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The Phoenix Patriot Are Nation Through Humanitarian Assistance Operation Mountain Fury The “...From the Ashes...” PHOENIX PATRIOT 2nd. Edition, Volume I Official Publication of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V Sept. 25, 2006 Photo By 2nd Lieut. Amanda Straub CJTF Phoenix Mourns Three Fallen Brothers Story by Lt. Janette Arencibia who served beside them will The operation’s key tasks include where Taliban have established ensure the success of the continued insurance of long term peace and strongholds, our Soldiers face The strength, fortitude, and fi ght for freedom in Afghanistan. growing economic prosperity by increased threat and danger. service of three American Soldiers All three Soldiers recently eradication of insurgent forces Families who have lost a will become part of the Afghan lost their lives while engaging with focused operations in Ghazni Soldier to date can rest assured legacy as Master Sgt. Bernard the enemy in combat as part and Paktika. The efforts to extend that their efforts contributed Deghand, Sgt. 1st Class Michael of Operation Mountain Fury. the capabilities of established directly to the great success of Taua’e Fuga, and Staff Sgt. The operation is intended to governance are parallel to the Operation Enduring Freedom Nathanial Lindsey are honored for push across the East. In areas limit insurgent abilities to where Taliban occupation in bringing prosperity and their contributions to Operation conduct operations and organize exists, coalition forces are peace to Afghanistan. To date, Enduring Freedom. The example continued violence and criminal infi ltrating routes and transition American troops and their they provided for the Afghan activity in the Eastern and areas at the eastern border. families have honored the National Army (ANA) Soldiers Southern regions of Afghanistan. As operations extend to areas lives of 276 service members. Afghan SECFOR INSIDE Interpreters LTG Sticks Learn Eikenberry THIS Together Lifesaving Visits ANA ISSUE Skills 1 On Point w/ the CSM General Guidance Jungleers, Warriors, It is with great sadness Last week three great and yet great honor that I Warriors from our task write this column as a trib- force were killed in action ute to our fallen warriors. while engaging the enemy; Over the last two weeks Sgt. 1st Class Mike Fuga, we have had three of our Staff Sgt. Brad Lindsey warriors pay the ultimate and Master Sgt. Bernard sacrifi ce. I could not be Deghand. All three were prouder of the Task Force exceptional Soldiers who in the way that we have volunteered for this mis- honored and respected these great Americans. sion because they felt a personal commitment to defend freedom I was touched beyond belief as I talked to the pallbearers at each and protect their loved ones. Each had a family and didn’t want ramp ceremony. I was moved to tears as our warriors dropped all their children to live under the threat of terrorism. These Soldiers, and their families, sacrifi ced a great deal so they could serve their they were doing to honor the memory of our fallen comrades. nation. They were proud of their service and were role models It should bring into sharp focus the fl eetingness of this life. I for others. Rather than following the path where others had gone, remember talking to Staff Sgt. Lindsey a couple of weeks before they went where there was no path and left a trail of accomplish- he was taken from us. We were sharing our experiences in Iraq, ments for others to follow. in New Orleans, and here in Afghanistan. I was amazed at his These brave men were warriors and were all battle tested. Each commitment to duty, his country, and his family. felt discipline was an essential characteristic to accomplish our Although, I never had the opportunity to meet Master Sgt. De- mission and demonstrated that discipline on a daily basis. As sea- ghand, or Sgt. 1st Class Fuga personally, I am sure of their com- soned veterans they knew how to conduct themselves in combat mitment to those same values and way of life. I have heard sto- and when they came under fi re they protected their fellow war- ries from their peers and comrades and have no doubt that they riors. Their actions saved the lives of others and demonstrated were men of conviction, honor, and values. their professionalism. I ask that you continue to keep them in your thoughts and re- Their fellow Soldiers described them as caring and compas- member that Freedom isn’t Free, and we owe our all to continue sionate but demanding of excellence. They took time to mentor to drive toward completing our mission in their honor. and coach at a very personal level. All three will be remembered for their commitment to the development of the Afghan National Army Soldiers and Leaders. They fought alongside ANA Soldiers and wanted to be on the front lines where they could make the most impact. We will miss Sgt. 1st Class Fuga, Staff Sgt. Lindsey and Master Sgt. Deghand and we grieve in their loss, but we also honor their service. Their dedication to the mission, our nation, the citizens Brunk Conley of Afghanistan and the free world, is what set them apart as spe- CSM, USA cial Soldiers and Patriots. They will live forever in our hearts and Command Sergeant Major minds. As we continue this most important of missions let us re- dedicate our efforts in their memory. Douglas A. Pritt Brigadier General, Commanding Fellow Patriots, tactical skills, leadership abilities, and nur- and sacrifi ce to continue the fi ght for a turing experienced logisticians. Still oth- free Afghanistan. If this country is not We are serving in eventful times in a ers of you are working in remote locations free from the rule of terrorists who seek to dangerous place. Some of you encounter with your Afghan National Army (ANA) harm and control Afghans and citizens of danger frequently and eliminate it. Others counterparts to hunt down and purge in- every nation, then none of us can be free. continue the work of building a prosperous surgent threats from this country as part of The stories in The Phoenix Patriot are nation through humanitarian assistance Operation Mountain Fury. told to you by your counterparts deployed projects, medical assistance missions, ed- In the last two weeks we have seen a around the country. Loyally support the ucation facilitation and economic restora- rise in insurgent activity and we all have members of the task force, your military tion. Some of you traverse the hazardous mourned the loss of our fallen comrades. family, and the people of Afghanistan in countryside delivering necessary supplies They worked tirelessly in support of our everything you do. Above all, remember and personnel to sustain the fi ght. Many of operation here because they believed your loved ones back home and all of the you are engaged on a daily basis mentor- whole-heartedly in our mission. Let us all things that make fi ghting to end terrorism ing Soldiers in the ANA, developing their band together in memory of their strength worth the trip. The Phoenix Patriot is the offi cial publication of Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V, authorized under the provisions of AR 360-1. The views and opinions expressed in The Phoenix Patriot are not necessarily those of, or endorsed by, the U.S. government, or the departments of the Army, Air Force, or Navy. The Phoenix Patriot is a bi-weekly publication distributed to deployed Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors and Marines all over Afghanistan with a circulation of 3500. The Phoenix Patriot is happy to publish photos and articles from the fi eld and we encourage readers to submit original material to the CJTFPHX V Public Affairs Offi ce. All contributions, questions, comments and suggestions should be submitted via e-mail to: [email protected]. Editor in Chief/ Writer/ Photographer - Major Arnold V. Strong - Public Affairs Offi cer Managing Editor/ Writer/ Photographer - Second Lieutenant Amanda M. Straub - Content Manager Writer/ Photographer - First Lieutenant Cathrin Y. Fraker - Deputy Public Affairs Offi cer Writer/ Photographer - Sergeant First Class Tom Roberts - Public Affairs NCOIC The Phoenix Patriot 2 Medics Overcoming Gender Barriers in Afghanistan Story and Photos by very important class because I may Sgt. Margaret C. Nelson be the only one left to help my co- alition friends…my buddies.” The FOB CAMP STONE, Afghani- 21 year-old has been assisting U.S. stan – Sgt. Nova J. Dragoo, 1042nd forces for two years and this is the Medevac, Salem, Ore., says her fi rst opportunity he has had to learn team of female medics is not letting lifesaving skills. gender bar them from accomplish- Another interpreter said that he ing their goals of, “teaching any Af- wanted to, “Serve his country and ghan, or soldier willing to learn.” assist the Afghan National Army’s The two medics are doing just (ANA) efforts to establish peace that by crossing cultural differences and security here.” at FOB (Forward Operating Base) The U.S. medics covered instruc- Camp Stone, about 10 miles south tion on airway clearing and provid- of Herat. They are teaching combat ed demonstration on a mannequin lifesaving skills (CLS) to approxi- followed by a question and answer mately 60 male Afghan translators period. The class was then broken- and civilian contractors not accus- down into groups of eight to 10 for tomed to receiving instruction, guid- Army Sgt. Nova J. Dragoo, Oregon’s “hands-on” exercises on manne- ance, and correction from females. Charlie Medical Company, shows a quins, and each other. “People were skeptical at the be- student where to fi nd a pulse. The enthusiasm and interest ginning about how many Afghans forces is one of the most dangerous amongst the students was evident would show up because of our gen- throughout the lesson with complete der,” Dragoo said.
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