The Hand Rule and United States V. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered
The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. Reconsidered
Allan M. Feldman, Brown University, and Jeonghyun Kim, Korea Information Strategy Development Institute
Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. (1947) is canonized in the law-and-economics literature as the first use of cost-benefit analysis for determining negligence and assigning liability. This article revisits the case in which the Hand formula was born and examines whether Judge Hand’s ruling in that case would provide correct incentives for efficient levels of precaution. We argue that the negligence test as used by Judge Hand is somewhat different from the Hand test as used by modern law-and-economics theorists. With a game theoretic analysis of the case, we show that Judge Hand’s negligence test could in fact produce games with inefficient equilibria, or with liability determinations opposite Judge Hand’s.
1. Introduction
Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.1 is canonized in the law-and-economics literature. It is like the opening
We are grateful to Mark Grady, Richard Wright, Judge Richard Posner, and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank seminar partici- pants at the 2003 American Law and Economics Association annual meeting, and at the 2003 Korea Academic Society of Industrial Organization conference. Send correspondence to: Allan M. Feldman, Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912; Phone: 401-863-2415; Fax: 401-863-1900; E-mail: [email protected]. 1. Note that this case stems in part from an appeal of Connors Marine Co. v. Penn. R. Co., decided by Judge Moscowitz. We will rely on Judge Moscowitz’s opinion for some factual information.
American Law and Economics Review Vol. 7 No. 2 doi:10.1093/aler/ahi017 Ó The Author 2005. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Law and Economics Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]
523 524 American Law and Economics Review V7 N2 2005 (523–543) measure of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, or the third line of the Bible: ‘‘And God said, Let there be light.’’ What is mainly remembered, of course, is the judge’s formula (p.173):
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Thus the judge throws mathematics and rational cost-benefit analysis into the law, and the theme has continued to play for 58 years in the literature of economic analysis of liability rules. As the economic analysis now stands, it is widely believed that a determination of each party’s negligence should be based on some cost- benefit test like Judge Hand’s: in essence, if a party’s cost of preventing accidents (what the judge calls the burden) is less than the expected losses from the accidents, that party should be found negligent; and it is also widely believed that, under certain general conditions, a negligence-based liability rule (like simple negligence, negligence with a defense of contrib- utory negligence, or comparative negligence) will lead rational victims and injurers to choose efficient levels of care.2 The purpose of this article is to revisit the United States v. Carroll Towing Co. case, and Judge Hand’s opinion. We will examine the Hand rule in that particular case. We will argue that there are three different ways to apply Judge Hand’s test, and that the facts of United States v. Carroll Towing Co. suggest Judge Hand must have been assuming one of these three ways, which we call the Hand rule contingent on the other party’s actual behavior. We will show that, under this interpretation of the Hand rule, the circumstances described in the United States v. Carroll Towing Co. opinion might produce games with efficient equilibria, as
2. See Brown (1973), Cooter and Ulen (2000), Landes and Posner (1987), Rea (1987), and Shavell (1987). We will use Hand test and Hand rule interchangeably, to denote Judge Hand’s algebraic method for determining negligence. A liability rule is a rule for allocating losses between parties, and may or may not be based on the parties’ negligence. The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 525 law-and-economics theorists would want, but they might also produce games with inefficient equilibria. The conclusion is that, contrary to the usual claim, the Hand rule might not be a key to efficiency, even in circumstances like those described by Judge Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. In section 2 we describe the United States v. Carroll Towing Co. case. In section 3 we discuss three ways to approach the Hand test. In section 4 we analyze the United States v. Carroll Towing Co. game model. In section 5 we make concluding remarks.
2. Structure of the Case
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. grew out of an accident that took place in New York Harbor on January 4, 1944. The parties involved were as follows: