Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 9 (author’s prepublication version)

9 The invasion of Iraq

On 19 March 2003, U.S. military forces, and significantly weakened global public supported by forces from Britain and a few support for the pillars of the post-World other countries, invaded Iraq and soon War II era — the U.N. and the North overwhelmed Iraqi military resistance. The Atlantic .1 U.S. government had spent months pushing its case for the operation, arguing that the Iraqi A note on terminology: because the initial regime had, or was trying to obtain, weapons military conflict was so one-sided, I seldom of mass destruction (WMD), especially refer to the invasion of Iraq as a “war.” In nuclear weapons, and implying it had links western media reports, the attackers were with the terrorist group al Qaeda. There had conventionally called “the coalition.” Here I been popular opposition to the invasion in usually refer to the “U.S. government” because numerous countries, including in the United it was the prime mover, with the British States itself. government playing second fiddle; other mili- In the months following 19 March, the tary contingents, such as from and occupying forces were met by a guerrilla , were token and mostly unremarked. I resistance. As U.S. soldiers died, George W. avoid referring to “the ” as an Bush’s promise of a glorious transition to actor — as in “the United States said” or “the democracy faded. Meanwhile, the search for United States attacked” — because it doesn’t Iraqi WMD came up with a blank, undercut- distinguish between the government and the ting the primary justification for the attack. people. But even to refer to the U.S. govern- These were signs the Iraq operation might be ment as the attacker is misleading, because a going wrong for the U.S. administration. But small group within the government made the signs of backfire had been apparent for a long key decisions. time. In examining the Iraq case, I look at the Prior to the invasion, protest rallies at- five principal ways the attackers tried to tracted huge numbers of people, with the inhibit outrage and how opponents attempted largest single-day numbers in history — some to express it. There is such a wealth of material ten million people across the world — on 15 on the events that only a few of many possible February, including large numbers of people examples can be presented here. I concentrate who had never joined a rally before. Public on the events leading up to the invasion. I opinion in most countries was strongly against the attack. Many governments opposed it, most prominently several key members of the 1. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views of a UN Security Council. Interviews in 20 Changing World (Washington, DC: Pew countries in May 2003 revealed that, Research Center for the People and the Press, June 2003), 1. Similar findings were reported in most countries, opinions of the United the following year: Pew Global Attitudes States are markedly lower than they were a Project, A Year after : Mistrust of year ago. The war has widened the rift America in Ever Higher, Muslim between Americans and Western Europe- Anger Persists (Washington, DC: Pew ans, further inflamed the Muslim world, Research Center for the People and the Press, softened support for the war on terrorism, 16 March 2004).

80 Justice Ignited examine only backfire dynamics associated supported military operations in was with the attack on Iraq; terrorist acts by the limited.2 Iraqi resistance, such as beheadings, can also However, there was no prospect of covering be analyzed in backfire terms. Wars are filled up the . Throughout with so many atrocities that they are a rich 2002, long in advance of the actual assault, the source of material on backfire. U.S. government increasingly signaled its In the cases described in previous chapters, intention to invade Iraq. This made the likeli- the targets of attack — peaceful protesters, hood of backfire much greater, at least if citizens being arrested, whistleblowing em- people perceived the attack as unjust. ployees — were relatively harmless, at least to Nevertheless, cover-ups played a significant wider society. The Iraq attack brings in a new role. It is often perceived that the attack on dimension: the target, namely Iraq only began in March 2003, but actually and his regime, was itself a menace. The Iraqi attacks occurred throughout the period after regime was built on ruthless violence against the first , in 1991, until 2003. This internal opponents. It had launched two major included frequent bombings of Iraq that wars, against Iran in the 1980s and Kuwait in seldom attracted news coverage or protest. 1990. Yet despite its terrible record of aggres- After the first Gulf war, the U.S. and British sion and human rights violations, many people governments unilaterally set up “no-fly” zones opposed the U.S.-government-led attack on — no flying for Iraqi aircraft — over parts of Iraq, because it represented an injustice of its Iraq, though these had no legal status, and own, whether seen as a violation of interna- made thousands of overflights between 1991 tional law, as an assault by an overwhelmingly and 2003, including regular bombings leading powerful military on a weak one, or as a self- to many civilian casualties.3 interested attack on an opponent that posed no Some attacks on Iraq in the period 1991- threat. For an attack on a reviled opponent to 2003 were undertaken covertly, but others backfire, the violation of norms must be corre- were made openly, sometimes with fanfare spondingly greater. When protesters are reso- such as the bombings beginning in December lutely nonviolent, as in Dharasana, a brutal 1998. For these latter attacks, the description beating can echo around the world. When the “cover-up” is not quite appropriate, but still target is a ruthless regime, attackers can get captures some of the dynamics. By being a away with much more — but there are limits. matter of routine and usually operating below The invasion of Iraq illustrates these limits the threshold of interest for news media and starkly. peace groups, the attacks largely escaped scrutiny and seldom caused concern. The very Cover-up normality and banality of the attacks served as a sort of de facto cover-up. Some wars are carried out in secrecy or by use of proxy armies, limiting the prospect for revulsion. For example, the U.S. government financially supported the French military in 2. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam for years until its defeat in 1954, and Vietnam and Papers (New York: subsequently supported the South Vietnamese Viking, 2002). government and military before, during, and 3. Anthony Arnove, ed., Iraq under Siege: The after direct participation by U.S. troops. The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War low profile of this involvement is one key (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000); reason why, from the late 1940s until the mid Jeremy Scahill, “No-fly Zones: Washington’s 1960s, opposition to U.S.-government- Undeclared War on ‘Saddam’s Victims’,” IraqJournal.org, 2 December 2002. http:// www.iraqjournal.org/journals/021202.html (accessed 29 June 2006). The invasion of Iraq 81

Such de facto cover-ups applied to many address, Bush did not mention that his admini- other matters involving Iraq. The U.S. stration had undermined international efforts government’s support for Saddam Hussein’s to develop a stronger biological weapons regime throughout the 1980s was, following convention, nor that the United States has the the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait in 1990, world’s largest biological weapons program. seldom mentioned by U.S. government offi- The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq begin- cials, especially in the 2002-2003 lead-up to ning in 1990 resulted in enormous levels of attack. Nor did officials mention the U.S. suffering and death, with figures commonly government’s unwillingness to topple Saddam quoted of around a million extra deaths over a Hussein in 1991 when, just after the first Gulf decade, but with no apparent impact on the War, it had the opportunity, and indeed had rule of Saddam Hussein. Such a death toll promised to support anti-Saddam uprisings but might have been treated, in other circum- then allowed them to be brutally crushed by stances, as an emergency warranting humani- the regime. tarian intervention. The process of de facto This silence about earlier complicity with cover-up — namely, lack of attention or Saddam became more salient as U.S. officials concern by government officials — turned this castigated the Iraqi regime for having biologi- into an unremarkable occurrence or a “price cal and chemical weapons and for using that had to be paid.”7 chemical weapons against Iranian troops and The investigation of Iraqi WMD was sub- Kurdish civilians in the 1980s. Little was said ject to more conventional cover-ups and by official sources about the role of U.S. and disinformation, at least by some accounts.8 British governments and companies in sup- The lack of evidence of effective, deliverable plying materials for Iraqi weapons programs. biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons in For example, in President Bush’s address to Iraq was covered up by false and misleading the nation of 17 March 2003, on the eve of the claims, for example of Iraqi importation of invasion of Iraq, he stated, “This regime has uranium from Niger. U.S. spying under the already used weapons of mass destruction cover of the UN weapons inspectors was also against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s covered up. In March 2003, diplomats from people.”4 However, he did not mention this half a dozen countries met in secret in an occurred in the 1980s when the U.S. govern- attempt to find a compromise that could ment supported the Iraqi regime, nor did he prevent the invasion of Iraq, but a British-U.S. mention that the U.S. government covered up spying operation disrupted the initiative. This the chemical weapons attack.5 Similarly, the too was covered up.9 British government covered up its role in Cover-up is greatly aided when mass media building the chemical plant in Iraq used for report U.S. government pronouncements with production of chemical weapons.6 In his

7. Arnove, Iraq under Siege; Sarah Graham- 4. George W. Bush, “President Says Saddam Brown, Sanctioning Saddam: The Politics of Hussein Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours: Intervention in Iraq (London: I. B. Tauris, Remarks by the President in Address to the 1999); Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Nation,” 17 March 2003. http://www.white Sanctions, Law and Natural Justice, 2d ed. house.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998). html (accessed 29 June 2006). 8. William Rivers Pitt with Scott Ritter, War 5. Bruce W. Jentleson, With Friends Like on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn’t Want You These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982– to Know (New York: Context Books, 2002). 1990 (New York: Norton, 1994). 9. Martin Bright, Peter Beaumont, and Jo 6. David Leigh and John Hooper, “Britain’s Tuckman, “British Spy Op Wrecked Peace Dirty Secret,” Guardian, 6 March 2003. Move,” Observer, 15 February 2004.

82 Justice Ignited no critical analysis or historical background, Iran and , the “.” An and do not run stories presenting other even more potent form of devaluation was to perspectives. This is characteristic of much demonize Saddam Hussein and to treat him as western reporting, especially in the United the personification of Iraq. There is no doubt States.10 Saddam was a brutal and dangerous dictator, The counter to these forms of cover-up is guilty of gross human rights violations and straightforward in principle: exposure of launching wars against Iran and Kuwait. Even information, for example of U.S. government so, U.S. government officials painted Saddam support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. as an even greater monster, for example by Some writers and activists made great efforts comparisons with Hitler. Bush in a talk in to expose the horrific consequences of the Prague on 20 November 2002 said, “Czechs sanctions. Finally, as mentioned, the conquest and Slovaks learned through the harsh experi- of Iraq was undertaken openly and signaled ence of 1938, … that aggression left un- well in advance. In these circumstances, cover- checked by the great democracies can rob up did not work very well to inhibit public millions of their liberty and their lives.” He fury over the attack. went on to say, “A dictator who has used weapons of mass destruction on his own Devaluing the Target people must not be allowed to produce or possess those weapons. We will not permit In January 2002, President Bush, in his State Saddam Hussein to blackmail and/or terrorize of the Union address, labeled Iraq, along with nations which love freedom.”11 This was an implicit comparison between Hitler and Saddam Hussein, at least as interpreted by 10. Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, reporters.12 Similarly, British Prime Minister Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Tony Blair, in an interview with The Propaganda in Bush’s War on Iraq (New Guardian, drew parallels between confronting York: Tarcher/Penguin, 2003); Paul Ruther- fascism in the 1930s and confronting Iraq.13 ford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing The comparison with Hitler was misleading the War Against Iraq (Toronto: University of in more than one respect. Hitler was a far Toronto Press, 2004); Danny Schechter, greater danger to the world because he Embedded: Weapons of Mass Deception: How commanded the extremely powerful German the Media Failed to Cover the War on Iraq military machine and embarked on a program (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003); of conquest; Saddam, though probably more Norman Solomon and Reese Erlich, Target Iraq: What the News Media Didn’t Tell You (New York: Context Books, 2003). For critical 11. George W. Bush, “President Bush Pre- assessments of the mass media more generally, views Historic NATO Summit in Prague see for example Cees J. Hamelink, Trends in Speech: Remarks by the President to Prague World Communication: On Disempowerment Atlantic Student Summit,” 20 November 2002. and Self-Empowerment (Penang: Southbound http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 and Third World Network, 1994); Edward S. 2/11/20021120-4.html (accessed 29 June Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing 2006). Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Robert 12. Anne E. Kornblut and Charles M. Sennott, W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democ- “Bush Seeks NATO Solidarity,” Boston racy: Communication Politics in Dubious Globe, 21 November 2002. Times (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois 13. Jackie Ashley and Ewen MacAskill, Press, 1999); Gerald Sussman, Communica- “History Will Be My Judge,” Guardian, 1 tion, Technology, and Politics in the Informa- March 2003; “Blair Likens Saddam to Hitler,” tion Age (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997). CNN.com, 1 March 2003. The invasion of Iraq 83 brutal personally, commanded only the medio- For a long time, the main theme was that cre Iraqi military, with limited capacity for Iraqi militarism was a threat to the world, external aggression after 1991. To compare including to the United States, especially via Saddam with Hitler, as dangers to the world, WMD. This cleverly reinterpreted the attack- was to confuse personal evil with state capaci- ers as the targets, and the target, Iraq, as the ties. Many torturers and serial killers are just attacker. The attack on Iraq then could be as evil personally as Saddam or Hitler, but interpreted as a form of defense, an interpreta- they do not pose more than a local danger to tion that was formalized as the doctrine of pre- the world. emption.15 Military aggressors have long Opponents of the invasion did not try to painted their targets as threats. argue Saddam was virtuous. Instead, their The interpretation that the Iraqi regime was response can be summarized by the questions the (potential) attacker was pursued in various “Why Iraq?” and “Why (attack) now?” They ways, including reference to Iraqi military use pointed to double standards: there were plenty of chemical weapons in the 1980s, claims that of brutal dictators in the world, including some evidence for Iraqi weapons programs existed, who ruled countries allied in the “war on and claims that the UN weapons inspection terror,” such as China, Pakistan, and Uzbeki- process was not working. Underlying the stan. Critics questioned why Iraq was singled ongoing claims by U.S. and other officials was out, among all the world’s repressive regimes, the assumption that the primary danger was for attack. Double standards were also in- from Iraq, indeed such an overwhelming and volved in demonizing Saddam, given that in immediate danger that military action was the 1980s, when he had been just as ruthless required and that any other course of action and was more powerful militarily, he had been constituted appeasement. an ally. At one point, inspectors found that some The demonization of Saddam no doubt Iraqi al-Samoud II missiles, in testing, traveled helped convince some people to support the further than the 150-kilometer limit placed on invasion. Others, though, used the double them after the first Gulf war: to be specific, standard test to draw an opposite conclusion. they could travel up to 183 kilometers. Iraqi officials claimed that this was because the Interpreting the Attack missiles had no payload. However, U.S. and British officials made great play over this The attack on Iraq was perceived by many as a case of the world’s sole superpower and possessor of overwhelming military force On war and the media more generally, see conquering a relatively weak country that Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: posed no immediate threat. The invasion was Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth seen as unjust because it was illegal and Century (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000); because it was disproportionate to any threat Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The posed by Iraq. as Hero and Myth-Maker To counter this perception, supporters of from the Crimea to Kosovo (London: Prion, the attack offered a series of interpretations of 2000); Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The what was going on. Whether these interpreta- Media and the Military: From the Crimea to tions are considered to be honest views or as Desert Strike (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, calculated public relations,14 they operated to 1997). reduce opposition. 15. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002); “Bush 14. Rampton and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Outlines Strategy of Pre-emptive Strikes, Deception; Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Cooperation,” USA Today, 20 September Persuasion. 2002.

84 Justice Ignited evidence of a threat — the missiles might be supplying WMD to terrorists, or was capable able to deliver biological or chemical weapons of doing so. Bush, in his address to the nation — and over Saddam’s alleged unwillingness just before the attack, stated, “The regime … to disarm, even though a 183-kilometer range has aided, trained, and harbored terrorists, was far short of what could reach Israel, much including operatives of al Qaeda.”19 Carefully less the United States. The key point here is crafted statements gave the impression that that the focus was entirely on the Iraqi military Saddam Hussein was implicated in the threat. September 11 attacks — polls showed that The obsessive focus on the danger of the many U.S. citizens believed this was the case20 Iraqi regime can be seen as a facet of — though no substantive evidence was ever “American exceptionalism,” a pervasive dou- presented to show any link between al Qaeda ble standard in which, for example, the U.S. and the Iraqi regime.21 government demands that others adhere to A third argument was that Iraq must be human rights principles but does not expect attacked to liberate Iraqis from Saddam these principles to be applied to its own Hussein. This received relatively little play behavior.16 before the invasion, but as the occupation Language played a big role in attempts to continued and no evidence of WMD or Iraqi justify the attack. During the Cold War, the links to al Qaeda could be found, Bush and his expression “weapons of mass destruction” supporters put greater emphasis on liberation referred exclusively to nuclear weapons. In the as a justification and downplayed their earlier lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, U.S. govern- reliance on fears of imminent danger from ment officials expanded the meaning to WMD and al Qaeda links. include biological and chemical weapons, even Although many people were persuaded by though there were no examples where biologi- one or more of these interpretations, many cal or chemical weapons had ever caused or others found them wanting. Critics presented were likely to cause “mass destruction” evidence of the absence of any serious threat approaching the scale routinely achieved using from Iraq, of the effectiveness of the UN conventional weapons.17 Other U.S.-govern- weapons inspection process, of Osama bin ment favored expressions included “regime Laden’s hostility to the secular Iraqi regime, change” (rather than “government over- and of fraudulent documents used to make the throw”), “death squads” (instead of “feday- case against Saddam Hussein.22 een”), “thugs” (instead of “troops”), and “liberation” (instead of “conquest” or “occu- pation”).18 19. Bush, “President Says Saddam Hussein The second main argument used by the U.S. Must Leave Iraq within 48 Hours.” government was that the Iraqi government was 20. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Americans Thinking about Iraq, but Focused on the Economy: Midterm 16. Julie A. Mertus, Bait and Switch: Human Election Preview,” Washington, DC, 10 Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: October 2002. http://people-press.org/reports/ Routledge, 2004). display.php3?ReportID=162 (accessed 29 June 17. Vic Carroll, “Some Words Can Make a 2006). War Cry Foul,” Sydney Morning Herald, 28 21. Gethin Chamberlain, “Experts Scorn May 2003, p. 13. Saddam Link to al-Qaeda,” The Scotsman, 6 18. Elisabeth Bumiller, “Even Critics of War February 2003; Pitt, War on Iraq. Say the White House Spun It with Skill,” New 22. Milan Rai, War Plan Iraq: Ten Reasons York Times, 20 April 2003, p. B14; Rampton against War on Iraq (London: Verso, 2002). and Stauber, Weapons of Mass Deception, For critiques of Bush speeches, see Solomon 113–30. and Erlich, Target Iraq, 125–54. The invasion of Iraq 85

Critics also pointed to double standards. example, many U.S. respondents had a false Iraq’s nuclear weapons program was nonexist- memory that WMD had been discovered in ent or at least far from making a bomb; why Iraq. The researchers concluded that their was it seen as such an urgent threat when results “are consistent with previous findings known weapons states, including Pakistan, in that the differences between samples reflect Israel, China, and indeed the United States greater suspicion about the motives underlying itself, were not subject to the same stric- the war among people in Australia and tures?23 Why was Iraq’s meager potential to Germany than among people in the United make deliverable chemical and biological States.”24 weapons seen as such a threat when dozens of For many commentators, the case for the other countries had a greater capacity? As for invasion involved so many transparent lies and the alleged need to liberate Iraqis, why not contradictions that they found it hard to take also undertake wars to liberate Pakistanis or seriously and so responded with humor, such Uzbekis, among others? as in the British Channel 4 television comedy Of the huge outpouring of words leading up “Between Iraq and a Hard Place” of January to the invasion, a large proportion were about 2003. In a Doonesbury strip, an instructor of interpretation of what was going on. Those CIA trainees says, “We’re here to serve the who supported an attack presented evidence President. When he asks us to jump, what does and, just as importantly, made assumptions the C.I.A. reply?” Dismissing the answer that framed attack as necessary, just, even “How high?” the instructor says “No. That’s emancipatory. Opponents of the attack coun- Congress. We say, ‘Into which country?’” In tered these interpretations using evidence and July 2003, inserting “weapons of mass de- exposure of double standards. They also struction” into the Google search engine led to presented alternative interpretations, including a fake error message saying, “These weapons that conquering Iraq was about U.S. access to of mass destruction cannot be displayed,” with Iraqi oil, about U.S. power in the Middle East, a series of mordant options for fixing the about revenge, about U.S. world hegemony, or problem. about diverting U.S. public attention away from domestic scandals and economic Official Channels problems. The way people responded to all this infor- Because it seems unfair when a powerful mation and opinion varied individual to country invades a weaker one without good individual, with systematic differences across justification, it is common for attackers to seek cultures. One fascinating study found differ- authoritative endorsement for their actions. In ences between countries in the way people the international scene, one of the best en- remembered misinformation, namely false dorsements is from international bodies, statements made in the media that were later especially the United Nations. After the Iraqi retracted. The respondents were surveyed in army invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, the weeks immediately after the invasion of the UN Security Council endorsed the use of Iraq. When the media published misinforma- force against the invaders. This gave credibil- tion that was later corrected, respondents in ity to the U.S.-led assault in 1991. Although Germany and Australia tended to discount it, many people favored other measures against whereas respondents in the United States Iraq, notably sanctions, the existence of a UN continued to believe the misinformation even though they knew it had been retracted. For 24. Stephan Lewandowsky, Werner G. K. Stritzke, Klaus Oberauer, and Michael 23. Ian Williams, “Double Standards, UN Morales, “Memory for Fact, Fiction, and Style,” Globalvision News Network, 3 Febru- Misinformation: The Iraq War 2003,” Psy- ary 2003. chological Science 16 (2005): 190–95.

86 Justice Ignited endorsement made a big difference in justify- U.S. officials to obtain a favorable UN resolu- ing the first Gulf war. tion,27 many people would have been unaware In 2002-2003, though, there was no imme- of these behind-the-scenes machinations. UN diate pretext for attacking Iraq: no hard endorsement remained a potent tool for legiti- evidence of Iraqi WMD, no immediate risk of mating an invasion. an Iraqi military attack on the United States, However, unlike previous occasions in no illegal Iraqi invasion or occupation of which the Security Council was more suscep- neighboring countries. An attack in these tible to pressure, this time few member circumstances could backfire. Obtaining UN governments acquiesced. The existence of approval for an attack would greatly reduce massive popular opposition to war played a popular opposition. significant role in stiffening the resolve of The U.S. government decided in 2002 to government leaders. seek a UN resolution permitting an invasion. The delicacy of the “politics of endorse- This can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce ment” is suggested by the U.S. government’s the backlash from unilaterally launching an hot-and-cold approach to seeking a vote at the illegal, unjust assault. If UN approval had been Security Council. Not long before the inva- obtained, it would have made a big difference sion, U.S. officials said they would bring a in many people’s minds. To be sure, some resolution before the Council. But then, as it people supported military action even without appeared that the vote would go against them, UN approval and others opposed it under any the resolution was not put forward. circumstances, but opinion polls showed a substantial middle ground of people who This was a tacit admission that it could not supported an invasion with UN endorsement have passed. If the resolution had been but opposed it otherwise. submitted to a vote and rejected, the nega- As noted, official channels may give only tive vote would have further undermined the appearance of fairness. The UN is very far the doubtful claim by the sponsors that from being a neutral, independent body, as earlier resolutions by the Council author- many analyses reveal,25 and the UN Security ized them to use armed force if and when Council is even less neutral and independent. they deemed that Iraq was in non-ful- The U.S. government applied its formidable fillment.28 persuasive powers — primarily threats and bribes, along with tendentious evidence — in In other words, for minimizing public back- an attempt to obtain a resolution authorizing lash, it was better to have no vote at all than a attack, and British prime minister Tony Blair hostile vote. Even so, having sought UN added his eloquence.26 Though there was some endorsement for months, the failure to obtain reporting of the heavy-handed tactics used by it made the backfire even more powerful than if no resolution had been sought. U.S. leaders displayed an ambivalent atti- 25. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A tude towards the UN. On the one hand, they U.S.–U.N. Saga (New York: Random House, 1999); Shirley Hazzard, Countenance of Truth: The United Nations and the Waldheim 27. Ed Vulliamy, Peter Beaumont, Nick Paton Case (New York: Viking, 1990); Abraham Walsh, and Paul Webster, “America the Arm- Yeselson and Anthony Gaglione, A Dangerous twister,” Observer, 2 March 2003; Martin Place: The United Nations as a Weapon in Bright, Ed Vulliamy, and Peter Beaumont, World Politics (New York: Grossman, 1974). “US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraq War,” Observer, 2 March 2003. 26. Sarah Anderson, Phyllis Bennis, and John Cavanagh, Coalition of the Willing or 28. Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq: The Search for Coalition of the Coerced? (Washington, DC: Weapons of Mass Destruction (London: Institute for Policy Studies, 2003). Bloomsbury, 2004), 7–8. The invasion of Iraq 87 sought UN endorsement for their preferred areas may suffer censorship and dismissal.30 options, but when this gambit failed, they NBC dismissed veteran journalist Peter Arnett attacked the UN as irrelevant. As soon as the for making a few comments during the UN became an obstacle, it was subject to conquest that, though innocuous enough in the familiar sorts of denigration, reinterpretation, eyes of many, were labeled as treacherous by and intimidation. high officials. His treatment was an object Another example of the role of official lesson for anyone who might stray from the channels is the UN team, headed by Hans mainstream. Blix, sent to Iraq in 2002 to look for WMD. If Tami Silicio, a worker in Kuwait, took a the team had found damning evidence, it photo of coffins of U.S. soldiers. After it was would have provided convenient legitimation published in the Seattle Times, she was fired for an attack. However, by failing to report from her job. U.S. military forces in Iraq have substantial Iraqi violations of UN-imposed attacked, arrested, beaten, bombed, and killed conditions, Blix became an obstacle to U.S. independent journalists.31 For example, on 8 government plans. Blix himself later claimed April 2003, a U.S. missile hit the that some U.S. officials had tried to discredit bureau of the satellite broadcaster Al-Jazeera, the UN team — and him personally — killing Tareq Ayyoub. U.S. officials claimed implicitly recognizing that his team’s work that their forces were responding to enemy was valued by the U.S. government only for fire, but Al-Jazeera said no fire was coming its potential role in legitimating an attack.29 from their building.32 Experts who do not toe the line can come Intimidation and Bribery under attack. U.S. government officials ex- posed the cover of covert CIA operative When a powerful government threatens a Valerie Plame as a reprisal against her weaker one, that itself constitutes intimidation. husband Joseph Wilson, who publicly chal- In addition, many forms of intimidation can be lenged official claims that Niger supplied used before, during, and after an attack. As uranium to Iraq.33 U.S. troops in Iraq have described earlier, Iraq came under repeated been threatened with reprisals should they be military assault over the years 1991-2003. In openly critical of U.S. government policy.34 the invasion in March 2003, the initial “shock and awe” bombardment served to intimidate 30. Kristina Borjesson, ed., Into the Buzzsaw: both Iraqi resisters and any other government Leading Journalists Expose the Myth of a Free that might consider defying U.S. government Press (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, demands. 2002). Another target is commentators, who may be threatened or wooed. It is well known that 31. Christian Parenti, “Al Jazeera Goes to journalists who write uncritically about U.S. Jail,” The Nation 278 (29 March 2004): 20– government policy can be rewarded with 23; Jeremy Scahill, “Shooting the Messenger,” greater access to officials, whereas those who The Nation 280 (7 March 2005): 4–6. are too critical may be penalized by denial of 32. For details about this and many other access. Journalists who venture into sensitive cases, see Committee to Protect Journalists, http://www.cpj.org/ (accessed 29 June 2006). 33. Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies that Put the White House on 29. Ibid., 215–28; Helena Smith, “Hans Blix Trial and Betrayed My Wife’s CIA Identity Interview: One Last Warning from the Man (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2005). Who Made an Enemy of Bush: UN Weapons 34. Steve Liewer, “Servicemembers Speaking Inspector Says Iraqi Guilt Is Still Not Proven,” Out: A Look at the Policies, Consequences,” Guardian, 11 June 2003, p. 4. Stars and Stripes, 22 August 2003.

88 Justice Ignited

The pettiness of reprisals is shown by the target the Security Council for espionage attack on Mick Keelty, the Australian Federal and outright subversion.36 Police Commissioner, Australia’s highest ranking police official, who was interviewed Intimidation and bribery are risky strate- about terrorism on Australian television in gies: if revealed, they can discredit those who March 2004. He made a passing and oblique use them. Therefore, a central task for those reference to the possibility that a country who want to magnify indignation is to expose having troops in Iraq was more likely to come the use of these unsavory means. under terrorist attack: “The reality is, if this turns out to be Islamic extremists responsible Conclusion for this bombing in Spain, it’s more likely to be linked to the position that Spain and other The 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq allies took on issues such as Iraq.” This was generated enormous hostility around the contrary to the Australian government’s posi- world, a popular and political reaction that can tion. The Prime Minister’s office immediately be interpreted as an example of how state- put pressure on Keelty to retract, and govern- sanctioned attacks can backfire. Much of this ment officials apparently even wrote the hostility can be attributed to the attack being “clarifying statement” that he had to make. perceived as unjust and disproportionate to Keelty’s original comment would probably anything the Iraqi regime had done, or threat- have passed unnoticed; forcing him to make a ened to do, to the attackers. Each of the five humiliating retraction drew more attention to usual methods for inhibiting outrage was used, it, as well as adverse comment on the govern- but without great success. The impending ment’s intolerance.35 invasion was announced to the world, so Yet another target is members of official cover-up played a limited role, though it was bodies. The bribes and threats used to pressure important in limiting awareness of the ongoing members of the UN Security Council have attacks from 1991. The demonization of already been mentioned. The connections Saddam Hussein was perhaps the most effec- between reinterpretation, official channels, and tive tool in inhibiting outrage, convincing intimidation are captured in this comment: many people the invasion was justified, but was powerfully countered by exposure of The glaring contradiction in the UK-U.S. double standards such as via the queries “Why posture toward the UN seems to be lost on Iraq?” and “Why now?” Various arguments Downing Street and the White House. On were advanced for invading Iraq: to prevent the one hand, Bush administration and Iraqi aggressive use of WMD, to prevent Iraqi Whitehall officials declare that war was government support for terrorists, and to liber- necessary to uphold the authority of the UN ate the Iraqi people. However, these arguments Security Council against alleged Iraqi were not very effective, partly because of denial and deception. President Bush even transparent inconsistencies and partly because cited the electronic bugging of UN weapon of powerful counter-arguments. An attempt inspectors by Iraqi officials in his eve of was made to legitimate the invasion by war address to the nation. On the other obtaining UN endorsement, but this failed, hand, the U.S. and British governments causing further delegitimation. Finally, there was some intimidation of critics of the attack,

36. Andreas Persbo and Ian Davis, “Electronic Surveillance of Foreign Diplomatic Missions: 35. Alan Ramsey, “Bad Call of a Keystone A Question of Law and Morality” (Silver City, Cop Routine,” Sydney Morning Herald, 20–21 NM & Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in March 2004, p. 39. Focus, 2 March 2004). The invasion of Iraq 89 but this did not appear to significantly reduce much greater importance for attackers than the overall volume of criticism. sometimes realized. These techniques are To a casual consumer of the media, the widely used in ostensibly open societies and, lead-up to the invasion of Iraq could well have even more extensively, by repressive regimes. appeared bewildering, with multitudinous These regimes do not rely solely on force. claims and counter-claims involving Saddam Examples include secrecy and state propa- Hussein, WMD, disagreements between ganda in the Soviet Union and the secrecy governments, and so forth. The concept of with which the Nazis carried out their exter- backfire brings some order to this complex minations. Official channels are also important picture by focusing attention on the struggle for dictatorial regimes, such as when they hold over perceptions, specifically the perception of elections that are transparently fraudulent, but an attack as unjust or disproportionate. nevertheless give a facade of legitimacy. The Iraq case suggests many ways to Backfire analysis can give a new apprecia- increase outrage, and roles for doing so. For tion of the diverse means of opposing attacks. exposing cover-ups, vital roles are played by Opposition to the attack on Iraq was most investigative journalists, whistleblowers, obvious in massive rallies throughout the outspoken advocates, researchers, independent world and in resistance by many governments commentators, and courageous publishers. To to joining or endorsing an invasion. These expose cover-ups can be very difficult: persis- forms of resistance cannot easily be separated tence in both gathering and distributing infor- from an ongoing struggle over information and mation in a credible fashion is vital. meaning, involving news reports, articles, Countering rhetorical means of justifying letters, leaflets, e-mails, and everyday conver- attack — devaluing the target and reinterpret- sations. This struggle will continue long after ing events — requires knowledge, commit- the invasion of Iraq, for example in the ongo- ment, eloquence, and access to communication ing debate over what U.S. officials actually channels. Commentary about an impending knew in advance about the presence or invasion, or one that has already occurred, is absence of WMD. far from irrelevant; instead, it is crucial in In many cases, such as the Sharpeville shaping attitudes that influence whether an massacre and the beating of Rodney King, invasion proceeds or, if it does, how and public anger occurs after the attack. In the case whether future attacks occur. of Iraq, in contrast, much of the anger occurred The role of official channels for legitimat- beforehand. This suggests that an early ing attacks is a challenging obstacle for warning system, raising concern about poten- opponents. There are two basic approaches to tial attacks, can be a potent way of resisting ensuring appropriate concern: to influence the injustice. official body to refuse to endorse the attack, or to undermine the credibility of the official Acknowledgements body or its deliberations. The first approach is This chapter is based on an article published in often more effective in the short term but, for Economic and Political Weekly 39 (17-23 official bodies whose appearance of fairness April 2004): 1577-83. I thank Don Eldridge, and neutrality is a facade, the second approach Truda Gray, Greg Scott, and Tom Weber for may be better. Finally, a good way to oppose valuable comments on drafts. intimidation is to expose it, thereby making it backfire. This analysis of backfire dynamics points to the crucial role of information and communi- cation. Attacks backfire because of percep- tions of injustice and disproportionality. Therefore, secrecy, disinformation, spin- doctoring, and public relations may be of