MANFRED MESSERSCHMIDT The Political and Strategic Significance of Advances in Armament Technology: Developments in Germany and the 'Strategy of Blitzkrieg' in ROLF AHMANN, ADOLF M. BIRKE, AND MICHAEL HOWARD (eds.), The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918-1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 249-261 ISBN: 978 0 19 920503 5 The following PDF is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND licence. Anyone may freely read, download, distribute, and make the work available to the public in printed or electronic form provided that appropriate credit is given. However, no commercial use is allowed and the work may not be altered or transformed, or serve as the basis for a derivative work. The publication rights for this volume have formally reverted from Oxford University Press to the German Historical Institute London. All reasonable effort has been made to contact any further copyright holders in this volume. Any objections to this material being published online under open access should be addressed to the German Historical Institute London. DOI: I I The Political and Strategic Significance of Advances in Armament Technology: Developments in Germany and the 'Strategy of Blitzkrieg' MANFRED MESSERSCHMIDT Germany's campaigns against Poland, Holland, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as well as the attack on Russia, have been described as examples of Blitzkrieg. These wars seemed to follow a coherent strategic plan. We know today, however, that this was not in fact the case. Never- theless, the Wehrmacht's successes during the first two years of the Second World War have led historians to speak of the strategy of Blitzkrieg, inspiring them to seek the reasons for and conditions of this rather complex phenomenon. Since Milward's and Eichholtz's works on Germany's war economy,1 it has been widely believed that Blitzkrieg was the result of economic shortcomings and wrong decisions in organizing Germany's economy and industry for wartime requirements. In effect the economic situation led to a concentration on Breitenriistung instead of Tiefenrüstung, that is, breadth of armament rather than depth of armament. Consequently the German forces could hope to win the war only by gaining a number of quick victories in succession, as the economy was geared to this kind of strategy. Early works like Klaus Hildebrand's Deutsche AujJenpolitik 1933-1945: Kalkiil oder Dogma?2 conferred upon this interpretation the status of a dogma by arguing that for Hitler Blitzkrieg was 1 A. S. Milward, Die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945 (Stuttgart, 1969); D. Eichholtz, Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft, i. 1939-1941 (Berlin, 1969). 2 Stuttgart, 1971. M. MESSERSCHMIDT the only possible kind of warfare, even against Poland.3 The course of the Second World War showed that Germany's Breitenriistung was successful on the Continent. Only the USSR and USA could stop the Wehrmacht, and only with regard to Russia did German hopes for a short war prove wrong. Such a hope never existed with respect to the USA, while Britain played a special role in Hitler's expectations. On the other hand, Hildebrand obviously believes that Germany's plans in 1938 to build a strong Atlantic fleet could have helped to realize Hitler's future policies against the USA, despite the fact that there were no plans for Tiefenrustung, which would have included the navy in 1938. The conclusions that have been drawn from the short- comings of German economic preparations for war will not concern me here. New research suggests that Germany was endeavouring to prepare for a coming total war by organ- izing her economic resources and manpower.4 There was no question of keeping a kind of Blitzkriegsfriedenswirtschaft (a peacetime economy geared to a short war); what is obvious is the failure of the attempt to organize a total war economy. There is, of course, a relationship between the economy and arms production, and, therefore, no doubt exists that Germany would have produced more and better weapons on the basis of a more effective economy. This was no secret at the time. Taking into account the fact that Hitler did not wish to start a great war in 1939, that he believed he would have more time to prepare such a war after the defeat of Poland, German armaments between 1936 and 1939 must be measured in terms of restricted goals and not of Hitler's ultimate aims. The impact of armament technology on Germany's policies and strategy must therefore be seen in connection with the question of whether it complied with or strengthened basic pre-war assumptions held by the political and military leaders. If arms technology offered any inducement to German strategic plans during the pre-war years it was 3 Ibid. 89. 4 R. J. Overy, '"Blitzkriegswirtschaft?" Finanzpolitik, Lebensstandard und Arbeitseinsatz in Deutschland 1939-1942', Vierteljahrshejte far Zeitgeschichte, 26 (1988), 379-435. Advances in Armament Technology 251 related to the Luftwaffe and the motorization of army units, especially the build-up of new Panzer divisions (tank divisions). THE PANZER FORCES Early experiences with tank units during manœuvres in 1935 had had a decisive impact on the army's operational think- ing. The second half of this year marked the transition from the hitherto unquestioned defensive strategy to what General von Fritsch called 'offensive defence'. The debate about strengthening the arrriy's offensive capability (Starkung der Angrif.fskraft des Heeres) began. Beck, chief of the general staff, was among the most fervent advocates of this idea. In addition to the three scheduled tank divisions he asked for extra tank brigades to be allocated to each of the twelve army corps. The idea was that besides assisting the infantry, the tank forces would be able to undertake far-reaching independent operations. Beck's Aujbauplan envisaged that forty-eight tank brigades would be ready in 1939.5 Moreover, Beck requested the creation of four motorized divisions to increase further the army's mobility. Thus the army was to become capable of launching long-distance operations. A timetable for the three years, from October 1936, contained the plan for the tank brigades shown in Table 1. This programme must be seen in the context of the general armaments plan of August 1936 that provided for a field army of 2.4 million soldiers and 44 divisions. The resources gained in Czechoslovakia and Austria greatly increased the army's strength in September 1939, permitting the formation of six tank divisions, four light infantry divisions, and four motorized infantry divisions. This, of course, represented a mobile force superior to that of other armies. The question is whether or not this superiority was based on technological advantages. That this was not the case is quite easily proven 5 K.-J. Muller, General Ludwig Beck: Studien und Dokumente ::.ur politisch-militiirischen Vorstellungswelt und Tiitigkeit des Generalstabschefs des deutschen Heeres 1933-1938 (Boppard, 1980), 469-77, doc. no. 37; 'Denkschrift iiber die Erhohung der Angrilfskraft des Heeres', 30 Dec. 1935, BA-MA, Ii H 662. 252 M. MESSERSCHMIDT TAB LE 1. Timetable for the strengthening of tank brigades from October 1936 Date Actual strength Additions Total 1 Oct. 1936 12 4 16 1 Oct. 1937 16 8 24 1 Oct. 1938 24 12 36 1 Oct. 1939 36 12 48 by looking at the year 1937, when the German tank units had only tanks of types I and II at their disposal. Both types used a Carden-Lloyd chassis, Panzer I being equipped with two machine-guns, Panzer II with one machine-gun and one 2-cm. gun. Beck called tank divisions of this quality 'die Waffen der guten Gelegenheit' (weapons for good opportunities).6 That is, he believed that they could not force a break- through against a strong enemy, but could take advan- tage of successes already gained by infantry and artillery forces, to extend a break in the defences into a Durchbruch (breakthrough). This had some significance for the general staff's strategic plans, which saw France and Czechoslovakia as Germany's principal adversaries. It meant that the tank divisions of the 1935-7 type would never be able to overrun the enemy fortifications. In Beck's view, Germany's strategy, further- more, had to use the tactics of offensive defence. It was impossible to talk of Blitzkrieg. Apart from the military thinking that focused on the idea of a mobile warfare in- tended to avoid a second war in the trenches, Blitzkrieg strategy simply did not exist. After 1937 technological developments did not really change the army's strategic problems. In view of Germany's disastrous lack of raw materials Beck told Blomberg in the 6 Muller, General Ludwig Beck, 461, doc. no. 35, 'Nachtragliche Betrachtungen zu dem Einsatz des Panzerkorps in der Lage der Truppenamtsreise vom 13. 6. 1935', BA-MA, RH 2/v. 134. Advances in Armament Technology 253 middle of December 1937, that is, after Hitler's conference with the supreme commanders on 5 November 1937, that the army would not be ready for action during the winter of 1938-9.7 General economic setbacks came in 1938. The new tanks that had gradually been introduced since 1938 were better equipped; Panzer III had a 3.7 cm. gun, Panzer Mark IV a 7.5cm. gun. But in 1938 only a few had been allocated. During the Czech crisis in 1938 Beck's strategic view obviously reflected his evaluation of the army's strength. In his 'Betrachtungen zur gegenwartigen militarpolitischen Lage Deutschlands' ('Reflections on the present military- political situation of Germany')8 dated 5 May 1938, he once again stressed that Germany could not count on a fully prepared army in the near future.