Chapman University Chapman University Digital Commons Sociology Faculty Articles and Research Sociology 2011 The oC alition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement Victoria Carty Chapman University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/sociology_articles Part of the American Politics Commons, International Relations Commons, Military Studies Commons, Models and Methods Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Carty, Victoria. 2011. "The oC alition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement." Peace and Conflict Studies 18(1): 79-115. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The oC alition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement Comments This article was originally published in Peace and Conflict Studies, volume 18, issue 1, in 2011. Copyright Nova Southeastern University This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/sociology_articles/10 The Coalition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement Victoria Carty Abstract The Bush Doctrine, which was installed after the 9-11 attacks on the United States under the guise of the war on terrorism, postulated a vision of the United States as the world’s unchallenged superpower and the invasion of Iraq became one of the central fronts of this war. After failing to get approval by the United Nations for the invasion, the Bush Administration’s attempt to assemble a coalition of the willing became critical to the battle for public opinion to back the war. While the administration was able to garner some support, the coalition eventually unravelled and all troops are expected to depart by 2011 in what is perceived by many as a failure of U.S. foreign policy. This article discusses how different strands of social movement theory, including resource mobilization and the political process model, can be combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war. It contributes to the literature on social movements by assessing the ways in which structural- and micro-level mobilization efforts are often interconnected in order to explain both the how and the why of social movements, usually treated separately in much of the extant research. The National Security Strategy document, or the “Bush Doctrine,” which was installed after the 9-ll attacks on the United States postulated a vision of the United States Peace and Conflict Studies 79• Volume 18, Number 1 The Coalition of the Unwilling as the world’s unchallenged superpower. It defended the preemptive use of U.S. military power, refusal of the United States to be bound by any international treaty or organization, the ability to violate international laws and disregard international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) when expedient to do so, and explicitly linked U.S. economic and military policy (Peter 2007). Critics charge that it served to accelerate the process of imperial globalization in the name of providing security to U.S. citizens and its allies under the guise of the “war on terrorism” (Gitlin 2005). The war on terrorism, as spelled out by the Bush administration, is defined as the military, political, and legal actions in response to 9-11 with the objective of countering terrorist threats, preventing terrorist acts, and curbing the influence of terrorist organizations (whitehouse.gov). Former President Bush consistently referred to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as one of the central fronts in the war on terrorism (Peter 2007). After failing to get approval by the United Nations (UN) for the invasion, the administration’s attempt to assemble a “coalition of the willing” became critical to the battle for public opinion to back the war. Shortly before the Iraq war began the U.S. government announced that nearly forty countries had joined the coalition. However, only four contributed troops—Britain, Poland, Australia and Denmark, and more than 95% of the committed combat troops were American or British (Ripley 2008). Key countries on the UN Security Council, most notably France and Russia, did not support the coalition from the onset, and as the conflict dragged on politicians and citizens in countries that originally supported the invasion began to question the war and dropped out of the coalition. As global networks of individuals pressured their Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 80 The Coalition of the Unwilling governments to cooperate in a coalition of the unwilling, the coalition eventually unravelled and all combat troops are scheduled to leave Iraq by 2011 in what is perceived by many as a defeat for the United States (Farrell 2008). Consequently, this raises questions regarding the ability of the United States to operate unilaterally in the future, and what factors were responsible for the demise of the coalition. In the past the United States’ success as sole superpower depended on a system of alliances with other powers and a division among those who would challenge it (Owens 2006). However, this has been altered on two fronts. First, at the core of the Bush Doctrine is the replacement of international cooperation with a world order based on direct U.S. assertion that it will act alone if necessary. Second, there emerged a collective opposition to the U.S. invasion even among former allies as public opinion increasingly turned against participation in the war on terrorism. This article discusses how different aspects of social movement theory can be combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war. Resource mobilization and framing theories can explain how the contemporary peace movement forged a sense of transnational collective identity as groups organized to utilize resources and attempted to influence public authorities through contentious politics. Other theories that employ the political process model, and the focus on political opportunity structures (POS) in particular, illustrate that the collapse of the coalition was also due in part to a “revolution at the ballot box.” The political process framework draws attention to the importance of working within the formal arena of institutional and electoral politics. Its emphasis on potential shifts in governance discourse, which allow activists to question Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 81 The Coalition of the Unwilling states’ legitimacy and manipulate competition between political elites, helps to clarify why mobilizations emerge. Incorporating both resource mobilization and political process theories further illuminates how activists and politicians took advantage of the process of blowback—the unintended consequences that resulted in their countries due to their governments’ support of the U.S. mission. I argue that neither resource mobilization nor structural theories on their own can sufficiently explain the demise of the coalition and ultimate defeat of the United States’ efforts in Iraq. This analysis contributes to the literature on social movements, much of which relies on a particular theory that focuses exclusively on either the how or the why of social movements, by assessing the complex ways in which structural- and micro-level mobilization efforts are interconnected. Social Movement Theory One central component of social movement theory is resource mobilization. This branch examines the tactical and strategic repertoires that activists use in specific campaigns as well as organizational dynamics, leadership, resource management, and the construction and legitimation of collective identities (Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Collective identity refers to the association of the goals and values of a movement with one’s own, and these can be a perception of a shared status or relationship rather than an exclusively concrete one (Polleta and Jasper 2001). Key to forging collective identity is how organizers “frame” their issues to resonate with potential recruits and they do this by linking participants’ grievances to mainstream beliefs and values (Snow and Benford 1992). Framing thus helps explain the articulation Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 18, Number 1 82 The Coalition of the Unwilling of grievances, the dynamics of recruitment and mobilization, and the maintenance of solidarity and collective identity. Frames are influential when organizers persuade large numbers of people that the issues they care about are urgent, that alternatives are possible, that there is a worthiness (or moral standing) of the activists’ demands, and that the constituencies they seek to mobilize can be invested with agency (Tarrow and Tilly 2006; Cress and Snow 2000). For a frame to go from understanding to motivating action it must have the elements of injustice, identity, and agency