers qua which Christian prayers solicit God’s help, philosophers generally lack the or the importance that people invest in competence to make informed decisions tokens of their relationships to others (such either way on individual findings in one or as wedding rings) can remind us that we other of the natural sciences 5). Winch’s are not always so distant from magical critics often and unreflectively assume a practices as all that. close connection between philosophy and science; they are apt to see themselves If Evans-Pritchard’s basic mistake is speaking on behalf of, if not from within, a grounded in the {pseudo-]philosophical scientific point of view and to treat the problem of the relationship between demarcations marked in scientific discourse by ‘reality’ as especially 6 Not to mention neglecting the extent to which science resembles Evans-Pritchard’s picture of the 5 Winch’s own interventions in the ‘social sciences’ belief structure of witchcraft, with innumerable do not transgress this limit, since as far as he is scientific predictions being falsified and then concerned ‘social sciences’ often subsumes ‘explained away’ in science’s own terms. I’m not conceptual confusions at least as much as empirical saying this is a good analogy, since the point is to difficulties. obviate this picture of how magic works.

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language and reality, which leads him into culture has its own independent and unsuitable analogies between the two distinctive rationality. Winch is not cultures when he attempts to understand arguing that there is such a disparity the part magic plays in people’s lives by between Azande culture and our own that matching it with something that plays a the rationality of theirs cannot be comparable part in ours. Recognition that recognised in terms of ours. On the practices that are much akin to magical contrary, Winch’s opposition is to what he ones come as naturally to some members sees as MacIntyre’s exaggeration of the of our culture as does dealing with contrast between our rationality and theirs. witchcraft among the Azande eliminates the need for the kind of explanation Evans- Most simply, it just is not as though ‘our’ Pritchard wants to give in terms of core concept of rationality demands that we find and supporting beliefs. Clearer ‘their’ practices irrational (No more, then, understanding of a practice can be enough, is it necessary to condemn ‘our’ concept of as it is in this case, to make it intelligible rationality as subject to ethnocentric as to why they continue in it. blindness to other cultures). To Winch, the version of ‘our culture’ which serves as the As this way of reading ‘Understanding a platform for Macintyre’s (1962, 1970) primitive society’ makes plain, its main arguments is one which makes our use of force is at least as much against Evans- ‘rationality’ more rigidly bounded and Pritchard’s treatment of ‘us’ as it is of well defined than it is. ‘Our’ notion of ‘them’, just as the second half of the paper, rationality is not to be applied in which centres on criticism of MacIntyre’s mechanical fashion, as though they could presuppositions about our standards of be applied across the board, quite rationality confirms. independently of the cases they are being applied to, those criteria are not even Wittgenstein’s methodology of showing necessarily all that determinate. It is as if that ordinary language expressions which one can tell on sight whether any activity is are the focus of philosophical puzzlement rational or not, without need to pay much have just as humble a civilian use as or careful attention to the case. Winch ‘lamp’ or ‘door’ does not lead Winch to holds that ‘our’ criteria do not embody an think of our concepts of ‘reality’ and advance assessment of every possible case. ‘rationality’ as being just-another-concept New cases can present problems for the concepts. Whilst one can find languages application of ‘our’ criteria, and the without the concept of lamp or door, it decision as to how to rate the cases may isn’t plausible to Winch that one would itself call for rational reflection, offering find one without either of these concepts. the opportunity for the extension of those Nevertheless much the same treatment can standards to unfamiliar, even be given to ‘rationality’ as was given to unprecedented kinds of cases, ‘reality’ above, i.e. recognising that understanding of both the standards and ‘rationality’ has a life outside scientific the cases being changed through contexts. I Its use is dependent on contexts thoughtful consideration: of application – it may be used in religious contexts just as readily as within scientific possibilities which are perhaps suggested ones (though it mustn’t be thought and limited by what we have hitherto so necessarily to have the same content from accepted [as rational], but not uniquely one religion to another). determined thereby. (Winch, 1964, p. 318) This is not leading up to the conclusion that I disavowed on Winch’s behalf earlier Furthermore, in the discussion, namely that there each these possibilities are limited by certain

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formal requirements centring round the limits centring around the demand for demand for consistency. But these formal consistency’ are a minimal requirement requirements tell us nothing about what in unavoidably set by the requirements of our particular is to count as consistency, just as own concept of rationality – if there were the rules of the formal calculus limit, but do not some consistency then why speak of not themselves determine, what are to be the different rationalities at all? proper values of p, q. etc. (ibid, emphasis in original) However, and in line with remarks in The Steven Lukes (2000), one of the longest- Idea of a Social Science about the standing critics of Winch and what he sees dependence of relations of logic on the as related positions, was relieved to find, relations of people, the point is that after reading through the fierce debate recognising such formal analogies between between Marshall Sahlins and Gananath our practices and theirs says Obeyesekere over events resulting in the death of Captain Cook at the hands of nothing about what in particular constitutes rational behaviour in that society; that would Hawaiians. require more particular knowledge about the norms they appeal to in living their lives. I was on the right track. For nothing said by (ibid, p. 318) Sahlins shows the Hawaiians to have been

bereft of the power to think logically and draw inferences and of the ability to Our determination of whether there is a recognize material objects and human contradiction in another culture depends persons, even including Captain Cook, for upon our developing an understanding of what they were. (Lukes, 2000, p. 17) that culture. We have to determine whether something which, on superficial Lukes relief reflects the fact he, like others, acquaintance with their practices, looks is apt to view the idea of different like a contradiction will continue to look rationalities as implying that others might like one as we become more familiar with be incapable of ‘logical thought’ where the ways of that practice and, as Winch that involves drawing inferences, adds, the contexts in which its rules apply, recognising inconsistencies and so forth, as well as the part that they play in the but that is not, as the quotations shows, an lives of those involved with them. idea that comes from Winch7 . ‘The formal MacIntyre is thus accused of treating the

7 Winch does discuss the fact that Azande do not determination of comparative rationality as acknowledge a contradiction that Evans-Pritchard a matter of applying our standard of thinks is to be found in their thought, but this could rationality as the measure of the rationality as well be understood in relation to Wittgenstein’s of their behaviour without thought for what theme that in their practical lives, people are not their own standards of rationality might be. ‘superstitious’ about contradiction in the way that he accuses formal logicians as being, and practical Hilary Putnam reputedly responded to the folk may not have any practical need to do anything charge that he was only using one’s own about the contradiction. If one thinks of a criteria of rationality, ‘Who else’s should I Marxist-style account of capitalism as featuring use?’ Winch likewise emphasises our internal contradictions, say, as a sound account, or unavoidable dependence on our own of Seymour Lipset’s First New Nation with its thesis that the history of American society has been criteria of rationality in framing our shaped by its commitment to the contradictory understanding of others, but does not think objectives of equality and achievement as a that this must result in the overriding of successful description, then it would seem that any one else’s independent standard. This neither do contradictions matter all that much to ‘us’. Winch’s discussion is about the fact that the Azande do not draw certain conclusions resulting in incapable of making inferences or recognising a contradiction, with no suggesting that they are contradictions.

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unavoidable dependence gives MacIntyre recognisable, easily identifiable with, or the ‘optical illusion’ that all that is even paralleling at all the shapes rationality involved in appraising their rationality is takes amongst us. Perforce, grasping one set of standards, which are both ‘ours’ others’ standards of rationality modifies and also ‘the’ standards. Hence in our own: examining behaviour, he poses the question: how does that behaviour square we are not seeking a state in which things up to these - our - standards? MacIntyre will appear to us just as they do to members therefore neglects what is for Winch the of S [an alien culture], and perhaps such a indispensible first task, which is to state is unattainable anyway. But we are establish what their standards of rationality seeking a way of looking at things which go beyond our previous experience in that it has are (standards in terms of which their in some way taken account of and behaviour is intelligible to them). incorporated the other way that members of Understanding their standards of S have of looking at things. Seriously to rationality is nothing different from or study another way of life is necessarily to additional to learning to understand their seek to extend our own - not simply to bring practices, but recognition that their the other way within the already existing standards of rationality are involved can boundaries of our own, because the point correct the ‘optical illusion’. It is not about the latter in their present form, is that necessarily beyond our powers to use our they ex hypothesis exclude that other (Winch, standards of rationality to identify and 1964, p. 318) understand those of the others in a way which does not obliterate or trivialise these Comparative assessments then must differences, for the very reason given crucially depend, on the one side, on above, that standards of rationality are careful determination of the features of the open, and that their application to new instant case and, on the other, choice of an cases involves decisions. The choices appropriate comparator. None of this available to us are not the ones that the implies a general, and certainly not apriori philosophy of social science has rather doctrine about the comparative rationalities tended to suppose must force itself on us, of diverse cultures, not least because the that we must either find that the others are focus in the two main cases - Evans- rational because they have just the same Pritchard, MacIntyre - is on what Winch rationality as us or that they cannot be takes to be a peculiarity of our culture, called rational in our terms because they namely, the prominent place that ‘science’ have a completely different and entirely is given in it, and some problems which different rationality. First of all, Winch’s arise among us as a result of that. When argument is wholly against the thought that these problems appear in the context of questions of comparative rationality are to ‘understanding another culture’ one way to be decided (even though he knows that counter them is by paying close(r) his own form of philosophy is one of attention to the ways of the other culture. apriori i.e. conceptual inquiry) through If this is done, then it may be that taking a general stand on the - shall I call unfamiliar ways will seem more it? – conceptual closure of different intelligible/rational than they first appeared, cultures. The substantive emptiness of the but it does not follow that this must be so. ‘formal’ requirements for rationality For once Winch is in agreement with ensure that this cannot be done, since their MacIntyre, the fact that a practice has rules substantive realisation is only possible does not establish that practice’s rationality, within the context of a culture., So it for wider account may need to be taken of cannot be assumed that the shapes the place the practice has in people’s lives rationality takes there must be readily in understanding the point of the practice:

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For, as MacIntyre quite rightly says, to note must do so again, for Azande belief in that certain rules are followed is so far to say witches just is one of those. Winch’s own nothing about the point of the rules; it is not philosophical position as such does not even to decide whether or not they have a entitle him to either endorsement or denial point at all. (Winch, 1964, p. 318) of the existence of witches, that is a substantive factual matter and outside Just as it is not to be assumed in advance philosophy’s remit, though it is just a fact that any given practice must have a point, about our (culturally conditioned) neither, presumably, is it for those who do responses that we give no credence to not belong to a practice to dictate whether witches. Winch’s exercise hardly incites it does, for the question is about how those us to reconsider our incapacity, being more engaged in the practice relate to it. No concerned that our inability to accept their more, then, can Winch be ruling out the beliefs should neither distort our possibility that people find those practices, understanding of their concepts (which is in which they themselves are engaged, e a matter of the part they play in their lives), pointless and alienating, even becoming nor sustain related misconceptions about critical of them, though he is often enough the part that science plays in ours. accused of conceiving people as intractably bound into the status quo. Winch’s arguments are addressed to social When James Kellenberger says scientists, but they do not speak to problems which belong distinctively to As anthropologists, or simply as social science, nor does he prescribe scientifically-minded observers, we can ask: Is their belief in witches true? As Twentieth- methods for them. Given his century men, of course, we have good reason Wittgensteinian views, it is not possible for to think it false. (Kellenberger, 1972, p. 48) Winch to legislate a correct method of understanding when the nature of the he is misleadingly treating the question ‘Is approach is descriptive (or, as Winch terms their belief in witches true?’ as though it it, ‘reflective’). Thus, Winch is not laying could be a live question for us, when that out any proprietary criteria for what question is only the same as ‘are there any ‘understanding’ must be, but is himself witches?’ One can see the way that asking applying those that he finds in use within ‘Is their belief in witches true?’ might the society, to determine whether, by those make relativism seem a tempting option, standards, this or that would count as especially in the light of Winch’s emphasis understanding or misunderstanding. In his on the autonomy of their standards. Saying last word on the subject, Winch makes outright that their belief in witches is false explicit just what I argue was always could seem like the kind of epistemic manifest in his early writings, namely that imperialism that Winch has been warning understanding ‘another culture’ does not against, so saying that ‘belief in witches is proceed on the basis of an unproblematic true for them’ might seem like a way out. grasp of the ‘home’ case. He again affirms Yet (a) appending “for them” only the possibility of limits to understanding, achieves redundancy, since in this context but not ones which can be drawn in any the ‘belief’ in ‘their belief in witches’ general way because ‘the line between means ‘take as true’ and (b) avoids facing what is and what is not “alien” is quite up to the fact that the question only means indeterminate’ (p. 202). Such limits may the same as ‘are there witches?’, and persist even though one understands very cannot effectively conceal the fact that this well the mechanics of some practice; this is not a question that we can seriously ask. may be ‘curable in particular cases, and in I have emphasised Winch’s sentence about others it may not’ (p.204). This ‘beliefs we cannot possibly accept’ and indeterminacy can result from the

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variability of human reaction, and arises criticism. I probably should insert between participants in different practices ‘rational’ before criticism. The basic logic in the same culture as much as between of the charge may be plain enough; the those from different cultures, as when he supposed ‘closure’ of cultures against one writes another does not only bound intelligibility, but circumscribes an epistemic limit I see no reason why a contemporary because the culture defines what historical scholar might not feel himself ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ are, and any fully more at home in the world of medieval encultured individual will by definition be alchemy than in that of twentieth century bound into faithful adherence to those football. (Winch, 1964, p. 198), definitions. Not because of any individual naïveté but simply because all thought is This kind of alienation can, for any given straight jacketed in these culturally given individual, be quite far reaching. Nor assumptions which define what can should we think that the comment ‘I conceivably count as ‘real’ (thus cannot understand how you could …’ precluding all possibility of counter- needn’t signify disappointment and a wish evidence). Disregarding the multitude of for a better understanding but, as David misconceptions involved in such Cockburn reminds, may express full-on misguided extrapolations, a response in refusal and condemnation. The forms accord with the ‘descriptive not legislative’ these disparities in understanding may take slogan can be a brief one: the task is not to are heterogeneous and multifarious and are, determine (as if for the first time, therefore for Winch (at least in part) produced by legislatively) the correct answer to ‘Is variability in responses, the ways in which (rational) criticism possible?’ but to ask ‘Is individuals react to their exposure to parts 8 there criticism? What kinds of criticism of the surrounding culture . Resultant are there, and what kind are criticisms such gulfs in understanding are not, then, the as these (e.g. of religion by atheists)? result of using a wrong method nor Where is this or that kind of criticism susceptible to ‘correction’ through use of intelligible, and where not?’ (all these the right one. These considerations were questions inviting descriptive answer). much in mind with my earlier example of This can be thought of as a third reprise of businessmen and bureaucrats being at least, the fundamental point: since key words if not more, remote from contemporary enmeshed in philosophical confusions sociologists than any Pacific islander could belong to the language, which includes be, as also in my comment on the social ‘criticism’ , then, like ‘reality’ and science reception of Winch as a choice ‘rationality’, criticism too can be example of his theme. The limitations to understood to be ubiquitous, multifarious understanding Winch has in mind are and contextually dependent. It is an prevailingly personal ones, those that elementary fact that there is plenty of individuals may nor may not find disparity, if not outright conflict, between insuperable, and which are no less cultures, and abundant criticism of one connected with the use of the concept of culture from within another. So there can ‘understanding’ than are those cases in too be disparity and criticism within a which persistent allegations are made single culture. This is just the sort of against both Wittgenstein and Winch for uncontroversial fact discussed at the outset, arguments which preclude all possibility of and it can only be utterly absurd to construe Wittgenstein and Winch as being 8 There isn’t room further to discuss the importance in blatant denial about this. for Winch of the place of the first place and the personal in all these matters (cf. Winch, 1989, pp. Recognising that this line of interpretation 14-17)

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is absurd will not, however, ease the thought, not some thoroughgoing problems of the acceptability of their affliction). arguments amongst some social scientists. Here the real trouble is not that the I’ve been trying to present a Winch arguments rule out all possibility of without doctrines, intent on showing that criticism per se but that they cast doubt on his arguments can be understood as free of the preferred position, which is that one the metaphysical and epistemological kind of criticism be considered pre- attachments that are frequently assigned to eminent: it rests on objective criteria (such them9. The tendency of commentators to as those provided by science’s methods or attribute both, most often for purposes of results, or comes with a successful facilitating rebuttal, only shows that philosophical theory) that can serve as a Winch’s commentators remain firmly transcendental and neutral standard against rooted in the kinds of doctrinal philosophy which the credibility or rationality of any that Winch would turn away from, culture can be compared. Another twist of consequently confirming his thought that the curlicue would be to say that social scientists are often thoroughly resistance to the idea of such an impartial enmeshed with conceptual problems, standard is relativism, for it denies all though under the impression that factual possibility of culture-free and impartial matters are at stake. Reading Winch assessment of people’s naive doctrinally can create and maintain the understandings of their situation, even their illusion that Winch aims to prescribe plight. Such a twist produces only another theory and methodology on the basis of lap of a circular argument where such controversial theses about the extent of objections again beg the question about human rationality, and the general form in the importance of context of use. It is not which people’s behaviour is to be that ideas of ‘impartiality’, ‘neutrality’ and explained (namely, as rule-following). ‘culture freedom’ are denied intelligible Understood, instead, as descriptive, it application but (following arguments becomes clear that he is not aiming to lay comparable to those about ‘reality’ and ‘rationality’) what could count as 9 instances of these is contextually Not to mention the kind of lunatic implications determined. It is the ‘rationalist’ idea that that are ludicrously attributed e.g. ‘Should actors agree that they are wealthy, happy, beautiful etc. ‘dependence on cultural context’ equates then they will be all of these things’ (Kemp, 2003, with ‘culture bound’ and its derogatory 72). Such absurdities result from disregarding the sense, leading to the false supposition that difference between agreement in responses (not Winch’s assertion of the unavoidable opinions) underpinning the constancy which ubiquity of such dependence must justifies talk of ‘a rule’ to begin with, and the role of the rule as standard according to which e.g. effectively also be affirming that we are assessments of facts can be made . As standards, universally culture bound. It is then doubly they give criteria for e.g. what counts as ‘wealth’ ironic that Winch’s objection to the or ‘beauty’ but the fact people agree – if they do!!! rationalist strains in Evans-Pritchard and – on what the criteria for ‘poverty’ or ‘ugliness’ are MacIntyre is that their proclamations of an does not mean that expressions such as ‘Y is poor, but X is not’ and ‘A is beautiful but B is ugly’ objective standpoint show that they somehow disappear from the language. Whether Y themselves are culture bound. There is no is poor or B is ugly is decided against agreed suggestion that if this is their position, standards, but it is the extent of Y’s resources and however, it is one which reflects an the character of B’s looks which determine whether, essential human plight to which we must they are ugly or not. It is decided by the agreement between the standard and the (relevant) facts, not all resign ourselves (for it is a fault Evans- by agreement (in opinion) amongst individuals. Pritchard and MacIntyre manifest only at a Recognising these differences ought to be an few – albeit crucial – moments in their elementary requirement to an understanding of Wittgenstein and/or Winch.

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down new procedures for social science, reflective and hence mutually meaningful as but attempting to draw attention to the true, but it is clear that it was important to ways in which people already – and him that this be the case, that he had a deep otherwise unremarkably – behave; it is a normative investment in his view that any matter of presenting what Wittgenstein very generalized scepticism concerning or pessimism about the prospect of mutual would call ‘reminders’ of what is already understanding is unwarranted. (Flathman, done within and across assorted practices 2000, p. 11). (including the unreflective conduct of social scientists themselves). Winch does These comments are made with respect to no more than point to the presence of the The Idea of a Social Science but even there concepts of ‘reality’ and ‘rationality’ in Winch references the limit that comes with disparate areas of social life and sketches variation in individual capacities for some of the ways they figure there. This is response by pointing to the no first step toward developing any indispensability of mathematical, musical proprietary account of the nature of ‘reality and aesthetic sensibilities for the itself’ which would almost inevitably understanding of maths, music and assume idealist proportions, to the effect painting 10 . In ‘Can we understand that ‘reality depends on our concepts’ (though it is only with a very considerable stretch that this could be regarded as a 10 It is true that Winch also remarks about birth, paraphrase of ‘the notion of “reality”; it sex and death as what Winch called ‘limiting only has any sense in some application’, notions’, but this is not very far from Wittgenstein’s remark on the role of the ‘common behaviour of and even then it would still risk being mankind’ as the frame of reference we use to dangerously misleading). The whole point understand an unfamiliar language: of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method is to abjure that next step, recognising that ‘The common behaviour of mankind is the surveying (some of) the diversity of system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language’ (Wittgenstein, applications is itself the point of 1953, $ 206) termination, no preliminary to, but a very deliberate abstaining from, either In any case, there is no dogmatic prescription of invidious identification of philosophy what limits follow from them: with any one of those contexts of Their significance here is that they are application or collectively inescapably involved in the life of all known (relativistically) endorsing all of them. human societies in a way which gives us a clue where to look if we are puzzled about the point of The sketch of Peter Winch drawn here an alien system of institutions (Winch, 1964, 322) shows him only a very distant relative (if Could this be same Winch? connected at all) to the one in this picture: But that does not mean that one’s views are Along with numerous other subject to the test of some ultimate criterion, the interpreters/appropriators of Wittgenstein’s criterion of what does and what does not belong thinking, Winch looked to it to critique to human nature. It means only that new positivist programs [sic] but at the same time difficulties, and perhaps new ways of meeting the to supplant them with a theory that shared difficulties, are always lurking below the horizon, and that discussion continues. Sometimes, if one the optimistic assessment of many positivists is lucky, the discussion clarifies or extends one’s concerning the possibility of a conception of what is possible for human beings. philosophically, a rationally, warranted But it is no use saying that this is contingent on understanding of the main features and what is or is not possible for human beings; for tendencies of human affairs. He advanced our only way of arriving at a view about that is the claim that human actions, practices and by continuing to try to deal with the difficulties activities are rule-governed, purposefully that arise in the course of discussion (Winch, 1972, p. 88).

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ourselves?’ a primordial connection I noted in the first chapter how philosophy is between the supposed problem of other concerned with elucidating and comparing cultures and that of other minds is the ways in which the world is made acknowledged, with, in both cases, the intelligible in different intellectual initial supposition being that the first- disciplines; and how this leads on to the elucidation and comparison of different person case understanding is wholly forms of life. The lack of commitment of unproblematic, whereas the third-person philosophy comes out here in the fact that it one is presumptively problematic. Winch is equally concerned to elucidate its own is cautioning that a capacity for self- account of things; the concern of philosophy understanding is not to be taken-for- with its own being is thus not an unhealthy granted as the starting point for reflection. Narcissistic aberration, but an essential part From the fact there is no logical of what it is trying to do. In performing this prohibition on the possibility of knowing task the philosopher will in particular be another person’s thoughts or feelings it alert to deflate the pretensions of any form of does not follow that a meeting of minds enquiry to enshrine the essence of automatically take place between any two intelligibility as such, to possess the key to reality. For connected with the realization individuals, whether or not they are from that intelligibility takes many and varied the same culture or even joint participants form is the realization that reality has no key. in the same practice. The possibility that (Winch, 1958, p. 102). (some) individuals might prove unfathomable to others remains, as does the fact that, at the level of practices, The possibility of Social Science advanced mathematics is impenetrable to most people. In Flathman’s reading of Winch Much of the argument against Winch is (which is intended to be mainly less about the possibility of understanding sympathetic) it as though it is the per se but about the possibility of a special philosopher’s job to adjudicate whether kind of understanding provided by Social understanding between individuals or Science and, especially, the continuing groups of human beings is uniformly viability of the idea of a ‘Critical Social possible, for only if that were so would any Theory’. Winch is accused of holding that wholesale optimism about ‘the prospect of the scientific study of social and political mutual understanding’ even be meaningful. things is inadequate or impossible [because] Winch’s philosophy is not apriori in this 11 action must necessarily be identified in the way , and offers no advance assurances actor’s concepts’ which are ‘logically as to whether there will be (reciprocal?) incompatible with causal explanation ( 1973, understanding in any actual case, nor even p. 254, quoted in Gunnell, 2007, p. 81) anticipates what criteria are in use to fix ‘what counts as understanding’ in any as But it is rather that ‘social science’ and yet unfamiliar practice. What could have ‘social theory’ are (largely) misplaced been properly expressed as scepticism efforts 12 . Winch brings The Idea of a toward general questions about ‘understanding’ is wrongly portrayed as a 12 Rachel Cooper (2004) asks ‘Can sociologists general scepticism about the possibility of understand other forms of life?’ My suggestion is giving a negative answer to such questions. that Winch’s answer to this is: given that other Toward the end of The Idea of a Social people can do this, there seems to be no reason why Science Winch recalls that sociologists shouldn’t be able to do it either, (subject, of course, to the usual conditions of variability in individual capacities to come to get the hang of or come to grips with those ‘forms of life’s’ forms of life and getting along with those 11 It is apriori in other ways who live them. Cooper’s argument presupposes

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Social Science to a close by substituting in itself may suffice to enable you to grasp the – then popular – analogy with social the connections between the various parts of scientific theories and their data which arguments in that language’ (pp. 134-5, fuelled ‘the idea of a social science’ by one emphasis in original) involving ‘theories of logic’ and ‘arguments in particular languages’ to the Even though these words were published effect that over fifty years ago and the analogy with the natural sciences is now much more ‘The relation between sociological theories unpopular, i.e. sociological generalities and historical narrative is less like the are not normally thought of as ‘laws’, yet it relation between scientific laws and the does not follow that their point is reports of experiments or observations than outmoded. Though there is no room here it is like that between theories of logic and to show contemporary application of the arguments in a particular language. ... One point, one can nevertheless say that the does not have to know the [logical] theory in question which Winch poses still deserves order to appreciate the connection between to be asked much more widely and the steps of the argument; on the contrary, it persistently: in sociology, does is only in so far as one can already grasp logical connections between particular understanding of cases really follow from statements in particular languages that one is the generalities as it is portrayed doing, or even in a position to understand what the is it, rather, that the generalities depends logical theory is all about. Whereas in on prior possession of what Winch calls natural science it is your theoretical ‘an independent’ grasp of the situations knowledge which enables you to explain making up those cases? There is, though, occurrences which you have not previously another question which is antecedent - how met, a knowledge of logical theory on the far are the questions to which sociological other hand will not enable you to understand generalities are given in answer even a piece of reasoning in an unknown language; genuine questions rather than expressions you will have to learn that language and that of confusion? And how far is that due – as Wittgenstein diagnosed – to two sources just what Winch casts doubt on, that sociologists of philosophical muddle: a craving for face a special problem, one which they must decide generality, and its associated disdain for by principled debate amongst themselves where the the particular case? Much the same things criterion of success will be whether agreement is can be said about the concept of achieved on a correct method which counts as ‘explanation’ as were said about ‘reality’, ‘yielding understanding of a culture’, rather than 13 responding to the question: what counts as ‘rationality’ and ‘understanding’ . understanding in and amongst those cultures). There may be questions about how much and what References sort of understanding is needed for sociological purposes but since these are neither well defined nor stable, these will perforce be meaningfully Austin. J.L. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia, asked only on fairly specific situations. Cooper’s Oxford, Oxford University Press. discussion focuses on ‘science studies’ for reasons Cooper, R. (2004). Can sociologists that ought to be obvious. Paul O’Grady (2004) understand other forms of life? says that Winch, like D. Z. Phillips, engages in ‘denial of some external vantage point from which Perspectives on Science, 12, 29-53. different views of the world can be judged’ and under the guise of ‘external’ slips in something 13 Richard Raatzsch (1993, 152) says ‘Sociology close to the idea of a ‘transcendental’ or ‘objective’ and philosophy do not merge, as [Roger] Trigg (and viewpoint. What else is Winch’s argument with also Winch) think.’ This is more correct if one Evans-Pritchard and MacIntyre if not about the superficially surveys the range of research topics need to be careful in judging a culture from an that sociologists address, but much less so if one external viewpoint? Not one that need be labelled assesses the major and persistent problems that transcendental or objective, but is just from another occupy sociology and that are presupposed in its culture. studies.

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Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1937). Witchcraft, Balance, Cambridge, Cambridge Oracles and Magic Among the Azande. University Press, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winch, P. (1997). Can we understand Flathman, R. (2000). Wittgenstein and the ourselves? Philosophical Investigations, social sciences. History of the Human 20, 193 -204. Sciences, 13, 1-16. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Gunnell, J. ( 2004). Desperately seeking Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, European Journal of Political Theory, 3, 77-98. Discussion Gunnell, J. (2009) Can social science be just? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Question Online first publication. So you are saying that the argument which Kellenberger, J. (1972). Religious claims a common universalist rationality to discovery, faith and knowledge. New be the basis for understanding all people Jersey: Prentice Hall, and cultures is much too intellectualist? Kemp, S. (2003). ‘Rethinking social criticism: rules, logic and internal Wes Sharrock critique.’ History of the Human Sciences, There is a point in Winch were he says he 16, 61-84. doesn’t like the sociologist’s standard Lukes, S. (2000). Different cultures, concept of socialisation, for the simple different rationalities? History of the reason that it overlooks the fact that Human Sciences, 13, 3-17. people react to their culture in very MacIntyre, A. (1962). A mistake about different ways. People’s responses to causality in social science. In P. Laslett what they are offered are reactions, not and W. Runciman, (eds.), Philosophy, rational assessment but reactions, and Politics and Society, Oxford: Basil while I think that socialisation is not Blackwell (pp.48-70) necessarily to be treated quite so glibly, in MacIntyre, A. (1970). Is Understanding our book, we do say well, the thing about Religion Compatible with Believing? In the Azande, or about religious people B. Wilson (ed.) Rationality. Oxford: more generally. I can perfectly well talk Basil Blackwell. (pp. 62–77) like a religious person I can say all sorts of Pitkin, (1972). Wittgenstein and Justice, things that religious people say, I can even Berkeley: University of California Press. do, ‘thee’ and ‘thou’ type religious Raatzsch, R. (1993). How not to speak of speaking and stuff, and it means absolutely Wittgenstein and social science. In P. nothing in my mouth. I can’t say it with Philipp and R. Raatzsch (eds.) Essays on seriousness, I can’t speak earnestly to Wittgenstein, Working Papers from the somebody like that, who’ll say “perhaps Wittgenstein articles. (pp. 127-153) we’ll see one another after death”. I can Winch, P. (1958). The Idea of a Social imitate it with great intensity, look them in Science and Its Relation to Philosophy. the eyes, “perhaps we’ll meet again after London: Routledge. death”. But I’m just, going through the Winch, P. (1964). Understanding a motions, I’m not engaged here. We use Primitive Society, American the analogy with the Azande we say well, Philosophical Quarterly, 1, 307-24. “if we got a chicken, and some drugs and Winch, P. (1972). Human nature in Ethics we went down the bottom of the garden, and Action. London, Routledge. we’d feel like lunatics” [laughter] and of Winch, P. (1987) Language, belief and course these things can’t be solved by any relativism. In Trying to Make Sense. method, they can’t be bridged by any Oxford: Blackwell, method. You either do or you don’t, so Winch, P. (1989) Simone Weil: the Just Winch sets that limit again, and I’m not

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sure that was the wisest move to make, but doubt that there are philosophical he says well, to do a study of music you questions as such? have to have an ear for the stuff, and to do a history of art or aesthetics, you have to Wes Sharrock have some sense of what a good painting is. Yeah, it’s always important to emphasise The whole idea of the usual discussion of that the aim is not to give evaluations of this stuff is to find the method, we need a these practices, this one’s right, this one’s method for understanding, and Winch is right, they’re both right, one of them is saying well these matters are not methodic right, one of them is wrong. It’s to present at all. them as best you can for what they are, and then to see if there’s a puzzlement about it. Phil Hutchinson And of course there’s no suggestion that So to follow on from that. Where because this is a perfectly intelligible Collingwood’s talking about (…..), we use practice, the people that practise it are an analogy similar to that in the book and perfectly reasonable people, so much so we say the way much of social science that you should take it up, or approve it or progresses, is as if, when we find endorse it. There are no implications of something puzzling, it’s a bit like, when that kind, because of course these are things are blurred because we’ve are short- matters for personal decision, they’re not sighted, and what we need is a for some scientist or quasi-scientist to methodology like we need a pair of decide for people in general. They’re for spectacles to correct our eyesight, but people to decide for themselves – whether that’s not what’s going on there, you can God exists is a religious, not a find something puzzling for different philosophical or scientific question. And of reasons and you just need to put more course what’s really being done by this is work into understanding the puzzlement. undermining the idea of any general The mistake made is this idea that you problem of understanding by highlighting need some artefact that will correct and the diversity of these kinds of allow us to understand. disagreements, and discontinuities there can be between people. As well as the Wes Sharrock continuities there can be diversities and So one of the points Mike made was of disagreements which are not all of the course that underlying this there’s a deep same kind or order. And in any particular scepticism about the motivation for the case they may present a quite different greater ambitions for ‘social science’ as a problem of intelligibility to other cases. fundamental change – a radical step And so the idea of a general solution, forward – in human understanding. What would need you to have the idea that there are the puzzles, the genuine puzzles that was a general problem. confront it, and of course, that was always the thing about philosophy and science, in Giuseppina D’Oro science, puzzles get solved, in philosophy A clarification question. I got the they don’t impression that there are strong affinities between Winch’s and Collingwood’s Question anthropological work. What was Winch’s Isn’t one big source of conflict between position on the reasons/causes debate? the idea that philosophy should tell us Would Winch have endorsed the kind of whether God exists, physics is (ultimately) thesis espoused by the likes of Dray and right, utilitarianism is the (categorically) Melden according to which the explanation correct morality and many other of action is rational/normative rather than substantive truths, and Wittgenstein’s causal/descriptive?

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Giuseppina D’Oro This suggests that Winch’s views on Wes Sharrock anthropological explanation are not very Well I think an important part of the different from Collingwood’s conception answer would be that of course, one of the of historical explanation. things that he points to is the fact that much of social life is organised on a rule- Phil Hutchinson following basis, and I take it that the kind Having read these quotes this morning I’m of understanding that we can have of the wondering whether Winch was well-versed Azande or the Hawaiians has to do with with Collingwood? Some of this is so the fact that what they do is rule-following. strikingly similar. Just to follow on the And we can understand the rules, we can rules and causes, I mean, when you’re learn the rules that govern their behaviour talking about Melden - would Winch be (from them). I’m not saying that. I think in like Melden? The Idea of a Social Science he overstated rule-following, and risked severe Guiseppina D’Oro misunderstanding, I’m not claiming that In the sense that he’s a non-causalist. everything is rule following but it’s very important to make the point that many Phil Hutchinson connections in social life are not causal. And I think, at the time when the first They’re rule-following connections. edition of ISS was penned, yes, certainly They’re cultural connections. A lot of yes, you can put Winch alongside explanation of action doesn’t have to do Collingwood and say he’s an adherent of with the question ‘what makes this person that philosophical position, when he comes do that’ in the way of causal compulsion. to pen the preface of the second edition, he An awful lot has to do with the question, retreats from that position to the extent that “what are they doing?” And “what’s the he wants to clarify that he’s not in the point of what they’re doing?” Sometimes business of advancing philosophical theses of course a cause can be given for about anything. The way I understand it is someone’s doing, because of course there something like this, correct me if I’m are cases where it's a perfectly good wrong, he just thinks, we lose a huge part question ‘what caused them to do that?’ of our descriptive capacities, our Well the answer isn’t to be given in explanatory capacities, if we don’t material properties of the occurrence of differentiate between reasons and causes - causal instigation, in many of those cases, it’s in terms of the causal factor’s place in Guiseppina D’Oro a system of rules. Clearly it’s not red - And isn’t that a philosophical thesis? light’s wavelength that leads us to pull up at the traffic light, but the fact the light is Phil Hutchinson being used to signal an imperative. So, No, it’s just a truism, that when we there’s all sorts of things to be explained, describe certain states of affairs, we other than- describe them by appealing to reason.

Giuseppina D’Oro Guiseppina D’Oro - an explanation which appeals to rules is Well I suspect that’s the difference normative, as rules are normative. between Collingwood and Wittgenstein, I don’t think that Collingwood would shy Wes Sharrock away from claiming that he’s making Oh sure yes. philosophical claims.

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Phil Hutchinson some people can say “what caused you to No, that’s what I thought this morning, stop the car?” you say “the traffic light” looking at the quotes, Collingwood is happy to make those claims. Dave Francis Yes, Winch does retreat from claims made Guiseppina D’Oro: there’s no in the first edition, when he comes to pen (therapeutic) aspect there? the preface to the second edition of ISS. He realises retrospectively that the trap that Wes Sharrock he fell into originally was the thought that Well there are so many things to talk about. reason and cause are fundamentally One is, in an important sense Winch isn’t opposed concepts, and that the reason making hypotheses, it isn’t a theory that that’s a trap is that that’s a philosophical people’s activities are infallible, it’s one of doctrine. What we now see in the second the most commonplace observations that edition is that reason and cause are you could possibly make. It’s not mundane concepts, which have been taken something that Winch knows as a over by philosophy and turned into philosopher, it’s something that Winch technical philosophical concepts such that knows from having been to school, gone to they appear to be diametrically and the cinema, driven a car. And logically opposed. And what he now says understanding what rule-following is, just is hang on a minute, let’s reconsider this, understanding what it is to stop for a traffic there are all sorts of ways that we use the light, play chess and so forth. So all this is concept of cause, which don’t presuppose not philosophical knowledge, it’s what we what philosophers have told us, the know and understand. So it isn’t like a concept of cause necessarily and logically hypothesis that people follow rules, so is presupposes. So, but I think he gets that that part of a good theory (collection of from Louch, because that is of course hypotheses) for explaining people’s what he pointed out many, many years behaviour? It’s just an observation that lots earlier, that, you know, it all goes back to of things people do is rule-following, and David Hume. We don’t have to go down when rule-following is appealed to, in that path. what circumstances does it give an explanation and what sort of an Giuseppina D’Oro explanation does it give? And that’s not a Interestingly the reasons/causes distinction question to satisfy the demands of a is not Collingwood’s own terminology. philosophical theory it’s to ask, what sorts He speaks of different senses of the term of explanations do people accept? And so, “cause” at work in different kinds of yes, a reason and a cause are different in so explanations/explanatory practices. He far as if somebody asks for an explanation takes philosophy to be a very abstract form and you give them a reason it’s different of conceptual analysis, a second-order from giving a cause and will play a activity, which uncovers the absolute different role.. Although that’s not to say presuppositions made by the practitioners that either causes and reasons have to be of different sciences. But I don’t think that completely separated because of course, leads him to endorse a therapeutic view of philosophy.

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