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Downloaded from Brill.Com10/02/2021 02:39:42PM Via Free Access 374 the KNOWLEDGE of GOOD NOTES Chapter One 1. Plato, Charmides, 166. Cf The Dialogues of Plato, B. Jowett, trans. (New York, Random House, 1937), Vol. 1, p. 17. 2. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Riga, Prussia: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1783 ), trans. here by Robert S. Hartman. Cf Paul Cams, Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Chicago: Open Court Pub. Co., 1949), p. 140. 3. Ibid., p. 143. 4. Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value: Foundations ofScientific Axiology (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 111.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), pp. 121-131. 5. Ibid., pp. 31-43, 69-92. See also Robert S. Hartman, "The Logical Difference Between Philosophy and Science," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 23 (March 1963), pp. 353-379. 6. Hartman, The Structure of Value, pp. 43-54, 101-106. 7. See Robert S. Hartman, "La Creaci6n de una Etica Cientifica," Dianoia, I ( 1955), pp. 205-235. 8. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1903), Sect. 75 ff., pp. 126 ff. 9. See Robert S. Hartman, "Critica Axiol6gica de la Etica de Kant," Revista Mexicana de Filosofia, I ( 1958), pp. 75-84; "The Logic of Description and Valuation," Review ofMetaphysics, 14 (December 1960), pp. 206--207; The Structure of Value, pp. 265 ff. 10. Gottlob Frege, Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Breslau, Poland: M. & H. Marcus, 1934), p. 34. 11. Rudolf Carnap, "Intellectual Autobiography," The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Paul A. Schilpp, ed. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Pub. Co., 1963), p. 6. 12. Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge ofthe External World (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 191. 13. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 12-15. 14. Ibid. 15. Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1933), p. 227. 16. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 3. 17. Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Free Press, 1957), p. 5. 18. Kant, Prolegomena. Cf Carus, Kant's Prolegomena to Any Future Meta­ physics, p. 9. 19. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 15. 20. John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Menston, England: Scholar Press, 1970); and Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), Bk. 3, Ch. 11, Sects. 15-18; Bk. 4, Ch. 3, Sects. 18-20, Ch. 4, Sects. 5-10, Ch. 12, Sects. 7-8; "Epistle to the Reader," par. 15. 21. C. G. Jung, PsychologyandAlchemy(New York: Pantheon Books, 1953); and C. G. Jung, The Interpretation ofNature and the Psyche (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955). Robert S. Hartman - 9789004496101 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 02:39:42PM via free access 374 THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD 22. Brand Blanshard, The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), p. 111. 23. Ibid., p. 94. 24. Ibid. 25. H. A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 21 ( 1912), pp. 21-37. 26. Blanshard, The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out, p. 95. 27. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1930); and Foundations of Ethics (Oxford, England: The Clarendon Press, 1939). 28. Blanshard, The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out, p. 95. 29. See Hartman, The Structure of Value, pp. 342-343, note 6. 30. Blanshard, The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out, pp. 97-98. 31. Ibid., p. 99. 32. Ibid., pp. 99-100. 33. G. E. Moore, Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1911). 34. Blanshard, The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out, p. JOO. 35. Ibid., pp. 100-101. 36. A. J. Ayer, Language. Truth and Logic (London: V. Gollancz, 1936), p. 108; quoted by Blanshard, The Impasse in Ethics and a Way Out, p. I 0 I. 37. Blanshard, ibid., p. IOI. 38. Ibid., p. 102. 39. Ibid., p. 103. 40. Ibid., p. 104. 41. Ibid., p. 105. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid., p. 106. 44. Ibid., p. 107. 45. Ibid., pp. 107-108. 46. Ibid., p. 109. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., p. 110. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid., pp. 110-111. 51. Ibid., p. 111. 52. Ibid., p. 112. 53. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961), p. 269. 54. Hartman, The Structure of Value, pp. 101-106. 55. Thomas Hill. Contemporary Ethical Theories (New York: Macmillan, 1950), p. 354. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., p. 315. 58. /bid. See also G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1922), pp. 271 ff., and p. 275; and Hartman, The Structure ofValue, pp. 131-149. 59. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 20. 60. Thomas Hill, Ethics in Theory and Practice (New York: Crowell, 1956). 61. Robert S. Hartman, "Value, Fact and Science," Philosophy of Science, 25 (April 1958), pp. 97-108; The Structure of Value, pp. 215-228; and Paul W. Taylor, Robert S. Hartman - 9789004496101 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 02:39:42PM via free access Notes 375 "The Normative Function ofMetaethics," Philosophical Review, 67 (January 1958), p. 29. 62. Hartman, The Structure of Value, pp. 58-60. Chapter Two 1. Goethe to Zelter. 2. Tobias Dantzig, Number: The Language a/Science (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930). 3. Edwin Arthur Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Physical Science (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), p. 76. 4. William H. Werkmeister, Theories ofEthics (Lincoln, Neb.: Johnsen Pub. Co., 1961 ), pp. 409 ff. 5. Henry Lanz, In Quest of Morals (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1941). 6. Albert L. Hilliard, The Forms a/Value (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950). 7. Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgment (New York: Hafner Press. 1974), First Introduction, Sect. 5. 8. Ibid., Sect. 6. 9. A. C. Ewing, "A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good," Mind, 48 ( 1939) in Readings in Ethical Theory, eds. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), pp. 231-249; and The Definition ofGood (New York: Macmillan, 1949), Ch. 5. 10. G. E. Moore, "Freedom," Mind, ( 1897). Quoted by L. Susan Stebbing in "Moore's Influence," The Philosophy ofG. E. Moore, ed. Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University. 1942), p. 520. 11. See Senator J. William Fulbright, "The University and American Foreign Policy," Center Diary, 12 (May-June 1966). Santa Barbara, Cal.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. 12. H. A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 21 (1912), pp. 21-37. See also D. Z. Phillips, "Does it Pay to Be Good?" Proceedings ofthe Aristo­ telian Society, ( 1964-1965), pp. 45-60. 13. Henry Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality (New York: McGraw­ Hill, 1950), Chs. 4 & 5; and Richard D. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1953). 14. Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940), p. 131. I 5. Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in Readings in Ethical Theory, eds. Wilfrid Sellars and John Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952), p. I. 16. Charles L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind, 46 (1937), pp. 14-31. 17. Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944), p. I. 18. Ibid., pp. 207-209. 19. Ibid., p. 21. 20. Ibid., p. 207. Robert S. Hartman - 9789004496101 Downloaded from Brill.com10/02/2021 02:39:42PM via free access 376 THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD 21. Ibid., p. 272. 22. Ibid., pp. 9, 134, 156 and pass. 23. Clarence I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1947), p. 366. 24. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 225. 25. Ibid., p. 132. 26. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Goethe's Color Theory. Arranged and ed. Rupprecht Matthaei (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971), section on Isaac Newton. 27. Charles L. Stevenson, "The Nature of Ethical Disagreement," Sigma, 1-2:8-9 ( 194 7-1948); reprinted in Great Traditions in Ethics, eds. Ethel M. Albert, Theodore C. Denise, and Sheldon P. Peterfreund (New York: American Book Co., 1953), pp. 341-347; and Ethics and Language, Ch. 11, and pp. 158 ff, 185, 198-199, 222, 261, 270, 328ff. 28. A. P. Brogan, "The Fundamental Value Universal," Journal of Philosophy, 16:4 (1919); Edwin T. Mitchell, A System ofEthics (New York: Scribner, 1950); S5ren Hallden, On The Logic of "Better" (Lund: C. W .K. Gleerup, 1957); Georg Henrik von Wright, The Logic ofPreference (Edinburgh, Scotland: University Press, 1963). 29. Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry (New York: Humanities Press, 1963 ). 30. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1952); Henry Margenau, Ethics and Science (Princeton, N .J.: Van Nostrand, 1964 ). 31. Bertrand E. Jessup, Relational Value Meanings (Eugene, Or.: University of Oregon, 1943 ). 32. Edmund Husserl, ldeen zu einer reinen Phiinomenologie und Phiinomeno­ logischen Philosophie (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1976), par. 9; Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 193 I), p. 54. 33. Otto Bruhlmann, Physik und Tor der Metaphysik (Munich, Germany: E. Reinhardt, 1935). 34. G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1903), p. 6. 35. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena (Riga, Prussia: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1783), par. 3. 36. Daniel Christoff, Recherche de la Liberte (Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957) and Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), Ch. 7, Sect. I. 3 7. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics (London: Methuen & Co., 1930), p. 2; Paul A. Schilpp, Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1938). 38. Immanuel Kant, Grundlegungzur MetaphysikderSitten (Riga, Prussia: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1797), Preface and Second Section, first footnote. 39. Immanuel Kant, Metaphysic he Anfangsgruende der Naturwissenschaft, Werke, Vol.4 (Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter, 1968), Preface. 40. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (Kfinigsberg: F. Nicolovius, 1803), Peface. 41.
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