University of Nigeria
/ Research Publications
FOMBO, Gregory Fah
Author Author
PG/ Ph.D/98/25334
Title International Politics of Border Conflicts: A Study of the Nigeria-Cameroon Dispute, 1960-2002
Social Science Faculty Faculty
Political Science Department Department
March, 2006 Date Date
Signature
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF BORDER CONFLICTS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF BORDER CONFLICTS: A STUDY OF' THE NIGERIA-CAMEROON DISPUTE, 1960-2002
FOMBO, GREGORY FAH (~~l~h~198h5334)
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD)
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA
SUPERVISOR: G. AFORKA NWEKE
MARCH 2006 APPROVAL PAGE
Fombo, Gregory Fah, a postgraduate student in the Department of Political Science with Registration Number PGIPhDi98125334, has satisfactorily completed research requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science (International Relations). The work embodied in this thesis is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for another degree of this or any other university, to the best of our knowledge:
Pro #k' essor Obasi Igwe (Head of Department)
/ ' Professor Okechukwu lbeanu (External Examiner) DEDICATION
In memory of: paddy njeh (Fom60 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In the course of this research, I benefited greatly from the advice of my supervisor, G. Aforka Nweke, who has always insisted that it is the test of fire that makes good steel. I also gratefully appreciate the assistance of the academic staff of the Department of Political Science, especially Dr 0. Ogban-Iyam, Dr Jonah Onuoha, Dr A-M Okolie, Professors A.H. Asobie, M. Ikejiani-Clark, 0. Ibeanu, Obasi Igwe and E.C. Amucheazi from whom I learnt a lot in seminars and comments at various stages of this work. I obtained materials from the Cameroon National Archives Buea, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, SOPECAM Yaounde, International Relations Institute of Cameroon Library, Yaounde, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs Library, Lagos and, of course, the Nnamdi Azikiwe Library, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. I am grateful for their assistance. Particularly, I am obliged to Mr N.T. Imo, Mrs G. P. Anozie and Mrs Helen Inyang-Ubi of the Nnamdi Azikiwe Library, Mr James Agbo of the NIIA Library, Lagos, Mrs Rosemary Shafack of the University of Buea Library and Prince Henry Mbaine of the National Achieves, Buea. Many others in government departments also provided me with vital information especially Mr Gerald Shila of the Ministry of External Relations, Yaoundk and Pa David Kukar. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, is acknowledged for maps on pages 35-37; the BBC for map on page 38, the ICJ for maps on pages 95, 156, 157, 160 and 170; and Nigeria for maps on pages 125 and 126. I also deeply appreciate the assistance of Mr and Mrs Peter and Blessing Osuji who hosted me while on research in Lagos.. Without the financial, moral and spiritual assistance of my parents, brothers and sisters and a network of extended family members on whom I depended entirely for sponsorship, I could not have continued with my protracted stay in school. I am especially indebted to my Dad HRH Fon Fombo of Njindom, Mum, Dorothy W. Fombo and Grandfather, Nelson Anjeh for their spiritual intercession. Mr Ferdinand Fombo and Late Paddy A. Fombo were my principal financial benefactors. The entire Cameroonian community in Nsukka and a host of friends and colleagues were very inspiring in seeing this research through. I am especially grateful to Dr and Mrs Kennedy Chah, Messrs George Akuchu, Willy Fonta, Nnaemeka Okereke, Innocent Okafor, Uche Ogbuaya and John Ogirai, as well as, Ms Peps Tanyi, Mrs Harriet Foleng and Ms Elsie
E. Akah. Members of my Nsukka family - Mrs Rosemary Shafack, Nancy Njilele, Dr Luc
Ngongeh, Tabi I. Chum, Gerald Anoh, Francis Awah and Emma E. Kengo - were most instrumental when the spirit was drooping. Together with Ms Onyinye C. Anozie, my humble self and the rest of the staff of Awandanz Conzputers who typed the work, Emma Kengo kept an eagle eye over the typesetting. In spite of this depth of debts, I remain responsible for any pitfalls in the content of this thesis. Greg F. Fombo University of Nigeria, Nsukka March, 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS
. . 11 Titlepage ...... Certification Page ...... 111 Dedication ...... iv Acknowledgements ...... v Table of Contents .. .. vi List of Maps .. .. 1X Acronyms .. .. X List of Cases .. .. xi Abstract ...... xii
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Background .. 1 Statement of Problem 4 Objective of Study .. 7 Significance of Study 8 Scope .. 9 Literature Review .. 9 Methodology .. 19 Sources of Data .. 26 References and Notes 27
CHAPTER 2: EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM AND THE CREATION OF THE NIGERIA-CAMEROON BOUNDARY
Geography of the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary ...... 39 Historical Evolution of the Boundary .. .. 4 1 Post-German Era Boundary Instruments 1916- 1946 .. .. 45 British Administration and Obfuscation of the Nigeria-Cameroon Colonial International Boundary .. . . 46 End of Trusteeship and Independent Nigeria-Camcroon Boundary 5 1 Reactions to the Results ...... 55 Implications of the Results .. 5 6 References and Notes ...... 58
------_CHAPTER 3: GEOPOLITICS OF-THE NIGERIA-eAMERBONBORDER- Location of Disputed Territories and their Strategic Value .. 62 Economic Value of Disputed Territory ...... 63 Ethnicity and the Disputed Areas ...... 7 1 Peopling of the Chad and Bakassi Areas ...... 75 References and Notes ...... 7 7 CHAPTER 4: THE DIPLOMACY OF RESOLVING NIGERIA- CAMEROON CONFLICT, 1964-1981
DanareIBoudam Land Dispute ...... 8 1 Yaounde I Border Commission Meeting ...... 83 The NgohICoker Line ...... 84 The Maroua Declaration ...... 8 7 Unravelling of the Maroua Declaration and the Abandonment of Demarcation Scheme ...... 90 Desirability of a Clear Boundary ...... 94 Post-Maroua Boundary Politics .. .. 100
References and Notes ...... ,. 102
CHAPTER 5: REGIME TYPES AND THE DYNAMICS TO WAR, 1981-1993
The May 198 1 Border Incidence .., .. .. Nature of the Crisis .. Narrow Escape from the Precipice .. Resolution of the May 1981 Crisis .. .. Continuity and Change in Leadership and Leadership Styles Nigerian Press, Public Opinion and the Slide to War .. Countdown to the 1993 Crisis .. References and Notes .. ..
CHAPTER 6: THE 1993 CRISIS AND MEDIATION
The Nature of the Border War Conflict Resolution Measures .. .. French Involvement and Mediation ...... Role of Togo and other African Offers in Mediation .. OAU and UN Involvement .. .. References and Notes
CHAPTER 7: THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE RULING ON THE NIGERIA-CAMEROON BOUNDARY CASE Parties to the Case ...... 152 Issues at Stake and ~rpnenisof the parties .. 152 Reactions to the Ruling .. .. 173 Consequences of the Judgment .. .. 179 Critique of the Conduct of the Case .. 181 References and Notes .. 187
vii CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion .. .. Recommendations ...... Projections .. .. References ......
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCES .. ..
APPENDICES ......
... Vlll LIST OF MAPS
Maps 1-3: Various Sections of the Nigeria Cameroon Boundary from Lake Chad to the Bight of Biafra ...... 35-37
Map 4 Flashpoints of the Disputed Border ...... 38
Map 5 Nigeria-Cameroon Maritime Boundary showing Point G to be East of the Equidistance Line .. .. 93
Map 6 Nigerian Map of Maritime Zone prior to 1992 Revision showing Bakassi as part of Cameroon .. .. 125
Map 7 Nigerian Map of Maritime Zone after 1992 Revision showing Bakassi as part of Nigeria ...... 126
Maps 8 Lacustrine Boundary as Determined by ICJ 156 + Maps 9 Boundary in the Lake Chad Area .. 157
Map 10 Contentious areas on the Land Boundary .. .. 160
Map 11 Gulf of Guinea showing Third Party Interests.. .. 171 LIST OF CASES
Burkina Faso V. Republic of Mali
Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening, 2002
Canada v. United States of America, 1984
Denmark V. Norway, 1993
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad, 1994
Qatar V. Bahrain, 2001 ACRONYMS
AG Action Group BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CCNC Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons CEMAC Communaut6 Economique et Monitaire de 1'Afrique Centrale CNAB Cameroon National Archives Buea DO District/Divisional Officer ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EEC European Economic Community EU European Union ICJ International Court of Justice b IRIC Institute des Relation International de Cameroun International Relations Institute of Cameroon KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (Committee of State Security) KNC Kamerun National Congress KNDP Kamerun National Democratic Party WP Kamerun Peoples Party LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission MNCs Multinational Corporations NBA Nigerian Bar Association NCNC National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons NIIA Nigerian Institute of International Affairs NPC Northern People's Congress NPN National Party of Nigeria OAU Organisation of African Unity UC Union Camerounais UDEAC Union DouaniPre et Economic de 1 'Afrique Centrale UNKJNO United Nations Organisation UNGAOR United Nations General Assembly Official Records UPC Union des Population du Cameroun ABSTRACT
The emergence of many African countries from colonial rule in the 1950s and 60s brought grim prospects of widespread border conflicts. These fears were borne out of the fact that European diplomats who had only limited knowledge of local realities artificially forged most of the boundaries of African territories. Although many actually erupted in the immediate post-independence period and a few continue to crop-up here and there, determined efforts were made by African leaders in different fora, using diverse instruments to stem the tide. As a result of the efforts, many of the disputes were quickly brought under control. However, some of these disagreements continued for long to bedevil relations between neighbouring African states. This thesis attempts a case study of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute, which bears the hallmark of territorial-cum-boundary disputes worldwide and has persisted for over four decades, albeit with limited bloodshed. The study iS centred on the protracted territorial and boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. These countries share a common border of over 1600km that traverses diverse ecological sectors of hot plains, grassy mountains and mangrove swamps, from Lake Chad to the Bight of Biafra. In spite of many shared social, economic and political affinities, which could form a basis for very close ties or even a form of union, for over four decades, both have been lurked in a border and territorial dispute in which relations between them have been characterised more by war or threat of war than diplomacy of mutual cooperation for development. An indepth examination of the background, evolution, issues of the conflict, including the role of third parties in their attempts to mediate and resolve the dispute constituted the object of this study. Specifically, the aim of the study was to describe, analyse and explain the nature and escalation of the dispute, and explore the prospects for a permanent settlement or at least, securing a modus vivendi for less conflictual co-existence among these countries and by extension all other African countries in similar situations. Highlighted especially is the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling of October 10, 2002, on the dispute, reactions to the judgement, and the implications of the verdict on bilateral relations between the two countries, and international relations in general. Theories of nationalism, provided the methodological rubric under which this study was carried out. It was assumed in this study that European imperialist activities in the last two centuries established most borders in Africa, including our case study. However, the basic element explaining conflicts over these borders today is nationalism, which is manifest in the form of a struggle for economic attainment and psychic aggrandisement, by nationals and their
xii leadership. Nationalism provides a critical explanation for the frequent war stirrings emanating from borders that go beyond the defence of territorial integrity of states. Intensive field research yielded archival data on colonial and postcolonial treaties and administrative reports, which were critically analysed. Extant data were also obtained from libraries to complement the archival and these offered diverse collections of informed scholarly opinions on boundary and related issues. A content analysis of the data enabled us to arrive at our findings. Analysis of the data revealed that, economic nationalism inspired by the mineral and other natural endowments of the disputed areas, is central to the dispute. Besides this, domestic political forces in these countries and their colonial background synergised with the basic economic element to reinforce the conflict situation. The wholly legalistic considerations embodied in the International Court of Justice judgement of October 10, 2002, which we have mitiqued proved to be, in essence, a novel vista for renewed bilateral diplomacy to resolve the dispute. However, because of the mixed feelings with which the judgement was received, we are yet to see the parties take full advantage of it to resolve the m6lCe. This notwithstanding, we considered a final settlement attainable within this framework. We therefore recommended greater functional integration of these countries and the West and Central African subregions to strengthen peaceful coexistence between them.
... Xlll CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
For over four decades of independence, Nigeria and Cameroon have been lurked in a border dispute in which relations between the two have been characterised more by war or threat of war rather than diplomacy of mutual cooperation for development. An indepth examination of the background, nature, issues of the dispute, including the role of third parties and their attempts to mediate and resolve the dispute constitute the object of this study. The import of this subject is suggested by Lord Curzon's assertion that "borders are the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace", of life and death to nations'. This assertion is corroborated by Spykrnan's statement that "whenever . . . pressures become unequal boundaries will
Several studies have indeed been conducted that point to a correlation between borders and war, though their findings are either controversial or inconclusive. In the Statistics of Deadly Quarrels, Richardson notes a "strong positive" relationships between frontiers and wars.3 Starr and Most, in a different study, also observe that: Borders may lead to high levels of international interaction and such interaction may, in and of itself, lead to more wars. Large numbers of borders create more close targets, which aggressive nations may choose to attack.. .. Finally, borders create uncertainty and nations may attempt to reduce that uncertainty by going to war.4
These studies suggest that, even if borders do not cause wars, they at least create the "structure of risks and opportunities" in which conflictual behaviour is apparently more likely to occur. Between 1950 and 1990 Paul Huth identifies 129 territorial disputes in the international system 5 , a list which Huth himself admits is not exhaustive.' Prescott notes that, except the qualified case of Australia, border-inspired interstate conflicts pervade all the continents of the world.' lnstances of this are legion. The Sino-Soviet antagonism of the 1950s and 1960s that had outward ideological trappings became exacerbated or even superseded by territorial claims along their over 2,700 miles b~rder.~China and India have gone to war over their disputed border9, while India and Pakistan have remained at daggers drawn over Kashmir till date". The conflicts within the former Soviet bloc, the Gulf wars" and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflicti2highlight the persistence and intricate nature of territorial conflicts well into the post-cold war world. While boundary disputes are dicey generally, in post-colonial Africa where the states are hard-pressed to find cohesive national ethos to keep the polities together other than the physical boundary, such conflicts carry more stakes. The historical origins and geographical location of most borders in Africa further compound the problem. African boundaries did not emerge from compromises and agreements between Africans but were rather imposed by European diplomats who drew them with inadequate knowledge of the geography of the areas and the existing # conglomerates of population. It was in recognition of this danger, especially as in the Somali-Ethiopia and Somali-Kenya problem", that the OAU wasted no time in passing the 1964 resolution14. By this resolution members pledged to respect as sacrosanct colonial boundaries as inherited at independence, in line with the concept of uti possidetis'5. However, even with this consensus (one recently reiterated by Kofi Annan when he qualified any attempt to review these boundaries as "tantamount to opening the Pandora's BOX"'^) there has been no such agreement on the exact location of many interstate boundaries in Africa. The unfortunate consequence of this is the continuation of border-related conflicts more than forty years after this resolution. As the recent internecine war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has again brought home the magnitude of tragedy that lies beneath the surface of border conflicts in ~frica'~,the overriding question is why do such conflicts continue in spite of the 1964 OAU resolution? And why is diplomacy rather than war not always used to resolve the border differences? Many reasons have been adduced for this situation by various authors. "Population overhang" across international borders according to ~ouvall~is often said to be an emotive issue that leads to disputes among states sharing such populations. ~r~sdale'~and ~ouval~~ have also argued elsewhere that in several areas in Africa, there are uneasy stirrings of irredentist claims sustained by groups whose traditional frontiers have been outraged by an international boundary. The Somalis straddled across the Ethiopia-Somali and Kenya-Somali borders; and the Ewes across the Togo- Ghana borders are examples. Boyd downplays the contribution of this to boundary conflicts, but acknowledges that these situations offer politicians a pretext for disputes which are often begun and pursued for other tangible (economic) than political reasons. 2 1 Prescott who opines that sometimes, hopeless claims have been launched to generate national cohesion when governments are facing serious domestic problems has expressed similar views in a somewhat covert cynical manner.22Whatever may be the motives for interstate border disputes, they constitute a serious element in the predisposition to use force rather than diplomacy in interstate relations. Commenting on the occurrence of border disputes in Africa Touval notes that: Such disputes continue to erupt from time to time. A few have been resolved, some were simply discontinued without solution and some continue to disturb relations between states.23
Suggestions like this of a persistence of these disputes, their irregular features and the havoc they cause continue to raise questions about the origin and nature of border disputes and the choice of policy instruments to resolve them. This of course, raises the fundamental question of the efficacy and efficiency of the policies to forestall or to nip them in the bud. Also of interest are questions as to what makes some disputes easily resolved, others "burnout", meanwhile some continue to bedevil relations among states for long. There is thus need for further inquiries into this phenomenon.
Although African countries (like all others) can adopt a preferred disposition towards their neighbours, the decision as to these neighbours was wholly a "hazard of history" or the sheer work of providence. Contiguity between Nigeria and Cameroon was largely as a result of the events of European colonial rivalries in Africa before, during and after the Berlin Colonial Conference of 1884-1885, which left much resentment between Britain and Germany when the latter outmanoeuvred the former to annex the territory of Cameroon. Britain had desired to have an uninterrupted control of the Gulf of ~uinea.~~These events and the outcome of World War I shaped the final boundary arrangements between the territories in a continuing kaleidoscope until independence in 1960161 when the disjointed British Northern and Southern Cameroons opted for different paths to independence. The bitterness left behind by the results of the UN-conducted plebiscite in this territory provided a classic recipe for dispute between Nigeria and ~ameroon.'~ ow ever, by entering into a series of bilateral cooperation agreements in 1963, coupled with other multilateral considerations in the run-up to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity, Nigeria and Cameroon apparently took steps towards more harmonious coexistence as neighbour2". Regrettably, this harmony did not last for long.,
Statement of Problem Nigeria and Cameroon share a common border of over 1600km that traverses diverse ecological sectors of hot plains, grassy mountains and mangrove swamps, from Lake Chad to the Bight of Biafra. These two countrids as well have many social, economic and political affinities, which could form a basis for very close ties or even a form of union. Some parts of both countries in the past were ruled as the same colonial realm. Contrary to expectations, relations between the two have been to say the least unstable. They have been passing through ebb and flow reflecting the perennial dispute between them over territories along their borders, and the border conflict features the most fundamental external challenge yet to the national interest of either side. Despite many years of bilateral talks in mixed border commissions, ministerial meetings and presidential summits, frenzies of external mediation efforts and finally, litigation at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague, the border problem remains unresolved. In the run-up to the Cameroon decision to take recourse in litigation at the ICJ, on December 2 1, 1993, a battalion of Nigerian troops occupied Diamant and Jabane, two islands off the Bakassi Peninsular. Nigeria advanced a number of contradictory explanations for the actions,27 amongst them the protection of Nigerian citizens living in the area from the exactions of Cameroonian gendarmes. In order to stem the growing crisis, by January 13, 1994, the moribund joint border commission was resuscitated and brought into action. Meanwhile, the crisis triggered some 18.000 Nigerians to flee the affected areas into Cross River In spite of an array of meetings to contend the situation, Cameroonian forces again came under sustained attack as Nigerian troops attempted to cut off the peninsula from the n~ainland.~~ These events ostensibly led Cameroon to take the matter to the Security Council, the OAU and the ICJ in March 1994. The border dispute is surprising because it is based on territorial claims almost forty years after the two states subscribed to the 1964 OAU resolution on the sanctity of territorial boundaries as inherited at independence. It was expected that this blueprint would offer a ready framework for quick resolution of any differences among African countries. Besides, these two nations have also knit a fabric of post- colonial accords on their borders that were meant to reinforce the colonial treaties. This has lend credence to the suggestions that, contrary to security concerns and doubts on the colonial status quo with regard to the location of the boundary often + cited as responsible for the dispute, the leitmotiv lies in the natural economic endowments of the disputed areas, the most prominent being the estimated 10 billion barrels of crude oil deposits underneath the mangrove swamps of the ~akassi.~'Press reports that by February 1994, Nigeria had captured "40 of the 52 potential oil wells and the two fishing villages on the ... area",3'give more credence to this thesis of economic calculation being at the centre of the disagreement.
Although relations between Nigeria and Cameroon took a dive in 1994, in fact it all started in the 1960s as a boundary dispute between two adjacent villages (Danare on the Nigeria side and Bodam on the Cameroon side).32It degenerated from then to a virtual contestation of the entire boundary from Lake Chad to the Bight of Biafra. The strategic posture of the belligerents on this border has since changed in consonance with Spykman's watchwords that; A sound foreign policy must not only be geared to the reactions of power politics, it must also be adjusted to the specific position which a state occupies in the world. It is the geographic location of a country and its relations with centers of military power that define its problems of security.33 Thus, Cameroon in her submissions to the ICJ in 1994 on the disputed borders, requested the eminent court to "specify definitively the frontier between Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria from Lake Chad to the sea".34 Cameroon's fears have led it to continue nebulous military pacts with its former colonial master, France, a situation which Nigeria is particularly uncomfortable with. Indeed, this has engendered a kind of security dilemma35. With their vaunted policies of peaceful diplomacy one wonders why this dispute has lingered on, leading to frequent bloodshed and severe disruption of economic activities in the area." Is it so intricate as to evade various attempts at resolving? Or is it an indication of the ineptitude and helplessness of NigeriaICameroon diplomacy in the face of passionate border issues contrary to orthodox views of their pragmatism? Much has been written on the military aspects of the dispute.37 Some academic attention has also been paid to this However, the existing volumes of literature on the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute have failed to articulate adequately, four major areas, namely; (1) the relationship between the various claims and existing agreements; (2) the relationship between the geography of the borders and the conflicts; (3) the inadequacies of each side's diplon~acyin pursuance of such vital national interest issues; and (4) assessment of the impact of the ICJ ruling of October 10, 2002, in sorting out the welter of claims by each side based on existing treaties, custon~sand eminent rulings on similar cases, as an attempt to free them from the border impasse. Specifically, the questions that demand investigation are as follows; (I) What is the relationship between the politics of European imperialism in Africa at the close of the 19'" and dawn of the 2oth centuries and the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflicts?; (2) 1s there any relationship between the presence of natural resources, particularly oil and the worsening border dispute?; (3) To what extent have the domestic policies of both countries helped to foster reconciliation, hinder and/or reinforce their efforts at resolving the conflicts?; and (4) What strategies have been adopted by the belligerents and the international community to resolve the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute?
Objectives of Study The general objective of this study is to examine the internal dynamics and international politics involved in border conflicts in Africa using the example of the Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute. This objective is realised by showing the Anglo- German (1884- 1914) and Anglo-French (19 16-1960) imperialistic deals over Cameroon as the diplomatic foundation and seal of the inherited post-colonial discord and how with time all these are related to the conflict situation of today. Thus, central to this study is an attempt to situate the border in its historical and geographical perspectives. The specific objective is to describe, analyse and explain the nature and escalation of the dispute, and to explore the prospects for a permanent settlement by searching hard and far for the complex of factors that have set Nigeria and Cameroon on the path of conflict. Under focus include the British administrative arrangements (or mis-arrangements) to safeguard the separate status of its share of Cameroon as a mandated territory of the League of Nations and later as a trust territory of the United Nations, although administered as an integral part of the colony of Nigeria. This marked the first attempts to ignore the international boundary. Past attempts at negotiating an end to the disagreement are examined and the outcomes analysed. Domestic exigencies on policies in Nigeria and Cameroon that have helped to diffuse and escalate the dispute at different points in time are critically examined, especially factors that led to the collapse of previous settlement^.'^ his study is also intended to show that the policy designers in Nigeria and Cameroon failed to capture the essence and shifting forces behind the border dispute. As such they failed to take decisive steps to stop once and for all each other's border probes. This study is also aimed at examining the role that has been played by the United Nations through its specialised agency, the ICJ, and other regional bodies in resolving border conflicts in Africa, in general. In such fora even a militarily weak country can stand its ground through astute diplomacy backed by international law to defend its national interest. To conclude this research, recommendations are made based on the findings for conflict management of border disputes in a continent in which imperialism, by creating artificial political communities, also implanted the national question as we know it today.
Significance of Study This study has both social and academic significance. There is considerable disquiet about conflicts, especially in Africa where they have greatly negated development and have remained topical. Recent interventions in such conflicts have had limited results be they inter- or intra-state. The frequent failures in intervention have led to a mood of "Afro-Pessimism" and "conflict fatigue" on the part of outsider^.^' Emphasis has thus shifted to containing the conflicts from escalating. Taking into consideration Bozeman's observation that African political processes cannot be adequately accounted for by simply applying findings from elsewhere (because of her empirical complexities)4', this work offers a good case study of the genesis of a conflict situation which carries the potentials of plunging the Central and West African sub-regions into a cataclysm and ruin. The study offers insights to both statesmen and international diplomats interested in resolving, containing or preventing conflicts; for the Nigeria-Cameroon border situation is unique and offers a good case study in that it reveals a distinct experience dictated* by the chequered colonial history of both countries. (Peoples on both sides of this boundary from Lake Chad to the sea have had a shared colonial experience either under German rule in Kamerun or British rule through Nigeria.) The Nigeria-Cameroon border differences have persisted for almost their forty- five years of independence. Facts have been obscured and beclouded by accusations and counteraccusations on the part of the belligerents, as well as by journalistic writings and sheer propaganda by both sides. Even after the UN ruling, passions have hardly given way to reasoning, especially as reflected in the press statements. This study is significant in streamlining the issues at stake and tracing the historic roots and stages of the dispute; and by so doing the way is illuminated for consideration of new policies that can further create an enabling environment to arrive at a modus vivendi between the two peoples, so that this melee will pass into history. The import of this has also been highlighted by A.1 Asiwaju who stressed in relation to this dispute that it is of "capital importance and significance" getting to the roots of the disagreement by way of research to facilitate its resol~tion.~~ By making a critique of Cameroon's response to the Nigerian probes and vice versa, in the Bakassi and other places on this border and with its recommendations, this study hopes to stimulate more research into the foreigfi policy making process in Nigeria and Cameroon. Perhaps better options can be proffered for the defence of the territorial integrity of the state than had been put in place before, since new developments in decision-making and foreign policy are of cardinal importance in realising the goals of the national interest. This study of international boundary disputes provides an interdisciplinary interlace of materials from history, geography, (international) law and political science in general. It is hoped this interdisciplinary dimension contributes to the generation of more data to support or discard existing theoretical knowledge on the phenomenon of border conflicts that has remained potent till today. Given that border conflicts pervade the world, it is hoped that this study may contribute to the burgeoning literature on conflict resolution. As Northedge and Donelan have argued "the notion that disputes can somehow be eliminated from the international system.. . is utopian". Rather efforts should be concentrated on the 8 management of the "inevitable" clashes of interest that must exist among states." Or as E.B Haas puts it ". . .conflict among states . . .is taken as a given; conflict is after all, almost a synonym for politics".44 The thrust thus, should be on management of conflict situations.
Scope The study is limited to the conflicting claims along the lacustrine boundary in the Chad area; the riparian dispute around the Kaila, the entire land border between Lake Chad and the sea and the maritime border around the Bakassi and adjacent islands (known as the Fish Towns in colonial days that are'the undisputable epicentre of the border dispute). The period of study is from 1960, when this international border re-emerged to the 2002 momentous ruling of the ICJ and its aftermath.
Literature Review The general issue of territorial and boundary conflicts in Africa has several underlying questions. Foremost are questions on how these boundaries were drawn, their effects and reactions to them. There is also the complex question of interpretation of the underpinning economic, social and political-cum-strategic benefits: how do we unveil them and how do our objective disposition come into play when considering them? What are the legal instruments and institutional arrangements for resolving ensuing conflicts? What factors, internal and external encourage or discourage the escalation of such conflicts? As far as these issues are concerned in the context of Nigeria-Cameroon dispute, its background, trough and peak nature, (especially the increased tension in the 1990s); NigeriaICameroon foreign policy orientations and African boundary diplomacy in general, myriad opinions and pseudo-explanations varying with the approaches to these questions have arisen. They are mirrored in the existing literature. ~ertslet~~and Ian rowl lie^^ offer collections of documents on the establishment of various boundaries in Africa. Hertslet's work provides an "eyewitness" account of texts of boundary treaties and other instruments as well as copies of correspondences between the various* contracting states and his own explanatory notes. Its unquestionable value notwithstanding, the work has remained unrevised after 1909, implying that subsequent adjustments on colonial boundaries in Africa in general and, particularly the Anglo-German boundary in Nigeria and Cameroon, up to 1913 are not reflected in this source. Brownlie provides these documents, including the post-First World War adjustments effected between the French and British after the defeat of Germany in the Great War all over Africa. His work published in 1979 allows him to comment on post-independence developments, which adds to the research value of encyclopaedia. A.C ~c~wen"~makes a similar study of African boundaries with emphasis on those of East Africa. Browlie's work is particularly relevant to the current research as a compendium of resource materials, especially for its information on the delineation of the present Nigeria-Cameroon boundary from Lake Chad to the sea and even its partial demarcation with pillars.48 Perhaps another work that shares this flair that lays emphasis on legal documents and negotiation stratcgies that were involved in establishing the agreements on the borders is the five-article sequel by Weladji that appeared in Abbia from 1974-1982.~~ he Nigeria-Cameroon border is the focus of the entire series. After establishing the legal status of this border, he gives the political setting of the present crisis, which is a key variable to understanding the exact nature of the conflict. He actually helps to situate the dispute (though partially) as more of a political than a legal phenomenon. He does this by establishing a link between domestic exigencies in Nigeria and the unyielding nature of the problem to attempted solution. However, his understanding of border problems between Nigeria and Cameroon is limited to the maritime area. Anene takes a more thorough and holistic approach to the establishment of Nigeria's bo~ndaries.~'With much vigour given by his perfect mastery of not just the historical facts, but also the ethnographic realities of Nigeria's border regions, Anene debunks the theory of Africa's and especially Nigeria's boundary arrangements being "mortally injurious" to the pre-colonial political order. Treating with remarkable details the ethnic composition of contiguous areas on Nigeria's borders, and the diplomatic negotiations that took place to establish them, Anene describes as being "unhistorical" and "dangerous" emotive phrases denouncing the existing international $ boundaries in ~frica." His elaborate treatment of the various tradeoffs among European states and the ethnic considerations they took, gives us an inkling of the enormous difficulties inherent in embarking on revisionism of the present borders of Nigeria to satisfy ethnic sentiments or claims, and by extension the rest of Africa; an endeavour which he describes as "utterly unrealistic". For sure, his argument is not that borders did not outraged the unity of some groups. But rather, there is no way this could have been completely avoided, especially in relation to the eastern boundary of Nigeria with Cameroon. While Anene treats with sympathy the cumbrous process of establishing Nigeria's borders, Emeka ~wokedi~~deplores the ill-defined nature of these borders and emphasises that like most others in Africa are the products of arbitrariness. He attributes intermittent border disputes between Nigeria and her neighbours to imprecision of boundaries, the presence of vital mineral resources within the frontier zones and what he calls "trans-border activities of nationals and government agents". Of import to this study is his discussion of efforts to resolve problems between Nigeria and her neighbours. Probably because of the focus on all the borders of Nigeria, his analysis is rather weak and his conclusions simplistic. For instance, his recommendations for stable boundary policies call for "intensified cooperation in economic, industrial, socio-cultural and political points of contact between these states" offers nothing new, given that he does not indicate how these issues over which they disagree can then be turned into issue of cooperation. Nor is it evident that he is borrowing a leaf from functionalists and neo-functionalists that do indicate explicitly how this can be achieved. ~siemokhal'~picks up this cue from a higher level. Armed with the analytical techniques of international law (as he claims) the author rather lopsidedly recounts the origins of the conflicts between Nigeria and Cameroon. After reviewing the strategic importance of the disputed Bakassi and surrounding islands he posits that the Anglo- German Agreement of 1913 that recognised German control of this area should be jettisoned for it was based on misinformed opinions on the part of the negotiators.5" He challenges the wisdom of the 1964 OAU resolution on boundaries and calls for a revision so as to "correct mistakes of the colonial past".'"his work is relevant to the + present study in two major directions. First it shares the concern of other analysts that erratic leadership could plunge Nigeria and Cameroon into full-scale war if these problems are not resolved. Second, by invoking international law and customs he exposes international litigation as a possible vista to be explored for a solution to the Nigeria-Cameroon crisis. Nwokedi and Esiemokhai share a characteristic patriotic acumen that rather lays emphasis on why Nigeria should wrest control of the disputed territories. Their studies do not lay emphasis on the legal-cum-historical facts of who owns disputed territory or where the colonial boundary was established. Rather this is assumed and the politico-strategic and economic benefits of the disputed regions are highlighted, giving the studies the savour of policy research. In a more critical analysis of the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon, G. Aforka Nweke focuses on the May 1981 cri~is.'~He analyses the response of the Federal Government of Nigeria to thc incident that led to the deaths of five Nigerian soldiers around the Bakassi Peninsular, from the decision-making perspective. He finds the decision of the Federal Government not to go to war with Cameroon to have been at variance with public opinion and the general consensus of politicians and the military in the country, as well as, inimical to Nigeria's national interest. However, his well structured analysis of the conflict still ends up reiterating the strategic and
economic importance of the Bakassi and adjoining islands - the holy grail of the Nigeria-Cameroon conflict - as being the "Achilles heel of Nigeria's maritime security"57 and underscores Nigeria's potential to have her way militarily, and not the legal issues or documents establishing the boundary. This study is particularly important to us in that it exposes the reluctance of the Nigerian leadership to take up a hard-nose military approach to the conflict. This reluctance he attributes to the lacklustre personality of the Nigerian leader, President Shehu Shagari, and his National Party of Nigeria (NPN), who prevaricated over vital issues, even though holding that the territory really belongs to Nigeria. Otherwise, looking at the distribution of military forces58 and other attributes of national power, which are overwhelmingly in favour of Nigeria, Nigeria could well have been tempted into full-scale invasion of the Bakassi Peninsula. + Like Nweke, Shagari pays some attention to the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute focusing on especially the 1981 crisis between Nigeria and ~ameroon.~~Beginning with a refreshing but familiar summary of the evolution of Cameroon under German, then French and British colonial tutelages which affected Nigeria's boundary, he argues that the diverse paths to independence taken by the British Northern and Southern Cameroons left Nigeria and Cameroon dissatisfied with the outcome of the decolonisation process. However authoritative this source might be, [the author was the president of Nigeria (1 979- 1983) during the May 1981 crisis] it does little to quell the controversies surrounding this border, particularly, in regard to postcolonial boundary instruments. He unwittingly joins those who argue that without ratification, the Maroua Accord was null and void, and also states emphatically that "It was clearly understood that the agreement signed by the two leaders would become law only after it was ratified by the legislatures of each of the two co~ntries",~'meanwhile, this seems not to have been stated in the course of the negotiations. Also, the shortcoming of the Accord as being overgenerous to Cameroon for gratification of support given to the Federal side in the Nigerian Civil War which he points, is also off the mark. This work is especially relevant to the study in that it exposes some of the dilemmas and quandaries a leader finds himself at the peak of such crisis. As he explained, Nigeria had a complete plan for a somewhat total war against Cameroon and not just limited reprisals as we have often been exposed to in the literature, but had to be more circumspect when this secret plan was leaked to France, the OAU Secretary General and Chairman and probably Cameroon, ahead of the D-day. Such leaks reflect a peculiar vulnerability and military weakness, which cannot be underestimated given that surprise, is of critical tactical importance in the conduct of war. This source also exposes the Civil War as an indirect element that influenced Nigerian foreign policy towards Cameroon. The traumatic experiences of the war, just eleven years before, played a critical psychological effect to weaken the predisposition to commit the country into another war. In spite of these insights it offers, the study is generally rationalistic, for obvious reasons, over the stance of the government. Two other studies in the 1990s on the Nigeria-Cameroon crises by Oladipo sholanke6' and Julius ~jinlcen~'~expose the unofficial* stance of both countries in these disputes. Both begin with refreshing renditions of the historical background in which the border between the two countries was created, but soon part company on how previous agreements on disputed areas should be treated. Sholanke's study tries to expose the wealmesses in previous treaties and protocols on which Cameroon's case against Nigeria is based. Noting the frequent pledges by leaders of both states to resolve the conflict peacefully, he concludes (rather erroneously) that in recognition of the weaknesses in previous agreements "both states have recently shown their readiness to redefine their boundary alignments"63 Meanwhile, Cameroon's vigorous defence of the status quo is exposed in Njinkeng's study in which he upholds the sanctity of various agreements concluded between the imperial powers in colonial days and later ones between Nigeria and Cameroon. These studies manifest the error in most works on the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute, especially in relation to the Bakassi Peninsula. Few have articulated the fact that the crux of the matter is a challenge of title rather than doubts as to where the boundary is located. It is only when a diachronic review is made of the widening claims by the parties that we can see the marked change of policy by Nigeria from 1992 when a new map of the federation was drawn and a corresponding intensification of the hostilities in the disagreements. This study hopes to fill this lacuna. A major school on African borders shares the common themes of colonial procedures for establishing the boundaries, sources of border conflicts and efforts at resolving them. zartmanb4,~shford~~, ~ouval", ~e~ner~',cukwurah" and ~c~wen~~ have articulated these in their various studies. Perhaps the most recurrent of these themes is that on the sources of conflict among African states. Zartman examines the intricate boundary problems of North and West Africa and sees the nature of the establishment of these boundaries to be problematic. To him they are flawed in that "unlike many of the world's borders, the boundaries here are not the walls and moats of history, natural defense lines whose terraces mark the military conflicts and diplomatic compromises of the nation's past." Rather most are geometric lines or are traced along riverbed courses and watersheds; established by colonialist whose knowledge of local geography was undoubtedly modest at the time.70 This led to disruption of long established social and economic zones, a situation that subsequently gave room or pretext for irredentism. Thus, irredengsm to him, like many other authors of this persuasion, is the recurrent source of conflict among African states. With similar examples, Touval subscribes to this7'. To them, Morocco's territorial disputes with Algeria, Mauritania and Spanish Sahara in the early 1960s are irredentist, for they were based on Morocco's claims that the territories were part of the 19'~century Sherifian Empire dismembered by colonial conquest and Morocco was desirous of their reunification. Touval again in similar vein72 situates the triangular territorial problems between Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya in the irredentist claims of the former. Douglas ~shford~~strongly agrees with Zartman and Touval that irredentist policies engender borderlterritorial disputes with neighbouring states, and goes further to explore the sources of irredentism. Focusing on Moroccan claims to Mauritania in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Ashford argues that irredentism only gained currency in Morocco two years after independence when clear disagreement had surfaced among the nationalist leaders. Although it is a fact that certain parts of Mauritania were in the distant past under the suzerainty of Morocco, he points out, had there been no breakdown in national solidarity and repeated failure abroad, this issue would have remained in the background. As he puts it; Only by reference to internal problems of the country's changing political system can the magnified importance of the irredentist question be explained . . . . They are convenient and attractive devices to create solidarity . . . the irredentist goal revives the spirit of the nationalist struggle and plays on intense patriotic feelings.74 These studies expose irredentism as a deliberate policy inspired by many (usually undeclared) reasons that unfortunately, leads African states into disputes. While Zartman and Ashford consider irredentism as principally a diversionary strategy for distracting the population from internal failings of the newly independent states, Anthony ~e~ner~%ontendsthat genuine sources of disagreement actually exist with regard to Morocco's borders. In many zones of the Moroccan border (like in several other borders of Africa in areas that were considered marginal lands) frontier zones rather than borderlines were the order of the day. Conflicts thus emanate from the ill-defined borders in some of these areas in Africa. Cukwurah and McEwen in addition to examining the myriad sources of disputes, lay more emphasis on the underlying international* laws involve and mechanisms for resolving territorial disputes, especially under the auspices of the Organisation of African With regard to the solemn pledge by African leaders to "peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration" Cukwurah notes that most leaders have ignored offers to use the machinery of the OAU to resolve territorial disputes77 and this posed serious challenges to the survival of the Organisation, especially in its infancy years. The above studies are generally state-based and accentuate rather political and legal dimensions of African boundary issues at the expense of relations amongst peoples. This approach leaves out a possible vista to handling discord among states over boundary matters. In contrast, another group to which, an so^', tern^^, ~siwaju~~)and ~jeuma'' subscribe, departs from the above in that they seek to highlight the relatively harmonious relations among Africa peoples along international boundaries, either through official or local efforts of divided peoples along them. While the work edited by Asiwaju reviews the situation of such partitioned peoples across Africa, Atem, Fanso, Njeuma and ark in do'^, focus on the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary peoples and government policies from colonial days to attenuate the negative effects of the artificial colonial borders on indigenous populations. As mentioned above, these studies by avoiding the usual territorial issues that often bring intractable disputes, offer insights into possible ways of managing border matters to reduce conflicts. They adopt a somewhat functionalist approach to borders that blunts conflict-inspiring political matters. Border disputes in Latin America and Asia especially, share similarities with those of Africa because of their common colonial backgrounds. The Sino-Indian border dispute and the India-Pakistan territorial dispute over Kashmir share many of the features of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute. Van ~ekelen~~gives a chronological and comprehensive review of the dispute between China and India, which like many in Africa, has the attribute of being a colonial relic. This dispute is also shown to be underlined by other (ideological) differences which helped to frustrate efforts at resolving them. While India fancied a legalistic approach to resolving differences based on treaty rights, established legal principles, historical facts and administrative precedence in the disputed area, China (more confident of its military capability) has adopted a nebulous position that rejects India's claims but without stating the + principles on which this is done. China thus exposes herself in this dispute to be revisionist. In similar vain, Pran choprag4 exposes the India-Pakistan dispute with remarkable pro-India passion. Religious differences between the nationalist leaders of the former British colony of India prior to 1947 left an irreconcilable chasm that resulted in the colony acceding to independence as two distinct countries - India (predominantly Hindu) and Pakistan (mainly Moslem). But it was the religiously mixed enclave of Kashmire that became an embodiment of the cultural conflict which soon led the two states to war. In this conflict, India that is numerically superior to Pakistan with perhaps a slight military superiority, stubbornly objects to any international involvement in the conflict through third party mediation unlike Pakistan's position that remains more amenable to the involvement of third parties in the mediation. A major similarity of importance to us in the Indian subcontinent to our present study is the disposition of one party in each dyad being loath to UN involvement particularly by way of arbitration. China, India and Nigeria in their respective (China-India, India-Pakistan and Nigeria-Cameroon) dyads eschewed arbitration, probably for want of confidence in the legal soundness of their respective positions The above literature has adequately articulated the rancorous processes and phases of the establishment of colonial boundaries, providing the resource materials generally for the determination of boundary claims. In the above review also, population overhang and irredentism have been established (or perhaps overstated) as major factors that lead neighbouring countries into territorial disputes. The significance of natural resources along borders as bates for territorial contests has been mentioned. The empirical literature on the dispute has generally been lopsidedly towards description of isolated incidents and, rationalisations of various government positions. Even policy measures for reduction of tensions have been proffered here and there, but they especially lack the dynamism proposed by recent research on functional analysis. A hiatus exists in the literature on border conflicts. This lacuna is even more glaring with respect to the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute. Existing studies as seen above have failed to articulate the crucial link between nationalism generally and e particularly, integral or militant nationalism and territorial disputes. The link has even become more apparent following recent developments in the Balkans, which has witnessed some of the worse scenes of carnage for territories in the recent past. The empirical literature above has many shortcomings as exposed within the review. Nothing is said about colonial administrative practice in the disputed areas, especially the Bakassi, during the period from 1916-1961 when Britain controlled both sides of this international border. These records if brought out will further illuminate the way for peacemakers and answer some of our research questions raised above. Also, other aspects of the conflict around the northern section of this border have not been well articulated in the existing literature. No seasoned critique has been made on the ICJ ruling of October 2002, on the Nigeria-Cameroon territorial dispute case, bearing in mind what informed the decision of the judges. Even more fundamentally, the isolated treatment and emphasis on various factors that are not adequately anchored within a
good theoretical framework have tended to remind us 'only about issues - like presence of mineral resources and marine life - which we know. It is only when these factors are interpreted within the right framework can their relative importance be assessed. It is hoped this study fills this lacuna. Methodology To analyse and explain the research problem as stated above, this investigation relies on theories of imperialism and nationalism. When combined in a single explanatory framework, these theories provide the critical analytical tools and variables for organising and evaluating the great mass of data on the evolution and escalation of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute and, for relating specific events to the wider issues and actors that constitute the milieu, vortex and the ultimates of the problem. The origins of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute date back to the advent of European imperialism in Africa in the 19~"and 20'" centuries. Imperialism according to Lenin, * . . . is capitalism in that stage of development in which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital has established itselc in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.85
It attained its highest stage at the close of the 19'" and beginning of the 20'" centuries.'(' ~n essential feature of imperialism is the division of the world among the great powers - Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, Portugal and spain." The period after 1870, argues Lenin, marks the beginning of the tremendous "boom" in colonial conquest;" while the First World War, which began in 1914, "is an imperialist war" regardless of various terms like "bourgeois-progressive" and "national-liberating" with which it has been "distorted or Lenin's theory of imperialism leans heavily on earlier theoretical formulations by Karl ~arx"and ~obson.~'In volume one of his magnum opus, Marx sets forth what he himself refers to as "The Modern Theory of ~olonialism",~~in which he demonstrates the connection between the changes in the capitalist mode of production in Western Europe and the new forms of interstate rivalries and the carving up of the world, through the process of what E.G. Wakefield calls "systematic col~nization"~)' into colonial empires and spheres of influence. Hobson's theory follows Marx's reasoning (although not a Marxist but a liberal himself). The thrust of Hobson's argument can be reduced to two propositions, namely (a) that the "partition of Africa" by European powers does not benefit the metropolitan power at large, but a few producers and investors; and (b) that the asymmetrical relationship between overproduction^' and "underconsumption" in the home countries is the motive force for imperialistic expansion and the division of the world.94 Karl Kautsky offers an alternative definition of imperialism, which sparked a great controversy within the communist camp at the dawn of the 20th century9'. Imperialism, according to Kautsky, is not a "phase" or "stage" of economy, but a policy, a definite policy "preferred" by finance capital. Kautsky defines the concept as follows: Imperialism is a product of highly developed industrial capitalism. It consists in the striving of every industha1 capitalist nation to bring under its control or to annex larger and larger areas of agrarian territory, irrespective of what nations inhabited those regions.96
As Lenin rightly pointed out, Kautsky's emphasis is on the political aspects of imperialism as a striving for control of territory. Though criticised by the former as being "narrow" and one-sided"" this conception captures better, the expansionist policies inherent in both industrial and agrarian polities before, during and after the late 19'" and early 2oth Centuries; the so-called "golden age of imperialism". Marxist authors agreed that the causes of European and American expansion in the latter part of the 19'~and early 20"' centuries lie in changes which took place within a maturing capitalist system though they have not agreed on whether it is a compulsion or a preferred disposition. Some theorists have regarded imperialism as a necessary condition of capitalist growth either because of the impossibility of continued accumulation of capital unless an effective demand is found among noncapitalist groups and societies98, or because of the desire to acquire investment
However, for a clearer understanding of the stated problem, we depart from these "ideal" conceptions of imperialism in the late 1800s and early 1900s to a perception of imperialism as a preferred orientation of policies marked by intense competition over economic resources fuelled by the activities of multinationals companies which in many respects, act as agents of imperialism within the "peripheral states". They stimulate a policy of expansion of central influence towards marginal or peripheral lands of the national territory in quest of avenues for their investments, which in turn leads to a clash of aspirations directed from diverse centres and engender conflicts in both trade and over territories. Within the national territory also, intense competition goes on pitting opposing ethno-nationalist groups with these MNCs supporting various factions that promise them handsome returns in mining concessions and trade, when the domestic conflicts are carried to a successful conclusion. Good examples of such imperialist activities by proxy that have fanned the ambers of conflicts in Africa are visible in the two Congos in the past decade. With this reconstruction, it is easier to understand the present dispute under study. The intense competition and continuing depletion of existing resources in both + Nigeria and Cameroon has led to a push from the centre to the peripheries where new ones have to be sought. In the wake of this, hitherto neglected and abandoned border territories have gained extreme importance. Because of previous neglect, boundary issues that could have been resolved but were ignored become flashpoints for war; dominating the speeches of politicians and elites in the opposing capitals. The elites whip up nationalist sentiments and elicit the support of the masses that also have stakes either as fishermen, herdsmen or petty-traders. Thus, it is seen that expansionist polices lead to conflict and arouse nationalism meanwhile, nationalism as shown below gives a renewed impetus to conflicts because of its exclusivist nature of "we" and "they". What is significant in the context of the present study is the picture imperialism depicts of the circumstances under which colonial territories were carved up; imperialists activities of the present epoch and the motivations behind them, which are largely economic and sectional. Thus a link is shown to exist between economic interest and territorial acquisitions, which ultimately lead to interstate rivalries over territory. Unlike the realist perspective of power politics'00 that usually attributes conflicts to be inspired primarily by security concerns, the above theories of imperialism point to economic factors as culpable. Also implicit from these studies are the differential benefits which Hobson suggests accrue to a few stakeholders (producers and investors in the developed countries, MNCs and the comprado ruling elite in Africa today), who because of their gains, continue in such expansionist policies at the expense of the state. Thus parochial interests push countries into conflict situations not the national interests which policy makers often portray they are pursuing. Theories of nationalism in the irredentist formulation, Risorgimento or integral analysis provide explanations to the phenomenon of territorial contest among states.lO' Nationalism connotes a wide range of conceptions, expectations and experiences which may all be directly or circuitously related to the mind set and aspirations of citizens of any given country.'02 Constructed around the trilogy of territory, state and nation or people, nationalism links an individual to the nation of his birth. During its first flourishing in early nineteenth-century Europe, nationalism was seen as a force + that would enable the peoples of the continent to cast off the fetters of their political, economic and social bondage. As a principle that inscribes self-determination upon the flags of people, nationalism supplied the demand for independent statehood legitimation in both 19'" century Europe and 20'" century Africa and Asia. It awakened great hopes and expectations'03.However, in Europe, especially after the First World War, the concept underwent a re-evaluation from its early tidings in the previous century. Nationalism seized to be regarded as a force that could lead Europe towards a better future of a more peaceful order among nations. It became associated, especially after the rise of National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy, as Huizinga puts it, primarily a "powerful drive to dominate"; a desire to "have one's nation, one's own state assert itself above, over, and at the cost of others ,, .104 This negative image of nationalism became stronger after the Second World War as it was equated with "bellicose aggression, the unbridled urge for expansion, and racism ,, . 105 The calamity of the Great War was blamed on nationalism. In spite of its revolutionary and liberating achieve'ments in Africa and Asia after World War 11, the European negative evaluation of nationalism predominates understanding of the concept. However, to consider nationalism and its history in terms of the variants manifested by Germany before and after the First World War and Italy between the Great Wars prevents a deeper understanding of its potency. As a political principle, it is currently very crucial in determining the foreign as well as domestic policies of many countries, especially newly independent states, and also very relevant in mobilising the masses against external opposition. Although there are many kinds of "nationalisms" Alter's typology groups them into two, namely; Risorgimento and integral nati~nalism.'~"his typology which though runs the risk of oversimplification, treats nationalism as a value-free, analytical category, and as a considerable heuristic device for describing and explaining the phenomenon of conflict among nations. Risorgimento nationalism or liberal nationalism is defined as "an emancipating political force that accompanies the liberation both of new social strata within an existing state, and of a people that has grown conscious of itself in opposition to a ,3107 transnational ruling power . . .. This serves as a medium for+ the political fusion of social groups, the formation of nations and their self-determination. The Greek, Italian and German unification movements of the 19'" Century, the Somali reunification drivelo8and that of ~ameroon"~in the 1950s and 1960s are epitomes of Risorgimento nationalism. Ideologues of Risorgimento nationalism such as Giuseppe Mazzini that was very instrumental in the 19th Century unification of Italy, considered the realisation of nationalist aspirations as a recipe for peace. To them, the order of nation-states would guarantee peace. It was a vision of a more humane and peaceful world order founded upon the plurality of free nations. But conflict is engrained in all forms of nationalism. Multinational imperial powers naturally regarded the principle of nation-state as an attack on their very existence; meanwhile, conflict is inert to any attempt at equating all nations and their aspirations. In multinational societies where nations virtually live on one another or multiethnic ones like most African countries, national aspirations come into conflict. Whether the aims of Risorgimento nationalism are unificatory or secessionist, conflict is bound to emanate from the aspiration. The second form of nationalism, which inspires even a more bellicose disposition by states, is integral, militant, right wing or extreme nati~nalism."~The philosophical foundation of this variant is a skimpy derivative of the Darwinian theory of natural selection and the doctrine of the survival of the fittest. Integral nationalism assets the interests of one's nation at the expense of others; replacing the slogan of national self-determination which is central to Risorgimento nationalism. What is "ethical" and morally justified is whatever serves the nation and its power; implying that injustice or even crime are acceptable insofar as they are committed in the name of the nation! In this lie the roots of ruthless persecution and violation of the law, genocide, expansionist foreign policy and the unbridled ambition of a "master race" seeking for Lebensraum, perpetrated in the 20'" century.
Theoretical Framework To render nationalism more relevant to our research problem, we adopt the economic interpretations of nationalism. Nationalism according to this school is the result of the tidal wave of modernisation that started in the 19~"century. This + "'modernisation', or more precisely economic development was not evenly spread.. .. Nationalism is, then, a compensatory reaction to this uneven development.""' It is a strategy to survive and prevent domination. Nationalism as the outcome of economic need becomes a force and a source of conflict when it is "refracted" into a society. The intelligentsia are agents of this refraction and are the main purveyors of nationali~m."~Harry ~ohnsonl'~and Albert re ton"^ have in their respective studies demonstrated the conceptual and practical links between "nationalism" and economic "national interest". Leaning on G.S. Becker's work'" in which he advanced the thesis
that individuals seek - in accordance with economic theory - to maximise their satisfaction, and that this satisfaction includes enjoyment of both psychic and material incomes, they identify nationalism with ownership by nat.ionals of various types of property and jobs and regard it as a type of collective consumption capital that yields an income of utility. C. Hah and J. Martin summarise the main thesis in the following reconstruction: 1. There are two ways in which nationalistic utility can be acquired. The first is through observation within the country of foreign operations: the property yielding income and status to the foreigner becomes property valued by the nationalists. The second mechanism - contact with and observation of other nations - provides knowledge of the forms of property that are highly regarded in other societies. 2. The national group will try to maximize its control over desired property and jobs.. .. 3. Given the two mechanisms by which nationalistic utility becomes attached to specific items of property (proposition I), these items will tend to be those which yield benefits primarily to the elite, the educated, the entrepreneurially qualified, and some of the wealthy. Thus there is an inherent class slant to the economic interest in pursuing nationalism. I"
Thus, nationalism provides critical explanations to the frequent war stirrings emanating from borders that go beyond defence of territorial integrity of states. Territorial differences alone need not lead to war given that there are hardly any terra incognita or terra nullius today. Other factors inherent in the passions of nationalism (economic and psychic gains) tend to blur the vision of state leaders to opposing claims over territory. Because there is a "basic self-doubt involved in any serious concern about identity, nationalism involves hostility towafd other nations and a tendency to adopt a double standard of morality with respect to them"' 17. Put into perspective, the varying support of the populations to policies on the disputed areas in both Nigeria and Cameroon can be interpreted in relation to expected gains. Nationalism also accounts for not just the present antagonism between Nigeria and Cameroon but portrays this conflict to be partly related to the frantic efforts of the centres of both countries to control the borderlands (that is British Cameroons) in the run up to the plebiscite of 1961. In this respect thus, the conflicts can be construed as residual irredentism by one or both sides to an unfinished business of political independence and national unity begun in 1960. The fact that the disputed areas were at one time or the other in no distant past under the same administration to which Nigeria and Cameroon are successors, in a sense, inspires the irredentist appeal. In the foregoing theoretical consideration, history, geography and economic needs are the basic categories around which the analysis of the protracted and recurrent nature of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute is structured. The advantage of this framework is two-fold; we are allowed to capture the driving forces of the m&e and difficulties of making concessions by either side and, it also adequately accounts for the nature, outcome and reaction to the ICJ decision of October 10,2002. Hypotheses The following hypotheses anchored our empirical investigations: 1) There exists a relationship between the politics of European imperialism in postcolonial states and the Nigeria-Cameroon border conflict.
2) Economic resources provide a nucleus for crystallisation of nationalist territorial aggrandisement and engender conflict.
3) There exists a relationship between domestic politics and the recurrent nature of border disputes.
4) International involvement in border conflicts in postcolonial states provides avenues for their resolution.
Sources of Data # The history of European imperialism in Africa, particularly in what is today Nigeria and Cameroon, from the embryonic stage when these emergent states were created in 1884- 85 and, the post independence history of these two states form the laboratory for our empirical findings for this work. Thus the study is basically diachronic. The study relies mainly on analysis of primary documents such as official reports of colonial administrations, treaties by the imperial powers especially Britain, Germany and France and, postcolonial agreements and administrative reports; government gazettes, communiques of various ministries, embassies and other arms of the respective governments; ICJ decisions and statements and, any other valuable documents that lend themselves to archival and library research. Systematic analysis of these documents allows us to situate patterns of events in their historical context and to establish their subsequent development in proceeding years. Secondary interpretative works, especially by eminent scholars and distinguished statesmen who are not just experts but also participants, complement these documents. Many of these studies appear in mimeographs, conference papers, journal articles, published textbooks etc. Meticulous use is made of them. A special category of materials exists in the newspapers and magazines. In cognisance of the biases that are often inherent in this source, effort is made to consult widely from both sides of the arguments. By so doing, the shortcomings have not dented their usefulness. They have been fully perused and winnowed to establish the facts from farce. The titles of these papers are given in our bibliography. References and Notes
1 Lord Curzon, quoted in Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press 1972).
2 Nicholas John Spykman, American Strategy in World Politics (~ewYork: Harcourt Brace, 1942) p. 390.
L.F. Richardson, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1960).
4 Harvey Starr & Benjamin Most, "A Return Journey: Richardson, Frontiers and Wars in the 1946-1965 Era", Journul of Conflict Resolution (22, 1978), p. 445.
5 Paul K Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Michigan University Press, 19962, pp 27-29.
6 Paul Huth does not include the Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute in his elaborate list of international conflicts in Africa. According to him, Nigeria's actions in the disputed regions never amounted to a border dispute since Nigerian intervention was purportedly to protect Nigerian citizens living there from the exactions of Cameroonian paramilitary gendarmes (see ibid pp 216-225). The ambivalence of the Nigerian official position on this conflict again came .to light in 1994 when, the visiting Nigerian Foreign Minister, declared to the press in Yaounde that "there was no area in dispute" between Nigeria and Cameroon [see Cameroon Tribune (March 8 1994) p.31.
7 J. R.V. Prescott, "Boundary Disputes", in Joel Krieger, (ed.) The 0.xford Companion to Politics of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) p. 84
8 C.P. Fritzgerald, "Tension on the Sino-Soviet Border", Foreign Affairs, 45, 4, (July 1967): 683-693.
W.F van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1964).
10 For more see, Ratna Tikoo, Indu-Pak Relations (New Delhi: National, 1987); S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1981), especially. ch. 6.
I I Territorial disputes remain a very potent source of international conflict though this might take a long time for real fighting to ensue. For instance, Iraqi claims against Kuwait date back to the 1930s, when Britain, on leaving Mesopotamia, carved out Kuwait as a separate state against the wishes of Iraq. It was not until 1990 that Iraq finally attacked Kuwait to press her claim to the whole kingdom. For more on this conflict see, David Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Lawrence Freidman & Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). '* See for example, Ritchie Ovendale, The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wurs, 2nd edn. (London: Longman, 1992); G. F. Fombo, "Africa and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948- 1980", M.Sc. Project, Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, 1998.
13 For more on this tripartite conflict see, John Drysdale, "The Somali Frontier Problems", The World Today 20, 1 (1964): 1-5; John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London: Paul Mall Press, 1964); Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1963).
14 OAU, Resolution AHGIRes. 16(1), Cairo, 1964.
15 The doctrine of Uti possidetis is a variant of the principle of territorial integrity first adopted by Latin American States whereby the administrative divisions of the Spanish Empire in South America were deemed to constitute the boundaries for the newly independent successor states. Reinforced by the 1964 OAU resolution which upholds that colonial frontiers existing at the date of independence constituted a tangible reality and that all member states pledge themselves to respect such borders, this doctrine has been extended by the ICJ as logically connected with the phenomenon of independence wherever it occurred in order to protect the independence of new states like in Africa, Asia and the former Soviet Union. The raison d '&re of Uti Possidetis is given as follows: "The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for territorial boundaries at the moment when independence is achieved. Such territorial boundaries might be no more than delimitations between different administrative divisions or colonies all subject to the same sovereign7' (ICJ Reports, 1986, p 566). For more see, for example, Malcolm N Shaw, International Law 4th edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 356-360.
''Kofi Annan, Interviewed over BBC's International Question Time programme, 1998; I. William Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies 111, 2 (1 965), p. 16 1.
17 For more on this tragic conflict see, BBC Focus on Africa, "Hate Thy Neighbour" (Oct- Dec 1998): 20-25; BBC Focus on Africa, "Trench Warfare" (April-June 1999): 20-25.
18 Saadia Touval, "Africa's Frontiers: Reaction to a Colonial Legacy", International Affairs, 4 (1966): 641-659.
I9 Drysdale, The Somali Dispute.
20 Touval, Somuli Nationalism.
2 1 J B Boyd, Jr, "African Boundary Conflicts: An Empirical Study", African Studies Review, XXII, 3 (1979): 1-14.
22 Prescott, "Boundary Disputes", p. 84. See also JRV Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries (London, 1987).
23 Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, p. 24. '"or more on Anglo-German colonial rivalries in what is today Nigeria and Cameroon see especially, J.C. Anene The International Boundaries of Nigeria: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation (London: Longman, 1970); Harry R. Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons 1884-1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938); John Hargreaves, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa (New York: St Martin Press, 1966).
25 See Vanguard (Lagos, June 6, 2003), pp. 18-19; Bolaji Akinyemi, Foreign Po1ic.v and Federalism: The Nigeria Experience (Lagos: Macmillan, 1986).
26 For an analysis of these agreements see Jean-Emmanuel Pondi and Laurent Zang, "Cameroon-Nigeria border Cooperation: Presentation and Analysis of Bilateral Agreements and Treaties", Mimeograph, IRIC, Yaounde.
27 Africa Today (MayIJune 1997), p. 49
28 Ibid,
'' See for example, Afiaican Concord (March 7, 1994), p. 16.
'' The first recorded disagreement along this border, after the official protest of Cameroon against the Plebiscite results in British Northern Cameroons, occurred between the adjacent villages of Bodam and Danare in 1963 over a fell tree for making a canoe. However, today this area is no longer the bone of contention between Nigeria and Cameroon. As early as 1965, complaints were beginning to reach the Prime Minister's office in Buea, from the present Bakassi area that is at the centre of the maritime border phase of the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute. In a letter to the Prime Minister dated 5 November, 1965 the people of Isangele complained that, ". . .the Nigeria Police still persist in crossing the boundary of Cameroon. On the 2ndof November, 1965, Nigeria Police crossed the boundary from Ikang . . . to Emong Ebeg fishing port on our river bank and arrested nine persons ...." Similar complaints continue to fly to opposite administrative headquarters today. See files Nos. 1372 and PM0 1971S1, Cameroon National Archives, Buea.
33 Nicholas J. Spykman, quoted in Edgar S Furniss, Jr, "The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Politics", World Politics 4, 3 (1952), p. 357.
34 International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and Orders, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria) Request for the Indication of Provisional Meusures, Order of 15 March 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 7.
35 The concept of security dilemma describes the situation where a state in building up her defences inevitably provokes the anxiety of its neighbour that perceives it as being a threat to their own security. For more on this see Huth, Standing Your Ground, p. 3 and more especially, note 5. 3 6 The exact casualty figures for this conflict remain highly guarded military secrets. However, media reports indicate that both sides have been incurring quite some loses, not least, as a result of the difficult terrain in which some of the fighting went on. For a report on how the war was prosecuted in the Bakassi see, Richard Conwell, "Bakassi - European's Came-up Legacy of Farce and Tragedy" Africa Today, 3, 3 (1997): 47-50.
3 7 See for example, African Concord (Nigeria), 7 March 1994: 14-23; Newswatch (Nigeria), 14 March, 1994: 16-18; Cameroon Tribune, 4 March, 1994: 3-4; 7 Mars 1994: 6-8.
38 These studies focus on various aspects of the dispute with varying scope and depth. A comprehensive review of them is given below. Salient ones include, G.Aforka Nweke, "Policy Response to the May 1981 Nigeria-Cameroon Border Crisis" in Gabriel 0. Olusanya and R.A. Akindele (eds.) The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria, 1960-1990, (Lagos, NIIAIVintage, 1990): 398-420; C. Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border" Abbia 27-28 (1974): 157-172; 29-30 (1975): 163-189; 31-33, 1978: 173-193; 34-37 (1979) pp 359-380; 38-40 (1982): 213-271
39 One such agreement that appeared initially like a breakthrough but which soon collapsed is the Maroua Accord of June 1, 1975 signed by presidents Gowon for Nigeria and Ahidjo for Cameroon.
40 D Smock & C Crocker (eds.) African Conflict Resolution: The U S Role in Peucemaking (Washington, USIP) p. 104.
4' A.B. Rozeman, Conflicts in Africa (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976).
42 Punch (October 21, 2002) p. 39.
43 F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Political Aspects (London: Europa Publication, 1971), p. 1.
44 E.B. Haas, "Conflict Management and International Organization, 1945- 198 1" in Paul F. Diehl, (ed.) The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns and Insights (Chicago, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1989): 189-223.
45 Sir E. Hertslet, The Map ofAfrica by Treaty, 3'd edn. 3 volumes, (London: HMSO, 1909).
46 Ian Browlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diploinutic Encyclopuediu, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1979).
47 A.C. McEwen, The International Boundaries of East Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 197 1).
48 Browlie, African Boundaries , pp 553-587.
49 Weladji, "The Cameroon-Nigeria Border" Abbia 27-28, (1974): 157-172; 29-30, (1975): 163-189; 3 1-33 (1978): 173-193; 34-37, (1979): 359-380; and 38-40 (1982): 213-271. 50 Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria.
" Ibid p. xv
52 Emeka Nwokedi "The Politics of Inter-African Boundary Conflicts: A Study of Nigeria and her Francophone Neighbours", Quarterly Journal of Administration, XIX, 1&2 (Oct, 1984- Jan, 1985): 45-60.
53 E.D. Esiemokhal, "Reflections on Some International Legal Aspects of The Nigeria- Cameroon Boundary and Territorial Disputes", ABU Law Journal, n.a. (1 982): 37-5 1.
54 Ibid: pp. 40-41
'' Ibid p. 40
56 G. Aforka Nweke, "Policy Response",
57 1bid p. 41 5
58 See The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1999- 2000 (London: OUP, 1999) especially p. 255 (Cameroon) and 270-27 1 (Nigeria).
5 9 Shehu Shagari, Shagari: Beckoned to Sewe, An Autobiography (Ibadan: Heinemann, 2001), see esp. pp 358-366
Ibid, p. 360.
6 1 Oladipo Sholanke, "Delimiting the Territorial Sea between Nigeria and Cameroon: A Rational Approach", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 42 (April 1993): 398-41 1 h2 Julius Njinkeng, "International Dispute Settlement: Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria - Origin of the Dispute and Provisional Measures", African Journul of International and Comparative Law, 9 (1997): 287-3 10.
63 Sholanke, "Delimiting the Territorial Sea between Nigeria and Cameroon" , p. 405.
64 I William Zartman, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", The Journal qf Modern African Studies, 3, 2 (1965): 155-175.
"'Douglas E. Ashford, "The Irredentist Appeal in Morocco and Mauritania" The Western Political Quarterly XV, 4 (Dec. 1962): 64 1-65 1.
66 Saadia Touval, The Boundaly Politics of Independent Africa.
67 Anthony S. Reyner, "Morocco's International Boundary: A Factual Background", The Journal of Modern African Studies Vol. 1, No. 3, (1 963): 3 13-326. 68 0 A Cukwurah, "The Organisation of African Unity and African Boundary and Territorial Problems: 1963-1973", Indian Journal of International Law 13, 2 (1973): 179-206.
69 McEwen, The International Boundaries of East Africa.
70 Zarhnan, "The Politics of Boundaries in North and West Africa", p. 155.
7 1 Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa, especially chapter 2.
72 Touval, Somali Nationalism.
73 Ashford, "The Irredentist Appeal in Morocco and Mauritania".
74 Ibid, p. 649.
75~eyner,"Morocco's International Boundaries": 3 16-3 17. # 76 In addition to the above-cited studies see also, 0.A Cukwurah, The Settlement ofBoundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1967) for a more general review of this process in the world.
77 Cukwurah, "The Organisation of African Unity and African Boundary and Territorial Problems", p. 183.
78 V.G. Fanso, "Tran-Frontier Relations and Resistance to Cameroon-Nigeria Colonial Boundaries, 19 16-1945'' PhD thesis, University of Yaounde, 1983.
79 ~eor~eAtem, "Cameroon-Nigeria Relations, 1884-1960: A Study in Political, Economic and Social Interactions Between Two Neighbouring States" PhD thesis, University of Calabar, 1984.
80 A.I. Asiwaju, (ed.) Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Acvoss Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1984).
" Martin Z. Njeuma, "Cameroon-Nigeria Frontier: Model For Culture of Peace, 1890- 199 1" Journal of the Cameroon Academy of Sciences, 2, 3 (2002): 183-201.
82 Bawuro M. Barkindo, "The Mandara Astride the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary" in Asiwaju, (ed.) Partitioned Africans, pp. 29-49.
83 W.F. van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China (The Hague: Martinus Hijhoff, 1964).
84 Pran Chopra, India 's Second Liberation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974)
" V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975), p. 106.
86 Ibid 87 Ibid, section iv, pp. 87-104.
*'Ibid. p. 92.
89 V.I. Lenin, On War and Peace (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), p. 7.
90 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 Vols. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1954).
9 I J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1902)
92 Marx, Capital, vol. 1 Ch. XXX, pp. 7 16-724.
93 Ibid. pp. 716-71 7
94 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 85. For contemporary analysis of the theories of imperialism by Marx and Engels, Hobson and Lenin, see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia: J.R. Lippincott, 1971), ch. 6: 172-183.
95 Karl Kautsky, Die Neue Zeit, 1914,2 (Vol. 32).
96 Karl Kautsky, quoted in Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, p.108
" [bid,pp: 108-109
98 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964).
99 Hobson, Imperialism.
loo See for example Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976); Huth, Standing your Ground, especially, chapter 3.
101 Several authors have conceived various theoretical interpretations to explain territorial disputes based on various forms of "nationalisms". The work by, Naomi Chazan, (ed.) Irredentism and International Politics (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991) offers a good analysis of how a state's policy to redeem foreign-controlled territory containing ethnically similar people inspires conflict among states. Peter Alter, Nationalism, translated by Stuart McKinnon-Evans (London: Edward Arnold, 1989) also pays theoretical consideration to both Risorgimento and integral nationalisms as prime motivators of conflict.
'02 See for example, Anthony Smith, "Nationalism" in Encyclopaedia of Government and Politics Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1992): 1114-1127; A. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (London: Duckworth, 1983); Hans Kohn and Wallace Sokolsky, African Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1965).
103 Alter, Nationalism, p. 24 "I4 Johan Huizinga, Men and Ideas. Essays on History, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 97.
"" Alter, Nationalism, p. 27
'(I7 Ibid.
108 Touval, Somali Nationulism. lo9 See Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); Victor LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); Richard Joseph, "National Politics in Postwar Cameroun: The Difficult Birth of the UPC" Journal of African Studies, 2 (1975-76): 201-229. b
'lo Alter, Nationalism, p. 38 ff.
111 Peter J. Taylor, Political Geography: World Economy, Nation-State and Locality, 3rd edn. (London: Longman, 1993), p. 21 8.
112 T. Nairn, The Break-up of Britain, quoted in ibid, p. 219
113 Harry G. Johnson, "A Theoretical Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States" Political Science Quarterly, LXXX, 2 (June 1965): 169-185.
"'Albert Breton, "The Economics of Nationalism" Journal of Political Economy, LXXII (1964): 379-386.
115 Garry S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
1 I6 C. Hah and J. Martin, "Toward a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism" WorM Politics 27, (July 1975) p. 366.
117 Harry G. Johnson, "The Ideology of Economic Policy in the New States" in Harry Johnson (ed.) Economic Nationalism in Old and New States (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), pp 124-141. For quotation see p. 126. Maps 1-3: Various Sections of the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary from Lake Chad to Bight of Biafra
Section one: 13' Parallel to 1 lh Parallel
NIGERIA
Source: United States, Department of State, International Boundary Study: Cameroon-Nigeria Boundary (Washington: Department of State, 1969) Section two: 1 l'hto gth Parallel
Source: United States, Department of State, International Boundary Study Section three: 8&Parallel to Bight of Biafra
NIGERIA
Source: United States, Department of State, International Boundary Study Map 4: Flashpoints of the Disputed Border
Source: http://www,bbc.co. uWbakassi CHAPTER 2 EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM AND THE CREATION OF THE NIGERIA- CAMEROON BOUNDARY
The Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute constitutes a complex, widening territorial jostle between the two neighbouring countries from independence till date. Though Nigeria and Cameroon gained independence and became players on the international scene only in 1960, the origins of their conflict could be traced to the period of the European "scramble" for colonies in Africa, which dates back to the second half of the 19~''century, as well as the intriguing and what others have called the "artificiality" of the various boundaries which they established to demarcate their respective colonies. The chapter revisits the evolution of this boundary, exposing the calculations and "wisdom" of colonial negotiators, which eventually established the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary. A close scrutiny of the available evidence reveals the colonial arrangements provided only, background and marginal reasons for such a protracted dispute, because existing treaties spelt out fairly well the location of the boundary. This chapter, however, first places the boundary in its geographical perspective.
Geography of the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary The border between Nigeria and Cameroon can be differentiated into roughly four physical and ecological sectors. In its northernmost part, the land boundary traverses Lake Chad and the neighbouring plains at an average altitude of about 300m above sea level. This unbroken plain during the rainy season from June to September, is inundated over large areas by waters of the Yedseram River and its tributaries. This area, especially as one approaches Lake Chad, becomes completely waterlogged during the rains. During the dry season which is longer, the.soi1 loses the excess water and becomes hard, providing rear water, cultivable land and pasture. Meek points out these fertile lands however, require heavy labour in clearing and ditching and further redirection of the available water for meaningful farming. This has gradually over the years encouraged a drift of population to the area.' Beyond this, the second phase which can be considered as the land boundary is a near continuous chain of mountains and valleys only broken by Benue valley near Yola. The area provides the source of headwaters for many rivers that drain into either the Benue and Cross River basins that flow into Nigeria or the Sanaga and its tributaries that flow into the Atlantic on the Cameroon coast. The predominant human activity in this sector is grazing although there are patches of cultivated grounds. This sector continues with a gradual descend from the Savanna mountainous region through more peaks and valleys and traverses very dense equatorial forests before approaching the coast. Describing this border, Anene gives a vivid account of its features: . . . the region stretching from the Bamenda plateau to the Alantika Mountain peak south of Yola, is one of fantastic mountain formations, including plateaux, parallel ranges and innumerable hill-tops. These are broken into by deep ravines which provide the river systems through which tributaries flow north-westwards to thk Benue and north- eastwards to the Faro. The Benue-Faro confluence is in the centre of a broad plain, some eighty miles by forty miles, dominated by Yola. Between the Benue and Lake Chad the geographical configuration repeats the features of the region south of Yola. There are the same irregular masses and a broken sea of granite peaks. The Yadseram valley, however, provides uninterrupted access to the plains of Ornu. The irregular mountain formations, north and south of Yola, gradually disappear as one moves eastwards into Cameroun Republic, to give way to a low plateau covered with grass in the north and thick tropical forest in the south.2
David E. ~ardinier~also notes these striking features of the border area, which have contributed to the fragmentary political units and intriguing human settlement patterns elaborated on below. Within this sector are two zones: a narrow belt of rugged forest with several peaks and a grassy zone of plateaux adorned by many peaks rising to altitudes between 4,100 and 8,200 feet. The third geographical sector of this border is the coastal region that descends into the area of the Bakassi Peninsular and the adjoining islands. This area is in the trough of the Gulf of Guinea with predominantly mangrove swamp vegetation. The Akpayafe assumed to be at the boundary in this area; the Rio del Rey and Ndian River to the east, as well as, the Calabar and Cross River to the west dominate the hydrology of this generally amphibious environment. This area is somewhat believed to be an Eldorado, abound with not just marine and aquatic life but substantial deposits of crude oil. The fourth and last sector of this boundary is the maritime zone characterised by a broken and adjacent coast. This maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon also ends in an ill-defined tripoint with Equatorial Guinea. The presence of Bioko Island (Fernando Po) belonging to Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe within this gulf further complicated delineation and demarcation efforts and the fact that the latter pair was not party to the dispute at the Hague precluded a comprehensive judicial ruling on the entire maritime boundary between these countries. Considerable oil deposits in this area and the marine life have impassioned emotions and compounded efforts, and at the same time, accentuated the need for a t clear demarcation of the maritime zone. It therefore constituted a critical part of the proceedings at the ICJ. The import of understanding the geography of the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier to guide our appreciation of the border dispute cannot be overemphasised. As noted above, the geography of most of the zones has impacted or even dictated the settlement patterns along the boundary. Besides its direct impact on settlement patterns, equally critical is the fact that human activities along the border are also dependent on the geography, which indeed carries a higher premium for developing societies that depend more heavily and directly on the immediate environs for subsistence. Exploitation of hydrological resources on one side of the border affects, for instance, the flow pattern of rivers that take their rise and flow across to the other (e.g. persistent wrangles over water management on the River Kalia). There is the significant overhang of population and human activities across the border, especially where the same people straddle the boundary. In the maritime zone, natural resources in the form of marine life and oil deposits lie across the border, providing opportunities for intense competition and bickering over their control.
Germano-British Era Evolution of the Boundary British traders had long standing interest in this part of West Africa that later became known as Nigeria and Cameroon. Before the age of empire creation in Africa, trade, slavery, missionary activities as well as adventure had attracted Englishmen to this area.' Pidgin English, for instance, was widely spoken among the coastal peoples and the business class. British Baptist missionaries had opened stations in Douala and Bimbia since 1845. However, the British Government had limited interest here and even turned down an offer in 1833 by natives to cede the mainland from Bimbia to Rio del ~e~.~It is doubtful though; if the kings of this area understood exactly what their offer meant. More plausibly, they were simply manipulated by (European) traders because they desired the protection of their home governments in areas where they operated." Such alleged invitations also came from kings of Douala for annexation of Cameroon even before the Germans did. It was not until 1884 that the British Government finally decided to annex the area. But by then it was too late for Britain to establish a complete domination as a genuine race had indeed begun among # European powers for colonies in the area. Germany deceptively dispatched Dr Nachtigal who concluded treaties with the Douala kings on July 12, 1884, for the annexation of the Cameroon coast for Germany a few days ahead of the British Consul Hewitt who was charged with this duty for Britain. On July 12, 1884, a German Protectorate was declared over Cameroon. This proclamation was preceded by a long period of manoeuvring by German commercial interest in Africa to enlist the support of their home government to join the race for colonies in Africa and Asia. It had been a policy of the German Imperial Government with Otto Von Bismarck as Chancellor to avoid any form of colonial entanglements that could lead Germany into conflict with the then established colonial powers, viz Britain, France, Portugal, Spain and Belgium. It was not until 1884, ahead of the Berlin Colonial Conference of 1884-85, that Bismarck changed his mind on the issue of acquisition of c~lonies.~ At around the same time or precisely on June 5, 1885, Britain declared a protectorate over the territory between the Protectorate of Lagos and the west bank of the Rio del Rey which was later renamed in 1893 as the Niger Coast protectorate." Discussions on the demarcation of the boundary between these contiguous protectorates were begun in 1885 and were increasingly made clearer as negotiators on both sides gathered more information on the claimed territories. The last settlements on the Anglo-German boundary in Nigeria and Cameroon were arrived at in the agreements of March 11 and April 12, 1913.~In many respects these agreements were a formalisation or refinement of the agreements preceding it, especially that of 1909 which took some two years to negotiate between 1907 and 1909. Thus, the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary was largely settled between Britain and Germany before outbreak of the First World War. The entire boundary had been delineated and, partly demarcated with pillars leaving little doubts as to its location. But following the defeat of Germany in this war and the lost of all her colonial possessions, including Cameroon, the situation changed. Events of the First World War completely changed the fate of Cameroon. The war that started in Europe was quickly carried to the colonies. German forces in spite of their dogged resistance in Cameroon were finally+ overrun in 1916 by a combination of British forces from bases in West Africa, especially Nigeria, and French and Belgian forces from bases in French Equatorial Africa and Belgian Congo, respectively.'0 At the end of the war in Cameroon in 1916 Britain and France after an attempted condominium embarked on a partition of the territory. The condominium, which was envisaged in 1914 when Britain and France first agreed on a joint conquest of German colonies in Africa, with Cameroon inclusive, could not be realised in practice. Shortly after military operations began in German Kamerun, mutual suspicions of future territorial calculations bedevilled relations between the two allies over a joint and equitable administration of Cameroon. The British invoking military necessity successfully maintained an administration that was essentially British in the very important port city of Douala, as well as its environs, right to Buea and Victoria. The rest of the territory was either administered by the French where their forces captured or by British officials from Nigeria where British forces captured. Meanwhile, even before the official partition as Declasse had articulated in a correspondence to Bertie (dated June 6, 1915), a good chunk of territory in Cameroon had reverted to France before the campaign could be concluded in Cameroon. In this forthright note he stated that I do not think there could be the least objection to our replacing immediately under French administration, territories ceded to Germany by . . . convention [of November 11, 19 111 and which, by our means alone, we have now retrieved. I' As soon as the Germans were dislodged from their entrenched position in Yaounde and ahead of their final collapse in Mora negotiations were opened between Britain and France for the final partition of Cameroon on an agreeable formula, abandoning the attempted condominium that had led to serious misunderstandings between the two allies.I2 At the negotiations, France demanded Douala and most of the rest of Cameroon with Cambon the French delegate intimating that the "French colonial party were excited over Cameroon". He argued that France coveted Douala above all as the only port that could serve its equatorial African colonies. However, this claim is spurious given that the French were in control of neighbouring Gabon with a considerable coastline and Douala in itself, had no good harbour. In spite of the fact that the British had contributed more militarily to the b conquest of German Kamerun and had dominated the administration of, especially, Douala and the neighbouring coastal districts in the course of the war, they conceded to French demands pretty easily, abandoning their long proposed boundary line that was to begin from the mouth of the Sanaga river. Rather a boundary (Picot Line) further west, from the mouth of the Mungo was agreed on. Two main reasons can be advanced for the British reluctance to have a fair share of Cameroon. Firstly, as Cambon had rightly pointed out, Britain by not accepting French assistance in the capture of German East Africa had effectively shut off the French against any claims there and in any case this area was more important to the British than Cameroon. So Britain was more disposed to make concessions in Cameroon. Secondly, there was also a genuine desire in British colonial circles to make concession to the French so as to sustain the public morale in the war effort in Europe and elsewhere. The negotiations that ended on March 6, 1916 adopted the Picot Line as the provisional boundary between the British sphere to the west and the Frcnch to the east. By this partition Britain had about one-fifth of what was left of German Kamerun and France had four-fifth. Despite some uneasiness in Britain, particularly in the Colonial Office, over the special consideration made to France, little was changed in the subsequent post-war negotiations that opened in March 1919. The Milner-Simon Declaration of July 10, 1919 finally settled the partition of the German colony into British and French spheres. This declaration was mainly an endorsement of the 1916 Picot line. It was subsequently appended to the mandate agreement in accordance with Article 22 of the statutes of the League of Nation and officially became one of the most important instruments on the definition of the Nigeria-Cameroon border.
Post-German Era Colonial Boundary Instruments, 1916-1946 Logically, the Picot Line and the Milner-Simon Declaration are the first instruments on this boundary during the period. In consonance with the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919 in which it was stated that; The Boundary commissioners shall be authorised to make such minor modifications of the frontier line as may appear to them necessary in order to avoid separating villages from their agricultural lands . . . [and] deviations shall be clearly marked on special maps and submitted for the ajproval of the two Governments; on 29 December 1929 and 30 January 1930 Sir Graeme Thornson, Governor of the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria and Paul Marchand, Commissaire de la Rkpublique Fran~aise au Cameroun signed a further very detailed agreement (henceforth known as the Thomson-Marchand Declaration) clarifying the alignment of this border. The Thomson-Marchand Declaration was approved and incorporated in an Exchange of Notes dated 9 January 1931 between A. de Fleuriau, French Ambassador in London and Author Henderson, British Foreign Minister (subsequently, "Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes"). Again, it was not a significant departure from the previous agreements between Britain and France over their boundary in Cameroon. What turned out to be a major change (which was not evidently so at the time of its conception) was the 1946 Order in Council Providing for the Administration of the Nigeria Protectorate and Cameroons, subsequently known as the "1946 Order in Council". The edict was enunciated in pursuant to a decision taken by Britain on August 2, 1946, to reorganised the administration of its disjointed share of the
Cameroons. The territory was divided into two - Northern and Southern Cameroons - to be administered respectively, as integral parts of the Northern and Eastern Regions of Nigeria. The Order in Council contained a detailed description of the boundary between these administrative units which following the diverse paths chosen by the territories in the plebiscite of 1961, turned out to be part of the international boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon today.
British Administration and Obfuscation of the Nigeria-Cameroon Colonial International Boundary In spite of apparent British fury over the lost of Cameroon to Germany in 1884, colonial authorities in Britain were not particularly excited with the occupation of Cameroon. As explained above the initial German annexation of Cameroon was achieved thanks to British procrastinations on doing so ahead of the German. When they again had the opportunity of establishing a strpng presence in Cameroon following the defeat of Germany and the forced surrender of its colonies according to the dictates of the Treaty of Versailles, Britain preferred territories elsewhere like Tanganyika. As Ronald Robinson et al., have shown, the Kamerun question (that is, partition) was considered in a wider global diplomatic context." The Foreign office seized the opportunity to concede territories in West Africa to France, Britain's principal ally in the war and rival in the colonial race, in order to secure East Africa considered more vital to British interest. Thus the main objective for Britain was to tidy up its frontiers in Nigeria, provide access routes by road and river, and to an extent, reunite divided peoples along the former Anglo-German Boundary. It was with this in mind that the British sought and obtained from the French some slight adjustments of the 1916 Picot Line by taking back from the French Uba, Billa Kilba, Holma, Zummu Malabu and Gurin.
Terms of the British Mandate in Cameroon: While agreeing to a cession of all German colonies in favour of the Principal Allied Powers in accordance with article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed on June 28, 1919, Articles 22 and 23 of the League of Nations made provision for the Mandate system under whose auspices the former colonies were to be administered. The agreement was permissive for the mandatory to be at liberty to: . . . constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his sovereignty or control, provided always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate.I4 These provisions were sufficiently vague to allow even more elbowroom for the mandatory to carryout its will. Under Article 2 Britain became responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants.I5
With this Britain opted to administer her disjointed share of Cameroon as adjuncts of the contiguous parts of neighbouring Nigeria. Britain's grand design in 1916 was to annex its share of German Kamerun to ~igeria.'~k he British had acquired this elongated bi-partite shaped territory in order to fill in the Nigerian boundary and had never intended to erect a new and separate administrative unit. But the terms of the mandate agreement (which was an American inclusion into the post-war settlement) forestalled this. As such, while striving in principle to maintain the juridical entity of the Cameroons as a mandated territory of the League, in practice Britain embarked on an administrative integration of the territory into Nigeria, consistent with its initial goal for acquiring the territory in 1916. The British authorities, citing administrative convenience dismembered the territory before joining the pieces to various administrative units of Northern and Eastern Nigeria. Although this policy led to very serious consequences in regard to future political developments in British Cameroons, the inconveniences cited by Britain were real. The narrow, elongated and bisected nature of the territory, together with the formidable geographical barrier of the Mambilla escarpment, made the separate administration of the British Cameroons practically difficult considering the parsimonious policies that inspired empire administrators."
Implications of the Integrative Policy of Britain: In the northern part of the territory (that became known as the British Northern Cameroons from 1946), Dikwa Emirate was reconstituted and administered as a division of Bornu Province. Meanwhile, the rest of Northern Cameroons was reorganised into Adamawa Emirate and placed under Adamawa Province, dominated by Yola. The entire province came under the Emir of Yola who was later officially known as Lamido of ~damawa.'~The Nigerian legal system also replaced German legislation from February 28, 1924 in the Cameroons. Generally, this gamut of British actions, especially the more positive ones of the mandatory between 1959 and 1961, led to orientation of every aspect of life in the territory to be centred on the Northern Region of Nigeria. Subsequent nationalism in this part tended to be inarticulate and, at the critical moment favoured independence through integration into Nigeria, as a result of the comprehensive administrative integration that was effected. A pan-British Cameroons nationalism never emerged in the run up to independence. Britain even advanced the fact that there was little or no b contact between the Northern and Southern Cameroons to justify its argument for the results of the two territories to be considered separately at the 1961 plebiscite. As shown below this affected significantly the outcome of the February 1961, UN- conducted plebiscite in the territory and led to a fundamental change of the Anglo- German colonial boundary in this area. While British policy of administrative integration of the Cameroons under British Administration with the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria led to the unwholesome transformation of the northern colonial boundary, it also considerably contributed to the current dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon on the southern border, especially in the Bakassi area. Elements of the impending dispute were evident in the incongruities in policies under British colonial administration on both sides of the border In the first instance, administration of Southern Cameroons as an integral part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria negated the fact of an international boundary between the two territories. Coupled with the ethnic mix of the border area,19 and the seasonal fishing occupation of most of the occupants of the hotly disputed Bakassi and associated islands, movement across the border was without any form of impediment. Native Authority tax officials and law enforcement agents from Oron (Eket Division, Calabar), pursued defaulters and criminals right across the border to areas that were supposed to be controlled from Kurnba Division for the Southern Cameroons. For instance, while on tour in the Fish Towns area, the Acting D.O. for Kumba, Mr J.S. Smith, reported he met Oron Native Court messenger Henshaw with two Native Court warrants of imprisonment for residents (at least temporary ones) of Ine Oriong and Ine Tayu in British Cameroons. The D.O. of Kumba sent a memo No. W.T.1811926 of 20 June, 1926 to the D.O. of Eket advising him to see that the Native Authority desist from the practice.20 Other problems as well resulted from double domicile of the residents of the border areas particularly, those of the Fish Towns, that made tax collection difficult. A modus vivendi that entailed the mutual recognition of taxes paid in each other's territory was arrived at among local administrators of the contiguous divisions of Southern Cameroons and Eastern Region. This arrangement was formalised in 1928 and it was accepted that where taxes varied only the excess should b be paid to the neighbouring administration, but it did not clarify where the locus of power laid in this area. Confusion as to the exact limits of the jurisdiction of administrators on the Nigerian side continued in the Fish Towns right to the eve of the decisive 1961 plebiscite. The administrative officer of Eket Division went on tour in areas belonging to Southern Cameroons even at a time when the Southern Cameroons was no longer a part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. As he himself acknowledged in a confidential letter (No. cx12126) of February 28, 1958, it was thanks to local chiefs of the area that he was informed Mat Ekpa, Ine Atabong, Ine Etoi, Abana, Ine Odiog, Ine Atayo, Ine Okpo, Ine Abasi Aqua Obio Effiat and Ine Usuk, which he thought to have been part of his division, were on the east side of the Akpayafe and belonged to the ~ameroons.~'He further explained that attempts at collecting taxes from there were resisted lately and because of the revelations, it was only about then that he restrained his agents from entering these areas for forceful tax drives. While observing that the areas were not clearly marked in the maps available to him, he also acknowledged seeing a correspondence dated in 1937 between a chief in one of these areas and the Divisional Officer for Victoria (Southern ~ameroons).~~In order to enforce tax payment in the Fish Towns area, the said D.O. in his confidential letter to the D.O. of Victoria, proposed that tax collection should continue as before (that is, carried out by agents from both divisions) and balancing could then be done at higher levels of government. Although residents in the areas who were predominantly indigenes of the Eastern Region of Nigeria preferred to pay taxes (when compelled to do so) to agents of their place of origin, the prop,osal of the D.O. of Eket was misleading as it was bound to perpetuate the status quo in which the Fish Towns appeared like "a no man's land" in-between Eastern Nigeria and Southern Cameroons.' Responding to the letter from the D.O. of Eket, the District Officer of Victoria confirmed in a letter (No. V.2201408) dated 3 1 March, 1958, that the said areas were in Victoria Division and urged him not to send his tax collectors to this area. He further pointed out that his proposal for a solution had become more farfetched as the Southern Cameroons had ceased to be an integral part of Eastern Nigeria as was the case in 1928 when the modus vivendi was instit~ted.~~ b The D.O. for Victoria actually captured the peril in the policy of allowing agents from Nigeria to collect taxes in Southern Cameroons territory. In a correspondence to the Commissioner of the Cameroons (No. V2201409) of 31 March 1958, he further explained the risk involved in allowing the perpetration of the above confusion. In a trenchant statement he observed that; If the area is to remain part of Southern Cameroons, then it is better that no tax be collected than that it should be collected by agents of another region.24
Though this position of the D.O. for Victoria showed better understanding of the intricate relationship between British Cameroons and Nigeria, there is no doubt that policies of his predecessors and colleagues on the Nigerian side had set a bad precedence in this area. Firstly, residents there were not very willing to pay their taxes and when compelled, they were more disposed to pay but to Nigerian authorities based on common genealogy, rather than agents of (Southern) Cameroons where they were resident and carried out economic activities. Secondly, Native Authority agents from Nigeria had developed the penchant for collecting taxes and pursuing (alleged) criminals into this territory. It had since been difficult for them to understand that this area, dominated by their indigenes, is part of another country. On the other hand, the British administration in Southern Cameroon because of their parsimonious disposition, considered this area too expensive to effectively control and as such created a vacuum which was readily filled in by the administrators across the border. Although it actually did not matter much when Britain controlled both sides of the border, it set the stage for the conflict without them knowing the future consequences of their policies. This was a significant departure from the territorial policy of the Germans in this area where they strove had to create parallel port and trading facilities in the Bakassi area to stop the flow of trade from their colony into the British colony of Nigeria.
End of Trusteeship and Independent Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary Events at the end of the trusteeship of Britain in the Cameroons brought the most fundamental change to the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary after its gradual b establishment between 1885-19 13. Although the partition of former German Kamerun in 1916 between France and Britain in a sense moved the colonial boundary of Britain eastwards from what it was in 1913, for some reasons, this did not amount to a change of the Nigeria-Cameroon border. As a matter of fact, Britain's ultimate aim in obtaining a share of the former German territory was to annex it to Nigeria and "correct" boundary errors of the past. According to Lord Milner the British Secretary of State for the Colonies; We [Britain] shall not, indeed, have added much to our possessions in West Africa, either in the Cameroons or in Togo. But the additional territory [Cameroons] we have gained, though not large in extent, has a certain value in giving us better boundaries and bringing completely within our borders native tribes which have hitherto been partly within British territory and partly outside it.25
But the involvement of America in the war and the introduction of the League of Nations with its provisions for former German colonies, led to a modification of British plans. Instead of an outright annexation of her share of Cameroon, as initially envisioned, Britain had to adopt a somewhat compromise position of only administrative integration of the Cameroons with Nigeria. This was because of its international status as a Mandated Territory of the League of Nations, as explained above, which had to be preserved. And even this compromise administrative integration was met with substantial criticisms in the Permanent Mandates Commission, (which was the League of Nations supervisory body for mandated territ~ries)~'and became more unpalatable to the United Nations Trusteeship between 1946 and 1960. We can in one piece conclude that while the international boundary of Britain in her colonial realm in this area changed, the international boundary of Nigeria and
Cameroon remained as agreed upon by Britain and Germany between 1885 - 19 13. This boundary as shown above was only preserved as a result of the strong persistence to oversee by the supervisory authorities of the League of Nations and the United Nations much against Britain's designs. With independence granted to Cameroun under French Trusteeship in 1960 and British Nigeria in the same year, a formula had to be adopted to safeguard the attainment of independence by British administered- # Cameroons. It was agreed that a consensus be arrived at based on the opinion of British Cameroonians. On the ground in the Territory, opinion was divided among nationalist leaders between the two UN-sanctioned options of independence through integration with Nigeria and independence through reunification with former French- administered Cameroun.
Southern Cameroons: Opinion in this territory started shifting from better representation in the Eastern Region within Nigeria to separation, after the Eastern Region House of Assembly crisis of 1953, which led to the collapse of the Macpherson Constitution. The Kamerun National Congress (KNC) party in Southern Cameroons led by Dr EML Endeley petitioned the British Government for the territory to be separated from the Eastern Region following the crisis. In the elections later that year within the whole of Nigeria, the party campaigned for separation from the Eastern Region and even mooted the idea of reunification with French Cameroun. After reunification was mentioned in the early 1950s, the KNC leader later became lethargic over the issue and this led to a split within the party. The dissenters, owing to discontent emanating not only from the growing ambivalence on the issue of reunification by the leader of the KNC, but also his continuous inclination to associate with Nigerian-based political
parties - this time the Yoruba dominated Action Group (AG) - formed the Kamemn National Democratic Party (KNDP). While the KNDP wanted immediate dissociation of the Southern Cameroons political groups from Nigerian political parties, the KNC leader was disappointed only with the Igbo-dominated National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and switched over to association with the Action Group. Meanwhile, the rump of the KNC that had favoured continuous association with the NCNC in 1953 was reconstituted into the Kamerun Peoples Party (KPP) and also favoured continuous evolution of the territory within the Nigerian framework. The issue of unification or continuous association with Nigeria polarised politics within Southern Cameroons and, after the inconclusive election victory of the KNDP over its rivals with the above theme dominating the campaigns in 1959, the UN visiting mission in the same year ordered a plebiscite to resolve the matter. It took t yet several months and much debate within the territories, United Kingdom and United Nations for the issues of the day to be framed in exact questions or alternatives for the plebiscite. The date was finally set for February 11, 1961 in Southern Cameroons. The pro-unification camp led by the KNDP of Foncha won by 233, 571 to 79,741 (approximately, 70.5%), while the pro-Nigeria camp lost with about 29.5%.
Northern Cameroons: Compared with the Southern Cameroons, political awakening in the Northern Cameroons was more retarded given the comparatively lower literacy. Its feudal social structure, largely preserved by the British indirect rule system, enhanced a close integration of the territory with the adjoining Northern Region of Nigeria that had similar social structures. When the great debate began over the fate of British Cameroons ahead of the attainment of independence in French Cameroun on January 1, 1960 and Nigeria on October 1 of the same year, discussion was generally muffled in Northern Cameroons. Without any locally based political parties, but for the Consultative Committee for the Northern Cameroons constituted in 1955, the local branches of the Nigerian-based parties, notably, the Northern People's Congress (NPP), shaped political opinion. It was in this backdrop that the UN Visiting Mission in 1958 arrived at a conclusion that the overwhelming desire in this territory was in favour of continuous association and independence by joining Nigeria. The Mission therefore, recommended to the UN Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee that no further discussion need be encouraged on the fate of the Northern ~ameroons.~~ However, the UN opted for a plebiscite to be conducted in Northern Cameroons before the end of November 1959, in spite of the recommendations of both the Visiting Mission and Britain as the trustee. The options were whether the territory was to continue as a part of the Northern Region of Nigeria or it wished to postpone the final decision until a later date. It was generally taken for granted that the November 1959 plebiscite would go in favour of union with Nigeria. But owing to local grievances over the existing system of local administration in the territory, the vote went in favour of delaying the b decision to a later date.29 Amidst strong allegations from the NPC that Britain manipulated the outcome against union with Nigeria, so as to perpetuate its rule of the territory and transform it into a military base," the UN accepted the results. In any case, the allegations appeared to have been baseless considering Britain's strenuous efforts to discourage the holding of a plebiscite in the .first place31 - a position supported by the British press. For instance, the Economist blamed the UN for requesting an "inexperienced and misguided Northern Cameroons to vote to be torn bodily from the country of which they are an integral part"32. Also, there was nothing else to show that Britain's prime intentions for obtaining the territory in the 1916 partition in order to revise Nigeria's colonial boundary had been changed.. It was more likely, as it later turned out, a ploy to pressurise Britain into more positive action to see the results go the way both the NPC leadership and the colonial administration so earnestly desired. More importantly, the embarrassing result turned out to be a warning that was seriously taken. Owing to pressure from the UN Visiting Mission and as a practical move to entice voters to the integration option, the obnoxious local government system was reformed. For the first time, the administration of the trust territory was separated from that of the Northern Region, something that had been achieved since 1955 in Southern Cameroons. The new councils were made more representative, especially of minority interests." This helped to swing the vote in the rerun plebiscite in favour of integration with Nigeria in 196 1. The UN concluded that the territory would have another plebiscite at the same time with the Southern Cameroons with the same terms or options: Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Federation of Nigeria? or Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroun? On the advise of the mandatory, the results of the election were to be considered separately for the Northern and Southern Cameroons. In the meantime, reforms were initiated in July 1960 in Northern Cameroons to resolve some of the grievances emanating from local administration, which led to the popular vote against integration with Nigeria. The plebiscite was held on February 11 and 12, 1961, and the result was in favour of integration with Nigeria by 146,296 to 97,659.
b Reactions to the Results The results of the separate plebiscites in British Northern and Southern Cameroons left joy in the Northern Region of Nigeria, dissatisfaction in the Action Group-dominated Western Region and indifference in the Eastern Region but for the Cross River area where there was great desire for a pro-Nigeria vote in Southern Cameroons. The Northern Region leadership saw it as their personal triumph in much the same way as the defeat of 1959 was. They had indeed laboriously campaigned and sacrificed funds for this option. The downcast and bitterness in the West was as a result of the fact that the Southern Cameroons voted to join La Republique du Cameroun. The pro-Nigeria parties in Southern Cameroons had aligned themselves with the Action Group that aspired to political ascendancy within Nigeria if the results had gone in their favour. The NCNC-dominated Eastern Region was lukewarm since they did not stand to gain politically within domestic politics in Nigeria, even if the Southern Cameroons had voted to join Nigeria. Moreso, the campaigns of the KNDP had been somewhat directed against ~i~eria'~,playing on the prevailing fears that the more industrious Nigerians, especially the Igbo, were going to dominate them if they voted for integration with Nigeria. In the Republic of Cameroun many political leaders were shocked by the results in Northern Cameroons, especially those of President Ahidjo's Utzion Camerounaise (UC) party. They had interpreted the 1959 result as indicating a pro- French Cameroun disposition in the territory. The entire National Assembly moved a motion to register a protest at the UN that the result was not representative of the people of Northern Cameroons. In a 77-page release," Ahidjo's government accused Britain and the UN supervisory team to have allowed, even condoned, irregularities in the registration procedures, the conduct of the polling and the counting of the ballots. Cameroun even took the matter to the ICJ but could not reverse the decision. This was followed by a week of national mourning declared by president Ahidjo to express the frustration of Cameroun over the loss. The reaction of Ahidjo can be justified more by what he stood to gain for his political ascendancy vis-a-vis his southern opponents in Cameroun, given his initial ambivalence towards the unification cause during the 1950s. These reactions further expose the fact that even as early as then, domestic b political considerations affected the policies of these countries towards their borderlands and territorial matters.
Implications of the Results On April 21, 196 1, the UN General Assembly by a vote of 64: 23 with 10 abstentions reject the Cameroun protest and as such accepted the results. June 1, 1961, was set as the date for the transfer of British Northern Cameroons to Nigeria, while October 1 of the same year was set as the date for transfer of British Southern Cameroons to Republic of Cameroun to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon. This decision confirmed the Anglo-French boundary as the new international border between Nigeria and Cameroon along the entire length of what was Northern Cameroons. By the same token, the former Anglo-German boundary along Southern Cameroons and Nigeria was restored and the fornler intra-Cameroon boundary established by the Picot Line in 19 16, and modified accordingly, was abolished. The British administrative line of division between Northern and Southern Cameroons detailed in the 1946 Order-in-Council acquired a new status as part of the international boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. Independence was attained in British Cameroons leaving disappointment in both Nigeria and Cameroun. In spite of the niceties behind Jaja Wachukwu's conciliatory speech at the UN in which he implored both Cameroun and Nigeria to accept the results of the plebiscite gracefully36,relations between the two states had taken off to a chilly start. The Ahidjo government pledged to continue to do everything to recover the Northern Cameroons helped to sustain this frosty start. Meanwhile, in Nigeria the press had adopted an even more belligerent mood. The West African Pilot editorial below confirms the entrenched bitterness in Nigeria as well. The question of the Southern Cameroons is in our opinion, one of prestige. We do not believe the game is lost. We do not believe we have lost our brothers and sisters in Southern Cameroons. Time shall decide this.37
Although this editorial was inconsistent with NCNC perceived indifference, it nevertheless helped to portray the feeling of ,bitterness in these countries and the inlpression of an incomplete business. References and Notes
1 Charles K. Meek, Land Tenure and Land Administration in Nigeria and Cameroons (London: HMSO, Colonial Office, Colonial Research Studies No. 22, 1957), pp. 346-35 1.
' J.C. Anene The International Boundaries qf Nigeria: The Framework qf an Emergent African Nation (London: Longman, 1970), pp. 96-97.
David E. Gardinier, "The British in the Cameroons, 1919-1939" in Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967): 513-555.
4 Harry Rudin, Gernians in the Cameroons, 1884-1914: A Case Study in Modern Imperialism, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938) pp. 17-43.
Ibid, p. 27 t
6 See for example, K.0 Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).
The exact reasons for this change of position by Bismarck are not clear. Concern over the worrying emigrants leaving Germany that were considered a permanent lost to Deutschtum has been mooted as a probable reason. Others point to the growing interest in the world of science to explore the unknown lands in the fields of geology, anthropology, etc. But this change stunned many in Germany and more so, colonial authorities in London who reacted angrily to this decision as it was consumn~ated with the annexation of Cameroon; an area of British purveyance of long standing. For more on this volteTface on the part of the German Chancellor see, Harry Rudin, Germans in the Cameroons, pp 17-43.
E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1909) p. 154.
9 Agreement (Protocol) Concerning the Demarcation of the Anglo-German Boundary Between Nigeria and the Cameroons (Kameroun) from Yola to the Cross River with 8 Accompanying Maps, signed at Obokum, April 12, 1913. This agreement is found at the Cameroon National Achieves, Buea [File no. Qfla (1964) 51.
10 For a detailed discussion on the prosecution of the war in Cameroon, see Lovett Z. Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon 1914-1 91 6: History of a Misunderstanding (Limbe: Navi Group, 1987)
I I DelcassC to Bertie, June 6 1915, Co. c 4 913. Cited in .Elango, The Anglo French Condonziniunz, p. 26. l2 The story of the Anglo-French condominium in Cameroon (19 14-16) is one rather of intent than reality. Owing to intense mutual suspicions on the part of the British and French colonial authorities, there was hardly any agreement on implementation of a joint administration in Cameroon. Lovett Z. Elango (The Anglo-French Condominium in Cameroon) has even argued that the mere description of the attempt during this period as a condominium is a misnomer. The British dominated the administration following their early capture of the important port city of Douala in 1914. As far as the entire territory was concerned, each occupying power established its administration in the areas it captured from the Germans. For more see also, L.Z. Elango, "The Anglo- French 'Condominium' in Cameroon, 19 14-19 16: The Myth and the Reality" International Journal of African Historical Studies 18, 4 (Dec. 1981); Essiben Madiba, "La France et la Redistribution de Territoire du Cameroun" Afrika Zamani Nos 128~13(Dec. 1981): 36-52.
Quoted in Elango, The Anglo-French Condominium in Can~eroon,p. 75 b 14 League of Nations, Mandate, Article 9. l5 League of Nations (Official Journal), Part 11, British Mandate for the Cameroons (Geneva: Nineteenth Session of the Council, gthMeeting, July 20, 1922), p. 896.
16 Gardiner, "The British in the Cameroons", p. 525. l7 The British territory was about 1000 miles from Lake Chad to the Bight of Biafra and nowhere wider than 80 miles. In addition to the division of the territory into two by part of the Adamawa Emirate, the Mabilla escapement formed a formidable barrier to transport and communication with the southern part of the territory. The entire region constituted largely a chain of mountains only broken by the Benue valley for must of its length until about 80 miles away from Lake Chad. Initial administrative reports submitted by Britain to the Permanent Mandate Commission of the League were divided into four sections corresponding to these divides.
l8 Gardinier, "The British in the Cameroons", p. 628.
l9 or an elaborate discussion of the ethnic composition of the border areas between Nigeria and Cameroon see Anene, The International Boundaries of Nigeria, pp. 53-87.
20 Cameroon National Achieves, Buea (CNAB), File No Ag 723/1922.
2 1 CNAB, File No. Ag (1946) 39. 220 Vol. IV
22 Ibid
23 Ibid
24 ibid. 25 Memorandum by Milner, "Cameroons and Togo," May 29, 1919, Quoted in Wm. Roger Louis, "Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, l884-1919", in Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa, pp. 3-46. For quotation see, p.42. The chapter makes good reading on the diverse range of issues that came into play in considering colonial settlements.
26 For instance, as early as July 1923, at the Third Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, Mr Pierre Orts expressed fears that integration of Northern Cameroons districts with adjacent areas of Northern Nigeria, was going to make the task of supervision by the Mandates Commission more difficult, (Gardinier, "The British in the Cameroons", p. 529. The Commission again in 1929, objected to the attitude of British administrator who were not seeming to appreciate that there was a difference between Nigeria which was under British sovereignty and British Cameroons, which was under Mandate [Permanent Mandates Commission, Sixteenth Session (November, 1929) p. 841.
27 David E. Gardinier [Cameron: United Nations ChaUenge to French Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) p. 1121 attributes the improved representation of British Southern Cameroons in Nigerian institutions (1 3 out of 80 seats in the Eastern Regional House of Assembly and 6 of the 34 seats reserved for the Eastern Region in the central legislature in Lagos) to United Nations Trusteeship Council criticisms on the lack of such representation earlier. However, the Northern Cameroons was not so represented.
2 5 Report on the Trust Territory of the Cameroons under British Administration, UN Document T.11426 (January 1959), p. 82.
29 he results were: 70, 401 in favour of postponing the decision and continuous trusteeship, and 42,797 for integration with Nigeria. For more on a comprehensive state of affairs in the territory see, Neville Rubin, Cameroun: An African Federation (London: Pall Mall, 197 1); Victor T. LeVine, The Cameroons ,from Mandate to Independence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964); Gardinier, "The British in the Cameroons".
30 Following the unfavourable outcome of the plebiscite, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Ahmadu Bello launched a scatting attack on the British. According to him the British manipulated the results in favour of continuation of Trusteeship so as to transform the "Trust Territory into an earthly paradise for the whiteman as well as a strategic military base for Britain" (Daily Times, Lagos, 11 November, 1959).
3' Bolaji Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Lagos: Macmillan, 1986), p. 150.
32 Quoted in Ibid, p. 153. Indeed, this outburst also exposes the extent to which the issues at stake were misconstrued and as such the results, even by seemingly informed metropole opinion. The vote ik favour of delaying the decision came as a protest against local administration in which terms the political parties and the electorates had viewed the plebiscite as pointed out by the UN Election Commissioner, Dr Djalal Abdoh. 3 3 For more on the reforms see, Rubin, Cameroun, pp. 106- 107
34 Willard Johnson, The Cameroon Federation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 146-152; E.O. Ardener, "Crisis of Confidence in the Cameroons," West Africa (August 12, 1961).
35 Cameroon, Ministkre des Affaires ~tran~kreset SecrCtariat d'Etat A 1'Information de la Republique du Cameroun, La Position de la Rkpublique du Cameroun d la suite du Plebiscite des I I et I2 ,fkvrier 1961 dans la partie septentrional du Territoire du Cameroun sous Administration du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord (Paris: Edition Diloutremer, 196 1).
3 6 United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, 1 5th Session, 21 April 1961.
37 West African Pilot, (4 October, 1961). b CHAPTER 3 GEOPOLITICS OF THE NIGERIA-CAMEROON BORDER
Although territorial disputes have been many in the multi-state international system and Africa in particular, most nations have not disputed their borders. For instance, between 1945 and 1990, 116 interstate borders were disputed. However, this is just about a third of all boundaries (that can be considered as potential areas of disputes) within the period.1 In the sub-region under study, Cameroon shares common boundaries with six other countries including ~i~eria.~Generally, there has been no territorial disagreement between these neighbours but for Nigeria. Meanwhile, Nigeria has had disagreements with all four of its neighbours, but the intensity of that with Cameroon dwarfs all others. This chapter extmines the distinctive geopolitical forces on the Nigeria-Cameroon border that make it a flashpoint for the persistent dispute under study. Why have the leaders of these countries chosen to challenge the colonial arrangements on this boundary unlike all others (in the case of Cameroon) and with such persistence (in the case of Nigeria)? And, why did a lasting solution elude the recurrent attempts at resolving the dispute up to 2002? These issues and more are scrutinised below. Specific attention is given to five issues which have often been associated with border disputes or are said to be responsible for exacerbating them. These are (1) strategic location of disputed bordering territory; (2) economic value of bordering territory; (3) ethnic ties across boundaries that may encourage a drive for political unification based on common background between the challenger or both states involved and the disputed territory; and (4) support for minorities along borders.' In addition to these, the topology and morphology of the issue areas of the border come into play, particularly in respect to their impact on hydrology. These factors interact with the forces of nationalism, especially economic nationalism, to create a unique environment for the feud.
Location of Disputed Territories and their Strategic Value Although the entire Nigeria-Cameroon boundary became the issue of litigation at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994, a close diachronic analysis of the disagreement shows that after the initial protestation by Cameroon against the outcome of the 1961 plebiscite in Northern Cameroons, Nigeria and Cameroon had resumed normal diplomatic intercourse before mid 1960s.~As such, the dispute between them is related to specific areas on the border. This concurs with the conclusions of a meeting of experts on the boundary held in August 1991,' at which the two sides "noted with satisfaction that the land border has been well defined" with the main outstanding task being that of "identification and densification of boundary pillars". However, in a subsequent meeting the Nigerian delegation pointed out that there were disagreements. Closer scrutiny of the facts raised by Nigeria shows that, this was not evidently a dispute but rather, a further explanation of doubts by both governments without either making any claims against the other. Thus in terms of location of the disputed areas, they can be identified as the Lake Chad basin, and the maritime region that igcludes the Bakassi and associated islands and their adjoining territorial waters. In the latter, two issues are intertwined. The lesser one is the purely boundary disagreement emanating from diverse interpretations on technical basis of existing agreements. The more complex is the territorial challenge of ownership of the Bakassi and neighbouring islands in the Bight of Biafra by Nigeria. It would be noted that the arguments hatched by Nigeria and Cameroon in respect to their land boundary largely appeared in court. Ahead of the litigation, no evident disagreement had emerged between the two, although doubts existed on the interpretation of delineating instruments and location of a few areas on the land border.
The Lake Chad Area Disagreement Historically, no doubts or disagreements had been expressed with regard to this sector of the boundary by Nigeria and Cameroon, nor was the matter of determining the lake frontiers raised until the border incidents that occurred in the lake between Nigeria and Chad, from April to June 1983.' In resolving the crisis at a meeting in Lagos in May 1983, it was agreed that the matter be submitted to the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the heads of state of member countries of the commission approved a proposal to set up a joint technical committee to be entrusted with the demarcation of the international boundaries between the four states which amongst them share the waters of the lake. The committee was thus set up to "demarcate" and not to "delimit" the said boundaries. This assignment was duly carried out receiving approval from experts, commissioners, ministers and heads of state without any reservations. This committee actually clarified the coordinates of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon to begin from a tripoint fixed at 13°05'00"0001 latitude North, and 14'04'59"999 longitude East and, the mouth of the Ebeji River to which the border is a straight line from the tripoint to be at 12O32'17"4 North and 14'12' East. It was only over ratification, Cameroon contends, that the work of the committee was rejected by Nigeria, whose national boundary commission as well as those of Cameroon, Chad and Niger had approved it on December 2, 1988.~The new opposition stemmed Nigeria's misgivings about the reliability and validity of the instruments that were used to arrive at the LCBC demarcations. These include, the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919, Thompson Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 and the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 193 1.O The stakes of the Nigeria-Chad dispute of 1983 in the Lake Chad region, give inkling into what is behind the strategic calculations of Nigeria and Cameroon in their subsequent dispute. According to Margaret Vogt, control of these islands allowed for adequate monitoring of the border area on which armed factions involved in the Chadian civil war had located bases. These gangs created insecurity to farmers and fishermen of all nationalities in the neighbourhood with frequent incursions sometimes to obtain supplies of food.'' As we find below, disputed islands in this area also provide adequate staging posts from which nationals and the governments can harness the natural resources of the lake region making a link with economic calculations. Thus, it can be stated that the territorial disagreement between Nigeria and Cameroon started only in the 1990s when, the former refused to ratify the demarcation report of the LCBC technical team. And even then the disagreement was not articulated in the form of a claim against Cameroon. The refusal stems from among other things, the supposed growing strategic value of the lake in an area with declining supply of water, coupled with the realisation that most of the settlements on both sides of the legitimate boundary were made by predominantly people of Nigerian origin. The Maritime Dispute The maritime disagreement between Nigeria and Cameroon constitutes the crux of their boundary dispute. In fact, it was this aspect that Cameroon first submitted to the ICJ on March 29, 1994, instituting proceedings against Nigeria described as "relating essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi ~eninsula"." The maritime disputes subsumes two issues: a territorial contest over ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula (as stated in the quotation above) alongside some neighbouring islands and a dispute over the offshore boundary up to point "G" and beyond. Underneath this dispute is a rejection by Nigeria of the crucial delimitation instruments especially, the March 11, 19 13 Anglo-German treaty, the Yaounde I1 accord and the June 1, 1975 Maroua Declaration. The strategic potentials of the disputed bBakassi Peninsula have been well emphasised. Most scholars who have written on this dispute, particularly those of realist persuasion, stressed the strategic importance of the Bakassi. For instance, Bassey E. Ate contends that The vital considerations involved in the maritime border dispute with Cameroon for Nigeria are strategic and political moreso than legal. The legal questions involved such as the relevance of the Anglo-German agreement of 1913, are, to be sure significant, but they have to be understood and interpreted in the light of the above vital consideration. l2
G. Aforka Nweke quoting a top military officer on the Nigerian side with respect to the dispute also reports that, "the Federal Government [of Nigeria] had to review its stands on the Bakassi Peninsula particularly because of its strategic position in the security of the South-eastern coast of Nigeria and access to the Calabar Port"." Esiemokal has also rehearsed (or even overstated) the above argument in an apparent regret of the level of official effort to recoup the territory. He posits that . . . Nigerian authorities failed to understand the strategic nature of about 1350 square miles of territory. Since the Bakassi is located strategically the effective foreign occupier [Cameroon] could site a military base there and it could serve for an attack on Nigeria. Should Nigeria take possession, she could use it for defence purposes. It seems an ideal place to conceal a rapid deployment force to guard Nigerian oil exploration in the Eastern states. It is also important as an observation post [from] where she could monitor events around the Bight of Biafra. This strategic approach has accentuated the conflict by portraying acquisition or control of such an amphibious environment to be a zero-sum-game involving invaluable military potentials; downplaying or even deliberately disguising the real objectives and stakes involved in the place. It has dominated and gained currency in academic and military circles especially, in Nigeria as evinced in the overview of the literature on this dispute and pronouncements of senior military authorities. Its origin can be traced to the manoeuvres in the area during the Nigeria Civil War (1967-1970) when Cameroon's collaboration with the Federal Government of Nigeria facilitated the complete naval blockade of Biafra, while compromising its control of the territory. This significantly contributed to the defeat of Biafra much to the chagrin of not just the secessionists but also many in West Cam~roonamongst whose population, there was considerable sympathy for Biafra. Had the Ahidjo government sided with Biafra, it would have been much easier for munitions to be shipped into this area with its narrow channels and transported to the frontline even if the Federal navy were patrolling Nigerian territorial waters. Though the Bakassi could be of considerable fascination for strategic reasons, especially in the sight of these authors and statesmen, but the disposition of Cameroon and history of their relations does not present the latter as a likely military opponent of Nigeria. Going by Spykman's view that "it is the geographic location of a country and its relations with centers of military power that define its problems of security",'4 Nigeria has no strong reason to be jittery with Cameroon. In spite of this, leaders of countries have advanced strategic importance of a border area elsewhere to rationalise territorial claims. In the Beagle Channel case between Argentina and Chile, for instance, the former advanced the proximity of their disputed island to an Argentine naval base and concern over Chilean control over passage rights around the Cape Horn to mobilise the nation for its acquisition. The Israeli decision to retain the Golan Heights is mainly based on calculations of its strategic location from where enemy forces (and there were many in Syria) could launch attacks against Israel. The fears and worries of the challenger in the above dyads coincide with fears of Nigeria as portrayed by the Nigerian authorities over Cameroonian control of the Bakassi and surrounding islands. Indeed, Paul Huth remarks that, the issues articulated in a dispute usually reflect domestic incentives.15 As such state leaders articulate challenges to a territory in ways that are desirable to domestic audiences. Craving to be nationalists who are deter~ninedto advance the interest of the state, the leadership of these countries have with sanctimonious rigidity embarked on a determined effort to acquire the disputed border territories.
Economic Value of Disputed Territory From north to south the Nigeria-Cameroon border region provides varying economic potentials for development. The dispute, which is especially centred on the northern and southern termini (as articulated in court), reflects more the economic allurements and the intensity of the conflict has inc;eased with awareness of their presence or growing necessity for these resources. Economic Potentials of the Lake Chad Region: Fishing and animal husbandry constitute the mainstay of the economy of this region and the lake offers great potentials for fishing as well as grazing in its immediate environs. Its numerous islands are characterised by many fishing shacks. Some of these islands are permanent while others are exposed only at low water tide in the dry season. Apart from the seasonal variations in water levels and the shifting opportunities, the lake is constantly retreating as a result of the encroaching Sahara desert and the diversion of waters of rivers that empty into it for irrigation.'"uring the long and very harsh dry season of the region, the lake and its environs provide scarce water and pasture for pastoralists who roam in quest of these with their cattle and sheep, having no regard to international boundaries. With growing hardship caused by the global economic system and the vagaries of the sahelian climate, more and more people tended to move into the region to irk a living and most of the new arrivals turned out to be Nigerians. What hitherto were temporary settlements became permanent with the retreat of the lake offering more avenues for such settlements. As the ICJ noted: "As Nigerian settlements, and the organisation within them of village life, became supplemented from 1987 onwards by Nigerian administration and the presence of Nigerian troops.. ." the control of some of these areas slept off from Cameroon." But it was only in 1994 through a note verbale that Nigeria made an official claim to the disputed villages in this area, that is, long after the maritime disputed had arisen." Meanwhile, Cameroon on her side, has been implementing territorial policies at home, which make economic life difficult for her nationals in its borderlands, as opposed to those of Nigeria, especially with provision of access roads. Invariably, every border part of Cameroon along its western boundary is more easily accessible from Nigeria. One of such places is Akwaya which has no road link from Cameroon but is a sub-divisional headquarters. The administrators and civil servants in this area must get there through Nigeria if they want to avoid trekking for over twenty hours. Because of such official neglect, economic life in particular and many other aspects of life in these areas are oriented towards Nigeria. The contribution of the economic endowments of the Lake Chad and its b environs to the conflicts are more or less indirect. "Economic migrants" who literally, moved ahead of their government took initiative before government policies were designed to absorb them. It became a forward policy aimed at not just securing "living space" but also to let the flag cover nationals in outlying territories. Maritime Boundary: The economic endowments of the maritime region between Nigeria and Cameroon are even more enticing compared to the Lake Chad area. From precolonial days, the entire zone comprising the Calabar River, Cross River and Ndian River basins formed the hinterland of lucrative trade in oil palm produce among others and imported European products. The trading "houses" of Efik city-states along the west banks of the Calabar and Cross rivers also owned agricultural lands across the Akwayafe cultivated by slave labour. Dating back also to precolonial times, the maritime area especially around the creeks of the Bakassi, has been the base of an important fishing industry. Reports of colonial administrators spoke of "good business and prosperity" among the predominantly migrant and itinerant or seasonal population reliant on fishing. The most important fish stocks were herrings, catfish (mbonga), and crayfish (or shrimps).19 The relative importance of this area to the industry has grown in recent years. Not only has there been an increase in the population of Nigeria and Cameroon with an attendant increase in the number of people moving into this peripheral area to fend for a means of livelihood, but also the drying up of stocks from other areas invaded by large trawlers from Europe and North Africa. Perhaps more important is the damage done to the habitats of fish in the neighbouring regions, especially, the Niger Delta caused by exploration and exploitation activities of oil companies, which have exposed an arrogant disregard to preserving the environment. As such, more people who could have been living in other areas have had to go further afield to the Bakassi. The population of the Bakassi and the neighbouring islands has increased from a few hundred fishing folks in the 1920s to 250.000'~in the 1990s. Besides fishing, other economic activities also take place within this region. As is the case with most of the Nigeria-Cameroon border, a large volume of this pertains to infom~aland uncontrolled transborder trade." However, unlike in other areas where b a modicum of control exists, the difficult terrain around the maritime boundary gives little room for regulation by customs services that usually do this with undue use of force. Anxiety by the Cameroon government to regulate such activities leads it to send in paramilitary forces that usually go in with methods, detested by the population.
People, especially aliens, involved in fishing and other economic activities - legitimate and illicit - have suffered harassments and they have bombarded their home governments with complains against their maltreatment, which invariable lead to more bitterness. Such highhandedness may not be restricted to the treatment of Nigerians or aliens. These security forces have a penchant to be hard on civilians in general. However, the faith of Nigerians is quite often spotlighted in the Nigerian press and misrepresented giving the impression that these forces are cruel to Nigerians only. On some occasions the security forces intervene in hot pursuit of criminals involved in piracy in the interest of the people but do it poorly. For instance, in 1972, following frequent attacks on traders returning from Nigeria, and fishermen (most of whom wcre Nigerian) within Cameroonian territorial waters, security forces from Cameroon raided some border areas and were evidently overbearing, terrorising those they went out to protect.22 The cross-border activities of criminals in particular, smuggling and the overreaction of Cameroon security forces have left a legacy of bitterness and mutual recrimination between the two governments over the treatment of nationals within each other's territory. Little wonder that Nigeria's initial professed reasons for intervention in the Bakassi area was to protect its nationals from the exactions of the security forces. The population of this area with its predominantly Nigerian provenance has increasingly felt alienated and has sought the support of their home government to ensure safety. Petroleum Factor: Petroleum is increasingly a strategic factor in international geopolitics today. For developing countries like Nigeria and Cameroon with a weak economic base, heavily dependent on the export of minerals and agricultural produce, this product supplies their economic lifelines. Petroleum is unarguably the biggest foreign exchange earner for Nigeria, contributing almost 90 percent of its foreign exchange b earnings. Cameroon, although not as heavily dependent on petroleum, also obtains valuable earnings from oil deposits, some of which are located adjacent to Nigeria's oilfields. Shell, Mobil and Gulf prospected and discovered oil for Cameroon in the maritime region with Nigeria in 1967.~'This discovery increased the stakes over the hitherto ill-defined maritime border. Leaders of both sides saw the need to hasten the settlement of festering border disagreements, which started modestly between villagers on both sides of the land border.24This inspired some concerted efforts in the 1970s (after the Nigerian Civil War that had interrupted an earlier attempt in 1966) to better define the border. But with the new knowledge of petroleum within the maritime zone, political leaders have for economic as well as political reasons, laid claims to territories in this zone aimed at pre-empting the results of further discoveries to fall within their respective spheres. The existence of such mineral wealth has been a recipe for conflicts elsewhere in the continent and the rest of the world and this region would seem to fit neatly in the global trend. Such vital mineral deposits also increase the strategic value of territories under dispute as their proceeds could provide necessary money for the purchase of expensive weapon systems by developing countries that usually depend on importation to satisfy their defence needs. Huth points out in his study that 94 percent of disputed territories with valuable economic endowment between 1946- 1990, involved developing countries.25 Examples of resource-inspired or resource-fuelled disputes abound in the international system. The claims of Libya against Chad to the Aozou Strip believed to be rich in minerals, including uranium and iron ore (both of which were very crucial to the latter's ambitious arms programme); Moroccan claims against Algeria over the Tindouf rich in large deposits of iron ore and, Tunisian claims for certain oil rich desert parts of Algeria between 1956 and 1970 are some of the cases in Africa. Elsewhere, the claims against Saudi Arabia by its Gulf neighbours are inspired by desires to control some of the extensive Saudi oil resources. Also, the claims of Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam against China over the Spratly Islands are partly inspired by mineral resources on the islands and their territorial sea.
b Ethnic Nationalities and the Dispute Ethnic composition of border regions is an important factor in cross-border relations between African countries as it is the case elsewhere. The presence of the same groups straddled across boundaries of African states is known to be a major influence on the socio-cultural activities across the border and relations between the states sharing such populations. These activities have on occasion, posed serious threats to state security and on others, posed even greater challenges to the economy. As Asiwaju points out, it is in recognition of this threat to state security that significant interest has been generated on African divided peoples referred to as "population overhang" with regard to their contribution to conflict^.^^ Insofar as the sharing of ethnically similar populations is known to affect border relations, evidence on the degree and direction of this influence is mixed. Asiwaju thinks that this influence is positive and should be encouraged as a step towards the illusivc drcam of African unity. To him the fact that such inhabitants ignore the artificially contrived boundaries of the colonial masters by maintaining across the border kinship ties, other socio-cultural relations 'and economic activities, is an achievement that eludes westernised elites who pay narrow and parochial obedience to specific states. Notwithstanding this positive side of uncontrolled borders, such activities as smuggling and uncontrolled grazing across international boundaries by pastoralists often lead to disagreements among states. These disagreements spring up from the inherent contradictions in the desires of the people and their traditions on one hand and the exigencies of the modern state. Two main reasons have been advanced for this situation. According to Asiwaju, borderlands in (pre-colonial) African societies were regions of overlapping cultures, manifest not only in the similarities or even identical nature and character of people on both sides of the border,27 but also similarity in the kind of economic activities they undertake. This invariably creates a livelihood regime that would be injured by any attempt at maintaining an absolute boundary desirous of the modern nation-state, or in the trenchant words of Anene "boundaries [that] have acquired.a sanctity alien to African traditional frontier^".^^ The second reason why these boundaries are wanting stems from the manner in b which they were drawn. In most cases, interstate boundaries in Africa evolved from colonial ones that were drawn up by European diplomats sitting in Europe and relying on inaccurate maps.29 The borders were drawn in disregard of not just the wishes of the local population but also ethnic distribution, communication patterns, economic needs like water resources and land. Although some colonial treaties allowed for adjustments, they often limited subsequent adjustments by on-the-spot administrators within a few kilometres. For example, the Anglo-German treaty of March 1913, only allowed for adjustments of up to 1.5kn-1 either way of the border between former colonies of Nigeria and Cameroon. Some of these diplomats also observed (not without a tint of cynicism) the awkwardness of their methods of boundary demarcation. Lord Salisbury noted in 1890 that, We [European diplomats] have been engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's foot ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never kncw exactly where the mountain and lakes were.30
Specifically, with regard to the manner in which Nigeria's eastern boundary with Cameroon was drawn, a commissioner that was involved pointed out that; "In those days we just took a blue pencil and a rule, and we put it down at Old Calabar, and drew that blue line to Yola.. .."31 Great injustices were evidently committed against the long established patterns of life of African peoples along these borders who were not keen on observing the European-contrived divides. In the post-independence period the successor African states have tended to observe these divides even more strictly than was the case during the colonial era. The attempts to subtly resist these arrangements by people living or carrying out economic activities across these frontiers have engendered conflicts. In spite of these observations of general ignorance and insensitivities to local realities in areas where boundaries were drawn in Africa, in a few cases boundary negotiators also argued in favour of incorporating certain areas in their spheres, to avoid dividing ethnic groups. But most of such claims were not really influential in the final boundary demarcation because either local potentates who claimed wide influence were hardly believed, or Europeans who presented the claims paid lip service to it just to enhance theirs, over other European claims. Here in lies the hypocrisy with which European agents sort to determine the limits of African societies. In any case, Anene has cautioned against sweeping statements or generalisations on the disruptiveness of colonial boundaries on indigenous societies: Africa did not present a tidily uniform political, linguistic and cultural pattern. It was if anything a continent of constantly changing variety, and it is therefore useless and misleading to generalise when one is discussing the effects of the international boundaries on African frontiers and c~mmunities.~~
It is from this background of half-hearted attempts at determining ethnic composition of borderlands by European boundary negotiators to avoid.their partition, and that of an aftermath of upheaval, un-uninformed political, linguistic and cultural patterns; characteristic of these borderlands, that we shall examine the situation of the Nigeria- Cameroon border. Most of the boundary zone between Nigeria and Cameroon had been in a state of flux in the period immediately antecedent to European annexation. The area was barely recovering from the confusion ensuing from persistent warfare for slaves or against slave raiders. This human cargo was either exported across the Sahara to the north or through the Atlantic coast in the south. The other influence that brought unsettling turmoil to the region was the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio and his standard- bearers, especially Modibo Adama. These Islamising forces forced many non-Fulani indigenes of the "grand north" to flee further south, setting a ripple effect that was felt right close to the Atlantic coast. Other "pegan" communities were forced to disperse and take refuge on mountaintops in the areas of the border particularly, northwards from the Mambila plateau within the vast Islamic empire that was so created. Although the original boundary in the north from around the 7th Parallel to Lake Chad, drawn between Britain and Germany has been modified following the decision of the former British Northern Cameroons to join Nigeria, the old and the new border traverse the same region that was subjected to the same influences. The partitioned people here in addition to the obvious Borno Empire, Adamawa Emirate and ~andara", include many small fragmentary heterogeneous societies that differ + within them in dialects and some elements of culture. The Higi and Fali and a host of others who perched precariously, on high mountaintops to avoid the mounted Islamic armies of the jihads, were divided by this border. Towards the coast trailblazers of the colonial race in'this area made an effort to understand the ethnic makeup of the border area prior to the settlement of the final boundary between Britain and Germany. The area that was explored presented a bewildering ethnic mix, which as Anene has argued, did not permit a demarcation of the border that would have avoided completely the partition of some ethnic groups. In his words, ...the Cross River-Cameroon zone traversed by the first section of the international boundary is one in which we should not talk glibly of tribes and clans.. . The complexity of linguistic pattern and diversity of origin are perhaps without parallel in any African territory. In a situation such as this, any question of ethnic demarcation is both difficult and mis~eadin~.'~
The reasons for this are not farfetched. In the first place, as David Gardinier has pointed out, the dense forest encouraged the people's fragmentation into hundreds of tiny political units.35 Secondly, the area was subjected on two sides to the disintegrating evil of the slave trade - the Jukuns raided from the north, while the Efik sacked from the south. These factors in combination left a legacy of fragmentation and heterogeneity without group consciousness going beyond the village. Of all these, two major "tribal" groups appeared to have been divided by the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary in the southern sector bounding the Atlantic coast. These are the Ekoi and Boki. Apart from the Efik slave colonies that were on the east bank of the Akpayafe, they were hardly affected by the international boundary.36 Owing to the fragmentary nature of the Boki and Ekoi groups and the dense forest environment they occupied, intra-group dependence was not evident, coupled with the low level of intra-group consciousness. Although from north to south a satisfactory demarcation of the intermingled ethnic groups that would have completely avoided the partition of some groups was unrealistic to attain, the boundary cannot be described as 'mortally injurious' to the (existing) pre-colonial order. Also, there was no evidence of unrest or 'tribal irredentism' against the boundary when it was created. (It was noted that when some of the Boki and Ekoi groups on the German ~idedifferently took up arms to resist conquest at the beginning of the 20th century, no common army was raised against the enemy from both, German and British territ~ries.)~~ The trend therefore along this border was that of divided people bringing their influences to bear on the border dispute in the form of economic activities that ignored the international boundary and not a conscious effort to unite divided people. We also note here that irredentist claims of the Babangida and Abacha administrations were not rooted in the distant past but in the administrative arrangements of Britain under which British Cameroons was administered as part of colonial Nigeria or just post- independence settlers.
Peopling of the Chad and Bakassi Areas Occupation of the disputed borderlands in the Lake Chad area appears to have been very recent, perhaps within the last three decades. The ICJ intimated that, by 1987, the lakebed villages that were only "beginning to be established" received yearly administrative visits by administrators of ~ameroon.~~It was only around then too that evidence exists of the population there taking part in political (especially, elections and census) activities in Cameroon. No evidence was gathered of any Nigerian government activities before this period. Nigerian settlements, and the "organization within them of village life became supplemented from 1987 onwards" with administrative outfits and Nigerian troops. On the other hand, the disputed area of the south have had organised (albeit seasonal) community life before the advent of European imperialist intervention at the close of the 19thcentury. These itinerant dwellers of the past became more sedentary with time. Owing to easier access from Calabar, long historic commercial activity and, greater population pressure, or what Robert North has described on another occasion as the "logic of historical process - unevenness in human population growth, advances in knowledge and skills, access to resources and derivative capabilities within and
,335, among states - , most of the incoming population were of Nigerian provenance. Most of them as well maintained a double domicile on mainland Nigeria and the peninsular. When these people who mostly considered themselves as Nigerians came under pressure from Cameroonian authorities who operate on the rule, qui in tevvitovio meo est, etian meus subditus, as Nweke puts it, or ag the popular adage goes, "If you step on my territory, you must dance to my tune", they appealed to kith and kin in their place of origin (mainly Cross River and Akwa Ibom states). Meanwhile, it could be said that the Cameroon government's control evident mainly in the disposition to send in tax officials backed by troops, police or paramilitary gendarmes is colonial and these forces have not discarded their repressive colonial mentality in dealing with the people. The combination of a history of resistance to taxation (without representation or for the simple reason that there is nothing to show in the miserable social amenities offered to these fishing folks that they have been paying taxes), together with poor integrative policies by the Cameroon authorities and highhandedness on the part of tax officials and the troops, created a flashpoint for disagreement with Nigeria and a cams beIZi for Nigeria's intervention. Nationalism or national honour demands protection of the citizens whenever and wherever necessary. It is known that whenever an alien authority allegedly maltreats nationals, a convulsive impulse is triggered among nationalists for redress, for instance, the Black Hole of Calcutta incident. Such appeals for intervention prior to 1993, eventually evolved alongside Nigeria's strategic thought into a shooting war in 1994. References and Notes
' Paul Huth, Standing your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1996), p. 69.
These are Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Chad and Nigeria.
3 These items are adopted from Paul Huth, Standing your Ground, p. 70.
Before the acrimony brought by the plebiscite results, Nigeria and Cameroon had established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level in 1960. No thought was given to severing them by President Ahidjo in spite of the much fuss he made in reaction to the lost of Northern Cameroons. In fact, on February 6, 1963, Nigeria and Cameroon signed a general agreement on bilateral cooperation to further enhance existing ties. As Jean Emmanuel Pondi and Laurent Zang ("The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Corporation: Presentation and Analysis of Bilateral Agreements and Treaties" Mimeograph, p. 5) have pointed out, this agree&ent marked a turning point in hitherto frosty relations following the plebiscite. In the preamble, they stressed brotherhood as the basis for cooperation, as well as, equality and mutual respect, which feature prominently in Article 1. Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the hostile rhetoric in the press over the fate of the Southern Cameroons too had been tuned down.
See Nigeria, Embassy of the Federal Republic, Yaounde, "Friendly working visit of Major General Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu, Honourable Minister of External Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, 27th to 3othAugust, 1991, minutes of the meeting of experts, Yaounde 2gthto 29'" August 1991n, p. 3
Cameroon, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, "Minutes of the Nigeria-Cameroon joint meeting of experts on boundary matters held at Abuja, Nigeria, 1 5th to 1 9th December 199 1", p. 6
' The crisis centred around the status of some islands in Lake Chad claimed by both countries, which both sides moved to effectively occupy. For more on this crisis, see Margaret Vogt, "Nigeria and Chad" in Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinteriwa (eds.), Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s (Lagos: NIIAIPumark, 1992) pp 92-102; Guardian (Lagos) June 5, 1983, p. 5; Sunday Times, June 6, 1983, p. 1.
ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) Judgement p.40
or a full text of these agreements see, Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1979).
10 Vogt, "Nigeria and Chad", p. 95.
' ICJ, Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996 (ICJ Reports 1996) p. 14. References and Notes
Paul Huth, Standing your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1996), p. 69.
2 These are Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Chad and Nigeria.
3 These items are adopted from Paul Huth, Standing your Ground, p. 70.
Before the acrimony brought by the plebiscite results, Nigeria and Cameroon had established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level in 1960. No thought was given to severing them by President Ahidjo in spite of the much fuss he made in reaction to the lost of Northern Cameroons. In fact, on February 6, 1963, Nigeria and Cameroon signed a general agreement on bilateral cooperation to further enhance existing ties. As Jean Emmanuel Pondi and Laurent Zang ("The Cameroon-Nigeria Border Corporation: Presentation and Analysis of Bilateral Agreements and Treaties" Mimeograph, p. 5) have pointed out, this agree&ent marked a turning point in hitherto frosty relations following the plebiscite. In the preamble, they stressed brotherhood as the basis for cooperation, as well as, equality and mutual respect, which feature prominently in Article 1. Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the hostile rhetoric in the press over the fate of the Southern Cameroons too had been tuned down.
5 See Nigeria, Embassy of the Federal Republic, Yaounde, "Friendly working visit of Major General Ike Omar Sanda Nwachukwu, Honourable Minister of External Affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, 27thto 3oth August, 1991, minutes of the meeting of experts, Yaounde 2sthto 29'" August 1991", p. 3
cameroon, Ministry of External Relations, Yaounde, "Minutes of the Nigeria-Cameroon joint meeting of experts on boundary matters held at Abuja, Nigeria, 15thto 19th December 199l", p. 6
' The crisis centred around the status of some islands in Lake Chad claimed by both countries, which both sides moved to effectively occupy. For more on this crisis, see Margaret Vogt, "Nigeria and Chad" in Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinteriwa (eds.), Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s (Lagos: NIIAIPumark, 1992) pp 92- 102; Guardian (Lagos) June 5, 1983, p. 5; Sunday Times, June 6, 1983, p. 1.
ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) Judgement p.40
or a full text of these agreements see, Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1979).
10 Vogt, "Nigeria and Chad", p. 95
ICJ, Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, Provisional Measures, Order of 15 March 1996 (ICJ Reports 1996) p. 14. 12 Bassey E. Ate, "Nigeria and Cameroun", pp 140 - 163., for quotation see p. 141
" G.A. Nweke, "Policy Response to the May 1981 Nigeria-Cameroun Border Crisis" In: Olusanya, G.O. and Akindele, R.A. (eds.), The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria 1960-1990, (Ibadan: NIIAIVantage, 1990) p. 415.
14 Nicholas John Spykman, quoted in Edgar S Fumiss, Jr, "The Contribution of Nicholas John Spykman to the Study of International Politics", World Politics 4, 3 (1952), p. 357. l5 Huth, Standing Your Ground, p. 75.
" Vogt, "Nigeria and Chad", p. 95.
17 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, p 55. b l8 Ibid, pp 54-55.
10 See files nos. Ae (1921) 60, Rio-del-Rey Administration as portion of Kumba Division; Qflo 1924 "Boundary Matters".
20 Africa Today (MaylJune 1997), 47.
2' See for example, Michael G. Schatzberg and I. William Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Cameroon (New York: Praeger, 1986); I. William Zartman (ed.), The Political Economy of Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1983).
22 File No. JCl196612
23 Nweke, "Policy Response", p. 403.
24 See note 32, chapter I.
25 Huth, Standing Your Ground, pp. 75-76.
26 A.I. Asiwaju, "The Conceptual Framework" in A.1 Asiwaju (ed.), Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries 1884-1984 (Lagos: Lagos University Press, 1984): 1 -1 8, especially, p. 12.
27 Ibid, p. vi
2R J.C. Anene, International Boundaries of Nigeria, 1885- 1960: The Framework ofan Emergent African Nation (London: Longman, 1970), p. xvi.
29 saadia Touval, Boundary Politics of Indeperldent Africa (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 3-4 30 Quoted in Anene, International Boundaries of Nigeria, p. 3
31 Ibid
32 Ibid, p. 8
33 The Mandara, although a fairly large and old community that had been islamised but independent of Bomo and Adamawa, dotted with "pegan" settlements on the hilltops had largely been neglected by most records on the "scramble" and partition of the Western Sudan. However, as Barkindo recons, this area was one of the important centres of commerce, particular in iron products, in preTcolonial history of the area. For more see, Bawuro M. Barkindo, "The Mandara Astride the Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary" in Asiwaju, Partitioned Africans, pp. 29-49.
34 Anene, International Boundaries of Nigeria, p.59.
3 5 David Gardinier, "The British in the Camerooas, 1919-1939" in P. Clifford and W.R. Louis (eds.), Britain and Germany in Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 514.
3 6 Talbot noted that two Ibibio-Efik groups were known to be in Southern Cameroons. Tabot quoted in Anene, International Boundaries of Nigeria, p. 88.
" Anene, International Boundaries of Nigeria, p. 87
38 ICJ Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, paragraph 68, p.55
39 Robert C. North, War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1990), p. 107.
also reiterated the need to retrace the demarcation of the terra firma boundary between the two countries, in order to clear existing uncertainties. The Kano meeting once more steered the two states in the direction of finding a permanent solution to the border melke. But what are the fundamental forces behind these disagreements and why are both sides eager to clarify the border? The answers to these questions can be surmised from a critical examination of the nationalist forces whose main drive is to establish what is "our" from what is "theirs". As newly independent states, the desire to have a national territory within sovereign borders, free from the fetters of external forces is primordial. This desire appears to have been stronger in Cameroon gripped by what could be described as delicate Risogimento nationalism; the consciousness of a # leadership to bring the people together in reaction or opposition to a "transnational" ruling old order, which Nigeria is perceived to be a successor. This image of Nigeria as the imperial power in Cameroon was evident in the nationalist forces in Southern Cameroons. Nationalism in British Southern Cameroons in many respects had a markedly anti-Nigerian more than an anti ~ritish-tendency.I7This was as a result of the fact that the territory as a Class "C" Mandate of the League of Nations and later a trust territory of the United Nations was administered as part of Nigeria. The administrative set up designed by Britain made the Southern Cameroons to be more or less an appendage of ~i~eria.'~After independence in 1960161 Cameroon was determined to break with this colonial legacy of being seen as existing under the aegis of Nigeria. This determination was stronger in Ahidjo who had accepted with bitterness the integration of British Northern Cameroons with Nigeria. Nigeria on her part nursed disappointment over the decision of the Southern Cameroons to join French-speaking Cameroon. Amidst strong rhetoric in the press with reference to Southern Cameroons like "We do not believe the game is ~ver",'~ the press continued to whet the appetite of ultra nationalists who thought the Federal Government should have resorted to more robust means to have the territory, especially bearing in mind the considerable financial debt it owed the Nigerian central government by time of its independence. As explained in our methodology above, all fomls of "nationalisms" are ingrained with conflictual tendencies. Thus, whether the aims of Nigeria's and (French) Cameroon's struggle over British Cameroons were against secession, integrative or unificatory, conflict is bound to emanate from the aspiration so long as they persists and continue to hope for a redress of losses of the near past. Considered in the light of anti-colonial nationalism, the Cameroonian nationalist forces construed Nigeria as the obstacle to the realisation of a viable and stable Cameroon in much the same way as they considered the latter as the obstacle to unification in the run up to the 1961 plebiscite. Pictured in this image Dov on en^' has explained elsewhere that such an obstacle (as Nigeria is perceived) is also considered to be an oppressor in the eyes of the nationalists. It was in this vain that the German nation perceived Napoleon b and his France at the dawn of the 19'~century as well as colonial masters in the eyes of Africans. In spite of these conflicting interests, Nigeria and Cameroon have a basically similar conception of what is right and wrong in the conduct of international relations. Because both share similar values, their differences are on specific issues and not on the system of value. They do not envisage a challenge of the rules or laws but rather their fair interpretation in a manner each side assumes it would be favoured. It is this consensus that allows for continuous exploration of a solution within the ambit of international law through negotiations. Without this communality, the search for a solution would have become implausible.
The Maroua Declaration In continuation of their search for an amicable solution to the border problem General Gowon and President Ahidjo met in Maroua from May 30 to June 1, 1975. Given Nigeria's avowed position of retracting from the NgoWCoker Line, Ahidjo conceded to a revision of the agreement. With this concession, Ahidjo abandoned the demarcation of the boundary on basis of the Geneva Convention and with it too, a revision of the NgohICoker Line. This rather short but straightforward two page agreement was a consummation of five years of negotiations and was a continuation of the 1971 "delineation of the maritime boundary between the two countries from Point "G" on the Admiralty Chart No 2433" adopted in 1971. The declaration describes the boundary as running: From Point 12 (Longitude 08" 24' 38" E and Latitude 04" 31' 26" N) situated at the end of the line of the maritime boundary adopt ed by the two Heads of State on April 4, 197 1, the boundary line runs due West along a line parallel to and three miles from the straight line joining Tom Shot Point and Sandy Point up to a Point A Longitude 08" 24' 24" E and Latitude 04" 31' 30" N. Thence from Point A along a straight line to Point A1 Longitude 08" 24' 24" and Latitude 04" 31' 20" N which is one kilometer East of Buoy No. 3. The maritime boundary then continues along the same straight line to a Point B Longitude 08" 26' 32" Latitude 04" 24' 10" N one kilometer East of Buoy No. 2. Then from Point B the maritime boundary continues due South through Point C Longitude 08" 23' 42" E Latitude 04" 23' 28" N one kilometer East of Buoy No. 1 to a Point D Longitude 08" 22' 41" Latitude 04" 20' 00" N where it intersects Latitude 04" 20'. b From Point D, the maritime boundary runs in a South- westerly-direction to a Point E Longitude 08" 22' 17" E Latitude 04" 19' 32" N which is 550 metres from the straight line joining the Fairway Buoy and Buoy No. 1. From Point E the maritime boundary runs in a South-Easterly-direction to a Point F Longitude 08" 22' 19" E Latitude 04" 18' 46" N one kilometre East of Fairway Buoy. Then from Point F Longitude 08" 22' 19 E Latitude 04" 18' 46 N the maritime boundary runs Southerly parallel to the Meridian 08" 25' 00" to Point G Longitude 08" 22' 19" E Latitude 04" 17' 00" N as shown on the Admiralty Chart No. 3433.
Implication of the Declaration The Maroua Declaration was the first of the anticipated multiple treaties between Nigeria and Cameroon to delineate their common boundary ahead of its physical demarcation on the ground. Although informed by the spirit of colonial treaties on their border, the two states envisioned the agreement with sentimentalism as one emanating from a "desire born of fraternity and the spirit of cooperation on the part of the African leaders to resolve amicably outstanding problems between their two countries", which was considered of additional value having been entered into freely and not inherited from the colonial past.2' Legally, the agreement became a compelling border instrument between Nigeria and Cameroon although some authors doubt its validity. Such doubts as presented by ~te,~~01adi~o~~ and most Nigerian based newspapers seem misplaced. Indeed, the consensus among these authors is that the Maroua Declaration lacks any legal basis because it was or it has not been ratified by Nigeria. Ratification in practical terms is a devise meant to ensure that a representative does not exceed his powers in negotiating an agreement. It also has the advantage of giving time for reconsideration of a treaty entered into by a state. Such reconsideration could be ensuing from public opinion to an agreement, common in the present mass media, democratic age. But the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is clear on non-ratification of inter-state agreements. Article 14 of the 1969 Convention notes that ratification is required where a treaty provides for that or in the course of the negotiations a party or the parties express such a desire or if the powers of the negotiators are such that it is obvious thebtreaty needs ratification. In any case, the question of how a state effects ratification is an issue of domestic law alone, which implies that its procedures may not necessarily affect international law.24As Malcolm Shaw has pointed out, "a state cannot plead a breach of its constitutional provision as to the making of treaties as a valid reason for condemning an agreement".25 This is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is also forthright on the issue of ratification. Article 46 enjoins that a State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.26
It is only when there is a fundamental change of circumstances from when a treaty was concluded could a state contemplate renouncing a treaty commitment but this is not also permissive "if the treaty establishes a boundary".27 Consequently, the Maroua Declaration established following a series of meetings of high-level authorities of both countries, as well as the Yaounde I1 Declaration preceding it, are legally binding documents; formally signed by the presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon with plenipotentiary powers. Ahidjo and Gowon even had the chance to revisit the Maroua Declaration in an exchange of letters in June and July 1975 to correct some discrepancies in coordinates on the document. Ahidjo and Gowon as presidents of their respective countries are, especially recognised by the International Law Commission as having full powers in "representing their state[s] for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the conclusion of treaties", requiring no further a~creditation.~'The ICJ in its memorable ruling on the dispute between them also had cause to restate that: The Court considers that the Maroua Declaration constitutes an international agreement concluded between States in written form and tracing a boundary; it is thus governed by and constitutes a treaty in the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ...to which Nigeria has been a party since 1969 and Cameroon since 1991, and which in any case reflects customary international law in this respect.29
Unravelling of the Maroua Declaration apd the Abandonment of Demarcation Scheme Although the Maroua Declaration took five years to craft, in less than this time the esprit de corps that prevailed within the leadership of Nigeria and Cameroon for a settlement of the entire boundary was lost forever. Consequently, until litigation at The Hague no such serious efforts were made at replacing the colonial treaties with post-independence ones, not tinted with imperialist vestiges, as so sentimentally stated in 1970. What then led to a lose of zeal and momentum to settle the rest of the boundary up to Lake Chad? The first comprehensive delineation agreement aimed at settling the maritime boundary was only accomplished after much difficulty. It entailed forth and back negotiations and some exasperation over the tactic which one Cameroon official described as a "tabula rasa" disposition on the part of Nigeria (referring to the tendency of abandoning previous consensuses in new meetings130. Also, the rest of the border had no compelling dispute at this time to rouse the leadership of the two countries into action. But the most important element in explaining the abandonment of this goal was the change of leadership in Nigeria that occurred barely three months after the Maroua agreement was signed. The new leadership in Nigeria under General Mutalar Mohamed and later General Olusegun Obasanjo had other more pressing problems, especially with legitimising their coup (as we shall see below) that impacted negatively on the spirit of negotiation and compromise required for such an exercise. The important elements of trust, mutual respect and personal acquaintance between negotiators identified by John W. ~ac~onald"as vital ingredients to successful negotiation and resolution of conflicts were largely eroded by the populist declarations of the new leadership. But what weakness other than the alleged procedural breach on the part of Gowon, led to the wearing away of the importance of this agreement, which were not evident at the time it was initially hailed as a breakthrough?32 The objections raised against the Maroua Declaration tend to be hinged only on the fact that General Gowon who committed Nigeria to it allegedly acted ultra vires. Because the president acted in that way, it was rejected by his successors. This argument lacks conviction because, apart from the supposed procedural imperfection advanced above against it, no other weakness has been pointed out in its substance. The Nigerian government's objections b to the document are succinctly articulated in paragraphs 258 and 259 of the ICJ 2002 ruling. Nothing is said about negotiation errors, for instance, on the part of Gowon and his team of boundary commissioners. It is rather assumed. Without this it can thus be said that Gowon simply lacked the territorial ambitions of his successor. Looking at the declaration with hindsight, Gowon secured for Nigeria a good deal as shown below. In a determined effort to arrive at a solution to the melee with Nigeria, outside UN or OAU auspices, Ahidjo compromised over the NgoWCoker Line that was definitely an equitable line of delineation duly arrived at based on the Geneva on vent ion.^^ Article 15 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which is modelled on Article 12 of the 1958 Geneva Convention provides that unless otherwise, in delimiting the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, the median point, every point of which is equidistance from the nearest point on the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured be used. In spite of this general principle as Shaw has shown, the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf has occasioned considerable debate and diverse state practice.34~rticle6 of the Continental Shelf Convention, 1958 also states that in the absence of an agreement and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, a boundary in such situations should be determined "by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each state is measured". In adjudicating the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon by delineating their common maritime boundary, the ICJ declared that the "equidistance line represents an equitable result for the delimitation of the area in respect of which it has jurisdiction to give a ruling."35 In accordance with this principle, (that is, equidistance) the court found out and actually declared that: Point G which was determined by the two Parties in the Maroua Declaration of 1 June 1975, does not lie on the equidistance line between Cameroon and Nigeria, but to the east of that line. Cameroon is therefore entitled to request that from point G the boundary of the Parties' respective maritime areas should return to the equidistance line.36
From the evidence adduced above, (illustrated on the sketch map below) Nigeria had the better part of the Maroua Declaration. As long as Point G at the end of the Ahidjo- Gowon delineation line lies but in Cameroonian territory, it is the latter that ought to complain about the agreement. It was in a bide to appease Gowon and avert a walkout by Nigeria from the border negotiations that Ahidjo made the concession which turned out to be very expensive for Cameroon contrary to popular opinion on this agreement. If Gowon were an expansionist of the Hitler type the concession would have been an extremely dangerous precedence. Gowon is somewhat right when in an interview granted to the Punch, he maintained that "All the agreements I entered into on behalf of Nigeria with other nations ... were done in a way to make Nigeria gain from such agreements".37 If this statement in other situations states an intention, in relation to the Maroua Accord, Nigeria actually profited at the expense of Cameroon as a result of his astute negotiating skills. In spite of the fact that the more moderate Gowon was overthrown and his successors chose to distance themselves from the agreement, it had indeed entered into law and Cameroon chose to remain steadfast to it. On the other hand, had Cameroon understood the gravity of the compromise of Maroua, the latter could have rejected it and by mutual consent, the treaty would have fallen into abeyance. Had Cameroon done this, the ICJ ruling would not have taken into consideration its provisions. This scenario would have left it without the commitments embodied in the compromise of Maroua in which Ahidjo conceded to Gowon a part of what had been recognised in the NgohICoker Line as Cameroonian territory. Cameroon would have had more from the ICJ ruling which would have Map 5: Nigeria-Cameroon Maritime Boundary showing Point G to be East of the Equidlrtolnee line
Source: Adapted fiom ICJ, Case Concerning the Land andikthritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 449 been reached based on the earlier agreements defining the border from the colonial period right to the Yaounde I1 Declaration. Considering the fact that the latter declaration was arrived at as an equitable delineation line between the two countries based on these colonial agreements and other multilateral agreements on international law like the Geneva Convention of 1958, these agreements were still enough to tilt the balance in the maritime and territorial boundary dispute between them in favour of Cameroon.
Desirability of a Clear Boundary The modern state exalts an exclusivist disposition which functionalists have noted, creates international demarcations and complicates the drive for the satisfaction # of man's needs that do not respect such boundaries. They even hold that it is this contradiction that engenders international conflict^.^' However, this character of the territorial state cannot be wished away immediately. In a somewhat self-fulfilling prophecy, the state requires clear boundaries in other to harness certain advantages that accrue to each by virtue of its position. It is only when distinct boundaries are known can the state exercise its right of cabotage. General state practice and popular opinion among writers holds that such advantages may be claimed in the maritime belt. This is the part of the sea which, "in contradistinction to the open sea, is under the sway of the littoral state."39 While there is no unanimity over the nature of such "sway" or even the exact limits of the maritime belt4', state practice and most authors consider this to be part of the sovereign territory of the littoral state. Thus, international law provides that the coastal state may, if it so desires, exclude foreign nationals and vessels from fishing, and reserve this exclusively for its subjects, whether fish or pearls or amber or other products of the sea are under consideration. These rights of the littoral state extend to exclusive navigation and trade along the coast (cabotage). Most importantly, the littoral state may exclusively exercise police and control in the interest of its custom duties, the secrecy of its coastal fortifications and the like, over its maritime zone, unless there are agreements to the contrary. Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Territorial Sea, 1958, as well as, Article 2 of the 1982 Convention, safeguard the sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea, airspace, and seabed as well as subsoil thereof and this sovereignty may be limited only by international convention commitments. By the same token, the coastal state has extensive powers of control in matters of security (however defined), customs and immigration within its territorial sea. Without prejudice to the international leverage provided for moderation of cabotage and other appurtenances of the maritime zone, the extent to which these safeguards of international law are pursued depends more on domestic or municipal legislation, and as such, differences exist among states in the claims and methods of enforcing them. Herein lies the crux of the incessant clashes between Nigeria and Cameroon and accusations of maltreatment of aliens often treaded against each other, b along the maritime border. These differences cannot indeed, easily be legislated away within the ambits of a bilateral treaty without adequate political foresight and will or without a commonality of values to see it work out. The exercise of cabotage will be shown to be at the root of these clashes.
Security Matters: Security for long has been a matter of grave concern along especially, the maritime border between these two countries. The different understanding of security needs of each country further compounds some of these problems. Security is a concept that is loaded and as such is difficult to define with exactitude. Security generally has a negative connotation in the way it is assessed. It is usually conceptualised in terms of absence of threats in various forms including military, political, and social as well as economic vulnerabilities. Security policy thus involves judgements on the severity of known susceptibilities (like long open borders that are difficult to police, restive nationalities within the state with perhaps known or suspected foreign connections, etc.) and the measures necessary to reduce them.41In any case, it is difficult to identify all vulnerabilities, and such a nebulous ideal is often a goal state leaders claim they are pursing and appeal to their citizens to sacrifice in its pursuit. 42 Such delicate issues as the fear of national elements copying undesirable ideas from across the border, smuggling which deprives the state of desired revenue and undermines its fiscal policies have been involved in the calculus of inter Nigeria- Cameroon border disagreements throughout the years. It would be noted that, the degree of emphasis laid on various aspects of security, both internal and external (the difference between the two being largely academic) varies with regimes and in the case of these two countries; their considerations of border policies have often been dictated by the internal contradictions of each. Though the leadership of both countries from independence right up to the 1980s was generally conservative and dominated by the Muslim Hausa- Fulani of the northern part of the respective countries, the great asymmetry between them in population and to an extent landmass with a long, traditionally uncontrolled border left Cameroon somewhat hysterical in its images of insecurity vis-a-vis # Nigeria. These factors intertwined with the plebiscite saga in British Cameroons in the run-up to the termination of British colonial rule and post-independence violence in Francophone Cameroun to produce an insecurity nexus that requires a further explanation here. Eventhough there was a detente in Nigeria-Cameroon relations in the days immediately preceding the launch of the OAU in 1963, which allowed them to sink their differences and cooperate under the aegis of the Monrovia Group, suspicion continued to linger in the minds of the leadership in Yaounde. This situation was influenced not so much by the plebiscite events but more by the smouldering civil conflict pitching the radical Union des Population du Cameroun (UPC) and the Ahidjo regime. This internal conflict had effectively begun since 1955, when the French colonial authorities drove the UPC nationalists underground and handed power to the moderate nationalists wing led by ~hidjo.~'Although this civil conflict never enlisted the kind of publicity and coverage the contemporaneous Nigerian crisis of 1966-1970 had, it impacted heavily on the subsequent structure of the Cameroonian state and shaped Ahidjo's attitude towards Nigeria. Ahidjo under the pretext of handling the crisis arrogated to himself emergency powers which he later used to create a cocoon around the state sustained by a network of "security" services manned by the Suret (Secret Police whose ubiquity has been likened to that of the KGB), gendarmes, police and the army. Political consciousness was stifled, the press gagged and literature censored. This overbearing nature of the state and its security system were also reflected in border controls, which were objectionable to neighbours. Non-nationals (most of whom were Nigerians) exposed to a different cosmology from that of Ahidjo were suspect. With such an enslaving conception of national security, borders bore an accentuated risk. Complaints from nationals and aliens alike against the overzealous security agents left them unperturbed and few were those who could even raise the concerns with Ahidjo (the only one they were answerable to). It was in this situation that most travellers to Cameroon found themselves. Complaints of highhandedness helped to fan the rhetoric in the Nigerian press against the excesses as they affected b Nigerians. Also, most of Ahidjo's villains in the national tragic drama of this time escaped from the country through Nigeria to other West African countries, notably, Ghana and Guinea. Though the radical and leftists agenda which they espoused was never shared by Nigeria, their communiques, tracts and other forms of literature, which Ahidjo considered to be subversive were believed to enter Cameroon from across its western boundary with Nigeria. Undoubtedly, this left Ahidjo uncomfortable and suspicious of his neighbour. Another dimension of the myth of insecurity perceived by Cameroon stems from the old connection between the two Anglophone provinces of the North-West and South-West and Cameroon's western neighbour, Nigeria. In many respects, these provinces became strange bedfellows with the rest of Cameroon formerly under French colonial tutelage. Although there were no manifest signs of disloyalty to the Cameroon state, Ahidjo considered them aggrieved enough to nurse secessionist tendencies and suspected Nigeria to be a possible source of assistance even when Nigeria had its internal contradictions that did not allow it the elbowroom to embark on such an ad~enture.~' Apart from these internally generated tensions from within Cameroon, there were other serious incidents of insecurity along this border, which had to be checked. Many instances of piracy were registered in the waters of the maritime border, even involving frequent deaths. The problem created by pirates was indeed considerable, as on the Cameroon side, a gap had developed over the tier of government responsible for patrolling the coastal waters that fell within the State of West Cameroon. The Inspecteur Federal d'Administration, Jean-Claude Ngoh, drew the attention of the Prime Minister to the problem in a memo. The First Secretary to the Prime Minister of West Cameroon stated in a reply (No. 75lSEClCC541) that the State had no means like patrol boats, at its disposal to carry out such patrols, even though this maritime zone actually was within West Cameroon. According to him, it was the responsibility of the Federal Navy of Cameroon to patrol the maritime region with Nigeria and not the West Cameroon police and customs.45However, with increasing and more daring attacks on fishermen and traders, from or returning to Nigeria, the combined security t forces of West Cameroon and the Federal Gendarmerie were literally, swept into action by the crisis. The worse incident happened in Mangossi Creek near the mouth of River Meme on 7 April, 1971, in which forty two Nigerians were killed by six bandits. The attackers who were also Nigerians were eventually apprehended in Ikang in Nigeria shortly after the incidence with leads from Cameroon security agents.46 A new source of friction arose from the highhanded methods used by the Cameroon security forces and tax drive agents in the maritime region. The Nigerian authorities were besieged by complaints from people in this area. Such distress letters came from the Okobo National Union, Lagos branch to the Honourable Minister of External Affair, Dr Okoi Arikpo, complaining about the alleged maltreatment of fishermen of their stock in the border region by Cameroon security element^.^' Jean- Claude Ngoh on a visit to Calabar apparently admitted this highhandedness but euphemistically, described this unacceptable situation where those the forces went out to protect became victims as being a situation in which ". . . 1 'on ne peut jamais preparer une omelette sans casser les oeufs". Such an approach evidently could not augur well for the law-abiding folks there who subsist on trade or fishing. Any responsive government would obviously want to take some positive action to tackle the source of such affliction to its people. Customs and Taxation: The fiscal policies of Nigeria and Cameroon were and continue to be fundamentally different, perhaps reflecting their historical backgrounds and their territorial sizes. Although both are basically developing countries with economies whose mainstay are essentially primary product exports, beneath this general character, significant nuances exist between them in the nature of primary products they export and their relative importance to their economies. While Nigeria has been heavily dependent on oil exports handled by MNCs for government revenue, Cameroon's exports have not been as lucrative. Consequently, a dense network of taxes and duties were put in place to generate money for the state in a manner that bordered on dirigisme. Although petroleum too is produced, it constitutes a very small amount of the foreign earnings. (Indeed, little,is know in Cameroon about the proceeds from the oil mines.) With a high percentage of GDP in Nigeria coming from petroleum, unlike Cameroon, the government encouraged easy export of goods through low duties on the locally produced goods and little border regulation of movement of goods. In the first place, both belong to different regional economic groupings, which operate customs policies that as would be expected, discriminate against non-members and have different tariff rates for imported goods from the industrialised countries of Europe, North America and Asia. This allows for re-export from Nigeria to Cameroon of imported goods from the industrialised countries. Also, the few processing industries they have, produce similar goods, interestingly, at different costs, implying a remarkable lack of complimentarily but with a comparative cost advantage in favour of Nigeria, particularly for the non-agro based industries. Regrettably, these neighbours in virtually every aspect rather see themselves as adversaries than possible partners. Apart from the economic needs of the state, for political reasons linked to the very dominant position of French interest in Cameroon, the interest of the local compradors of the foreign imperialist class and that of their firms (foreign and domestic-owned), a need is perceived for heavy taxes to be placed on imports from non-French sources and even more heavier ones on non-EEC (EU) countries." This makes it possible to re-export imports into neighbouring countries, especially Nigeria to Cameroon. To check this, customs and state security agencies operate with strict instructions to discourage trade across the border in question. This leads to ruthlessness in the form of destruction of goods that are unduly labelled as contrabands or in order to scale through, the businessmen are extorted heavy sums of money by the officials. Such acts bitterly resented by the Nigerians who dominate retail trade, especially in former Southern Cameroons, inspire the complaints against the Cameroon government. Perhaps the most critical factor that encouraged large-scale transborder trade between Nigeria and Cameroon especially, in items, which are imported into the latter, was the relatively stable, and in a sense overvalued CFA franc pegged at a fixed parity to the French franc. This policy particularly designed by French neo-colonial interest to facilitate the repatriation of profits from Cameroon removed from the state an important monetary instrument that could be used to control the economy." So, the divergent fiscal, monetary and security policies of these states have engendered discord along their common border. t
Post-Maroua Boundary Politics The Maroua Accord did not end the rancour along the Nigeria-Cameroon maritime border. Not only did Gowon's successors distant themselves from the accord, the Cameroon security forces continued to act with impunity in pursuit of supposed tax defaulters, illegal immigrants and smugglers. These incidents widely reported in the liberal Nigerian press50 gave the impression of an unfinished business on the maritime boundary. Presidents Obasanjo and Shehu Shagari tried to reintroduce the maritime border issue on the agenda while on official visits to Cameroon in 1977 and 1981. But Ahidjo was of the opinion that the matter had been settled." However, the joint boundary commission held a four-day meeting in Jos to examine ways of reducing the tensions along the border.52 In the meantime, a new contentious subject had arisen over the diversion of water from River Kalia by Cameroon to beef up supply of water to Lagdo hydroelectric scheme. The diversion was allegedly causing hardship to Nigerian village communities dependent on the river for agriculture and fishing. The Bomo State Assembly discussed the development and urged the Federal Government to intervene on behalf of the 800.000 people believed to have been affected.53 Although Nigeria and Cameroon have had repeated relapses in their negotiations, the scenario remained until then relatively calm as direct military confrontation had been averted. During this time adequate measures were taken to deflect tensions albeit, temporarily. The fact that negotiations were taking place put them ahead of even the American-Soviet kind of "Hotline" whose basic purpose was to keep the lines of communication open. As pointed out above, this can be explained by their commitment to the same principles on international law with regard to resolution of conflicts. Thus, it can be said that although contending nationalist forces brought about the conflict and sustained it, the consensus on international law principles mitigated the scale of the dispute and the means adopted for its resolution. It is interesting to note that over this period from 1964 to 1980, basically b economic issues dominated the flashpoints for dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. Nevertheless, this situation started changing following the deadly clash of 1981. Because of the predominance of economic issues in the sources of conflict and the fact that the realistic security issues were those of criminal gangs not backed by any government, the dispute during this period was low-keyed and amenable. The push for a bilateral agreement to resolve differences offered an attainable scenario for settlement. This observation is in line with Huth's hypothesis that "disputes centering on economic issues, compared to other issues at stake in a dispute, should be the least likely to escalate".54 However, in the 1980s the political reason of national security began to be projected by vested interests and it gained more currency. The challenger in this dyad (Nigeria) became more bellicose. The national population seized the initiative and it became a good issue area to divert attention from other (domestic) matters. Ibrahim Babangida appeared to have used this card (though with doubtful degree of success) in the heat of his transition debacle between 1988-1993. General Sani Abacha took the cue from him, encouraging the border crisis that began in December 1993, barely one month after stampeding President Shonekon out of state house. References and Notes
' James Der Derian, "Diplomacy", in J. Kogan, The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 244-246; see also Richard Rosecrance, "Diplomacy", in D. Sill (ed) Intertzntional Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol. 4, pp. 187-192.
2 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4'h Edition (New York: Alfred Knop, 1967), especially, ch. 3 1, pp. 5 19ff.
Ibid, p. 519.
4 Ibid, p. 52 1.
' See, Cameroon National Archives Buea (CNAB), File No PMO 197lTEMI for testimonies of some of the villagers involved.
6 More light is shed on the nature of this problem by the hTigerian Consul in Buea, S.J. King who in a confidential memo to the Prime Minister of West Cameroon, dated 11 January, 1965 laid the blame on the Boudam whom he accused of crossing the border to cultivate and exploit Danare land and forest; exposing ignorance of the existence of the Anglo-German boundary which was supposedly drawn to their knowledge in 1913. Indeed, the Boudam who were occupants of the two village sites before the Danare settled, welcomed and offered them sanctuary after the latter offered some tributes to this effect. However, the Boudam continued to assume the land to be theirs even after the boundary had cut them off from the Danare on the basis of nationality (see Ibid).
7 See "Minutes of the meeting held at the Senior Divisional Officer, Mamfe's Office on 9'h June, 1965 between Delegates from Nigeria and those from the Cameroun for Preliminary Discussions on the Danare (Nigeria)/Boudam (Cameroon) Boundary Dispute", p. 4. This document is found in CNAB, File No PMO 197lTEMI.
Cameroon National Achieve Buea, File No. PM0197lSI.
9 See, Cameroon, Embassy of the Federal Republic, Lagos, Press Release, July1969.
'O See, Daily Times (Lagos), June 25, 1970, p. 28.
I I Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Boundary Commission, "Declaration of the Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Boundary Commission Sitting at Yaounde from 12-14 August 1970", pp. 3-4.
I2 Bassey E. Ate, "Nigeria and Cameroon" in Bassey E. Ate and Bola A. Akinteriwa (eds.), Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s (Lagos: NIIAIPumark, 1992) pp. 154-155. l3 A major source of disagreement between the boundary commissioners was the interpretation of the limit of territorial sea. While Cameroon insisted on the three-mile limit stipulated by Articles XXI and XXII of the 1913 agreement between the imperial governments of Britain and Germany, Nigeria opted for the evolving state practice of 12 miles, which the OAU had recommended to members. Considering the narrowness of the waters separating the two states, it became necessary to adopt the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1958 in regard to partition of the territorial sea in such circumstances. According to article 15 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea which is basically same with article 12 of the 1958 Convention, "where no agreement has been reached, neither state [sharing adjacent coasts] may extend its territorial limits beyond the median . . .which is equidistance from the nearest point on the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured" (Shaw, International Law, p. 402). It was on this basis that the subsequent NgohJCoker line was drawn.
14 Ate, "Nigeria and Cameroon", p. 156.
b l5 Ibid, p. 157.
16 Ibid; New Nigerian, 2 September 1974, p. I l7 Neville Rubin, Cameroon: An African Federation (London: Pall Mall, 1971), p.81
18 It is this arrangement and the reaction to it by Southern Cameroonians that informed the description of the territory by some authors as a "colony of a colony". See for example, Victor LeVine, The Cameroon Federal Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. xix; Rubin, Cameroun.
'west ~fricanPilot, October 4, 1961
20 Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 52.
2 1 Ate, "Nigeria and Cameroon", p. 160.
22 Ibid
23 Oladipo 0 Sholanke, "Delimiting the Territorial Sea between Nigeria and Cameroon: A Rational Approach" Internatiortal and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 42, (April 1993): 398-41 1.
24 Shaw, International Law, p. 640; Michael Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), pp. 63-4, 154-57. See also, Fitmaurice, "Do Treaties Need Ratification?" 15 British Year Book of International Law, 1934, especially p. 129; H. Blix, "The Requirement of Ratification" 30 British Year Book of International Law, 1953, p. 380.
25 Shaw, International Law, p. 661 26 Quoted in Shaw, International Law, p. 661.
27 Article 62 (20a).
28 Quoted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning the Land alld Maritime Boundary Between Camerooll and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), ICJ, 2002, paragraph 265, p. 124.
29 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroo11and Nigeria, p. 124 paragraph 263.
30 came roo?^ Tribune, (Mars 7, 1994)
31 John W. McDonald, "International Conference Diplomacy: Four principle" in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Menve (eds.) Conjlict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 247. # 32 The declaration was popularly received by especially, the more vociferous press in Nigeria, which Cameroonian authorities are quite often apprehensive of; and on several occasions accused to be fanning the ambers of conflict through misinformation (see "Minutes of a meeting held at the Senior Divisional Officer, Mamfe's Office on 9'h June, 1965 between Delegates from Nigeria and those from the Cameroun for Preliminary Discussions on the Danare (Nigeria)/Boudam (Cameroon) Boundary Dispute"). New Nigerian of June 2, 1975 welcomed it as a resolution of the maritime border dispute. The Nigerian Chronicle (June 3, 1975, p. 1.) saw it as a good tiding, particularly welcoming to the fishing folk of both countries. In an editorial, the Nigerian Observer (June 5, 1975, p. 3) cautiously though, considered it as theoretically settling the nagging problem of border clashes over fishing and land rights in the maritime border area. Meanwhile, the Daily Express was most enthusiastic. The agreement was hailed as a 'milestone in bilateral diplomacy" between two neighbouring African countries (see, Daily Express, July 16, 1975, p. 3).
'' The said NgoWCoker Line was arrived at based on the guidelines laid down by the Nigeria- Cameroon Joint Boundary Commission sitting at Yaounde from 12th to 14th August, 1970. According to the guidelines, "the delimitation of the maritime boundary be carried out in accordance with the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea ...."
34 Shaw, Internationul Law, p. 436; for more see also, M.D. Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); J.I. Charney, "Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law", American Journal ofI?lterriational Law 88 (1994) p. 227.
35 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary Betyeell Cameroon and Nigeria, paragraph 306, p. 141.
36 Ibid, paragraph 307, p. 141.
37 Punch, June 11,2001, p. 7. 38 Cf the sources of international conflicts advanced in the thesis of the functionalists by its foremost exponents David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organizations, 4th edn. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1943); David Mitrany, The Road to Security (London: National Peace Council, 1944); E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Inis Claude, Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organisations, Revised Edition (New York: Random House, 1964).
39 L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Volume 1, fifth, edn. (edited by H. Lauterpacht), (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1944) p. 185.
40 The Institute of International Law has according to Oppenheim (Ibid) voted in favour of six miles, or two marine leagues, as the limit of the maritime belt.
4' Lawrence Freedman, "The Concept of Secyrity" in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds.), Encyclopaediu of Government and Politics Vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 1992): 730-741. 42 See for instance, Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol" in A. Wolfers (ed.), Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1964). 43 For an elaborate study of these events and the activities of the UPC from formation in 1948, through its radical agenda and struggle with the Ahidjo government see, Richard Joseph, Radical Nationalism in Cameroun: Social Origins of the UPC Rebellion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
44 The strong feelings and apprehension of the general population of the former Southern Cameroons never really crystallised into rebellion because critical elements of the elite were suspicious of one another and some had even "fraternised" and became at least, passive executors of the Ahidjo scheme. An instance of this is the extremely repressive draconian decree of 25 October 1963, which Mr Foncha, an Anglophone, signed in his capacity as Vice President to strengthen the repression arsenal of the state). However, those who by association with the Yaounde regime of Ahidjo knew what was going on in the torture chambers of East Cameroon and the kind of people who were taken there on just any trumped up charges, were cowed into submission for fear of their own safety. For more on this see, Albert Mukong, Prisoner Without a Crime (Limbe: Alfresco, 1985); Richard Joseph (ed.), Gaullist Africa: Cameroon Under Ahmadti Ahidjo (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1978); J.F. Bayart, "One Party Government and Political Development in Cameroon", African Affairs, 72, (1973): 125-144.
45 CNAB, File No. PClIl196713.
46 The attack was reported to the Gendarmes in Ekondo Titi by Peter Mbunda, David Okole and Mgbo Moses. This information is contained in a confidential report from COMPOL Meme to COMPRINIJUDPOL Buea dated 20 April, 1971 (NAB, File No. JCI 196612). " CNAB, File No JC1196612
48 See, Regina1 H. Green, "The Political Economy of External Dependence in Cameroon7' in Richard Joseph (ed), Gaullist Africa, pp. 162 - 178.
4' The instrumentalities, effectiveness and implications of this policy are well articulated in several studies including, I. William Zartman (eds.), The Political Economy of Carneroon (New York: Praeger, 1986) and Natang Jua, "UDEAC: Dream, Reality or the Making of Sub-Imperial States", Afrika Spectrum 21, 2 (1986): 21 1-223. The seminal study by Emmanuel N. Tata-Mentan, "French Monetary Imperialism in Africa: The Implication for Cameroon Foreign Policy (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science UNN, 1984), is perhaps the most incisive.
50 See for example, Nigerian Tribune, 17 May 1977; Daily Times, 5 August 1977; Daily Times, 17 November 1977; Punch, 24August 1978. # 5 1 See Daily Sketch, 13 August 1977; National Concord, 29 January 198 1.
52 Nigerian Herald, 2 November 1978; Times International (Nig:), 6 November 1978.
" National Concord, 2 December 1980.
'4 Huth, Standing your Grounds, p. 112. CHAPTER 5 REGIME TYPES AND THE DYNAMICS TO WAR, 1981-1993
Between 1981 and 1993, the perennial cross border disturbances between Nigeria and Cameroon escalated into war, albeit on a limited scale. This negative twist did not occur in one swoop, but rather a gradual drift with numerous efforts to withdraw from the precipice. The gloomy downturn reached its high watershed in the 1990s hostilities that finally led Cameroon to resort to litigation at the International Court of Justice. Significantly, domestic factors in the nature of the regimes appear to have influenced and dictated the options preferred in the management of the border problems. This chapter attempts an ex-ray of the policy styles and the glide to war # during this decade-long period. Our thesis is that differences in leadership styles led to the boil over of the border differences into war. This we hope to show, by making a comparison between President Shagari's successful efforts alongside President Ahidjo in deflecting an explosive situation in 1981, following the regrettable killing of five Nigerian servicemen by Cameroonian forces in maritime border waters and; the styles of Generals Babangida and Abacha on one hand and President Biya on the other, which led to war.
The May 1981 Border Incident For over two decades of territorial disagreement between Nigeria and Cameroon, no military casualties were recorded in direct combat. However, this relatively condonable level of conflict changed in May 1981 when a platoon of Nigerian soldiers clashed with Cameroonian forces leaving five Nigerian soldiers dead and three others wounded. The ominous development was a departure from the widely reported incidents in which civilians bore the brunt of military operations and custom sweeps. With military casualties recorded, it took considerable effort on the part of the Nigerian leadership to contain the jingles of jingoes and the incident almost led to war between the two countries.' That Nigeria and Cameroon did not go to war in May 198 1 was not because passions were not sufficiently high within Nigeria that suffered the casualties. Rather as we shall see, Shagari's leadership with a good knowledge of the intriguing border problem, many of the fact of which were not privy to journalists and the general public, deflected the convulsion in the country in favour of war. We would however, begin by attempting a reconstruction of this event of 1981. The incident of 1981 has been at the centre of several studies2 that have not really settled the controversies sparked by the crisis. One of the elements of the debate remains why the Nigerian government chose to ignore the popular outcry for reprisals against Cameroon. We hope to unearth more of the difficult choices that were open to Nigeria and Cameroon during the crisis, the fallouts from it, as well as, strive to "uncover the secret and more compelling reasons why the Shagari administration rejected military action against ~ameroon".' The explanation appears to be more obliging now, given the recent developments on the conflict and the fact that a b comprehensive settlement is yet to be accomplished.
Nature of the Crisis: Several versions of what happened on the morning of May 16, 1981 have been offered. A popular rendition was offered by most Nigerian contemporaneous newspaper columns4 and even more recent ones~lsosanctimoniously recite this version in reaction to the ICJ ruling of October 10, 2002. According to the basic elements of this version, five Nigeria soldiers in two . . . patrol boats at Ikang, a border town [with Cameroon]. . . in Cross River State, spotted non-Nigerian patrol vessels inside Nigerian territory. Moving forward to identify the vessels, the Camerounian gendarmes in those vessels opened fire . . . killing five patrol men and wounding at least three others16
This first strike was allegedly backed by a barrage of fire from tree top-pitched gendarmes along the riverside f~rest.~ While Ikang is a better-known bordering town, the incident obviously took place on one of the waterways around the disputed maritime boundary. The Nigerian government dispatched a team of investigators to establish the exact place where the shooting took place considering the muddled alignment and myriad waterways in the area. According to what the public was told by this team of investigators, the incident took place on Nigerian territory and it was as such considered as cold-blooded murder and not a clash of combat ready forces from opposing camps. It will be shown that this incident could hardly have been premeditated. In its characteristic manner of playing down disturbances on the border, there was hardly any elaborate statement on this crisis from the Cameroon government and, given the strict censorship on the press then, nothing could be gleaned from the private press. However, in later reviews of disturbances on this border, a Cameroon government white paper recounted that: A Nigeria military patrol violated Cameroonian territory by penetrating the Bakassi peninsular up to Rio del Rey where it attacked a Cameroonian navy boat. The Cameroonians fired back and repulsed the assailant^.^
The national daily Cameroon Tribune also toed this official line avoiding any statement on the Nigerian casual tie^.^ Little light is thrown on the intensity of this crisis by these Cameroon sources. Africa Research Bulletin offers a clearer picture, especially on the circumstances surrounding it and the Nigerian reactions. According to this source, the incident occurred off the "Rio del Rey, a border river". In addition to the Nigerian deaths, three others were wounded in the clash.I0 Cameroon in spite of initial equivocation admitted the occurrence of the clash but insisted the Nigerian forces were killed in an exchange of fire and that it took place in Cameroonian territorial waters. Following a strongly worded ultimatum from the Nigerian government demanding an apology from the Cameroon government, compensation to the families of the dead soldiers and punishment of the Cameroon troops that carried out the shooting, Cameroon consented to payment of compensation and offered regrets over the lost of lives in the incident. In a message to the Nigerian President, Shehu Shagari, Ahidjo expressed his "sincere regrets as well as those of the government and people of Cameroon" and conveyed to the bereaved families deep sympathy and "whole-hearted condolences"." Ahidjo further expressed willingness to enter into negotiations, not just to diffuse the crisis but also on ways of averting such an occurrence in the future.
I.. Narrow Escape from the Precipice: The border episode of May 1981 put a severe stress on Nigeria-Cameroon relations and it remains amazing how the tension was diffused without war. The press whose role during the crisis is examined more elaborately below, especially, played a critical part in exacerbating the row. The sensationalisation of the incident with highly inflammatory articles in the press l2 brought so much pressure to bear on the Nigerian government to the extent that, many pundits at the end hailed Shagari's "qualities of restraint and h~manism"'~,although others considered Shagari and his government to have been feeble and unable to defend the national interest.I4 In the heat of the crisis, the Nigerian Defence Minister, refused to rule out the possibility of armed conflict with cameroon.I5 A litany of other complaints against Cameroon were rehearsed in b the press, notably charges that Cameroon was levying taxes on Nigerian citizens in their fatherland, and prospecting oil in Nigerian territorial waters." Entranced the more by the rhetoric in the press, University of Lagos students led a violent demonstration at the Cameroon embassy, destroying cars, damaging windows and a fence wall. In the meantime, Cameroon fearing the worse, ordered the evacuation of non-essential staff from its embassy and dependents of embassy officials.I7 President Shagari boycotted the 18'~summit meeting of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held at Nairobi in protest over what Nigeria considered to have been a lack of concern on the part of the organisation, over the killing of five of its servicemen by Cameroon. According to Nigeria, by not placing the matter even on the agenda of the summit, the OAU did not treat it with the expected seriou~ness.'~This dramatic venting of anger by Nigeria came to a head when the Cameroon envoy, Paul Donsop, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs was misconstrued to be a junior cabinet member.19 The mounting tension reached a level that Ahidjo had to in a rear front- page interview with Cameroon Tribune deny that fighting had broken out between Nigeria and ~ameroon.~' In spite of the mounting clamour for reprisals against Cameroon within the army, among leading politicians, especially, of the opposition parties and most of the press as noted above, Shagari exercised restraint and was vindicated in our opinion, although his anti war disposition was not attuned to popular opinion, which is precarious for any politician. On the other hand, the pro-war stance of the above elements placed Shagari in a perilous position and it was actually this that forced him to step up the rhetoric. As Nweke has rightly pointed out, Although the stem protest was couched in such a language as to give the impression that the Federal Government was poised for a military showdown with Cameroon if the latter failed to comply with the ultimatum, the threat to 'fight back' was as much designed ... to pre-empt and assuage the 'hawks' within and outside the formal institutions for policy making that the moment of forward strategy which held the big stick above the carrot had arri~ed.~'
In reality it lacked the teeth for such action as the army high command and leading elements of the ruling PNP were sceptical of the legality of Nigeria's stance on the disputed territory. But this combination of strong words to the Cameroon leadership over the reprehensible incident, boycott of the OAU summit and the troop movements reported on the Nigerian side of the frontier around these tense days22,transmitted the right signals of Nigeria's disappointment over the killings. Two desirable things from the Nigerian point of view happened following this approach without a shut being fired. First, the OAU was stirred into action. Presidents Koutche of Niger and General Eyadema of Togo undertook to mediate on the long- standing border dispute. Also, the OAU not only appointed a ministerial committee to mediate between the two states in reaction to Nigeria's boycott of the Nairobi summit2', but also, the Secretary General, Edem Kojo, embarked on a shuttle diplomacy between Lagos and Yaounde to dampen the heat from the crisis.24 second, the approach stroke the right node in conveying Nigeria's outrage to Cameroon; for it was only after this that Cameroon's initial guarded response was revisited. The statement of regret had stated nothing concerning the other two demands - compensation to the bereaved families and punishment of the perpetrators of the killings - placed by Nigeria. With Nigeria's stiffening position and the intervention of the mediators, Cameroon offered more to resolve the crisis. Resolution of the May 1981 Crisis: The ultimate aim of the leadership of both Nigeria and Cameroon in the days following May 16, 1981, was to resolve the crisis triggered by the incident without, preferably, further lost of lives, in spite of the reported troop movements on both sides of the border. This aim was achieved through a series of actions and reactions between the two countries that culminated into the January 1982 state visit to Nigeria by president Ahidjo. The exchanges during the crucial two-month period from when the incident happened through when Nigeria's External Affairs Minister, Ishaya Audu, made an official stance, to July 20 when Cameroon offered to indemnify the bereaved families, spelt a period of tempering emotions over an issue that took centre stage in Nigerian politics and foreign policy debates. b Ahidjo's Letter Offering Compensation: After initial quibbling on the part of Cameroon inspired by the continuous belief that the incident took place in its territory, Cameroon finally agreed to pay reparations as demanded by Nigeria. The Office of the President in Lagos announced this offer on July 20, 198 1. In the letter accepting the indemnity, Ahidjo also reiterated regrets over the deaths and added that the Government and people of Cameroon considered that the incident was unfortunate and "should in no way degenerate into a brutal confrontation between the two countries". He further urged both countries to "transcend the passions which tend to crystallize around this incident and find a lasting, peaceful solution to it".2" With this offer of indemnity, Cameroon met two of Nigeria's demands (the expression of regrets which could be taken for an apology and "sincere condolence" being the other). The demand for punishment of the soldiers involved in the shooting on the Cameroon side was dropped when the latter met the above demands. Cameroon even accepted that the border dispute be submitted to an international tribunal. Details of the plan were to be worked out during a state visit to Nigeria by Ahidjo in January 1982. The Wisdom of Restraint and Peaceful Diplomacy: Reprehensible as the incident might have been, reprisals on the part of Nigeria would have led to loss of more lives on both sides. Cameroon was most unlikely to have withdrawn or made any territorial concessions unless faced with a crushing defeat - which Nigeria was not willing or able to inflict without unacceptable cost. With the indemnity offer, further escalation on the part of Nigeria, could have been interpreted as overtly informed by a desire for territorial aggrandisement. Also, such an action would have attracted irresistible pressure especially, from major powers notably, France, Britain and the United States, for arbitration. However, direct military intervention seemed unlikely given that the area was one largely dominated by the interests of western democracies unlikely to overtly support opposing camps over principally economic matters. Indeed, not even France that was alleged to have sent troops to assist Cameroon could have been so impetuous. Without a sound legal case, any gains on the battlefield by Nigeria, could easily have been lost if adjudication went against Nigeria in a forum like the International Court of Justice, which over the years* has shown remarkable independence in approach from the political options of mediators or even the Security Council. In any case, the killing of the Nigerian servicemen could hardly be imagined as a deliberate, premeditated act by the Cameroon government. Judging from the entire episode, the killings rather bore the hallmark of an isolated act of turgid, if not scared, weary soldiers, worn out by long patrol in a difficult environment. The conservative leadership of Ahidjo could not have launched an attack on Nigeria, or risk the possibility of a war against Cameroon's giant neighbour with a battle-tested army over the boundary dispute.26 or could Ahidjo had so much relied on French military assistance under the new Socialist Government with whose leadership he had sharply disagreed over the latter's domestic policies in Cameroon, especially, prosecution of war against the leftist UPC insurgency, while the Socialists were in the opposition in France. (Indeed, this Socialist Government later schemed Ahidjo out of power in Cameroon, barely a few months after it came to power in France.) Even more importantly, it would have meant inflicting severe distress on Nigerians if the government had embarked on reprisals against Cameroon in the area of the Bakassi because; the area is settled predominantly by Nigerians. Perhaps this partly informed the decision of Nigeria to have planned an invasion of Cameroon from Garoua in the north.27 The government of Shagari understood all these and not deserve the warm welcome.33 Be it as it may, the visit was not unanimously welcomed especially in Nigeria; it nevertheless, strengthened relations between the two countries to pre-May 1981 levels if not better, well ahead of the final payment of the indemnity, which Cameroon had agreed to. These warm relations largely remained until the change of leadership in Cameroon in November 1982. Within a month after the change the new president, Paul Biya dispatched his Prime Minister, Bello Bouba Maigari, to Nigeria to reassure the Nigerian leadership that their bilateral ties were not affected by the change at the helm of affairs in ~ameroon.'~Four months later, president Biya himself visited Nigeria with a similar message of strengthening their cordial bilateral relation^.^^ In November 1982 the claims and counter claims involved in the May 1981 # crisis were finally settled. The exact amounts involved were not disclosed but Cameroon was indemnified for the deaths of the five Nigerian soldiers, while Nigeria covered the cost of repairing the Cameroon Embassy in Lagos, which was ransacked by angry students.36 with the settlement of claims, a line was drawn under this yet most difficult crisis in Nigeria-Cameroon relations. The agreements were rightly described by a Radio Cameroon statement as being made in the interest of "good neighbourliness" and meant that the incident was "definitely closed" at intergovernmental level. It marked a happy ending to a dicey situation that were it not for mature handling, could have led to war between Nigeria and Cameron ahead of the 1993 fighting.
Continuity and Change in Leadership and Leadership Styles For over two decades Ahidjo was the president of Cameroon stamping an unmistakable mark on the foreign policy of the country. When he resigned on November 6, 1982, his successor, Paul Biya was quick to make moves aimed at reassuring Nigeria that the change in leadership may not affect their bilateral relations. As shown above, the high level visits by the Prime Minister in November 1982 and the president in April 1983 were meant to convey this. These high profile manifestations of a determined effort to maintain the old style in the conduct of bilateral relations meant a continuation of a system that has often been described as con~ervative.~'This style was incidentally also characteristic of Shagari's diplomacy but was not guaranteed continuity with the coup that toppled Shagari, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and the Second Republic. The coup of December 1983 that overthrew Shagari brought to power a junta led by General Buhari that fancied the radical leadership. style of the late Murtala Mohamed. This disposition became more and more manifest with the entrenchment of the army in power in Nigeria and in the direction of relations with its neighbours. Although this radicalism was more obvious in domestic policy under Buhari, some of the domestic policies had implications on relations especially, with Nigeria's immediate neighbours. For example, the decision of the Nigerian government to close its borders for a currency change caused much anxiety among Nigeria's neighbours3' # and gave Nigerians and the neighbours alike an impression that this administration was bent on giving the country a new caste in not just domestic affairs but foreign policy as well. Gradually, a discernable trend appeared within the military leadership in a temperament to fret over security and border matters. As early as 1984 while serving as Chief of Army Staff in the Buhari administration, General Ibrahim Babangida gave the first indication of the new line of strategic thought of the military government. In a paper titled "Analysis of Threats to Nigeria" Babangida reviewed with dismay the alleged total economic and political dependence of Nigeria's neighbours on France and the attendant control this imposes on their foreign policies. In his words, Their [Nigeria's neighbours'] political independence appears to be a prominent fluke because of their total dependence on their erstwhile colonial master, who without the modicum of conscience, takes pride in fashioning the domestic and foreign policies of her former colonies. 39
He also portrays France in this paper as the implacable enemy of Nigeria lurking to subvert her security4', and by extension, Nigeria's neighbours whose policies are supposedly dictated to by Paris. Babangida, who became president of Nigeria two years later, also concluded in this paper that, Intelligence reports have continued to indicate a steady military build-up by Cameroon and it is not unlikely that this is aimed at Nigeria and her oilfields. To this extent, Cameroon is a threat to ~igeria.~'
Although this emphatic description of Cameroon as a threat was not followed up by any dramatic policies aimed at settling their perennial boundary differences in favour of Nigeria, it was indeed, an ominous indication that things may change. Change came gradually and became glaring with the entrenchment of the military in power in Nigeria. Ahead of the defining moment in the 1990s though, available evidence points to diverse policies towards the border by both side. On one hand, there was a continuation of subtle bilateral and multilateral measures within the Lake Chad Basin Commission, to resolve the differences On the other, both sides at the same time continued to jostle to make their influence felt on the ground. Cameroon as usual persisted with the policy of dispatching detachments of soldiers and paramilitary gendarmes to back up tax drives in the disputed borders areas; a move which cynics in Nigeria paradoxically decried as attempts to "lure them into accepting Cameroonian nati~nalit~".~'Meanwhile, Nigeria worked hard to erode the influence of Cameroon in the disputed areas of the lacustrine border and also increase its presence on the Bakassi Peninsular. On the whole, there was no major crisis after that of May 1981 during the rest of 1980s. However, during this period as shown below, the Nigerian press continued to urge the Federal Government to adopt a more robust approach to the drawn-out border problems with Cameroon. This campaign by the press synergised with other internal dynamics in Nigeria, which also coincided with the instability emanating from democratisation in Cameroon to set the stage for the outbreak of war in 1993-94.
The Nigerian Press, Public Opinion and the Slide to War The press has for long been recognised as a critical interlace between decision- makers and the public. Its role is considered important in conveying decisions or state policies to the masses and by so doing making them opinionated; transmitting the views of the public to the policy-makers; and interestingly, helping to shape both. Students of foreign policy have deployed much effort to ascertain the relationship between a nation's foreign policy and the opinion of its citizenry.44 Most agree that the subject often lends itself to "impressionistic and faulty analysis".4' Notwithstanding this danger, the essence of the following paragraphs is not to rehearse the value-loaded statement that public opinion and foreign policy, to which the press is a linchpin, should or ought to be articulated in harmony but rather, it is to show how there was a shift from the reasoned longstanding official stance for over thirty years of Nigeria's relation with Cameroon (even in the midst of severe and tempting situations like in May 1981), for containing border difference, to a robust militaristic position long favoured in the press with which it had also opinionated the public. The Nigerian press quite often portrayed itself to be at variance with many b aspects of Nigeria's territorial policies towards its neighbours and even more critically, over what it presents as a feeble response to instances of maltreatment of Nigerian nationals by the neighbours." With its "crusading" rather than "eclectic" approach to news reporting and journalism, foreign policy issues, especially with respect to our research subject, are not reported with the required balance. So often, the government position on relations with immediate neighbours has been presented to be out of tune with public opinion in an attempt to lead the government into positions it would have not likely adopted. One such instance where the Federal Government was so presented was over Fernando Po in the 1960s, the beginning of which could indeed, be traced to the late 1950s. In January 1958, an article had appeared in the West African Pilot calling on the Nigerian government to open negotiations with Spain for ceding of the island to Nigeria because it was geographically part of Nigeria, the source stated, and that should Nigeria fail to enlist the cooperation of Spain (the imperial power on the island), force should be used.47 A rejoinder to this editorial in 1959, urged the federal government (of Nigeria) to ignore "international legal technicalities" and recognise the island as part of Nigeria on the basis of the supposed fact that more than 50 percent of its population was ~i~erian.~'Peter Enahoro, editor of the Sunday Times visited the island and also began publishing articles not just to enlist support for the above dream but also to "embarrass" the Federal Government. He presented population figures for the island, which were inaccurate to give a false image that Nigerians were preponderant on the island.49These articles, coupled with the refutations of the government generated much interest in this matter and portrayed the latter to be unambitious and insensitive to the national ,interest and the interest of Nigerians in "irridenta". As Akinyemi testifies, There is no doubt that the press had aroused public opinion, which was now demanding annexation of the island.. .. The Sunday Times claimed that it had received 'hundreds of letters from readers' all the letters called for the use of force by the Federal Government . . . . Some of the sentiments expressed . . . [are] 'Any map of Nigeria without Fernando Po is, from this day, incomplete'; 'We must use any kind of force to terminate Spanish rule on the island'.
Such opinions with "exaggerated, wild and colourful" press reports of maltreatment of Nigerians working on the island even had a further dangerous twist when it was wrongly reported that Prime Minister Balewa, had promised his government "might be compelled to apply certain measures, even if it meant annexation of the island, if peaceful negotiation failed to solve the sit~ation".'~This tone equally dominated the coverage of Nigeria-Cameroon border diplomacy from independence all through till date, and has evidently grown stronger, observing no respite during military dispensation as one might expect. In regard to the Bakassi, lately, the press has championed the cry for a referendum to be conducted in the area to determine the wishes of the people whether they desire to be in Cameroon or Nigeria. There is no gainsaying that over 90% of the population is of Nigerian origin and indeed many of them are very recent settlers. While such a proposed referendum would satisfy the important principle of self determination enshrined in the UN Charter and serve as an invaluable tool to nationalists in Nigeria, an indiscriminate application of this principle would tantamount to opening the Pandora's Box any where in the world. Even in Nigeria, many of its disgruntled nationalities would opt out of the present polity if given such an opportunity. As such not even the Nigerian government can unequivocally stand by this principle. Also, such clamours serve a negative cause for the people of the area since they could engender artificial measures like it happened in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, to change the population figures through mass deportations and even ethic cleansing in disputed areas. But why is this tendency rife in the press? A number of factors interplay to account for this. In the first place, the Nigeria press has remarkably been independent and liberal since independence (even under military rule).51 However, for the most part the press has not functioned as an efficient and objective news gathering agency especially with regards to its coverage of the difficult border differences between Nigeria and Cameroon. Instances of lapses in reporting the issues of the border problem are myriad. As R. Oluwole Coker, former (Nigeria's) Director of Federal Survey, who was for long at the centre of boundary negotiations between Nigeria and Cameroon noted in reaction to an article in the centre page of the Punch of June 1, 1981, "Unfortunately this publication, which I suppose was intended to throw light on the border issue [of May 16, 19811 was both inaccurate and mi~leadin~"'~.Contrary to # the impression given in the paper, he went on; At no time during the discussion on the boundary was any group of Nigerians transferred to the Cameroun nor was there any shift of population from Nigeria to the Cameroun. Any person who claims that Nigerians had been placed under Cameroun jurisdiction as a result of the deliberations on the boundary should clearly state the areas involved and relate them to the 1913. Anglo-German Agreement on which the definition of the boundary is based.53
Such reports with maps that are unfortunately, not related to issues quite often misinform and misrepresent the facts of the boundary disagreement. Thus, there should be little wonder that the overwhelming opinion within the Nigerian public, especially given that most rely solely on these papers for their information, is that of a French-backed Cameroon persistently creeping into Nigeria's chasse garder of Bight of Biafra oil wells, which to the chagrin of many, the Nigerian government has been unwilling to confront; or confronted only half-heartedly, until 1993. Idang attributes this temperament in Nigerian papers to the fact that many of the journalists are not well trained and as such they cannot resist the temptation of narrow-minded commentaries and engaging in "careless speculation and sen~ationalism"'~ not her factor he points to as being responsible for this is the regional base of most papers coupled with their link with particular party interests and the attendant tendency to be dogged in supporting or opposing the government. Given the nature of Nigerian politics, most of these papers are usually antiestablishment in domestic politics and tend to project their disagreements over divisive domestic issues unwisely into the coverage of foreign policy. The military governments that usually had a worse image in the press over domestic issues manage to gain a modicum of popularity over foreign policy by adopting a tendency of more adventurism into digressive populist border disputes. This is true of virtually all the military regimes that have ruled Nigeria after Gowon's boundary agreement in 1975. For instance, General Murtala Mohamed is said to have vowed to go to war rather than accept the Maroua ~ccord.~~His successor Obasanjo, also expressed his desire on several occasions to see it re~ised'~while Babangida promised to settle the border dispute before handing over to civilian rule. But it was Abacha who finally took the step of # matching in troops to settle the dispute just when the crisis over the disputed June 12, 1992 elections reached its climax with Abiola's self-declaration as winner and his subsequent arrest. While not accepting hook, line and sinker J.B. Boyd's disparaging conclusions on the sources of border conflicts in Africa to be the machinations of unpopular regimes that are bent on diverting attention from the real domestic issues of the day, it would appear successive military administrations in Nigeria have been more belligerent with regards to the border dispute with Cameroon. And by so doing they gained some support at home. It was no less so than in the run up to the war of 1994. While the Buhari military government was out of office before its honeymoon with Nigerians and the press was truly over, the Babangida government that succeeded it began to yield to the populist theme of resolving the Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute in favour of Nigeria (by force should diplomacy fail), long advocated for in the press. This cynosure became more alluring when the timetable of the administration to organise democratic elections and hand over power to an elected government was found to be increasingly wanting by Nigerians. With the constant reminder in the press that Cameroon was annexing Nigerian villages along their common border, and maltreating Nigerian nationals in these villages, the rhetoric of the officials of Babangida's administration began to change. Countdown to the 1993 Crisis In October 1990, a Nigerian government panel constituted to collate and examine the legal aspects of the border dispute submitted its report.57 Though the exact recommendations of the panel were undisclosed to the public, from the increasing rhetoric of (Nigerian) government officials and the turn of events between then and 1993, one would surmise growing exasperation over negotiations, faithlessness in litigation and disappoint with the existing legal facts and general status quo along this border. Nevertheless, the joint boundary commissions of these countries led by Anthony Asiwaju and Paul Omgba for Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively, met and considered further ways of easing the palpable border tension at the beginning of the decade.j8 At the end of a two-day joint meeting of the # commissions in Abuja, hopes were hinged on the long awaited Lake Chad Basin Commission technical report (which was due for release soon) to provide for the demarcation of the lacustrine border and resolve that part of the dispute. Meanwhile, a solution to the more unsettling maritime dispute remained illusive. Both sides agreed to reconvene in 1991 in Yola to explore further ways of resolving the dispute, by which time the final report of the LCBC would have been out. Amidst these forth and back attempts at an amicable solution to the border disagreement; the last effort being the proposal for the creation of a Gulf of Guinea Commission, on similar lines with the LCBC, the Nigerian press continued its advocacy for a military solution." Africa Research Bulletin noted that the authoritative New Nigeriarz (government owned daily), had in a lengthy review called on the government of General Babangida to opt for military action to repulse alleged incursions from ~arneroon." The paper recounted the numerous accusations of transgressions committed by Cameroon, including alleged grave atrocities and bloody attacks by gendarmes on inhabitants of Nigerian villages living along the borders. Also given prominence are stories that as late as June 1991, Cameroon annexed ten fishing villages in the maritime zone that belonged to Nigeria; claims which the Cameroon embassy in Lagos strenuously denied.6' The article also reviewed promises made by Nigerian leaders, including General Babangida to do everything possible to settle the dispute before leaving power.62 This editorial ended up with the conclusion that "the persistent Cameroonian raids prove that diplomacy has failed to pay any dividend, and only the military option is left" adding that Cameroon has relentlessly been the aggressor, always ready to attack and to ignore diplomacy." This period marked a critical turning point in the border diplomacy of Nigeria. In what appeared like a deliberate effort to prepare the general public and particularly, the academic think tank of Nigeria whose ultimate responsibility would include the rationalisation of the foreign policy moves of the government and the military; and in retrospect a thinly veiled warning to Cameroon that Nigeria's patience was running slim, Ike Nwachukwu in an address at a banquet organised by the prestigious Nigerian Society of International Affairs, stated that: Military power is the ultimate language of diplomacy because when diplomacy fails, there is usually'a call to war and wars are also ended by diplomacy.64
This statement not only signalled exasperation but also a hint to the receptive press that the Nigerian authorities were not insensitive to the pubic mode. The battle lines for the sporadic war that ensued in 1994 appeared to have been drawn when in 1992, the Nigerian Government published a new map of Nigeria (see the next two attached maps) that included some disputed territories which hitherto, were shown to be in Cameroon, particularly, the Bakassi Peninsular. When this new map appeared, putting it side-by-side the existing ones, pundits concluded that Nigeria had taken a forward position. This was an attempt to "correct" some existing cartographic facts that militated against Nigeria's claims to the disputed Bakassi Peninsular, especially. Though the new mapping gave a modicum of psychological vigour to the Nigerian bid to control the disputed territories, in reality its relevance appeared to be marginal, especially in international law. This stems from the fact that the new map was at variance with the existing ones annexed to colonial and postcolonial treaties defining the border; meanwhile, all adjustments on the boundary have always been reasoned on the basis of colonial agreements. On the whole, the administrations of Babangida and Abacha took a hard nose approach to the border dispute. This coincided with their most trying moments in domestic politics. While this was going on in Nigeria, the Biya administration in Cameroon was also under considerable pressure emanating from disputed presidential elections which many hold were won by the opposition but hijacked outright by the ruling party of Biya. So, these regimes had to be firm, or even adventurous in foreign policy in order not to further lose credibility at home. To this extent, the nature of these regimes appeared culpable in compounding the crisis and making it difficult for them to adopt more flexible polices that could have averted the imbroglio of 1993 that boiled over into bloody clashes from 1994. Thus, domestic politics tend to introduce irnmobilism towards the settlement of territorial dispute. Map 6: Nigerian Map of Maritime Zone prior to 1992 Revision showing Bakassi as part of Cameroon
Source: Adapted from Cross River State Government NB: Red line represents the international boundary Map 7: Nigerian Map of Maritime Zone after 1992 Revision showing Bakaasi as part of Nigeria
Source: Cross River State Government NB: Red line represents the international boundary References and Notes
Africa Research Bulletirl, May 1-31, 198 1, p. 604 1
See for example, G. Aforka Nweke, "Policy Response to the May 1981 Nigeria-Cameroon Border Crisis" in Gabriel 0. Olusanya and R.A Akindele (eds.) The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria, 1960-1990, (Lagos, NIIAIVintage, 1990): 398-420; Stanley Marcebuh, "Public Opinion and the NigeriaICameroon Crisis" Nigerian Forum Vol. 1, Nos 7&8 (Septemberloctober 1981): 30 1-306; Oscar Ede, "The Nigeria-Cameroun Boundaries", Nigerian Forum Vol 1, Nos 7&8 (SeptemberIOctober 198 1): 292-300.
Marcebuh, "Public Opinion and the NigeriaICameroon Crisis", p. 301.
4 See for example, Punch, 17 May, 1981, pp 1&4; West Africa, May 25, 1981, pp. 1149- 1150; Nigerian Stateman, May 26, 1981, p. 3; Punch, June 6, 1981, p. 1; Sundaj~
Punch, June 7, 1981, p. 15. b
Guardian, October 10, 2002, p. 40; Thisday, November 12, 2002, p.40; Daily Times 29, October, 2002, p.11.
Nweke, "Policy Response", p. 399.
Ibid; Daily Times, 31 May, 1981, p. 32.
' Republic of Cameroon, Document on the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute (Yaounde: National Printing Press, 1994), p. 12.
9 Cameroon Tribune, March 4, 1994, p. 3
I' Afiica Research Bulletin, May 1-3 1, 1981, p. 604 1.
' ' Ibid. l2 See for example, Nigerian Chronicle, May 20, 1981, pp. 3 and 7; Punch, May 20, 1981, p. 1; Daily Sketch, May 20, 1981, p. 1. l3 Afiica research Bulletin, July 1-31, 1981, p. 6103. l4 Macebuh, "Public Opinion and the NigeriaICameroon Crisis"; Nweke, "Policy Response" p. 413.
Is Africa research Bulletin, Junel-30, 1981, p. 6072.
I6 see for instance, Daily Times, May 25, 1981, p. 3
17 Africa research Bulletin, June 1-30, 198 1, p. 6072
I' Ibid, p. 6068. 19 This was the opinion widely shared by the press and as such the Nigerian public (see for example, Punch, February 4, 1982, p. 57). In Nigeria, the appellation "minister of state" typical to the British tradition, is reserved for junior cabinet members. However, in the Cameroon sense, this title is reserve for a select cabinet considered to be very senior like, defence and external relations. When the press got this title, it was assumed that such a junior minister was dispatched because Cameroon did not take Nigeria serious enough or the matter, to warrant the dispatch of a full minister. This supposed snob only helped to enflame the anger of the Nigerian public.
20 Cameroo11 Tribune, May 25, 1981, p. 1.
2 I Nweke, "Policy Response" p. 406.
22 Africa research Bulletin, July 1-31, 198 1, p. 6 103.
23 West Africa, June 1982, p. 1933. b
24 See, New Nigeriun, July 14, 1981, p. 1
25 See Africa Research Bulletin, July 1-34 1981, p. 6103; West Africu, p. 1733; Duily Times, July 21, 1981, p. 1.
26 Although boundary disagreements are usually involved in most territorial disputes, up to the 1980s the dispute between these countries was largely that of a disagreement over where the boundary is located as described by delimitation instruments that are basically agreed upon. Cameroon could not have been exasperated to invade Nigeria or risk a major confrontation with her when the stakes were that low. While disagreeing to the treatment meted out to her nationals along the maritime border region, Nigeria had not articulated even within her military circles any plans of correcting this through a claim to the Bakassi peninsular. However, as we shall see below, the military government of Babangida appeared to have arrived at the reasoning that a security corridor was better obtained by pushing the boundary to the east at the expense of Cameroon. The redrawing of the Nigerian map to include the Bakassi which hitherto had been presented on maps as part of Cameroon marked the first shut in the subsequent escalation of the dispute in the 1990s.
27 Shehu Shagari, Shagari: Beckoned to Serve, An Autobiography (Ibadan: Heinemann, 2001), see esp. pp 358-366
2 8 The Nigerian public appeared to have been poorly informed on the facts of the dispute by sensational reports of unceasing incursions and harassment of Nigerians by Cameroonian gendarmes. Many of these happened to be exaggerated and at times completely false, forcing government officials at times to issue disclaimers.
29 Africu Research Bulletin, Dec 1-3 1, 1981 pp. 6274-75.
30 African Research Bulletin, January 1-3 1, 1982, p. 6304; Nigerian Tribune, January 14, 1982, p. 3. 31 Daily Star, January 19, 1982, p. 2; January 25, 1982 p. 2.
32 Nigerian Tribune, January 17, 1982, p.2.
33 Weekly Focus, January 25-3 1, 1982, p. 7.
34 New Nigerian, December 1, 1982, p. 24.
35 New Nigerian, April 20, 1983, p. 1.
36 ~fricanResearch Bulletin, Nov 1-30, 1982, p. 6645.
3 7 Cameroon's foreign policy has generally been characterised as conservative and remarkable for the absence of a substantive "ideology or any coherent doctrine embodying a critical assessment of the status quo, or a view of the desirable future ...." As a result of this disposition towards conservatism, "the hallmark of Cameroon's evolution since independence has been the emphasis on stability and the maintenance of the status quo" (Ndiva Kofele-Kale, "Cameroon and its Foreign Relations" African Affairs Vol. 80 No. 3 19, April 198 1, p. 198). This very perceptive assessment indeed, captures the essence of Cameroon's approach to relations with Nigeria and particularly, the border differences. Such is the wisdom that informed the government's support for the Federal side in the Nigeria Civil War, which was not attuned to the popular opinion in the country that was pro-Biafra
'' See Africa Research Bulletin (Economic Series), April 1-30, 1984, p. 7263
39 Ibrahim Babangida, "Analysis of Threats to Nigeria", Confidential Memo by Ibrahim B. Babangida, Chief of Army Staff, Lagos, February, 1985 p. 10
40 The frosty relations between France and Nigeria date back to the early 1960s when Nigeria openly criticised France for testing a nuclear device in the Sahara, the fallouts of which were potentially dangerous to a wide area bordering the test site, including Nigeria. This led to a diplomatic row and severing of diplomatic ties between Paris and Lagos. Even more crucial to this lingering suspicion of France's intentions was the thinly veiled French support for Biafra during the Nigeria Civil War [See G. Aforka Nweke, External Intervention in African Conjlicts: France and French Speaking West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (Boston: African Studies Centre, University of Boston, 1976).
4' Babangida, "Analysis of Threats to Nigeria", pp. 13-14
42 See, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), ICJ, 2002, paragraph 68, p. 55.
43 Nigeria, Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, Press Release No 740, May 11, 1987; National Concord, May 8, 1987 pp. 1 and 9; and September 21, 1987, pp. 1 and 11. 44 See for instance, James, N Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York: Random house, 1961); Bernard C. Cohen, "Foreign Policy Makers and the Press" in James N. Rosenau (ed.) Internutional Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1961); Gordon J. Idang, Nigeria: Internal Politics und Foreign Policy, I 9 60-1966 (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1973), especially chapters 8 and 9.
45 Rosenau, Public opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 3.
46 The effect of such reports can be surmised from a review of the convulsion that gripped England over the Black Hole of Calcutta incidence in which, 123 of 146 British prisoners were alleged to have died of suffocation in 1756 in the hands of foreign elements.
47 West African Pilot, January 7, 1958. t 48 West African Pilot, Editorial (18 May, 1959). This argument of peopling became even stronger as we shall see, over the Bakassi Peninsula from the 1994 when the surge for a peaceful solution was underway after fighting had erupted between Nigeria and Cameroon in early that year.
49 Bolaji Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federulism: The Nigerian Experience (Lagos: Macmillan Nig., 1986) p. 136.
Daily Express, February 2, 1962, quoted in Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism. This was a misrepresentation of what the Prime Minister said, which goes further to underscore the sensational disposition the press was so often accused of.
" Cf the opinion of Frederick Schwarz that the "freedom, variety and liveliness [of the Nigerian press] have long been the envy of other African'countries" (Quoted in Idang, Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 99.) Elsewhere in Africa (which also holds true for most totalitarian regimes), the press is dovetailed to always support the view of the government and nowhere was it more so than in Cameroon.
5 2 Punch, June 16, 1981.
53 Ibid.
54 Idang, Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 100
55 Oscr O.B. Ede, "The Nigeria-Cameroon Boundary: Diplomatic Intrigues and Crises" A paper presented at the Conference on Nigeria's International Boundaries, April 5-7, 1982, organised by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, p. 25.
56 Ibid.
57 Daily Times, November 1, 1990, pp. 1 and 14. 5 8 Guardian, December 20, 1990, pp. 1, 2 and 4.
5 9 The Commission proposed by Ike Nwachukwu, the Nigerian External Affairs Minister, comprising Nigeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, was to concert and resolve disputes among members in the area and handle possible environmental disasters, such as could arise from oil spillage (New Nigerian, November 6, 1990, pp. 1 and 11).
Africa Research Bulletin, November 1-30 1991, pp 10332-10333.
" Ibid
62 Guardian, December 2, 1991, pp. 1and 3
63 Quoted in Africa Research Bulletin, November 1-30, 1991, p. 10333. 64 New Nigerian, January 20, 1992, p. 7. + CHAPTER SIX THE 1993 CRISIS AND MEDIATION
After the May 1981 incidence in which five Nigerian servicemen were killed, the milky dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon hardly attracted any attention beyond their shores. In fact, even the quiet demarcation effort of the Lake Chad Basin Commission was largely limited to the lacustrine northern part of the border shared by the four members - Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. However, the growing tension at the close of 1993 coupled with bloody clashes in the following year, amidst mutual recriminations as to who is the aggressor, once more, brought the spotlight onto this boundary disagreement. Several mediation efforts interspersed the intermittent fighting between 1994 and 1998. These efforts became more relevant in securing the frequently broken ceasefire agreements as Cameroon from 1994 decided to place a greater premium on adjudication rather than mediation. By mediation we refer to the efforts of third parties like other governments and international bodies such as the, UDEAC, OAU and the UN, by means of offering good offices, facilitating discussion between the belligerents and proceeding with fact-finding missions. These endeavours generally referred to, as diplomatic procedures are distinct from adjudication', which we have discussed, in the next chapter. These mediation efforts as we shall see were doomed, and in the circumstance, even the OAU that was prominent in the diffusion and settlement of the 1981 mSlCe, faded away as the United Nations-backed ICJ took centre stage in arbitration.
The Nature of the Border War Direct confrontation between the forces of Nigeria and Cameroon broke out in February 1994 following the build up of tension over regulation of border activities by nationals of both countries, and continued intermittently for several years. Like in 198 1, the flashpoint was in the maritime zone following many years of negotiations that ended in a frustrating stalemate. In strategic terms thus, the fighting could be seen as an attempt by one or the other to change the facts on the ground ahead of anticipated future negotiations. However, when fighting broke out, other factors synergised with this basic scenario to further complicate the stakes. The exact story of who started the fighting remains vexeta quaestio. However, a close examination of the various claims has allowed us to surmise the trend of this crisis. Cameroon in its rendition of the events firmly lays the blame at the feet of Nigeria, who Cameroon accuses of nursing "expansionist ambitions". In a booklet whose contents were aimed as much at a sceptical Cameroonian public (to have faith in a government with dented legitimacy following the outcome of disputed elections in 1992 that left the country polarised), as it was to explain to the world the origins of the renewed hostilities between the two neighbours, the Cameroon Government recounted that: + Le 2 1 decembre 1993, les autorites nigerianes decident d'envoyer leur unites armees sur le terrain sous pretexte de proteger leurs ressortissants qu'ils estiment menaces dans la peninsule de Bakassi par les gendarmes camero~naise.~
The document further explained that fighting broke out when Nigerian forces made more incursions into Cameroonian territory at Isagele, Achibong and Idabato and had to be confronted by elements of the Cameroon navy.3 This version of the developments had earlier been stated in similar words by Cameroon's Minister of Communication, Augustine Kontchou. In a press conference in which he not only sort to inform the general public on the origin of the crisis but also to propose an editorial format for the press, he revealed that without resistance, Nigerian forces had captured among other places, Jabane and Diamond by January 4, 1994. This was done, he explained, under the pretext of protecting their nationals "qui seraient menac&espar les gendarmes camerounais". These settlements are about six kilometres from the legitimate boundary.4 Cameroon Tribune also states that the flashpoint was provided by a "minor incident between Cameroonian and Nigerian fishermen" following which on December 2 1, 1993, "Nigerian troops infiltrated Cameroonian territory", but fighting between the two sides only broke out on February 18, 1994 when Nigeria attempted further penetration by which time Cameroon had sent in reinforcements to confront them5. Expectedly, the Nigerian Government never agreed with this version of events, though without clearly articulating a different account. From December 1993 when Cameroon first complained of Nigerian troop movement into its territory, Nigeria insisted that its troops were sent to the peninsula to prevent communal violence among ethnic groups of Akwa Ibom and Cross River state^.^ The source also added quoting President Abacha, that the presence of the troops, also became necessary to "ensure the security of thousands of its Nigerian inhabitants, victims of constant raids by Cameroonian gendarmes".7 Two months into the crisis, and even after the February 18 bloody clashes, Nigerian authorities continued to issue contradictory information on the situation in the Bakassi Peninsula. Indeed, there seemed to have been an official policy to muffle the developments at the frontline. In 1981, as Nweke has # convincingly shown, the Cameroon government dithered and tried to cover up the May crisis while Nigeria was steadfast in publicising (at least it version of) the events. At the outbreak of the 1993-94 crisis, the parties behaved in a similar way, albeit with reversed roles. This time, it was Cameroon that sought to publicise while Nigeria was determined to play down the crisis. However, when the local press widely relayed information on the clashes of 18-20 February 1994 between Nigerian and Cameroonian forces carried by the international media, government officials broke ranks on the policy of concealing the crisis, to correct information that supposedly had
Meanwhile, behind this official faqade, much appeared to have been happening on the Nigerian side of the border ahead of the February bloody clashes, giving the impression of a calculated and well-planned operation. The African Concord unequivocally stated that there had been persistent reinforcement of Nigerian forces in the Bakassi since December 1993 ahead of the February 18, 1994 serious clashes. African Concord further reported that; . . . four army trucks, two Cross Line Coaster buses and several cars pulled in from Calabar, . .. to disembark a battalion of Nigerian soldiers. Their destination was . . . Bakassi Peninsula, their mission: to end the Camerounian aggression on the Peninsula once and for all. The soldiers, most of who had fought in Liberia, were brought in from Lagos earlier in the week for the trip to the Peninsular. They joined their colleagues and mobile policemen who had already turned the Peninsular into [a] military zone.. .. That day was the end of mobilisation begun in December, and the beginning of an operation which would show that the Nigerian troops were in Bakassi for business.. .. 9
The Director of Defence Information, Brigadier-General Fred Chijuka, maintained that there were no clashes. According to him, Nigerian forces were too disciplined to engage in a shoot-out without clearance from Defence Headquarters. Nigerian forces in the Bakassi were going about their "normal routine duties", he added.'' Nevertheless, Foreign Affairs Minister, Baba Gana Kingibe, speaking on the same day in Abuja admitted the clashes, awing that Nigerian forces were provoked into taking the action, although the tension had been brought under control.'' In a version, which the African Concord supposed to be authentic, it recounted that: Camerounian soldiers in several gunboats sailed towards Atabong, the operational headquarters of Nigerian soldiers through Onosi Creek. But unknown to the Camerounians, Nigerian soldiers ... waylaid the Camerounians on the Creek. There was exchange of fire which spread to other parts of the peninsula. Cameroun suffered heavy casualties.. . .12
The ill-defined mission of Nigeria brought further confusion into this picture. Baba Gana Kingibe maintained the equivocation earlier expressed by General Abacha on the exact intentions of Abuja when he declared that The ownership of the [Bakassi] Peninsular, whether it is Nigeria or Cameroun is not the issue. The issue involves our duties and responsibilities to protect our nationals. Over 90 per cent of the people in the Peninsula are Nigerians.I3
This statement that ended up with an accusation that the gendarmes "have made free access into Nigeria very diffic~lt"'~,and the general refrain that 90 percent of the inhabitants are Nigerians who need protection seem to have been an admission that the Nigerian troops were out to "pacify" a territory with a population of predominantly Nigerian provenance but living out of the precincts of the national territory. However, the spineless mission of risking to violate the sovereignty of a different country just to protect nationals living there bore the hallmark of Germany's push towards Eastern Europe in the late 1930s and appeared difficult to sell in this present world. Moreover, Cameroon had taken the initiative to publicise the disturbances as an invasion of its territory by Nigeria. Nigeria therefore, had to redefine or clarify its objectives. This duty fell on the shoulders of Foreign Minister, Kingibe who addressed a press conference in Lagos and spelt out Nigeria's challenge in terms of defence of its territorial integrity and population under threat from a French-backed Cameroon.15 With this, both Nigeria and Cameroon had defined their endeavours in the Bakassi in very similar terms: defence of territorial integrity and population. The Nigerian position occasioned some disquiet+ nonetheless. Pundits question the wisdom of the delay in clearly articulating this when the crisis erupted. "Would it not have been much more effective at home and abroad if it had been issued much earlier, at the time the conflict broke into the open?" queried an editorial in the Guardian.'" With all fairness thus, one point is clear from the above: prior to December 1993, Nigeria had no troops in the Bakassi area.17 It can be surmised from the various versions of these events that the crisis was indeed induced by Nigeria but the question remains as to what informed this decision. Alternatively, why did Nigeria opt for a military occupation of the disputed area at this point in time after more than two decades of peaceful negotiations on the border differences? Before examining the motives, we would dismiss one of the official reasons advanced by the Abacha government at the time: that of protecting citizens. Our contention is that the intervention of the Nigerian government in the Bakassi on grounds that it wants to protect its population under threat from Cameroon state agents (gendarmes) is spurious. The records of the Nigerian government, especially under Abacha and his successors on the treatment of its population in the oil rich but restive Niger ~elta,"does not give it the moral high ground to make such claims. As Asobie has rightly noted: . . . most international conflicts are either conducted or perceived as inter-governmental contests or struggles. And the bone of contention is usually territory or some other economic resource. It is seldom the welfare of the citizens of one or more of the states concerned that is perceived to be at state.I9
The reasons have to be sought further afield. These can be understood from two perspectives. Strategically, Nigeria could have decided to challenge the status quo so as to force Cameron into meaningful negotiation. Admittedly from the 1960s, respective Nigerian and Cameroonian governments have shown that they have interests in the maritime border area to protect. These interests ranged from the regulation of trans-border activities of nationals to effective and incontestable delimitation of the border to allow for exploitatio~)of the resources of the border areas without eyebrows being raised. The shared interests gave an impetus for negotiations. But by the close of the 1980s Cameroon was evidently disappointed with Nigeria's persistent demand for a revision of the Maroua Accord of 1975. As such, Cameroon became less and less committed or disposed to bilateral negotiations with Nigeria. Beginning with the publication of the new map of Nigeria in 1992 on which Nigeria unilaterally reviewed the boundary with Cameroon, Nigeria tried to force Cameroon to the negotiation table. The 1993 occupation of the Bakassi Peninsula was only a logical continuation of this policy. Beside this strategic calculation, the political stalemate in Nigeria orchestrated by Babangida's bungled transition programme left much anxiety. As Asiwaju contends; ...there can be no doubt that the immediate occasion, if not cause, [of the border crisis] was the now well known failure of Babangida's Administration to achieve its well articulated programme of transition from military to democratic rule.20
Indeed, this fact lends credence to the thesis that political leaders to divert attention from domestic failings at times foment boundary conflict^.^' Ironically, Baba Gana Kingibe, Nigeria's Foreign Minister describing this tactic to be Machiavellian subscribes to it but accused Cameroon authorities to be the ones playing this "dangerous game".22 Truly, the Cameroon government was at its own crossroad as a result of the civil strive that followed the 1992 disputed presidential elections. It could thus have served such a purpose for it but the available facts do not seem to have indicted Cameroon that much, although, it must have contributed to Cameroon's obduracy in seeking an extra African solution to the border dispute.
Conflict Resolution Measures Bilateral Following the outcry of Cameroon against the assumed violation of its territorial integrity by Nigeria, a meeting was quickly arranged between officials of the two countries. Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister, Kingibe and Bamanga Tukur, Industries Minister, visited Cameroon to discuss the alleged deployment of 500 + Nigerian troops on Cameroon territory and the growing tension since December 21 1993,~' but little was accomplished. The meeting rather offered both sides the opportunity to reiterate their incompatible positions with Cameroon calling for an unconditional withdrawal of Nigerian forces before further discussion. In a situation like this, six theoretical modes of behaviour and outcomes are available to a dyad that seeks to defend or achieve incompatible goals or interests: (1) avoidance or voluntary withdrawal, (2) violent conquest (3) forced submission or withdrawal (4) compromise (5) award, and (6) passive settlement24 The first option, avoidance requires an understanding of one or both parties to a conflict that their goals are incompatible, usually in the wake of stalling bilateral initiatives. This would entail either sides or one party to withdraw from a physical or bargaining position, or by ceasing the acts that initially caused hostile reactions. This could not be attained in this dyad because both governments had publicly committed to their respective demands or courses of action with the press and general public joining in the debates. Although in practice this may be unusual when fighting or a crisis has erupted between neighbours, for instance, but it is indeed, the usual intercourse between countries, especially neighbours that strive to maintain good ties. The second and third, 'violent conquest' and forced 'submission-withdrawal' are similar in that force is an element whether used (conquest) or simple threat of it leads to the desired results from the adversary (submission-withdrawal). This option could not be achieved either because neither had the required preponderance of military power nor the will, arguably, to carry out the option. Besides, an all out war would have met with even more denunciations and criticisms from the international community as seen in the pressure brought to bear on the belligerents in the course of the limited war. And even more critical is the fact that, massive show of force if successful usually sows the seeds for future conflict. The sixth option of "passive settlement" could be attainable in situations where the parties in a dispute implicitly accept a new status quo as partially legitimate. This option too appears to have been rejected by the parties particularly Cameroon whose position was being challenged.
Thus, two modes - compromise and award - were probable to resolve the crisis. The attempts to pursue these options dominated the policies of these countries 8 with respect to the border crisis from 1994 till date. For most of the while, both compromise (negotiations) and award (adjudication) were pursued concurrently even if with asymmetrical commitment by each of the parties to either of the options. Compromise preoccupies us immediately, while award is the theme of the next chapter. Compromise option as used here refers to any attempt at an agreement which entails a partial sacrifice of the objectives, interests, or position of both sides.25~ut because the very outbreak of crisis and the ensuing violence seriously undermined communication, particularly, the element of mutual trust or ~onfidence,~~third parties became essential to stem further drift and maintain a modicum of contact between the belligerents. Several third-party initiatives were therefore introduced into the conflict equation and these were hardly coordinated with several made concurrently. At the same time, such intervention appeared to have been unwelcome by Nigeria, although actively canvassed by Cameroon. Nigeria's preference for a bilateral solution to the border problem or at worse, a multilateral one within the ambit of the LCBC or ECOWAS was consistently stated over the year, especially following the lost of faith
with the OAU for failing to give the disagreement due importance in 1981.27 This had earlier inspired a proposal by General Ike Nwachukwu, then Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister in 1990, for the creation of a Gulf of Guinea Commission similar to the LCBC to resolve border differences and coordinate management of resources that straddle the border.28Within such a forum, Nigeria could count on its political clout to strengthen its essentially weak legal case. But Nigeria did not give up even when Cameroon had reported the crisis to the Security Council. Nigeria's Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN, Isaac Ayewa, testified that efforts were stepped up to "stall the actual consideration of Cameroon's request at the Security Council". He explained that the preferred approach of Nigeria is "one-on-one consultation" with members of the Council and Non-Aligned caucus in New York to present what he called a "fair account of the dispute" instead of presentations as a debate in the Security Council or OAU.
French Involvement and Mediation b France was among the first to actively get involved with attempts at arresting the situation (for reasons which are considered below). The 'French announced in Paris on February 25, 1994 that they were concerned by the tension between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi. In a comtnuniquC from the Foreign Ministry, they also announced that diplomatic action had been initiated and contacts established with both Nigerian and Cameroonian authorities to speedily resolve the dispute.29 In line with this, a delegation was dispatched to the region led by Colonel Christian Quesnot, which met with president Biya on February 28 and moved on for a similar meeting with General Abacha in Abuja. The French envoy urged both sides to resolve the conflict peacefully. Several reasons informed the special concern of the French. Their political and economic interests in the region were and are still quite considerable especially, in the oil sector of both countries, whose installation were particularly vulnerable in the event of total war. Besides the anxiety to protect these interests, there was also a peculiar one emanating from its mutual hazy defence pact with Cameroon. France faced a dicey situation where it might be expected to side with Cameroon for political reasons against Nigeria where its economic interest was much more. The French had a rebuff from Nigeria as they tried to wangle through this dilemma. The mission appeared dubious in Nigeria's eyes and hardly had a chance given that while the plea for peace had not been fully considered, France responded positively to a request fiom Cameroon for military assistance in the wake of the supposed aggression by Nigeria. The request for assistance was made in line with a pact signed between the two countries shortly after Cameroon gained independence pledging mutual assistance if one party is under external aggression. Even without Cameroon asking for the military aid, it was extremely difficult for France to be perceived as an honest and neutral peace broker considering its defence pact with Cameroon. Cameroon invoked the provision of this pact to call for French military assistance; an issue which the Cameroonian authorities were not interested in concealing.30France responded positively to the request with a symbolic contingent of lightly armed paratroopers. Although this French support was initially downplayed by Nigeria, it soon became the subject of much debate in the vjbrant Nigerian press. The French were accused of having caused an escalation of the problem by introducing "a new dimension which changed the situation"." Cameroon's disinclination to continued bilateral talks, though consistent with its policy from 1990, was considered in Nigeria, throughout the cause of the conflict, to be inspired by the military and diplomatic backing of ~rance." French token military support to Cameroon also served another role to the Nigerian government. Military setbacks at the front were easily blamed on the French military factor and the fighting explained as a struggle against imperialist force^.'^ More significantly, it ruled out France as an honest broker of peace between the feuding neighbours although the then French Ambassador to Nigeria, Garrigue-Guyonnaud, strenuously explained that there was no contradiction in their manifestly incongruous roles.34The Togolese president, General Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had also entered the mediation strut continued but was suspected by Nigeria as simply being there to continue the French plan. Meanwhile, many other western foreign ministries and seats of government expressed similar displeasure with the growing hostilities between Nigeria and Cameroon. The European Union, for example, issued a communique released by the German Embassy in Cameroon on behalf of the Greek Presidency of the EU. According to it, "The European Union expresses its grave concern at the skirmishes taking place in the border region between Nigeria and Cameroon. It strongly believes that there is only one way of resolving disputes, namely, through peaceful ~ettlement".~'Little else was done beyond this statement.
Role of Togo and other African Offers in Mediation Togolese president, Gnassingbe Eyadema stepped into the Bakassi crisis from early 1994 at about the same time with the French attempt. Unlike the French, he was initially more acceptable to both parties. Eyadema shuttled to Yaounde on March 3, 1994 for what sources in Cameroon described as a "working and friendly visit" where he held talks with Paul ~i~a.~~After three hours of discussion, he spoke of his satisfaction with "President Biya's attachment to zj peaceful solution" of the border crisis and expressed the hope that he would have a similar commitment from General Abacha whom he was to meet on the same day. Although publicly involved for the first time in the border dispute, some other members of Eyadema's delegation which included his Foreign Minister, Fambare Quattara Natchaba and Defence Minister Inoussa Bouraima, disclosed that he had met twice in the preceding week with Abacha over the crisis.37 It was held that the Togolese president succeeded in arranging for a summit meeting between Biya and Abacha in Maiduguri but French military support made Cameroon more intransigent and less dispose to hold a summit meeting with Nigeria. At first sight, Eyadema appeared to have been a mediator that could make an impact. Being of the West African sub-region, he was acceptable to Nigeria and trusted by Yaounde to be in a position to impress on Nigerian authorities to accept a withdrawal from the disputed peninsula. His rich pedigree in mediation, which included his personal effort to reconcile presidents Sekou Toure of Guinea and Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Gowon and Omar Bongo of Gabon on one hand and Gowon and Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast over their sympathy with Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War, further raised the hopes. More recently too, Eyadema was involved with mediation between Burkina Faso and Mali in their territorial dispute.38 But the optimism ended up being misplaced. In spite of several other trips by Togo's foreign minister to Cameroon and Nigeria and many meetings between Nigeria and Cameroon at ministerial level, no summit meeting was held, the intermittent war continued and the frontline hardly changed for the next eight years. Other mediation offers were made concurrently, with that of Togo. President Omar Bongo of Gabon was mandated by his colleagues of Union Douaniire et Economic de I'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), to use his good offices to explore and facilitate an early resolution of the conflict.39 ow ever, as the maxim goes, 'a bad messenger carries a bad message', this initiative hardly went far as Bongo was reportedly shunned by Biya for his purported bad humours.40Another offer came from Guinea as the dispute raged on. Despite this flurry of mediation offers, little was accomplished.
+ OAU and UN Involvement On March 24 and 25, 1994, the newly created central organ of the OAU responsible for the resolution of conflicts among member countries constituted only at the OAU Summit in Cairo the previous June, formally gave a hearing to delegations from Nigeria and Cameroon on their border disagreement. This organ was especially crafted in response to the rising spate of intra- and inter- state disputes on the continent and before examining the Nigeria-Cameroon case, it had met only once in November 1993 to examine the conflicts that were raging then in Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi. At the end of the hearings on the Nigeria-Cameroondispute, the body issued a communique noting with relief the commitments made by the two parties to seek a peaceful settlement to the crisis, in spite of the fact that several skirmishes had been taking place along the border. The cornmuniquk underscored the importance of achieving a peaceful settlement based on the charters of the UN and OAU, reaffirming its commitment to the principle of uti possidetis (that is, the inviolability of frontiers inherited at independence).4' The commission agreed to entrust the task of resolving the dispute into the hands of presidents Mubarak of Egypt, then OAU Chairman and Eyadema of Togo, both of whom were already involved in apparently parallel mediation efforts. The reiteration of uti posidetis by the OAU commission reassured Cameroon even though the actual mediation was left in the hands of Mubarak and Eyadema and not the commission members themselves. This can be explained by the fact that all through, Cameroon firmly stated its case as a violation by Nigeria of the colonial boundary established by Britain and Germany the former imperial powers in these territories. Nigeria on her part had vacillated between claims of colonial transgressions in establishing the boundary to attempts at arresting atrocities being committed against its population settled in the Bakassi area. Thus, Nigeria in support of her claims to the territory as we shall see, rather emphasised the "Nigerianess" of the territory before the advent of colonial rule and argued that the main agreement of March 11, 19 13 between Britain and Germany defining this border was fundamentally flawed because + Britain went against some earlier commitments with the kings of Old Calabar. The mediation efforts of Egypt and Togo went ahead pari passu the intermittent skirmishes, the litigation at The Hague and UN involvement. However, going by what the Cameroonian authorities held, the mediation efforts of Togo had borne no fruits because of Nigeria's diversionary tactics. Nigeria perhaps because of the popular image of Togo's efforts as being masterminded by the French tended to prefer Egyptian mediation. It was from this background that Baba Gana Kingibe met President Mubarak in Cairo, on March 16 and announced an imminent meeting between Abacha and Biya, which Cameroon was quick to dismiss as being doomed because no consultations were made with Cameroon prior to the announcement in ~airo.~~ The United Nations was not directly involved in mediation. However, the Security Council called on the parties in the course of the intermittent clashes to desist from actions that could escalate the situation, while the ICJ was examining the claims of the parties. Also, the Secretary General initiated a fact-finding mission to the area in September 1996, in the wake of the continuing clashes.43 On the whole, these mediation efforts accomplished little at this phase of the conflict. The reasons for this lie mainly in the faithlessness of the belligerents, especially Cameroon, relying on the OAU and the mediators for a solution. Repeated efforts to arrange a summit meeting between Abacha and Biya could not be realised with each side blaming the other for the stalemate. Even the frequent ministerial visits accomplished little because of the deep mutual distrust existing between them.44 More elaborately, several other factors can be adduced for the outcome of the mediation efforts considered above. First, perceptions of the parties rendered the endeavours fruitless. Nigeria and especially, Cameroon were not serious with grabbing the opportunities offered by these mediators. Cameroon from the very beginning of the crisis eschewed bilateral negotiations with Nigeria on the grounds that previous agreements had not been respected. Cameroon therefore, preferred arbitration or at least negotiation within a multilateral forum offered either by the OAU or the UN. Nigeria though willing to negotiate, was at the same time unwilling to make concessions after having publicly taken stance on the border issue which + could not be withdrawn without domestic criticisms of feebleness. Thus, both sides considered the crisis to be involving "core values" associated with the "national self' that could not be compromised.45 Second, there were factors emanating from the environment such as those that influence the capacities and capabilities of the parties to fight or negotiate, including domestic political structures and public opinion, as noted above, that determine government's freedom of action in negotiation. These regimes that were under domestic pressure (from difficult democratisation programmes) and were hard pressed for opportunities to divert attention from the issues of the day, could not afford to go in for negotiations and offer concessions that would provide a forum for further crystallisation of opposition to them at home. Coupled with this is another environmental factor related to ideology. Cameroon largely saw Nigeria as a military dictatorship projecting its repressive domestic policies into the international arena, and having the disapproval of the rest of the international community. Cameroon inherently had the self-image of being pious. Nigeria as noted above in the statement of Foreign Minister, Baba Gana Kingibe, who described Cameroon as being involved in a dangerous Machiavellian game to divert attention from domestic failings, had just a similar idea. These conflicting ideological perceptions also helped to render mediation efforts fruitless. There were also personality factors at work. Some of the mediators as we have seen above, were for one reason or the other, treated with suspicion or absolute scorn, like the Gabonese initiative on behalf of UDEAC, for reasons unconnected with the crisis itself. When such distrust and lack of confidence exists, mediation can hardly resolve the substantive issues in a dispute. Meanwhile, deep suspicions had also poisoned relations between Yaounde and Abuja over the years, especially during the period of military rule as we have shown above in this and the preceding chapter. Other obstacles to the efforts could be considered as procedural. Perhaps the most serious impediment to a compromise agreement being reached in the conflict resulted from the outbreak of violence itself. As Boulding has strongly asserted: . . . violence in itself prevents . . . conflicts from'being resolved and indeed perpetuates them. Violence, for instance, creates an atmosphere in which reconciliation is difficult and in which, indeed, each party is likely to move farther away from the position of the other.46 #
Because of the violence and occupation of part of the disputed peninsula, Cameroon refused entirely any summit meeting unless Nigeria withdrew its troops to the position ante bellum. Of course, Nigeria never considered its forces in the Bakassi to be on Cameroonian territory and so, could not accept the precondition set by Cameroon. Given the difficulties of organising a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries, negotiations were only at lower levels, which meant that decisive actions could not be taken by those who were involved. The procedures adopted by the mediators also contributed. For instance, the French could not succeed with mediation while ostensibly rendering military support (all be it, small) to one of the parties. Equally, the Egyptian move of allowing a summit meeting to be announced by Kingibe without prior consultations with Cameroon rendered such endeavours futile as a result of the procedures adopted.
With the failure of mediation as we have seen, the stage was now set for judicial settlement which Cameroon preferred. Truly Cameroon's contention and claims were more rooted in legal than political or social arguments, as was the case with Nigeria. This ipso facto predisposed Nigeria to a bilateral resolution of the problem or at worse a regional arrangement where the political and social arguments could be brought to bear on the case. Cameroon on the other hand stood to gain more from a legalistic prosecution of the dispute, in spite of the ongoing fighting. Meanwhile, the international community had in place a code of conduct which somewhat favoured Cameroon. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which was also incorporated into Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, had proscribed war as an instrument of national policy. Article 2(4) enjoins UN members to refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another state. Although force may be legitimate when used in self-defence, a successful use of force does not constitute a valid method of acquiring territory. Security Council Resolution 242 as well, emphasised the "inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war". In the same vein, the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly provided that: the territory of a state shall not be the object of acquisition by another state resulting from the threat or usk of force. No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as
Given the above consensus in the international community as reflected in existing international law, Cameroon had every reason to be undaunted by the sporadic fighting that was not going well on its part. Several areas in the disputed territory had been lost to Nigeria through sheer force of arms. A successful prosecution of the case became the most reasonable course for obtaining redress and restoration of these loses. References and Notes
I See Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Chapter 18 pp. 7 17 ff.
Cameroun, Republique du, Dossier sur le differend frontalier de la Peninsule de Bakassi (Yaounde: Imprimerie Nationale, nd) p. 14.
Ibid
4 Cameroon Tribune, March 7, 1994, p.3
Ibid, March 3, 1998, p. 4.
Newswatch, Match 14, 1994, p. 17.
Ibid.
African Guardian, March 7, 1994.
African Concord, March 7, 1994, p. 14.
lo Ibid.
' ' Ibid, p. 15.
l2 Ibid
I' Africun Concord, March 7, 1994, p. 15.
l4Ibid
IS Daily Times, March 7, 1994, p. 14 and March 9, 1994, p. 14.
16 Guardian (Nig.) April 9, 1994 p. 16.
l7 Guardian (Nig), February 24, 1994 p. 1; Punch, January 7, 1994; Newswatch, March 14, 1994, p. 17; African Concord, March 7, 1994, p. 14; Vanguard, August 21, 1995 pl. See also, the position of Anthony Asiwaju, "The Bakassi Crisis: An Alternative to War and Litigation", in Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects, London: Kluwer Law International, 1998. Excepts of this paper are published in Punch, Oct 29,2002 p. 39.
18 See for example, 0. Ibeanu, "Our Mothers' Courage Silenced all Guns" Women and Conflict in the Niger Delta" University of Nigeria Journal of Political Economy, 1, 1 (2005): 52-73.
l9 H.A. Asobie, "The Conflict between Nigeria and Cameroun over Land and Sea Borders and Territories: The Political Context and the Contending Principles" University of Nigeria Journal of Political Economy, 1, 1 (2005): 74-104. For quotation see p. 76. 20 Punch, Oct 29, 2002 p. 39
2' See, J.B Boyd, Jr. "African Boundary Conflicts: An Empirical Study", African Studies Review, XXII, 3, (1979): 1-14; J. R.V. Prescott, "Boundary Disputes", in Joel Krieger, (ed.) The Oxford Conzpa~lionto Politics of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 84.
22 Daily Times, March 7, 1994, p. 13.
23 Punch, Jan 7, 1994 pp 1 & 2
24 K.J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behaviour and some Figures on Procedures". Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. X, No 3 (1966), p. 274. See a similar categorisation by Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper, 1962.) b 25 Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts", p. 277.
" See Ibid, p. 270, for an analysis of how this suspicion and constriction of communication sets in, in a crisis.
27 Africa Research Bulletin, June 1-30, 1981.
28 The Gulf of Guinea Commission proposed by Nigeria was not realised mainly because Cameroon was reluctant and suspicious that it will be used by Nigeria to advance her interest in the sub region at her detriment.
2" Cameroon Tribune, March 1, 1994, p.3.
30 See Cameroon Tribune (March 7, 1994, p.3) for what Augustin Kontchon expected from France under this pact.
3' Daily Times, March 4, 1994 p. 1; see also Guardian, March 9, 1994 p. 1.
32 Daily Times, March 7, 1994 p.13; Financial Guardian, March 3, 1994, p.1; Daily Times, March 3, 1994 p.12; National Concord, May 11, 1994 p.7.
33 Africa Today, (April - May, 1997) p.48
34 Guardian, March 6, 1994, pp. 16-17.
35 Cameroon Tribune, March 4, 1994, p.2.
36 Cameroon Tribune, March 4, 1994, p.2; Daily Times, March 5, 1994 p. 1
37 Ibid
38 Ibid 39 ~ameroonTribune, March 2, 1994 p.3.
40 Cameroon Tribune March 7, 1994, p.7
4' Cameroon Tribune, March 3 1, 1994.
42 Cameroon Tribune, March 18, 1994, p. 2. Cameroon had obviously found favour with Eyadema as a mediator, perhaps because of his alleged teleguiding by France. In fact, the Cameroon government spokesman described him as a "natural mediator"
43 Daily Times, September 16, 1996, p. 40; Punch, September 20, 1996, p. 1; Guardiun, September 20, 1996, p. 1
44 Following meetings at ministerial levels in 1994, it was hoped that a presidential summit was in the offing. Abacha invited Biya to one at Maiduguri. Biya placed as a precondition a withdrawal of Nigerian forces from what Cameroon claimed to be its territory in the maritime zone to pre-December 1993 positions. Nigeria promptly rejected this condition. Abacha on his part skilfully dodged attending the 1995 OAU summit in Yaounde where it was hoped the two presidents could have a direct meeting on the sidelines to diffuse the sporadic clashes. Even when a meeting was finally arranged by Eyadema between the two presidents in Tunis at the sidelines of the OAU in June 1994, little was achieved and there was no follow-up to the initiative.
45 See Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent. Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 176-177, for more on how such a perception compounds and frustrates negotiations. The subsequent categorisation of factors that affect negotiations are based on this text.
46 Quoted in K.J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts'' p. 277
47 Quoted in Shaw, International Law, pp. 341-342. CHAPTER 7 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE RULING ON THE NIGERIA- CAMEROON BOUNDARY CASE
As early as 1981, Nigeria and Cameroon had mooted the idea of submitting their maritime boundary disagreements to an international tribunal. However, after diffusing the tensions caused by the May 1981 shooting incident, the idea fizzled out until the next major crisis in 1994. On March 29, 1994, Cameroon filed at the registry of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) an application instituting proceedings against Nigeria. The dispute was described as "relat[ing] essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula", coextensive to the rest of the maritime boundary, the delimitation of which has "redained a partial one despite many attempts to complete it.. .."' Ahead of the court action, Cameroon signed up to the compulsory appearance clause of the ICJ to which Nigeria had signed on September 3, 1965. In any case, the ICJ being an integral part of the United Nations system to which both Nigeria and Cameroon had acceded at independence, the latter could still have proceeded with the application as a member of the UN. Two months after the initial application, Cameroon on June 6, 1994, filed in an additional application "for the purpose of extending the subject of the dispute" to include the lacustrine area of Lake Chad and its basin. In the additional application Cameroon also requested the Court to examine the entire frontier between the two states from Lake Chad to the Atlantic. This additional application Cameroon explained, was designed to be an amendment to the initial one, implying that Cameroon desired the two to be treated as one case file. The ICJ and Nigeria consented to this modification and the stage was set for the proceedings. It was however, to take many months of procedural delays and objections raised by Nigeria before the substantive matters of the dispute could be presented to the Court. Thus, Cameroon's action did not come as a surprise. Certainly, there has been no lack of precedence to resolve international boundary disputes by delegating the power of decision to a court; for almost all international conflicts, especially boundary ones, involve important legal questions. Such legal questions were no less present in the Nigeria-Cameroon case. Two African examples readily come to mind: the Libya- Chad boundary dispute and the Mali-Burkina Faso. As Holsti has argued, while the records of tribunals in resolving international disputes may not be very impressive generally, they have done better when it concerns boundary disputes.2
Parties to the Case Cameroon (plaintiff), instituted proceedings against the Federal Republic of Nigeria (defendant) in a suit that took eight years (1994-2002) for the International Court of Justice to adjudicate. In the course of the proceedings, the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, on 16 November, 1998, requested and obtained a copy of the memorial filed by Cameroon and copies of the maps presented to the Court by the parties. This request was in earnest, a step towards an'application for permission to intervene in the case pursuant to Article 62 of the Statute of the ICJ. Equatorial Guinea filed an application at the Registry of the ICJ on 30 June, 1999. The Court on 21 October authorised Equatorial Guinea to intervene base on the fact that, the latter had sufficiently established it had interest to be protected ili the case and the principal parties raised no objections against this. Although Equatorial Guinea expressly stated in its request that it did "not seek to become a party to the casem3,it was given the opportunity to state its opinion, not only in writing, but also orally like the principal parties.
Issues at Stake and Arguments of the Parties As Northedge and Donelan have stated, in general, "any dispute, either from the outset or over the life of it, is on close view a tissue of component disputes.. .7 74 so too is the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute. This dispute can be reduced to four fundamental
~ ~ aspects, twirled by composite disagreements, which for convenience, shall be examined in four sections from Lake Chad to the Atlantic Ocean.
1. Lacustrine Border on Lake Chad: This constitutes the main element re-introduced by Cameroon into its initial case file on June 6, 1994. Nigeria and Cameroon disagreed over the location of the boundary in the lake region, which resulted in a territorial contest over certain islands in this area, notably Darak, Katti, Kime Chika'a and Naga'a. Underneath this aspect of the dispute was a divergence over the interpretation of delimitation instruments of this undemarcated boundary. These instruments postdate the First World War as the border arrangements were borne out of the war spoils as explained above in chapter two. The instruments delimiting this section of the boundary include, the Milner- Simon Declaration of 1919, which was annexed to the mandate agreements for Cameroon, the Thompson-Marchand Declaration of 1929- 1930 and the Henderson- Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 193 1. More fundamentally, the parties disagreed over the very basis on which territory can be claimed by a state or the relative importance of the contending principles on which territory can be claimed. b In its case file, Cameroon contended that the boundary in Lake Chad was definitively established by the Milner-Simon Declaration of 191 9 and further clarified by the subsequent delimitation agreements of 1929 1930 and 1931, pending a demarcation exercise envisaged by Britain and France, the mandatories in this section of the intra-Cameroon international boundary, but it was never carried out. These instruments defined the boundary as a straight line linking the tripoint designated at coordinates 13'05'N and 14'05'E to the mouth of the' Ebeji River, situated at coordinates 12'32'17"N and 14'12'E as specified by the LCBC panel of experts. According to Cameroon, the coordinates of the tripoint and the Ebeji were determined and stated in the instruments to protect them from hydrological and other changes. Consequently, sovereignty over all territories, including the above named islands, to the east of this line is vested with Cameroon on conventional treaty basis. As evidence, Cameroon pointed to the fact that the LCBC subcommittee created to resolve the fallouts from the Nigeria-Chad clashes in the lake in 1983 had as its assignment, the demarcation of the boundary in this area, which presupposed an accepted delimitation. In spite of the loose use of the word 'delineation' ascribed to this committee's assignment, Cameroon contended, "an examination of the mandate given to the commissioners and experts charged with the operation leaves no room for doubt" its role was that of demarcation to the exclusion of delimitation since the subcommittee retained as working documents instruments agreed on at bilateral level between Germany and France, Germany and Britain, and Britain and France between 1906 and 1931, including all those Cameroon upheld had defined the boundary. Cameroon further argued that, Nigeria raised no objection to this point of reference, even though Nigerian delegates along the line criticised the demarcation operation of the subcommittee. But after their misgivings were addressed, they ultimately declared themselves satisfied. In any case, the misgivings of the Nigerian commissioners were not even based on the delimitation instruments themselves but rather with technicalities dealing with the position and identification of some and not all the beacons on the demarcation line. It was only at the stage of ratification of the final work of the subcommittee that Nigeria rejected the exercise and Cameroon argued that, the rejection in no way impugned the validity of the delimitation instruments b used. Cameroon also provided as evidence, certain maps annexed to the boundary agreements, which according to it, have "never been the subject of the slightest representation or objection from the UK or the Federal Republic of Nigeria" and that there exists no map, "not even a Nigerian one, showing a boundary as claimed by Nigeria in Lake had".' Nigeria on the other hand disagreed with the existence of a definitive delimitation in the Lake Chad area, as claimed by Cameroon. According to Nigeria, the instruments claimed by Cameroon to be definitive were only transient pending further clarifications, which were never made. To elucidate this fact, Nigeria argued that the Thompson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 did not amount to a final determination of the Anglo-French boundary in regard to Lake Chad but provided for delimitation by a boundary commission, since in a note signed by the Secretary of Sdate, Henderson, the Thompson-Marcha~dDeclaration was referred to ag a "preliminary survey" and that "the actual delimitation [would] be entrusted to the boundary commission envisaged for the purpose by Article 1 of the Mandate". In addition to this fact, Nigeria also regarded the use of 'approximately' in relation to the coordinates of the tripoint and the location of the mouth of the Ebeji and the fact that its mouth has shifted with time, to be indicators to the non-definitive status of the delimitation operation. In the absence of such delimitation, the proposed delimitation and demarcation under the auspices of the LCBC, which Nigeria had refused to accept by not ratifying the final report, was not binding on Nigeria. According to Nigeria meanwhile, sovereignty over the above named areas with Nigerian settlements, belonged to it as a "consequence of historical consolidation of title and the acquiescence of ~ameroon".' Thus, on the sidelines of this dispute is a contention of the relative importance of the competing principles on which territory can be claimed in international law The ultimate task of the Court in regard to this phase of the dispute was thus to determine the status of the boundary: whether or not it had been delimited and also to rule on the contending bases on which the parties claimed title over the disputed villages. In doing this, the Court assessed the validity of the supposed instruments t defining the borderline on which the parties sharply disagreed as presented above. The ICJ upheld that the Milner-Simon Declaration of 1919, the Thompson-Marchand Declaration as approved and incorporated into the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes, established binding agreements on the parties and have the status of international agreements that in progressive detail, delimited the present Nigeria- Cameroon boundary. Each of these documents attempted a delimitation of intra former German Cameroon international boundary between Britain and France, which were annexed to either of the mandate agreements or the trusteeship agreements over Cameroon. These agreements taken together with the accompanying maps, according to the Court, show that "certainly by 1931, the frontier in the Lake Chad area was indeed delimited and agreed between Great Britain and ~rance".~ With the status of the instruments clarified, it became clear that certain territories claimed by Nigeria fell to the east of the boundary line delimited by these agreements and as such were on the Cameroon side of the frontier (as shown in the following two maps below). But Nigeria had further grounds on which it claimed ownership of these outlying villages. This as contained in Nigeria's argument above, was based on three separate but related principles, which together or separately, bestowed sovereignty on Nigeria. These principles are historical consolidation, effectivit&and acquiescence. Map 8: Lacustrine Boundary as Determined by ICJ
Source: Adapted fiom ICJ, Case Concerning the Land andhhritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 348
The Court ruled that historical consolidation remains a controversial means of claiming territory and such may not take precedence over a conventional title from treaty rights as claimed by Cameroon. Thus the Court recalled that it had ruled on a number of occasions on the legal relationship between "efectiviti" and titles. In the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), it pointed out that, Where the act does not correspond to the law, where the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the title.'
This decision as the Court pointed out is not novel. It emphasises the superiority of treaty rights emanating from succession or cession in this ca~e,~overother modes of acquiring territory as contended by the parties. b Nigeria's claims based on historical consolidation, effectiviti and acquiescence are elements of what may be considered as prescription or occupation in international law rubric. Meanwhile, prescription according to Shaw; is a mode of establishing title to territory which is not terra nullius and which has been obtained either unlawfully or in circumstances wherein the legality of the acquisition cannot be demonstrated. It is the legitimisation of a doubtful title by the passage of time and presumed acquiescence of the former sovereign.. . . 10
Thus in the wake of protest from the former sovereign, which can take any of several forms including, diplon~aticnote verbale protests, severing of diplomatic relations, proposition of arbitration or judicial settlement, a territory cannot be claimed on this basis. Nigeria could not thus, claim any of the disputed territories in the Lake Chad basin and the Bakassi Peninsula given the protest from Cameroon.
~ppppppppp------2. Land Boundary between Lake Chad and Bakassi Peninsula: The dispute between the parties in this segment of the border is largely, as the ICJ observed, "over certain points on the land boundary . ..[and] the interpretation or application of particular provisions of the instruments delimiting that boundary"." Both sides were generally agreed on the delimitation instruments, which in addition to those relevant in the lake region include, the British Order in Council of 2 August, 1946 and the Anglo-German Agreements of 1 1 March and 12 April 1913. However, Nigeria disagreed with what it called the "Bakassi provision" contained in Articles XVIII to XX of the March 1913 agreement (relating to the status of the Bakassi Peninsula that will be examined more closely below). Cameroon in its amended application asked the Court "to specify definitively" the course of the land boundary as fixed by the relevant instruments of delimitation. Nigeria on its part in the preliminary phase of the case on its admissibility argued (albeit unsuccessfully) that there was no dispute over the land border but conceded subsequently to disagreement at specific locations on the land boundary, which, in its view, called for the Court's consideration. According to Nigeria, this was because either the "delimitation instruments themselves were 'defective', or because they had b been applied by Cameroon in a way which was 'manifestly at variance' with their terms"." Nigeria therefore, requested the Court to "clarify" the delimitation in those areas where there were defects in the instruments and correct the boundary line claimed by Cameroon in areas which the latter has allegedly misinterpreted the clearly spelt out instrument. Cameroon acknowledged there were some ambiguities and uncertainties in the instruments. Even with this convergence of views, the parties were hardly agreed on what role the Court would play. While Cameroon stressed on the Court confirming the instruments and warning against any attempt to effect a delimitation de novo in such areas as purportedly requested by Nigeria, the latter on its part insisted on the Court to "clarify" the instruments, especially in situations where they seemed not to be accurate or cases where some geographical features like marshes have dried up, or rivers have changed their courses, or a reference is made to an ill-defined tributary meanwhile on the ground, there are several. The Court on this aspect took a position closer to what Nigeria had pleaded: that in order to specify the course of the boundary in this area definitively, it is bound to examine the instrument more closely; clarifying where the instruments are inaccurate and ambiguous, and reconciling divergent interpretations where necessary. For this purpose, the Court in collaboration with the parties identified seventeen such areas in doubt for scrutiny (as shown on the next map below). Map 10: Contentious Arear on the Land Boundary
Source: Adapted from ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 361 A content analysis of this phase revealed that of the seventeen identified areas in contention [Limani, the Keraua (Kirewa or Kirawa) River, the Kohom River, the watershed from Ngosi to Humsiki (Roumsiki)/Kemale/Turu (the Mandara Mountains), from Mount Kuli to BourlidMaduguva (incorrect watershed line on Moisel's map), Kotcha (Koja), source of the Tsikakiri River, from Beacon 6 to Warnni Budungo; Maio Senche; Jimbare and Sapeo; Noumberou-Banglang; Tipsan; crossing the Maio Yin; the Hambere Range area; from the Hambere Range to the Mburi River (Lip and Yang); Bissaula-Tosso; and the Sama River], the Court adopted almost entirely Nigeria's position in six of them and partly so in one .'"n the other hand, Cameroon's claimed boundary line was accepted five times and partly so in one.14 on five of them, the Court rejected the claims of both parties and spelt out a new t boundary line. These figures however, tend to obscure perhaps the most interesting aspect of the land boundary ruling. In three of the six positions the Court ruled in favour of Nigeria's claimed boundary line, Cameroon benefited compared to the de facto situation before the judgment. In the neighbourhood of Humsilti as well as Jimbare and Sapeo area" and Noumberou-Banglang area, ihe boundary line claimed and shown on Nigerian maps, which the Court considered to be accurate appeared to be more favourable to Cameroon than that shown on Cameroon's maps.16 One can surmise from this observation that Cameroon gained more than she bargained for in regard to the land boundary. Essentially, it can also be said that the land boundary was not what took Nigeria and Cameroon to court. This came in as an appendagc to the main territorial disputes in the lake, Bakassi and maritime regions. Both sides appeared not to have prepared well for this part of the case. One would imagine that if there were adequate preparations, Nigeria under normal circumstances would not produce evidence in court more favourable to Cameroon. Else, they would have reconciled their positions and not for them to allow the Court point out situations where Nigeria's cartographic evidence and otherwise appeared to favour Cameroon rather. This also brings us face-to-face with some other contradictions or absurdities involved in boundary disputes. Nationalist feelings are exclusivist and seldom give room for objectivity, lest such illogicalities would very easily be identified. 3. The Question of Sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsular: The territorial contest over ownership of the Bakassi Peninsular and the adjoining islands constituted the crux of the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. It is this and the maritime that were the subject of Cameroon's litigation at the ICJ in March 1994. Cameroon claimed the territory based on treaty rights accruing from the March 1 1, 1913 Agreement between Britain and Germany. This agreement placed the Bakassi on the German side and Nigeria and Cameroon as successor states to these colonial powers are bound by it according to the principle of uti possidetis. Whereas Cameroon rested its claims mainly on colonial treaties, Nigeria claimed the territory based on title held by the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar which Nigeria supposed they retained as at 1913 and beyond until the territory passed to Nigeria at + independence in 1960. Great Britain was thus unable to have ceded the territory to Germany as conceded in the March 1913 treaty, because the former had no title to pass on (nemo dat quod non habit). Based on the fact that title over the area did not belong to Britain in 1913, the relevant provisions of the Anglo-German Agreement of March 11, 1913 must be regarded as ineffective given that Britain acted ultra-vires, according to Nigeria. Nigeria further argued that besides the above weakness, the 1913 agreement was defective because the German Parliament, contrary to the General Act of the Conference of Berlin of 26 February, 1'885 and contemporaneous German domestic legislation, did not approve it. In addition, the agreement was abrogated as a result of Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, by which it was provided that pre-war bilateral treaties concluded with Germany had to be revived by notification to Germany by the other party and since Britain did not, the agreement was accordingly abrogated and as such Cameroon could not have succeeded to it. In response to the above arguments raised by Nigeria, Cameroon's position is that the German government considered the arrangements of 1913 as simply rectification of boundaries, which did not indeed require parliamentary approval. Cameroon also contended in response to the argument that Britain had no right to cede the Bakassi that, the "colonial protectorate" entered into by Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar in the practice of the period was essentially in international law, the same with colonies. Like in the case of colonies, external sovereignty passed to the protecting state and this was manifested through the acquisition and exercise of the capacity to cede part of the protected territory by international treaty, without any intervention by the population or entity in question.I7
Cameroon also argued, even if the hypothesis that Britain had no right to cede the Bakassi were correct, neither Britain nor Nigeria had before sought to claim that the agreement was invalid on this grounds. Rather, as Cameroon recalled; . . . until the start of the 1990s Nigeria had unambiguously confirmed and accepted the 1913 boundary line in its diplomatic and consular practice, its official geographical and cartographic publications and indeed in its statements and conduct in the political field."
b This was of course, not shown in the course of the negotiation that led to the Maroua Accord. It was only from the 1990s that Nigeria began making claims to the Peninsular. Also, Cameroon contended that the Agreement of March 11, 1913 is indivisible and that it is not possible to sever from it certain parts. Cameroon asserted that treaties accepted as valid must be interpreted as a whole and "all the provisions accepted and applied" and that, parties to a treaty cannot "pick and choose" which sections to apply unless provided so by the treaty. Cameroon also avowed that having included the Peninsular in the 1961 Plebiscite, the UN had recognised it as part of British Cameroon as was indeed shown on the map annexed to the Report of the Plebiscite Commissioner. The Southern Cameroons that it formed part of, had voted to join Cameroon and Nigeria voted in favour of General Assembly Resolution 1608 (XV) to actualise the Plebiscite result without registering any protest. The ICJ in its judgment decided that sovereignty over the Bakassi lies with Cameroon. It upheld the sanctity of the Anglo-German Agreement of March 1 1, 1913, in its entirety. But on accepting the boundary claimed by Cameroon in this area, the Court first ruled on the various counts on which Nigeria thought the agreement of 1913 should be invalidated. It dismissed Nigeria's claim that the treaty failed to meet up with German internal rules governing such. The ICJ opined that Germany obviously considered that the procedures prescribed by its laws were met and Britain (the other party to the treaty) did not raise any objections. Even more importantly, this agreement was officially published in both Germany and Britain. As such, it is irrelevant that the German Parliament did not approve it. The Court could not also reject the 1913 treaty on grounds of the prescription of Article 289 of the Treaty of Versailles of 28 June, 1919, which Nigeria claimed Britain did not meet up with. The Court noted that since 1916 Germany no longer exercised any authority in Cameroon and under Articles 118 and 119 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany officially relinquished title to its overseas territory. So Britain did not need to reactivate the 1913 treaty in line with the provisions of Article 289 of the Versailles Treaty. The Court also decided contrary to Nigeria's argument that Britain was not impeded from ceding the area in question by treaty obligations with the Chiefs and Kings of Old Calabar. Going by the practice of the *day, not every treaty of protection had the same status. Unlike the case of the protectorates of Morocco (1885), Tunisia and Madagascar (1895) in their treaty relations with France, or the case of Bahrain and Qatar in their treaty relation with Britain, in sub-Saharan Africa such treaties termed "treaties of protection" were entered into with important indigenous rulers and not with states. In effect, there were no significant differences between such and ones of annexation. In support of this reasoning the Court recalled that Max Heber, sitting as arbitrator in the Island of Palinas case, explained that such a treaty is not an agreement between equals, it is rather a form of internal organisation of a colonial territory. . . and thus suzerainty over the native states becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as towards other members of the community of nationsI9.
The Court was of the opinion that the choice of a protectorate treaty by Britain was just a question of the preferred manner of rule. Going by the tenets of intertemporal law, the legal consequences of the treaties concluded at that time in the Niger Delta have to be inferred from the existing practice then. Thus Britain is said to have regarded itself as administering the territories comprised in the 1884 Treaty, and not just protecting them. In this regard, Consul Johnston reported in 1888 that "the country between the boundary of Lagos and the German Boundary of Cameroons" was "administered by Her Majesty's Consular Officer, under various orders in co~ncil~~~~ From the above the Court concluded that, under the law at the time, Britain was in a position in 1913, to determine its boundary with Germany in respect of Nigeria. The ICJ found no evidence of protest by the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar against this action. The Court also found that during the Mandate and Trusteeship periods up to independence of Southern Cameroons in 1961, British colonial administrative actions gave no doubt that the area formed part of the mandated and later trust territory. Right to the Plebiscite of 1961, the international community, including the League of Nations and the United Nations, also recognised this. Having voted in favour of UN General Assembly resolution 1608 (XV), which terminated the trusteeship and approved the Plebiscite results, Nigeria too had recognised the above fact. Accordingly, the Court found that Nigeria from the wealth of available evidence, + accepted it was bound by Articles XVIII to XXII of the Anglo-German agreement of March 11, 1913, as well as Cameroonian sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsular. Nigeria also laid claim to the Bakassi on other counts, which the World Court had to consider independently of the treaty title above. In this regard, Nigeria emphasised that it had title over the disputed peninsular on the basis of historical consolidations, together with acquiescence in the period since independence. As evidence, Nigerian alluded to its state activities in the area and population statistics showing a preponderance of Nigerians in the area, not only in terms of their akin ethnic relations with neighbouring Cross River and Akwa Ibom states, but also in their possession of Nigerian identification documents. The Court however, reiterated its earlier position stated in connection with the lacustrine border that, the invocation of historical consolidation cannot "vest title to Bakassi in Nigeria, where its 'occupation' of the peninsula is adverse to Cameroon's prior treaty title" and moreso, the possession has been for a limited period. The court also decided that, even though there is no reason to doubt the Efik and Effiat toponyrny of the settlements, or their relationships with Nigeria these facts do not establish Nigerian title over the Bakassi. Furthermore, in spite of evidence of Nigerian state activities in the area giving the semblance of Nigeria acting a titre de souverain, the protest or resistance to this on the part of Cameroon, be it limited, suggests that Cameroon did not acquiesce to allow its treaty rights over Bakassi pass onto Nigeria. As the Court made clear in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina FasoIRepublic of Mali), "where there is a conflict between title and effectivitis, preference [is] given to the formern2'. The boundary was upheld to be as established by the Anglo-German Agreement of March 19 13 and thus, sovereignty over the Bakassi, lies with ~ameroon.~~
4. Maritime Boundary Dispute: The dispute over the maritime zone between the parties for convenience is considered in two parts. The first part is defined by existing (albeit, disputed) agreements from the three miles delimited by the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 to point "G" located at coordinates 8" 22' 19" E longitude and 4" 17' 00" N latitude defined by post-independence agreements between Nigeria and Cameroon. b Unlike the first part, there are no agreements on the second part of this maritime border from point "G" up to the ill-defined tripoint with Equatorial Guinea. Cameroon's claims in the maritime region are invariably linked to the fate of the Bakassi Peninsular. It is obviously so because the alternative boundary claimed by Nigeria if adopted would have fundamentally changed the point of "anchorage" of the respective inner sea claimed by the parties. As such the very first issue at stake in the maritime dispute is the relevance of the Anglo-German Agreement of March 1913 to the boundary, which the Court had ruled to be authentic in its entirety. This decision resolves the issue of the first three miles of the maritime boundary delimited by Articles XXI and XXII of the latter agreement. The second issue underneath the maritime dispute is the relevance of the Yaounde IS Declaration of 4 April, 1971 and the Maroua Declaration of 1 June, 1975. Cameroon contended that these postcolonial agreements extended the maritime
delimitation with - Nigeria from- the - three-mile limir defiried above to Point G. Cameroon went further to argue that the Maroua agreement signed by the presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon expressed the consent of the two states to be bound by that treaty without any reservation or condition attached to it and that this instrument was not construed to be subject to ratification. Nigeria on its part denied the existence of any delimitation agreements on the maritime border. On the basis of its claim to the Bakassi Peninsula, Nigeria argued that the maritime boundary begins at the mouth of the Rio Del Rey and down the median line into the sea. Nigeria further contended that even if Cameroon's claims to the Bakassi were upheld, the boundary proposed by Cameroon was still unacceptable on several counts, notably Nigeria's non-recognition of the Yaounde I1 and Maroua agreements as binding. The former, according to Nigeria was not a binding agreement but simply a record of a meeting in an ongoing process on the maritime boundary that was subject to further discussions. Nigeria likewise contended that the latter was wanting for lacking ratification by the then Supreme Military Council, in line with the Nigerian constitution in force at the time. Nigeria presumes this to have been known or ought to have been known by Cameroon, as a neighbour to Nigerian. Nigeria claimed to have made its disapproval of these supposed maritime boundary b instruments known since 1977 and desired that the entire maritime boundary be delimited de novo. Invoking Article 46, paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Nigeria argued that it could not be bound by the provisions of an agreement which had not been duly submitted for ratification by the competent body in line with its constitutional provisions. According to Nigeria, Cameroon should have known that without ratification, the Maroua Declaration was null and void. The World Court rejected Nigeria's arguments on the nullity of the Yaounde I1 and Maroua declarations. In spite of Nigeria's initial objection to the Yaounde I1 agreement the reference made to it in the Maroua Declaration indicated that its terms remained binding on the contracting parties and indeed, the latter agreement was an extension of its provisions. The ICJ further stated that the Maroua Declaration, as well as, the Yaounde I1 Declaration is binding and established a legal obligation on Nigeria. Nigeria, the Court enjoined, cannot invoke domestic law to invalidate international agreements freely entered into by the head of state that is a plenipotentiary. Given that in negotiating the treaty, the parties did not indicate that ratification was required, the Declaration immediately came into force upon signature. The Court also observed that in July 1975, the parties inserted a correction in the Maroua Declaration; and that in so acting, they treated the Declaration as valid and applicable, and that Nigeria only raised objections to the agreement in 1977 two years later. Given that the Agreement was duly lodged at the Secretariat of the UN, sufficient publicity was made of it. In these circumstances the Court adjudged that: The maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria up to and including point G must be considered to have been established on a conventional basis by the Anglo-Gennan Agreement of 11 March 1913, the Yaounde I1 Declaration of 4 April 1971 and the Maroua Declaration of 1 June 1975, and takes the following course: starting from the straight line joining Bakassi Point and King Point, the line follows the "compromise line" jointly drawn at Yaounde on 4 April 1971 . . . and passing through 12 numbered points, whose precise co-ordinates were determined by . . . the Joint Commission meeting in Lagos in June 1971 ; from point 12 on that compromise line the course of the boundary follows the line to point G specified in the Maroua Declaration . . . as corrected by the exchange of letters between the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria of 12 June and 17 July 1975.23 fi The second part of the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon has a significantly different background. Beyond point G, there has never been any delimitation agreement on the boundary. Technically it could well be argued that no dispute exists in a legal sense between the parties since both parties agree to this. However, the jurisdiction of the ICJ became an issue in itself, which indeed, Nigeria had raised from the outset of the proceedings. The second peculiarity in this part of the maritime boundary is the intervening interests of non-party third states, namely, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, which had to be taken into consideration. Cameroon in its application of 29 March, 1994 called on the Court "in order to avoid further incidents between the two countries, . . . to determine the course of the maritime boundary between the two states beyond the line 'fixed in 1975". Cameroon asked the court to specify the course of maritime boundary with Nigeria alone without prejudicing the interests of third parties by limiting the delimitation to "the outer limits of the maritime zones which international law places under the respective jurisdiction of the two parties". Alternatively, the Court according to Cameroon could well delineate beyond the boundary exclusive to the parties but such should not be binding on third parties states (Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome) in the Gulf of Guinea. Cameroon's thrust was that the geography (concavity) of the Gulf of Guinea placed it in a disadvantaged position which should be taken into consideration when delimiting their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). And in effecting the delineation, equity rather than equidistance should be the objective. In the course of the proceedings, Cameroon submitted a proposed delimitation map of this maritime area that became a serious bone of contention. Nigeria in the first place objected to the admissibility of Cameroon's request and urged the Court to reject it because, the delimitation affects areas claimed by third states and secondly, because the requirement of prior negotiations has not been satisfied. To the extent that what Cameroon requested for infringes on third states, Nigeria argued that the Court had no jurisdiction at all. In any event, Nigeria contended, Cameroon could not be asking the court to fashion a boundary line that would correct its disadvantaged position which indeed is a natural reality and which to @ Nigeria is an attempt to reform nature or refashion geography. The ICJ ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case but also upheld Nigeria's argument that it cannot delineate the boundary to the extent desired by Cameroon, which goes beyond their exclusive common border to areas that overlap third party interests, while also rejecting Nigeria's argument to a need for prior negotiation. The ICJ noted that negotiation had indeed taken place, even if no agreement was arrived at and concluded that it would proceed with the maritime boundary delimitation between Nigeria and Cameroon in so far as the rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe are not affected. In carrying out the delimitation, the Court invoked its jurisprudence over the years with respect to maritime boundary delimitation, which in the present case was to determine, with effect from point G, a single line of delimitation for the coincident zones of jurisdiction "within the restricted respect of which the Court is competent to give a ruling".24 This task the Court observed in
can only be carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential treatment to one of [the zones] to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them.25
The applicable criteria and principles are embodied in the "so called equitable principleslrelevant circumstances method", which the Court noted, is very similar to the equidistancelspecial circumstances method applicable in delimitation of the territorial sea. This entails first drawing an equidistance line, and then considering whether there are factors calling for the adjustment of that line in order to achieve an "equitable result". This is in consonance with the decision of the court when it observed that "it is in accord with precedents to begin with the median line as a provisional line and then to ask whether 'special circumstances' require any adjustment or shifting of that line".26 Special circumstances are those which may modify the results produced by an unqualified application of the equidistance principle brought by a "fact necessary to be taken into account in the delimitation process". It was on these bases that the ICJ proceeded to establish the equidistance line between Nigeria and Cameroon, which it had been opportune to define as: + the line every point of which is equidistance from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two states is
The Court determined the base points for its construction of the equidistance as West Point and East Point situated at 8" 16' 38" longitude east and 4" 31' 59" latitude north, and 8" 30 ' 14" longitude E and 4" 30' 06" latitude N, respectively; located on either side of the bay formed by the estuaries of the Akwayafe and Cross River. After establishing the equidistance line as shown on the sketch map on page 93, the Court found no reason to adjust it as requested by Cameroon. Cameroon raised three issues to be present that made it necessary for the adjustment of the equidistance provisional line to make it "equitable". According to Canieroon, the concavity of the Gulf of Guinea placed it at a disadvantaged position and necessitated the shifting of any equidistance line between the parties to make it equitable. But the World Court found out that this was not evident in the section of the boundary it had jurisdiction to rule on in the case. Rather, the concavity of Cameroon's coastline was especially obvious in the area from Dibundsha Point opposite Bioko Island (Equatorial Guinea) which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court as it affected the interest of a third state which was not a party to the proceedings (see map below). Cameroon as well requested for an adjustment of Map 11: Gulf of Guinea showing Third Party Interesfs
. +...- I., . Source: Adapted from ICJ, Case Concerning the Land andithritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 444 the equidistance because according to it, the presence of Bioko Island tended to cave in Cameroon since it was closer to Cameroon's coast than to that of mainland Equatorial Guinea to which it belongs. The Island, the Court maintained, could not be a circumstance to necessitate such an adjustment because its effects come in with regard to Cameroon's boundary with Equatorial Guinea and not the exclusive boundary with Nigeria. Lastly, the court dismissed Cameroon's claims that its proportionately longer coastline vis-a-vis Nigeria justified a shifting of the equidistance. The Court was of the opinion that Cameroon's coastline irrespective of where it is measured, is not longer than that of Nigeria and thus cannot be invoked as such. In all, the court found no special circumstance to warrant an adjustment of the equidistance line and thus the line could be considered as equitable. Cameroon and Nigeria made submissiqns and counter-claims requesting the Court to impute damages on the other for the state's 'misconduct' over the years in respect of the disputed territories. Cameroon specifically argued in respect of the limitrophe of Lake Chad and the Bakassi that by invading and occupying its territory, Nigeria has violated and has continued to violate, its obligations under international law. Consequently, reparations are due to Cameroon "on account of the material and moral injury suffered". Nigeria on its part contended that the occupation alleged to be an invasion by Cameroon was rather peaceful and had been on since independence. Nigeria again strongly maintained that its deployment of forces was mainly for the purpose of resolving internal problems and partly in response to Cameroon's systematic encroachment on Nigerian territory. Furthermore, Nigeria argued that even if the Court were to award these areas to Cameroon, its presence there was as a result of a "reasonable mistake" or "honest belief'. As such, Nigeria cannot be held responsible for conduct which, Nigeria had every reason to believe lawful. The ICJ in its judgment ordered that the parties are under obligation to expeditiously and without conditions withdraw any civil administration, military or police forces from areas which pursuant to the judgment, fell within the sovereignty of the other ~ide.~"ddressin~ Cameroon's specific request for reparation, the Court rejected it stating that by the very fact of the present Judgment and of the evacuation of the Cameroonian territory occupied by Nigeria, the injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the occupation . . . will in all events have been sufficiently addressed. [It] will not therefore seek to ascertain whether and to what extent Nigeria's responsibility to Cameroon has been engaged as a result of that occupation.29
The court finally concluded the judgment by stating its inability to rule on the many alleged claims of cross-border incidents by Cameroon and the counter-claims of Nigeria on similar incidents, or their imputability to the other party, on grounds that they were not proven.30
Reactions to the Ruling + Nigeria: Despondency characterised the general reaction to the verdict in Nigeria. Newspaper headlines, editorials and columns for several weeks from October 11, 2002, paid much attention to it. The Guardian captioned, it as a "painful end to a tortuous legal battle"". As the government dropped a clue it might not accept the judgment, the captions became more forthright in denouncing it. A Thisday headline "Bakassi: ICJ Judgment, western imperialist gang-up" typified the general tempo of the press.32 In a review of opinions, the Guardian reported that the judgment evoked spontaneous reaction of rejections in the Bakassi (the area that makes up the kernel of the litigation). The people of the Bakassi are "bona fide citizens of Nigeria and will forever, inhabiting our Bakassi, remain Nigerians", said Florence Ita Giwa, a representative of the area in the Nigerian Senate. In the same review, the president of the Nigeria Bar Association (NBA) Chief Wole Olanipekun expressed surprise that Nigeria lost the Bakassi. In his words, "I never expected Nigeria to lose that case, Bakassi is the juiciest part of Nigerian heritage . . . it is most unfortunate that we lost the case"." The Punch with a similar tone in an editorial described the judgment as a "Bitter pill to swallow for the government and people of Nigeria". It further rebuked it as "dubious" and a "product of political expedience rather than of equity and; indifference to the relevant historical A columnist with Thisday justified rejection of the judgment for its being "unwholesome, demeaning, a-historical, anti- people, anti-justice and above all superficial and partial".3s After almost a fortnight of silence, the Nigerian Federal Government complemented its initial disjointed reaction, (which held that the ruling left no victor nor vanquished)36 with a communiquC that exposed the bitterness it orchestrated. At the end of an executive meeting convened to examine the ruling on October 23, 2002, the Minister of Transport, (Ojo Maduekwe) read out its official stance on the judgment largely rejecting the Court's ruling.37 Perceivably emboldened by the general disgust with the pronouncement of the ICJ, the government cited grave and extensive errors of judgment and bias on the part of the World Court. According to the statement, b . . . for purely political reasons, the court, headed by a French President, upheld a legal position which is contrary to all known laws and conventions, thus legitimizing and promoting the interest of former colonial powers at our expense.38
The government reaction was especially fine-tuned to coincide with public opinion and the general mood in the country, but appears to be at odds with previous dispositions of African countries on ICJ rulings, concerning territorial and boundary disagreements. Meanwhile, President Obasanjo also, in an interview, rejected having entered into a pact with his Cameroonian counterpart in the presence of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to abide by the decision of the ICJ? The official release and the interview of Obasanjo taken together, illustrate the anguish in which the government of Nigeria found itself after the ruling. In spite of this obvious tone of rejection, the statement ruled out war with Cameroon and it urged Nigerians to remain calm while the government forged ahead with the quest for a peaceful solution. But the general atmosphere in the country remained that of dejection, shock and disappointment. Notwithstanding the government's ruling out of war as a means of reversing the unpleasant situation, military strategists in some quarters, continued to discuss the possibility of war.40 The Senate even ordered the executive arm of government to get the armed forces "combat-ready for any eventuality", which it considered as a back-up to the continued diplomatic endeavours. Also, the Senate asked for funds to be allocated for the evacuation of the estimated four million Nigerians in Cameroon in the event of a total war to recover the Bakassi lost in the legal t~ssle.~' In the wake of the public frustration and general disbelief, the temptation of apportioning blame could not be resisted. Much scorn was poured on the government and its handling of the matter. Not only were there trenchant comments against the composition of Nigeria's team of jurists who handled the defence,42 but also, strong words were reserved for Nigeria's acceptance of a French national, Gilbert Guillaume, as president of the bench, to have presided over the case.43 Still, others thought that Nigeria should not have in the first place consented to ICJ adjudication of the dispute. Those who espouse this position consider the advisers that impressed on the t government to go to court as the real
. . . demarcating the land boundary between the two countries . . . make recommendations on additional confidence-building measures such as the holding, on a regular basis, of meetings between local authorities, government officials and Heads of State, developing projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross- border cooperation . . ..62
This commission has been steering the efforts to implement the ICJ ruling. Nigeria- Cameroon relations have significantly improved and would likely continue as the Mixed Commission progresses with the arduous task assigned to it; a task that is not limited to the ICJ ruling but largely on the sustenance of peace between the two through functional integration.
Wider International Relations: + The October 10, 2002 ICJ ruling also had implications on international law. In the first place, by upholding the treaty rights of the parties as the basis of its award the Court has reinforced treaties as the primordial source of international law. From the disputed villages established on the bed of the receding Lake Chad, through the hotly contested Bakassi Peninsula, up to Point "G" on the maritime boundary, existing treaties prevailed over other principles of international law such as effectivitk, historical consolidation and acquiescence, on which bases territories could also be claimed. Uti possidetis is another principle of international law whose eminence was upheld by the ruling, especially in relation to international boundaries in Africa. Although the principle has its underpinning in treaties, it gives boundaries in post- colonial Africa greater stability even against moribund colonial treaties. The Court rejected Nigeria's claims to the Bakassi based on a colonial treaty between Britain and the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar. This agreement since 1913 had seized to be respected and indeed was not evidently taken into consideration in defining Nigeria's boundaries at independence. African countries having invoked the sanctity of boundaries, as they existed at independence, can continue to rely on this principle for resolution of territorial disagreements. It is hoped that a leaf would be borrowed from here to settle Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute. Critique of the Conduct of the Case Composition of the Defence Teams: The composition of the defence teams of both parties presents a tinge, which, the facts of the case aside could have contributed to the outcome of the legal tussle. Cameroon was represented by a team of fifty-seven among them eleven university professors of international law, nine of whom were still in active service and two emeritus professors. In addition to these, two other university dons were part of the team and a retired advocate and minister as well as the Cameroon Minister of Justice, Amadou Ali, as agent. Apart from the Minister of Justice, the Cameroon case was in the hands of these university dons led by Professor Maurice Kamto. These fourteen legal authorities and the minister addressed the court at public hearings from 18 February to 2 1 March, 2002. # On the other hand, Nigeria was represented by a team of forty-eight of which five were university professors in international law. Unlike Cameroon whose case was largely in the hands of the university dons, Nigeria's case was largely handled by political office holders but for foreign members of the team. Indeed, of the nine members of the team that addressed the court at public hearings from 18 February to 21 March, 2002, four were Nigerians by nationality but none was from the faculty and they appeared to be authorities of domestic than international legal matters. Meanwhile, a leading Nigerian student of international law, Professor R.O. Cukwurah was not at the centre of the defence, although a member of the team. One would surmise that the Cameroon team dominated by renowned students of international law had an edge over that of Nigeria, especially with regard to their grasp of contending theoretical issues underpinning international boundary and territorial matters at the World Court. The Cameroonian academics were very instrumental in advising thegovernment to opt for litigationat-the KJ and had-surely taken a critical review of the facts of the disputes vis-&vis international legal norms, before foreign legal jurists and experts were hired. Conceivably, if such authorities were brought in timely by Nigeria, it could well have maintained its qualms about going to court in the first place. Such candid advise could hardly have been expected from the foreign experts whom, with all fairness, can be considered as mercenaries for their main motivation is not nationalism (or call it patriotism) but the heavy financial fees paid to hire their services. Most likely, if their reward were pegged on their being successful, they would have taken a harder look at it all before getting involved. We therefore maintain that with a better team, Nigeria could have been advised to go for an out of court settlement or put up a better fight at The Hague. However, no matter how good that team could have been, it would be fantasy to declare that the results would have been very different in court.
Financial and other Costs: The elaborate defence teams assembled by the parties were obviously expensive. Not only were they so many (57 and 48 for Cameroon and Nigeria, respectively) in terms of numbers, the composition of the teams left much to be desired. There were so many in the teams who definitely had little or nothing to do # with the legal battle at The Hague. Included in this category are the many local administrators, bureaucrats, journalist and even lawyers who would have been relevant for a suit in a domestic court over land boundaries and not at the international level. These people had to go to The Hague many times during the eight-year spell of the trial. The travel bills and other logistics, including accommodation, were obviously overwhelming. In addition to these expenses, the sheer cost of hiring the services of such distinguished international academics and jurists cannot be overlooked. Considering that the foreign members of these teams had no national colours to defend, handsome financial returns undoubtedly motivated them. In another sense, the protracted endeavours of the Lake Chad Basin
Commission, involving national experts from four member countries - Cameroon,
Chad, Niger and Nigeria - and the hiring of the services of IGN-International of France, was following the court action and judgment, largely an exercise in futility. The creation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission team was prompted in 1983, by disturbances in the Lake Chad area involving the forces of Nigeria and Chad. The heads of state of these countries meeting in Lagos from July 21 - 23, 1983 set up a sub-cornmittee charged with demarcating the boundaries of these states, with the final contract for the actual placing of beacons signed out to IGN in 1988. After initial delays caused by funding difficulties, between 1983 and 1994 the subcommittee, and from 1988 to 1993 the contractors worked hard to accomplish the difficult task assigned to them. At the VIIIth summit of the heads of state in Lagos in 1994, a final report on the work was submitted to the chief executives of these countries for signature following its unanimous acceptance by experts from member states. This report was also accepted by the heads of state pending ratification within a year before it took effect. Chad and Niger ratified within the one-year period ahead of the next summit. Cameroon delayed and finally did in 1997. Nigeria has not yet done so. But clearly the ICJ ruling has superseded it, at least, as far as the Nigeria-Cameroon Iacustrine boundary is concerned, and with this is gone the cost of all what was put into this exercise. This becomes more regrettable when it is understood that the ICJ decision in the Lake Chad area is similar to the conclusions of the Lake Chad Basin # Commission's experts and contractors. It suggests that the .oodles of money and time spent on the judicial process could have been better spent. In fact, demarcation which the Lake Chad Basin Commission contractor (IGN-International) had carried out will have to be done anew under the auspices of the UN Mixed Commission. In the same vein, the ruling in the Bakassi area up to point G on the maritime boundary simply confirmed what the Gowon-Ahidjo teams of experts had done in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the Court extended the maritime boundary beyond point G. But this could also have been done bilaterally had the channels of communication not broken down. In addition to the cost in time and money noted above, equally lost is the spirit of sub-regional and bilateral negotiation to resolve border problems. The resolve at bilateral level to negotiate amicably had earlier been severely tested when the Maroua Declaration was renounced by Nigeria and further negotiation on the rest of the maritime boundary suspended. The recourse to adjudication at the ICJ seriously weakened the faith in bilateral mechanisms for resolving territorial disagreements between Nigeria and Cameroon, and even within the LCBC sub-regional body.
Uti Possidetis Under-utilised: Uti Possidetis offered a shorter way of determining the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary in the Bakassi area. If colonial practice were given the position it deserved, the detour of establishing the legality of the Anglo-German agreement of March 1 1, 19 13, would have been avoided. By simply examining British colonial practice and the documentation handed down to the parties at independence in 1960/6 1, the lengthy wrangles in court could have been averted and the proceedings that took over eight years would have taken a shorter time. This is similar to the position taken by Judge Al-Khasawneh when he stated in his separate opinion that the ICJ appeared to have taken the tortuous position of investigating the rights and wrongs of territorial acquisition and claims by imperial powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.63 Going by the principles of uti possidetis, the ultimate question is "Where was the boundary at independence?" Of course, the issue of the treaty of March 1913 could have come in but obviously not as a central one. British colonial practice alone could have convincingly answered this question. No one doubts the centrality of the b canon of uti possidetis in African (as well as Latin American) boundary matters. This principle was freely, imported into African boundary matters by African leaders in 1963 to forestall the many boundary problems anticipated in the continent by cynics.64 It is thus surprising that when the moment came for its use, it was not acclaimed as expected. Secondly, the argument that Britain acted ultra vires in 1913 to cede the Bakassi to Germany seems spurious. In 1884 when the British entered into the much talked-of protection treaty with the kings and chiefs of Old Calabar, they never did this as a part of Nigeria. The ultimate source of legitimacy for Nigeria, Cameroon and most other African countries as political entities is that they are the embodiments of what the imperialist created. Nigeria has quite often been regarded as the creation of Britain and if this is so, there can be no questions of its being defective if purposively done. If Britain left out the Bakassi from its dream of Nigeria, then so be it. No
------referendum was c-0-nducted at any-pointintime-tohowif-thepeoples that toddayYmake ------up Nigeria would have loved to join. The same is true for Cameroon to a large extent and most other African countries or better still, all African countries. (European imperialism also shaped even Ethiopia's boundaries!) There cannot be a question of a section of Nigeria being left out of Nigeria by Britain; meanwhile, the very idea of Nigeria indeed is British. This entity was not moulded in one swoop in 1900. Rather its morphology (structure and form) was evolved throughout the colonial period. What is really "Nigeria" is what came out of this kaleidoscope in 1960-61 and not what ought to have been in 1913. As late as 1961, following the plebiscite results in British Northern Cameroons, a significant change was introduced to the picture after the independence of most of present day Nigeria. If the decision to create 'Nigeria' is legitimate as a colonial fiat, then that of leaving out a part of Old Calabar is also right ipso facto. Otherwise, Nigeria was in the awkward situation of challenging its very existence or legitimacy. The conduct of Nigeria over the Bakassi seems irredentist though, but lacks the critical cutting edge for irredentism. If the pre-independence boundary instruments defining Nigeria-Cameroon boundary carry a black spot on them as a result of their imperialist origin, post independence ones are safe from such iniquities. Thus the Yaounde I1 and Maroua Declaration stand unique in that the parties on their own Ehose to enter into them. Once entered into, Nigeria could not unilaterally withdraw from these agreements on the bogus basis that the latter was not ratified, meanwhile ratification was not expressly spelt out as a sine qua non for its coming into effect as was the case with the abortive LCBC draft delineation and demarcation agreement, which was signed in Abuja in 1994 but was not ratified by Nigeria as stipulated and only belatedly ratified by Cameroon. Thus, the importance of treaties as the primary basis of claiming territory in international law could still have been upheld, as the Court was keen to do, but with emphasis shifted to the post-independence ones. By choosing to emphasise the centrality of the March 1913 agreement in defining the boundary in the Bakassi area between the belligerents, the ICJ transcendentally exonerated former president Gowon. Many in Nigeria (even after the ruling) continue to indict him to have allegedly ceded Bakassi to Cameroon. This position is surnmarised by a trenchant columnist in the Guardian who insisted that Gowon's often bland denials that he did not cede Bakassi will not do. He owes Nigerians and posterity an historic duty to fully and truthfully state his own side of the transaction at Maroua and what the intentions were.
But the ruling forcefully placed the Maroua deal to have been in consonance with Nigeria's existing treaty obligations inherited at independence. Such sentiments and opinion from pseudo-nationalists do not state the truth, which is that the Yaounde I1 and Maroua Declarations aside, title over the Bakassi belonged to Cameroon by virtue of the 1913 Agreement between Britain and Germany, and confirmed by British colonial practice in the area between 1916 and 1961. The allegations that Gowon ceded Bakassi to Cameroon as compensation for Cameroon's support to the Federal side in the Nigeria Civil War does not seem to be supported by any historical evidence. Nor is the thesis that Cameroon was in a position of strength in the course of the negotiations preceding the agreement, (as Nigeria had not fully recovered from the civil war) relevant to the declaration. Rather the Declaration was intended to be a confirmation of the colonial instrument on this section of the boundary and an extension or projection within the same spirit of this boundary in line with their national declaration on their limits of the territorial sea, 'beyond the three-nautical # miles delimited by the colonial treaty of March 191 3. In spite of the mixed reactions to the ruling, it has provided an enabling environment for a final settlement of the intractable territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. However, it is left for both sides to fashion out less contentious policies towards the management of trans-border activities by their nationals and also more humane treatment of nationals living in each other's territory. The United Nations Mixed Commission has embraced this endeavour and it is too early to judge their attainment. References and Notes
I International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning tlze and and Maritime Boundary between Curneroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), Hague: ICJ. 2002, p. 13.
K.J. Holsti, "Resolving International Conflicts: A Taxonomy of Behavior and some Figures on Procedures", Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. X, No 3 (1966), p. 289.
"CJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 15, paragraph 18.
4 F.S. Northedge and M.D. Donelan, International Disputes: The Politicul Aspects (London: Europa Publications, 197 1) p. 70.
ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundarj hetween Cameroon and Nigeria, paragraph 42, p.39.
6 Ibid, paragraph 40, p. 38.
Ibid, paragraph 52,p.44.
ICJ Reports 1996, p. 587, paragraph 63; see also, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab JamahiriyaIChad), ICJ Reports, 1994, pp. 75-76.
9 Shaw, International Law, 4th edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 339. lo Ibid, pp 343-344.
I I ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundar)i between Cameroon and Nigeria, paragraph 85, p.60.
l2 Ibid, p. 58 paragraph 78.
l3 These six are Limani, Keraua River, Maio Senche, Jimbare and Sapeo, Noumberou- Banglang and Bissaula-Tosso and the partial one is Ngosi to Humsiki.
------~~~~ ~ ~ 14
~ - - These areas are-Kohon -River; Kotcha, Crossingof-Maio Yin, The Hambere Range, and Sama River and partly Ngosi to Humsiki.
l5 Ibid, paragraph 145, p. 83.
l6 Ibid, pp. 83-85, especially paragraph 151).
17 ICJ, Case Concerning tlze Land and Maritime Boundary between Ca~rzeroonand Nigeria, p. 10 1 paragraph 202.
In Ibid. 19 RIIA, vol. 11, pp. 858-859, quoted in ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 103, paragraph 205.
20 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, pp 103- 104, paragraph 207.
2 1 ICJ Reports, 1986, Judgment, pp. 589-587, paragraph 63.
22 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 112 paragraph 223.
23 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 126 paragraph 268.
24 Ibid, p. 134 paragraph 286. b 25 ICJ, Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (CanadaNnited States of America), 1984 paragraph 194.
26 ~aritimeDelimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark V. Noway), ICJ Reports, 1993, Judgment, p.6 1, paragraph 5 1.
27 ICJ Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar V. Bahrain) 2001, paragraph 177.
28 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, p. 144, paragraphs 3 14 and 3 15.
29 bid, p. 145, paragraph 3 19.
30 Ibid p.146, paragraph 324.
" Guardian, October 10, 2002, p. 40
3 2 Thisday, November 12, 2002, p.40. "The latest partition of Africa" Daily Times (29, October, 2002, p.11); "Lamido deplores ICJ ruling on Bakassi" Comet (5 November, 2002, p.3); "Bakassi: I never pledged to respect ruling Obasanjo", Thisday (26 October, 2002, p.1) were some others that portrayed the dejection of many Nigerians.
33 Guardian, October 12, 2002, p. 40.
34 Punch, October 17, 2002. p.14
'5 Thisday, October 14, 2002, p. 8.
36 Daily Times, October 23, 2002, p. 11 37 West Africa, 4 - 10 November, 2002, pp. 16-17; Guardian October 24, 2002, p.54; Heron, October 25, 2002, p. 1 1.
'' Ibid
39 Thisday, October 26, 2002, p. 1 ; West Africa, 4 - 10 November 2002, p. 16.
40 Comet, December 12, 2002, p. 15
41 Thisday, November 12,2002, p. 8
42 Daily Champion, January 14,2003
43 Thisday, October 14, 2002, p. 40; Daily Champion, October 14, 2002; Daily Champion, October 16, 2002.
44 Daily Champion, October 15, 2002, p. 1 1. #
45 Ibid; Daily Champion, December 10, 2002, p. 11; Sunday Champion, October 27, 2002, p. 32.
46 Nigerian Tribune, November 1, 2002, p. 12.
47 Vanguard, June 6,2003, p. 18.
48 Ibid.
4%uardian, November 5, 2003, p.8
5 0 Post, October 14, 2002, p.3.
51 C'ameroon Tribune, November 13, 2002, p.2
52 Post, October 14,2002, p.3.
53 Ibid. Most Cameroonians are very disappointed with the way the petroleum resources of the country are managed. The revenues from oil remain a highly guarded secret of the president and a few of his henchmen. Like to most observers in Nigeria, the Bakassi conflict is often seen through the prism of its assumed oil wealth in Cameroon.
54 Ibid.
55 Heron, November 4-1 1, 2002, p.2.
56 The Post (October 25, 2002, pp. 1 and 3) for example, commented lengthily on the Nigerian government statement. Meanwhile, the Heron' (November 13 - 20, 2002, p.11) published the entire Nigerian government communiqd.
57 Cameroon Tribune, November 1, 2002, p.7. 5 8 For more on the commitment and the decisions reached at that meeting see; United Nations, United Nations Mixed Commission (Cameroon-Nigeria) for the Implementation of the I.C.J. Judgement of 10 October 2002, 1 lth Meeting, Yaounde Hilton Hotel, 18-19 August 2004, p. 12.
59 1bid. Through the Commission, contact has been maintained between Nigerian and Cameroonian authorities for the peaceful implementation of the October 10, 2002 ruling. Meetings are held alternately in Abuja and Yaounde. Despite delays in catching up with agreed timetables, the momentum is still on.
'"The others are General Assembly, Secretariat, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council.
" United Nations Mixed Commission, Yaoundk, 2004, p.13.
62 Ibid. b
63 ICJ, Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, (separate opinion, paragraph 2).
64 See Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent. Africa (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), especially, p. vii. CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion Boundaries remain a critical source of discord among many nations in the international system today. The possibility of border disagreements escalating into war also continues to be real. Confronted by this reality in the world, scholars and experts have developed many methods for the resolution of conflicting border claims in the international community. Many of these depend on a host of factors (including, the historical background of the states involved, their general level of economic attainment, the nature of the borders themselves,* the specific socio-economic-cum- political issues along disputed borders, as well as, their domestic politics and economic structures), for success in deflecting border crisis. Most of these elements underlie the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute and have been the subject of our investigation. The findings demonstrate the connection between European imperialism in West Africa and the problematique of contentious boundaries in the area. Especially exposed are the intrigues of the great European powers at the close of the lgthcentury to obtain lucrative colonies in the Guinea coast of West Africa to satisfy their overbearing calculations for economic gains in Africa. We have shown that while colonial boundaries were sometimes hotly negotiated with passionate arguments against partitioning of existing political and social formations, arguments for the preservation of such African social and political groupings were mainly invoked where the advocate stood to benefit. Some suspicious or dubious efforts were thus made to determine boundaries in the colonies to avoid dividing African peoples. This was not accomplished in many instances, not just because of the weak motivation to do so, but also because of the sheer difficulties of attaining neat delineation in areas where there was great ethnic mix, like most of the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary zone. We have also demonstrated that while efforts were made to clearly delineate colonial boundaries such were not to avert future friction between emergent Africa states, but rather, to serve the purposes of colonialists. Also, the fact that the colonial intervention was less felt at the borderlands meant locals were largely allowed undisturbed to continue their pre-colonial activities across the borders. But successor states to the colonial territories for cabotage and other reasbns, desire more rigid and clearly defined and respected borders, which invariably run counter to the basic existential pursuits of the people. Here and there doubts existed but we have shown that the areas of grey have only provided remote and background motivations for conflicts between successor states to these boundaries. We have argued that while this background might have provided the "structure of risks and opportunities" for conflict behaviour, the treaty arrangements between the imperial powers, especially in the case of Britain and Germany (1884 - 1914), Britain and France (1916 - 1960); and between Nigeria and Cameroun (1960-1975) provided sufficient guidelines for amicable resolution of any boundary disagreement if other vested interests do not blur # the vision of the leadership of the two African states.. Regrettably these vested interests do exist as we have shown in chapter three. Our findings in this study also support our second proposition to the effect that the boundary conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon is inspired and fuelled more by concrete issues of economic needs rather than strategic (national security) needs. Under chapter three, we have exposed the motivations to the border disputes in our case study. The presence of economic resources in the form of substantial oil deposits and lucrative fishing grounds have made the disputed border areas the rallying call for (economic) nationalists in both Nigeria and Cameroon. We have demonstrated that because of these elements, which tend to be beneficial to nationals across the board (big businesses in the petroleum sector and their allies in government; local potentates with an eye on royalties from oil companies, myopic to the usual environmental degradation when oil is exploited with the notorious impunity we know in the Niger Delta area; petty-fishermen as well as big concerns in thefishingindustry,one that we have seen to pre-date colonialism; and petty traders who make a living from commerce on the output of the fishermen and those that thrive on provision of supplies to them) have found themselves to be stakeholders in the disputed areas. We have also shown that hydrological considerations and pastoral land are at stake in the border areas although these offer weaker motivations to conflict. These interests that tend to cut across society generated an apparent harmony of interests among the varied and diverse national elements in securing national control of the Bakassi, making it easier for nationalist forces to crystallise. However, it has been known that there is no harmony of interests between those involved in fishing and the oil companies. The empirical investigations have also amply demonstrated and laid bare the often exaggerated (strategic military) stakes involved in the control of the Bakassi
Peninsula - the holy grail of the boundary dispute - that have been ramped into the minds of many in Nigeria to be spurious. It is hard to understand the security gulf allegedly to be created should Nigeria lose the Bakassi. The importance of this area to Nigeria's naval command for control of its southern approaches from the Atlantic is more doubtful given that the area does not offer any good harbour. Meanwhile, # Nigeria still has a long coastline for naval bases, if it so needed more for its security. Ironically as we have exposed, the first Nigerian state foothold on the Bakassi was offered during the civil war, when the conservative government of Cameroon under Ahidjo allowed federal forces under Adekunle to patrol the area in order to cut- off supplies to the secessionist Biafran forces. With such support from Cameroon at an obviously critical and dire moment, one wonders the level of security threat presented by Cameroon. For many years as we have shown, dating back to colonial days, many Nigerians (indeed more than Cameroonians) lived happily in the disputed border areas; peacefully subsisting on the natural resources of the area with little or no intervention from state officials from both sides of the neglected border areas. There was little concern about maltreatment of Nigerians living in the Bakassi area. However, this situation was transformed when Nigeria laid claims to the area beginning with the subtle efforts of the Murtala Moharnrned/Obasanjo military govmmed to revise the 9vlwlta Acmrctto+heovertefforts of~eneral~ BzbangidaL and Abacha to annex the Bakassi and Lake Chad area villages, militarily. It was following this transformation that Cameroon forces became increasingly more brutal against Nigerians in these areas in an attempt to stamp the authority of their political masters in Yaounde. These actions that were not directed at winning hearts and minds boomeranged as Nigerians in these areas increasing appealed to the Nigerian state officials for protection. Consequently, the spiralling human rights violations which were indeed committed by security forces of both sides in the conflict were not the cause of the conflict but in fact, a manifestation. State security concerns are therefore not central to the conflict but rather used as a pretext to cover other ulterior motives. Chapters four, five and six touch on the recurrent elements in the Nigeria-
Cameroon boundary disputes for four decades - steady efforts at improving relations by some leaders and conspicuous military adventurism on the part of others. Our third hypothesis is critically examined here and by exposing the efforts of the various leaders towards deflating the crisis over the years, a trend was established. The military regimes of Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo, Babangida and Abacha espoused revisionism with regard to the Nigeria-Cameroon border. This can be traced to their backgrounds. Basically, the Murtala Mohammed-Obasanjo government had some # radical dispositions (like the brief Buhari junta) to shake-up perceived lethargy after the long rule of Gowon (1966 - 1975) and had an additional populist tint. These elements required a departure from their predecessor and largely accounted for their reluctance to approve the Maroua Declaration concluded between Gowon and Ahidjo. The less conciliatory stance was meant to satisfy their populist instincts and win them legitimacy. Obasanjo never offered any objective reasons for clamouring for a revision of the 1975 Accord. Our empirical findings expose the Babangida and Abacha administrations on the other hand, to be unpopular military governments that were facing growing dissatisfaction at home as a result of unpopular economic policies and a bungled democratic transition programme. To close this legitimacy gap, they embarked on a grand strategy to divert attention from the difficult domestic political issues to adventurous military ventures abroad. Liberia proved to be less popular and a new bogey was found in Cameroon. It is therefore this basic domestic element in Nigeria that made the regimes wade into the milky situation of militarily contesting the boundary culminating in sporadic fighting from 1994 - ,1999, which already had a good framework for maintaining harmonious intercourse across the border Meanwhile, the more conservative and legitimate governments of Gowon and Shehu Shagari appeared more conciliatory. These coincided with the stable leadership of Ahidjo in Cameroon. The successful deflation of the potentially very explosive border incident of May 1981 contrasts sharply with the misguided decisions of Abacha to match troops into the Bakassi in 1993 and Biya's confrontational response. The finding largely validates our third proposition. The fourth proposition is partly examined in chapter seven and we hope to be vindicated with time for the rest of it. The available evidence and trend points to a lasting solution being found to the boundary dispute and a workable formula put in place for deflating possible sources of disputes. The sporadic fighting and bloodshed of the 1990s have stopped. Both Nigerian and Cameroon have made public pronouncements on their being irrevocably committed to implementing the ICJ ruling of October 10, 2002. This ruling largely delimited the boundary between the two countries from Lake Chad to the sea. In addition to this, a UN-backed mixed commission made up of officials from Nigeria, Cameroon and the UN has been working out ways of implementing the ruling. The commission will also see into the demarcation of the boundary to avoid future doubts. It has been agreed that conspicuous physical symbols be put along the entire boundary to allow for instant recognition by villagers living close to it. This is a proposal that was made as far back as 1965 when the first boundary commissioners of Nigeria and Cameroon met. However, the ultimate solutions to such problems must also be sought in functional cooperation between the two states. The mixed commission is determined to foster this as well. On the whole, this work shows that contrary to the popularly held narrow view that border conflicts between African countries are largely emanating from errors of the colonial past, imperialist designs of the colonial era provide only partial and largely background explanations. The "leitmotif' for these conflicts lies mainly in nationalistic calculations of economic interests inspired or driven by domestic economic needs and politics. Politicians tend to ride in the popular feelings to contest for these economic resources to divert attention from their shortcomings at home. Consequently, their management or mis-management is contingent on the leadership of African countries involved in such conflicts. Greater functional integration on economic matters and sharing of resources offer avenues for mitigating aggressive nationalist tendencies inherent in all nations2 but, which are especially, very active in new states. Recommendations The foregoing investigations, analyses and conclusion allow us the opportunity to proffer some recommendations in the context of this study. In the first place, African countries, and more specifically Nigeria and Cameroon should accept colonial boundaries with whatever shortcomings they may have, as the reality of their background and moderate their boundary policies accordingly. Any hypocritical acceptance of uti possidetis in lofty speeches, while nursing revisionism, will only add another critical element to the internecine intra-state conflicts ranging on in the continent and further negate its development goals. Cameroon that has gained the Bakassi and the limitrophe villages of Lake Chad that have a considerable level of sedentary life, as well as Nigeria in other settled areas $ it acquired along the disputed boundary, should make concerted effort to improve on the social amenities and the general standard of life in the acquired areas. Without a determined effort to improve on the lives of the people, elements that had especially benefited from ties with the previous state would continue to nurse grievances and possibly foment discontent if the general population and these "elite" elements are betrayed by the new administering authorities. They need to transcend the legal issues of the court that won them the disputed territories and translate their commitments made to the ICJ into practical policies for winning the hearts and minds of these marginalised people, in order to convince them that there is nothing to regret belonging to the new polity. Some inevitable clashes are bound to exist between states. As such, more should rather be done to manage the "inevitable" clashes of interest that must exist among them.3 The plan put in place by the United Nations (Cameroon-Nigeria) Mixed Commission for the Implementation of the ICJ Judgement of 10 October 2002, should be vigorously pursued. Among the projects to enhance functional cooperation between the two states is the construction of a good road to link Mutegene through Kumba, Mamfe, Ekok Ikom to Abakaliki. If this is done, it would encourage confidence building between the two peoples. Also, efforts should be made to integrate the two economic groupings (ECOWAS and CEMAC) to which Nigeria and Cameroon belong. When this is done, border controls of economic activities between the two would become less draconian and the contentious customs problems along the border would progressively reduce as integration increases. Although the UN is already involved in the post-adjudication political process of arriving at a final settlement on the border dispute, ~i~eriaand Cameroon should request for a UN military observer mission similar to that, which oversaw the Libya- Chad settlement, that is, the UN Ouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG). Such a military mission would be better placed to monitor the disengagement of forces from the Bakassi Peninsular that witnessed considerable troop deployment by both sides in the course of the conflict.
Projections # Even after the ICJ ruling we might not have come to the end of disagreements along the Nigeria-Cameroon boundary. In the first place, a major hindrance to Nigeria leaving the disputed Bakassi is the accumulated rhetoric.over the years especially during the administrations of Babangida and Abacha. After so much publicity about the mineral wealth and strategic value of the territory, Nigeria will find it difficult to withdraw without losing face. Not withstanding this dilemma, the fact that the country is no longer firmly in military hands gives an opportunity for a break with the covetous policies and militarism of old. However, if the Obasanjo administration continues to aspire to a third term of office, it would be most unlikely to make the necessary political decisions to withdraw from the Bakassi in particular. We therefore, believe that Nigeria will likely conform to the decisions of the International Court of Justice, if its democratic experiment persists. Usually for a country to accept the jurisdiction of a tribunal in a dispute, it consents to the prevailing principles of international law, at least those relating to the case. We do not expect old arguments to be rehearsed at the UN Mixed Commission, since in awards, hard nose bargaining ceases when both sides have agreed to adjudication. Cameroon's conspicuous neglect of its borderlands will continue to create a vacuum likely to attract its giant neighbour. Cameroon has regrettably failed to learn some basic precepts from empire builders (or better still, nationalists) like Lord Curzon. According to his dictum, "He would be a short-sighted commander who merely manned his ramparts . . . and did not look beyond."4 To support this maxim, Lord Curzon points to the example of Logju, which was for long shown on British maps as belonging to India, but no attempt was made to provide a good administrative and social framework for the area until after the Second World War. This area became the first point of thrust by China in 1954 when it began to intensify activities to seek a readjustment of the Himalayan border to confornl to what China described as claims of the past ("terra irrident~").~This is a characteristic fate that may befall any country as a result of neglect and excessive parsimony in policy considerations towards its borderlands. References
I See revised map of the Bakassi area above (p. 126) showing the peninsular to be part of Nigeria contrary to earlier ones that place it on the side of Cameroon.
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Africa Confidential Africa Contemporary Record Africa Research Bulletin Africa Today African Concord African Guardian BBC Focus on Africa Cameroon Tribune Daily Champion Daily Express (Nigeria) Daily Sketch Daily Star Daily Times (Lagos) Guardian (Nig.) Heron Jeune Afrique Kessing 's Contemporary Achieves Le Messager National Concord Newswatc h New Nigerian Nigerian Chronicle Nigerian Herald Nigerian Tribune Post (Buea) Punch The News Thisday Vanguard Weekly Focus West Africa West African Pilot APPENDICES APPENDIX A O.A.U. RESOLUTION ON BORDER DISPUTES (CAIRO), 1964
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its First Ordinary Session, held in Cairo, U.A.R., from 17 to 21 July 1964; Considering that the border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension; Conscious of the existence of extra-African maneuvers aiming at dividing the African States; Considering hrther that the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality; Recalling the establishment in the course of the Second Ordinary Session of the Council of the Committee of eleven in charge of studying the means of strengthening African Unity; Recognizing the imperious necessity of settling, by peaceful means and within a strictly African framework, all disputes between African States; Recalling hrther that all Member States have pledged, under Article VI, to scrupulously respect all principles laid down in Article I11 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity; 1. Solemnly reaffirms the strict respect by all Member States of the organization for the principles laid down in Article 111, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity; 2. Solemnly declares that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence.
APPENDIX B
PROTOCOL OF THE COMMISSION OF MEDIATION, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Article I The Commission of mediation, conciliation, and arbitration established by Article XIX of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity shall be governed by the provisions of the present Protocol Article I1 1. The Commission shall consist of twenty-one members elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 2. No two members shall be nationals of the same state 3. The members of the Commission shall be persons with recognized professional qualifications 4. Each member state of the organization of African Unity shall be entitled to I nominate two candidates
5. The Administrative Secretary-General shall prepare a list of the candidates I nominated by Member States and shall submit it to the Assembly of Heads of ! States and Government Article 111 1. Members of the Commission shall be elected for a term of five years and shall be eligible for re-election 2. Members of the Commission whose terms of office have expired shall remain in office until the election of a new Commission 3. Notwithstanding the expiry of their terms of office, Members shall complete any proceedings in which they are already engaged. Article IV Members of the Commission shall not be removed fiom office except by decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, by a two-thirds majority of the total membership, on the grounds of inability to perform the hnctions of their office or proved misconduct. Article V 1. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the Commission, it shall be filled in conformity with the provisions of Article 11 2. A member of the Commission elected to fill a vacancy shall hold office for the unexpired term of the member he has replaced Article VI 1. A President and two Vice-Presidents shall be elected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government fiom among the Members of the Commission who shall each hold office for five years. The President and the two Vice-Presidents shall not be eligible for re-election as such officers. 2. The President and the two Vice-Presidents shall be full-time members of the Commission, while the remaining eighteen shall be part-time members. Article VII The President and the two Vice-Presidents shall constitute the Bureau of the Commission and shall have the responsibility of consulting with the parties as regards the appropriate mode of settling the dispute in accordance with this Protocol, Article VIII The salaries and allowances of the Members of the Bureau and the remuneration of the other members of the Commission shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity Article IX 1. The Commission shall appoint a Registrar and may provide for such other offices------aspmay 6e CTeemed necessary 2. The terms and conditions of service of the Registrar and other administrative officers of the Commission shall be governed by the Commission's Staff Regulations Article X The Administrative expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the Organization of African Unity. All other expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings before the Commission shall be met in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Commission Article XI The Seat of the Commission shall be at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia GENERAL PROVISIONS Article XI1 The Commission shall have jurisdiction over disputes between States only Article XI11 1. A dispute may be referred to the Commission jointly by the parties concerned, by a party to the dispute, by the Council of Ministers or by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 2. Where a dispute has been referred to the Commission as provided in paragraph I, and one or more of the parties have refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission, the Bureau shall refer the matter to the Council of Ministers for consideration. Article XIV The consent of any party to a dispute to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission may be evidenced by: (a) A prior written undertaking by such party that there shall be recourse to b Mediation, Conciliation, or Arbitration; (b) Reference of a dispute by such party to the Commission; or (c) Submission by such party to the jurisdiction in respect of a dispute referred to the Commission by another State, by the Council of Ministers, or by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Article XV Member States shall refrain from any act or omission that is likely to aggravate a situation which has been referred to the Commission Article XVI Subject to the provisions of this Protocol and any special agreement between the parties, the Commission shall be entitled to adopt such working methods as it deems to be necessary and expedient and shall establish appropriate rules of procedure Article XVII The Members of the Commission, when engaged in the business of the Commission, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities as provided for in the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of African Unity Article XVIII Where, in the course of Mediation, Conciliation, or Arbitration, it is deemed necessary to conduct an investigation or inquiry for the purpose of elucidating facts or circumstances relating tc a matter indispfkthe parties concerned and all other Member States shall extend to those engaged in any such proceedings the fullest co-operation in the conduct of such investigation or inquiry Article XIX In case of a dispute between Member States, the parties may agree to resort to any one of these modes of settlement: Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration
MEDIATION Article XX When a dispute between Member States is referred to the Commission for Mediation, the President shall, with the consent of the parties, appoint one or more members of the Commission to mediate the dispute Article XXI 1. The role of the mediator shall be confined to reconciling the views and claims of the parties 2. The mediator shall make written proposals to the parties as expeditiously as possible 3. If the means of reconciliation proposed by the mediator are accepted, they shall become the basis of a Protocol of arrangement between the parties
CONCILIATION Article XXII 1. A request for the settlement of a dispute by conciliation may be submitted to the Commission by means of a petition addressed to the president by one or more of the parties to the dispute 2. If the request is made by only one of the parties, that party shall indicate that prior written notice has been given to the other party 3. The petition shall include a summary explanlation of the grounds of the dispute Article XXIII 1. Upon receipt of the petition, the President shall, in agreement with the parties, establish a Board of Conciliators, of whom three shall be appointed by the President from among the Members of the Commission, and one each by the parties 2. The Chairman of the Board shall be a person designated by the President from among the three members of the Commission 3. In nominating persons to serve as members of the Board, the parties to the dispute shall designate persons in such a way that no two members of it shall be nationals of the same state. Article XXIV 1. It shall be the duty of the Board of conciliators to clarify the issues in dispute and to endeavour to bring about an agreement between the parties upon mutually acceptable terms 2. The board shall consider all questions submitted to it and may undertake any inquiry or hear any person capable of giving relevant information concerning the dispute 3. In the absence of disagreement between the parties, the Board shall determine its
ow_npro~edu~p ------Article XXV The parties shall be represented by agents, whose duty shall be to act as intermediaries between them and the Board. They may moreover be assisted by counsel and experts and may request that all persons whose evidence appears to the Board to be relevant shall be heard Article XXVI 1. At the close of the proceedings, the board shall draw up a report stating either: (a) That the parties have come to an agreement and, if the need arises, the terms of the agreement and any recommendations for settlement made by the board; or (b) That it has been impossible to effect a settlement 2. The Report of the board of conciliators, shall be communicated to the parties and to the President of the Commission without delay and may be published only with the consent of the parties
ARBITRATION Article XXVII 1. Where it is agreed that arbitration should be resorted to, the arbitral tribunal shall be established in the following manner: (a) Each party shall designate one arbitrator from among the members of the Commission having legal qualifications; (b) The two arbitrators thus designated shall, by common agreement, designate from among the members of the Commission a third person who shall act as Chairman of the Tribunal; (c) Where the two arbitrators fail to agree, within one month of their appointment, in the choice of the person to be Chairman of the Tribunal, the Bureau shall designate the chairman 2. The President may, with the agreement of the parties, appoint to the Arbitral Tribunal two additional members who need not be members of the Commission but who shall have the same powers as the other members of the Tribunal 3. The arbitrators shall not be nationals of the parties, or have their domicile in the territories of the parties, or be employed in their service, or have served as mediators or conciliators in the same dispute. They shall all be of different nationalities Article XXVIII Recourse of arbitration shall be regarded as submission in good faith to the award of the Arbitral Tribunal Article XXIX 1. The parties shall, in each case, conclude a cornpromis which shall specify: (a) The undertaking of the parties to go to arbitration, and to accept as legally binding, the decision of the Tribunal; (b) The subject matter of the controversy; and (c) The seat of the Tribunal 2. The compvomis may specify the law to be applied by the Tribunal and the power,
if the parties so agree, to adjudicate------ex aequo _e_tbp_no,thetime-limit within which-
------the awarrf -of- the arbi€ratoii shall be given, and the appointment of agents and counsel to take part in the proceedings before the Tribunal Article XXX In the absence of any provision in the compvomis regarding the applicable law, the Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute according to treaties concluded between the parties, International Law, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Charter of the United Nations and, if the parties agree, ex aequo et bono
FINAL PROVISIONS Article XXXII The present Protocol shall, after approval by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, be an integral part of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity Article XXXIII This Protocol may be amended or revised in accordance with the provisions of Article XXXIII of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity In faith whereof, we the Heads of African State and Government, have signed this Protocol. Done at Cairo (United Arab Republic), on the 2 1'' of July, 1964.
APPENDIX C
COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED AT THE END OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL AND PRESIDENT BIYA AND PRESIDENT OBASANJO IN PARIS, 5 SEPTEMBER 2002 PARIS, 5 SEPTEMBER 2002
At Secretary-General's invitation, Presidents of Cameroon, Nigeria met in Paris to discuss Bakassi Peninsula, other issues. b. 5 September 2002
The following statement was issued today by the spokesman for the Secretary-General Kofi Annan:
At the invitation of the Secretary-General, Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Biya of Cameroon met today in Paris, in the Secretary-General's presence to discuss, the Bakassi peninsula, as well as other issues of common interest.
In the course of their meeting, both Presidents agreed to: respect and implement the decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Bakassi Peninsula; establish an implementation mechanism, with the support of the United Nations; and resume, in Abuja on 30 September, Ministerial-level meetings of the Joint Commission
The two Presidents also agreed on the need for confidence-building measures, including the eventual demilitarising of the Peninsula, with the possibility of international observers to monitor the withdrawal of all troops; an early visit to Nigeria by President Biya; and the avoidance of inflammatory statements or declarations on the Bakassi issue by either side.
There was a recognition by the two Presidents that the Bakassi Peninsula issue needed to be seen in the wider context of the overall relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon. In this context, the two leaders expressed their determination to restore the fraternal and neighbourly relations that existed between Cameroon and Nigeria until recently. Possibilities were also discussed for cooperation in the economic field, including joint ventures, for example in the water and electricity sectors. APPENDIX D
MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL, PRESIDENT BIYA AND PRESIDENT OBASANJO ON THE 10 OCTOBER 2002 RULING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE GENEVA, 15 NOVEMBER 2002
At the invitation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, President Paul Biya of Cameroon and President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria met today in Geneva in the Secretary- General's presence, to follow up on the ruling of 10 October of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In this connection, the two Presidents acknowledge the importance for their countries of respecting their obligations under the United Nations Charter.
The Secretary-General welcomed President Biya's and President Obasanjo's renewed commitment, as Heads of State of law-abiding countries, to renounce the use of fore in their bilateral relations and pursue peaceful ways for the settlement of their boundary differences, as well as the constructive spirit which prevailed throughout the'various meetings held during the day.
In the course of these meetings, both parties agreed to identify a number of confidence-building measures which would pave the way to resolving many of the issues which are the subject of the ICJ ruling. These include measures considered by the two Heads of State in Paris on 5 September 2002, as well as additional relevant measures.
In addition, the two Presidents agreed on the need for a meeting between the two sides at Summit level at the earliest possible opportunity, to discuss defence and security issues of common concern.
The two Presidents further agreed to ask me to establish a mixed commission of the two sides, to be chaired by my Special Envoy, Almedou Ould-Abdallah, to consider ways of following up the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward. The Mixed Commission will meet in Abuja and Yaounde on an alternating basis. The first meeting will be held in Yaounde on 1 December 2002. The Mixed Commission will consider all the implications of the decision, including the need to protect the rights of the affected populations in both countries. The commission shall, inter alia, be entrusted with the task of demarcating the land boundary between the two countries. It will also make recommendations on additional confidence-building measures such as the holding, on aregular basis, of meetings between-local authorities, Government officiaIs and Heads of States; developing projects to promote joint economic ventures and cross-border cooperation, the avoidance of inflammatory statements or declarations on Bakassi by either side; troop withdrawal from relevant areas along the land boundary; eventual demilitarisation of the Bakassi Peninsula with the possibility of international personnel to observe withdrawal; and reactivation of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
The two Presidents agreed to consider what further assistance their countries would need from the United Nations and to meet again in due course under my auspices to review the progress achieved. ! I reaffirm my personal commitment and that of the United Nations to continuing to assist i Cameroon and Nigeria in their efforts to settle their differences peacefully. APPENDIX E
COMMUNIQUE ADOPTED AT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE CAMEROON- NIGERIA MIXED COMMISSION ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THE JOINT GENEVA COMMUNIQUE OF 15 NOVEMBER 2002 YAOUNDE, 1-2 DECEMBER 2002
The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, which was established pursuant to the Joint CommuniquC adopted at the meeting held on 15 November 2002 in Geneva between His Excellency President Paul Biya of ~ameroonand His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, in the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations held its first meeting in Yaounde, Republic of Cameroon, on 1 and 2 December 2002.
The meeting of the Mixed Commission was attended by members of the Commission from Cameroon, led by Mr. Amadou Ali, the State Minister in charge of Justice and Keeper of the Seals of Cameroon and from Nigeria, led by Prince Bola Ajibola (SAN), former Minister of Justice and former High Commissioner of Nigeria to the United Kingdom. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, chaired the meeting. The meeting took place in a cordial atmosphere and discussions were conducted in an open, constructive and transparent manner. Both delegations expressed their commitment to sustain the spirit of peaceful and good neighbourly relations between their two countries, which had characterized the discussions between President Biya and President Obasanjo in Paris on 5 September 2002 and in Geneva on 15 November 2002.
The delegations further expressed their determination to build upon and consolidate the progress made during these summits, as well as at the meeting of the Cameroon- Nigeria Joint Commission held in Abuja on 30 September 2002.
The Mixed Commission also decided that it would be necessary for a joint assessment mission of the commission to undertake a visit to the affected areas in order to better understand and appreciate the practical problems it would have to deal with and resolve in the course of the implementation of its mandate, as defined in the Joint
Co~n~ueof15November2002.~------
The Mixed Commission also decided that it would be necessary for a joint assessment mission of the Commission to undertake a visit to the affected areas in order to better understand and appreciate the practical problems it would have to deal with and resolve in the course of the implementation of its mandate, as defined in the Joint CommuniquC of 15 November
In the meantime, the parties reiterated their undertaking to respect the rights of the populations of the other country residing in these affected areas and to afford them full protection in accordance with international human rights law.
The Mixed Commission decided to establish a Sub-Commission which would be responsible for the demarcation of the land boundary between the two countries. The Sub-commission shall be composed of legal experts and cartographers, from the two parties and the United Nations. It shall meet before the end of January 2003 to prepare a small-scale map indicating the boundary and to consider the nature and characteristics of the maps that need to be prepared for the demarcation. On the basis of the presentation by the Sub-cornmission, the Mixed Commission will decide on the work plan of the Sub-commission.
9. The Mixed Commission agreed to consider the assignment of United Nations military liaison officers in both countries at a large date.
10. With regards to confidence-building, the Mixed Commission reaffirmed the measures agreed upon at the Paris and Geneva Summits.
11. In particular, the Mixed Commission decided that Lake Chad Basin Commission should be re-energized at the earliest possible date. The assistance of the international community will be sought to support the work-plan of the Lake Chad Basin Commission.
12. The Mixed Commission also agreed that both Governments should proceed with the project relating to the improvement of the Mamfe-Eyumojok-Ekok-Mfum-Ikom road and related socio-economic projects.
13. The Mixed Commission decided that, henceforth, it shall meet on the first Tuesday every two months, on the understanding that it may adjust the timing of each particular meeting, should circumstances so require. Special meetings of the commission may be convened, if necessary, by the Chairman upon consultation with the members of the Commission.
14. The Mixed Commission agreed to hold its next meeting in Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, on 4 and 5 February, with a possible extension to 6 February 2003.
APPENDIX C
WORKING CALENDAR OF THE MIXED COMMISSION
-----(YAOUNDE, 6 AUGUST, 2003)
September 2003 *:* Tripartite visit of the Mixed Commission to the Lake Chad area (3rd or 4th week of September)
October 2003 *:* *:* Preparatory meeting immediately preceding the October session of the Mixed Commission, on practical matters related to withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces from the Lake Chad area. Q Consideration of the progress report of the Sub-commission on Affected Populations following its visit to the Lake Chad area. Q Review of the progress of the Sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its work programme Review of the activities concerning fund-raising Consideration of confidence building measures Consideration of practical matters relating to withdrawal Starting on 8 December of civil administration and military and police forces from the Lake Chad area, taking into account the outcome of the preparatory meeting. Request to Cameroon and Nigeria to submit their proposals to the Mixed Commission at its next meeting on how to proceed with the Maritime Boundary
December 2003 Q Deployment of Mixed Commission observer personnel in the Lake Chad area *>' Withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from the Lake Chad area by 3 1 December *:* *:* Consideration of the progress report of the Sub-commission on Affected Population following its visit to the affected land boundary areas. *3 Review of the progress on the sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its work program. Review of the activities concerning fund-raising *:* *:* Consideration of confidence building measures b *:* *:* Consideration of Cameroon and Nigerian proposals on how to proceed with the Maritime Boundary and of the question of possible establishment of a Sub- commission on matters related to the Maritime Boundary
January 2004 *:* *:* Verification by the Mixed Commission observer personnel of the completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from the Lake Chad area *3 Establishment of Cameroonian civil administration and deployment of security forces in the Lake Chad area *:* *:* Tripartite visit of the Mixed Commission to the affected land boundary area
February 2004 *:* *:* Tripartite visit of the Mixed Commission to Bakassi Peninsula *:* *:* Consideration of the final report of the Sub-commission on affected populations following its visit to Bakassi Peninsula *:* *:* Review of the progress on the Sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Programme
*:* *:* Review of the activities concerning fund-raising ------
- 4-Cunsiderafion of confidence building me%uresp - - *:* *:* Preparatory meeting immediately preceding the February session of the Mixed commission on practical matters related to withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula *:* *:* Consideration of practical matters relating to withdrawal of civil administration and military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula, taking into account the outcome of the preparatory meeting *3 Follow up on the discussions on the Maritime Boundary
March 2004 *:* *:* Deployment of Mixed Commission observer personnel in Bakassi Peninsula 225
April 2004 Beginning of withdrawal of Nigeria civil administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula Review of the progress of the Sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Program Review of the activities concerning fund-raising Consideration of confidence building measures Consideration of practical matters related to withdrawal of civil administration and military or police forces of Cameroon and Nigeria from the respective affected areas of the land boundary Follow up on the discussions on the Maritime Boundary
May 2004 Q Completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula *:* *:* Verification by the Mixed Commission observer personnel of the completion of withdrawal of Nigerian civil administration, military and police forces from Bakassi Peninsula
June 2004 *:* *:* Review by the Mixed Commission of the progress in the implementation of its Programme of Work *:* *:* Review of the progress on the Sub-commission on Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Program *:* *:* Review of the activities concerning fund-raising *:* *:* Consideration of confidence building measures *:* *:* Follow up on the discussion on the Maritime Boundary
July 2004 *:* *:* Beginning of withdrawal of civil administration, military or police forces of
Cameroon and Nigeria from the respective affected areas of the land boundary I
August 2004 Q Completion of withdrawal of civil administration, military or police forces of Cameroon and Nigeria from the respective affected areas of the land boundary *:* *:* Review of the progress of the Sub-cornmission on Demarcation in the implementation of its Work Program *:* *:* Review of the activities concerning fund-raising *:* *:* Consideration of confidence building measures *:* *:* Follow up on the discussions on the Maritime Boundary
*:* *:* Final report to the Mixed Commission by the Sub-commission on Demarcation on the completion of the demarcation of the land boundary
4