Brian Martin, Justice Ignited, chapter 9 (author’s prepublication version) 9 The invasion of Iraq On 19 March 2003, U.S. military forces, and significantly weakened global public supported by forces from Britain and a few support for the pillars of the post-World other countries, invaded Iraq and soon War II era — the U.N. and the North overwhelmed Iraqi military resistance. The Atlantic alliance.1 U.S. government had spent months pushing its case for the operation, arguing that the Iraqi A note on terminology: because the initial regime had, or was trying to obtain, weapons military conflict was so one-sided, I seldom of mass destruction (WMD), especially refer to the invasion of Iraq as a “war.” In nuclear weapons, and implying it had links western media reports, the attackers were with the terrorist group al Qaeda. There had conventionally called “the coalition.” Here I been popular opposition to the invasion in usually refer to the “U.S. government” because numerous countries, including in the United it was the prime mover, with the British States itself. government playing second fiddle; other mili- In the months following 19 March, the tary contingents, such as from Australia and occupying forces were met by a guerrilla Poland, were token and mostly unremarked. I resistance. As U.S. soldiers died, George W. avoid referring to “the United States” as an Bush’s promise of a glorious transition to actor — as in “the United States said” or “the democracy faded. Meanwhile, the search for United States attacked” — because it doesn’t Iraqi WMD came up with a blank, undercut- distinguish between the government and the ting the primary justification for the attack. people. But even to refer to the U.S. govern- These were signs the Iraq operation might be ment as the attacker is misleading, because a going wrong for the U.S. administration. But small group within the government made the signs of backfire had been apparent for a long key decisions. time. In examining the Iraq case, I look at the Prior to the invasion, protest rallies at- five principal ways the attackers tried to tracted huge numbers of people, with the inhibit outrage and how opponents attempted largest single-day numbers in history — some to express it. There is such a wealth of material ten million people across the world — on 15 on the events that only a few of many possible February, including large numbers of people examples can be presented here. I concentrate who had never joined a rally before. Public on the events leading up to the invasion. I opinion in most countries was strongly against the attack. Many governments opposed it, most prominently several key members of the 1. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views of a UN Security Council. Interviews in 20 Changing World (Washington, DC: Pew countries in May 2003 revealed that, Research Center for the People and the Press, June 2003), 1. Similar findings were reported in most countries, opinions of the United the following year: Pew Global Attitudes States are markedly lower than they were a Project, A Year after Iraq War: Mistrust of year ago. The war has widened the rift America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim between Americans and Western Europe- Anger Persists (Washington, DC: Pew ans, further inflamed the Muslim world, Research Center for the People and the Press, softened support for the war on terrorism, 16 March 2004). 80 Justice Ignited examine only backfire dynamics associated supported military operations in Vietnam was with the attack on Iraq; terrorist acts by the limited.2 Iraqi resistance, such as beheadings, can also However, there was no prospect of covering be analyzed in backfire terms. Wars are filled up the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Throughout with so many atrocities that they are a rich 2002, long in advance of the actual assault, the source of material on backfire. U.S. government increasingly signaled its In the cases described in previous chapters, intention to invade Iraq. This made the likeli- the targets of attack — peaceful protesters, hood of backfire much greater, at least if citizens being arrested, whistleblowing em- people perceived the attack as unjust. ployees — were relatively harmless, at least to Nevertheless, cover-ups played a significant wider society. The Iraq attack brings in a new role. It is often perceived that the attack on dimension: the target, namely Saddam Hussein Iraq only began in March 2003, but actually and his regime, was itself a menace. The Iraqi attacks occurred throughout the period after regime was built on ruthless violence against the first Gulf war, in 1991, until 2003. This internal opponents. It had launched two major included frequent bombings of Iraq that wars, against Iran in the 1980s and Kuwait in seldom attracted news coverage or protest. 1990. Yet despite its terrible record of aggres- After the first Gulf war, the U.S. and British sion and human rights violations, many people governments unilaterally set up “no-fly” zones opposed the U.S.-government-led attack on — no flying for Iraqi aircraft — over parts of Iraq, because it represented an injustice of its Iraq, though these had no legal status, and own, whether seen as a violation of interna- made thousands of overflights between 1991 tional law, as an assault by an overwhelmingly and 2003, including regular bombings leading powerful military on a weak one, or as a self- to many civilian casualties.3 interested attack on an opponent that posed no Some attacks on Iraq in the period 1991- threat. For an attack on a reviled opponent to 2003 were undertaken covertly, but others backfire, the violation of norms must be corre- were made openly, sometimes with fanfare spondingly greater. When protesters are reso- such as the bombings beginning in December lutely nonviolent, as in Dharasana, a brutal 1998. For these latter attacks, the description beating can echo around the world. When the “cover-up” is not quite appropriate, but still target is a ruthless regime, attackers can get captures some of the dynamics. By being a away with much more — but there are limits. matter of routine and usually operating below The invasion of Iraq illustrates these limits the threshold of interest for news media and starkly. peace groups, the attacks largely escaped scrutiny and seldom caused concern. The very Cover-up normality and banality of the attacks served as a sort of de facto cover-up. Some wars are carried out in secrecy or by use of proxy armies, limiting the prospect for revulsion. For example, the U.S. government financially supported the French military in 2. Daniel Ellsberg, Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam for years until its defeat in 1954, and Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers (New York: subsequently supported the South Vietnamese Viking, 2002). government and military before, during, and 3. Anthony Arnove, ed., Iraq under Siege: The after direct participation by U.S. troops. The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War low profile of this involvement is one key (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000); reason why, from the late 1940s until the mid Jeremy Scahill, “No-fly Zones: Washington’s 1960s, opposition to U.S.-government- Undeclared War on ‘Saddam’s Victims’,” IraqJournal.org, 2 December 2002. http:// www.iraqjournal.org/journals/021202.html (accessed 29 June 2006). The invasion of Iraq 81 Such de facto cover-ups applied to many address, Bush did not mention that his admini- other matters involving Iraq. The U.S. stration had undermined international efforts government’s support for Saddam Hussein’s to develop a stronger biological weapons regime throughout the 1980s was, following convention, nor that the United States has the the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait in 1990, world’s largest biological weapons program. seldom mentioned by U.S. government offi- The UN sanctions imposed on Iraq begin- cials, especially in the 2002-2003 lead-up to ning in 1990 resulted in enormous levels of attack. Nor did officials mention the U.S. suffering and death, with figures commonly government’s unwillingness to topple Saddam quoted of around a million extra deaths over a Hussein in 1991 when, just after the first Gulf decade, but with no apparent impact on the War, it had the opportunity, and indeed had rule of Saddam Hussein. Such a death toll promised to support anti-Saddam uprisings but might have been treated, in other circum- then allowed them to be brutally crushed by stances, as an emergency warranting humani- the regime. tarian intervention. The process of de facto This silence about earlier complicity with cover-up — namely, lack of attention or Saddam became more salient as U.S. officials concern by government officials — turned this castigated the Iraqi regime for having biologi- into an unremarkable occurrence or a “price cal and chemical weapons and for using that had to be paid.”7 chemical weapons against Iranian troops and The investigation of Iraqi WMD was sub- Kurdish civilians in the 1980s. Little was said ject to more conventional cover-ups and by official sources about the role of U.S. and disinformation, at least by some accounts.8 British governments and companies in sup- The lack of evidence of effective, deliverable plying materials for Iraqi weapons programs. biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons in For example, in President Bush’s address to Iraq was covered up by false and misleading the nation of 17 March 2003, on the eve of the claims, for example of Iraqi importation of invasion of Iraq, he stated, “This regime has uranium from Niger. U.S. spying under the already used weapons of mass destruction cover of the UN weapons inspectors was also against Iraq’s neighbors and against Iraq’s covered up.