Winning Friends and Influencing People with Guns: Understanding the Growth of China’s Military Diplomacy Steven J. Smith A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2016 Reading Committee: David Bachman, Chair Saadia Pekkanen Daniel Chirot Program Authorized to Offer Degree: International Studies ©Copyright 2016 Steven J. Smith ii Disclaimer The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the US Government. iii University of Washington Abstract Winning Friends and Influencing People with Guns: Understanding the Growth of China’s Military Diplomacy Steven J. Smith Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor David Bachman Jackson School of International Studies Beginning in roughly 2002, China’s once reclusive military commenced upon a steadily expanding program of military diplomacy activity that now includes dozens of annual engagements with scores of states involving thousands of personnel. This dissertation seeks to understand the factors that have contributed to the remarkable rise in Chinese military diplomacy activity during the decade from 2002 to 2012. More specifically, the dissertation focuses on examining two of the common, yet understudied, assertions in the literature on Chinese military diplomacy. The first assertion is that the growth of China’s military diplomacy is due to China’s desire to protect its growing international economic interests. The second assertion is that China uses its military diplomacy activities to promulgate positive images of the state to its domestic and international audiences, using these images to promote China’s international status. This i dissertation examines these two assertions by formulating complete arguments for each, beginning with the relevant theoretical foundations and then linking these theories to the empirical patterns of behavior manifest by two representative case studies: the People Liberation Army’s combined exercises with other states and its humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) engagements. Examination of the first assertion regarding China’s international economic interests as a driver of China’s expanding military diplomacy reveals significant correlations between China’s major trading partners, the global transportation routes upon which China depends for its commercial prosperity, and the states China chooses to engage in combined exercises and HA/DR operations. Examination of the second assertion regarding the use of military diplomacy as a means to promote positive images of the state likewise reveals patterns of activity that support the hypothesis. The economic and political attributes of the states China chooses to engage, Beijing’s characterization of those engagements, and the sizes of those engagements are calculated to satisfy the expectations of China’s domestic audiences for manifestations of China’s improving international status while also acknowledging international wariness regarding China’s increasing international security presence. To be sure, China’s expanding military diplomacy activity is motivated by multiple factors, each of which deserves further study. However, this dissertation makes a significant contribution to our understanding of how China’s economic interests and image building goals relate to China’s growing international security presence. Given the tensions inherent in China’s rise, understanding these factors is of value to policymakers in the United States and elsewhere who must understand how and why China’s international military activity is changing as they consider strategic responses. ii Table of Contents Abstract i List of Figures iv List of Acronyms vii Introduction: Overview of the Dissertation 1 Chapter One: China’s Expanding Military Diplomacy 9 1.1: Definition, Premises, and Practice of Military Diplomacy 9 1.2: Charting the Growth of China’s Military Diplomacy 23 Chapter Two: Literature Review, Research Methodology, and Research Design 71 2.1: Literature Review 71 2.2: Research Methodology and Design 93 Chapter Three: Protecting International Economic Interests as Explanation for the Growth of Chinese Military Diplomacy 109 3.1: Theoretical Foundations of the Argument 109 3.2: China’s Overseas Interests 123 3.3: Case Study One: The PLA’s Combined Exercises 140 3.4: Case Study Two: The PLA’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Engagements 164 Chapter Four: Image Building as Explanation for the Growth of China’s Military Diplomacy 176 4.1: Theoretical Foundations of the Argument 177 4.2: Case Study One: The PLA’s Combined Exercises 190 4.3: Case Study Two: The PLA’s Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Engagements 215 Chapter Five: Conclusions 227 5.1: Summary of Findings and Implications: Protection of International 229 Economic Interests as Explanation for the Growth of Chinese Military Diplomacy 5.2: Summary of Findings and Implications: Image Building as Explanation 240 for the Growth of Chinese Military Diplomacy 5.3: Final Thoughts 246 Bibliography 248 iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Military Diplomacy on Spectrum of Political Ways 10 Figure 2: Military Diplomacy on Spectrum of Political Purposes 12 Figure 3: US Doctrinal Timeline for Shaping Activities 13 Figure 4: US Doctrinal Conception of Military Diplomacy on Conflict Continuum 15 and Range of Military Operations Figure 5: Military Diplomacy Complex Ambiguity 19 Figure 6: Expansion of Chinese Military Diplomacy by Activity Type (1998-2012) 26 Figure 7: Growth of Chinese Strategic Security Dialogues by Year 30 Figure 8: Growth of PLA and Foreign Military Attaché Offices by Year 31 Figure 9: Growth of PLA and Foreign High-level Military Exchanges by Year 34 Figure 9A: Growth in Number of States Participating in High-level 35 Military Exchanges by Year (1999-2012) Figure 10: Growth of Functional and Educational Military Exchanges by Year 38 Figure 11: Growth of PLA and Foreign Navy Port Calls by Year 41 Figure 12: Growth in PLA Participation in UN Peacekeeping Missions by Year 45 Figure 13: Growth in PLA Participation in Combined Exercises by Year 49 Figure 14: PLA Participation in Anti-Piracy Operations by Year 55 Figure 15: Growth of PLA International Humanitarian and Disaster Relief 62 Engagements by Year Figure 16: Value of Chinese Arms Exports and Imports by Year 69 Figure 17: Summary of Literature Review Explanations for Growth of 91 Chinese MD Activity Figure 18: Research Bounds—Case Study and Research Question Intersection 105, 228 Figure 19: Analytical Framework for Understanding Growth of 107 iv Chinese MD from 2002-2012 Figure 20: China’s Trade as Percentage of GDP (1981-2012) 125 Figure 21: China FDI Outflows and Inflows (1981-2012) 127 Figure 22: China’s Top Oil and Gas Import Origin States by Percentage (2012) 134 Figure 23: China’s Top Iron Ore and Refined Copper Import Origin States 135 by Percentage (2012) Figure 24: China’s Top Export Destinations and Import Origins 136 by Percentage (2012) Figure 25: China’s Key Global Maritime Shipping Routes, 137 Strategic Chokepoints, and Energy Pipelines Figure 26: China’s Combined Exercises with Other States (2002-2012) 142-143 Figure 27: Frequency of China’s Combined Exercises with Other States (2002-2012) 144 Figure 28: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to China’s Annual GDP, 146 Trade Volume, and FDI Outflows (2000-2012) Figure 29: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to China’s 148 Major Trading Partners Figure 30: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to China’s 150 Major Oil Import Origin States Figure 31: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to China’s 151 Major Natural Gas Import Origin States Figure 32: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to China’s 153 Iron Ore Import Origin States Figure 33: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to China’s 155 Refined Copper Import Origin States Figure 34: Frequency of PLA Combined Exercises with 158 Other States (2002-2012) Figure 35: Locations of PLA Combined Exercises with Other States (2002-2012) 160 Figure 36: China’s HA/DR Engagements with Other States (2002-2012) 166 v Figure 37: Frequency of China’s HA/DR Engagements with 167 Other States (2002-2012) Figure 38: Correlation of PLA HA/DR Engagements to China’s 169 Major Trading Partners Figure 39: Frequency and Locations of PLA HA/DR Engagements with 172 Other States (2002-2012) Figure 40: China’s Combined Exercises with Other States Including 192-193 GDP per Capita and Polity IV Scores (2002-2012) Figure 41: Frequency of China’s Combined Exercises with Other States 195 Including Average GDP per Capita and Polity IV Scores (2002-2012) Figure 42: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to Partner State GDP per Capita 197 Figure 43: Correlation of PLA Combined Exercises to Partner State Polity IV Scores 200 Figure 44: Chinese Characterization of PLA Combined Exercises with 202 Other States (2002-2012) Figure 45: China’s Combined Exercises with Other States Including 210-211 Size/Participant Numbers (2002-2012) Figure 46: PLA Combined Exercise Size by # of Participating 212 PLA Personnel (2002-2012) Figure 47: China’s HA/DR Engagements with Other States Including 221 GDP per Capita and Polity IV Scores (2002-2012) Figure 48: Average GDP per Capita of States by HA/DR Subcategories 222 Figure 49: Proposed Routes of China’s “One Belt, One Road” Initiatives 231 vi LIST OF ACRONYMS APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association