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A Hat Trick of HERRICK 2 Vol 64 No 7: Mar 2013 1 RGR - A hat trick of HERRICK 2 RGR - Army Canoe Polo Champions QGS - Op HERRICK 17 Update Gurkhas in the kingdom of Tonga The Gurkha Welfare Trust aims to relieve poverty and distress among Gurkha ex-servicemen of the British Crown and their dependants by rais- ing funds for distribution in Nepal through the Trust’s field arm, the Gurkha Welfare Scheme, and by responding to welfare needs as they arise in the UK. A big thank you from The Gurkha Welfare Trust The Trust would like to extend its grateful thanks to all serving members of the Bri- gade of Gurkhas for all your support in 2012. Your generosity via the One Day’s Pay scheme and your help at so many of our fundraising activities have enabled the Trust to continue its care for our elderly retired Gurkha soldiers and their dependants. Thank you! The Gurkha Welfare Trust, PO Box 2170, 22 Queen Street, Salisbury, SP2 2EX www.gwt.org.uk . Telephone: 01722 323955 . Email: [email protected]. Registered Charity No. 1103669 Vol 64 No. 7 March 2013 Editorial Staff Contents Editor: Mrs Janette Patterson 1 RGR 2,3,4,14 & 15 Assistant Editor: LCpl Rakam Thamshuhang GSPS QGS 5 - 9 Telephone: 01980 618012 (94344 8012) Photo News 10 - 11 Fax: 01980 618938 (94344 8938) e-mail: [email protected] Nepali Page 12 - 13 MOD Users: [email protected] Bde Band 15 Please send your articles together with good quality 2 RGR 16,20 photographs (300 dpi), through your unit’s Parbate Rep, to: BGN 17,19 The Editor, Parbate Office, HQBG, Trenchard Lines, QOGLR 18 Upavon, Pewsey, Wiltshire SN9 6BE ITC Catterick 18 Parbate is published every month by kind permission of HQBG. It is not an official publication and the views expressed, unless specifically stated otherwise, do not reflect GCS 19 MOD or Army policy and are the personal views of the author. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the permission of the Editorial Staff. No responsibility for the Front Cover: quality of goods or services advertised in this magazine can be accepted by the Editorial Staff or Publishers and advertisements are accepted on the express condition that they in no Prince Harry and Capt Chandra Saheb reunited in Op HERRICK 17 way contravene the provisions of the Trades Descriptions Act 1968 nor any other prevailing Consumer Legislation. The Editorial Staff and Publishers cannot accept responsibility for the Picture Below: result of errors or omissions in articles or advertisements. Prince Harry Giving a tour of his office to Capt Chandra Saheb Parbate is designed by CGS Design Studio, and produced using recycled paper. 1 RGR A Hat Trick of HERRICK By Capt Chandra Pun, 2IC D (Kandahar) Coy fghanistan is a country at the The US’s response was Operation Enduring We were based in FOB Delhi and manned crossroads between a number Freedom, which began on 7 October 2001, two check points; JTAC HILL and BALACLAVA. Aof historically important and with US and British aerial bombing of Taliban Both Check Points were located at either large empires, including British, Russian, positions and known terrorist training camps. end of a gravel road which was running Persian, Indian and Chinese. Mountainous This weakened the Taliban, who were then, from west to east. The gravel road acted as a and in many areas largely inaccessible, seemingly, defeated by the Northern Alliance. borderline between the protected community it has developed its own unique culture The US Military subsequently took control of to the North and an area known as without the influence of a central much of the country and began the process “no-mans land” to the south and east. controlling authority. Pride, tradition and of establishing a democratically elected At that time we were able to engage anyone religion make for an explosive mix. government, starting with the Bonn Agreement within our arcs under Rules of Engagement It shares borders with Pakistan in the south in December 2001. Crucially though, 429A, as these areas were used by insurgents and east, Iran in the west and the Central the Taliban had not been completely defeated, only, to attack us or to smuggle arms and Asian States of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and and as a result the insurgency that we explosives into the protected community. Tajikistan in the north. A narrow strip of land are facing today took hold and began It was a dangerous time with little respite from in the extreme northeast leads to a short to undermine the democratically elected fighting - we even took over the check points border with China. With an area of 647,500 government that had been installed. from the Coldstream Guards under small square kilometres, it is slightly larger than It was this resistance to the Government of arms fire contact. There was a high threat of Spain and Portugal combined. Most of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) accurate Small Arms Fire (SAF), IDF attack Afghanistan is between 600 and 3,050 that led to British forces being deployed, (107mm), RPG and a very low threat of meters in elevation. with their focus being on prosecuting a Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) during that The attack on the World Trade Centre on counter insurgency campaign in 6 key districts period. We didn’t concentrate on Counter 11 September 2001 killed 2,823 people in Helmand Province, namely; Lashkar Gah, Insurgency (COIN) at that time; we mainly from many countries including 67 Britons. Gereshk, Sangin, Musa Qaleh, Now Zad and focussed on holding ground and defeating The attack by Al Qaeda was the product Garmsir. But in 2009 a coalition force uplift saw a brave and persistent enemy; although we of several years of planning and was in the US taking responsibility for the majority of occasionally supported the villagers by building part co-ordinated from Taliban held areas Helmand province including Garmsir. a water pump and distributing warm clothes. of Afghanistan where Al Qaeda had Op HERRICK 7 (Sep 07 – Apr 08) Looking into the overall pie chart across the established itself. The United States and ‘Stay low, move fast’ was the motto whole Area of Operation (AO), Garmsir was its allies were left with little choice but to used in HERRICK 7. the most contacted AO within Helmand invade Afghanistan, with their intent being province during HERRICK 7 with up to 47 to destroy training camps and replace the I deployed to Garmsir in Helmand province as contacts occurring every day, with a mixture Taliban regime that was supporting terrorism. 5 Platoon Commander B (Sari Bair) Company of SAF and IDF being fired at our locations. The invasion was considered legitimate by in the ground holding role. Although 1RGR Daily life was quite basic; we operated with the International Community as Al Qaeda deployed as Battle Group, we were attached very limited welfare facilities and without fresh had directly attacked the United States. to the Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR). rations however we used to have messing 2 Parbate Vol 64 No 7 March 2013 1 RGR every 2 days. Although we were only one Coy Op HERRICK 12 (May – Nov 10) Rules of Engagement (ROE). Card A for self Group operating in Garmsir, we managed ‘Stay low, move slow’ was the motto defence was used throughout the tour due to establish three further new Check Points used in HERRICK 12. to increased risk of civilian casualties. to the south and east before we conducted 1RGR Battle Group deployed to the Nar-e- The IED threat was extremely high and our TOA (Transfer of Authority). We used our Saraj AO in Helmand province in a ground therefore vallons were used on every occasion. WMiKs and Pinzgaurs as ambulance vehicles holding role. As I entered PB3, I was stunned After the first three months off the tour there (these were unprotected and open vehicles to find that all the soldiers were living in was a green on blue incident which occurred in with a mounted gun on top), had limited tents. Clearly there was no IDF threat. PB 3 and resulted in 3 x Killed in action amounts of ISTAR equipment and survived by As A (Delhi) Company 2IC, I took over the (OC -Maj Bowman, Pl Comd- Lt Turkington applying basic soldiering skills in an incredibly Ops room (from where all operations were and Sect comd- Cpl Arjun Purja) and 4 x austere environment. controlled) from the Grenadier Guards. wounded in action. Immediately after this A number of times IDF and RPG landed As the Company started to conduct Ground incident we moved further south west to inside the FOB, which was only 150 x150m. Defence Area (GDA) patrols, we realised establish new check points which helped to We were very lucky that no one was injured there was a high threat of SAF, IEDs and push bad memories of PB 3 out of our minds. as on one occasion 3 x 107mm rockets landed suicide bombers. Our ground patrols focused Meanwhile, one of the Coys from 1 Lancs took inside. Finally we completed the 6 month tour on Biometric Enrolment and ex-spray, over PB 3. with only 3 x seriously injured casualties; this link analysis, hearts and minds, and Counter Initially, we found it was quite hard to could have been far worse and had it not Insurgency (COIN). The ISAF mentoring team establish new Check Points in RAHIM KALAY been for the outstanding soldiering skills and started to teach weapon training, medical (it was an area known as an insurgent strong- endurance of our Rfn, it would have been.
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