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Pakistan's Nuclear Development South Asian Studies A Research Journal of South Asian Studies Vol. 30, No.1, January – June 2015, pp. 221 – 235. Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (1974-1998): External Pressures Iram Khalid University of the Punjab, Lahore. Zakia Bano Government College for Women, Sahiwal. Abstract Pakistan detonated its nuclear test on May 28, 1998 in the Chagai hills which is along the western border of the province, Baluchistan. Many personalities and organizations were involved in developing the nuclear device against a backdrop of political, security and economic constraints, as well as opportunities. India’s 1974 nuclear explosion had proved a fundamental flashpoint for Pakistan‘s nuclear program. Pakistan decided to accomplish its vow to “eat grass or go hungry” in its mission on its advance for the nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear program evolved under immensely intricate and challenging security dilemmas and circumstances. Historical experience, a combination of cultural nuances, idiosyncrasies of personalities, and domestic politics existed throughout the nuclearization process. Pakistan faced regional crises, geographical compulsions, technical challenges, global politics, external pressure and international propaganda to nuclear materials know-how. Key words: Nuclearization, India's Explosion 1974, Security Dilemma, External Pressure, International Propaganda. Introduction The international community had been unable to stop the creation of nuclear weapons despite determined efforts. The subsequent potential of future nuclear crises is one of the world’s most important security concerns. On nuclear crisis, there exist two schools of thoughts, namely optimists and pessimists. Favoring stabilization and destabilization of nuclear weapons and concerns on regional security, scholars of the two schools have their own assumptions for the issue. The way to Pakistan’s nuclear program is one of the steady resolve and devotion. Pakistan’s constant antagonism and strategic competition with India bitterly turned over its intentions. India fought a series of wars and crises with Pakistan. The last major war in 1971 resulted in humiliating military defeat and dismemberment of East Pakistan. It simply reinforced Pakistan’s belief that its adversaries were detrimental for the very existence of the new state. This perception integrated the 221 South Asian Studies 30 (1) nation-state into a “never again” state of mind (Ganguly & Kapur, 2009, pp. 1-2). It promoted nuclear nationalism for the acquisition of nuclear capability. Security dilemma could only be resolved through arming themselves and /or forming alliances to deter potential threats (Sridharan, 2007, p. 27). Therefore, in this regard deterrence and deployment of nuclear weapons was the only option. Air Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan was also of the view that nuclear weapons had decreased the danger of war (Dhanda, 2010, pp. 17-18). Pakistan is a de facto nuclear weapons State. Pakistan’s policy makers took decision that any full-scale conventional conflict with India is likely to escalate to the nuclear level. Pakistan is not only to ensure its own security but also to pursue a strategy of limited conflict against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir (Sagan, 2011, p. 195). Pakistan’s nuclear program is reactive in nature. Pakistan may not abandon its nuclear policy until India does it. India may not do the same, as long as China and other NPT legitimate nuclear powers do so (Chari, Cheema & Zaman, 1996, pp. 16-17). To say that every state has the same historical experience is unusual, but their practices are useful for highlighting the similarities. The unique strategic beliefs of Pakistan are found in histories of other nuclear aspirants. Three threads interweave through the fabrics of many nuclear weapons aspirants: national humiliation, international isolation and national identity. When Pakistanis looks onto their history, then these themes are recurrent and provide a conceptual foundation from which specific beliefs emerge (Khan, 2013, pp. 7-10). States are concerned primarily to maximize security to face external threats and an unfavorable distribution of political, economic, and military capabilities of their adversaries. Pakistan's Nuclear Test Pakistan exploded nuclear test on May 28, 1998 in the Chagai hills which is along the western border of the province, Baluchistan. Many personalities and organizations were involved in developing the bomb against a backdrop of political, security and economic constraints, as well as opportunities. Pakistan decided to fulfill almost accurately its promise to “eat grass or go hungry” in its mission for the development of nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear program started under severely complex and challenging security dilemmas and circumstances. Historical experience, a blend of cultural nuances, idiosyncrasies of personalities, and domestic politics existed throughout the nuclear development. Pakistan faced regional crises, geographical compulsions, technical challenges, global politics, and international propaganda to nuclear materials know-how (Khan, 2013, pp. 3-5). Studies have estimated that lack of proper technical capability does not deter highly provoked states from pursuing s ‘nuclear hedging strategy' (Lavoy, 2007, p. 71). Table 1 is showing Pakistan's nuclear weapons potential with two categories of nuclear weapon designs: a low-yield tactical weapon, and full size fission weapon. 222 Iram Khalid & Zakia Bano Pakistan’s Nuclear Development Table 1: Pakistan’s nuclear weapons potential Date of tests Type Total no. of Yield Possible target/use tests 28 May 1998 Largest explosion 1 30 kilotons Strategic (boosted fission) 4 Collective yield application Small, low-yield of 4=10 kilotons Tactical Device (fusion) application 30 May 1998 Miniaturized 1 15-18 kilotons Tactical/strategic Version size and application Weight of the bombers reduced(fission) Source: Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures and Restraint Regime in South Asia', New Delhi: Manohar, 2004, p. 27. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capability Pakistan’s nuclear development process consists of three distinct phases which eventually made Pakistan as nuclear weapons state in May 1998. Threshold states argue to exercise their nuclear option for political prestige, military security, economic gains and domestic compulsion. Pakistan’s security dilemma categorically involves India’s nuclear capabilities and intentions. India has more than 15,000 km of frontier and 6000 km of coastline, with huge conventional forces (Rajain, 2005, p. 260). First Phase: 1974-78 India detonated its nuclear device on 18 May 1974 at Pokhran. Pokhran was about 100 km south of the Pakistan border, in the thar desert of Rajasthan (Banerjee, 2004, p. 192). It was called "Buddha Smile". India claimed that the explosion had no military implication. It was a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 14 August 1973. He explained that India's explosion was a threat to Pakistan. He described that "Pakistan would not accept under any circumstances India's hegemony over the subcontinent" (Pakistan Times, 1974). Table 2 shows India's nuclear weapons potential that India has three types of nuclear weapon designs: a low-yield tactical weapon, full-size fission weapons, and a thermonuclear weapon 223 South Asian Studies 30 (1) Table 2: India’s nuclear weapons potential Date of Type Total Yield Possible tests number Target/use of tests 18 May Fission 1 15 kiloton Peaceful nuclear 1974 explosion Thermonuclear 1 43kilotons Strategic device(fusion) application 11 May Fission device 1 12 kilotons Tactical/strategic 1998 missile and bombers Tactical Low-yield 1 200 tons, or less application weapon(fission) than a kiloton (sub-kiloton) 13 May Low-yield fission 2 Between 0.2 and Tactical 1998 0.6 kiloton application Source: Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, 'Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures and Restraint Regime in South Asia', New Delhi: Manohar, 2004, p. 20. Pakistan’s nuclear policy was tremendously influenced by its relations with antagonistic neighbor India. It was also evolved within the context of developments in India’s nuclear program. In 1972, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had committed with Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) to meet the nuclear needs of Pakistan. The report issued in 1973 to set up 600 megawatt (MW) nuclear units during the period 1982-1990. PAEC initiated working, as energy reports had recommended. The site, Cashma was selected to build the 600 MW power plants, CHASNUPP depending on the assistance of America and Britain. Both countries did not release funds, and the project did not start (Ebinger, 1981, pp. 91-94). It was a clear indication to keep its nuclear option continued. The India’s nuclear explosion of 1974 confirmed Pakistan’s doubts about the peaceful nature of Indian nuclear intentions. So, Pakistan sustained its enthusiasm for the development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of scientists at Multan on 20th January 1972, at the residence of Nawab Sadiq Qureshi, former governor of Punjab. Those who were to attend the meeting included Dr. Abdus Salam, the scientific advisor to Pakistan government, Dr. I. H Usmani, chairman of the PAEC, Dr. Z.A. Hashmani secretary education. Scientists from various scientific and research centers, and universities also came to attend the meeting. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto appointed Munir Ahmad Khan, the new chairman of the PAEC in this meeting, who was then the in charge of the nuclear
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