The Changing Dynamics of Japan-India Cooperation: A Case of ‘Rule-Based Order’ in Indo-Pacific Naresh Subba, Research Scholar Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Email: [email protected]

Abstract

Japan and India are the largest and the oldest democratic countries in . They have maintained cordial relations since the inception of their diplomatic relation in 1952. The two countries never had any outstanding issues in their bilateral relations. However, they remained aloof during the Cold War period due to their ideological differences. In the post-cold war period, their relations with India improved with ‘Look East’ and liberalization policy, but soon faded away after the Pokhran test in 1998. Their relations normalized from the beginning of the 21st Century with formal visit made by Mori to India in 2000 to become global partners.

In 2005, the two countries signed the ‘global strategic partnership’, after the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to India. The strategic partnership has highlighted the different aspects of international order based on the principle of international law. To that end, statesman from both the countries has started to talk about new architecture of ‘rule-based order’ in Indo-Pacific. In order to achieve that goal both has started to engage in bilateral and multilateral dialogue such as the Shangri-La dialogue, G4, G20, etc. Thus, this paper will try to address the complex interdependence of Japan and India in the Indo-Pacific.

Key words: Japan, India, Indo-Pacific.

Introduction

Japan and India are the two largest and oldest democratic countries in Asia. They have maintained cordial relations since the inception of their diplomatic relation in 1952. Both the countries share many aspects in common by virtue of being Asian nations. However, they remained aloof from each other during the Cold War period partly due to their different approach towards international politics. In the past few decades, both the countries have come closer in term of bilateral relations, thereby focusing on the various areas of cooperation.

Historically, the two countries never had any outstanding issues in their bilateral relations; rather they have been supportive of each other in times of need. Since the beginning of the 21st Century, the bilateral relation has improved with the formal visit made by Mori to India in 2000 to become global partners. This visit was significant because Japan had put economic sanction against India after the second Pokhran test in 1998. Thereafter, the relation had further strengthened with the visit made by Koizumi in 2005, where the two countries had, for the first time, used the term ‘strategic’ global partnership in their bilateral relations (Choudhury, 2018). In terms of economic cooperation, the two countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) of Economic Partnership Agreement and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA/CEPA). This agreement was the outcome of the recommendation submitted by the “Report of the India-Japan Joint Study Group (IJJSG) in June 2006 (Pinto, 2006).

The political relation between the two countries was further upgraded with the high level visit of dignitaries from both the countries. In 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited India for its 8th Annual Summit with his counterpart Dr. Manmohan Singh and also attended India’s Republic day parade as a chief guest at New Delhi. This visit was subsequently reciprocated by the newly- elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the same year to attend the 9th annual summit with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. During this visit, the two sides had agreed for ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership,’ and also agreed to establish ‘India-Japan Investment Promotion Partnership’ (MEA, 2018).

The bilateral strategic partnership also highlighted the different aspects of international order as well as regional order, based on the principle of international law. To that end, statesman from both the countries had started to talk about new architecture of ‘rule-based order’ in Indo-Pacific. In order to achieve that goal both the countries started to engage in both bilateral and multilateral dialogue. In 2006, the former Foreign Minister of Japan Taro Aso, asserted the ‘rule of law’ in his speech to give an idea of an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ and to stress the universal values such as “democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, market economy” (Khan, 2018). Thereafter, in 2007, the Prime Minister Abe addressed the Indian Parliament while taking the idea of ‘Broader Asia’ and the ‘Confluence of Two Seas’ thereby highlighting the importance of two democratic nations at the edge of two oceans (MOFA, 2007). The main intent of this principle is to encourage the rule-based order, to have an equal participation of states in international as well as regional level. The changing power dynamics in international politics, attributed by the China’s rise and the declining US influence in Asia-Pacific has contributed to the growing partnership between the two countries. This has also shown a major concern in Japan’s foreign policy, since Japan always had bilateral issue with China on various issues (Khan, 2018). At this critical juncture, while dealing with the rule-based order, it is important to understand international regime because it sees the different aspects of international norm and rules that govern states in international realm. This could be best understood through using different theories of international regime to have a diverse view at its conceptual level. Then, it further needs to narrow down to deal with rule-based order and its issues in various domains like maritime regime to deal with the Sea lane of communication (Singh, 2017).

The changing dynamic of Japan-India relations had commonly dealt with strategic cooperation at the broader level where the ‘rule-based order’ or ‘rule of law’ remain critical among other bilateral issues (MOFA, 2015). The Indo-Pacific region is inundated with various issues that require attention of the international community and needs interpretation by international law. Hence dealing with Indo-Pacific, players and interpretation of international regime becomes equally important. One such particular area is in maritime domain. There are various complexities and issues arising in the area of maritime domain, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea. This is mainly due to the alarming Chinese military presence in the region and the growing concerns of Japan and Southeast Asian states over it. The heavy militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea claims by China and the ongoing problem with the sovereignty issue over these islands with Southeast Asian countries. This had impacted on the security problem of Japanese cargo ships, where 90 per cent of Japanese crude oil has to go through this water. Thus, this problem needs a serious interrogation in order to resolve the issue and for the better future of all the stakeholders in the region.

In this context, both Japan and India are constantly cooperating to maintain a robust international and regional order and are engaging in different bilateral and multilateral institution to address the issue. One can observe that both the countries are engaging in many activities in international level such as the Shangri-La dialogue, G4, G20, ARF, and Malabar Exercise against the pirates in the Indian Ocean. They are making rigorous effort to maintain peace and stability in Indo- Pacific (Singh, 2017). To that end, both Japan and Southeast Asian countries sees India as stabilizing force in Indo-Pacific with its growing popularity in the international arena. The major concerned shown by the Japan, India, the US and other democratic countries argued that the high seas come under global commons and each countries has equal right to use it freely. In 2014, the then Prime Ministers of Japan, Shinzo Abe had urged the international community to adhere to the international law, while making their claims and resolving their disputes during his speech at Shangri-La Dialogue in (Khan, 2015).

The geographical location and the shared identity of being largest democratic countries in the Indo-Pacific, they are considered to have a greater responsibility for a peaceful growth of the region. The two countries have equal respect in the international law in order to resolve the issue, based on the consensus of the member states in a disputed area. In recent times, both Japan and India are showing the growing interest in the areas such as maritime security, climate change, nuclear cooperation, infrastructural development and environment-related problems. Among these issues the sea lane of communication (SLOC) for free and open navigation in the sea remains critical for the growing significance of energy security of Japan. Thus, Japan sees India as an important partner in order to deals with the difficult situation that has arisen in the maritime domain.

The Early Development of Concept “Indo-Pacific”

The early development of the “Indo-Pacific” concept can be trace back to the early 20th century. For long period Indo-Pacific concept was not popular and remain to open interpretation even though the concept was first introduced by German geopolitician Karl Haushofer in the early 20th century. In 1920, he mention the term “Indopazifisher Raum” to denote the ‘Indo-Pacific Space’ in his writing where he talked about the ancient Indian and Chinese civilization as one of the cornerstone of the development of the term. The two civilization before 18th century constitutes more than half of the global gross domestic product (GDP). Thus, the region has gained significant importance due to its vibrant economic growth during those days. In recent times, the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ was first use by the Japanese Prime Shinzo Abe during his visit to Indian Parliament in 2007. He defines the term by saying the “confluence of two seas” that reflects the geographical vision of ancient Asian understanding. Thereafter, the term has been used by the different political analyst in their official and academic writing. The concept became more coherent in the subsequent year following the Australian formally use the term “Indo-Pacific” in their Defence White Paper in 2013 (Magri, 2019). After that, in October 2017, US Secretary of State Tillerson explicitly mention US strategy towards Asia and he further mentions the eastern and western beacons that signify India and the USA. Meanwhile, the regional concepts has also developed in Japan and too, where Japan, the northern beacons has pushed the concept since 2007, and the southern beacons Australia has officially started using the terminology by 2013 (Brown, 2018). By November 2017, US National Security Strategy pledged to increase quad cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India and had an informal discussion during East Asia Summit in Manila on the issue of achieving common goal and overcoming challenges for making “Indo-Pacific” a viable reality. However, New Delhi did not mention explicitly in upholding a rule-based order and International law, freedom of navigation and over flight maritime security in the region, unlike the others Tokyo, Canberra, and the Washing DC (Amdad, 2018).

The reason behind the popularity of Indo-Pacific is also due to the inadequacy of the earlier geopolitical concept called Asia-Pacific. The Asia-Pacific concept has been promoted by Japan and Australia in 1970s and 1980s to draw closer attention to the US. India was far from Asia- Pacific construct, geographically and politically, and economic and strategic interest uninvolved in the region. In one way, the coinage of the term ‘Indo-Pacific has indirectly influenced of India’s rise in the 21st century. Donald Berlin has written that the “rise of India” is itself a key factor in the increasing significance of Indian Ocean. Thus, India could be no longer excluded from the earlier geopolitical imagination of Asia-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific will help to solve the dilemma by incorporating India as a responsible actor in the Indo-Pacific construct in the Maritime Asia. However, the term ‘Indo’ in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct means for Indian Ocean, and not India. Until 2006-2007, the Indo-Pacific was a subconscious effort to the rising India’s stand as part of the geo-strategic reorientation in the region. In 2014, when Prime Minister Modi launched the ‘Act East Policy’ the coinage of Indo-Pacific has gain momentum. Meanwhile, portraying its power flexing more towards the east and Southeast Asia is to reinforce “strategic deterrence” against China. Earlier in 2012, during her visit to Australia then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton also mention India as “an important player in the Indo-Pacific region” to play a responsible role in regional affairs. However, in 2018, Shangri-La Dialogue, India’s Prime Minister Modi clarifies few important points regarding the Indo-Pacific construct from Indian perspectives. He highlight the idea of “inclusiveness”, “openness” and “ ASEAN Centrality”, and also states that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept was not to target towards any country, which Indicates the ‘gentle’ persuasive and dissuasive pressures upon China (Khurana, 2019).

In the beginning of 21st century, Buzan and Waever foresaw that the ‘Asian Regional Super Complex’ forming where broad understanding of regional security externalities has begun to entangle South, Southeast and East Asian interest. In a sense the Indo-Pacific is partially a re- conceptualization of the Asian region thereby expanding its strategic horizon stretching it across two Oceans from the West of Pacific to Indian Ocean. For many, the earlier understanding of Indo-Pacific in the region in terms of Asian balance of power in early 21st century. Japan has played a significant role in re-conceptualization the Indo-Pacific construct. However, other states has equally embrace the construct, Japan precarious strategic environment, dependence in energy import, antagonistic history with China and its over dependence in security with the US have all contributed Japan to come up with such regional power like India as a form of security hedge. Since, India shares some sort of similar problem with Chinese counterpart. Initially, it was Japan-India rapprochement in the beginning of 21st century that draws special attention to give birth the nascent Indo-Pacific concept. It was very symbolic that in 2006, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wrote in his book thereby addressing India in a title “Towards a Beautiful Country” that signifies the Japan-India relation could go beyond Japan-US and Japan-China ties and that would be no surprise. From 2006, the Indo-Pacific strategy was very much prevalent in Japanese official document. Since then, there is a series of bilateral and trilateral agreement among the four important countries. Meanwhile, they have also proposed the idea of making Quad, which is yet to materalise and come with a formal agreement among the four members. In addition, India-US annual joint Malabar naval exercise in Bay of Bengal and now involving Japan, Australia and Singapore. These strategic and military developments can be viewed as a nascent security alliance can be directly attributed at balancing rising China.

Japan-India Cooperation in Indo-Pacific

Japan and India, being an oldest and largest democracy in Asia has always maintained cordial relations and has supported each other in times of need. In recent times, the two countries have actively engaging in different bilateral and multilateral forum. Their ambition to be a part of UN Security Council permanent membership has also gained some positive response in the international forum. In Indo-Pacific, both the countries have had strong sense to maintain the status quo while respecting the international law. To that end, they are actively engaging in order to ensure the rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Since, the earlier incident has evident that China was asserting the unilateral decision in South China Sea and East China Sea. Other issues like human trafficking, drug trafficking, sea pirates, terrorism, environmental issue, etc. are also equally important for the bilateral engagement of both the countries. In this context, Japan wants India to play more responsible role in the region. Since the two country shares similar ideas of Indo-Pacific construct where India is one of the most responsible power in the region as it shares important strategic location in the region.

The bilateral relation between Japan and India has been improving tremendously for the past few decades. They are commonly dealing with strategic cooperation at the broader level where the ‘rule-based order’ or ‘rule of law’ remain critical among other bilateral issues (MOFA, 2015). The Indo-Pacific region is inundated with various issues that require attention of the international community and needs interpretation by international law. Hence dealing with Indo-Pacific, players and interpretation of international regime becomes equally important. One such particular area is in maritime domain. These issues were raised by both the leaders from Japan and India in their diplomatic meeting.

It is obvious that the Indo-Pacific concept has gaining its popularity with the increasing Chinese foreign and security policy assertiveness in the region and beyond. This had led to the gradual concern to the both Japan and Indian counterpart regarding the kind of policies that China pursue with countries collaborating with Beijing on BRI project in Asia, Africa and , where Japan and India were not part of BRI. However, it is not just Japan and India, the US too has joins the Tokyo and New Delhi in promoting project either bilaterally or multilaterally. This has resulted in the nascent formation of “Quality Infrastructure” led by Japan where India and the US join the chorus later. The idea is to promote the quality in terms of sustainability and balanced instead of Chinese-led mega-infrastructure projects (Magri, 2019).

The Indo-Pacific strategy was revisit by the first visit by the former American President Trump to Asia in November 2017. This shift has also shown to recreating the idea of quadrilateral dialogue (Quad) as an alliance that comprises of the US, India, Japan and Australia. The Indo- Pacific strategy also serves America’s attempt to check China’s geopolitical expansion. In the process, the US has its expectation towards India to fulfill its crucial strategic vision as New Delhi is becoming more assertive towards other regional players. In addition, other state like Australia and Japan were expected to further strengthen Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Initially, the military component would play an important role, since, the Indo-Pacific theatre has involved with multiple players including China’s increasing military development.

Meanwhile, India becomes important player in Japan’s foreign policy option in the recent times. Japan-India relations are getting momentum and have reached a new level of engagement. Since both the countries has its shared interest in the region, where India’s Act East Policy was overwhelmed by Japanese counterpart. According to strategic logic, India’s engagement with Japan has completely transformed from the economic to strategic in the past few decades. It is well known fact that Japan is the first country to institutionalize the high level meeting to set up ‘2+2’ dialogue bringing together the ministry of defence and foreign affairs in a single platform. Other important aspect of Japan-India cooperation in the infrastructure building across the Asia and the Africa was its nascent project to build the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) was firstly launched in 2017. This project represents the mutual interest of both Japan and India for the strategic importance for the economic growth of the region. In the military cooperation, Japan has also become a permanent in the India-US Malabar Exercises in 2015, where Australia can be a potential partner (Miracola, 2019). In 2018, the prime minister of two countries Modi and Abe has come up with a joint statement after the bilateral summit in Tokyo. The two leaders had agreed to start a formal negotiation over the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) that would allow both the Indian military and Japan Self-Defense Force (J-SDF) to use each other’s bases for logistical support. This has to be considered by both the governments to make the conclusion of the ACSA negotiation in order to ease logistics for a number of joint Indo-Japanese military exercises scheduled for the coming years. (Gady, 2018).

Rule-based order in Indo-Pacific

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2015) released a joint statement under the title, “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership: Working together for Peace and Prosperity of Indo-Pacific Region and the World.” This comes after the official visit made by Abe at the invitation of his Indian counterpart Mr. Modi. Among the several points they discussed, one particular aspect points out, “The two Prime Ministers reiterated their unwavering commitment to realize a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.” This reflects the significance and of ‘rule-based order,’ which is based on the democratic principles to govern the Indo-Pacific region. Ministry of External Affairs, India (2018) give a press release under the joint consultation meeting by the Foreign Ministry officials from India, Australia, Japan and the United States in Singapore. In the statement, the participant has reaffirmed the ASEAN centrality and ASEAN mechanism for the free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific, based on the shared value to promote a rule-based order in the Indo- Pacific.

Shamsad A. Khan (2016) posits broad understanding of how the strategic thinkers vis-a-vis the policy makers, see the possibilities of the rule-based order in Asia-Pacific. He argues that the two countries have come up with the common agenda that can address the existing international regime and regional order in Asia-Pacific. This could be resolved by stressing on the principle of international law in facilitating such issues. This was because there is the growing concern about the expansive policy made by China in the South and East China Seas. Abhijit Singh (2017) raises important question about why and how the ruled-based order is needed in Indo-Pacific and to whom it needs to address? This was important because in theory, rule-based order is a common multilateral mechanism to fight against the non-state actors and natural disaster. In practice, the Rule-Based Order is usually applied for the security of East and South China Sea, where regional nations have dissatisfaction about Beijing’s moves to take over crucial islands and strategic maritime territory. He further argues that despite the fact that India agrees to support common principle of rule-based order across the maritime domain of Asia, New Delhi consider rule-making through the lens of strategic autonomy and balance-of-power in South Asia.

Robert Farley (2016a) posits that the rule-based order in Asia can be only successful with the regional inclusion against the common challenge they have. In practice, one such initiative as Bradford et al. suggests some remedies in the form of multilateral action like the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise series that provides the bilateral and multilateral training exercise between the US and different Southeast Asian states. Farley (2016b) further made a critical assessment of how ‘rule-based order’ is worth to continue in international relations. He argues that the rule-based order has both negative and positive rules. Positive side deals with the common response of the states against pirates, terrorist, natural disasters and so forth. On the other hand, negative side of it will warn states from taking advantage of cooperative work for the individual gain. So one needs to take care of appropriate form of competition in framing a rule based order to address all the complex issue arisen in the process.

It is evident that the disruption of international rules-based order can be challenged by both the state and non-state actor across the world. In case of Indo-Pacific, the concern regarding the rule- base order has been raised by both the Japan and India for the Chinese unilateral intervention in the South China Sea and East China Sea. Further, such concern has also raised by ASEAN member countries, but not been able to be vocal about the issue, partly due to its economic dependence towards China. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) can be seen a policy response to the China’s OBOR and periphery diplomacy. First, Abe come up with Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) and adopted it in February 2015. The purpose of this charter is to contribute more proactively towards the established community. Second, Abe also announced the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) at the 21st International Conference for the future of Asia held in Tokyo in 2015. These policies are complimentary to the India’s “Act East” policy and can play a complimentary role to each other’s policies in the Indo-Pacific region.

Initially, Japan use to consider the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a strategy, but in recent times, statesmen in Tokyo consider it more of a vision where the central theme of this vision is known for “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” or FOIP in short. Koga has rightly argued that the evolving “Indo-Pacific” construct can be sound more as a vision, rather than strategy. Since, strategy could be seen as a policy directed towards a particular country (China), whereas vision can be a softer version of foreign policy tool, which serves as neutral approach toward any countries in the region. Thus, the core element of FOIP vision is to protect the freedom of navigation, uphold the rule of law in both air and water and also to develop the infrastructure and economic development following the international standard in the Indo-Pacific region (Koga, 2018). Further, in 2016, Japan come up with Vientiane Vision for more integrated defense cooperation with the ASEAN countries thereby echoing the core idea of the FOIP strategy and its commitment to promote the international law (concerning the maritime security and sea laws) to enhance capacity-building cooperation by sharing know-how about defense buildup planning and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief by sending the human resources along with technology transfer for the effective use (Lindgren, 2019).

Trends and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific

Since the past few decades the term “Indo-Pacific” has gained momentum in the international politics with its various reasons. One of the important dynamics that one can observe in the Indo- Pacific construct was that the geopolitical significance of the region has increased tremendously. Statesmen from across the globe have started writing the significance of the Indo-Pacific concept for the upcoming days. Meanwhile, the region has also facing lots of challenge either from the state and non-state actor. Since, the Indo-Pacific relies on the huge sea lane of communication across the Seas of Asia and the Indian Ocean and most of the countries in the region are dependent on these sea lanes for its economic engagement. Also, 90% of the Japanese crude oil coming from gulf countries is dependent on these sea lanes. So, the security of these sea lanes is very important for Japan and they are expecting India to play a vital role in the region as it has its geographical advantage in the region.

The changing power dynamics in international relations was characterized by unstable and uncertain regional security. Japan, China and India are actively pursuing their policy initiative based on their national interest. Beijing has its own version of geo-economic strategy through OBOR in the Asia-Pacific region. Whereas, Tokyo and New Delhi seeks to pursue its Indo- Pacific Vision 2025 thereby focusing on geo-strategic and geo-economic Indo-Pacific strategy and Act East Policy. However, one can observe that the confluence and contrast of geo-economic and geo-strategic vision based on China’s Asia-Pacific vision and Japan-India Indo-Pacific vision.

An idealist view promises the peace, harmony and prosperity for everyone in Asia. The three countries in Asia, Japan, China and India claim to remain stable in major power relation with peaceful regional environment to economic growth in the region in general. It consider China’s Asia-Pacific vision and Japan-India Indo-Pacific Vision of 2025 as complimentary for peace and stability solving dispute by peaceful means and maintain to the rule of law. On the other hand, realist approach focus more on competition and conflict in international politics. The state will pursue power through a set of goal guided by its national interest and objectives. A closer look on their competing vision and policies in details reflects considerable contrast and contradiction in the geo-economic initiative among the Asian powers.

The post war international order were shaped by US liberal order and after Cold War, US played further in shaping and managing international regime and institution. The post 1990s, US enjoy ‘uni-polar moment’ as the only global superpower backed by military and economic might. However, this US-led order has been challenged by various elements across the globe. Firstly, there is a shift in balance of power. Secondly, with the rise of states capitalism in different part of the world, most notably the China’s economic model. Thirdly, the unending competition for resources and energy and at last the return of geo-politics and geo-economics in times of globalisation.

The early 21st century, the Asian countries were facing dilemma of whether to choose US-led regional security system without China or the regional economic integration led by China. However, the Asian region remains stable since China has relatively focusing more on economic engagement until 2010. China started became more assertive and proactive expansion in East and South China Sea, especially when Japan formally claims the Senkaku Island in East China Sea. Thus, Asia is facing dichotomous region with the economic order led by China and the security order were more or less centered around US network of alliances that tend to exclude China’s involvement (Yasuyuki, 2018).

On the other hand, Japan is facing a couple of strategic choice on whether to follow the power shift with the rise of China to shape a new international order by expanding its strategic horizon, or to stick to national security while limiting its strategic scope. This kind of policy change is actually felt since 2010, when China surpassed its economy to become the second largest economy in the world. Secondly, China began to physically and politically challenge over Japan’s administrative rights over Senkaku Islands, and even its close allies the US was strategically distanced since the global financial crisis of 2007-08 saw the relative decline of its influence over Asian region (Koga, 2020). In addition, Thomas Wilkins further argues that there is a disruptive in the regions for which countries like Australia and Japan needs to be made a cautious policy in order to hedge such circumstances. He pointed out disruptive non-state actors and disruptive state (including disruptive leaders) and disruptive technologies. The Policy brief concentrates despite non-state actors had gained popularity; states still remained the primary actor in international affairs and present a serious challenge to the rule-based order. The main state actor to create disruptive in the regions are North Korea provocation, Chinese assertiveness, Russian revisionism are few notable threat in the Indo-Pacific region (JIIA, 2018).

Conclusion

It is evident that the 21st century has witnessed lot of changes in the international relations. One of the key features of such changes is the geopolitical shift of power from West to East with complex interdependent variable and actors. Initially, the Indo-Pacific construct can be seen in the early 20th century by a German geopolicician Karl Haushofer by mentioning the term “Indopazifisher Raum” that refers to the ‘Indo Pacific Space’. Thereafter, the term “Indo- Pacific” was only materalise in the international relations textbook in 2007, when Shinzo Abe gave his speech in the Indian Parliament thereby addressing the “Indo-Pacific” region as the “confluence of two seas” reflecting the importance of geographical dimension of maritime space. However, Australia is the first country to officially use the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2013 in its defense white paper.

Japan and India, being the status quo-est power in Asia, Unlike China, who always aspire to be the hegemonic power and tries to lead the Sino-Centric regional order in Asia. The two countries have always seen the international law as the source of regional order in the Indo-Pacific region. The main reason behind the strategic convergence between these two countries has always been their shared interest in the region that is deeply embedded in democratic values such as the ‘rules-based order’ or ‘rule of law’, freedom of navigation, free market economy, human rights and respect the territorial integrity. One of the key aspects of Japan-India strategic cooperation is to maintain the maritime freedom thereby securing the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). To that end, UN Convention on Law of Sea (UNCLOS) remains vital in their approach to resolve the regional maritime issue in the region. For that, they need to cooperate with the partner countries like the US, Australia and other like-minded countries in ASEAN such as Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia.

In terms of Infrastructural cooperation, the two countries are actively engaging in its nascent ideas of Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) to ensure the quality infrastructure in Asia and Africa. The AAGC will also ensure the safe passage of Indian Ocean region and Pacific Asia through the open sea lane of communication. In order to fulfill the objectives of AAGC project as a grand success, the role of Indian navy remains critical in the Indian Ocean region. Further, both the countries are been engaging in the quadrilateral dialogue or “Quad” along with Australia and the US. The Quad is still in its nascent phase where the future prospects of Quad might change with the course of time. However, it is true that the Quad has one way or the other aims to constrain, if not contain Chinese assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the other hand, some Japanese media believes that Japan’s FOIP strategy is not counter the China’s Asia-Pacific policy, and former Japanese Prime Minister Abe seems to decide to foster a good Japan-China cooperation for Japan’s security and economic interest of Japan in the region. It is argued that Abe’s FOIP strategy also to embrace the OBOR initiative, rather than countering it, and constrain the China’s hegemonic maritime expansion. This was evident in “Abe Doctrine” that the Japan’s Indo-Pacific further strengthens with its partners countries such as India, Australia, and the US as a hard balancing role that encourage China to act more responsible role in the region. Japan-India partnership aims to strengthen the ASEAN-Centric regional architecture to maintain rules-based order.

Meanwhile, Japan and ASEAN countries see India as a stabilizing force in the Indo-Pacific with its growing popularity in the international arena. In fact, the shift of term ‘Asia-Pacific’ to ‘Indo- Pacific’ is partly contributed by the rise of India that has prompted to the shift in geopolitical conceptualization of the region. This was well reflected in the many political dialogue made by the partner countries like the US and Australia in their policy documents. Nonetheless, China is one of the key players to shape the future prospects of Indo-Pacific region with its economic and military might. Bibliography *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2007), Confluence of the Two Seas, Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, at the Parliament of the Republic of India, August 22, 2007. See: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan (2015), Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership to Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World, Japan-India Relation, Tokyo: Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html

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