Seizing on Weakness Allied Strategy for Competing with China’S Globalizing Military
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SEIZING ON WEAKNESS ALLIED STRATEGY FOR COMPETING WITH CHINA’S GLOBALIZING MILITARY TOSHI YOSHIHARA JACK BIANCHI SEIZING ON WEAKNESS ALLIED STRATEGY FOR COMPETING WITH CHINA’S GLOBALIZING MILITARY TOSHI YOSHIHARA JACK BIANCHI 2021 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2021 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS Toshi Yoshihara is a senior fellow at CSBA. He held the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies and was a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. Dr. Yoshihara has served as a visiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego; and the Strategy Department of the U.S. Air War College. He currently teaches a graduate course on seapower in the Indo-Pacific at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. His latest book, with James R. Holmes, is the second edition of Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (Naval Institute Press, 2019). The book is listed on the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program, the Indo-Pacific Command’s Professional Development Reading List, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program. In 2016 he was awarded the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award in recognition of his scholarship on maritime and stra- tegic affairs at the Naval War College. Jack Bianchi is a research fellow at CSBA. He focuses on Asia strategy and U.S.-China long-term competition, to include the U.S.-China military balance, the defense of regional allies, nuclear strategy, technology issues, and political warfare. He was previously a Research Analyst at Defense Group Inc. where he performed bilingual (Chinese and English) open source research and analysis for U.S. government clients on Chinese cybersecurity issues and China’s defense-related science and technology development. His prior experience also includes work at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and in the Office of Investment Security at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. His writing has appeared in War on the Rocks, China Brief, and ORMS Today, as well as in CSBA publica- tions and in Chinese Naval Shipbuilding: An Ambitious and Uncertain Course. He is a Pacific Forum Young Leader and has working proficiency in Mandarin Chinese. He holds an M.A. in China Studies and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a B.A. in International Studies from Boston College, a certificate from the International Chinese Language Program, National Taiwan University, and a certificate from The Beijing Center for Chinese Studies, University of International Business and Economics. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors are indebted to many individuals for their contributions to this report. The authors are grateful to Captain James E. Fanell, USN (Ret.), (Geneva Centre for Security Policy) and Christopher D. Yung (Marine Corps University) for their detailed and thoughtful feedback on an early draft of this monograph. Many thanks to the participants who attended two workshops held in Washington, DC and Canberra, respectively. Both meetings generated important insights and ideas that helped frame the report. Special thanks to Ross Babbage who convened the outstanding workshop in Canberra. At CSBA, Thomas G. Mahnken and Evan B. Montgomery provided valuable recommenda- tions that advanced the study’s analytical aims. The authors would like to recognize Grace Kim for her diligence throughout the project, especially during the early writing phases of the report. Finally, the authors thank Benjamin Noon for his research assistance and, in particular, James Mersol for designing the graphics and for shepherding the monograph through the production process. CSBA receives funding from a broad and diverse group of contributors, including private founda- tions, government agencies, and corporations. A complete list of these organizations can be found on our website at www.csbaonline.org/about/contributors. Cover: The PLAN destroyer Haikou (R), frigate Yueyang (L), and supply ship Qiandaohu (C) are seen conducting underway replenishment in the Pacific Ocean during the Rim of the Pacific multinational naval exercises on June 13, 2014. Credit: Hu Kaibing/Xinhua/Alamy Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . i CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . 1 Why a Globalizing PLA Matters ............................................. 2 How Allied Strategy Can Leverage Chinese Weaknesses ........................... 4 CHAPTER 2: COMPETING VOICES ON CHINESE WEAKNESSES . 7 It’s All About Power ..................................................... 8 Beware Chinese Weaknesses ............................................ 10 Evolving Thinking About Chinese Military Weaknesses ........................... 13 An Analytical Blindspot? ................................................. 17 CHAPTER 3: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CHINA’S WEAKNESSES . 19 Defining Strategic Weakness and Strategic Vulnerability .......................... 19 China’s Conception of National Power and Its Strategic Goals ...................... 20 Testing China’s Strategic Weaknesses. 22 China’s Demographics: A Methodological Illustration ............................ 25 Rationales for Case Selection ............................................ 29 CHAPTER 4: CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC WEAKNESSES . 31 China’s Geospatial Surroundings .......................................... 32 Composite Land-Sea Power Concept. 37 The First Island Chain .................................................. 42 The Island Chains in the Missile Age ........................................ 46 Geography and China’s Global Ambitions. 49 CHAPTER 5: WEAKNESSES IN GLOBAL POWER PROJECTION . 51 Defining Global Power Projection. 52 China’s Proliferating Overseas Interests and Chinese Military Strategy ............... 55 The PLA’s Current Difficulties in Defending China’s Global Interests .................. 57 The Impact of China’s Force Structure Tradeoffs ................................ 60 Limits of PLA Global Power Projection Platforms ................................ 65 Confronting Difficult Choices .............................................. 70 CHAPTER 6: CHINA’S WEAKNESSES IN OVERSEAS LOGISTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE. 71 Western Assessments of PLA Logistics. 72 Limits of Self-Reliance .................................................. 74 Gaps in Capabilities and Infrastructure ...................................... 76 Measuring Up to the United States. 79 Potential Overseas Commitments and Liabilities ............................... 83 Assessing China’s Self-Appraisals .......................................... 85 CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIED STRATEGY . 89 China’s Weaknesses and Beijing’s Ability to Overcome Them. 89 The Various Costs China Must Incur to Overcome Its Weaknesses .................. 91 A Point of Departure for Allied Strategy ...................................... 94 Leveraging Chinese Vulnerabilities ......................................... 97 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION . .. 103 LIST OF ACRONYMS .. 106 FIGURES FIGURE 1: CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT ......................................33 FIGURE 2: THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S PAST ARMED CONFLICTS .....................35 FIGURE 3: CHINA’S CURRENT MAJOR TERRITORIAL DISPUTES ..............................36 FIGURE 4: CHINESE STRATEGIC VIEW OF THE PRC’S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .................39 FIGURE 5: CHINESE STRATEGIC VIEW OF U.S. POSTURE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC ..................45 FIGURE 6: LOCATIONS OF INTEREST TO THE PLA FOR OVERSEAS FACILITIES ...................78 FIGURE 7: SELECT U.S. TERRITORIES, ALLIES, AND PARTNERS RELEVANT TO U.S. POSTURE ........80 www.csbaonline.org i Executive Summary China’s military is going global. In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, beyond the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies and part- ners, who have enjoyed largely unobstructed access to the world’s oceans for the last three decades, will need to adjust to new military realities as the PLA makes its presence felt in faraway theaters. Washington and allied capitals should anticipate a future when a globalized PLA renders the operational environment far less permissive than they have enjoyed in the past. A decade hence, a globally present PLA will require the United States and its allies to revise assumptions about deterrence, reassurance, and warfighting across different regional theaters. The allied militaries will need to revisit their force structures, postures, day-to-day peacetime operations, and wartime planning as the forward presence of capable Chinese forces around the world becomes a fact of life. Given the velocity of the PLA’s global ascent, it behooves allied policy- makers to think productively about counterstrategies based on a sound assessment of Chinese power, including its strengths and