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The Art Industry and U.S. Policies That Undermine Sanctions. Staff Report

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The Art Industry and U.S. Policies That Undermine Sanctions. Staff Report United States Senate PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Rob Portman, Chairman Tom Carper, Ranking Member THE ART INDUSTRY AND U.S. POLICIES THAT UNDERMINE SANCTIONS STAFF REPORT PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE THE ART INDUSTRY AND U.S. POLICES THAT UNDERMINE SANCTIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ 16 A. U.S. Sanctions Enforcement ........................................................................ 16 1. The U.S. Treasury Department ................................................................ 16 2. Sanctions Following the Russian Federation’s Invasion of Crimea ....... 20 B. The Art Market ............................................................................................... 33 1. Money Laundering in the Art Market ..................................................... 35 2. The Art Industry is the Largest Legal, Unregulated Market in the United States ............................................................................................ 36 3. The Applicability of the Berman Amendment to High-value Art ........... 38 4. Shell Companies ........................................................................................ 39 C. The Four Major Auction Houses ................................................................ 41 1. Sotheby’s .................................................................................................... 41 2. Christie’s .................................................................................................... 43 3. Phillips ....................................................................................................... 45 4. Bonhams .................................................................................................... 46 5. Online Auctions during the COVID-19 Pandemic ................................... 46 D. Art Dealers, Art Galleries, and Art Fairs ................................................. 47 E. Voluntary Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Programs in the Art Industry ......................................................................................... 49 1. Sotheby’s ........................................................................................................ 50 2. Christie’s .................................................................................................... 55 3. Phillips ....................................................................................................... 58 4. Bonhams .................................................................................................... 59 5. Private Art Dealer ..................................................................................... 61 i III. ROTENBERG CASE STUDY: USING OFFSHORE COMPANIES, LAWYERS, AND ART ADVISORS TO MASK OWNERSHIP ............................ 63 A. Attorney Mark Omelnitski and the Markom Group .............................. 63 1. The Markom Group Established Rotenberg-linked Shell Companies .... 67 2. Rotenberg-Linked Shell Companies were Used to Purchase Art ........... 69 B. Art Advisor Gregory Baltser ....................................................................... 79 1. The Auction Houses Viewed Mr. Baltser as the Principal Buyer ........... 81 2. Mr. Baltser Purchased Art as an Agent for Steamort ............................. 84 3. Mr. Baltser Established BALTZER Auction Agency and Club in Moscow ................................................................................................................... 90 4. Examples of Pre-Sanctions Art Purchases ............................................ 105 5. The United States Sanctioned Arkady and Boris Rotenberg on March 20, 2014 ......................................................................................................... 112 6. Examples of Post-Sanctions Art Purchases ........................................... 115 7. Mr. Baltser Shipped Art Purchased by Rotenberg-linked Companies to the Hasenkamp Storage Facility in Germany ....................................... 131 8. Mr. Baltser Attempted to Sell Art Purchased with Funds Traced to Rotenberg-linked Companies ................................................................. 133 9. Mr. Baltser Did Not Cooperate with the Subcommittee’s Investigation ................................................................................................................. 141 10. During the Course of the Subcommittee’s Investigation Phillips, Christie’s, and Sotheby’s Stopped Transacting with Mr. Baltser ......... 142 IV. ADDITIONAL U.S. DOLLAR TRANSACTIONS BY ROTENBERG- LINKED SHELL COMPANIES ............................................................................. 144 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 147 ii THE ART INDUSTRY AND U.S. POLICIES THAT UNDERMINE SANCTIONS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The United States government imposes economic sanctions on foreign adversaries in attempt to change their behavior. In theory, sanctions are simple. U.S. persons and companies are prohibited from doing business with sanctioned persons and entities. This prohibition should bar access to the world’s largest economy. The United States imposes sanctions for a wide range of reasons. For example, the United States has imposed sanctions on Russia for election interference, human rights abuses, providing support to Venezuela and Syria, but mainly in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This report focuses, in particular, on a case study documenting how certain Russian oligarchs appear to have used transactions involving high-value art to evade sanctions imposed on them by the United States on March 20, 2014 in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. Specifically, the Subcommittee traced purchases of high-value art back to anonymous shell companies linked to sanctioned individuals Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, two Russian oligarchs, and Arkady’s son, Igor. It appears the Rotenbergs continued actively participating in the U.S. art market by purchasing over $18 million in art in the months following the imposition of sanctions on March 20, 2014. Shell companies linked to the Rotenbergs also transferred over $120 million to Russia during a four-day window between President Obama’s March 16, 2014 executive order stating that the U.S. would be sanctioning certain Russian Arkady Rotenberg and Vladimir Putin individuals and the Treasury Department (Photo Credit: The New Yorker) specifically naming the Rotenbergs as sanctioned on March 20, 2014. In addition, certain Rotenberg-linked shell companies continued transacting in the U.S. financial system long after Arkady and Boris Rotenberg were sanctioned. The Subcommittee determined these Rotenberg- linked shell companies engaged in over $91 million in transactions post-sanctions. While Russia-related sanctions, including those against the Rotenbergs, were set to expire in March 2020, President Trump extended them for another year. The effectiveness of these sanctions, however, is in question. To date, Russia has not withdrawn from Crimea and has even expanded its military operations in 1 surrounding waters. The Subcommittee sought to understand why the sanctions have not been more effective and, after reviewing a number of suspect transactions, launched a narrow investigation into high-value art. If wealthy Russian oligarchs can purchase millions in art for personal investment or enjoyment while under sanction, it follows that their businesses or hidden resources could also continue accessing the U.S. financial system. * * * * * * * * * * * The Subcommittee’s investigation uncovered a complex set of facts involving shell companies with hidden owners, intermediaries who mask purchasers and sellers, and lax money laundering safeguards in the U.S. art industry. The art industry is largely unregulated. The art industry is considered the largest, legal unregulated industry in the United States. Unlike financial institutions, the art industry is not subject to Bank Secrecy Act’s (“BSA”) requirements, which mandate detailed procedures to prevent money laundering and to verify a customer’s identity. While the BSA does not apply to art transactions by art dealers and auction houses, sanctions do. No U.S. person or entity is allowed to do business with a sanctioned individual or entity. The art industry has been enjoying a boom. According to the 2019 Art Basel and UBS Global Art Market Report, world-wide art sales hit $64.1 billion in 2019. That report found the United States was the world’s largest art market comprising 44 percent of global sales, or around $28.3 billion. The art industry is generally divided into sales at public auctions and by private dealers. In 2019, sales at auction houses made up 42 percent of total art sales, while the remaining 58 percent of sales were through private dealers. The four biggest auction houses by sales—Sotheby’s, Christie’s, Phillips, and Bonhams—are selling art for sizeable amounts. In November 2017, Leonardo da Vinci’s Salvator Mundi sold at auction at Christie’s in New York for over $450 million. In May 2019, Christie’s New York sold Jeff Koon’s Rabbit for over $91 million, the highest price ever paid for a piece by a living artist. Even during
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