Canadian Naval Strategy: the Way Ahead
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CANADIAN NAVAL STRATEGY: THE WAY AHEAD by Commander Ron Lloyd Commander Ron Lloyd graduated from the Royal Roads Military College with a BA in Military and Strategic Studies in 1985. After completing the Destroyer Navigating Officer course in 1987, he navigated HMCS IROQUOIS and then moved to Victoria to navigate HMCS YUKON, TERRA NOVA, and ANNAPOLIS. In 1990, he was posted to HMCS VENTURE as a navigation instructor. In 1993, he at- tended the Operations Room Officer Course in Halifax and on completion was posted back to Victoria as the first Combat Officer in HMCS CALGARY. After a short six-month reprieve as a planner in MARPAC Headquarters, he returned to sea as Combat Officer Sea Training Pacific. In December 1997, he was appointed Executive Officer of HMCS OTTAWA. Upon graduation from the Canadian Forces College, Commander Lloyd will assume command of HMCS CHARLOTTETOWN in Halifax. The sine qua non of the strategist is imagination. He must foresee the circumstances under which the next great conflict will be fought, and prepare plans and appliances of the highest order of completeness and novelty to meet them with success. It is well to study the campaigns of the great commanders of the past, but not exclusively. The war that the strategist must win is not the last war but the next war.1 — Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske INTRODUCTION cumstances under which Maritime Com- mand would operate in the future. Part One In order to ensure that the Canadian Navy re- of the document is entitled ‘The Operating mains ‘Ready Aye Ready’ to meet the chal- Environ-ment to 2015’ and Part Two is lenges of the new millennium, the Director called ‘Operating Canada’s Navy in 2015’. of Maritime Strategy (D Mar Strat) is current- Although the strategy addressed the neces- ly in the process of promulgating new naval sity of looking into the future, unfortunately strategic guidance. The new document will it did not benefit from the study of the past be presented to senior naval leadership no lat- campaigns of great commanders, as recom- er than March 2001, and it will be the follow- mended by Rear Admiral Fiske. Adjusting on to Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy Course, A Naval Strategy for Canada failed for Canada, published by the Chief of Mari- 2 to incorporate a number of timeless mari- time Staff (CMS) in 1997. In preparation time principles, as articulated by Julian S. for promulgating the ‘plans and appliances of Corbett in Some Principles of Maritime the highest order of completeness and novel- Strategy, written in 1911. The most signifi- ty’, D Mar Strat is seeking background pa- cant of Corbett’s principles which were over- pers from a number of institutions. A thor- looked are the linking of na-val strategy to ough search for a critical review of the pre- articulated foreign policy ob-jectives, the vious strategy was conducted and proved foreign policy objectives, the im-portance of fruitless. Therefore, an analysis of Adjust- joint operations, and the recogni-tion of the ing Course is considered not only extremely need to protect convoys. This pa-per will im-portant, but very appropriate, and timely. demonstrate the importance of reflecting on naval history prior to developing a modern Adjusting Course was completely naval strategy, and explain Corbett’s con- de-voted to attempting to foresee the cir- 53 tinuing relevance to the subject. Strategy Interdependency — Strategy 2020.5 The will then be defined, the significance of pro- experiences of the western navies, as they ducing a naval strategy will be explained, attempt to understand the implications of the and the challenge of determining if Adjust- ever-accelerating pace of the technological ing Course is a strategy will be exam-ined. revolution, are very sim-ilar to those that the The Canadian strategic environment will British Royal Navy en-countered with the then be analysed in order to identify the introduction of ironclads and then dread- challenges faced by D Mar Strat in promul- noughts at the turn of the last century. Can gating a new strategy. Finally, linking naval anything valuable be gained from reflecting strategy to foreign policy, joint operations, on the British experience of the early 1900s, and convoy operations will be examined to or have the collective naval histories of the demonstrate the importance of addressing last millennium finally become nothing these timeless principles by D Mar Strat in more than a ‘useless branch of knowledge’? the next naval strategy. In the late 1800s, the Royal Navy IRONCLADS, DREADNOUGHTS, AND was attempting to rationalize the higher edu- THE RMA cation of their officer corps in order to deal with the rapid pace of technology. It was Faced by a constant and accelerating during this period that John Knox Laughton technical revolution men who had undertook to establish the importance of his- grown up with the centuries old cer- tory and its value in developing naval doc- tainties of the wooden sailing ship trine. He stressed that “a ‘scientific’ study were convinced that the past had be- of history, in contrast to the haphazard, ro- come ‘a useless branch of knowl- 3 mantic stuff that then passed for naval histo- edge’. ry, would produce ‘lessons of the gravest A great deal of imaginative thought meaning’ for the study of strategy… Indeed, and research has been appliled in the attempt he argued that history was the only basis from which a coherent written doctrine could be to predict the impact of the revolution in 6 military affairs (RMA) on Canada. In the developed.” Laughton’s thesis is just as concept paper, Canadian Defence Beyond rel-evant today as it was at the turn of the 2010: The Way Ahead, written by an RMA last century. For example, an examination operational working group in May 1999, the of the most recent American naval strate- authors provide a number of recommenda- gies, ‘...From the Sea’, ‘Forward ...From tions based on their research to date. Their the Sea’ and the British 1998 Strategic De- fence Review reveal that they are based on first recommendation is to establish a work- 7 ing group, “to ensure that a coherent well- findings written in the early 1900s. Unfor- defined DND/CF approach to 2010 and be- tunately, none of these strategies have given yond is realized”.4 This paper also exam- attribution to the author responsible for the principles from which these strategies were ines the impact of the RMA on other west- 8 ern na-tions including the United States, derived. The author in question is none Germany, Australia, France, and the United other than Sir Julian S. Corbett. Therefore, Kingdom. Canada also has a number of the answer to the question of whether naval other documents which look into the future, history has be-come a useless branch of such as Strategic Capability Planning for the knowledge is that the views contained in Canadian Forces DRAFT, dated 28 October Some Principles of Maritime Strategy re- 1999, and Autonomy, Interoperability and main “unerringly apposite to today’s world 54 of economic constraint, political uncertainty, naval strategy with Corbett’s work, one prof- small wars and local conflicts.”9 its from both his theoretical insight into war in the naval context, and then his use of a SIR JULIAN CORBETT plethora of historical facts to support his prin- The last thing that an explorer ar- ciples of maritime strategy. Corbett would rives at is a complete map that will probably agree with Rear Admiral Fiske, and cover the whole ground he has caution modern-day strategists against study- trav-elled, but for those who come ing history exclusively. Indeed, he “never after him and would profit by and claimed that historical study could produce extend his knowledge his map is detailed rules for the future conduct of battles the first thing with which they will and campaigns. The practical experience and begin. So it is with strategy.10 personal qualities of commanders and the unique circumstances of every war and bat- — Sir Julian Corbett tle were of primary significance, but sys- 15 Sir Julian Corbett’s works have been tematic study could help.” Therefore, the contributing to the development of naval stra- Mar-itime Command must continue to do tegic thought for almost a century. After both. D Mar Strat needs to pursue the rele- send-ing a letter to the First Sea Lord Admi- vance of the RMA and its potential impact ral Sir John Fisher complaining that the on the na-vy and ensure that they incorpo- Admiralty Papers he had seen were only rate the lessons of history as articulated by notable for the “ ‘amateurish rubbish’ that Corbett and other historians. Prior to under- posed for strategic thought”, he was subse- taking a stu-dy of maritime history to aid in quently given a job as a ‘strategic’ lecturer at the develop-ment of a modern naval strat- the Royal Naval War College in Greewich egy, it is necessary to lay the proper strategic in 1905.11 As an instructor he was quite framework. To this end it will be expedient concerned about the absence of contempo- to first define naval strategy and determine rary naval thought and used his lectures as a where it fits in-to Canada’s hierarchy of vehicle to try to improve it.12 This was an strategic guidance. undertaking with in-herent challenges. Cor- UNDERSTANDING THE DEFINITION bett wrote, “My strategy lectures were very AND IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGY uphill work. I had no idea when I undertook it how difficult it was to present theory to By maritime strategy we mean the the unused organs of na-val officers.”13 At principles which govern a war in the request of Fisher, Corbett wrote Some which the sea is a substantial fac- Principles of Maritime Stra-tegy, which was tor.