3. Against The Islamic State In February 1969, in his paper for a consultation of the DGI, T. B. Sima- tupang wrote: “Many Christians are preoccupied with the fear of an Islamic state…Most of the Christians assume that in their hearts, many of the Mus- lims want to attain a situation similar to that of Egypt or Malaysia where Islam is given the position of a state religion, and that the position of non- Muslim citizens is not entirely equal to that of the Muslims.”1 The Christian fear of being treated as second-class citizens under an Islamic state was certainly not new in the history of the Republic of Indonesia. On 18 August 1945, just one day after the Proclamation of Independence, the Christians in the East of Indonesia asserted that they would not join the newly born state if it would apply the shari’a (Islamic law). Simatupang’s statement, however, indicates that the fear of an Islam- ic State was quite strong among the Christians in the late 1960s. Indeed, after the political collapse of the Communists and Communism, the contest between the Islamic ideology and the nationalist ideology re-emerged. As discussed in Chapter 1, during the Guided Democracy (1959-1965), Soekar- no tried to combine the three major ideologies of Nationalism, Islam and Communism in his NASAKOM (Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis). Now when the Communists were defeated and Communism was banned in 1966, the con- testing ideologies that remained in place were only Islam and nationalism. By the absence of the Communists, the Islamic groups felt politically more confident to pursue their ideological ambition. However, the Islamic ideol- ogy had to face its enduring rival, namely secular nationalism whose pro- ponents were not only secular civilian Muslims and Christians but also the ruling military. The reason was, in addition to the fact that the Islamic groups were now the most viable political rivals for the military, the latter also had bitter memories of war against the Darul Islam movement that had launched armed struggle against the central Government between 1948 and 1962 to establish an Islamic State.2 Thus, a clash between the proponents of Islamic ideology and secular nationalism could not be avoided. Because the military was in favour of the nationalist ideology, the Christians naturally allied with the former. A certain group among the Cath- olics even cooperated very closely with the military, not simply in opposing the Islamic ideology but in creating and supporting the political policies 105 FEELING THREATENED of the regime in general. The Christian-military alliance eventually helped create bad relations between the Christians and the Muslims, particularly the ideologically Islamic-oriented Muslims. On the other hand, by the mid 1980s, the New Order regime had forced all social and political organisa- tions to take the ideology of the nationalists, Pancasila, as their sole basis. Although most religious organisations, including Islamic and Christian, eventually accepted the regime’s demand, some of their leaders developed certain interpretations of Pancasila that were different from, or opposed to, that of the regime. In the present chapter, I shall discuss these issues in some detail. 1. Ideological Debates in the Early New Order The ideological debates in the early years of the New Order were closely connected with the history of the Indonesian constitution since the preparation for independence. As a realization of the Japanese promise of Indonesian independence, on 1 March 1945, the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence called ‘Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai’ or ‘Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan’ (BPUPK) was established. Besides the Indonesians, a few of the Japanese also became members of the BPUPK.3 In May, June and July, the 62 members of the BPUPK had some sessions to discuss the drafts of the state basis (dasar negara) and constitu- tion. On the issue of the state basis, one group proposed Islam to be the ideology, while another aspired to a nationalist and secular ideology. To find a compromise, a sub-committee consisting of nine members was set up to concentrate on the formulation of the draft of the state basis that was also intended to be the preamble of the constitution and the statement to proclaim Indonesian independence. On 22 June 1945, the sub-committee finished its work, which was to be called ‘the Jakarta Charter.’ In a plenary session of the BPUPK in July 1945, without much debate, the Jakarta Charter was accepted. One basic point of the Islamic group’s proposal accommo- dated in the Charter was the obligation of the Muslim citizens to observe the shari’a. This point, later known as ‘the seven words’,4 was put as the first and one of the five principles of the basis for the state.5 On 17 August 1945, on behalf of the Indonesian people, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesian Independence. Ten days before, on 7 August 1945, the Japanese military administration allowed the estab- lishment of the Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence (Pani- tia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI) whose members were wholly 106 A GAINST THE I S L A M I C S TATE Indonesians.6 On 18 August, the PPKI discussed the draft of the Preamble (i.e., the Jakarta Charter) and the Constitution of 1945. It was on that day that ‘the seven words’ were dropped due to the objection of the Christians of the Eastern parts of Indonesia. As a substitute, the first principle of the state basis was decided to be ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.’7 This formulation is untranslatable; and as we shall see, its translation and interpretation was to become the centre of Muslim-Christian debates. Moreover, this formulation was later considered to be the distinctive feature of the basis of the state called ‘Pancasila’ as opposed to the seven words of the Jakarta Charter.8 After the 1955 elections, on 10 November 1956, a Constituent Assem- bly was inaugurated. The major responsibility of the Assembly was to make a decision on the ideology as well as the constitution of the state. The debates on the ideological basis of the state took place from 11 Novem- ber to 7 December 1957. There were three visions for such a basis: some of the parties wished to see Islam as the basis of the state, others Pancasila and yet another, social-economic justice. 9 The first two views had more sup- porters than the last one and therefore a compromise between the two was necessary. However, neither the Islam nor the Pancasila bloc could achieve the required two-thirds majority, and attempts to reach a compromise also failed. The Government eventually offered a suggestion that the state should return to the Constitution of 1945. The Islamic groups could accept the Government’s proposal on the condition that the ‘Islamic words’ of the Jakarta Charter were incorporated. The Pancasila bloc, however, could not accept this proposal and another deadlock was unavoidable. Partly because of the deadlock and partly because of the political circumstances outside the Assembly, with the support of the military, President Soekarno finally issued a Decree on 5 July 1959 in which he proclaimed the return to the Constitution of 1945.10 To accommodate the Islamic groups, it is mentioned in the consideration of the Decree that “the Jakarta Charter, dated 22 June 1945, inspires the Constitution of 1945 and constitutes a coherent whole with the Constitution.”11 On 22 July 1945 the decree was finally accepted by acclamation in the Parliament. Soekarno’s decree had become a tentative solution to the ideologi- cal conflict until the collapse of his regime. Up to early 1966, the ideologi- cal conflict between the proponents and opponents of the Islamic ideology had not yet resurfaced. In January 1966, on the occasion of the 40th anniver- sary of the NU, there was a parade in which people expressed some slogans written on the banners demanding a return to the Jakarta Charter. During the NU’s celebration, the Christians did not show openly their opposition to 107 FEELING THREATENED the Jakarta Charter, and they even participated in the celebration. Feillard records the participation of priests, nuns and students of Catholic schools in the NU parade.12 Likewise, Sinar Harapan reported that the Protestants contributed the traditional music called ‘angklong’ to the NU’s anniversary celebration in West Java.13 The ideological tensions apparently occurred for the first time after the coup of September 1965, in the session of the Provisional People’s Con- sultative Assembly (MPRS) in June and July 1966. As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to establish a constitutional legitimacy for the rising power of the army and the illegitimacy of the previous regime, particularly its Communist elements, the MPRS session took the idea of a pure application of Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. For the Islamic groups, this idea opened the question of the position of the Jakarta Charter mentioned in Soekarno’s decree of 1959. In other words, if the decree was the main reason for the constitutional position of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, while the decree somehow mentioned the Jakarta Charter, would the idea of a pure application also include the Jakarta Charter? In this context, the memorandum of the Parliament (DPRGR), dated 9 June 1966, on the sources of Indonesian law that was ratified by the MPRS Decree No.XX/1966, dated 5 July 1966, may reflect the ideological battle in the legislative body. The underpinning idea of the memorandum was to determine the constitutional basis of all state decisions, so they could become a true application of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.