The MILITARY REVIEW dissemi­ nates modern military thought and current Army doctrine concerning command and staff procedw-es of the division and higher echelons and provides a forum for articles which stimulate military thinking. " . " sPECIAL sEcrlb.Ns EDITOR' Authors, civilian and military alike, COL ROBERT' M..w.Ai.xER, ARTY are encouraged to submit articles which will assist in the fulfillment of this mission. Editor , GILBERTO GoNzAL:Iilz-JULIA, INF Assistant Editors ' MAJ ~oM!s H. GUFFAW, INF ORLANDO ORTIZ MORENO, INF POUCY. Unless otherwise indicated, the BRAZILIAN EDITION views expressed in the original ar­ Editor ticles in this magazine are those SEBASTIAO FEBREIRA CHAVES, ARTY of the individual authors and not necessarily precisely those of the Assistant Editor Department of the Army or the WALDm DA COSTA GoDOyWM, ARTY U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Production Officer , Editor. LT COL .LOUIS RUIZ, CMLC

The printing of this publication' has been approvooby the Direetor' of the Bureau· of ,th~ Budget 19 June 1956.

REVIEW-Pillilillhid, monthly' by ·11. S. ~. c:iotnfni,.nd alld GEneral Stall' College, Fort Leav­ in E"gll$h,';*,j,atl!t>b. ,.;,a pi>rt1iiuek~: jii~ ... ~cklass maUerAurust 81, 1984. at Fori: W$'liibHb:' Kan..... pBder tti,':Act :~ ••.~~j:I. Subserh>tloi rat.est $8.&0 ) a year':rn ,~;1'.intt.iit Skte&df ' ' '~', '" .. ' ~ee; ionl!.tI1* l:Oun~" 1!blcb of tbe Pai>;A~~l'oa'*t~~l:i'it. 0 a)iea1'Jn'iit'ot'behoUntries. , ~~' ,w,: '~~'~'?~~i~~~,~:_ 0;«. ~ -, . MILITARY R'EVIEW VOLUME XXXVII DECEMBER 1951 NUMBEU CONTENTS Soviet Views on Limited War ______Docto?' Raymond L. Garthoff Implications of Vertical Warfare ______13 Doctor Hans Karl Gunther A Case for Behavior Techniques in Command ______19 Chaplain (Major) Leo W. Frye, Cha(plain Corps Von Steuben-Drillmaster of the Continental Army ______25 Karl Theodore Marx

~obody Fights Alone ______~ ~ Colonel Hughes L. Ash, Infantry The Army of the Future _ ___ _. ______38 Major J. H. P. Curtis, MC, British Army The Gettysburg Battle ______~ ______48 Colonel Charles H., Blumenfeld, Artillery Development and Application of Joint Capabilities _____ '- _ _ _ 62 Colonel Hamid E. Nelson, General Staff MILITARY ~OTES AROUND THE WORLD ------~ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS ______73 National Defense and Military Resources ______73 The Demyansk Pocket, March-April 1942 ______: ______77 Problems of Atomic War ______84 Irregular Warfare ______87 The Offensive ______~ ______._ 90 Against an Army of Mercenaries ______96 Mutual Security Planning by the American Republics ______104 BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER ______._ 109

This copy is not for sale. It is intended for more than one reader. PLEASE READ IT AND PASS IT ALONG, Souiet Views"on Limited Wor* Doctor Raymond L. Garthoff

As' THE increasing Soviet nuclea~ sible limitations (geographicat or in the power has made all-out thermonuclear war use of weapons) on war, it is perhaps less and less attractive as even a reluctant useful to note that in addition to such resort, military thinkers in the West have military substitutes for total war, there been confronted with the problem of mili­ is an entire range of political substitutes tary (and political) substitutes for total for armed conflict. At the present, the war. Viewed in this perspective, it is not Soviets favor the use of nonmilitary sub­ difficult to understand the standing Soviet stitutes such as political and economic preference for such substitutes in the face pressures, inducements and blandishments, of American thermonuclear striking power. military demonstrations and threats, sub­ The mutual ability to destroy the oppo­ version, colonial rebellion, and guerrilla nent, regardless of who should strike first, warfare over direct military means as a apparently is in sight. strategy to extend Soviet influence and While such a situation may lead to control. mutual deterrence from all war, it is only Nikita S. Khrushchev, in his first major prudent to assume that it may only deter theoretical pronouncement (in February from tolal war, but not necessarily from 1956), stated that Marxism-Leninism in other forms of armed conflict. Mainte­ the contemporary era no longer considers nance of a continuing thermonuclear ca­ that war is inevitable; socialism may be pability for total war is, of course, essen­ established throughout the entire world tial to the deterrence of total war and without war. Thus characteristically, the would always be available to implement ideology is reinterpreted in terms of the a strategy of last resort. practical situation: war is no longer a The Soviets do not explicitly discuss useful course of national policy, therefore possibilities of limitation in doctrinal it is no longer "inevitable." And. if mili­ terms. Their occasional discussions of tary force is to be used, the Soviets well Western views on possible limitation usu­ understand (in the words of one colonel) ally are couched in propagandistic terms. the value of "the use of various means Nonetheless, it is possible and indeed most and forms of armed conflict depending necessary to consider the probable calcu­ upon the circumstances." lations on limited war in Soviet policy­ Soviet strategy is predicated upon the making. basic principle that war, as an instru­ Before discussing Soviet "iews of pos­ ment of policy, may assume various forms. It is not assumed either that nuclear -• This article is a chapter in the forthcominll" ~?Ok by tht> author titled Soviet Strategy in the weapons definitely will or definitely will Fuclenr ApC', to be published in early 1958 by rederlck A. Praeger, ]nC'., New York. not be used; rather, it is ,recognized that

Although 'the Soviets' nuclear ar.senal is extremely powerful. it appears unlikely that they will initiate such warfare in a limited type conflict due to the overriding disadvantages that would accrue to the USSR 4 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1111 under various circumstances they mayor of the United States to invoke what u may not be employed. Consequently, the viewed as a virtually suicidal thel'lllO!Ul. Soviets seek to build and maintain mili­ clear 8trategy to save Iran-or even West tary forces necessary for conventional or Germany? Or would such countries wel. nonnuclear warfare, and to prepare the come even a "limitsKWar" tactical nu. forces necessary for nuclear war. Soviet clear strategy whlch is, in any eVen~ recognition of the need to be prepared for virtually suicidal for them? general thermonuclear war is evident in The Soviet Union recognizes the value many ways. Nonetheless, the available of exploiting this situation. The first ob­ evil!\ence suggests that the Soviets may be­ jective presumably is the isolation of these lieve it will be to their advantage to countries from the United States. By of· strive for the nonemployment of nuclear fering blandishments and probably avoid· weapons in a future war. ing the appearance of threat of war, the Soviet prqpaganda, ever since the war, Soviets will seek to secure the abrogation has ostensibly sought the complete prohi­ of US treaties of alliance and grants of bition of nuclear weapons. There are ob­ base rights to the United States. At a vious propaganda dividends from playing later stage, the blandishments might give upon the fears of peoples everywhere. way to more open pressures and threats There also is an obvious Soviet advantage and a further extension of Soviet influ· in attempting to neutralize the nuclear ence and control. If the circumstances deterrent strength of the United States. were deemed appropriate for resort to Less obvious, but more important, is the arms, in this context, it is quite possible possibility that under certain conditions that the Soviet Union in fact may favor this objective might be achieved. The nonuse of nuclear weapons in a major possibility of an effective international war even in a situation of nuclear strik· agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons ing parity in which the USSR holds the must be recognized as very remote. But initiative. under circumstances of nuclear stalemate Soviet Avoidance of Nuclears through mutual deterrence, the United Three important considerations might States might forego use of nuclear re­ lead the Soviet to avoid initiating the use taliation if the Soviet provocation were of nuclear weapons. First, the Soviet bloc clearly to involve less than a directly mor­ is stronger in nonnuclear military forces tal threat. -increasingly so as the West comes to Soviet Propaganda depend more and more upon nuclear mili· In the Soviet political-military strat­ tary power. The relative advantage of the egy, the wide belief in Europe and Asia of Soviet Union in seeking to avoid the em­ the existence of a general thermonuclear ployment of fission-fusion weapons, even stalemate between the Soviet Union and at the risk of possible loss of initiative in the United States is regarded as an im­ the use of these weapons, is very great. portant advantage. Will other nations Second, the'absolute advantage to both have confidence in the ability and resolve the Soviet Union and the free world is a powerful force for mutual deterrence Doctor Raymond L. Garthoff is a grad­ from their use in war. Soviet forfeiture uate 01 Princeton and Yale Universities. A SPl'cialist on Soviet military and politi­ of the opportunity for prior use of these cal affairs, he is the author 01 the book, weapons might lead to Western decision Soviet Military Doctrine. Two articles on withholding their use. As the Soviet ba8ed on thi8 book have appeared in the capability for deliVering massive megaton June 1959 and March 1955 issues of the MILITARY REVIEW. attacks increases, the possibility of West­ SOVIET VIEWS ON LIMITED WAR I) < ern initiation of a mutual destruetion duel did not definitely intend to use it. The seriously diminishes. And of this the So- I speciousness of this argument is evident viets are doubtless aware. This is true < by comparison to our own objective: we even if the West has failed to provide an are building a powerful Strategie Air alternative sufficient eonventional or "tae­ Command as a deterrent which we hope tical nuclear" theater eapability, and is never to have to use. And most important, tbus left no alternative but limited de­ the Soviet strategic concept does not re­ feats (the Ameriean Continents, at the quire the employment of an intercontinen­ very least, being unassailable by Soviet t!%l striking force to gain a victory, while conventional weapons). Partieularly is in the America:n concept and under cur­ such deterrence likely since the Soviet rent policy such use is assumed to be neces­ Union, by initial nonuse, would have shown sa:ry. In other words, the Soviets retain an alternative-albeit unpleasant-to the the flexibility of a strategy without use vastly more unpalatable certainty of mu­ of the intercontinental thermonuclear tual destruction by reciprocal thermonu­ striking force, and maintain the strong clear assaults. I ground and tactical aviation forces to fight Third, Soviet military thinkers do ?lot such wars. regard nuclear and thermonuclear weap­ In addition to the reasons noted, there ons as all-decisive; therefore, the risk of are other doctrinal tenets which make defaulting to American initiative in the views on possible nonuse of nucl~r weap­ use of the weapons can be contemplated, ons seem feasible to the Soviets. Partic­ although tQ be sure not lightly. The gains ularly in view of the belief that such weap­ of nonuse may be so great, and the pos­ ons are not decisive, even in an attempted sibility of successful mutual deterrence surprise blitzkrie, campaign, there would from their use so large, as to make this be no gain in initIating a war with mortal strategy attractive. risk and the certainty of enormous destruc­ It is, of course, a precondition of a tion. The Soviet objective is expansion of strategy based upon nonuse of nuclear power and influence, but only by ways in weapons that the Soviet Union have a which the Soviet Union herself is not sullicientIy powerful, and sufficiently in­ risked as the stake in an "adventure." vulnerable, intercontinental the~onuclear Finally, if nuclear weapons ereate a rec­ striking force to persuade and enforce ognized stalemate, this stalemate would mutual deterrence. Cognizant of this fact, serve as a shield behind which the vastly the Soviet Union has been endeavoring, superior Soviet conventional military strenuously and successfully, to create power could, through threat and possibly such deterrent power. An air force suit­ in actual limited wars, be used to expand able to this purpose is presently being Soviet control at much reduced risk. acquired and perfected, and there are in­ If the reasoning advanced here cor­ dications of Soviet development of sub­ rectly describes the Soviet position, favor­ marine launched missiles and of an in­ ing the nonuse of nuclear military power tercontinental ballistic missile especially through mutual deterrence both for de­ USeful for such a mission of deterrence. fense and as a screen for possible future Similarly, Soviet civil defense efforts may expansion, the Soviet Union may avoid serve this purpose. initiation of the use of nuclear weapons. Soviet Strategic Concept In a situation based upon necessary en­ It is occasionally argued that the So­ emy "cooperation," enforeed by the en­ viet Union would not create an expensive emy's own advantage, there is, of course, and large long-range bomber force if she always the risk of an irrational enemy use 6 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 of his nuclear' strength. Can the Soviet waged, and end under specific politiCllI, Union, or any country, take this risk? In geographical, and economic conditioli8. . view of the Soviet evaluation of the im­ These various statements clearly imply possibility of attaining a decisive surprise the contingent possibility of nuclear war nuclear blitzkrieg attack, it is reasonable in Soviet thinking, in contrast to the pres. to assume that this risk, while great, may ently dominant view in the United States be considered acceptable under some con­ (and projected into NATO) to assume ditions. Moreover, there is no alternative that any major war must be nuclear, and for expansion with less risk. ('Relative accordingly to prepare only for that even· quiescence, which is not excluded in the tuality:For example, the testimony in 1956 reasoning, is, of course, less risky than of General Nathan Twining, then Chief limited moves of overt expansion.) of Staff of the United States Air Force, Nonnuclear War was to the effect that the United States The Soviets themselves consider their cannot afford to prepare both for atomic preparations for nuclear war in terms re­ and conventional war. flecting implicitly the contingent alterna­ tive of nuclear war. For example, as Major Nuclear Deterrence General N. Pukhovsky put it in 1955, since Soviet interest in preparing for the can· the enemy "threatens to use atomic weap­ tingency of all-out nuclear war is, of ons" the Soviet must prepare "to win in course, apparent and anticipated 'on contemporary combat also [sic] under grounds of simple logic. The fact that it conditions of the employment of atomic is advertised by such statements as those weapons." It is significant that Soviet cited earlier, and others relating to nu· descriptions of va.rious tactical and pro­ clear weapons tests (in particular the tective measures in atomic warfare are thermonuclear tests of November 1955) typically stated in the terms "under con­ is evidence of the Soviet attempt to max· ditions of the employment of nuclear imize deterrence. Such deterrence pur· weapons." Clearly such specification indi­ poses (and still less statements of alleged cates a belief that warfare may also be Soviet intent) by no means exclude the conducted under other conditions; under possibility that the Soviet Union may. .conditions of the nonemployment of nu­ under certain conditions, herself unleash clear weapons. The Soviets also sometimes a world thermonuclear war. But, as we state that the existence of nuclear weap­ have seen, there are cogent reasons ·for ons "in the hands of the imperialist states believing that the Soviet Union believes and the possibility of their use in future her gl'eatest advantage would be served war seriously influences the character of by avoiding a thermonuclear war and us· contemporary combat. . . ." ing her growing nuclear striking power to The Soviet view that future wars, gen­ stalemate Americ'an deterrent power, and eral and local, mayor may not include then to take advantage of this neutraliza· the use of nuclear weapons was most au­ tion for purposes of gradual and prob· thoritatively set forth by Marshal Georgi ably indirect· aggrandizement. K. Zhukov, in early 1957, when in reply to The Soviets are aware that the choice questions on whether atomic and thermo­ of limited or unlimited war may not be nuclear weapons would be used in future theirs. Several senior Soviet military men wars· he stated: have, in 1955 and 1956, cited a statement once made by Lenin; Neither I nor anyone else can answer completely all these questions now because Anyone would agree that an army whick all wars, major and small, arise, are did not prepare to employ every kind of SOVIET VIEWS ON LIMITED WAR 7, weapon and means of combat which the strategic planning, then, is the possibility enemy has or might have would be foolish of enemy assumption of the initiative. This and e~en criminal. was the key impetus to a Soviet reevalua­ tion in 1954 and 1955 of the importance And, as we have seen, the Soviets are of surprise in the nuclear era, and the building up powerful long-range air, na­ necessity to launch a preemptive initial val, and missile forces capable of unlim­ nuclear attack if ever the United States ited offensive thermonuclear war. But to would attempt to launch a surprise nu­ be prepared to employ any weapon or to clear attack on the Soviet Union. wage any kind of war does not mean it will be necessary to employ all kinds of Possibility of Nonnuclear War weapons or wage all kinds, of wars. These qualifications indicate that even Several Soviet statements have hinted if the Soviet Union decided that total nu­ that general nuclear war will result only clear war should be avoided in favor of if the West initiates the use of nuclear a major nonnuclear war, they might not weapons. Thus in 1955 Major General be able to ensure limitation of the war to Pukhovsky wrote that: "If the enemy de­ a nonnuclear status. But the possibility of cided on such an adventure as the employ­ a major nonnuclear war in Europe re­ ment of atomic weapons, he will be de­ mains strong enough-and may increa ..~ stroyed by the same weapon." It is quite in likelihood-so that the question of prep­ significant that the specific threat to de­ aration for waging such a war should stroy the enemy with nuclear weapons is concern all great powers. The Soviets real­ tied to American decision on the prior ize this and plan accordingly. use of atomic weapons, rather than to A general war, limited by the nonusage American initiation of a war. of nuclear and thermonuclear (and prob­ The implication that the Soviet Union ably bacteriological and chemical) weap­ would not initiate the use of nuclear ons, might have no geographical limita­ weapons is quite in accord with the rea­ tions. What would be the characteristics sons earlier advanced which make such of such a war? As Soviet nuclear striking acourse both advantageous and plausible power (weapons and delivery systems) has in terms of the Soviet strategic concept. !frown toward a balance with our own, Similarly, Marshal Zhukov in his speech this question has increasingly occupied to the 20th Party Congress in February Western political and military analysts. 1956. said that: "Future war, if they un­ A nonnuclear general war, in the fash­ leash it, will be characterized by atomic, ion of World War II, seems indeed quite thermonuclear, chemical, and bacteriologi­ unlikely. In the past year and a half, the cal weapons," a formulation carefully pre­ Soviets have shown signs of recognizing served in the frequent subsequent para­ the decline of this possibility in view of phrasings of this statement, and reflecting American and NATO policy. the Soviet belief in American intentions , There is one case, however, of a major, to use nuclear weapons. It is likely that although not world, war under which the since 1955 the Soviet leaders have con­ Soviets may attempt to place the West sidered. in view of American and NATO in a position where we will not use nu­ planning and nuclear armament, that the clear weapons. This would result from a West is ,increasingly bound to a nuclear major Soviet challenge which they deem strategy-if a general war is actually insufficient to provoke us to all-out mas­ fought. . sive retaliation under prevailing circum­ The other restriction on Soviet freedom stances of mutual strategic deterrence. 01 action in military development and Thus at some time the Soviets might 8 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1911 launch a nonnuclear attack on West Ger­ Asia would surely be attempted. But let many, or on Western Europe, in g!lneral, us return to the central problem of inter· if they had been led to judge mutual de­ continental warfare. terrence to be so strong a restraint on It is unlikely, in view of the state of American action that we would withhold modern air detection and defense systems, our nuclear fire' in response to such a that the United States would seek to d~ major conventional attack in which neither feat the Soviet Union by strategic bomb­ major protagonist was directly threat­ ing with high-explosive bombs. The ex· ened. This might at the least present us tent to which the United States did -and the people of the area involved­ engage in intercontinental bombing in a with a most difficult choice, and conceivably nonnuclear war probably would deter· might lead us, in line with Soviet expecta­ mine the extent of Soviet efforts to a~ tions, to forego our relative advantage tack SAC airbases in North America.1t in the use of nuclear weapons and to fight is also unlikely that the Soviet Long-Range a major nonnuclear war. Air Force would find it profitable to en· In examining Soviet doctrine for a non­ gage in strategic bombing of the economy nuclear war the task is simplified by the of the United States. Soviet long-range relatively recent transition from a non­ raids might be made for home morale nuclear to a nuclear strategy and doc­ (prestige) reasons, and also for a pur· trine. The Soviet military doctrine of pose which Marshal of Aviation Skripko World War II, with postwar modifications, specified as early as 1946: to tie down provides a general basis for the cdnduct of military capabilities for the defense of nonnuclear warfare. The ground forces North America. . have been mechanized and their_firepower Naturally, as part of the mechanism of greatly increased, but their operations wartime deterrence, such air defense would be conducted on the basis of a would in any case have to be maintained modified form of traditional doctrine. The by the United States, but there might tactical air and naval forces similarly well be a greater drain on the American have improved weapons, and basically un­ military effort from the main theater of changed doctrine. In the case of all these the Eurasian rimland if Soviet bombers arms, Soviet doctrine has provided pre­ engaged in nuisance raids. Also, there cepts for training for tactical atomic probably would be prestige raids on such warfare; but such provisions are explicitly political centers and symbols as Wash· conditional upon the circumstance of the ington and New York, to match such use of such weapons. In the nonusage of American raids as might be made on Mos· such weapons, doctrine also is clear. cow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other Soviet Conduct of Nonnuclear War cities. The major distinction of Soviet mili­ American supply' lines to Europe and tary strategy in a nonnuclear general war Asia would be strongly attacked. But on concerns intercontinental wa

LSTIFYING before a Senate Appro­ all territory of all belligerents. It will re­ priations Subcommittee on 12 June 1957, quire a total effort and the victor will be Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, the that nation or group of nations which can United States Army's Chief of Research mobilize the greatest effort in the shortest and Development, stated that the Army period of time-or wh~se defense is more was developing a 100 percent effective air nearly total than that of the enemy. defense system which would provide a Warfare-dovetailing the industrial rev­ complete defense--even against intercon­ olution-has undergone three basic phases tinental ballistics missiles. Such a devel­ in the last four ge~erations. From the opment, offsetting the tremendous gain days of the ancient Egyptians until the; which offensive warfare made with the Crimean War, a campaign was fought on advent of aerial bombardment, would con­ a small, concentrated scale-a pinpoint tinue the cycle of offense versus defense. dangling at the end of a supply line that The usual trend in military history has often was long and precarious. Even Na­ been for new offensive weapons to domi­ poleon's Grande Annie of over 550,000 nate for a period until defensive weapons men was essentially deployed in this man­ and tactics could neutralize them to some ner, which condition proved to be its extent. The atomic intercontinental ballis­ downfall.'" tic missile was generally presumed to pre­ The second phase was linear warfare on clude an effective defense, and there has a protracted front often of hundreds of been much speculation that this "ultimate miles. The Civil War was the first con­ weapon" would halt the offense-defense flict which was fought in this manner, cycle and make any future war "unthink­ such tactics being made possible by drafted able." Now with the great advance of the mass armies and improved communica­ Nike projects (Nike-Ajax, Nike-Hercules, tions. Both W orld Wars-at least in Eu­ and Nike-Zcus) , we are told that not only rope and on the Chinese mainland-were is a defense possible but that a 100 per­ fought principally in this manner. cent defense is likely. This prophecy is Perhaps the main characteristic of these both a promise and a threat. It certainly two first forms of warfare was that war encourages continued research; it also em­ moved only in two directions, depth and phasizes the necessity of an ever-increas­ breadth, and concerned only the surface. ing preparedness. Vertical warfare will be total war in • The flanking eorps of the Grand~ ArmIs under Macdonald and Prince Schwarzenberg conllisted amuch more real sense than any previous entirely of auxiliaries, remained in the Baltic prov.. inces and Poland, respectively, and were quite conftict: it will involve all capabilities and ineffective.

Until military def~nse against air-delivered destruction is 100 percent civil defense will remain a matter of urgent importance and should have the stature, emphasis, and the support of a fourth military service 14 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951

As long as only one- or two-dimensional In the Battle of Britain the Royal Ai! war was possible, defense was a relatively Force prevented the superior Gel'lllan easy task of erecting a f ntal shield. A ground strength from being thrown in . perfect defense mainta' ed an unbroken against the British Isles• ring around the count and averted hos­ The Allies, especially the US Army Air tile attacks upon it; a imperfect defense Corps, by brilliant and continuous lotten. permitted partial ho ile occupation and sive operations crippled German industry the threat of collaps which would permit and transportation both before and duro the enemy to roam the country at will. ing the campaign of 1944-45 in France Even in the First orld War, with the and Germany. They so completely dis­ birth of so-called " otal war" conditions, rupted German communications that the the front was a Ii e on the ground, and German High Command was unable to although war affect all the people of supply the defenders of the Siegfried Line, the belligerent nations to varying degrees, let alone an ambitious -enterprise like the it was fought on the' crust." Ardennes offensive. American vertical war· fare achieved such p~rfection that Amer· ican planes managed to knock out single T\le third and final stage is three-dimen­ enemy tanks. sional warfare, which has een made pos­ During the Second World War, and es· sible by the addition of vert cal operations. pecially during the Korean war, Ameri· The first harbingers of ings to come can planes often took a decisive part in were the isolated and sparse aerial bom­ infantry fighting for ridges and hills. Both bardments of the First World War. For in a strategic and a tactical sense, ver­ the campaign of 1919, which the Armistice tical warfare has become more and more of 11 November 1918 obviated, the Allies important, and the more it has been per· had planned more extensive bombard­ fected, the less of a defense has there been ments and even parachute landings. against it. The advent of guided missiles It was on this state of planning rather seemed to give all overpowering advan· than the campaign of 1918 that military tage to vertical firepower. A defense thinkers like General Giulio Douhet for­ against it is only now coming within the mulated the tenets of air strategy and that range of possibility, and it will be several World War II opened. Throughout the op­ years before that possibility becomes a erations of 1939-45 the vertical element reality. came more and more into prominence. The The present incomplete defense against Germans used it tactically with devastat­ ing effect in Poland, Norway, and in the vertical attack points up more than ever Butch-Belgian-French campaign of 1940. the necessity of reevaluating many of the time-honored precepts of military think· Doctor Hans Karl Gunther received his ing which, after all, developed in an age Master's degree in history at Wa8hington when warfare had not yet acquired its University in 1947 and his Ph. D. in mod­ ern history from Stanford Univer8ity in third dimension. These widely accepted 1954. He served a8 an instructor in Ger­ axioms, based on Clausewitz, may be SUDl· man at the University of Missouri for four marized as follows: years; was principal library assi8tant, 1. The defense is innately stronger than Social Science Division, Stanford Univer­ --, sity Libraries; professor of history and the offense. I German at Deep Springs College, Deep 2. Victory, however, cannot- come as a Springs, California; and now is lecturer result of defense, but only after successful in history and military science, College of Special and Continuation Studies at the offensive operations. Thus a major test of University of Maryland. . strength always is essential. IMPLICATIONS OF VERTICAL WARFARE 15 S. The primary aim of military opera­ In spite of the possible perfection of the tions always is the destruction of the en­ antimissile missile, both airplanes and mis­ emy's armed forces rather than the con­ siles basically are-and always have been quest of territory, since territorial gains --offensive, not defensive, weapons. Un­ are an automatic consequence of the de­ less antimissile missiles are built in such struction of the enemy, but the reverse profusion that they can guard all cities does not follow. and towns, defense still will be imperfect. 4. The ultimate end of wilr is to break If there are not enough missiles at any the ~nemy's will to fight and to impose point under attack, total destruction may upon him our will and our terms. result because there is no way of predict­ ing the density with which the enemy Air Defense Difficult would scatter his seed on a particular From its beginning aerial warfare has target. possessed a superior value because at no The prophets of gloom and doom-many time has either fire from the ground or of whom probably exaggerate the likely opposition in the air been entirely effec­ effects of nuclear attack--commonly (and tive in defense against aerial attack. Sur­ without much substantiating evidence) face attack on land (and, to a lesser ex­ presume that each side will loose a gen­ tent, at sea) can be met and turned aside eral Armageddon upon the other on the completely; attack in the third dimension opening day and that with fallout added often has been weakened but seldom pre­ to direct destruction no one will recover vented. from this shock. Thus mankind will have The German and Japanese Air Forces committed a kind of mutual suicide. Even were rendered impotent' only at a late time, they contend, cannot heal the wounds stage of their defeat, and by the very of modern mass destruction, and no longer nature of their element could operate with will any place be safe for human habita­ much less interference than their brethren tion. They foresee mankind perishing in on land and at sea. When the Luftwaffe the awful triumph of the offense. was well-nigh defeated, missile prototypes emerged. There was no 100 percent de­ Are Old Axioms Valid 1 fense against them. Such considerations-even though we Vertical firepower emerged triumphant need not by any means accept the vaster from World War II and the Allies in­ aspects of this horrible prognosis-must stantly saw the great promise of German cause us to rethink the axioms of: experimentation with missiles. Combined 1. The relationship of offense and de­ with the nuclear bomb of America, this fense. development portended a kind of airpower 2. The primary and ultimate aims of too fast to be intercepted and so destruc­ warfare. tive that unless a total defen8e could be 3. The implications of modern technol-. invented, a new kind of total de8truction ogy for the three branches of the Armed almost certainly would take place. And Forces. until recently total defense has seemed Unless and until the antiaircraft and out of the question. Thus vertical offense antimissile missiles become both 100 per­ today is stronger than the defense. At cent effective and so abundant that they least a minority of the enemy air force are available for the defense of all mili­ might get. through our defenses and lay tary and civilian targets, the offense will strings of H-bombs on our defensive, in­ retain a tremendous superiority. This edge dUStrial, and demographic centers. We is due to a great extent to the awesome tould do the same to the enemy. destructive power of even a single weapon 16 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER Itl! which might penetrate the 'defensive The survival of an army, navy, and air shield. force in a posture of defense can be as The defense-in contrast to past mili­ important as ever to the ultimate offensive tary history-suffers from the necessity to win the war. But what follows the in· that· if it is to be effective at all it must itial attack is going to depend also on be totally effective. Perfection, however, the condition of the home country wpich always is difficult to achieve. No suit of must supply the armed forces with the armor would repel every arrow, no vest wherewithal for war. will stop every bullet, and no wall "jVill The armed forces· exist for the preser· withstand every type projectile ang bomb. vation of their home country; not the In two-dimensional warfare, defense did country for the armed forces. Therefore, not need to be perfect, for the penetration the defense-of necessity, the perfect de· of small, hostile units into friendly terri­ fense-of the home country become8 the tory was not unusual or serious and, as main object of all warfa1·e. Vertical de· Clausewitz pointed out, the loss of por­ fense, because of the very power of vertical tions of territory did not greatly matter offense, now is the most vita,! task of all as long as the army emerged intact--a military and civilian official8. It is this thesis supported by the Russian campaigns task which makes even the possibility of of World War II. But the penetration of 100 percent aerial defense the most im· one bomber or a few missiles might cause portant fact to come out of postwar reo death and damage to an astronomical de­ search. Possession of its secret will give gree. Perfection thu8 emerge8 as the prime us a position stronger than that which we requi8ite of vertical defense. Unless it is held before the advent of airpower, for achieved, the offense remains 8tronger we shall then be able to mete out punish· than the defense. ment without having to fear retaliation. This fact raises the basic question of At least since the Spanish-American the primacy of the Armed Forces. It is War the United States, by conviction and still true, to be sure, that the victor will almost by definition, has been on the stra· see his own country free and the enemy tegic defense. This' condition exposed us at his mercy. It is also true that the tre­ to such calamities as the sinking of our mendous strengthening of the offense over merchant ships in World War I and the the defense makes it all the more essen­ sneak attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 Decem· tial to smash the offensive capacity of the ber 1941. enemy, especially his air and missile At a time when the offense is so much power. But it is equally true that until stronger than the defense and when (con· perfect vertical defense is achieved, an trary to 1917 and 1941) the territory of the army may find itself with only the ruins continental U-nited States is within im· of a country to which to return from a mediate striking distance of the potential victorious campaign. This likelihood exists enemy, this defensive attitude constitutes less in countries which possess defense in the most serious drawback of our entire depth (like the US, the USSR, China, and position. It gives the potential enemy the India) than in the case of Belgium or certitude that he will determine the time, Japan, but it is a real consideration. manner, and probably the place where Defense Is the Key hostilities erupt, and it virtually endows It i~ generally accepted that the Western him with the strategic advantage of light­ democracies are not going to enjoy strate­ ing on his own terms. gic surprise because they will not strike In view of these factors it is most grati. the first blow. fying to note that one of the fastest IMPLICATIONS O~ VERTICAL WAR~ARE 17 growing items in the United States budg­ disaster relief in flooded or drought­ et is the appropriation for civil defense stricken areas. But the Federal Civil De­ , -the field in which the most could be done fense Administration cannot force indi­ toward minimizing the effects of an enemy viduals, corporations, and cities to provide attack that did get through. Even so, the for their own protection. vital importance of civil defense in the conduct of future war thus far has not Logically a Federal Problem been recognized and little actually has Officially and legally civil defense has been accomplished in this field which is been considered largely the business of the supported with only two or three percent states, and some states have devoted much of the appropriations budgeted for the time to civil defense preparations. How-' Armed Forces. ever, there is not a single major city in Anyone who has studied the effects of the United States today which could be Allied bombing of Japan and Germany in evacuated in a couple of hours or where World War II and who has extended the adequate shelters exist to keep the popu­ analysis to visualize the much greater de­ lation from getting hurt. struction which could be expected in the The survival of any part of the Nation first few days or nights of the next big affects all the rest, and the civil defense war (more destruction than in the years of any state is as much the business of the from 1939 until 1945) must arrive at the remaining states as it is of the Armed conclusion that civil defense is going to Forces. be fully as important as the armed serv­ In the broad view war is waged by the ices. In fact, for all practical purposes Nation, and if any city in the Nation is civil defense can be regarded as one of bombarded with nuclear weapons, it is be­ the services defending the country. cause that city is in the United States of The Federal Civil Defense Administra­ America, not because of any local reasons. tion has published the facts on atomic war­ The responsibility for civil defense would, fare and defense or protection against it. therefore, seem to rest squarely on the It is easy to obtain plans for shelters and Federal Government. And if the people of instructions on improving existing cellars. the cities with vital industries in them Yet many Government' officials and other will not build shelters, there is a good experts have wondered about the utter case for the Federal Government's doing lackadaisical attitude of the American pub­ it, because, although individuals and cor­ lic toward this danger. How many of us porations may wish to gamble with their have bomb shelters in our homes? How own survival, the Nation needs their pro­ many people would know where to run if ductive capacity. It makes just as much Red Alarm were sounded? How many peo­ sense, if not more, to defend a city on its ple would even recognize a Red Alarm? own grounds against enemy-caused de­ Where is the public building that could struction as to defend it, along with others, provide shelter in nuclear warfare for the on a front overseas, and it is done for hundreds of people in its offices? the same reason. The Federal Civil Defense Administra­ That this is the case is demonstrated by tion has been improving fire-fighting and the surrounding of many of our cities hospital facilities in many parts of the with Nike installations to ward off enemy Nation'and has tried to ensure proper law attack. After the hostile planes or missiles enforcement, first aid treatment, and evac­ take off from home ground, the Air Force uation of threatened areas in case of at­ would try to shoot them down with the tack. It has even been called on to provide long-range-Hofnarc or the plane-to-plane I~l 18 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 19!!

Falcon missile, if not with its airplanes. Staff? That is the measure for which three­ The Navy would try to get them with its dimensional warfare seems to call. planes, or with long-range Talo8 and Such a radically new measure might short-range Terrier missiles, or by the not be required if we planned to strike plane-to-plane Sidewinder and Sparrow. the first blow in any future war and if Planes or inissiles that got ~hrough would we could be certain that all hostile 'reap. be tracked down over the threatened city ons of aerial offense could be either de­ by the Army's Nike weapons. But if a stroyed on the ground or eliminated in plane or missile managed to destroy any midair, as General Gavin predicts they part of the city, rescue, rehabilitation, and will be in the future. But until we reach emergency service would be largely the such a state of defensive perfection, and responsibility of the state and local gov­ unless we adopt the attitude of uncondi­ ernments. tional strategic offensive policy, failure to put up the strongest imaginable defen­ A Fourth Service? sive guard' appears an act of incomprehen­ Would it not seem much more logical sible lassitude which can be rectified only to consider civil defense the fourth of the by the extension of the responsibilities of Armed Forces and put it under the mili­ the Armed Forces and full preparation to tary planning and orders of the Depart­ make good the promise of instant mas­ ment of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of sive retaliation.

The passive defense capability of our "homefront" is just as important as is the offensive capability of retaliating weapon-for-weapon on the "battle­ front." For, from the chemical, petroleum, steel, electronics; agricultural, and hundreds of other industries will come the means of keeping out combat forces effective if they must engage an enemy. Thus a strong civil defense pro­ gram is just as necessary as is a strong national defense program-not only might it deter an enemy from attacking our Nation, but if he does, a strong built-in defensive system may well make his attacks upon the "homefront" abortive and of little help to his war schemes_ Major General William M. C1'eas'y ACase for Behauior Techniques in Command Chaplain (Major) Leo W. Frye, Chaplain Corps Planning Division, Office of the Chief of Chaplains

HISTORy'may well condemn this age squad level to the top of the chain of com­ for its physical and moral destructiveness mand. ... Thus there is little room for in its negation of civilizing factors, its the -dull clod in our Army of today. lack of charity and justice. On the credit side, however, this age of destruction has So long as we have a large standing produced something uniquely constructive. : Army we must recruit from all classes and social strata. This results in an amal­ It has breached the fron~iers of the per­ sonality factors which continue to cause gamation of men with divergent levels of great physical and mental suffering. These education, widely separated cultural back­ factors must be recognized in order to grounds, a multitude of religious persua­ utilize the inner strength of individuals. sions, high or low motivation, and diverse Discovery of the principles which under­ attitudes toward authority-all to be lie personality integration and disintegra­ welded into the pattern of the ideal sol­ tion may pqssibly go down as the greatest dier. There is, indeed, "little room for the achievement of our time. dull clod." An ideal of such dimensions may be Application of Principles practically unattainable. We may achieve The intelligent application of these prin­ some labored success by supplying mini­ ciples of behavior can make the successful mum levels of education. We can pretty commander. They will help him to arrive well place men in the same cultural milieu. at a new understanding of interpersonal Religion could be a great impetus: it relationships. Every successful leader has answers the "why" of action, the "for made instinctive use of these principles, what" of life. That, however, is an area and a working knowledge of them is es­ sential to any intelligent approach to of human autonomy which should be un­ touchable. The big question of command leadership. Lieutenant General Walter L. remains: how to motivate men,' and how Weible, Deputy Chief of Staff for Per­ to activate such a ready response to au­ sonnel, made the following pertinent re­ mark which appeared in the Army Infor­thority, as to approach the ideal? The answer will complement education, culture, mation Digest, February 1957: and religion. It will deal in the area of New and more imaginative tactical con­personality. In this area .we can achieve cept8 cannot be executed without imagina­a great deal of understanding, and may tive leaders, officers and enlisted, from the even augment change, in the total man.

No commander is "expected -to fulfill the expectations of all. his men, but he can be a good leader if he trusts in their integrity, is consist­ ent in direction, wary of self-concern, and takes time for their needs I 20 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1957 Emotions Move Men matical{y"re8pond in an appropriate .man· The basic premise in this science of be­ nero We may control our 8peech and our havior is that all men emote. Like it or actions, but we cannot control the height. not, much of our behavior is basi'd on sheer ened heartbeat and respiration~ increased emotion. For this reason something more /low of adrenaline and perspiration, inhi· than a transfer of ipformation is needed bition of digestion, and salivation. to effect a change in any soldier, and especially the "problem soldier." Without Emotional Motivation Differs doubt he already has the information why If only ideas could stand alone. But they A WOL i~ intolerable, or why the order depend upon persons to accept, reject, de­ to police the area must be followed with fend, or evaluate. In brief, different per· the same acceptance as the order to go sons emote differently, even to the same on night patrol. Nevertheless, this knowl­ idea. Therefore, We must insulate the per. edge somehow does not get through to him. son's area of vulnerability before he can His educational and cultural background digest the idea. Our corollary then is this: are of little help. His actions are poorly It is futile to strive to fill a position of motivated. That is why he went AWOL leadership by treating "all men the same." in the first place. He was so wrapped up No leader can treat all men identically. 'in emotion that the "intellectual-receiv­ His personality differs from theirs; hence ing" and the "information-giving" proc­ he does not react to each in the same way. esses were not effective. They, in tur:n, do not act like figures on This is not only the case, with the "prob­ a slide rule: They are persons, and per· sons feel anger and love. Some transfer· le~ soldier," it is trur ck, every human bemg. Each of us has areas of vulnerabil­ ence of these emotions is made even when ity. As the famous psychologist, Dr. C. strangers meet. Imagine their strength Gilbert Wrenn, stated in the Minnesota after a long relationship. Journal of Education, December 1956: Defenses Emotion is, deny it or not. When you and Since the man is- not known who can I are frightened or made angry or become turn his emotions on and off like- a spigot, highly excited over something unfavorable a covering-up process is necessary. The to us, our viscera immediately and auto- soldier covers discomfort, for example, by cynicism, sarcasm, shyness, or aggression. Chaplain (Major) Leo W. Frye attended Oddly enough, the leader, too, reacts with Saint Gregory College, Cincinnati, Ohio, his own "coverup." He could treat all men and receiveq his theology degree from Mount Saint Mary, Norwood, Ohio. Dur­ the same if leadership were purely an in· ing 1944-46 he served as division artillery tellectual process. It is not, however. chaplain with the 95th Infantry Division Leadership is 'an interactive process be· at Metz-Saarlautern; and with the Ninth tween the leader and the led. The leader Army after the cleanup operations in the Battle of the Bulge, and in the Ruhr-Rhine who says "I guess I told him" is getting breakthrough. He had a civilian pastorate an undesirable self-feeling into the inter· until February 1951, at which time he re­ action. This blinds him to his primary turned to the Army to become 85th Artil­ function as a leader, namely: "Did I tell lery Group Chaplain and later Post Chap­ lain in Germany. He attended the U. 'S. him in such a way that he could accept it Army Command and General Staff College and thereby act upon it?" in 1955, and the following year was as­ Implementing proper interaction is an signed to duty with the Menninger Foun­ art. Through it the good leader achieves dation. He now is with the Planning Divi­ sion, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, a certain rapport. In the practice of his Washington, D. C. art he must call upon his understanding A CASE FOR BEHAVIOR TECHNIQUES IN COMMAND of human emotions to attain verfection. energetic, imaginative, and devoted. These He may use certain keys to unlock the make the good appetite. The artful leader doors of human emotion. finds methods for enticing the appetite, for releasing and putting into construc­ Concern tive use the power within the individual His first key is a true, interior, un­ to digest the teaching and training. More­ feigned concern for his men. Any person over, only if the leader's concern is true made to feel insignificant or worthless in and unfeigned will he make the effort to the presence of his leader will be poorly get this food inside the soldier in digest­ led. ible form. • Concern is not purely intellectual; 'it is Awareness of Self-Concern a virtue. It will be felt. The Army is mak­ To have real concern for his men the ing steady strides toward career attrac­ leader must be wary of too much self­ tiveness through benefits, promotion, and concern. Does he understand what he is security. All these factors reflect concern doing? Is he dominating because he ac­ for the economic outlook of the individual, tually feels feeble? Is he accepting his men yet concern over money cannot be primary. as worthwhile individuals? Will he admit If it were, there would never be a rich mistakes? Is the central thrust of his delinq,uent. leadership to get inside the soldier, the Surveys in industry and other walks of person, to help him get hold of his feel­ life prove that economic security is not the ings? Does the leader take the words and motivation which is required for man' to the acts of the soldier seriously? How does do his level best. The soldier who recog­ he conceive himself? As an impressive nizes the sincere concern of his leader power figure? As a respected, belove,d will have an inherent gratification in a figure? job well done. He will enjoy accomplish­ Picture a group of soldiers being led ing the difficult, overcoming the obstacle. through a tactical or technical problem. This will be his reaction to a leader who Each man will have variable motivation is concerned about him as a person moti­ to learn. Some will be in different stages vated by feeling. of heeding or unheeding, a few even hos­ Each soldier who comes into the Army tile. Now the artful leader here recog­ ,has undergone some form of education. nizes that he is no longer concerned pri­ He has had a basic diet, we might say. marily with the maneuver or the weapon It may have been balanced or unbalanced, involved; his primary concern is the "feed­ it may be adequate to carry him through ing process." as a topnotch soldier, or it may be of He must, if he is going to make these such a highly specialized nature that when men good soldiers, be person-centered in the man looks at this new diet of soldier­ his approach to them. His self-concern ing he loses his appetite. We must some­ has little place here. He cannot get 'too how adjust the food to his particular taste focused on information-giving. If infor­ if we are going to help him accept sol­ mation-centered, he is achievement-cen­ diering. Ile has not been trained to cope tered. Self-concern is moving him. Since with this new situation completely and he can eat the diet his men should swal­ may need a special diet. low it, too. If the leader must force this T~ue, he gets a special diet through need to succeed oh his soldiers, he is no guidance in Army training. But again, longer striving'to help them. Instead, he before he can eat, he has to have an appe­ is demanding that the soldiers prove he tite. It takes motive to be eager, alert, is a good le~der. 22 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1917

What are the possibilities that some­ that is an invitation for the soldier to one has not told these people how to be speak. good soldiers? It is of little use at this It may appear contradictory, but a point to force information upon them. practical expression of good leadership is Dr~ Charles A. Curran, of Loyola Univer­ maintaining authority while c'I"eating an sity, put it nicely in his comments to a atmosphere of trust. The result of its ap· .faculty of counselors: plication will make the leader more 'free Shoving or pushing more information of himself. As he becomes conscious of at people at such a time will only make the complexes which are present in all them freeze and traumatize'the situation. of us, his faith is strengthened in the sol· dier's innate power and dignity, in his We may be sure that, above all, sol­ reason,. his goodness, and his manliness. diers are not inclined to get tied up with If the leader denies this, he can foster no the needs of their leader. It is very diffi~ hope, no desire in his soldier. cult for a leader to see this. Psychologi­ cally speaking, his achievement goal is Time called projection, and he projects his The leader cannot ignore his men. Proof achievement into his "problem" soldiers. should be given that "time" is available. His self-concern vitiates his leadership. It may sound trite, but is it? Any soldier will become -quickly aware that his com· Trust mander "has no time" for him; and with From this point of view (knowledge of that awareness he becomes less a soldier. self) the artful leader senses that he is By "time" the leader demonstrates reo something more than a heartless director spect for the dignity of his charges; he or imparter of information. His knowl­ recognizes the. value of their work, and edge and trust of man is most important. implies his appreciation. When the recog· Every soldier can turn out to be much nition of the impOF.tance of "time" be­ more capable, more reliable, and more comes a reality, the leader has contributed astute than believed. It is essential that to another's self-respect. Even more im· the leader believes this. Of necessity we portant, he has elevated the other's reo must grow to trust the strength in our spect for him. people. The best leaders have the greatest When, for example, correction is advis· trust and this inevitably "gets across" to able for specific behavior, time is taken their men. Until the soldier is conscious on the spot, and the correction is not re~' of this trust he will not be motivated to ceived as an affront. Finding fault and do his best. placing blame are easy, but guilt, being No soldier necessarily wills himself the terrible thing it is, requires the use through his tour of duty into a state of of one's precious time-lest salt be rub· love for the service. He, like everyone else, bed into another's wound. has. instinctive defenses such as anger, fear, and withdrawal. The successful sol­ Consistent Direction dier finds a better way to control these Many of the greatest leaders also have defenses than the "bad" soldier. The com­ been beloved men because they were able mander must maintain his position of au­ to give consistent direction. They were thority-there is no question on this point. not ~acillating, not overly punitive, and But, he must build an atmospherll that is not overly permissive. They were firm, but free from threat-an atmosphere of accept­ kindly. Men loved them not because they ance, of understanding; an atmosphere had self-love or boasted of their dignity, A CASE FoIi' BEHAVIOR TECHNIQUES IN COMMAND 23 but because they could 'make a soldier most important drive in his life is to realize that as a soldier he was as good become as unlike that "no good father" as the commander thought he was~ as he can possibly be. With this new esteem of self our sol­ This behavior is primarily unconcious. diers will have a new esteem for their How does the soldier approach the leader? leaders. Any commander who thinks that With a chip on his shoulaer? With arro­ he has a poor outfit, has one. When the gance? Demandingly? With passive hos­ soldier's faith in his leader is destroyed, tility or anger? Is he a fawning beggar? the soldier's faith in himself is under­ A fighter? A domineering type? Does he mined. Psychologists say this goes back obsequiously agree, while at the same to childhood. When a father rejects his time remaining sullen and uncooperative son, the father is hated and the son is within? This is how he learned to cope wounded. with authority in the years of his devel­ Recognizing the fact that all people opment. Only by consistent direction, tem­ screen out what they do not want to hear pered with "fatherly" regard, will that or see, we begin to realize that, from in­ soldier identify himself with his leader. fancy on, men learn certain patterns of behavior. These patterns have to do with Realistic Expectations obedience and respect; with our relation No commander could possibly be ex­ to a power figure, to the father figure. pected to fulfill the wide variety of in­ Successful fathers are consistent in their dividual expectations of all his soldiers. direction and ennobling in their regard for Yet to have loyal, competent soldiers we the offspri~g. must somehow manage to fulfill at least A soldie~'s relation to his superior is their realistic expectations. These expec­ colored by his childhood. He has taken tations obviously relate to the father role into himself the values of parents and for the leader. During the conduct of the the culture in which he was reared. He Menninger Industrial Seminar in 1957, has learned to be like those parents, to Doctor Harry Levinson, Ph. D., discussing adapt himself to their values. He reaches the "Role of the Supervisor," stated: out for love. If he finds it, he establishes When you are in a position of power, firm ties and draws strength therefrom. when you are in a position of authority, Parenthetically, therefore, it would be un­ people have these expectations 01 you fair of the leader to expect of his men a whether you like it or not and you can't higher code of behavior than he himself is undo their expectations short of leaving willing to live. that position 01 power. Suppose, however, the soldier had a father who did not love him, who wanted The good leader, therefore, .will strive nothing to do with him. However he re­ to balance his power to the needs of his acts now, this was what he learned in the soldiers. He must gratify the soldier's de­ past. Unable to establish firm ties be­ sire for self-expression, and yet help him cause of inconsistent direction and lack to conform to what a good soldier should of regard, this unloved son brings a 20­ be. He must motivate the soldier's coop­ year pattern of living to his commanding eration, yet stimulate his competition. He officer. As a child he was cut off from the must elicit the soldier's drives toward duty, power 'figure, the father. it will not be and resolve his drives toward pleasure. easy now for him to take on the power What, then, would be the soldier's cumu­ values of his commander. He rejects them. lative concept of his leader, the realistic He becomes a "bad" soldier. Why? The expectations the leader can meet? We may 24 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 19&!

establish a reference by looking at a sur­ It (the father role) implies that 108 . vey which industry recently made. Ac­ could profitably focus our efforts not 80 cording to this survey the worker expects much on the specifics of what we do in the. following .from his boss: relationship to soldiers, nor on th(! specifics 1. Recognition and appreciation of his of the environment, but on the total at­ work. mosphere which we create in relationship 2. An opportunity to advance. to them. Many mistakes are made bg fa­ 3. Consideration for himself as an in­ thers in the course of rearing children, dividual. and yet these mistakes really don't make 4. Encouragement. a lot of difference if there is an atmos­ 5. Representation of his feelings to phere of regard. higher authority. 6. Information. Proof of the Pudding 7. An approachable boss. All of the above ideas have met clinical The basic assumption was that a good test. An interesting experiment in lead~. supervisor must possess and must exercis.e ship took place recently in the reorgani. power. zation of a textile business. An intricate Note that the employees do not want change in production methods had to be their supervisor (just as soldiers do not made in order to meet competition. 'Fhe want their commander) to be a "Good workers were divided into three groups, Joe." They do expect him to be able to Group one was told exactly what to do plan work, to get it started, and to be and given the production rate. Group two firm in the attainment of results. These was oriented on the managerial problelll, employees were not asking for softness; but by delegates. To all in group three they were asking to be treated like human management threw open the problem and beings. They expect their boss to act with asked for discussion and recommendations, concer·n for them and trust in them. There This group was so closely identified to is no contradiction between this and the management that they made the problem authority which must be maintained. their own. The results 40 days later were: a high percentage of personnel turnover The Impossible Goal? and a deficient production level in group These qualities closely resemble what one; group two had achieved good produc· any of us expect of good parents. A good tion, but the personnel turnover was sig· father is not the father who allows his nificant; in group three, not one person son to do everything he wants to do, nor quit, no grievances were voiced, and pro· does he inhibit all spontaneity. That would duction levels exceeded those previously be crippling to the boy. He would live in attained. an environment that was too lax or too People like to be considered worthwhile controlled. It is just as crippling or de­ and responsible. Soldiers do not 'differ, structive in the Army as in the family. They will achieve a high level of efficiency The good father exercises consistent di­ and gratification in a job well done so rection. Actually, the good commander is long as their leader is truly concerned like the good father. His art is not bluster about them as individuals, little concerned and bravado nor ruthlessness-rather, he about self, trustful of their integrity 8S senses what it means psychologically to men, consistent in his direction, and takes have power over someone. He must be time for their needs-all without relin· guide, protector, director, and counselor. quishing his authority. It is a big order, Doctor Levinson also said: . but possible of attainment. 'VON STEUBEN Drillmaster of the Continental .Army Karl Theodore Marx

IN A recent dispatch frol1j Heidelberg, progress, the circumstances, and the suc­ Germany, an American Army captain cess of Von Steuben's work. First, it must' paid tribute to a man who so often is be pointed out that Von Steuben arrived assigned a casual role in accounts about in the Colonies at a time when the Gates­ the American Revolution. The accomplish­ Conway cabal against Washington was at ments of this man, however, attested to its height. Its purpose was to unseat by George Washington and the Continen­ Washington in favor of Gates, with Con­ tal Congress, meant the transformation way aiming to become inspector general, of the Continental Army from a medley independent of Washington's command. In of the various state militias into a well­ his recommendations to Congress Conway disciplined, homogeneous unit. With a sin­ made one fatal error-an error that made gleness of purpose he unified forms of Von Steuben's appointment so much easier command and modern methods of combat. -when he recommended that the Prussian This US Army captain, the son of a system, that is, that of the "great Fred­ German war veteran who had fought erick," be adopted in the American Army. against Americans in World War I in Conway considered Frederick's methods the bloody trenches of France, knew what the acme of military efficiency, superior he was talking about when he spoke of to both the French and English disciplines. repaying a debt to Germany when he now Coincidentally, at that time none other trained German troops to take their place than a veteran of Frederick's campaigns, in the vast army of free nations. He knew Von Steuben, was on the high seas, un­ that it was another version of the "Lafa­ aware of the furor in the Continental yette we are here" when he faced his first Army, ready and eager to offer just that German contingent of trainees in Ander­ vl!ry knowledge Conway had recommended nach, Germany, to teach them the Ameri­ as the solution. Washington and Conway can manual of arms-as Von Steuben did were anything but comrades in arms­ in 1778. It is appropriate, therefore, to there was more than icy politeness between point out the work of "volunteer" Von the two-there was open enmity and cer­ Steuben, his task, his results, and also how tainly a disinclination on the part of circumstances made him, the ex-captain Washington to let Conway's methods of of the Prussian Army of Frederick the approach go unchallenged. When the vola­ Great, the mentor of the American Army. tile Conway presented himself to Wash­ The following letters will show the ington at Valley Forge in December 1777

The a~complishments .of "volunteer" Von Steuben, drillmaster of the American Army, brought about the transformation of that army from a group of state militias into a well-disciplined homogeneous unit 26 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER liS! he felt slighted and returned to York, in favor of more glamorous or crafty com· Pennsylvania, complaining to Congress petitors. Throughout all his personal trials about his cool reception. and, tribulations he always kept his goal On 3 January 1778 Washington felt in mind, his one purpose-to free the compelled to write to Henry Laurens, Colonies from an unjust rule, to defeat President of the Continental Congress: his military enemies, and to keep his per­ sonal adversaries in check. When Conway If General Conway means, by cool re­ tried his coup with Gates against their ceptions that I did not receive him in the language of a warm and cordial friend, I comm~der in chief, Von Steuben, who readily confes8 the charge. I did not, nor . had ~ust arrived at Portsmouth, New shall I ever, till I arr], capable of the arts Hampshire, wrote to Washington at Val­ of di8simulation. These I despise, and my ley Forge: feelings will not permit me to make pro­ Sir: The inclosed copy of a letter, the fessions of friendship to the man I deem original of which I shall have the honour my' enemy and whose system of conduct to present to your Excellency, will instruct forbids'it. At the same time truth author­ you of the motives that brought me over izes me to say, that he has had no cause to this Land. I shall only add to it, that to jU8tify the assertion, that he was re­ the Object of my greatest ambition is to ceived and treated with the proper respect render your Country all the Services in due his official character, that he could my Power, and to de8erve the title of a not expect any support for fulfilling the Citizen of America, by fighting for the duties of his appointment. Cause of your liberty_ If the distinguished . Von Steuben Writes Washington ranks in which I have Served in Europe It' is necessary here to interpolate a should be an Obstacle, I had rather serve few words about Washington, the man. under your Excellency as a Volunteer, We know him as a successful general, as than to be a subject of Discontent to such the Pather of his Country. Yet Washing­ deserving Officers as have already dis· tinguished themselves amongst you. Such ton was much more than just that. He was a great human being, a man of un­ being the Sentiment8 I have always pro· fest, 1 dare hope that the respectable COlI­ usual fortitude of character and purpose. gress of the United State8 of America He not only had to figh~ the British gen­ will accept my Service8. I could say more· erals and armies, he had to overcome va­ over (were it not for the fear of offending rious attempts to belittle and unseat him your Moflesty), that your Excellency is Mr. Karl T. Marx was born in Germany the only Person, under whom, aft.er hav­ and is a United States citizen. He was ing served the King of Prussia, I could vocational counselor at the YMCA in New wish to pursue an Art, to' which -[ have York City for 16 years where he special­ ized in immigrant and refugee work. His wholly given up myself. I intend to go to other activities include teaching German Boston in a few Days, where I 8hall pre· over Radio Station WOR; director and 8ent my letter8 to the Hon. John Han­ writer of "All Nations Hour," Radio Sta­ cock, Esq_, member of Congres8, and there tion WGBS (now WMCA), New York; and producing cultural and technical films. I 8hall wait your Excellency'S Orders. The author of Der Feigling, five booklets of aphorisms, many short 8torie8, and It is certain that Washington was glad numerOU8 technical articles on unemploy­ to receive such a letter from Von Steuben, ment and vocational guidance, Mr. Marx the veteran of Rossbach and other battles has been an executive in a textile machin­ under Frederick the Great. Had not Con­ ery concern in New Jersey for the past 10 years. way and his coterie recommended Prus­ VON STEUBEN-DRILLMASTER OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY 27 sian methods and discipline? Had they not a man of varied moods, a most generous extolled them as the acme of perfection? spender, perhaps a seeker of soldierly for­ Why not accept the veteran who had tune, but most certainly a sincere convert served Frederick? Why fall back on an­ to a new conception of citizenship and gov­ other foreigner, Conway, who had served ernment "after he had tasted life in Amer­ against Von Steuben in the French Army ica-for he never returned to his home and who knew only by defeat about the country and he always wrote in enthusi­ superior Prussian discipline? Destiny astic terms about his life and experiences dealt the cards, as we all know. Conway here. Let us hear what one of his aides, lost; amid bitter recriminations he re­ Duponceau, had to say about Von Steuben, signed and Congress speedily accepted the wrathful. This narrative has to do his resignation. Conway had outdone him­ with Von Steuben's journey from New self when he recommended Prussian meth­ Hampshire to York, Pennsylvania, to pre­ ods. sent his credentials to Congress, as sug­ gested by Washington: Washington, stung by criticism from the "native" camp about "foreigners" in We had been cautioned against putting his army (including the infamous Con­ up at a certain tavern in Worcester way), replied to Von Steuben cautiously: County, Massachusetts, not far from ihe frontier of Connecticut. We were told that Jan'y. 9th. 1778 at Valley Forge. the landlord was a bitter Tory, and that Sir: I yesterday rec'd the honor of yours he would refuse to receive us or, at least, from Portsmouth inclosing Copy of a letter treat us very ill. We determined to avoid from Messrs. Franklin and Deane, the that place if it were possible.' 'Unfortu­ original of which I shall be glad to receive nately, when we were some distance from from your Hands as soon as it is con­ it we were surprised by a violent Snow­ venient for you to undertake the Journey. storm; it was in the evening, and we were As it will solely rest with Congress to compelled to seek 8helter in the very house make a suitable provision for you in the we wi8hed to avoid. We had not been mi8­ American Army, you will be under the informed. The landlord at once said that necessity of prolonging your Journey in he could not accommodate us. He had no order to lay before them at York Town beds, no bread, no meat, no drink, no milk, [York, Pa. where Congress met at the no eggs; all that he could offer us was the time] the honorable testimonials which bare walls. In vain we remonstrated and you bear of your former service. I return prayed. He remained inflexible. At last the you my thanks for the polite manner in Baron [Von Steuben] grew impatient and which you express your desire of serving flew into a violent passion. After exhaust­ lInder me and have the honor to be, Sir. •.• ing all his store of German oaths, he called in that language to his servant to bring It is rather tempting to lose oneself in his pistols. Then the Baron, presenting the details, in embroideries, as this fascinat­ deadly weapons at the frightened land­ ing historic vignette progresses in color lord, repeated the questions that he had and fact. However, we want contemporary asked in vain before: '!lave you bread, accounts, not retrospective evaluation by meat, drink, beds, etc.?' The answers were later generations-scant as they are-to now such as we de8ired; we were accom­ tell us about this interplay of American modated with good bed8, and a good sup­ history, focusing ever so briefly on a Ger­ per, and our horses were properly cared Illan soldier by the name of Von Steuben .. for. In the morning after our breakfast He was indeed a soldier, but he also was we politely took leave of our host who, 28 MILITARY REVIEW • DECEMBER 1951 though a Tory, did not refuse tJie con­ Th~ Baron von Steuben who was a Lieu. tinental money in which we liberally paid tenant General and Aide de Camp to the him. King of P)'ussia-

troducing hi'm to the army, and one that On 7 May 1778 Lieutenan~ Colonel John would give him -the most ready oppor­Laurens wrote to his father: hmity of displaying his talents. I there­ fore proposed to him to undertake the Yesterday we celebrated the new alli­ office of Inspector General, which he ance (with France) with as much splendor agreed to with the greatest cheerfulness, as the short notice would allow. Divine and has performed the Duties of it with services precede.d the rejoicing. After a a Zeal and Intelligence equal to our proper pause, the. several brigades marched wishes. . . • I should do injustice, if 1 by their right to their posts in order of were to be longer silent with regard to battle, and the line was formed with ad­ the merits of Baron de Steuben. His mirable rapidity and precision. Three sa­ knowledge of his profession, added to the lutes of artillery, and three general dis­ , zeal which he has displayed since he began charges of running fire by the musquetry were given in honour of the King of I upon the functions of his office, leads me to consider him as an acquisition to the France, the friendly European powers, service, and to recommend him to the at­and the United American States. The tention of Congress. . . • The baron is order with which the whole was conducted, sensible that our situation requires a few the beautiful effect of the running fire variations in the duties of his office, from which was executed to perfection, the mar­ tial appearance of the troops, gave sensi­ the general practice in Europe, and par­ ble pleasure to everyone present. The ticularly that they must be more compre­whole was managed by signal and the hensive, in which, as well as in his in­plan, as formed by Baron de Steuben, structions, he has .skillfully yielded to succeeded in every particular which is in circumstances . ••• a great measure attributed to his un­ In the New Jersey Gazette of 6 May wearied attention, and to the visible prog­ 1778 an American officer wrote from Val­ ress which the troops have already made ley Forge: under his discipline. The Army grows stronger every day. Conclusion It increases in numbers • • . and there is On 5 May 1778 Congress resolved: a spirit of discipline ~mong the troops That Congress approve of General that is better than num&ers. Each brigade Washington's plan for the institution i8 on parade almost every day for several of a well-organized inspectorship. hours. You would be charmed to see the That Baron von Steuben be ap­ regularity and exactness with which they pointed to the office of Inspector Gen­ march and perform their maneuvers. Last eral, with the rank and pay of Major year the troops were 80 harrassed with General, his pay to commence from marches that there was little discipline the time he joined the army and en­ among them. It was almost impossible to tered into service of the United States. advance or retire in the presence of an And on the evening of 6 May 1778, after !'Wmy without disordering the line and the Grand Review had been over, Wash­ falling into confusion. That misfortune, ington assembled his officers and their I believe, will seldo~ happen again • . . ladies about him, then proffered a toast for the troops are instructed in a new and to the unsuspecting Von Steuben, not "as 10 hap'PY a method of marching that they a lieutenant general in foreign service lOon will be able to advance with the ut­but as Major General Baron de Steuben, 1II08t regularity, even without musick and Inspector General of the Army of the 011 the roughest grounds. United States." NOBODY fIGHTS ALONE Colonel Hughes L. Ash, Infunf1·y Faculty, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College hE nature, locales, and possible forms Conduct of a Coalition War of future warfare are subject to much The Alliance of Chaumont, 1814, pledged contemporary debate. Amid all the discus­ Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Brit· sion, however, there stands the militarily ain to oppose Napoleon with 100,000 men significant point that there is a strong each. No centralized command or staff probability that the United States will structure for planning, directing, or con· not fight any future war alone, but as a trolling their combined efforts was pro­ member of a coalition or alliance. Such a vided. Heads of, state traveled with their coalition could vary from a two-nation ef­ armies in the field. Conflicting political ob. fort resulting from one of our numerous jectives promoted a successive seriea of bilateral arrangements to military opera­ partner clashes. This lack of unity of ef· tions conducted under the directorship of fort permitted Napoleon to postpone in· the United Nations. evitable defeat for another decade. Coalition warfare is almost as old as Germany was by far the dominant figure conflict itself. From Biblical days to Han­ among the Central Powers in World War nibal and, finally, to General Mark Clark I. Unity of command for this war was as Commander in Chief, United Nations vested in the German forces. Yet only Command in Korea, wars have been waged limited control was achieved due to a lack by varying numbers of partners with of mutual knowledge and the absenee of varying degrees of success. Historically, mutual respect, confidence, and under· coalitions have produced strange bedfel­ standing. However, since the other coun· lows and challenging problems. Held tp­ tries respected the eminence of Germany, gether by the compelling mutuality of de­ she became a virtual arbiter for interna· feating a common enemy, coalitions are tional disputes among the coalition memo continually subjected to the debilitating bers. Divergent national considerations effects of divergencies in national interest, and principles precluded centralization of aims, and objectives. coalition~ay fail logistics. Throughout the entire war the altogether because of these c nfl cts. In military operations of the Central Powers contrast, they may be too su ces ful, as were hamstrung by language barriers and was the strange alliance of West and conflicting customs. East which overwhelmed Germany in Allied efforts in World War I were long World War II, only to create a vacuum frustrated by jealousies, distrusts, double for Communist imperialism. dealings, political differences, and absence An examination of some typical coali­ of unity and coordination. There was no tions raises some interesting points for over-all strategy or political direction of the student of future warfare. Allied effort. Only in the final phase" of

The successful military p"oponent of a coalition strategy must study the strengths and weaknesses of prospective allies, possess a desire to understand them, and determine the best role for each in future war NOBODY FIGHTS ALONE 33 the war was unity of command achieved, and Italian effort. Nothing resembling a and even then, only on one of four Allied combined chiefs of staff was used. Typical fronts. Foch, the eventual Allied Supreme of partner difficulties were Italy's decla­ Commander, considered that his principal ration of war on Greece without consult­ problems, other than Clemenceau, stemmed ing Hitler, and German-Italian relation­ from each commander's concern for the ships during the retrograde in Russia. In preservation of his own forces and the the first instance, unilateral action by an consistent refusal to subordinate national ally committed Hitler to an area of opera­ interests to Allied requirements. tion for which he was not prepared; in Not until the Beauvais Agreement in the second, the already tenuous mutual April 1918 did Foch gain any semblance trust virtually was obliterated. Hitler's of effective control of Allied forces. By failure to coordinate the combined efl'orts this pact Foch was charged by the British, of his own and allied forces completely French, and US Governments with coor­ forfeited the advantage of preponderant dinating the action of Allied armies on the strength. Western Front. While his powers included Allied conduct. of World War II is a strategic direction, national commanders well-known and well-told story.. The stu­ retained full control of tactical employ­ dent of contemporary history has access ment plus the right of appeal to their own to volume upon volume of memoirs and governments if they deemed Foch's direc­ personal accounts which set forth the tions to jeopardize the safety of their thinking processes of countless important forces. Indeed, this was command by com­ decisions by both our political and mili­ promise. tary leaders. In these volumes all Allied World War II viewpoints have been set forth, including In World War II the Axis Powers had a splendid cross section of professional no over-all strategic plan. Each country views. pursued its own political objectives in its General Marshall has pointed out the own sphere of influence. Declarations of significance of Churchill's early trip to war were unilateral. Even the preSeR~fthe United States in December 1941. He German staff missions with the Italian and his British chiefs of staff came to High Command and principal field com­ iscuss British-US war relations with the mands failed to achieve unity of German President and our military leaders. As a result of this meeting the combined chiefs G%nel Hughes L. Ash was graduated of staff was establi.shed. (This also caused from North Georgia College in 1932. He the creation of our own joint chiefs.) Im­ attended The Infantry School, 1948; the . . U. S. Army Command and General Staff mediate strategy for the combmed con­ College, 1952; and the Naval War College, duct of the war and policy for future 1.956. D1l1·ing World War II he s~rved in strategy and contrbI promptly were for­ the EuroPl!an theater of operattOns. He mulated. Marshall credits. the combined was battalIOn commander, 15th Infantry; .. . h. comma1lded the 23d Infantry; and was chIefs wIth the' UnIty of ~ffort ac Ieved Deputy GI, Eighth Army, during the Ko­ in the war. The control and coordination rfan co.n(iict. Other assignments include effected in the fields of intelligence, man' d!~t~ '!V'th the Research and Development power munitions allocation of forces D,vIs,on of the Department of the Army ! .' . ...' Geneml Staff, and cbmmander of Combat materIals, and shlppmg stand m VIctorIOUS eommand C, 3d Armored Division. Tn June contrast to the divergent efforts of the I 1956 he was assigned to the faculty of the Axis Powers. From the outset the US USA CGSC where he is s.erving in the.D.e­ and the British launched their coalition /lIIrtme1lt of Larger Umts and Admlnls-. . tratitle Support. wIth a umty of purpose. ,34 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951

The combined chiefs of staff had both preme commander of his contemplated US and Allied personnel in all their com­ action. mittees. These committees paralleled the In Operation Overlord the combined ,national joint chiefs' structures: plans, chiefs, pursuant to directives of their administration, intelligence, transporta­ heads of state, designated General Eisen· tion, communications, munitions, and civil hower as Supreme Commander, Allied Ex· affairs. The height of combined chiefs' ac­ peditionary Forces. In this command all tivity occurred at the various conferences forces were grouped by service component, of the chiefs of state such as Casablanca, rather than by national groupings. The Cairo, Teheran, and Quebec where the supreme commander retained personal operation of the combined staffs permitted command of ground forces, but utilized an an Allied military view to jell and facili­ Allied commander for both air and naval tated the formulation of many on-the-spot forces. The Supreme Headquarters Allied decisio!ls in final form. Expeditionary Forces staff was both "al· lied" and "joint." An unusual feature One Command about the SHAEF staff was the inclusion ,The We~ern Allies achieved unity of of political officers and the attendant po· command during World War II to the Iitical and governmental problems antici. most effective extent yet known in coali­ pated in the liberation of Nazi-dominated tion warfare. In the early days of Ameri­ Europe. ; can participation, only the US and the The war ended before any widespread British were primarily concerned, al­ employment of Allied forces occurred in though other countries participated in the Pacific. However, the principle of uni· some of the conferences and the British ty of command was followed in the Allied made use of Canadian personnel in their efforts in the China-Burma campaigns. portion of combined staffs and commands. The maintenance of separate commands In Operation Torch-invasion of North under MacArthur and Nimitz will long be Africa-Eisenhower as Commander in debated, with liberal examples tending to Chief, Allied Expeditionary Forces, was prove that cooperation is a poor substi· responsible to the combined chiefs of staff tute for positive command relations. A and received all his directives from that supreme command concept was contem· body. He was authorized direct communi­ plated for the actual invasion of Japan cation with joint staffs of both countries and was pursued in the occupation. and was given supreme command of all forces-Army, Navy, and Air. His basic Advantages of Coalition Warfare directive from the combined chiefs spe­ The frequent and glaring defects of the cifically stipulated adherence to the prin­ coalition as a mode of strategy tend to ciple of unity of command. The traditional submerge the advantages inherent in the right of appeal by a national commander concept. The ancient cliche of "strength to his own government was practically in numbers" readily comes to mind. By an eliminated. Commander, British First alliance, smaller or weaker nations, in­ Army, was instructed by his own govern­ capable of resisting the overtures of a ment to accept all supreme orders, but to larger state, find the aggregate strength inform- his government should he appraise to stand up for their rights, rather than grave and exceptional circumstances likely bow to the whims of the big fellow in in­ to result therefrom, provided that his ac­ divi~al appeasement. tion in so doing did not jeopardize the A well-organized coalition can be eeo· Allied effort, and that he ajivise the su­ nOl\1ical. While no single nation might be NOBODY FIGHTS ALONE 35 inclined to bear the expense of a large disadvantages of the coalition as a mode defense establishment, several nations can of warfare, it is wise to recognize from defend themselves economically by pooling the beginning that a coalition by its very their resources. Additionally, this concept nature is susceptible to a multiplicitY of permits selective pooling of resources, weaknesses. Rather than diminish the ac­ wherein ~ach partner may contribute ac­ ceptability of coalition warfare these his­ cording to his means and in the field for torical weaknesses should form the basis which he is best adapted or best prepared. for future improvement. This is a rather theoretical concept, not Basically, a coalition possesses the or­ yet achieved to any great degree of prac­ . ganic weakness of being a composite affair ticality. However, the contribution by one -a temporary expedient-rather tha\t a nation of naval, air, or so-called technolog­ permanently integrated organization. No ical support to an alliance where the others one single member calls the signals. Rather might furnish the preponderance of other each has his objectives, his strengths, and force requirements is an example-good weaknesses. All have a common enemy or or bad-of this thought. a common goal. T;'e principal problem is A properly conducted coalition war has to achieve a system of direction wherein the capability of coordinating several the conflicting interests can remain sub­ otherwise divergent efforts against a com­ servient to the overriding common interest mon enemy. The absence of a strong motif to which the coalition is dedicated. This for the coalition, however, can well result disadvantage is labeled the problem of in each country seeking to preserve its sustained cohesion. ~ own forces and to attain its individual ob­ A second disadvantage of coalitions jectives. Therefore, if several nations con­ stems from the first. This is the problem template warring on a common enemy, the of continuous acceptable directorship. Ob­ most economical and most effective mode viously, the problem here is greater than is the adoption of a common strategy pur­ that of a single or at most a bilateral or sued through combined effort in which tripartite effort. The Western Allies in divergence is not permitted. World War II were in constant fear that Finally, a coalition, regardless of Russia might not stay in the war; they whether offensive or defensive, marshals were concerned lest Russia refuse to en­ a portion of world opinion in its support. ter the war against Japan. Thus even the most vicious aggressor, if On the other side, it now is fairly ap­ he has a few allies, is not condemned parent that Stalin was apprehensive that unanimously by his fellow states. Cer­ the English-speaking partnership might tainly, a coalition of the diversity and conclude the war with Hitler without tak­ stature of NATO has much of the weight ing him into their confidence, and that he of world opinion in its support. Equally was most anxious to get on the winning recognizable is the impact of this already side in the Pacific for whatever he might marshaled world opinion on the actions pick up for free. This lack of mutual of nations whose interests conflict there­ trust resulted in the English-speaking with. partners learning for the first ti~e in October 1944 of Russia's actual war plans Disadvantages of. Coalition 'Warfare against Hitler. Until that timr-the com­ A haphazard itemization of' weaknesses bined chiefs referred to efforts on the observed in a historical review of coali­ Eastern Front as basic assumptions. tion warfare could be most misleading to Churchill points this out significantly in the student of warfare. In considering his Triumph and Tragedy. At best, then, 36 't MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 the over-all)directorship of the total AI- tary view, the governments would agree lied effort in' World War II was one of on what is to be done, the participating compromise. At n'o time was Russia a share of each partner, and the selection genuine partner supporting a slate of of military directorship; then, the allied mutually agreed upon political and mili­ military' command could proceed, with a tary objectives. Perhaps it was the best moderately free hand, in the formul!jtion arrangement possible under the circum­ and execution of the military strategy. stances. Actually, it can never be expected to be The important point for the military that simple. student is to recognize that the lack of History indicates that the military will . political unanimity in a coalition war may be fortunate indeed if they are presented greatly hamper unity of military effort or with reasonably clear-cut political objec. direction of military effort. If ,a coalition tives accompanied by continuing unanim. is to remain just that, then the political ity of political direction as the war pro. views and objectives of all members must gresses. In his C"lIsade in Em'ope, General be considered in determining military ob­ Eisenhower pointed up this continuing jectives. problem when he described Churchill's at· A further disadvantage of coalition tention to military operations as making warfare is found in the actual implemen­ him U a virtual member of the British tation stage. Assuming an adequate degree Chiefs of Staff." of cbhesion to permit the acceptance of a Mutual trust is an absolute prerequi. set of allied objectives and a structure for site to allied success. This trust must take directing the allied effort, the task of the form of trying to understand the other fighting this coalition force must then be fellow's point of view; of strengthening undertaken. The problems are limitless his weaknesses rather than criticizing and cover the fields of national, political, them; refraining from national compari. and military strategy and support. sons; conducting operations and arriving Lessons From Past Coalitions at decisions from ·an allied viewpoint What does this review of past coalitions rather than a natiolfal one; of being mean to the militarist of the atomic age? willing to learn something from the other First, the contemporary configuration fellow, regardless of the relative stature of~international power necessitatesr that of his country; and a willingness to share the military planner adjust his thinking views and make the best use of available. to the probability that most future wars facilities and resources; rather than ad· undoubtedly will be coalition efforts. Even here blindly to' your own basic doctrine. in so-called brush fires, no nation is likely General Eisenhower considered that one to chance provocation of global war with­ of the greatest products of victory in out the reassurance of a goodly segment of Africa was. the welding of Allied unity, world opinion through some type of coali­ finding the command team, and creation tion. . of a genuine trust and unity. Next, for a coalition to have a reason­ Finally', the military man must enter able chance for success, there must be coalition warfare with the full recogni­ over-all agreement among the participat­ tion that, more so here than in any other ing governments on objectives and limita­ type of war, there is no readily recogniz· tions, if any, to be imposed upon the coali­ ably sharp dividing line between the polit­ tion effort. Obviously, at governmental ical issues and the sphere of the military. level the method of directing the effort The successful military proponent of a coa­ must be established. Ideally, from a mili­ iition strategy must be' well-grounded in NOBODY FIGHTS ALONE· 37 his knowledge of his allies: he must possess Conclusion a desire to understand them. Under no cir­ Among the requirements, then,.for pro­ cumstances can he give way to the brash fessional military men in preparation for -imd sometimes understandable-impulse coalition war are included a study of co­ to go it alone. He must be prepared to alitions as to strengths and weaknesses; work with the .civilian heads of state and a knowledge of government; and a keen have an awareness of the impact of his study of prospective allies, accompanied military operations on the ever-changing by an intense desire to understand them political situation. He must cheerfully and and to determine the best role for each freely accept the mandatory direction of in future war. An open mind, well-in­ war by his civilian superiors, with the formed, supported by a flexible approach learned understanding that national dif­ is as important to the successful outcome ferences may, after all, subordinate his of future conflicts as is the propE!r em­ military wishes to the postwar situation. ployment of forces.

The strength of the great mutual security system in which the United States is associated with 45 other nations around the globe appears to have con­ vinced the Communists that, for the time being, at least, they cannot profit from overt aggression. Our own defense team-our magnificent Army, Navy, and Air Force-is the keystone of this whole mutual defense structure. Nearly half the strength of the United States Army is deployed overseas in 75 countries and foreign areas. Our Army combat troops are standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the men of our allies along the frontiers of freedom-the Iron and Bam­ boo Curtains-in Europe and Korea. The presence of our soldiers stimulates the morale and stiffens the resistance of our friends by constantly reminding them-not in mere words but in the solid substance of American men and American armaments right there with them-that we are in this crusade for peace together, and that we intend to see it through together. In addition, the constant, visible evidence of our strength and resolution has a very discourag­ ing effect upon any new plans the Communists may have to extend the bounds of their empire of fear by armed aggression.

* * * * The effectiveness of NATO is not determined alone by the number of divi­ sions. planes. and ships available for defense. More importantly, it is reflected in the unity and cohesion that has been built up among its members. By work­ ing together. each becomes more powerful than it could \lossibly be alone. The strength and vitality of the NATO alliance stems directly from the recognition of a common need, and the putting forth of common effort to meet that need. NATO has not weakened the independence of any member nation. On the con­ trary, it has enhanced the ability of each member to maintain its national integrity. Because we stand together against the menace of Communist ag­ gression, we individually attain new stature. Secretary of the Army Wilba M. BI'I/ckcl' The Army of· the future Major J. H. P. Curtis, MC, British A"my The King's Royal Rifle Corps

Powerful, compac.t fighting divisions of all arms are what we need for un­ limited nuclear war, capable of sustained fighting without reinforcement and witll their own nuclear artillery and sllort~range missiles. -Field Marshal Lord Montgomery of Alamein Lecture to the Royal United Service Institution 10 October 1956

Atomic wa)'fare requires a reevalu­the evolution of new tactical doctrines ation of tactics and organization em­and organization has been slow. We have ployed by g)'ound forces. In this seen the first stage-the superimposing of . installment, the first of a two-part atomic weapons on the conventional.for· article, Major J. H. P. Curtis, British mations. We now are at the second stage Army, analyzes the changes and morti­where, in both the British and United fications to current tactical doctrine States Armies, we are gradually modify· requi)'ed by the employment of tacti­ing our formations to suit the new weap· cal atomic weapons.-Editor. ons. That the process is slow is not sur· prising. In peacetime not only are the financial restrictions severe, but also there DURING recent years there has been is no practical experience on which to base singularly little disagreement among mil­ each tentative step. itary thinkers as to the broad principles We cannot, however, afford these ex· which should govern the equipping of an pensive trials a'nd reorganizations much army for nuclear warfare. Field Marshal longer. We must think clearly, look into Montgomery's statement quoted above was the future, and, having the courage of our not a new concept; he was merely empha­ military' convictions, decide once and for sizing a policy which already had been all what types of tactical atomic weapons given serious study in both the British will be available in the immediate future, and American Armies. and what tactical restrictions these weap· The real problems and controversies ons will impose. Then and then only can arise, however, when an attempt is made we decide upon the organization of our to translato;! these principles into fact and fighting formations. actually to produce units capable of fight­ This article is based on the firm belief ing this hypothetical nuclear war. that small atomic weapons will shortly Although it is generally agreed that the become available in quantity at the lowest advent of nuclear weapons marks a com­ tactical level and that the artillery arm plete revolution in the history of warfare, will, in consequence, dominate the battle-

Wemust look ahead clearly 'll1itl boldly into the future to determine the types of tactical atomic' weapons needed and th~ corresponding changes in organization required to employ such weapons most effectivelY THE ARMY; OF THE FUTURE 39 field, just as the rifle, the machinegun, and for such a shell might be all-round devas­ the tank have each in their turn domi­ tation within 500 yards of the point of nated it in the past. The revolutionary burst and a safety factor for our own effect on tactics of this contention is dis­ troops, suitably protected, of 1,500 yards. cussed in the first part of the article. The To fire such a shell a self-propelled gun logical outcome in terms of the type of on the lines of our present field or medium , units we shall require to implement these artillery with a maximum range of 15,000 tactics is set out in detail in the second to 18,000 yards would be all that we should part. require. Recent reports indicate that such a weapon already is beyolld the experi­ Impact of Atomic Weapons mental stage in the United States. We Tactical Atomic Weapons can expect, therefore, a complete range " Atomic heavy guns and surface-to-sur­ of atomic weapons capable of placing their face ballistic and guided missiles are a missiles anywhere from one to a hundred reality. One such gun and a half a dozen miles beyond the frontline. These are army shells now can obtain the same effect on weapons. Beyond that the air force, with the battlefield as could only be produced 'iong-range rockets or 1,000-mile-an-hour by many hundreds of guns in the last war bombers, will penetrate to the farthest and then only after days of preparation, corner of the enemy's territory carry­ positioning of thousands of tons of am­ ing either nuclear or thermonuclear mis­ munition, and hours of sustained firing. siles. Moreov-er, although the local effect of the General Effects atomic explosion is annihilatory, it is pos­ The consequences of this ability of both sible, even with the present system of dis­ sides to produce atomic bombardment on charge, to explode a small shell as little as any part of the battlefield and beyond it two miles in front of the forward troops, will be threefold. provided they are forewarned and dug in First, any easily definable target such for protection from the blast and flash. as docks and railheads, base installations, It is a logical surmise that the explo­ large headquarters, or administrative sive charge can be progressively reduced transport is certain to be subjected to until it can be fired from the equivalent early attack and destruction. We can no of the present field gun. The specification longer rely on the lavish administrative Major J. H. P. Curtis attended Eton backing which has been accepted as es­ Col/ege; the Royal Military College at sential in the past. It is this factor above Sandhurst; and the Advanced Associate any other which will dictate a radical Course of The Infantry School, Fort Ben­ ning, 11157. Commissioned in 1939, his change in the future organization of our WOl'/d War II service includes duty in fighting formations, depending as they do Yorth Africa and Italy; and with Head­ 'now on a weight of logistical supply of at quartel's Northern Army Group as mili­ least 300 tons per division per day. tary liaison with US First and Ninth Armies. After the war he was an instruc- . The second effect of fundamental im­ torat the Middle East School of Infantry; portance is that any force that concen­ served in Italy with the 1st Battalion, trates sufficiently to be effective against King's Royal Rifle Corps;' was chief in­ conventional attack, and which rigidly slnlcto)', Tactical Wing, of the Command ~>td General Staff C.ollege, Quetta, Pak­ identifies itself with a particular piece of Istan; deputy assistant and quartl!rmaster ground can be destroyed by an atomic general of an infantry brigade in the bombardment which can be produced in . British Army of the Rhine; and now is a matter of a few hours. Conversely, if a t:ecutiv~ officer, 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps. defensive force disperses sufficiently to 40 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1961 avoid presenting an atomic target, it be, short.war will enable us to obtain a higher comes ineffective against conventional degree of self-sufficiency and thus become ground attack. A compromise will be of far less dependent on a vulnerable line no avail for should any part of the de­ of communications. Air transport will then fense produce a point of vital resistance, become a practical proposition for the sup. no matter how small it may be, it will ply of the smaller quantities of vital rna· merit an atomic attack. The Spartans at terials that will be required. ' Thermopylae are the perfect example of Since an early decision can be expected an atomic target, although they num­ from the strategic air bombardment, the bered but 300 infantrymen. army will no longer have the traditional The conclusion to be drawn is that any task of holding the enemy at arms length attempt to hold ground by means of fixed for an indefinite period until the nation's defenses will be doomed to failure. l'esources can be mobilized. Instead, it will The defensive tactics of the army will have to cope with a short period of inten· have to be based, therefore, not on hold­ sive operations, the defensive stage of· ing ground but on denying it. Denying which may last only a few weeks or even ground can be defined as "selling ground days. Thereafter, as soon as the strategic dearly." The atomic armory will ensure air attack has begun to take effect we will that the price to be paid will be very high move immediately into the decisive 'Stage if indeed any ground is lost at. ali. which certainly will involve offensive ac· tion on the ground. In the last two wars The final effect of importance is ~hat the nuclear war will be a short one. The ex­ it took two years to reach the offensive ponent of strategic airpower will promise stage and two more to complete it. In a a decision in 48 hours. The pessimist will, future conflict the final outcome will de· however, recall those who in 1914 and pend upon the ability to win the strategic· 1939 said, "It will be over by Christmas." air battle and win it quickly. The truth is impossible to foretell. Never, It may be that both sides will be equally theless, so long as our national existence prostrated by this mutual bombardment. depends on heads of governments and We may then find two armies fighting each huge populations huddled in great capital other for the last remaining remnants of cities, on sprawling miles of factories and civilization and industrial power, like two complex networks of railways and har­ Bedouin tribes fighting for an oasis. In bors, the decisive phase of a nuclear war such a case the army which is the least will occur in tie first few days or weeks. dependent on its home factories and vul· Meanwhile, the long-range offensive air nerable land or seaborne line of supply, is weapons will have the advantage over the the best equipped with atomic weapons defense and as the Americans so clearly and ammunition, is the quickest to exploit appreciate, it will be the country which an attack, and the most elastic in defense gets there "the fastest with the mostest" will be the victor. Undoubtedly, therefore, that will, by forcing an early capitula­ it must be powerful, compact, and capable tion, save itself from annihilation. of sustained fighting without reinforce· ment, If it is otherwise, it will not long Fortunately, these three major conse­ survive, let alone win, a nuclear land quences of nuclear warfare are comple­ l?attle. mentary. The introduction of tactical atomic weapons to combat units will pro­ Effect on Organization vide the means for reducing forces in size The nuclear weapon will force a reduc· and weight and, at the same time, increas­ tion in the scale of land warfare simply ing their firepower. Smaller forces and a because .the massive installations, head· THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE 41 q~arters, and supply system of the present In order to maintain its ability' to carry military structure are too vulnerable to out these two roles the tank has devel­ survive for even a few hours after, the oped during the last 25 years from a fast, opening of hQstilitie,s. This need not mean, light, and, therefore, highly mobile ve­ however, that the strength, in its true hicle mounting small guns to a 50- or 70­ sense, of the frontline troops will suffer ton monster whose size is dictated by the in. proportion. The power of the tactical need to carry a huge high-velocity gun, atomic weapon will be the means of im­ the primary purpose of which is to destroy measurably increasing the firepower of enemy tanks. the fighting units while, at the same time, At sea the capital ship and in the air allowing enormous saving in manpower the bomber have followed the same trend. and materials, as will be indicated later. Both have increased to the limit of their Only a general streamlining of the com­ practical size in order to improve their bat formations and a radical change in means of delivering bigger and more pow­ their present weapons, 'communications, erful loads of conventional high explo­ means of propulsion, and way of living sive. The atomic missile has reversed this can produce the conditions which will lead trend entirely. One submarine now can to the virtual revolution-for that is what carry the destructive potential of a battle is required-in our present cc.mmand and fleet, one airplane the power of a bomber logistical structure. fleet. On the ground the same principle Is this so impossible of realization? Al­ soon will apply. Domination of the battle­ ready where we formerly needed 100 guns field, hitherto achieved by large numbers and tO,OOO shells, one gun and one shell of tanks, now can be obtained by a hand­ is sufficient. A hundred conventional guns ful of atomic guns. One such gun will : today require hundreds of officers, thou­ have a degree of mobility, flexibility, and sands of men, and over 600 vehicles to destructive power far beyond that which maintain them in the field; thousands of is possessed by 100 tanks. In short, the gallons of fuel to keep them mobile, and atomic weapon epitomizes the principle of tons of rations to feed the men for even economy of force. alimited period. One atomic gun requires It is, however, the logistical factor which a fraction of this logistical effort. will ultimately drive the tank, as we know This potential saving in logistical sup­ it today, from the battlefield. The logisti­ port requirements can be increased, but cal effort required to maintain a force of only by bringing the atomic shell to the 50-ton tanks in battIe is enormous. An , close support stage and relying upon it armored division requires 500 tons of fuel i entirely. If we can eliminate the present to move 100 miles. It can fire 200 tons of need for hundreds of 50-ton tanks on the ammunition in one short engagement. A battlefield, we shall have gone far toward huge bridging train must be transported solving the problem. forward if a riverline has to be crossed. Effect on Armor Large recovery vehicles are required. A force of tanks is logistically the most Heavy engines, tracks, and gear boxes i uneconomical of all arms and is justifiable must be kept well forward to replace , only so long as it is the only means by those worn out after every few thousand , which we can: miles of track running. Even the %-ton L Dominate the battlefield in mobile tank gun barrels reqaire changing after warfare. firing a limited number of rounds. 2. Provide effective support to infantry The tank has developed in an era when in both attack and defense. the.administrative services could still cope 42 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 with every new demancl made upon them It should be possible, therefore, in the by the. tactic'al requirements of the fighting future to dispense with the big tank al­ troops. This era of administrative plenty together. Its place will be taken by lightly began when the railway was first put armored vehicles which derive their main to military use in the middle of the last hitting power from atomic field artillery century. It was the railway which in the working in close support. Their local pro­ First World War made possible the de­ tection will be provided by vehichlborne ployment and maintenance of the huge guided antitank missiles and conventional armies which faced each other in Europe weapons. The main.task of these armored for four years. In the last war it was vehicles will be to provide, both in attack again the railway, made flexible by the and defense, information and local protec­ added use' of motor transport, aircraft, tion for the artillery observation officers and ships, which coped successfully with and to exploit the results of atomic fire­ the demands of the mobile armies. Now all power. Infantry support will be essential these forms of transport are seriously to provide the protective and offensive re­ threatened. As the range, accuracy, and connaissance without which armored ve­ availability of the ballistic missile in­ hicles cannot perform at night or in close creases we shall be forced to reduce the country. size and scope of our administrative sys­ tems. We shall then reach the stage, sim­ The Defensive Theory ilar to that which obtained 150 years ago, Provided one accepts the conditions that when the administrative potential dictated the defense objective can no longer be'to the size of the fighting forces instead of stop the enemy oead in his tracks, it ap­ "vice versa." pears that a light mobile force equipped In nuclear warfare armor soon will be with atomic artillery will be mQre than deprived of the vast quantities of fuel, a match for any enemy who bases his ammunition, and spares on which it de­ strength on numbers or weight of con· pends for its -fighting power. Then, like ventional metal. The enemy may be dis­ some great reptile of the prehistoric era, persed, but somewhere behind a hundred deprived of the lush vegetation on which heavy tanks will be a hundred vehicles it once thrived, the heavy tank gradually carrying fuel and ammunition. Behind will become extinct and its skeleton will those vehicles there are large dumps and , be found only in museums. beyond that again are the refineries and A few years ago there occurred a factories_ All are being continually sought spirited controversy between those who out and brought under nuclear attack. advocated that the majority of our tanks The tacti<;al value of ground will not should be highly mobile and, therefore, change. Defiles, as in the past, will be of lightly armored and gunned, and the or­ immense value in forcing the enemy to thodox school who maintained that to lose concentrate and provide profitable targets tank versus tank gun superiority was to for atomic missiles. Riverlines with their lose the battle. The combination of these bridges blown will be certain to produce two theories now is within our grasp. The the targets required. High ground, par­ development of a mobile antitank weapon ticularly in open country, will give the on the guided missile principle will elimi­ observation needed to inflict heavy caS­ 'nate the need for big tank guns. The self­ ualties on an advancing enemy. In front propelled atomic field gun will provide of any such position a few well-placed the hitting power without which mobility atomic missiles, equipped perhaps with by itself is useless. special defensive charges designed to pro­ THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE 43 duce maximum gamma ray contamination, forces of mobile infantry and 25-pounder . may inflict many hours' delay and in­ guns termed "Jock" columns. The guns numerable casualties on an enemy who is provided sufficient support to enable the not fully equipped to detect the unseen armored cars to maintain their positions dangers of nuclear radiation. against moderate opposition. The infantry At night the infantry will come into provided patrols and protection at night. its own. Its task will 'be to do by night Ground was given freely in the face .of what the armored vehicles did by day. heavy opposition but never without in­ Reconnaissance patrols will be working flicting .casualties on the plentiful targets fo~ward to discover likely targets for the which presented themselves. following day. Standing patrols will be The strength of the "Jock" column lay. watching the possible lines of advance to in the damaging effect of its 25-pounder give warning of an enemy approach. shells and the ability of the artillery obser­ Night poses many defensive problems. vation posts (OP's) to protect themselves These problems may be largely overcome, with their own shellfire and the close however, through the use of new radar protection afforded by mobile antitank and infrared devices. In any case, the night guns. patrol line once penetrated in strength The weakness of these columns lay in will be trained to slip away, calling down the fact that once the OP's were driven a defensive fire of atomic shells as it does in, the entire column had to give ground. so. In this technique of defense, much will Thus they could never be given more than depend on making the enemy keep his dis­ a delaying or harassing role and later tmee by day, so that ahy night advance became unpopular as the use of artillery on foot will have to cover a great distance in this way was deemed uneconomical. before reaching the pa,trol line thereby Nevertheless, these columns did provide reducing the possibility of a penetration the means of dominating wide frontages in depth, The delineation of such a pene­ in both attack and defense with a minimum tration and the counterattack with atomic of force and logistical effort. The future fire will, in any case, be one of the most equivalent of the "Jock" column can be profitable forms of inflicting casualties provided with a hitting power many times on the enemy. greater than its desert predecessor. Its Strategically this defensive concept is value in attack and defense will be in­ similar to that of the Germans in 1944. creased to the same extent. The German generals ~mew that their The methods employed by these desert armies could not withstand the advance columns and the systems used to supply of the Allies on all fronts. They attempted them are worthy of study: future warfare to keep their armies intact by withdraw­ will be based on much the same principles. ing gradually across Europe hoping that Today, we are groping for a defensive in the meantime their V-weapons would method which can be applied by existing turn the scale. If those weapons had forces. All agree that they must disperse reached the stage which they have today, to survive but none can show how, having and had the V-2 been equipped with an dispersed, they cim remain effective. Dig atomic warhead, their defense might have to live is another cry. But living in dug­ been successful. outs is the very antithesis of 'mobility, Tactically we c~n find an analogy in and dispersed localities small enough to the Western Desert of 1942 where for avoid the attentions of atomic artillery long periods the front was stabilized by will have no military value whatsoever. armored car screens backed by small task The morale effect on soldiers, however' 44 MIL~TARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1957 well dug in, awaiting atomic attack is a have to be undertaken by the army. factor which has yet to be assessed. Whether thh'l is a gigantic mopping-up It seems that the defensive answer operation against a scattered and de­ must lie in a blend of dispersion and con­ moralized army, or a hard battle against cealment which can stem only from com­ organized troops who are determined to plete mobility, coupled with the ability of sell their lives dearly, will depend on whom each small group to depend primarily on we are fighting and how effective has been atomic fireRower to destroy the enemy on the air bombardment in their rear. their particular portion of the front. We shall have at our disposal the same The Offensive Theory light armored forces supported by infantry The reasons have been given why the and atomic artillery which have been dis· defensive will be carried out by small well­ cussed. The technique of attack with these dispersed forces on a wide front. The un­ forces will be the advance on a wide front, breakable line must be replaced by a the pulverization, again on a wide front· d!,!fensive principle of depth based on com­ age, of any resistance encountered. and plete resilience. The attack is governed the rapid exploitation by the fighting ve· by the same factors. To concentrate will hicles; closely supported by their infantry be suicidal, overdispersion ineffective. and atomic field artillery. Reserve forma· Only the devastation caused by an atomic tions simihirly organized will have the bombardment will provide the link ,be­ task of locating and atomizing any areas tween the two extremes and enable com­ which have been bypassed by the forward paratively small forces to achieve results troops. which previously required long weeks of Limitations of the Present combat by thousands of troops. Although atomics have swung the Many factors exist today which must pendulum in favor of the attack, we must be resolved before we can hope to reorgan· not suppose that the offensive is going ize our forces on the lines indicated here, to be easy against an enemy who is simi­ The most impo~tant of these is that it larly equipped and prepared to employ the is impossible to be I'evolutionary and same principles as have been outlined in evolutionary at the same time. Even if the previous paragraphs. Those who fol­ it were to be agreed that we can, in the lowed the German Armies through Italy neal' future, base our entire organization and France in 1943-44 know the power on the decentralization of atomic weapons, of a well-handled and hard-hitting rear we are still faced with the problem of pay· guard. It is a force which strikes hard and ing for the development of these weapons then slips away in time to fight another and the manufacture of large stocks of day. The attack must not be undertaken atomic missiles while at the same time lightly. In any case, to undertake a ground maintaining our present forces at a high offensive before the strategic air offensive state of readiness during the transitional has achieved a large measure of success period. These problems, however. are not would be unsound. It would be wise to insoluble since the introduction of atomic begin the advance only when the enemy's weapons will enable us to make such tre· ability to wage war hilS been damaged mendous reductions in military manpower seriously and his ground and air forces and equipment that it will, to quote the have already begun to feel the effect of popular advertisements, "pay for itself in our interdiction. a few years." , In any condition other than total capitu­ At present, atomic missiles are like lation some form of offensive advance will magic pills which can be dispensed only THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE 45 by those in very high places. Even :when no soldier had even heard of an atom bomb these missiles become smaller and more or shell. Yet today we have atomic cannon plentiful there will be many problems to and rockets in operation on the battlefield. overcome bef"re they can be discharged Will anyone say that in 30 years or less we by low-level formations all along the bat­ will not have atomic field guns, nuclear­ tlefront. We ,still know very little about powered vehicles, or even a gamma ray them and are more concerned with ,the gun? damage we may do to our airmen with the We are, therefore, at a difficult and flash, to our soldiers with the blast, or dangerous stage in the history of war­ to our reputations if we put one in the fare. The atomic weapon has resulted in wrong place. a revolution greater even than that pro­ The need for coordination with the air duced by the introduction of gunpowder force is one of the major factors which in the 13th century. The evolution of prevents the decentralization of control of forces adapted for the proper use of the atomic weapons. However, the require­ atomic weapon must, from the very na­ ment for Royal Air Force (.RAF) sup­ ture of things, 'be slow. And yet if war port within 100 miles of the battlefield were to come tomorrow, we will have no probably will disappear except for recon­ time to develop and exploit our new power. naissance. With improved communications The recent reorganization of our for­ and fewer headquarters there will be no mations can be regarded as nothing more difficulty in ordering short periods of than a stirring of the conventional ingredi­ cease-fire when sorties are to be flown, ents which has produced the same cake particularly if tactical reconnaissance can with the addition of an atomic cherr-y for be made the responsibility of the army decoration. The numbers of troops, vehicles, rather than the RAF. It is a logical devel­ and guns get no smaller; indeed, the in­ opment of the air OP principle that the fantry division is increased by a brigade army should search out the targets for its of tanks and its total strength now will own long-range rockets, the success of be not far short of 20,000 men. which may depend on the entire land bat­ The infantry division's ability to hold tle, particularly as this role does not de­ ground in the face of atomic attack already mand a high performance aircraft. It is is small since the dispersion necessary for equally logical that the air force should be survival cannot be equated with the abil­ left free to concentrate on the strategic ity of the individual unit to resist attack. air offensive with its equally important It lacks the firepower, the communica­ long-range reconnaissance commitments. tions, and the mobility to operate as a Another of the problems which beset us strong'defensive screen on a wide front. at present is the question, "What is an It is, therefore, an unsuitable organiza­ atomic target?" Today, when the missiles tion for atomic warfare so long as it has are large and scarce and the means of de­ to depend for its offensive and defensive livery are limited, the answer is, in the power on a few atomic weapons controlled normal course of events, something fairly at a higher level. big, say a brigade concentration. The day 'I The armored division, even when pruned probably will arrive, however, when half of an infantry brigade, still will have a dozen tanks or a .company of infantry 3,000 vehicles and use 2,000 gallons of holding' up our advance or threatening our gasoline per mile. This great force of pooition will warrant a small atomic shell. vehicles will come to an abrupt halt when The atom was first split in 1932, only faced with a river a dozen feet in width 25 years ago. A dozen years or more ago and depth until bridges or rafts capable , \' 46 MILIXARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 of carrying.a load of 50-60 tons have been Since such a vehicle will require five constructed, while the loss of the infantry times as much fuel as a roadborne vehi. brigade has seriously reduced its powers cle, three times as much maintenance, and of sustained action. will have to use roads through any natural These are the forces then that must or artificial defile, it has not yet made its keep the balance in Europe until the de­ appearance. velopment of atomic weapons for the army Now, however, a completely new logis­ will enable us to carry out the revolution tical prospect begins to emerge. The or· in organization the necessity for which is ganization which is outlined in the latter already 12 years old. It is a solemn thought part of this article can reduce the ration that it is the Germans who are in the best strength of the fighting troops to one-sixth position to profit from this military rev­ of their present number per mile of battle· olution. Starting from the beginning with front. The ammunition problem, provided none of the organizational or equipment that all artillery missiles are atomic, will problems which hamper us, they can, be negligible in comparison. The vehicle should they so wish, provide for an army strengths will be reduced to about one­ based on atomic firepower throughout. It twentieth of the present numbers and each will be interesting to see whether they have vehicle will be capable of running at least appreciated their advantage or whether 200 miles on the contents of its gasoline political considerations will demand a tank. The vehicles will be largely of a rapid buildup of conventional divisions. standard pattern and require no heayy spares such as new engines and tracks Logical Logistics every few thousand miles. A division in action requires daily ad­ Since the war will be a short one ra­ ministrative support at the rate of not tions can be cut to a sensible minimum less than 300 tons. Since our air force can­ and e!1ch subunit will start with 10 days' not begin to support a field army as long supply of food. One hundred miles of spare as tonnages of this a~ount are required, fuel will be carried either on the vehicle it all has to come by road or rail. Roads or in transport close to the front. All these and railways pass through towns and val­ factors will make it possible for the army leys, cross rivers on existing or military of the future to be virtually self-contained bridges, and are marked with fatal clarity for the first 10 vital days after the open­ on the map. Along these vulnerable ar­ ing of hostilities and for air supply to teries flow the hundreds of supply vehi­ become a practical proposition at all levels. cles which, unlike their predecessors th~ The supply problem will resolve itself horse, the mule, and the ox, cannot live into a simple "matter of keeping small off the country. Each vehicle adds to the stocks of POL, ammunition, and rations ever-increasing demand for fuel and ra­ in dispersed dumps well in rear of the for­ tions in the battle area. ward troops and moving them forward The four main components of the logis­ by road or helicopter into supply points tic snowball are POL, ammunition, ra­ within reach of the fighting troopS. The tions, and vehicle spares. Until these are helicopter for a long time to come will reduced to a fraction of their present level be too uneconomical to replace entirely the it is fatuous to demand either a reduction truck as a supply vehicle. As a temporary in the administrative "tail" or for an air substitute in an emergency, however, it supply lift. Many have advocated a sup­ will impart a high degree of flexibility to ply vehicle with a cross-country perform­ the supply system. It will also be available ance as the answer. for the variety of other roles which are THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE 411 already evident, namely assault crossings on the battlefield. Ill' a short time they can of obstacles, intercommunication, and cas­ be in sufficient quantity and at such a ualty evacuation. The maintenance of the stage of development that they can be supply of vital atomic shells could well used to destroy either a small center of become entirely dependent on air trans­ resistance or a great city. The tremendous port from factory to fighting troops. cost of their development will be offset Here, then, is the answer to the quarter­ in a few years by the saving in manpower master's prayer-a flexible forward sup­ and conventional materials which they will ply chain, able to operate by road or air make possible. to carry forward the much reduced re­ The effect on the military situation is quirements of the fighting troops. Added far-rea~hing and fundamental. We shall to this is the increased ability of the for­ be forced to reduce the scale of our pres­ ward troops to survive for a reasonable ent-day armies. Concentration of troops period even when their direct supply line at the vital point in attack or defense no is cut, thus giving that invaluable margin longer will be a feasible proposition, and of time in which to reestablish the ad­ in consequence our present tactical meth­ ministrative communications by either air ods will change completely. Since the or road. strategic air offensive will force an early The problem of POL supply will re­ decision, the army can afford to rely on main with us for a long time, even after a higher degree of logistical self-suffi­ the elimination of the heavy tank, as a ciency which can be given permanency and reminder of our old methods of wl;\ging flexibility by an air and road supply sys­ war. The advent of nuclear-powered en­ tem no longer burdened by the huge de­ gines, however, may one day solve even mands of the past. this problem. The disappearance of the heavy tank Summary from the battlefield will enable us to Tactically this has been a big meal to create the really light, mobile, and hard­ digest. Since it will be pointless to go hitting forces which the atomic era will further until the many fundamental demand. In the last war we were domi­ changes in the present principles of tac­ nated in thought and on the battlefield by tical warfare have been accepted-or at the tank which influenced every phase of any rate partially accepted-it will be as battle with its protective armor and vi­ well to summarize briefly at this stage. cious gun. At present, we are seeking to Ten years ago land warf!\re was waged couple the armored mobility of the tank by massive armies whose striking power with the offensive potential of the few depended on large qlltantities of tanks, in­ atomic weapons at our disposal. It is, how­ fantry, and artillery supported in the air ever, a passing phase for as atomic weapon by great numbers of aircraft. Good in­ development increases so the mobility and fantry, well-concentrated and adequately invulnerability of the tank will decrease, sUpported, was the backbone of the de­ until the atomic gun alone is left as the fense. In the attack it provided the bayo­ dominant weap0!l on the battlefield. nets which were the only conclusive ar­ It is only against this background of gument in the battle since the effect of tactical domination by the atomic missile artillery, bombardment, however massive, that the task of designing an organiza­ was never totally destructive. tion for a nuclear warfare army can be Atomic weapons already are available undertaken. THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE Colonel Charles H. Blumenfeld, AI·tilINY Faculty, U. S. Army War College

IN A six-month period General Robert try corps and one cavalry division oppos· E. Lee and the Confederate Army of ing a Union force of seven infantry corps Northern Virginia had won two smashing and one cavalry corps; approximately victories - Fredericksburg (December 76,000 Confederates against approximately 1862) and Chancellorsville (May 1863). 00,000 Union troops. Confederate corps Chancellorsville probably was Lee's most were approximately twice the strength of brilliant victory for there he defeated a Union corps since the Confederate divi· Yankee force two and one-half times his sions contained 10,000 to 18,000 troops as own strength. But it proved to be a dearly opposed to the Union divisions of 5,000 to purchased victory for it took the life of 9,000. General Thomas J. (Stonewall) Jackson, The location of the forces and their com· Lee's II Corps commander, his most mandel's at the outset of the Gettysburg trusted and aggressive field leader, and Campaign is shown on Figure 1. ,one whos~ presence at Gettysburg, it has The Confederate I Corps was com· been said, might well have turned the tide manded by General James Longstreet, the into a decisive Confederate victory. II Corps by General Richard S. Ewell, The Battle of Gettysburg was the great­ Jackson's replacement, the III Corps by est battle ever fought on American soil General Ambrose P. Hill, and the cavalry and one of the greatest battles of all division by General J. E. B. (Jeb) Stuart time in its own right. In three days there On the Union side, General Joseph E.

were over 50,000 < casualties-killed, Hooker was in c'ommand as General Lee wounded, or captured, more than one­ started north, but in a petulant mood he third of the United States casualties in asked to be relieved when denied the the three years of Korean fighting; ap­ Harpers Ferry garrison as reinforcements proximately 23,000 on the Union side, or for his field army and, as a result, he lost one-fourth of the Union force, and 25,00(11. his command to General George G. Meade to 28,000 Confederates, almost a third of just three days before the battle, The the Confederate force. It is a classic ex­ Union corps commanders were: I Corps, ample of a meeting engagement, a colli­ General John Reynolds, who was suc· sion of opposing forces with neither side ceeded by General John Newton on Reyn· fully deployed and prepared for battle. oldl" death; the II, General Winfield Scott Hiincock; the III, General Daniel E, Sick· Organization of Forces les; the V, General Meade, succeeded by A review of the organization of the two General George Sykes upon Meade's as· armies and of the leaders on both sides sumption of army command; the VI, Gen· shows a Confederate force of three infan­ eral John Sedgwick; the XI, General Oliver

A st~dy of the Battle of Gettysburg-one of the greatest land battles ever fought on ArneI' cqn soil, and one of the greatest battles in its own right-reveals rn tny lessons of vallie to today's military leaders THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE 49 O. Howard; and the XII, General Henry was unpopular to the point that in many W. Slocum. General Alfred Pleasonton places the draft was meeting the resist­ commanded the cavalry corps, and the ance of armed mobs, and an antiwar senti­ Union cavalry division commanders were ment was growing fast in the North. Brigadier Generals John Buford, David Gregg, and General Hugh J. Kilpatrick. Lee Moves Before going ,nto the events leadIng up On 3 June Lee left A. P. Hill's corps as to the battle, it is well to become oriented a covering force at Fredericksburg (Fig­ with the terrain over which the two ar­ ure 1) and quietly began slipping the re­ mies marched and maneuvered to meet mainder westward toward Culpeper for finally at Gettysburg. an advance up the Shenandoah and 'Cum­ FigUl'e 2 indicates the routes and ter­ berland Valley, where the Blue Ridge and rain used by the opposing forces. South Mountains would screen his move. From the South's viewpoint, June General Hooker had the -Union Army 1863 appeared to be a good time to take concentrated south of Manassas Junction, the war to the North. Southern morale with detachments at Harpe~'s Ferry and was high; Lee's ranks had been refilled Winchester, but suspecting Lee was up and the Army reequipped since Chancel­ to something he pushed his cavalry to lorsville; the Union Army was measured Brandy Station to make a reconnaissance for'the kill and a successful invasion of in force. Here~ on 9 June the Blue cav­ the North might mean recognition and war alry jumped Stuai·t's troops recovering loans from England and France and the from two successive grand reviews and means to shake the strangling blockade celebrations. It was pr~ctically the first of the Confederate's ports. It might even real taste of success the Blue cavalry had turn the North's whispers for peace into ever enjoyed and it did much to bolster a resounding roar. their morale, They finally were beaten off, The North's morale was low. The losses after a furious fight which lasted from of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville early morning to midafternoon, but ob­ had produced staggering casualty lists, tained enough information to confirm Federal taxes were mounting, conscription Hooker's suspicion that Lee was planning a major move, although Hooker was not Colonel Charles H: Blumenfeld wa,s clear as to Lee's objective or line of gl'adMted fl'om the University of Illinois III 1930, He also is a gl'ad1late of the Third march. Ge"eJ'al Staff Class of the U, S. Army The first tangible evidence vf Lee's in­ Command and Genel'al Staff College. 1941 ; tentions came on 14 June when General thr ["dustrinl College of the Armed FOl'ces, 19,9; and the U. S,' A1'1ny War Colh·ge. Ewell's corps leading the Confederate 1956. Froll! Febl'ltarll 1!142 to Jannal'J! march slammed into Winchester' and oap­ 19., he It'as on the faculty of the USA tured half of Major General Robert H. CGSe, He sC1'l'ed in Em'ope d1l1'in,q WOl'lrl Milroy's Union force before he could with­ Wal' II n,q G4, Headqual·tel·s, FOl'warrl Eehcloll. Communications Zone, and com­ draw to Harpers Ferry, as he had' been m""ded the 25th Rcg1llating Station (First directed. Lee now picked up speed. By I\"IIIY), Othcl' assignments includc rluty 17 June Ewell had crossed the Potomac as assistant e,'rccutive to the Undel' Sccl'e­ and was heading into Hagerstown with 'tal'l/ of the Army; ,commanding o/Ticel', 5th AAA l1attaliqu aud 250th AAA Group; his cavalry approaching Chambersburg. errellfiv£' office,' to the President's special Behind Ewell's corps tramped the men of "epl'cscnfative in Em'ope lor NATO lIlat­ Longstreet and A. P. Hill. ~1'~; and comma1ldi1lg o,fficel', 32d AAA In the meantime General Hooker had , ,'/gade in USAREUR. He 110W is on the acuity of the U. S. Anny Wal' Colrege. completed the concentration of his Army 50 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 195! 1 near Manassas Junction, and as soon as tpe Potomac at Rowser's Ford west of he learned of the Confederate crossing of Rockville and headed for Westminster and . the Potomac;' he wheeled northward to­ Hanover with the idea of joining Ewell by . ward Harpers Ferry to be in a position cutting in ahead of the Union Army. to threaten Lee's flank and to protect Lee still was under the impression that Washington and Baltimore. The Blue cav­ the Union forces were south of'the Poto· alry protecting the Union left flank was mac and, therefore, when on the night of so effective that General Lee had no defi­ 28 June he received word from a Confed· nite knowledge of the wherebouts of the erate spy that the Union Army was at Union Army, so he assumed it still was Frederick converging on the passes of back at Manassas Junc~ion. By 24 June, South Mountain, and on Harpers Ferry, however, the Union Army was well on its he feared for his line of communications. northward march, with its leading ele­ Orders were dispatched immediately to ments already north of the Potomac. all- Confederate commanders to concen· Lee, at this time, ordered Stuart to trate in the Cashtown-Gettysburg area, cross the Potomac, east of the mountains, Lee's plans being to threaten Baltimore make contact with the Union Army if it and draw Meade away from the Confed· crossed northward, and do· the Union as erate line of communications west 1>f the much damage as possible. Then he was to mountains. close up on Ewell and keep in touch with Meade, however, on assuming command, him. Nothing was said about keeping Gen­ abandoned Hooker's plans to strike Lee's eral Lee informed and this proved most line of communications, and on 29 June unwise, for General Lee lost touch with hurried his Army noxthward from Fred· Stuart's cavalry from' 28 June, when erick planning to take up a defensive po· Stuart started eastward, until 1 July, sition near Taneytown along Pipe Creek when a message reached Stuart at Car­ and to force a battle with Lee to draw lisle ordering him back to the Gettysburg him off from Har.risburg and the Susque· fight. hanna River. On 30 June Buford's cavalry division Meade Deploys Union Troops screening Meade's Army rode into Gettys· On 28 June the Union Army was in the burg from the east. He immediately threw vicinity of Frederick, Maryland, under its out patrols to the north and the west, con· new commander, General Meade. Ewell's tacted Reynolds' corps, the nearest Union corps, in the van of General Lee's Army, infantry, and realizing the importance of was ~ell on its way to the objective of Gettysburg with its network of roads de· Harrisburg. The corps was deployed with cided that ·it would be a good place to two divisions in the Carlisle area and hold. General Jubal A. Early's division, having Here at the little town of Gettysburg passed eastward through Gettysburg, in on 1 July, in the cool quiet hours of a York. The leading brigade of Early's di­ summer morning, Buford's division of some vision was at Wrightsville on the Susque­ 3,000 men deployed along McPherson hanna, with instructions. to cross at that Ridge awaited the leading division of A. point and close on Harrisburg from the ·P. Hill's Confederate III Corps approach· east. ing from Chambersburg. Stuart had started after the Union Army but its strength and route of march First Engagement prevented him from interposing his cav­ At 0800 on 1 July, Hill's leading divi· alry between it and Ewell's forces asdi­ sion under General Henry Heth drove in rected. Stuart then swung, east, crossing Buford's patrols who fell back on McPher· THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE 51

DUN/oN ra CONFEDERATE 52 MILIT,ARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1957 son Ridge. Heth deployed his division but again it was Buford and the battered cav· gained no ground. The word went back airy division who took the brunt of the ini­ and the balance of A. P. Hill's corps tial assault. Again he gained precious time moved up. with his dogged delaying action, to permit By 1000 Reynolds was on the field with Howard to form a line at right angles to his three divisions strung out along the Doubleday's position along McPh~rson roads behind him. Analyzing the strong Ridge. terrain positions of Cemetery and Semi­ Buford fell back He had used up half nary Ridges, Reynolds sent word to bring his division but had accomplished one of up his own troops immediately, as well the best day's work of any Civil War cav· as those of General Howard's XI Corps. aIry division commander. These orders initiated the Battle of Gettys­ It was touch and go for the next few burg. hours with Howard's XI Corps-still Bufol'd's troops, although heavily out­ smarting from the thrashing they had numbered, stopped Hill's advance for a taken at Chancellorsville from this same gooa two hours, largely through the use corps then under Stonewall Jackson­ of theil' newly issued breech-loading car­ holding o!f the Confederates. Ewell posi. bines. Just as their ammunition was run­ tioned some artillery on Oak Hill and ning low and they were being heavily opened up along botl} flanks of the Union crowded by Hill's infantry, Brigadier Gen­ lines; and just at this time Jube Early's eral James S. Wadsworth's division lead­ "walking" cavalry came down the Harris· ing Reynolds' corps, followed by Maj,or burg Road. They lashed into Howard's General John C. Robinson's and Brigadier right flank causing the XI Corps to give General Thomas A. Rowley's divisions, ground and fall back through the streets 'came up the reverse slope of Seminary of Gettysburg. Before the XI Corps could Ridge and took over the center of the be halted along Cemetery Hill and rein· line. Buford shifted his exhausted cav­ forced with Steinwehr's division, 4,000 alrymen over to the Carlisle Road. For men were lost. Doubleday's I Corps with a time, after furious attacks and counter­ its flank exposed also fell back and took attacks, the Union I Corps had the better up position to the left of Howard's corps of it and the battle dwindled away to a along' -Cemetery Ridge, while the Gray long-range artillery duel. Reynolds, at the tide rolled relentlessly through the tow~ height of the fighting, was cut down by of Gettysburg and lapped at the foot of a Confederate sharpshooter and General Cemetery Hill. A. P. Hill's forces occupied Abner Doubleday temporarily assumed Seminary Ridge. command. Ewell Waits Too Long About noon, General Howard reached It has been conjectured that had Ewell the field, and recognizing the importance continued his assault up Cemetery Hill of Cemetery Hill he dropped off one divi­ he would have completed the smashing sion ,( Brigadier General Adolph von Stein­ Confederate victory of the first day. How­ wehr's) to hold it and act as his reserve ever, from about 1630 he delayed despite and moved the other two divisions toward orders from Lee to follow up the attack McPherson Ridge to bolster the I Corps. "if he thought it practicable." But Ewell He was forced, however, to change his thought "it impracticable." He waited for front; for the roar and smoke of a new Major General Edward Johnson to come engagement was boiling up north of' up; he was concerned over reports that Gettysburg. Down the Carlisle Road came more Yankees were coming up to General Ewell's big veteran corps and strengthen the Union lines on Cemetery THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE 53 Ridge. By the time General Lee joined not take the bait, and up on Cemetery Hill him at 1900, only one hour of daylight the Blue lines were growing stronger and remained. Lee did not order Ewell to at- stronger, as breastworks took shape, po-

IGETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN I

CONfEDERATE UNION ~ INfANTRY ... = CAVALRY _

taek but pointed out in his ogentle way si'tions were improved, and units were re­ that the longer they delayed the stronger assembled. would be the Union position. Ewell did General Hancock was in command now. 54 MILItARY REVIEW DECEMaER 1957

Upon, hearing of Reynolds' death, General Lee's Attack Plan Meade sent General Hancock forward to -Lee's attack plan was simple enough. take command, and it was he who organ­ Longstreet would move his corps (as ized the Union position along the famous shown in Figure 3) down Seminary Ridge, fishhook line. (Figure 3.) As General Slo­ get beyond and roll up the Union left flank. cum's XII Corps arrived, it went into po­ At the sound of Longstreet's guns'IA. P. sition on Culp's Hill at the extreme right Hill would attack the Union center and of the line, with General Howard on Cem­ Ewell would storm up Cemetery and etery Hill, and General Newton's I Corps Culp's Hills. The attack was to be launched along Cemetery Ridge. Sickles' III Corps as early as Longstreet could possibly get began arriving at 1900 and took over the ready; Lee made that plain. But Long. Union left~ It was 0300 when General street brooded. He had not approved of the Meade rode in and tdok command. Gen­ invasion in the first place. He pointed out eral Hancock's own carps, which arrived to General Lee that the best plan was to during the early morning, was positioned encircle the Union left and strike them between Newton and Howard. Sykes' V in the rear to disrupt their trains and Corps, which contained practically all the communications. old regular Army infantry regiments, When Lee vetoed the plan, Longstreet closed in shortly thereafter and went into urged that the Confederates take iIp a reserve positions near the cenfer of the defensive position, as they had at Fred· line. Only Sedgwick's VI Corps now was ericksburg, and let the Yankees attack absent, but it was due to arrive by mid­ them. Lee, however, stood firm. "The enemy afternoon. is right there, General Longstreet," he On the Confederate side, General Long­ said, "and I'm going to strike him." Even street's corps arrived early in the morn­ then Longstreet delayed for Pickett's di· ing of 2 July although General George E. vision had not yet joined. When all his Pickett's division had remained with the remonstrations and delays were in vain, corps trains at Chambersburg, leaving Longstreet set ab~ut his task, consuming only General John B. Hood's and Major precious time in endeavoring to find a General Lafayette McLaws' divisions to covered route to the flank so as to avoid extend Lee's lines along Seminary Ridge detection by the Union signal station on to the right of Hill's corps. Little Round Top. It was 1500 before his , Figure 3 depicts the battleline~ at 1530, artillery was in position and opened up, after both sides had completed ~heir dis­ and 1600 before the infantry of McLaws positions. Note at the left flank of the and Hood jumped off-an attack which Union lines the salient formed by'Sickles' Lee had planned for daybreak. III Corps. He had been ordered to occupy Once the attack started, the men of the southern part of Cemetery Ridge and Longstreet fought with all the determina· extend the Union flank to Little Round tion and vigor they' always employed. They Top but had pushed forward to the Em­ overlapped the Union left, and drove in mitsburg Road where the ground was· Sickles' salient; one brigade drove all the higher leaving Little Round Top unmanned way to Cemetery Ridge before being by any combat force. When Meade dis­ hurled back. Hood's division smashed covered this shortly after noon, Sickles through the brush and boulders of Devil's offered to pull back; General Meade real­ Den rolling up Sickles' Jines in confusion; ized it was too late, however, since the but there they were stopped. The Union V Confederate activity indicated an attack Corps under Sykes now was deployed, stiff· was under way. ened by its tiny regiments of grizzled reg· THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE 55 ulars, hardened by year~ of Indian I fight­ was the key to the entire Union line which ing. This was their kind of war, hand to it dominated, for Big ~ound Top was too hand, no quarter asked, and none given. heavily timbered for artillery; and yet

At the extreme right a regiment of when Sickles had advanced his line, Little Hood's division stormed up the draw be­ Round Top was left unmanned. By a stroke tween the Round Tops. Little Round Top of luck General Gouverneur Warren, the 56 ' MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1957

Army Engineer, was on Little Round Top Actually, the odds were building up in when the attack opened. On his own re­ Mead'e's favor. Buford's badly battered sponsibility he ordered up two brigades cavalry division was in the rear guarding of infantry and a battery of artillery from the trains, but Kilpatrick's and Gregg's the V Corps. It was an uphill fight on both divisions were relatively intact, an~ sides, but at dark the Union forces held guarded the left and right flanks respec­ both Round Tops. Sickles' salient was tively. Meade's forces now were complete, slowly ground in, but the III and V Corps including Sedgwick's VI Corps which was reestablished the Union line along Ceme­ posted in reserve behind the Round Tops. tery Ridge where Meade had originally It had completed a continuous 34-mile intended it. Hood was wounded but his march and was utterly exhausted, but division held Devil's Den and anchored a night's sleep would find it refreshed the Confederate right where it stayed un­ and provide Meade with a substantial re­ til the pattIe's end. serve. During the night the balance of Lee's Faulty Coordination Army closed up-General Pickett's divi­ On the Confederate line the attack was sion, which was to acquire immortality poorly coordinated. Oniy Hill seems to during tomorrow's fight, and the balllnce I have done what he had been told. He hit of Stu

SITUATION SHORTLY AFTER DARK 2 LY unable to support the assault because of tacked the Confederates were forced back the heavy woods and steep slopes, so the to their 1 July positions. By 1100 Ewell's Gray infantry. went in alone. It was a corps was through for the day. ''''Ill I MIL'ITARY iREVIEW DECEMBER 1951 68 I Lee heard the news of Ewell's repulse in ! knock~d out, except at the center of the silence. He knew that one-third of his plan : line, and for these fresh batteries were had failed, but he was still resolved to ordered up from behind Cemetery Ridge, attack Meade's center. Upon Longstreet's , From the Confederate lines, the artillery argument that McLaws' and Hood's divi­ I cannonade continued without break, but sions were too weakened by their attacks 'General Edward P. Alexander, the corps of the preceding day, Lee made available artillery commander, knew hils ammuni· Heth's division, now commanded by Gen­ tion was running low. And the waning of eral James B. Pettigrew, and brigades the Union artillery's reply made him think from General William D. Pender's and , it had beeIl effectively hurt. He sent word General Richard H. Anderson's divisions : to Pickett, '''If you are coming at all you of Hill's corps. He designated as the objec­ must corne immediately or I cannot give tive a little clump of trees that stood out you proper support." in the center of the Union lines where Just before 1500 General Warren sig. Hancock's II Corps was posted. More than naled from Little Round Top, "They are 150 guns were wheeled into position along ; moving out to attack." Longstreet's and Hill's front, to mass their The long Gray lines had begun to move fires on the objective. Longstreet was fear­ out from the concealing trees on Semi· ful and apprehensive to the last. To Lee nary Ridge, through the line of Alexan· he argued, "There are no 15,000 men alive , der's batteries, down the gentle slope to who can break and hold the center of that the Emmitsburg Road. At parade step line up there today." His words to Pickett they carne, 15,000 men in three dense for­ were, "My God, Pickett, we are being cru­ mations-General Pickett, Major General cified." The dispositions just prior to the Isaac R. Trimble, and General Pettigrew, attack are shown on Figure 5. Over them 42 regimental battIe flags rose The Confederate Assault and snapped in the summer wind as they But ,Lee was adamant. At 1300 the Con­ started their death march toward that federate guns opened up, concentrating little clump of trees a mile across the open on that little clump of trees. At first some fields. A mile away a stubborn Blue line of the shot went high and over the ridge that had weathered the deluge of Con· to drive Meade out of his headquarters. federate shell grimly waited. But they adjusted and the trees shed their From the Union left and all along the leaves and' branches and stood gaunt as ridge, and from Little Round Top, the in midwinter. Stones boiled up from the Union artillery opened at long range, en· rock wall behind which Hancock's infan­ filading Pickett's men. The gunfire tore try waited. The Union guns-SO of them, great holes In their ranks, their flags be· all there was room for between the Ceme­ gan to go down, their parade step was tery and Little Round Top-replied. It ragged now, but they closed ranks and was a tumultous exchange that shook the pressed on. Not a shot had yet been fired battlifield and sent up dense clouds of bil­ by the infantry on either side. lowing smoke and dust. From Cemetery Ridge every available For an hour and a half the duel It0n­ gun was firing now, first with grape, then tinued and then the Union fire slackened. with canister, and then with double can­ General Henry J. Hunt, the Union artil­ ister. The Union infantry then opened up. lery commander, had ordered a partial The clouds of smoke obscured the field cessation to let the' guns cool, replace from the watchers on Seminary Ridge. broken carriages, and to conserve ammu­ The parade was over now. At 100 yards nition. Not many Union guns had been Pickett's men delivered a volley of musket THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE 69 fire, and charged the low' stone fence and Lewis A. Armistead kept pouring forward. the infantrymen crouching behind. They went over the wall with Armistead

Both Pickett's flanks were exposed. still in the van. About 100 yards beyond Union infantry vaulted the fence and the wall Armistead went down. closed in on either side. The center of the Hancock's reserves now closed in. The Confederate line led by Brigadier General Confederate charge was broken. In re- 60 MILl';!'ARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 treat the CQnfederates ebbed back across had grabbed for wagons, supplies, and am. the bloody fields with Union cannon pur­ munition that cluttered up Meade's rear, suing them unmercifully. but his men were numb with fatigue, one General Lee met them as they stumbled of his brigades was forced to withdraw past him toward the safety of the trees for lack of ammunition, and Gregg's cav. on Seminary Ridge. "It's all my f,auIt, aIry division, after a roaring threEt-hour men, all my fault. It is I who have lost battle drove him from the field. ' this fight." The task was to rally the men for the expected counterattack. Longstreet Confederate Withdrawal' recalled Hood's and McLaws' divisions to It rained on 4 July and activity was their original 2 July position on Semi- restricted largely to casualty collection,

I LEE'S RETREAT AND SITUATION 13 JULY nary Ridge, and managed to form a line consolidation, and waiting. When it be­ from the remnants of Pickett's division. came apparent to Lee that Meade did not But no attack came. General Meade was intend to attack him, he ordered a with­ content with his defensive victory. drawal. During that night and the morn­ General Stuart also was in for rough ing of the 5th, the Confederate Army fell treatment around in the Union rear. He back (Figure 6) along the Chambersburg THE GETTYSBURG BATTLE 61

Pike and the Hagerstown Road. Meade and resistance to Lee's plans; Lee's un­ followed, the bulk of his Army going successful assault; Sickles' exposed posi­ south to Frederick, but except for some tion on the left of Meade's line; and rear guard action and cavalry raids, Lee Meade's failure to counterattack and de­ was able to retire to the Potomac which stroy Lee after Pickett's attack. Praise he crossed on the night of 13 July and too was theirs-for Buford and Reynolds' the morning of the 14th. Only Hill's corps first day's stand; for Hancock's mas~erly was seriously pressed in the crossing. This deployment of the Union forces an~ his was due principally to the fact that the defense of the Union center; Meade's cavalry rear guard mistakenly crossed leadership and victory; and Lee fo~ his ahead of his last division, which was set wise strategy, although it went awry, and upon by Kilpatrick's Union cavalry. his magnificent control of the Army dur­ ing its withdrawal. Conclusion Among the 3,000 battle monuments at Lee's invasion of the North was ended. Gettysburg, is the only' one ever erected It had been a bold stroke' and nearly suc­ to commemorate an address-Lincoln's cessful. Commanders of both sides came Gettysburg Address of 19 November 1863 in for praise and criticism-criticism for decreed by history as the fitting epilogue Ewell's delays; Longstreet's vacillations to this continent's greatest battle.

The Army's job is to fight on land, but this does not mean we are earth­ bound. The Civil·War Army moved at the speed of a horse, the World War I Army moved at the speed of a slow truck, the World War II Army moved at the speed of a fast truck (55 miles an hour). This is the air age; now we have an air-minded Army. What we want now is an Army we can move by air­ around the world, and around the battlefield. • We want to be able to move divisions by air to any distant small war. We have no desire to run a fleet of strategic air transports; we look to Air Force, Navy, or even commercial aviation to provide the airlift. When the means to do this hecome available, the value of our General Reserve will multi­ ply and our deterrence of Communist grabs at weak nations will be greatly increased. On the battlefield we need airplanes and helicopters for observation, for command, for shifting troops, for frontline supply, for moving out wounded. These vehicles we do operate ourselves. We want also new weapons and equipment designed to cope with the battle­ field problems of atomic war: the necessity to disperse into small combat groups, yet give them the power to communicate, to act in unison, to move with great speed, to strike with great power. General Williston B. Palmer Deuelopment and Application Of Joint Capabilities Cofonel Harold E. Nelson, General Staff Headquarters Third United States Army

ON 26 November 1956, Charles E. ing to arrive at a recommendation on a Wilson, then Secretary of Defense, re­ matter for which there is little policy, doc· minded the Armed 'Forces of the United trine, or precedent . .States that they are part of a joint team To provide a source for background in· when he delineated specific fields of re­ formation upon which logical decisions sponsibility among the services. Whether can be made on joint matters, our country or not all the services agreed with the de­ must establish a system for dev.eloping cision is less important than the fact that joint doctrine and procedures. Once de· a decision was made. veloped the information must be subject Although each of the services has pre­ to constant study to meet the rapid changes sented what it hone~~IY feels to be its role in weapons systems and political require· in joint as well as']Uniservice operations, ments. Such a source would be invaluable the fact that these uniservice viewpoints to the JCS and would supplement other conflict i's the natural result of years of agencies in providing guidance in the de· research and development into the best velopment of weapons and forces as well tactics and strategy t9 be ~pplied in par­ as in the preparation of plans for coping ticular fields of warfare. There has been with future emergencies. little formal development and research into the joint use of the separate systems. Existing Agencies Uniservice viewpoints on joint roles nat­ Some agencies already exist that could urally fall into categories influenced by playa major role in this field, namely the the experience, background, and interests three joint colleges of the Armed Forces. of the service of the author. Certainly. there is no other place where The problem that faces the Joint Chiefs joint problems are aired in a more chal· of Staff (JCS) and the Department of lenging and academic atmosphere than at Defense in reaching a decision must be these institutions. tremendous when orre pictures advisors There are. however. additional measures from various services trying to maintain that could be taken to assist in solving an unbiased attitude, thrown together with this problem. Many service misunder. hardheaded businessmen who are experts standings are the result of lack of expe· in the financial and political implications rience and understariding of the capabili· of the matter being considered-all try­ ties of the other services. This results from

New weapons and organizations require that our country establish a system for developing joint doctrine and procedures during times of peace to ensure effect!ve usage in coping with any future emergencies DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF J~INT C~PABILIT~S "­ 63 the faet that most officers spend 15 to 20 ices on the staff might be nothing more years in'their respective branch of the than liaison officers or advisors. Armed Forces before they share the ex­ Cooperation versus command is another periences of the other services, and then troublesome problem preventing full de­ it is limited to a joint service school or velopment and understanding of joint high-level joint staff position at a time capabilities. Some services insist on full when the officer is more or less set in his command authority within their service viewpoint. but do not recognize the same requirement To correct this situation, early and con­ in joint operations, Although cooperation tinuous training in joint forces and their has been successful to some extent on high­ application is required. The cadet should level joint staffs, it is a poor substitute be taught the role of his branch as a part for command of small units in joint war­ of the over-all team and as a member of time operations. a joint team in actual operations. To a limited extent West Point cadets and An­ Establish Joint Forces napolis midshipmen receive an orientation Although existing joint staffs at high in the annual CAMID exercises (a com­ levels are effective in spite of lack of ex­ bined maneuver in collaboration with An­ perience and prescribed doctrine, the ad­ napolis midshipmen). It is hoped that the vent of new weapons and the possibility Air Force Academy can join in this op­ of simultaneous operations in different eration. This, however, is only a small parts of the world will pose n!!w problems part of the indoctrination needed. for the future Joint staff officer. The application of joint operations to To provide a vehicle for dev(:;oping doc­ small field units is an area that is rela­ trine and providing joint forces capable tively undeveloped. The employment of of coping with future problems, there is joint forces is confused by the variety of a need now for a joint force, at the task viewpoints as to which service will provide force level, where the young service officer the subordinate task force commanders and can gain experience and where the future the extent of control the commander will senior staff officer and commander can exercise over certain components. The face problems that can be expected to de­ staffs on some task forces are called joint velop in wartime. In such an organiza­ although the representation of other serv- tion the economic, political, and opera­ Colonel Harold E. Nelson attended the tional experience gained would be an ideal University of Illinois and received his background for future joint commanders Maste)' of Science degree from Cornell and staff officers. University in 1947. He also is a graduate of the U. S. Army Command and General This force must be small enough to fit Staff Col/ege (1947) and the A rmed' Forces budgetary limitations, balanced to include Staff Col/ege (1957). He was one of the realistic portions of the service elements road locators on the Alaskan Highway required for the mission, and equipped to and served as S3 of a provisional brigade of the advanced section, communications move and fight with the utmost speed and zone construction troops in the First and flexibility. After initial required training, Third Army a"eas during World .War II. the force could be used to test concepts Other assignments include duty as instruc­ and doctrine as well as war plans. Under tor at The Infantry School; command~r of 532d'Amphibious' Support Regiment m ideal conditions and to obtain the optimum Korea and Japan; and IX Corps Engine~r. in practical experience. the organization He now is assigned as Chief of the LogIS­ could be moved by air and sea to partici­ tic Management Division, G.t, Section, Headquarters Third US Army, Fort Mc­ pate in combined exercises with our allies. Pherson, Georgia. At the outset one such force would be 64 MILITARY REViEW DECEMBER 1951

established but eventually several of the Operations Center (JOC) as a location for groups would be organized. As the system °a commander who has been delegated au. progressed it could be integrated into the thority to release atomic strikes. JOe it. over-all defense capability of our country. self is primarily an Air Force operation The troop elements assigned to the force center with Army and Navy representa· would vary from time to time reverting to tion. Separate facilities (Fire Support Co­ their parent service after a period with: ordination Center (FSCC) ) control Army the joint force. weapons and the Navy has similar facili· During rotational periods when no ties. What is needed, especially in a task troops were assigned the staff would be force operation, is a truly JOe operated occupied .in preparing plans for subse­ by a joint staff capable of dealing with all quent exercises. Studies, procedures, and the forces employed in the battle area. operations of the staffs would be corre­ Operation of forces in remote areas r~· lated c"losely with material presented at quires joint logistic support to the maxi. the joint armed forces colleges. mum extent possible. No doctrine exists . Personnel would be assigned by JCS on for such a Joint Logistic Force today. Ini. a 12-month tour basis and rotated among tial studies could be conducted in packag· the services. ing, transporting, storing, and issuing of The size of the units employed would common use items and the service ele· vary with the forces available and the ment necessary to handle the items. mission involved. Initially, battle groups, This discussion is not meant to ·preclude battalion landing teams, squadrons, the development and assignment of uni· groups, and small fleet elements would be service missions nor to prevent the develop· combined in some instances merely for ment of organizations and equipment for training and familiarization. Eventually, the employment of land, sea, and air forces. the size of the force would progress to the It does, however, point out a means of . division, air force, and corresponding field testing and evaluation of tactics and naval elements level. A force larger than techniques under' the supervision of the this would involve expenditures and forces JCS. not normally available for peacetime Conclusion training. The scientific genius of the world is rapidly putting weapons that call for rad· Study Problem Areas ically new doctrine and organization into A major contribution of this force to the hands of the soldier, seaman, and air· joint operations doctrine would be in the man. Since these, and future weapons, will study of specific problem areas. be employed in any major effort as a joint Two fields of immediate importance to service undertaking, the training in the current and future operations that could employment of such joint forces should be studied and field tested now are the be initiated now. Establishment of these Joint Combat Operations Center (JCOC) joint forces as a training vehicle will en· and the Joint Logistic Force. Tile JCOC able personnel of the several services to has been tried on an improvised J'basis in work together and produce joint doctrine Europe but there is no existing ,doctrine and procedures during peacetime that will dealing with this OI,'ganizational' element. result in a more effective effort in time Current practice uses the existing Joint of war. UNITED STATES Combat Soldier's Pack High-Altitude Research Craft The United States infantryman's new The U-2, a jet aircraft designed for re­ individual load-carrying equipment is con­ search rather than combat, is able to siderably lighter' than the older models, maintain high-altitude flight for compara­ and allows for maximum freedom of move- tively long periods of time. Wide straight wings give the U-2 an increased load capacity to accommodate meteorological data-gathering equipment. Powered by a

US Army Photograph Stripped-down combat pack ment. It is adapted for use with present and future weapons and equipment, and Official US Air Force Photograph provides for easier adjustment and as­ The U-2 research plane sembly of components. As a full pack for use under march conditions, it consists of J-57 turbojet engine, the aircraft attains a 25:pound battle load of weapons and a speed of 495 miles an hour at an altitude ammunition, 20 pounds of survival items, of 50,000 feet. It utilizes a tandem land­ and 10 pounds of sleeping bag, clothing, ing gear with retractable outriggers at and personal possessions. It can be stripped the wingtips to balance the aircraft on down for combat use.-Official release. the ground.-Official release. 66 -MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 19$1

Radar Booster Tube A recently developed radar booster tube, the Amplitron, is reported to' be twice as efficient as previous radar tubes, and capable of making the energy output

Basic design of fuel cell

US Army Photograph More efficient Amplitron of the radar's basic signal many times stronger. It can handle a power load equal to that needed to light a small town, and provides a constant and unwavering sig­ nal 10 times steadier than now possible with the high-powered magnetrons of the radars it is designed to replace.-Official release. Hydrogen-Oxygen Power Direct conversion of the chemical en­ ergy of gases into electricity has been accomplished with the development of a fuel cell which uses hydrogen and oxygen for fuel. The cell utilizes chemically treated, hollow porous carbon electrodes Chemical energy power pack through which the gases enter. They also of by evaporation. The cell, which operates conduct the electricity produced by the at temperatures between 120 and 140 de- ' electrochemical reaction. The only byprod­ grees Fahrenheit, has a theoretically un­ uct of. the cell is water which is disposed limited life. Experimental cells ha"e been MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 67 operated eight "hours a day, five days a The rockets are fired from their tube week, for a full year without sign of de­ mountings two at a. time in 12 rapid teri()ration. Optimum cell design is said pulses. The Mighty Mouse ,is an impact· to be one which will produce approximately olle kilowatt of power from a packaged unit one cubic foot in volume. For an out­ put of small amounts of power, the cell can operate with oxygen from the air. It uses potassium hydroxide as an electro­ Iyte.-Official release. Jet Engine Protection ' ! Screens are used to prerent foreign ob­ iects from being sucked into the intake of jet engines of Air Force aircraft dur­ F·I02A firing Mighty Mouse rockets ing test runups and taxiing. The screens fuze, solid propellant rocket which is 50 are necessary to prevent damage to the inches long and weighs 20 pounds. It at­ tains a velocity of approximately 2,500 feet per second.-News item. Powerful Jet Engines ' A B-52 Strat%rtress will be used as a test bed for two of the recently devel­ oped J-75 turbojet engines. The J-75'8

Official US Air Force Photogrflph Screen on air intake of F·86 engines, even though runways are kept clean by giant vacuum cleaners (MR, Oct Front to rear, the J-75 with afterburner, 1956,p 67). A new type of runway sweeper the J·57, and the J·17 turbojet engines Uses a combination of vacuum and an elec­ will replace the four outboard J·57 en­ tromagnet, and cleans a path eight to 12 gines of the 650-mile-an-hour swept-wing feet wide.-News item. Strat%rt. The J-75 engine with after· 'Oelfa Dagger' Armament burner is rated at more than 15,000 pounds Primary armament of the F·I02A Delta of thrust. In contrast the J-57 engine, Dagger, a delta-wing interceptor of the eight of which are normal to the B-52, de­ Air Defense Cpmmand, is the GAR-2A velops 10,000 pounds, while the J-47 Falcon missile. Secondary armament con­ reaches 6,000 pounds of thrust. The J-47 sists of twenty.four 2.75-inch Mighty 'is used as a standard powerplant for the Mouse folding fin aircraft rockets mounted B-47 Strato;et medium bomber.-Com­ on the missile bay doors of the aircraft. mercial release. 68 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1957

Drone Aircraft 600 miles an hour. The swept-wing Fire­ Among' the current developments in .bee has been flown at distances of more pilotless target and surveillance aircraft than 100 miles from the electronic remote are a rocket-powered expendable target control unit, and is equipped with a two­ drone, another described as the world's stage parachute that permits its easy re­ fastest target missile, and plans for the covery for reuse. development of two new combat surveil­ Two drones for aerial combat·' surveil. lance systems. lance are under development--a propeller. The rocket-powered expendable target driven type for immediate operational use drone, the XKDT-l Teal, has completed and an advanced type for future use. Both its first test flight successfully. Designed systems will use such techniques as pho­ tography, infrared or radar. They will he zero-length launched and recoverable.­ News item. Jungle Clearing Machine A giant machine specifically designed for use in clearing jungle and semijungle areas is now in use ripping a right-of.way for roads through the jungles of Peru. Two other models of the Tree Crusheiare under test. The machine, which weil/hs approximately 140 tons, rips trees up)y the roots, throws them to the ground, and XKDT·l Teal rocket·powered target literally smashes them into pieces. Inac­ for launching from carrier-based aircraft, tion, the Tree Crusher can clear an acre the Teal is 12 feet long, 10 inches in di­ ameter, and has a wingspan of nearly five feet. Its speed is slightly under the speed of sound at 50,000 feet altitude. During the powered phase of its flight the Teal emits flares to aid in visual tracking. It also is provided with equipment to score near misses. The Q-5 target missile is said to be capable of more than twice the speed of sound. It is 39 feet long, has a wingspan of 10 feet, weighs more than 7,600 pounds, Giant Tree Crusher and is to be used in testing the accuracy of dense jungle every 15 minutes. In tests, and destructive power of the nation's mis­ it has smashed oak trees 12 feet in cir· sile arsenal. Like the Teal, the Q-5 is in­ cumference. The rollers of the machine strumented to score near misses and even are 22 feet wide and nine feet high, and theoretical hits without being destroyed. are equipped with 300 heavy steel cleats Another high-speed, high-altitude, pilot­ shaped much like a conventional ax blade. less jet target. plane is the Firebee, 30 of The machine is 19 feet high and 74 feet which are on order from the United States long, and is operated by one man through Navy for delivery to the Royal Canadian pushbutton type control of the diesel· .Air Force. The Firebee is powered by a electric power which turns the rollers.­ J-44 jet engine, and has a top speed of Commercial release. MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD 69 GREAT BRITAIN Although operational data on the V bomb­ 'V' Class Bombers ers has not been released, it is known that Two of Britain's V bombers, the Vul­ the Victor is capable of exceeding the speed and the Valiant, are in service with of sound in a shallow dive.-News item. Royal Air Force, and a third, the Motorized Truck Jack Victor (MR, Sep 1956, p 73), will reach An electrically driven motorized truck squadron service next year. . jack developed for the British Army is The delta-wing Vulcan B.1 (MR, Dec used as a vehicle parking device. The 1956, p 70) is powered by four Olympus two-spool turbOjet engines generating about 50,000 pounds of thrust. The Vulcan 8.2, an advanced model of this aircraft, will be equipped with the more powerful Olympus Mk 200 engines. The Valiant (MR, Nov 1956, p 78), which is used as a bomber and on photo­ graphic reconnaissance missions, features

Motorized truck-parking jack powerful mobile jack is capable of lifting and moving loads up to 10 tons. Push­ button controls are located in the steering handle of the device.-Official release. Mighty Jet The Olympus Mk 200, production ver­ sion of the Bristol B 01 6 turbojet engine, is to be used in the delta-wing Vulcan Mk 2 medium-range bomber. Developing a thrust of 16,000 pounds, the Olympus Mk 200 is reportedly the world's most power­ ful engine outside the experimental cate­ gory.-Official release. ITALY Antiaircraft Missiles vbombers Vulcan (above) and VaUant Three antiaircraft missiles, the A.R.4, the use of electricity for operating the A.R.15, and C.S.t, have completed opera­ undercarriage, powered controls, wing tional tests and are going into production. Raps, bomo doors, fuel pumps, and other A fourth type of antiaircraft missile, the functions. The Valiant also is to be used M.R.27, which has a speed of about 1,000 . a tanker version for aerial refueling. miles an hour and a range of about 30 The Victor, like all new V bombers, will miles, is being tested at the Italian missile finished in white antiradiation paint...... ,.J:!lnge on Sardinia.-News iiem. 70 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 FRANCE several nations including ,the United Missile Progress States, Sweden, and West Germany. Other The French missile program includes a missiles in the program are: complete series of missiles, some of which VeroniquB, an experimental missile pro. are in· production. The outstanding mis- pelle.d by a liquid fuel rocket, is cable. controlled for the first 180 feet of. ascent This 20-foot-Iong missile is reported to

Arsenal 5501 Drone have attained a speed of 3,000 miles an hour, and an altitude of 84 miles. Sud-Est 4200, a ramjet-powered, sur­ face-to-surface missile which has the con· figuration of a small aircraft, is fired from a short ramp with booster rockets mounted

Experimental Veronique

above and below its stubby fuselage. It is capable of near sonic speed and has 8 range of 60 miles. It iS'Tadar controlled. 88-11, a two-stage, antitank missile de. .Surface-to-surface Sud-Est 4200 veloped f.rom the 88-10, has a reported range of 10 miles, and can be firedcIrolll sile is the cable-controlled antitank 88-10 the. ground or as an air-to-surface rocket. (MR, Oct 1956, P 72 and Aug 1957, p 70) It is now in production. which is under consideration for use by Matra 051 and 8FECMA8-5103. Both MILITARY NOTES AJOUND THE WORLD '11 of these high supersonic air-to-air missiles liquid rocket propelled antiaircraft mis­ are in production. They are two-stage, solid sile which attains a speed of Mach 2, is propellant rockets designed for either beam-riding or homing heads. A larger

French Embaa81l Pf'e88 and Air-to-air Matra Information Division Photo8 --­ Antiaircraft Parea . model. the Matra AA. 20, which is 10 feet long and propelled by a SEPR 251 liquid said to have performance similar to the rocket motor, is in production for the United States N(ke.-News item. Mystere aircraft. Parca, a surface-to-air beam-riding BRAZIL rocket with a proximity head, is in pro­ Reactor Operative duction. This liquid-burning missile weighs The first nuclear chain reaction in Latin 2,205 pounds, utilizes four solid propellant America has been achieved in Brazil's Sao Paulo "swimming pool" type reactor (MR. Jul 1956, p 70). Utilizing 13.2 pounds of uranium enriched at 20 percent provided by the United States under the "atoms for peace" program, the installation will be used to train scientists and nuclear en­ gineers.-News item. AUSTRALIA Transports Ordered Twelve C-130 Hercules transport planes. each capable of carrying 90 fully equipped soldiers a distance of 2,000 miles at a cruising speed of 330 miles an hour, have SFECMAS-5510 Drone been purchased from the United States boosters, and is reported to be able to for the Royal Australian Air Force. The engage attacking aircraft at an altitude huge propjet Hercules will be used to ofsixmiles. It attains a speed of Mach 1.'7. carry heavy ~quipment and artillery in Other developments include the ramjet­ support of assault operations, for landing propelled, booster-aided, winged Arsenal paratroops, and for long-range, high-alti­ 5501 and the SFECMAS-5510, both of tude transport of troops and freight.­ which are target drones. The SE 4S00, a News item. 72 MILITARY, REVIEW DECEMBER 1111 WEST GERMANY maneuvers in the Barents and Kara Seas. Naval Plans -:-News item. Three submarines have been salvaged by the West:German forces and a fourth Missile Stations has been found. The 250-ton VW20, the Soviet missile bases are reported to have former V2365 which was scuttled off the been established at Kraskino and Slav· Danish coast in 1945 and salvaged last yanka on the south shore of Pe~er the year, has been reconditioned as a training Great Bay between Vladivostok and the vessel. Two XXIII type vessels, designated North Korean border, and the entire 115· the V-I and V-2, also have been sal­ mile-wide bay has been closed to foreign vaged. Undersea craft of the XXIII type shipping. Construction of the two mis· displace 257 tons, and are capable of a . sile bases is said to have been completed speed of 12.5 knots submerged. The XXI during the summer of 1957. It was also class peroxide-powered submarine that reported that special submarine facilities was found displaces 1,700 tons;. and is are under construction at Poset, near capable of 17.5 knots submerged. Kraskino.-News item. Present plans for the West German Navy include 18 destroyers, 40 motor tor­ Missile Claims pedo boats, 54 minesweepers, 10 escort The super-long-range, multistage .inter· ships, 12 submarines, and 36 landing continental missile announced as success· craft. Purchases of warships planned in­ fully tested by the Soviet armed forces clude seven Hunt and Black Swan class attains an altitude of'600 miles, and strikes frigates and three motor "torpedo boats the target at a speed of 15,000 miles an from Great Britain, one 'subchaser and hour according to a Russian missile ex· six minesweepers from the Unite<:\, States, pert. The report stated that the missile and five minesweepers from Frarlce.­ can be armed with a hydrogen bomb, and News item. estimated the deviation of the weapon from the expected target to be no more USSR than six to 12 miles. Nuclear Warfare Training A new type multipurpose guided weapon Atomic and hydrogen charges in differ­ which will be effective as a surface-to-air ent types of Weapons have been tested in or air-to-air missile, and also double as connection with Soviet Army and Navy an auxiliary powerplant for aircraft, has maneuvers according to an announcement been announced. The missile is reported by Soviet News agencies. The report stated to weigh 220 pounds and have a top speed that the tests were carried out in nonpopu­ of over 4,000 miles an hour. It carries a lated areas, and at great heights. The test­ target-¥eeklng device for homing on tar­ ing of atomic tactics and possibly the gets. 'A system for remote control of the weapons themselves is believed to have missile is said to be under development. been included in the Soviet Fleet's fall -News item.

The MILITARY REVIEW and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for factual accuracy of information contained in the MILITARY NOTES AROUND THE WORLD and the FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS sections of this publica· tion. Items are printed for the purpose of stimulating discussion and interest, and no offi­ cial endorsement of the views, opinio~s. or factual statements is to be implied.-The Editor. Notional Defense and Military Resources Digested by the MILITA~RY REVIEW from an article· by Marshal A. Juin in "La Revue des Deux Mondes" (France).

THIS is not the first time since the becomes automatic to commanders and world began and men have been killing subordinates, we find that it absolves them one another that it has been realized that from thinking. This can have serious con­ whatever is discovered or invented the sequences when, in the first encounter, course of a war always will remain closely the theory proves inadequate in the face dependent on chance. It is for this reason of surprises which had not been envisaged. that wise brains have always recommended Again, it is important that the theory that a war should not be undertaken should be conceived after mature consid­ unless and until you possess equipment eration, and should take its inspiration properly adapted to the conditions of the from all the duly verified or even conjec­ struggle to be maintained-that is, the tural facts relating to the subject. All equipment best suited to your concept of the great captains of history have devoted that struggle. themselves to this labor of adaptation be­ By equipment must be understood not fore challel'!givg the fortunes of battle. only the instruments of destruction and There is no doubt that, even if it did not protection which science places in men's result in the discovery of an infallible hands, but also the'moral preparation and system, their effort of reflection had a the training of those who are called upon large share in the genius they later dis­ ,(0 use them, and the method of operating played in tht! course of their campaigns. them so as to secure the most effective In the same way, after every war or on use. This, in turn, involves tactics 'or the the appearance of a new weapon, we have theory of employment. seen military theorists striving by reason­ Theory is something which counts in ing to construct the theory which appeared a war. Once it has been assimilated and to correspond most closely with the data collected and the expected consequences R*.This artie1e appeared in the "British Army of the new weapons. evH"w,H March 1957. United Kingdom Crown Copyright reserved. It must be admitted that they have not i 74 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 always achieved this in the most logical fully studied agreement between the taco way, and that they often have been out ti~al procedure of the infantry and the of date or on the wrong lines at the open­ increased power of supporting arms. From ing of subsequent hostilities. the end of 1917 onward the equipment was Thus without going very far back, we good, even if still somewhat restricted by find in France, in the years preceding excessive prudence and method. It was to 1870, our academic theorists, impressed by triumph in the gigantic decisive ,'battle the havoc caused in the French ranks at conceived by the genius of Marshal Fer· Magenta and Solferino by the Austrian dinand Foch in the last months of the artillery and later by the adoption of a campaign in France. rapid-fire rifle (the chassepot), recom­ The Lesson of Victory mending and insisting on the importance Unfortunately, it is the privilege of vic· of remaining in good positions in order to torious nations to rest on their laurels. secure the greatest ,advantage from the When peace is restored, the lessons of the increase in firepower. This radical change past are profitable to soldiers only when of- theory on the eve of war naturally was they recall humiliatil)g and sorrowful bound to cause confusion in the minds of memories. During the 20 years separating leaders who had hitherto been trained on the two World Wars, imagination was attack; Worth, Forbach, and the battles curbed, so to speak, in the French Krmy. below Metz and Sedan were the melan­ It was forbidden to move very far from choly consequence. the methods and procedures which were After 1870, once the French Army had the fruit of long and costly experience, been reformed, a return to offensive tHe­ which had secured victory, and which ories was set in motion. This development were the objects of a blind faith. was accentuated shortly before 1914 in In the sluggish state into which we had the fever induced by the signs indicative sunk, insufficient attention was paid to of a coming conflict. But the balance was the ,progress which had taken place in exceeded in the sense that mind, moving arms of which we' were the inventors-a away from matter and reality, ended by progress which was soon to make of them endowing the offensive with purely meta­ exceptional ~nstruments for the offensive physical virtues and by neglecting to study and for exploiting success. Light bombers the modes of employment of the various were neglected, not to mention long-range arms in close cooperation. On the eve of bombers, and, on the eve of World War II war in 1913 belated regulations did in­ there were still many in the French Army deed try to establish one or two principles, who believed that the tank, as a powerful but through lack of time these were not shock weapQ.n, should be used primarily assimilated by those who had to carry for breakthrough attacks which would be them out at the tactical level; and there methodically mounted and aimed at lim· followed the shocks and slaughter of the ited objectives. Lightly mechanized divi· battle on the frontiers which were due sions operating on foot were considered largely to our incompetence and to dis­ to be exceIlent but better suited to acting parities between movement and fire. as a screen along broad fronts than to It was to take nearly three years after concentrating in order to drive in 8 the recovery on the Marne-achieved as given direction. As for our armored divi­ by a miracle thanks to a spurt of energy sions, the war overtook us while they were and to the undeniable efficiency of our still being organized and while the logical 75-mm field ,artillery piece-to establish principles of their employment were still a theory of offense based on a more care­ being sought. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 75 Clouded by the concept of firepower and begin it by surprise, dealing those first an obsession. with meeting engagements blows which always are the most danger­ in the first days of hostilities, our theory, ous. as regards the offensive, was rigid, de­ Shield and Javelin termined to advance only by measured The concept of defense evolved to meet stages. Where the German, inspired by such an aggression always has included, a more lively fire and imagination, had whatever the. equipment actually used, devoted all his efforts to forging for him­ what might figuratively be called a shield self a redoubtable spearhead which he and a javelin-a shield to deaden the first was able to place in the hands of resolute blows, lose as little as possible of our ter­ and astonishingly well-trained command­ ritory, and give us time to collect and ers, the French refused to be the first bring to bear the weapons of offense which to attack, and dug in for nine months constitute the javelin, the weapon of de­ along a Maginot Line which had been de­ cision. signed to economize troops in order to In the past the rules of the game in­ provide mobility but which was not even volved, for self-protection, the positioning used for this purpose when the time came. on the frontier of the densest possible mass This was clearly a mortal sin, and in 1940 of combatants, equipped with efficient but our defeat was consummated in a few short-range weapons of a type more or days. less current among all the nations. In What is the theory now? It is still in the future we must expect the terrifying process ,of development, although by now surprise effects of atom and thermonu­ it has gone beyond the stage of first prin­ clear bombs capable of creating general ciples to enter that of adaptations and paralysis within a few days, if not a few procedures. hours. It must be admitted, in justification of In the past, again, once the enemy had the delay in its evolution, that the ap­ been halted and one's own resources col­ pearance at the end of the war of atomic lected, the aim was to go over to the of­ weapons of remarkably increased power fensive in accordance with the rules of completely overthrew the ideas acquired conventional strategy which involved, if in the course of preceding wars, including not the annihilation of the enemy forces the last. This experience was limited to in battle, at least their progressive attri­ the use of traditional weapons and now is tion and the repulsing of the remnants to irrelevant. Everything must be rebuilt on their own territory. Hence a slow rhythm, new facts provided solely by experimental although the advance in conventional air­ explosions, and this is no easy task. craft in the last war enabled this to be It should also be noted that the evolu­ accelerated considerably. tion of this new theory is faced with the Today, with the use of nuclear weap­ difficulties, always experienced within a ons, it is to be feared-as I have said al­ coalition, of reconciling differing points of ready-that the shield will shatter and view. Furthermore, the theory is defen­ that paralysis will intervene before any sive in principle, since the Atlantic coali­ reply can be made. tion, which has no intention of being the To prevent this it is essential that the aggress,or, is concer!).ed at first only with screen should hold, thanks to appropriate establishing a defensive system. The war protection and tactics, and that the in­ thus envisaged may begin badly for us terior, protected in turn to the fullest with our adversary being completely free possible extent, should manage to survive. to prepare for it when he de:;;ires and to But above all it is absolutely necessary to 76 :MI~ITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 have available a powerful instrument of lin. Although the use of the tactical atom offense, based on new weapons. It must bomb and the proposed cooperation of be capabl~ of paralyzing the aggressor 'Germ!ln forces have now relieved many in his turn, once aggression is unleashed, anxieties caused by the numerical superi. by striving ,to destroy his poten~ial both ority of our possible adversary, it remains at the sources of its production and on true that there is still much to d9 in the the lines of its transportation and at the modification of organization and in taco places of its use. tical procedures. This instrument-which is still based on Work certainly is being done on this, aircraft as its mode of transport, until but only slowly, each country having its such time in the near future as aircraft own ideas. It is an achievement that we are replac~d, partially at least, by long­ have been able to agree on a frontline range guided missiles-is now in being, strategy which involves covering the max· and there is no doubt that in these days e imum space consonant with the laws of it constitutes the decisive weapon, if there atomic warfare; and also on the need for is to be a decision. For who can guarantee correlated measures aimed at the protec· that, once the deVastating deluge and the tion of armies and civilian populations persistent radioactivity with which we (dispersal, passive defense, surface de· are preparing to swamp the tactical and fense). But there is still sharp discussion strategic areas of an entire hemisphere about the tactical modes which ultimately have passed, there will be a victor and will determine reforms in organization. a vanquished? There are even grounds Some people, denying the possibility of for supposing that the maintenance of movement in atomic warfare, want large peace, in Europe at least, until now has and purely static formations to hold been due as much to this uncertainty as ground more firmly, defend themselves to the horror inspired in men by the use better, reduce impedimenta, and lighten of such weapons. the logistic burden. Others, on the con· tJary, would like to see the new formations The Task much smaller, endowed with power, flex­ In this case it may be asked, how do ibility, and mobility so as to be able, by you define the tasks to be assigned to constant movement, to evade atomic threats ground and naval forces in the future? Ob­ and concentrate in the shortest possi­ viously; they will no longer be the essen­ ble time at selected. points of attack. No tial instruments of decision. However, they doubt the truth lies between these two will make a considerable contribution by extremes, ana the French General Staff protecting territory and the main ocean has not been slow to seek it on these lines. routes, and by helping us to survive, and Experiments carried out in the last two their task will not lack greatness. years with two light motorized infantry It is difficult to imagine that the ground divisions and one mechanized division forces, which form part 'jlf the shield and have enabled us to clarify our ideas in which must constantly be held ready for this respect and to present an objective action, do not permanently possess all the scheme for what is required. This is not resources they require or that they are yet unanimously accepted, but I am con­ not already in position. Nevertheless, vinced, for my own part, that it will prove they still fall far short of the degree of valid after some minor but necessary al­ preparedness and availability of the jave­ terations. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 77 _The Demgansk Pocket, March-April 1941 Translated and dilreated by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant Colonel Joaehim Sehultz-Nauma,nn ill "Allgemeine Sehweitzeriache Militirzelt.ehriU" (Switzerland) November 1956.

EARLY in 1942 the Soviets, in a farflung A point of particular danger, however, operation, had encircled the German II was the northwest front where great Army Corps and parts of the X Army breaches yawned in the impassable, Corps with a double offensive thrust from swampy, wooded terrain around Zamoshka, the south and the west. Soviet units also Pustynya, and Lyanno. Near Pustynya attacked from the north across frozen was a breach three miles wide over which Lake Ilmen and then continued south along the infantry was not able even to main­ the Lovat' River. On 8 February 1942 tain surveillance with the scanty forces they linked up with the Russian forces available. Snow 40 inches in depth and coming up from the south. The latter terrain covered with primeval forest had pushed to the north with ski brigades, growth made patrol of·this area impos­ tanks, and divisions capable of mobility sible in the absence of ski troops. in the wintertime, and had followed the Any security that could be attained was course of the Lovat' northward. In the possible only on the basis of strong points cold of the Russian winter, when 30 to dependent, in turn, on existing settlements. 50 degrees below zero weather "las not un­ The Soviets turned these difficulties to common, the superior Soviet forces, pre­ their own advantage and, at the end of pared as they were for winter warfare, February, a tank task force had pene­ were able to drive through the German trated nine miles into the deeply snow­ divisions which were not equipped for covered and trackless Polomet' valley be­ winter combat. fore it was repulsed. Although Field Marshal Wilhelm Rit­ Beginning with 1 March the enemy ter von Leeb, Commander in Chief of the maintained constant pressure on the Pus­ Northern Army Group, had predicted en­ tynya, Zaprudno, and Lyanno strong points circlement unless the six divisions of the without being able to make any appreci­ II and X Army Corps were pulled back, able penetration. Two Soviet ski r~ttal­ Hitler wished this area retained as a base ions did break through to the north of for a new offensive in the spring. After Pustynya, but the 1,000 men of this force the encirclement, therefore, he gave assur­ were virtually annihilated by the rear­ ance of all help possible to the II Army ward firing guns of the German artillery. Corps, He commanded that "Fortress This action by the enemy-by which he Demyansk" be held to the last man. planned, first, to plunge into the depths Through the entire month of February of the pocket and, secondly, to break out ceaseless enemy attacks were repelled on important sectors of the front-was only almost all the fronts of the pocket. The the forerunner of a large-scale operation focal points of the fighting in February clearly aimed at the headquarters 'of the were the south and western fronts of the II Army Corps and the Demyansk air­ field. The Demyansk pocket was to be split pock~t, but no less violent were the at­ tacks on the northern and northwestern up from within in coordination with at­ fronts. 'Here the intention unquestionably tacks on the external fronts of the pocket. Was to split off the west portion of the Paratroop Attacks pocket by means of an irruption into the At the beginning of March 1942 II Cbrps Pola River valley. (' .. Headquarters was in Dobrosli, two miles 78 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 west of Demyansk. The Demyansk airfield On 10 March enemy ski units again was the headquarters for the air supply crossed the Solovevo-Vesiki supply route of the entire combat area. The alterna­ with a force of around 1,000 men. The tive airfield at peski had far less capacity ,corps ordered the 30th Infantry Division than the big Demyansk field. Both the to close off the point of the enemy break· enemy and the Germans knew that when through by attacking along tM w~t bank the command and supply setups were of the Polomet' from both the north and knocked out, the fate of the 100,000 en­ the south. Additionally, a battalion strong circled men would be sealed. point was directed to be established to the During the night of 8-9 March 1942 the northwest of Solovevo. Soviets -broke through the:'.trackless, Information as to the strength and lo­ swampy, wooded area to the so~th of Pus­ cation of the enemy forces that had in· tyny.a and by dawn of 9 March part of filtrated across the Polomet' on 9 and 10 their forces were astride the Solovevo­ March and to the east was of increasing Veslki supply route. Rear area and re­ importance to the headquarters of the II serve forces finally forced this enemy Army Corps. Although the reinforced group to fall back. A ~aptured enemy German forces succeeded in defending situation map showed that their objec­ their system of strong points, the situa· tive had been Demyansk. In the im­ tion on this sector, where the adversary penetrable wooded and swampy area to had every terrain advantage, remained the east of the Polomet', however, the critical for weeks. North of Vyasovka in· whereabouts of the main body of the at­ filtrated enemy forces interfered to a serio tacking force was difficult to determine. ous . degree with the supply movements to To the headquarters of the II Army Corps, the front. As long as the breaches be· this action was a warning to adopt meas­ tween Pustynya and Vyasovka remained ures for the protection of Demyansk with­ open, the enemy could continue to filter out delay. The 30th Infantry Division also through. organized a strong point defense for the On 12 and 13 March supplies and more Polomet' valley and was given two bat­ Soviet troops were parachuted into the talions of reserve troops. N eviy Mokh swamp to the north of Dem· In the paratroop attacks which began in yansk. the days which followed, two points of Counterattack Plans main effort were discernible. The princi­ Two unsuccessful attacks were con· pal attack of a strength of two brigades ducted on 14 March against the Soviet was directed against the corps headquar­ forces in the Neviy Mokh swamp west of ters and against the Demyansk airfield, Maloye Opuyevo. The strength of the while one brigade which landed in the enemy was estimated at from 1,500 to north sector of the 30th Divisi~n was to 2,000 men at this time. link up with an enemy from the north. The corps considered that the situation Although the enemy was prevented from would 'worsen in the Demyansk area be· achieving his end objective, the German cause of the reinforcements they had re­ command for a week was forced to em­ ceived by paratroops. Having no forces ploy countermeasures of every type, capable of maneuvering under winter.con· mostly improvised, such as the formation ditions, the corps requested the army to of alarm battalions, and the removaJ of assist combat by the use of aviation. forces from fronts not under attack which The division engaged in defense at made the highest demands on maneuver­ Maloye Opuyevo was to be reinforced, but ability. before these reinforcements could become FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 79 effective, the enemy seized possession of 2. To effect a breakthrough on the Maloye Opuyevo and at dawn of 15 March south front of the pocket. attacked Bol'shoye Opuyevo with 800 to 3. To knock out the north and 1,000 men and considerable air support. northwest fronts (30th Infantry Di­ All forces in and around Demyansk were vision). 'alerted, and two battalions and a rein­ 4. To seize possession of the prin­ forced company were added to the forces cipal center of the pocket-the city defending Demyansk and the corps head­ of Demyansk. This was indicated by quarters. the infiltration and dropping of enemy On this day the enemy again succeeded parachute forces into the Neviy Mokh in effecting a penetration in the vicinity swamp. of Pustynya and pushing forward east­ The corps reported this estimate of ward across the Polomet'. Even though a the situation to army headquarters and start had been made toward occupying a stressed the fact that an early attack from continuous line of strong points along the the west by a German relief force was Ilomlya-Vesiki supply route, it had not vitally necessary. been possible to fill out this line com­ pletely due to shortage of forces. Heavy Action in the North weapons also were lacking. The situation remained tense on all the The enemy's attacks in the northwest fronts but especially in the north where at Zamoshka and Zaprudno, as well as his the 30th Infantry Division had to repel activity northwest of Dedno, were con­ enemy attacks everywhere and attacks sidered to be related to the actions on the from the rear by infiltrated enemy forces Polomet' and in the Neviy Mokh swamp. had to be expected. On the evening of 13 March the situation On the following day the rear area of was extremely confused, since neither the the 30th Infantry Division remained under strength of the enemy in the Neviy Mokh constant enemy threat, especially in the swamp nor the location of the enemy Vol'noye Berezno area. It had not been forces reported to be advancing on Dem­ possibl; to clear the supply route along yansk from the north could be determined. the Polomet'valley. On 17 March an enemy A night attack on the Demyansk airfield, parachute brigade even crossed the Vol'­ therefore, was to be expected, and the noye Berezno-Zabolote supply route from headquarters of the II Army,Corps was south to north, threatened the rear of the shifted from Dobrosli to Borovichi, six front at Lychkovo, and blocked the only miles east of Demyansk. supply route over which all supplies for During the night of 15-16 March the the left wing of the 30th Infantry Division enemy elements in the Maloye Opuyevo passed. area were again supplied from the air. When elements of the parachute unit No attack occurred on the Demyansk air­ had attacked in the north and penetrated field. into the brush-covered area south of Lych­ kovo, an attack on Lychkovo was started Enemy Intentions by enemy forces from the north; despite Regarded as a whole, the following these attacks the Lychkovo sector held. enemy i,ntentions were evident on the In addition to this the front at Zamoshka pocket fronts: . and Zaprudno, which was already strained 1. To cut off the west part of the to the breaking point, was again attacked pocket by an attack from the north from the west. On all these sectors the along the Polomet' River. fighting continued on into the night. Even 80 MILJTARY REVIE,W DECEMBER 1957

around Zabolote, from which an attack on now was bent on knocking out the entire the enemy south of Lychkovo was to be arc of the 30th Infantry Division's front. conducted, fighting broke out. His intentions were frustrated, however. When the situation had become threat­ The German defenders succeeded, by ening on all the front sectors under at­ means of artillery fire systematically tack, two battalions of reinforcements shifted from sector to sector and. closely from the corps arrived during the night. followed by their own infantry, in 'driving These succeeded, after hours of fighting, in the 'enemy parachute units to the north. clearing the blocked supply route in the The enemy attacked from the north and Polomet' valley between Solovevo and seized possession of a one-half mile stretch Vesiki, and remained at the disposal of of the railway line which passed west of the 30th Infantry Division. With these Lychkovo. But before the enemy could reinforcements the German forces, at­ consolidate the position, he was caught by tacking from Vol'noye Berezno along the a flank attack and thrown back across the Berezenka valley, finally succeeded dur­ main line of defens,e with the remnants of ing the course of the forenoon of 18 March the parachute fotices'who were attempting in relieving Zabolote and in opening the to escape. Vol'noye Berezno-Zabolote supply route. The end result of the day's operations The Luftwaffe gave effective support to was the annihilation of the Soviet 2d the German attack. Parachute Brigade. The enemy's losses I The pressure of the enemy attack on the ran into the hundreds. The German de· outer front was not broken during this fenders were able to bring in only 50 day. On the contrary, he kept repeating prisoners, however, as they lacked ade· his mass attacks on into the night. Very quate forces for a systematic combing considerable enemy forces which had fallen of the terrain. For weeks after this, how· back from the Zabolote area succeeded in ever, scattered enemy groups continued to escaping northward into the wooded ter­ hold out. They were picked up later in rain southwest of Lychkovo. They there mopping-up operations. joined other enemy forces in this area. In spite of days of violent attack from Due to the increasing seriousness of the front and rear, the 30th Infantry Division situation, an additional infantry battalion had not only held its position, hut had was moved to the north to add to the been able to crush the enemy to the rear. strength of the 30th Infantry Division. The erasure of this portion of the pocket front had failed. . During the night of 19-20 March re­ connaissance succeeded in locating the as­ Fighting West of Demyansk sembly area of the remnants of the para­ While tIre fate of the Soviet 2d Brigade chute brigade which had moved up to the was being sealed between Polomet' and vicinity of Zabolote. Since German forces Bereska, the two parachute brigades that were insufficient for encircling them, it had landed in the N eviy Mokh swamp was decided to push them back north­ were wasting away in piecemeal attacks ward across the main line of d!lfense into west of Demyansk. The 12th Infantry Di· the enemy lines. When this idea was put vision was in defense of the Demyansk into operation early on 20 March, there area. began, simultaneously, the long antici­ For some strange reason the two enemy pated major Soviet attack on Lychkovo. parachute brigades remained inactive on It was accompanied by attacks in the 18 and 19 March. Security and defense Volodikha and Zaprudno sector. After the preparations were continued in and around failures of the preceding ~ays, the enemy Demyansk without enemy interference. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 81 On 21 March the enemy attacked the For the further reinforcement of the Dem­ former Dobrosli command station (the yansk front, an additional infantry bat­ corps headquarters had moved to Boro­ talion was placed under the orders of the vichi on 16 March) with a force of around 12th Infantry Division. 200 ski troops. But both here and in an­ Contrary to all expectations the enemy other attack on Shumilov Bor to the north­ remained inactive on 22 March. Both So­ west he was repulsed. Four enemy radio viet' and Ghman patrols were active, and transmitters were spotted in Maloye Opu­ an enemy forest camp west of Shirkovo yevo. In addition, thll enemy engaged pa­ was shelled by German artillery. On the trols in every direction out of this locality. basis of the enemy's behavior and the re-

N +

LEGEND <0 ~ SOVIET POSITIONS o ..... GERMAN POSITIONS SCAlE 10 15 20

There also was great enemy air activity. suIts of the German reconnaissance it was The Demyansk airfield was attacked by clear that the Russian forces, seemingly in ground support planes. individual groups, were deployed over a In view of the lively enemy activity, an broad front north of the Demyansk­ attack by stronger forces on the Dem­ Bol'shoye Losnitsy automobile highway. yansk airfield and the automobile highway No reason was discovered for the Russian extending westward from Demyansk now delay in conducting a concentrated attack. was to be expected",i1' According to the 1.sJAtements of a pris­ Breakout Attempts to the South oner captured at Dlbrosli, the enemy had On 23 March another 'group of enemy the mission of capturing the command forces was repulsed at Dobrosli. An at­ staff which they thought to be in Dobrosli. tack on the automobile high.way to th~ 82 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951

west of Bobkovo was but partially re­ wooded areas to break outward through ~ pulsed. East of Bobkovo the enemy' with the front. In the Meglino-Staroye Tara. about company strength succeeded in sovo area the enemy suffered heavy losses breaking through toward the south and in the execution of this plan. in temporarily barring the highway. It While the fighting south of the auto. was, however, cleared again of the enemy mobile highway went on with center of by the German security forces in counter­ gravity in the rear area of the 12th Di· attack, and wholly secured. vision, the enemy north of the Dernyansk During the days which followed the front displayed no more activity. Only the Russians continued very active in indi­ Maloye Opuyevo strong' point was still vidual operations on the automobile high­ occupied by the enemy. In view of the eon· way west of 'Demyansk, and it was im­ centrated enemy activity to the 'rear of possible to know accurately the total the south front of the corps, however, en· strength of the forces that had been able emy attacks at any time against the outer to cross the highway prior to that time. front of the pocket had to be expected. Combat reconnaissance came upon two The Soviets made continuing efforts to deserted forest camps south of the high­ open a passage southward for theil' forces way, but found strong enemy elements in behind the German front, but even when an area four miles south of Demyansk. they met with success now and then, it During the night of 24-25 March these had no influence on the over-all situation. forces attacked the divisional combat sta­ Soviet attacks against the outer front of tion of the 12th Infantry Division in Igoz­ the pocket at Lunevo were repulsed as hevo from three sides. Only after sever~l werE! those against the rear of this sector. hours of hard fighting was it possible, with the aid of reinforcements which had Continuing Operations been' hurriedly dispatched for support, to Supply camps and an airfield discovered drive out the enemy. The remnants of the north of the automobile highway in the enemy forces withdrew southward. Neviy Mokh swamp were taken under , It became evident that the Soviets had fire by the artillery on 29 March. The same been able to cross the highway in far ,day the enemy was driven out of Maloye greater strength than had been presumed, Opuyevo. He suffered heavy losses. Numer· for the divisional staff quarters of the ous prisoners and a great deal of captured 12th Infantry Division had been attacked materiel were brought in. by no less than 500 men. In this action At the conclusion of this operation a the Russians had lost 181 dead and 16 slackening up of the security measures prisoners, as well as weapons and equip­ on the Demyansk-Bol'shoye Losnitsy auto· ment of all types. German losses were five mobile highway was ordered, as no more officers and 28 enlisted men killed and 37 strong enemy attacks were to be antici· wounded. pated. It is true that for days flare signals On the following day the fighting south between enemy aircraft and residual en· of Demyansk continued. Violent fighting emy groups in the Neviy Mokh swamp,as was required to clear the enemy from the well as landing attempts on the airfield Igozhevo-Yermakovo highway. As in the there were to be observed, but an end was area to the rear of the 30th Infantry Di­ put to them by artillery fire. These events vision, it had to be expected that the en­ were no longer of any consequence. emy would attempt to create confusion in Thus during the period between 21 and the rear of the 12th Infantry Division and 29 March 1942 the Soviet 1st and 4th make use of routes, river valleys, and Parachute Brigades lost around 1,500 men FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 83 killed, numerous prisoners, about 100 ma­ been the animating force in the last efforts chineguns, mortars, and other weapons. at resi_stance. This was learned from the According to prisoners' statements the interrogation of the brigade commander German artillery fire had a particularly who stated that, although the commander devastating effect on enemy concentrations of a -brigade, he had, at the same time, and forest camps. Due to ammunition command over all three brigades. shortage, however, fire was laid down only Due to this ill-advised command ar­ when the position of these camps was rangement, the brigade commanders were positively known. soon at variance with one another and the During the first days of April almost activities of the three brigades became un­ all combat activity had ceased in the rear coordinated individual operations. When areas of the 12th Infantry Division. Only the commissar finally was flown in to en­ in the area around Zales'ye were addi­ sure a unified command, the brigades al­ tional forces of the parachute rifle forma­ ready had lost a large part of their shock­ tion found and destroyed in mopping-up power, and the surprise factor of their operation7.Remnants of this unit contin­ first appearance was gone. Their last, ued to hold out in the inaccessible wooded hard attacks were only of local signifi­ region south of the highway. Prisoners re­ cance. ported that some of these forces were planning to break through from south to Concluding Observations north across the highway at Krivaya­ The Soviets had not been able to achieve Chasove. A battalion posted there to block their aim of cracking open the pocket from their passage was not obliged to go into within and splitting it up into a number action, however, as the enemy did not at­ of smaller pockets. They must have been tempt to carry out his plan. very anxious to do this before the begin­ The enemy's attempt on 2 April to force ning of the relief attack ;from the west, the main line of defense at Chernaya in and the arrival of the thaw period. The a surprise assault from the rear failed. relief attack had started its action against The situation in the Zales'ye-Annino area the enemy in the pocket on 20 March. This became critical again when an enemy force occurred at the same time that the fight­ of 400 m~n attacked, but this also was ing on the north and northwest both around repulsed. To the north of Andrevskoye an th\! perimeter and within the sector of the attempt by the enemy to break through the 30th Infantry Division had resulted in an front toward the southwest was frus­ extreme threat to the Demyansk area. trated. It became apparent that although Skillfully planned and, in its initial the Russian forces around Zales'ye had phase also skillfully executed, the opera­ suffered heavy losses, very large groups tions of the three parachute brigades-­ still remained hidden in the wooded area. the main body of which had infiltrated by They Were maintained by means of sup­ land and parts of which had been dropped plies dropped at night. from the air-became split up into dis­ The last ~ajor attack was made by the sociated, individual ·operations. Only in Soviets on 8 April with a strength of 600 the southern area of the pocket had they men against Nikolayerskoye. An at­ been able to create any great threat. Their tempted breakthrough toward the south­ temporary tactical successes on the north­ West was frustrated. The Soviet brigade ern and southern fronts were entirely in­ commander was captured, while among consistent with their actual strength. the 300 dead, in addition to many other Success would unquestionably have been Officers, was the Soviet commissar. He had on the Soviet side if a main effort by all ""I 84 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 three brigades against the junction point and flexible execution of decisions in this between the 30th and the 290th Infantry undertaking of the Soviet command, the Divisions (which the attack on Demyansk German forces were able to achieve a de­ would have had to follow) had been fense victory over the enemy both within formed. Since there was Jack of systematic and without.

Problems of Atomic War Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an arti.le by Dodor (General) Lothar Rendulic in "Deutsche Soldaten-Zeitung" (Germany) February 1957.

ACCORDING to prevailing doctrine, the decision in an atomic war have no concep· beginning of an atomic war will come tion of what their own country would look with one 'power making a heavy surprise like after even a very short atomic war. nuclear attack on the command, communi­ It is true that we have no dependable ex· cation, and production centers of another. periences relative to the measure of the After this atomic attack has been made destructive effects on the life and mental· on him, the adversary is assumed to be ity of the population; on their social es· quite able to strike back with similar tablishments, their towns and cities, their weapons. \ communication networks, and their produc­ The great significan~e of surprise in the tion facilities that would be produced by initial attack heightens distrust in inter­ the atomic weapons. We are only certain national politics, for surprise is most ef­ that these effects would be devastating. fective when an attack has not been antic­ Even if one of the belligerents lost his ipated. The assumption of the possibility ability to fight sooner than the other, the of striking back is justified, since the first wounds of the victor would be so great atomic attack probably would not be capa­ that he probably would not be able to ex­ ble of destroying all of a nation's airfields, ploit his "victory." We have no clear idea aircraft, and weapons. of the nature of a decision in atomic war. Two important consequences derive from This seems even more grotesque when we the possibility of striking back. One is the consider the nature of the decision in so-caned strategy of retaliation of the classical warfare, concerning which per­ United States. This possibility relieves fect clarity exists through centuries of the United States from the necessity for experiences. Here, the decision was pre· a preventive war against the Soviet Union. mised, as a~ on the retention of re­ The second consequence which comes from sources and onslderable residual combat the possibility of a counterblow is the capacity after the defeat or capitulation determent theory which claims that an of one's opponent. This permits far-reach· atomic war is accompanied with such ing freedom of\ aetion on the part of the great risk that such a war is made quite conqueror, even if not always to the ell' improbable. tent desired. However, the possibility of retaliation cannot but lead to unrestrained atomic Advantage and Disadvantage war of considerable duration accompanied How can one equally a.rmed adversary by unimaginable destructions in the ter­ become incapable of further combat sooner ritory of both adversaries. Those who than the other? Superiority of leader· count on the possibility of obtaining a ship, which was of such great importance r FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 85 in classical warfare, would hardly play ployment of the ideas and concepts proper any great part. On the contrary, an ad­ to classical warfare. Thus the fact is not vantageous situation can be a matter of recogniZed that atomic war is not the great import if it exists only on one side. means to the end that we have always as­ In the ca.se of a conflict between the United sociated with war. States and the Soviet Union, after the lat­ ter has attained a state of armament Inexpedient Theory equality, America's overseas bases, for No war objective can be of such great example, constitute an enormous advan­ significance that it is purchased at the tage. cost of the destruction of a large portion They permit attacks from all directions of one's own country and population, as at relatively short distances from the tar­ well as jeopardizing humanity's vital re­ gets as long as the Soviet Union does not quirements for survival. For this reason succeed in knocking them out with bomb­ it is quite obvious that the theory of ers or long-range missiles. By means of atomic warfare must be wrong, or at least them, simultaneous attacks a<>:ainst many inexpedient. Yet on such a theory rests, targets, producing surprise and making among other things, the security of Eu­ defense uncommonly difficult, are quite rope. possible. Medium jet bombers which are It is very questionable whether there available in great numbers, but which do would ever have been so exclusive a bas­ not possess intercontinental range, can be ing of warfare on atomic weapons if there employed in these attacks. had been any prior understanding of its At the same time, the disadvantage utterly unprecedented powers of destruc­ exists that the vital structure of the West, tion. In World War II, by tacit accord, as a result of the massing of its popula­ the nations voluntarily refrained from the tion in large cities and the concentration use of the fearful weapon of war gases. of its industries, is much more vulnerable Now, however, there exists a terrible to attacks by atomic weapons than that tragedy in the fact that men no longer of the East. One atom bomb can produce acted voluntarily but out of comp-ulsion more destruction there than severaL of when they made the atomic weapon the them in the Soviet Union. The advantages basis of warfare. and disadvantages, of which only two have This came about as a result of the com­ been mentioned, may well cause one of the plete disarmament of the west after World adversaries to become incapable of fur­ W~ II and the incomprehensible unwill­ ther combat before the other. ingness of the European states, in spite After all, the probability cannot be re- ­ of the excessive state of armament of the jected that an atomic war would end with Soviet Union, to bring their armament the exhaustion of both adversaries and back to a suitable level. The Western that there would not be anything that Powers had no force at their disposal with could be called a decision. The result of which they could have opposed the far such a war could only be that the ter­ superior Soviet ground forces. ritories of both participants would be noth­ The only way in which this could be ing but highly radioactive fields of ruins counterbalanced was by means of atomic With a biologically injured population. weapons which, along with delivery means, Although atomic .warfare represents have been continuously improved until fi­ something entirely new, something that nally the present stage has been reached. cannot be tied to experience, there seems Also, the fulfillment of the desire of all to be an inability to refrain from the em­ mankind that they be freed from the threat 86 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1911 of atomic weapons is made impossible by is intrinsically improbable. It is no less the continuing Soviet superiority in g,riund grave a matter to Europe if-after the forces. The Soviet's enormous reservoIr of attainment of. an approximate armament trained reserve; hinders any approach to balance between the two world states­ a realization of this desire, even on the the Soviet Union with only her traditional assumption of a thoroughgoing and gen­ forces, without the engagement of atomic eral disarmament. weapons, and without attacking the iUnited States, attacks Europe. The False Conclusion In such a situation the questions pre­ Since aviation is the backbone of atomic sent themselves: Will the restraints on warfare, America and the European states the employment of tactical atomic weap· have drawn the dangerously false conclu­ ons then be removed by the West? Will sion that ground forces may be neglected American aircraft begin the flight to the almost to the point where they are of in­ Soviet Union and will the US take upon significant worth. The "e'ffect of this on the herself the odium of having initiated the European ~ATO states has been that their employment of atomic weapons? Is not the assigned quota of forces has hardly been theory of deterrent, a product of US po· half reached and all continuation of arma. litical and military thought, also valid in ment in this direction is practically at a its effect on America? Will the United standstill, if we leave out of considera­ States accept the risk of inconceivable, tion the slow constitution of the German enormous destruction on her own terri· contingent. Europe is depending, in case tory to bring help to Europe-a help of need, to a decisive extent on American which, in view of the one-sided American help. It is not recognized that the Soviet armament, can only be brought by the en· atomic armament is continually drawing gagement of atomic weapons? Or will there nearer to the status of that of the United be a tacit abstinence from the use of States. In this connection we call atten­ atomic weapons as was the case with tion especially to the sl1ccessful creation of chemical weaponl!? Will Europe then be intercontinental bombers and remote-con­ able to think of defending with even the trolled missiles which can be fired from least chances of success? submarines. As a result, the United States These are very vital questions which de· is more and more in the situation where cisively affect the defense of Europe and atomic weapons could land within her yet no one is able to answer them today. own territory. This situation changes from year to year to the disadvantage of Amer­ The Catastrophic Mistake ica. One point, however, is brought out by The United States already is security these questions with complete clarity: Neg· conscious to the highest degree. In the lect of traaitional combat forces in Eu· case of an attack by atomic weapons, she rope as a result of the theory of atomic naturally will have to put into execution warfare is a catastrophic mistake. All her countermeasures on the basis of her arfnament must take all eventualities into defense. The defense of Europe, even consideration. The Western Powers are against the Russian ground forces, may concentrating, however, on pure atomic pOllsibly play only a secondary role in war-on a single possibility which, in ad· America's concept. In any event, it will dition, is based on an unproved theory be very strongly influenced by it. which is subject to change as develop· We must, however, not only think of a ments occur. war between the United States and the The idea of pure atomic warfare was Soviet Union, which as an atomic war adopted as an expediency for the purpose FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 87 of counterbalancing the .West's shortage The military power which the European of ground combat forces. When we con­ states had developed before World War: II sider that with the growth of Soviet atomic was so great that today they could doubt-. power, importance must again be attached less resist the greatly increased Soviet to the Russian superiority in ground combat forces. What was possible then forces, the only logical conclusion that should also be possible today, especially can be drawn from this development is since our very existence and freedom de­ that the ground combat forces of the West pend on it. If there existed an approxi­ eventually must be developed to the point mate balance between the traditional com­ where there will be some hope for success bat forces of both camps, the elimination in a defensive war. Such a war is quite of the atomic weapon also would be within within the bounds of possibility. the realm of possibility. Irregular Warfare Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from a copyriJ,hted article by Air Manhal Sir Robert Saundby in "Air Power" (Great Britain) Winter 1956-57.

THE development of intercontinental man nature to suppose that the nations bombers carrying nuclear weapons has of the world, realizing this, will refrain made global war more frightening and less from quarreling, or will seek to settle likely. We are now on the threshold of an their differences by negotiation or arbitra­ era in which long-range ballistic or guided tion. The' United Nations, as presently missiles carrying atomic, hydrogen, or constituted, cannot resolve internl!-tional even cobalt bombs will enable the great disputes or uphold international law. Al­ powers, if they are so minded, to destroy though there undoubtedly will be an in­ each other within a few hours, and pos­ creasing tendency for nations to seek sibly to extinguish the greater part of the agreed' solutions of many problems, they human race. The weapons now available will still strive, whenever their vital in­ are so immeasurably destructive that war terests are concerned, to gain their ends can no longer be regarded as a practicable by forcible methods short of resorting to way of settling international disputes. full-scale war. Clausewitz defined war as a "continua­ The Soviets have alrelldy appreciated tion of state policy by other means," but a this, and they will rely in the future continuation of policy that leads immedi­ mainly on some form of irregular war­ ately and inevitably to national suicide is fare, using the weapons of propaganda, an absurdity-nor can there be winners political and economic penetration, inter­ and losers in such a war. The most that nal subversion, civil war, and industrial the "winner" can hope for is to be de­ sabotage to enable them to progress to­ stroyed a few hours later than the "loser." ward their avowed aim of dominating the In these circumstances, we shall have world. They will employ overt aggression to find other means of settling interna­ only in circumstances in which they be­ tional disputes, since full-scale war has lieve that the conflict can be "localized." now, as Clausewitz prophesied that it This has been called the "cold war," and would, reached the stage of employing the it is being prosecuted by the Communists utmost violence and has become too se­ as vigorously as ever, although since Sta­ vere to be of any practical use. lin's death it has been accompanied by It would be expecting too much of hu­ some improvement in Russian diplomatic 88 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1911 manners, and camouflaged by smiles and them-:-remained in the Fourteenth Army, expressions of good will. the Japanese would have been defeated Although we are techJ:jically at peace more quickly. with Soviet Russia and Red China, be­ The Commandos of World War II were cause our old-fashioned diplomacy recog­ allowed to draw off the best junior leaders nizes only two formal states in interna­ -officers and noncommissioned officers­ tional relations-peace and war-we are who were urgently needed to strengthen really the victims of an unceasing irregu­ and train our armies after the defeat and lar warfare waged against us by the Com­ material losses that culminated in the munist bloc. Many of their actions are of Dunkerque evacuation. such a hostile nature and so damaging to The combined operations that were car· our vital' interests that in the old days ried out in 1941-43 against the coasts of they would have been regarded as intoler­ France, the Low Countries, and Scandi· able and would have led to full-scale war. navia were all failures and had no useful Now that this ultimate sanction is"in prac­ bearing on the conduct of the war except tice, no longer available, it is necessary to one-the seizure of German radar equip. find other means of ensuring our ,survival. ment from a coastal station at Bruneval We shall have to devote a great deal more which enabled us to discover the wave· thought and, if necessary, more'money to length on which their defensive ra~ar op· the solution of this problem. erated. In the past our incursions into the field Irregular warfare, however, can be of of irregular warfare have not been en­ great value when it is properly used as couraging..This is mainly because we have an adjunct to full-scale operations in suit· employed it on the periphery of an offen­ able circumstances. The best example of sive campaign overseas, as a psychologi­ this is to be found in the Soviet guerrilla cal relief from the iriexorable burden of warfare against the German occupation conducting, in accordance with sound forces and lines of communication in Rus­ strategic principles, a, long war which we sia which reached its climax in the Crimea entered unprepared and ill-equipped. in 1942-43. . History The twofold obj ect of these guerrillas Three examples at once come to mind. was to drain the German manpower so During the First World War T. E. Law­ as to weaken their front, and to deprive rence conducted a sporadic campaign on them of arms, equipment, and supplies. Allenby's right flank with Bedouin tribes­ The first object can be achieved by com­ men of the Hedjaz and the Syrian desert. pelling the enemy to deploy his manpower It was romantic and exciting, but there is to secure his rear areas, and the more no evidence that it shortened Allenby's numerous; daring, and widespread their campaign by a day, while it had political exploits, the greater will be the success of repercussions that have embarrassed our the guerrilla bands. policy in the Middle East ever since. - The second object is achieved by attack· Again, Wingate's attempt during the ing the enemy's lines of communication, last war to operate behind the Japanese by wrecking trains, setting up roadblocks front in Burma weakened the regular and ambushing convoys, and by sabotag­ forces available for the campaign, and im­ ing equipment and supplies. Each indi­ posed great losses and hardships on his vidual band of guerrillas is self-contained, own force without doing anything really striking swiftly and withdrawing into effective. It is impossible not to believe cover or mingling with the civilian popu· that had the men-picked men, many of lation. The Russian guerrillas seldom wore FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 89 uniform, unless it was German uniform, well-trained and equipped partisans would and they soon discovered that a thousand have been most valuable, the great major­ bands of 50 men each were better than 50 ity of those who could and would have bands of a thousand. helped us were dead or in German prisons. The guerrillas relied for intelligence It may be argued that our action in and for their supplies of food on their supporting the "resistance" had an in­ close contacts with the civil population. tangible moral value and while that may Their central organization was loose but well be true I do if it was worth the effective; it gave broad directions as to price paid in live an suffering. It would the important targets which were selected have been far better i e had built up a and timed to aid the general conduct of secret o~ganization, designed to become the war as far as possible. The guerrillas active only when our return to the Con­ relied mainly on the air for their supplies tinent was imminent. of weapons, ammunition, and technical Because we live in an island which has equipment. They were elusive, ruthless, not been seriously invaded since 1066, we and observed no code of military conduct. have no experience of the offensive aspect They took no prisoners, and knew that if of guerrilla warfare; nor have we much they fell into German hands they would experience of defense against guerrillas be shot. except during the last 10 years in Kenya, Malaya, and Cyprus. We are still in­ The operations of these guerrillas were clined to think in terms of the Hague tremendously effective, because all the Convention on land warfare which sharply factors needed for success were present­ distinguishes between combatants and non­ a vast territory including great forests combatants, and assumes that the indige­ and swamps, a plentiful supply of arms nous population are peaceful civilians. and ammunition, a population inspired by We have much to learn from a study of a fanatical hatred which the Germans had the German antiguerrilla warfare in Rus­ largely brought upon themselves, and long sia and Yugoslavia-if only to learn what lines of communication passing through not to do--because we may be sure that undeveloped country. in the future we shall have to deal with The irregular warfare conducted by the an increasing volume of Communist­ Yugoslavs also was successful for the inspired guerrilla activity in our colonial same reasons. But our attempts to keep territories. And in any war against the partisan warfare alive in occupied France Communist bloc-not necessarily only in and other western European countries full-scale war-we shall" have to deal with were relatively unsuccessful because the guerrillas and saboteurs even in our own right conditions did not exist. There was country. It will not be like the last war no regular warfare, going on in western when we merely had to lock up a couple EUrope, the German lines of communica­ of hundred Fallcists. We shall have to tion were much less important than those deal with thousands of Communists, Brit­ in RUssia, and the territory was too highly ish citizens owning allegiance to a hostile developed and covered with a network of foreign power, and hundreds of thousands roads and railways. of deluded Communists and Nationalists The "resistance" did little more than in our Empire overseas. irritate a limited number of Germans, and It is chiefly these problems, and those it was unfortunately very profligate of of the "cold war," which will interest us the lives of brave men and women. By the . for the next generation or so, and it is time the invasion arrived in June 1944, time that we began to think more seriously When the existence of a large number of , about them. 90 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER IIll The Offensiue Translated and digested by th.. MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major General E. Wanty in "LtArmee--La Nation" (Belgium) June 1957.

ACCORDING to Clausewitz, the object of the emergence of a tactic entirely new in an offensive strategy is the destruction of spirit and methods? r the forces of the adversary. On a tac­ Recently, General Besancon, Inspector tical level this means an advancing move­ General of the French Artillery, wrote ment against the resistance of the enemy the following judgment: to impose the attacker's will and power upon him. Within this general concept, it ., The shell i8 the weapon of the artillery. is the task of the small unit to advance Our artillery, therefore, can be content and gain territory in the direction of the only if .it has at its disp08ition a 8hell assigned objective. It is here that the use that will appropriately increase the effec. . of the atomic .weapon appears as an in­ tivene88 and force of its fire under modern fluence that might well change our accepted conditions. The appearance of the atomic traditional ideas. • explosive does not change in the least the general mis8ions that are the responsibil. The offensive is essentially movement, ity of the artillery. . maneuver, and coordinated fires put into action. The defense, however, is static, These words, coming from such an im· bound to the ground and the employment portant pen, are thought-provoking. Here of combined fires. Movement and immobil­ openly appears a tendency toward estab· ity are diametrically opposed, but the fac­ lishing continuity between the past and tor of fire is identic in nature. the future through the absorption of the It is necessary to eliminate the defensive new weapon by the artillery. Words like fire by an offensive fire. The offensive fires, neutralization, counterbattery, interdic· in power and effectiveness, must be supe­ tion, and direct support still will remain rior to the defensive. This is not an ob­ in common use. Nothing seems to have jective in itself, but only a means, a neces­ changed in methods or vocabulary. They sary means, that allows movement after are just conveniently applied to this new the fire of the defense is silenced. and incomparably powerful weapon, and An exact coordination between the fire that is all. and the movement is vitally necessary. A closer look at this appears to be nee· This is the crucial problem of the offen­ essary. sive. Strategists have been looking for the ideal solution to this problem with more Deployment and Contact or less success ever since the range of fire In the past a methodical concentration so drastically modified basic tactical con­ of forces for an attack usually was made cepts. during daylight using several routes with Has the atomic weapon already caused, units echeloned in depth. or will it cause, a revolution in the tradi­ The range limit of the artillery of the tional methods of the offensive? Is the enemy permitted virtually free movement atomic weapon the "absolute" weapon solv­ of forces except within close proximity to ing the requirement for superior fire­ the battle Position~ut the introduction power? Will it replace the heavy support of airpower to the b tlefield complicated weapons of the traditional artillery? In this problem to a e en greater extent, other words, have we already witnessed and the fact must now be accepted that FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 91 any target of sufficient density is worth latter eventually may be able to give a an attack by missiles or planes with or clear picture of the enemy positions even without atom bombs. <, before the actual contact is established. Forming up for the attack in the tradi­ In case it has been decided to use atomic tional way has become "unthinkable." weapons for the attack, it will not be as Larger units must double the area covered necessary as it was in the past to know by the marching~ or attack formation, and the details of defensive organization of extend their columns in order to disperse the enemy. Not long ago it was necessary in consideration of the radius of effect of to knock the enemy out by successive and an atomic projectile. Even with such wide carefully planned concentrations accord­ dispersion great losses will have to be ex­ ing to a time schedule, but now we can pected. In most of the cases the solution' count on the atomic weapon to destroy adopted will be based mainly upon the the entire defense position instantly. In one factor of "security." principle, it should suffice to know more It appears that traditional firepower or less accurately the surface extensions still will be necessary to crush the small of the latter. Then a point zero has to be frontline enemy forces that will probably determined in order to catch all essential escape atomic fire, since the latter has to elements in the zone of maximum effective­ consider the safety of friendly troops. ness of the atomic burst. This brings us back to the old concept of This does not mean, however, that the contact. It is thus doubly necessary to stay reconnaissance loses its value. It is still in close contact with the enemy forces. This just as vital as it is difficult. also facilitates obtaining an extensive and Close contact also was necessary in or­ accurate picture of the enemy dispositions der to remain informed about the effect and determining in detail the different ele­ of preparatory fires. The loss caused by ments of his forces. these fires has not usually been too great. In the past a close contact was both In the past, after some 10 minutes at most, necessary and realizable with traditional the defense could again find its courage arms. It was necessary because the prep­ and reengage in combat; then, carefully aration (destruction or neutralization) de­ controlled final protective fires could play manded planning of the shift of fire con­ havoc with the attack. This was the major centrations from one target to another; reason why France retained, until 1940. and realizable because these fires of prep­ the doctrine of combined tank and infan­ aration required only relatively short and try employment to solve the problem of reduced safety distances. All in all, they th,e "last 300 yards." left only a dangerous zone of about 300 The events of 1940, however, produced yards that had to be crossed by the in­ a definite development on the German side fantry with only the support of its own with regard to closing with the enemy. The organic arms and tanks. neutralizing action of Stukas and the mass Contact Today employment of airborne troops at the po­ Does the idea crf contact accomplish the sitions of th~ Albert Canal facing Maas­ same thing today? This question is well tricht, for example, took the place of the Worth discussion. frontal attack. Technical evolution has developed new In other words, there was no systematic means of Mercenaries " , 'DI,Iested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an artlele by Lieutenant Colonel A. Green in the "Australian Army Journal" March 1957.. . ' , / IT IS no surprise that two such eminent Conscripted Armies pioneer exponents of tank warfare as It is accepted generally that tire General Charles A. de Gaulle and General growth of great conSCript armies, a Sir Giffard Martel have been the most voc- European and American development, ~ ative proponents of the elite long-service was facilitated by the industrial revolu. professional army of our times. General tions of the last century and the resultant de Gaulle, in his forthright Vers' fArmee improved capacity for equipping and de Metier, primarily was concerne'li with moving such armies. Citizen obligations French conditions and needs before Worid to serve in ti'me of war had existed in War II; and Sir Giffard Martel, in his law since feudal times, but only with 'postwar writings, has naturally directed the support of 19th century factories his theories toward a solution of purely and railways could entire national popu· British military problems, particularly lations be utilized in war. At the same British commitments on the Continent of time, improved political and administra· Europe. tive machinery rendered the system ef· It is now quite clear that a similar feative. school of thought is emerging from It was fortunate also that the handling among some of the most thoughtful and of the earlier weapons produced by the experienced Australian staff corps offi- factory system, principally the ritle and cers. They feel that a compact, well- bayonet, were adequately, if not super· trained, and well-equipped professional latively, mastered by conscript soldiers army would be more appropriate for the serving for two or three years. Artillery fulfillment of Australian defense obliga- presented certain difficulties and doubt· tions than the existing larger Australian less the device of the preferential as· Military Forces, compounded as they are signment of the better men to artillery of small regular units and cadres with units compensated for this deficiency. large complements of Reserves and Na- It is noteworthy that, although there tional Servicemen. was some press-ganging, British armies It would, of course, be unreasonable from the Napoleonic Wars until halfway and disappointing to expect professional through World War I, remained basically soldiers to prefer amateurs or conscripts voluntary since Britain was predomi. were there any simple choice. Regular nantly a naval power. Hence the thesis officers, by their upbringing and tradi- that one volunteer is worth three, four, tion, are unremitting perfectionists, and ,or six conscripts, depending upon the mood the achievement of their technical aspi- of the expert: from which it might also rations is greatly facilitated b,y a IQng- be deduced, in parenthesis, that one regu, service professional army. Unfortunately lar long-service man was worth say two for them, under Australian economic and last-minute volunteers. political conditions, the choice is not a The great battles in France and Flan· simple one, and their proposal requires ders and static lines of defense played the most careful examination to deter- havoc with the equations of military mine whether it is valid, wholly or quality, and forced most of, the armies partly. engaged there to resort to conscription. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 97 One of the notable exceptions was, of be effectively deployed and maneuvered. course, Australia, whose referenda on the On the other hand, the mechanized conscription issue constitute a precedent armies would demand the finest' human which no thinking soldier or politician material, intensively trained and hard­ can ignore. Nevertheless, we see a fairly ened for prompt dynamic employment. constant tradition of the volunteer stand­ There is no doubt that much of their ing army, backed by volunteers and ter­ prognostication came true in World War rilorials (Commonwealth Military Forces II. The effective battle-winning elements in Australia, or nonpermanent Active Mi­ of the German Army were the mecha­ litia in Canada). nized forces which cut through the old­ As soon as World War I ended, the fashioned armies of Poland, France, and old British RegUlar Army ~as revived, initially, Russia, with convincing ease. and conscription was only reintroduced However, probably of necessity, the con­ when Hitler's war was inevitable. The version was not complete, and the Ger­ French remained true to their conscript man and Russian Armies notably re­ tradition, but the Germans were tem­ tai~ed a numerical preponderance of porarily forced to maintain a restricted slower and more primitive formations professional army of 100,000. Having until the end of the w~. derived great refinement of quality from Since that war ended the British pre­ this Reichswehr, the Germans reverted to occupation with hot and cold war and large·scale conscription after the as­ imperial poli\!ing has proved costly in sumption af power by Hitler. men and material. The arguments of General Martel in favor of a regular Trend to Professionalism force to provide the British contribution At this stage the more advanced sol­ to NATO and imperial garrisons appeal diers, notably J. F. C. Fuller in England to the soldier and civilian alike. Peace­ anp Charles de Gaulle in France,' con­ time conscription is foreign to British ceived a new ideal of smaller, yet more tradition and inimical to the economic powerful, armies of great mobility body as well as to the career of the in­ manned by technical military experts. This dividual civilian. need came about because the armament If a sufficient force of professional industry had developed equipment and soldiers could be found for the task of weapons of such power and complexity the British Army apparently.everybody fhat lesser numbers of more intelligent would be pleased: but that happy state and better-trained soldiers were required has not proved ·attainable. to produce a given volume of fire in a much more mobile form. Defects of the Conscript The instruments of this policy-the It is relevant to consider the principal airplane, the tank, the machinegun, and objections of the professional soldier to the vehicle-were more expensive than the general mass of conscript soldiers. the rifle, bayonet, and ammuniti'on boots It is a common allegation that, because on which the soldier had relied prin­ the conscripts are enlisted compulsorily, cipally. The new forces, maneuvering they are necessarily unwilling. This was across the land like naval fleets at sea, certainly true at certain periods in the would render entrenched infantry "and French and the Italian Armies, and horse-drawn transport completely obso­ even in the German Army, if we are to lete. The great nations-in-arms, accord­ believe a certain type of war novelist. ing to these theorists, could no longer It is hard to define all the factors that 98 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1957 must exist. before one volunteer becomes democratic institutions, must exercise the putative equal of two, three, o'r six every economy in human life. They do conscripts. Much depends on national not apply to those Asian and totalitarian tradition, morale, and the political and armies which subscribe to the doctrine military handling of the conscript. The of saturating the defense in "human sea" Prussians were effective conscripts. It tactics, although neither can they totally must, however, be conceded that a volun­ escape the influence of such proiressive teer generally will display more enthu­ ideas. siasm for the task than the conscript; XChange of military thought is not indeed, by the act of ~olunteering he has s ject to national frontiers or customs already done so. bt rriers. The Finns taught the Rus· Another drawback .suffered by a con­ sians the finer points of winter warfare script force is that, almost inevitably, around Lake Ladoga in 1940, and the despite modern selection procedures, it Russians were soon busy,. teaching the must contain a de~ite proportion of Germans tlj,e same lessons during the inapt soldiers. They !nay be physically winter of 1941. It cannot be assumed that fit and, officially, mentally sound, and the adverSe moral effects of -conscription yet prove misfits. As they must be placed upon the Anglo-Saxon youth will be in units they have a disproportionately equally apparent in the young Musco· bad influence on other soldiers. Above vite who has been reared in a totally all, the greatest defect of the conscript different domestic ,and intellectual en· in the eyes of the career officer is the vironment. inadequate time available for his train­ ing and stibsequent integration into his Virtues of Conscription unit. Powerful influences were needed to Normally, the system can only allow force the entire Anglo-Saxon world to time for a concentrated and mass-pro­ conscript its manpower for war and cold ducing recruit training, whereas that war. Therefore, 'there must be some vir· most important phase of the trained sol­ tues in the system in the present con· . dier's maturing-the welding into the text. Probably the greatest and most unit and subunit team, and the produc­ obvious of these is the elementary jus· tion of good noncommissioned officers and tice of imposing the· grave burdens of unit specialists-has to be a hurried af­ defense equally over all sections of the fair. It is equally deplored that the great population. Two generations have seen numbers of partially trained soldiers pro­ the most morally and physically fit of duced by universal training cannot al­ the nation. go forth voluntarily to suc· ways be fully equipped by modern stand­ cessive decimations. Nations can afford ards. Technical ingenuity may, in time, neither the illitial loss of such cadres overcome this handicap by such devices nor the subsequent rancor engendered as the Sten submachinegun and the re­ by unequal sacrifice, no more than in· coilless field gun, which are the products dustry and good administration can with· of lighter, rather than heavier, industry. stand the unnecessary dislocations of a It is pertinent to note that these ob­ voluntary system. jections to the levee en masse are essen­ The second virtue is, therefore, the tially those voiced by modern Western ability of the system to apportion the soldiers who base their thinking upon aptitudes and skills of the nation in the attainment of maximum firepower priority of war tasks, provided~an effi­ and mobility, and, being responsible to cient system of personnel selection, allot· FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 99 ment, .and industrial mobilization exists. every resource must be carefully har­ It is also important that, so long as our bored. sturdy democracy functions, the con­ Britain and the United States are ICripted soldier is serving, not at the highly developed and populous terri­ behest of the military hierarchy or the tories. Even Canada-of comparable politicians, but of the voter-himself. area to Australia, but comfortably con­ This is in itself a great· safeguard of his tiguous with the United States and more freedom 'and interests. remote from all but the transpolar From the purely military point of threat-is better populated than Aus­ view the system commends itself because tralia. Moreover, Canadian and British it is, under present conditions, the only defense in the North Atlantic is inte­ means of producing forces of the re­ grated fully with that of the major part­ quired strength and, equally important, ner. Such integration and such allies are the reserves for those forces. Thus dur­ not so easy to achieve in the southwest ing World War II the British Common­ Pacific or in southeast Asia. wealth nations and the United States Australian policy during the past 10 had to resort to these methods, and, in years h.as required balanced forces of some form, they have retained the system all three services; regular components during the current uneasy peace. At the being permanently available for occupa­ same time, it is incontestable' that the tion of enemy territory, and cooperation French armies-badly launched, ill­ in UN, ANZUS, ANZAM, and SEATO. found, and nurtured in the school of Thus by various devices a total of all static defensive doctrine--pI:oved singu­ larly unsuccessful in 1940, and a very regular services of about 50,000 has been poor argument for the system of con­ maintained more or less constantly. scription. These forces actually constitute only the cold war and token forces. Behind them There has been much criticism by pre­ war regular officers of the postwar Na­ are the more basic defense forces, mainly tional Servicemen in the British Army; of the army, required to be available for but impartial critics of these troops in full-scale warfare, and consisting of a lIalaya and Korea consider that in many combination of volunteer citizen elements cases they compare more than favorably with the bulk of rank and file being found with the prewar British regular soldier, from National Servicemen. particularly in intelligence and keenness. It is certain that without National Service the present force of approxi­ The Forces We Need mately three divisions could not be kept The defense problems and the man­ in being at full strength. Moreover, in power difficulties of Australia are not view of the critical time factor of modern generally analogous to those of Great war, which may be accentuated by the Britain, Canada, or the United States. confusion of nuclear warfare, it is ac­ Isolated, and adjacent to southeast Asia, cepted that there is unlikely to be a year Australian attention is focused on im­ of respite for training and deployment mediate local threats of real urgency in such as the Australian Imperial Forces avast and absorptive terrain. Her inter­ was given in World War II. Therefore, nal development makes a great demand two criteria are important in the con­ on the available labor force. The quantity sideration of the type of army we need: and quality remaining for all the de­ first, what is the size of force required, lense forces normally is inadequate, and and second, by what system can we 100 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951 achieve the requisite quality and effi­ a higher proportion of population than ciency in that force? the civilian economies of the United In the worst case, the Australian Mili­ Kingdom or the United States. Making tary Forces could, in global emergency, allowance for this, and the naval and air be called upon to operate practically force share of manpower, four divisional alone, with perhaps only a division from slices in peacetime from a population of Great Britain or the United States co­ nine million seems a feasible, althougb operating for a limited period. As the not an easy, target to reach provided the nearest force to southeast Asia it could electorate recognizes the validity of the be expected to provide the comm~-;:;d and armed forces' demands. services for the force. In such circum­ Comparison of Methods stances a force less thtm a corps of three divisions is unthinkable. Meanwhile, Few will dispute the necessity for these there is a constant role for at least one forces, but there rarely will be aglreement brigade, such as was positioned in Japan on the best method for obtaining them. and later in Korea, for early deployment The main choices before us are by: which must be held in immediate readi­ 1. Regular enlistments, that is, Aus­ ness. tralian Regular Army. 2. Voluntary citizen service-Common­ Moreover, in this nuclear age a local wealth Military Forces. home and civil defense force comptising 3. National Service training of limited coastal, antiaircraft, and heavy rescue duration. units about the equivalent of at least 4. Selective Service on the lines adopted another division is necessary. By these in the United States. calculations the existing Australian Reg­ The regular army, in whole units and ular Army and Commonwealth Military formations, is a recent growth in Aus· Forces are not excessive; in fact, they tralia that has established itself rapidly probably are insufficient. Furthermore, in public esteem. Most of the credit for the tropical theaters in whiCh we are this success must go to army schools most likely to operate demand full and fit which have accomplished the transforma­ cadres with a high proportion of similar tion from the interim army. reinforcement units. AU must be im­ The old elite cadres of the prewar staff mediately available for service, not in and instructional corps were more limited the military chrysalis stage, or as para­ in scope than the Australian Regular graphs in the mobilization handbooks, Army and had less impact on national but in solid flesh and blood. life. They achieved the highest quality by It may be contended that such forces selective recruitment and training. They are beyond Australian resources of man­ were held in the highest regard profes­ power and material. In war it is con­ sionally by other British Commonwealth sidered feasible to produce at least one .armies, and are still· bearing excellent divisional slice of about 50,000 all arms, fruit to this day. as well as naval and air components, Regular forces are the logical instru­ from each million of the population. The ments for the formation of instructional Russians, with smaller establishments cadres, staffs, and overseas garrisons. and relying on more primitive yet ef­ Nevertheless, it is clear that an ~ustraIia fective logistics, could double or even whose amazing economic development can triple that number of Qivisions. The in­ only be compared with that of the United ternal needs of. the vast territory of the States in the 1860's can produce only a Australian Commonwealth must absorb limited number of regular army recruits. FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 101 This experience is a close 'paraIIel to that ily on the achievements of these fore­ of the United States Navy and -Army runners, from Monash to Morshead, and during the latter half of the 19th century, their mark is, conspicuous on Australian when the regular forces faced insuperable public life, as well as in military affairs. recruiting difficulties but managed to keep Unfortunately, the wholly voluntary a strong and effective cadre of staff of­ Commonwealth Military Forces can never ficers in being against the emergency of produce the number of soldiers needed, at· major war. Civilian employment is too the time required, for modern war. This competitive for the services in Australia. shortcoming is accentuated by the stress In regard to some of the manpower pres­ of modern professional and business life.. ently recruited, it seems unlikely that The good, mature man whom the army re­ even a doubling of the Australian Army quires as an officer or noncommissioned pay could double the strength and main­ officer is likely to be entering the most' tain the quality of the Australian Regular demanding phase of his vocational and Army. domestic life. He cannot spare much time The necessity to accept some substand­ or energy for the army. Governments ard recruits in' a mercenary army was have always souglit the maximum sup­ well-known in the old British Army, and port from citizen forces, primarily be­ is becoming more familiar to the Aus­ cause they are cheap, and partly because tralian Regular Army. Canada contrives they are regarded as politically innocuous. to maintain a divisional slice of regular There arises now some doubt of the soldiers in being, including two brigades degree of technical perfection, in suqh overseas at one time, and apparently has units as armor or electrical and mechani­ not, despite her greater population and cal engineers, 'which can be expected from prosperity, found it easy. It is probable Commonwealth Military Forces units, that the Australian Regular Army now is although they have hitherto been notably at the maximum .strength feasible. strong in field engineering. Over-all it The voluntee~ traditions of Australia cannot be immediately expected that such are well.exemplified in the Sudan, the units will ever be up to a war establish­ Boer War, and the two World Wars. ment with fully trained soldiers. There also is a willingness to accept There is reason to believe that only conscription in approved circumstances. small specialist elements or individuals Before World War I Australia was the can achieve complete readiness for war first British nation to introduce compUl­ under the voluntary citizen system; thus, sory training, and has twice repeated the although we are not informed of the pro­ process in peace since then. It might be portion of citizen pilots who fought so said that the tradition is broadly one of successfully in the Battle of Britain, we compulsion for training and for wars do know, from the number of auxiliary threatening the mainland, and of volun­ air force units on the Royal Air Force teering for imperial wars. order of battle and the intake of volun­ The volunteer has the valuable quality teer reserve pilots up to that time, that a of enthusiasm, which is to the soldier high proportion of that corps d'ilite was what charity is to the soul-an'indispen­ nonregular. aable leavening. He is naturally the easiest There are many indispensable special­ man to train because he wants to train ists such as doctors, dentists, petroleum himself. Added to this, citizen units at­ engineers, and radio and radar techni­ tract the cream of civilian talent from a cians who are best recruited from civilian broad selection of professions and trades. - counterparts. Moreover, in an individual­ Australian military tradition draws heav­ istic outdoor-loving people like the Aus­ 102 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER I9l7 tralian, the proportion of natural soldiers that standard required, individually and is high but not so high as to dispense collectively, of an expeditionary force with training as some propagandists unit. imagine. At the same time the Australian Mili. We cannot afford to ignore the Common­ tary Forces seem able to accomplish more wealth Military Forces as a source of with their trainees than the Royal Aus. military strength; but, unfortunately, we tralian Air Force, which does nott appear can no longer rely on it for the bulk of to integrate the trainees into squadron our force. In home defense it might pro­ establishments. The air force is apparently duce most valuable and effective forces training large numbers of its quota in similar to the Boer commandos or Home airfield defense duties which could well Guards, but for immediate global employ­ be undertaken by soldiers. It is this fail· ment a definite standard of organization, ure to reach a fully proficient state in training, and reinforcements must be units which dismays many critics of the imposed. In the Australian Military existing system. They find, after experi. Forces the role of the Commonwealth ence in Korea and Malaya or from ex· Military Forces is comparable to that of change duty in NATO formations, that the Australian Regular Army in the qual­ the statutory period of training is not ity it contributes, and in the limitations sufficient to produce a battleworthy unit of its numerical strength. Mot:eover, the and formation. The gunner who is 'barely Australian Military Forces must continue beyond the trained recruit stage, the to draw the majority of their o$lIers from driver who can drive but cannot maintain these dedicated amateurs. his vehicle. and the weak junior infantry National Service was the deliberate leader-all bespeak an army unfit to take declared will of the Australian people, the field immediately under modern con· and fortunately has been acclaimed as ditions. gen"er:ally successful by the public. There Moreover. the critic believes that many is sometimes a suspicion that this public trained soldiers will never be available in success is based more on the social than war either because. under existing legisla· on the military effects of the training. In tion. they will not volunteer to serve over· an era of endemic adolescent delinquency, seas or because they work in essential service training plays an important part civilian occupations likely to be reserved in orienting, disciplining, and educating Therefore. the critic sees the National our youth. This can only be a byproduct, Service scheme as a qualified success; and soldiers must also be satisfied with its which is both militarily slightly wasteful. military efficacy. and falls short of the desired standards Fourteen weeks' total training in depots of military proficiency. compares unfavorably with the 16 weeks' The fourth system of raising armies recruit training once deemed necessary in that is open to us is Selective Service, simpler times before a regular soldier . similar to the American practice. Under joined his unit. Training methods have this system. when the eligible civilians improved and with increased unit train­ exceed the number of recruits needed. ing in National Service battalions, the the necessary conscripts are obtained by trainee reaches a remarkably good stand­ selection and subsequent lottery. This sys· ard of general and unit training. Subse­ tern has two great advantages: it has an quently, his two annual camps and his element of fairness so long as the lottery home training refresh and contiilUe' his is properly conducted; and. it brings in teaching, but it must be emphasized that only as many recruits as the service r~· they are not sufficient to bring him to quires. Politically it is disliked because It FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 103.

ultimately leads to uneven acceptance of will be necessary for them after they the defense obligation. lfo'ave their units to mainwin them in fit­ Nevertheless, it is an effective instru­ ness for reinforcement. Selective service­ ment to raise the forces to predetermined men would also be available for overseas strengths with manpower of specified garrisons and forces in peace. qualities. It is beJieved that if this system 4. The remaining fit males should be were used in conjunction with a longer given compulsory home service training period of service, a field force of the over a period of five to six years in home right size and correct quality could be and civil defense units of the Common­ ensured for the AustraJian Military wealth Military Forces. Forces. Therefore, this system should not 5. Deferments should be given to spe­ be rejected despite political objections. cialists such as medical students, engi­ neers, and electronic workers to enable A Plan them to be called up as fully skilled men It has been shown that the Australian and to take their appropriate places in Military Forces require three main cate­ establishments, which would benefit the gories of formatioh: standing garrisons armed services and the civilian populace and overseas contributions in peace; field equally. This measure, coupled with Se­ forces for war; and home I and civil de­ lective Service, would be a great improve­ fense forces for war. It then follows that ment in manning the navy and air force these forces could be effectively manned which seem to find difficulty in employing in the following manner: their present quotas of unskilled National 1. Regular components must be raised, Service trainees. either as units or cadres, in all three cate­ This proposal would meet the legitimate gories of force. Nevertheless, from the desire for a regular army which the re­ demographic reasons given earlier, the formers express. It would not, of course, bulk of soldiers must be found from other be a wholly professional army. It might sources. be unpopular with some politicians but it 2. Volunteer Commonwealth Military will be found correct in the ultimate Forces soldiers should be employed in verdict of history. field forces whenever they are available The perfectionists, whether in France, at the field force standard; otherwise, Britain, or Australia, who have sought they should be made available for home their ideal in a professional army, confuse and civil defense units. the means with the end. The means may 3. Selective servicemen will then pro­ be several, according to the circumstances vide the balance of soldiers required in and the country, but the end is one-to field force units. After extensive training, produce a battleworthy army. Our best from one to two years, in formed units war material, to paraphrase the late and formations, their technical and tac­ Marshal Werner von Blomberg speaking tical training will be complete, junior to Field Marshal William Ironside, is that leaders can be selected and seasoned, and produced by the mothers of .our nation. the mobilization process accordingly sim­ Who can doubt that that material, intel­ plified. Two years in units may sound a ligently and purposefully p,repared, will long time, but, in fact, may barely suffice. play its part irrespective of what we call Refresher training in an active reserve the system? 104 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBERl9I! Mutual Security Planning by the American Republics Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from a report prepared by the Inter-Amerlean Defense Board.

THE Inter-American Defense Board, as ganization of American States, w~ich, in a symbol of Western Hemisphere solidar­ turn, spawned the military agency of ity and as an agency of Western Hemi­ today, the Junta lnteramericana de De· sphere Defense, is a somewhat silent lema. partner in the maintenance of world In the early days of Western Hemi· peace-silent at least as far as the daily sphere collaboration, the problems were press is concerned. The concentration of fundamentally economic. In a milita1'j' public attention at the current focal points sense we rested securely behind the na~ of East-West contacts in Europe, Africa, ural barriers of two great oceans, bu~ ~nd Asia is quite natural. The contribu­ tressed as they were by the Monroe Dpe­ tion of the "silent partner" to the ultimate trine and its announeed divorcement from democratic goal of peace and security is, the conflicts of the Old World. Conse· however, no less significant. quently, the requirement for close mili­ The roots of the Inter-American De­ tary collaboration did not exist, primarily fense Board reach far back into the his­ because there was no immediate or fore­ tory and have their origin in the many seeable threat to our individual or co~ struggles for freedom in the Western lective security. . Hemisphere. These roots antedate all of As the war clouds gathered in the 1980's, the "grand alliances" which seem to be however, it was evident to all that the occupying the center of the stage in pop­ so-called "advances" of civilization pre­ ular attention today. vented a likely conflict from being eon­ The development of solidl!rity among fined to the Continent of Europe. Modern the 21 American Republics was a natural warfare required more than men and outgrowth of the indomitable spirit of rifles. It required a more extensive base the great leaders who made possible the of raw materials, industrial capacity, and independence of those republics. After political support. It followed, then, that having achieved freedom from colonial the belligerent parties would seek the servitude, they turned their thoughts recognition and collaboration of the world'S toward winning international respect and uncommitted balance. consideration. They took positive steps to When war finally began in 1939, the forge bonds among themselves to assure vast Potelltials of the Western Hemi· the continuation of their newly won sphere as a source of urgent supplies be­ liberty and individual sovereignty. came increasingly obvious. The American Inter-American cooperation was mani­ nations were faced with a choice of ideol­ fested for the first time in 1826 when : ogies. They had to choose a course of ae· Simon Bolivar, the great liberator, con­ tion which would guarantee for them the voked the first meeting of representatives liberties their ancestors had struggled so of the young American countries at the hard to achieve. They had to make their Congress of Panama. It was not, however, decision realistically and then undertake until 1889 that the "International Union steps to ensure the validity of this deci· of American RepUblics" was created in sion. < Washington. This was the forerunner of In July'1940 the Foreign Ministers of the Pan American Union and of the Or­ the American Republics, meeting in Us· FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 105· vana, declared that an attack by.a non­ ernments to {ltudy and to recommend to American state against any American them the measures necessary for the dec state would be cons}dered an attack feme of the continent. against :111 the signatory nations. This tirst Thus was born the Inter-American De­ wartime decision pledged all to a common fense Board which held its inaugural ses­ objective and announced to the world that sion in the Pan American Union Building the hemisphere must be regarded as an in Washington, D. C., on 30 March 1942. entity by any aggressor. Then, as a result The appointed delegates of the 21 of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor American Republics were organized as a

The home of the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington, D. C. in 1941, the Foreign Ministers met at Rio board on democratic principles. Each de Janeiro in January 1942 and drafted national delegation was treated as a "nit agreements now generally referred to as whose size and composition was determined tbe "Rio Treaty." Among their recom­ by the government it represented. Deci­ mendations to their respective govern­ sions were to be made by majority vote, ments was: each delegation, being entitled to one vote, " . the immediate meeting in Washing­ with no provision for a veto. ton of a commi8sion of military and ~aval During the years of World War II the technicians appointed by each of the gov­ board made recommendations on such 106 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER Uil subjects as the elimination of clandestine tary collaboration was firmly laid. telecommunication stations, procedures An inter-American conference" met in to facilitate the transit of military air­ Mexico City in 1945 to evaluate the work craft, security against sabotage, produc­ done by the board and to plan its future, tion of strategic materials, naval and The delegates recognized the board's value airbases, antisubmarine defense, and as an international agency. They resolved standardization (of materiel, training, and that the board as then constituted should organization) and utilization of man­ continue its functions until a permanent power. By the end of the war the Inter­ agency should "be established.

The 21 sovereign nations of the Inter-American Defense Board combine efforts for the common goal of mutual defense American Defense Board had established At a conference held in Bogota in 1948 itself as a valuable agency for 'coordinat- the Organization of American States was ing defense measures and as focal point created with a charter in harmony witb for the interchange of ideas on hemi- that of'the United Nations. The Organiza· spheric military matters. Except for sub- tion of American States' charter provided marine warfare conducted in its coastal that the Inter-American Defense Board wat~rs, the American Continent was never should continue to act as the organ of prep· threatened by the ravages of war. How- aration for collective defense against ago ever, the groundwork for full-scale mili- gression. The participating nations agree! FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS 107 that the board would undertake to de­ planning. Recognizing the ever-changing velop plans for the security of the hemi­ developments in modern warfare, the sphere in addition to. continuing its role board is constantly projecting its thoughts as a collective advisory body. so as to maintain balance with reality The next step in expanding the mis­ and the task the board has accomplished sion of the Inter-American Defense Board in this field is vital to the security of was taken at the Fourth Meeting of Con­ every American country. sultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs In its present organization the board held in Washington in April 1951. Meet­ consists of a Council of Delegates, a ing "because of the need for prompt ac­ Technical Staff, and a Secretariat..The tion by the republics of this hemisphere senior position is that of Chairman of the

INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (POLITICAL AttO MIlITARY ASPlCTS)

INTER AMERICAN CONFERENCES

SPECIALIZED Yo CONFERENCES

~ECW. TECHNICAL PROBLEMS

SPECIALIZED OR'ANIZATlONS 5P[CW. TECHMCru. FUNCTIONS

for common defense against the aggres­ Council of Delegates. The Regulations of sive activities of international commu­ the Board require that the chairman be nism" the ministers drafted a resolution "an officer of the Armed Forces of the of Inter-American Military Cooperation country in which the board functions." and charged the Inter-American Defense The chairman is assisted by a vice chair­ Board with preparing and keeping up to man who, by regulation, must be of a date the military planning for the common nation other than that.of the chairman_ defense. Plans formulated by the board The board operates on a modest budget. were to be submitted to the several govern­ Its funds are ,provided by the Organiza­ ments for their consideration and decision. tion of American States to which all the Since that time the board has carried member nations contribute in accordance on its work in the field of progressive with an equitable formula. Like all mod­ 108 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1951

ern military estab1i~hments, it is con­ significance of the board's actions. In. stantly plagued by, problems of economy. tensification of the board's planning role It is constantly fighting the battle of is evident on all sides. Similarly, the in. "maxim)lm output at minimum cost." creased requirement for the formulation As indicated earlier, the free nations of detailed subsidiary plans on an in· of the Western Hemisphere have never' tegrated basis is encouraging the inves. before e subject to a threat from abroad tigation and development of improved Il!il. to the exten hich world communism is itary defense measures throughout the threatening tod y. Because of the often hemisphere. insidious nature of the threat there hal! In summary, it can be said that the been a reluctance or an inability on the board is the natural product of evolution. part of some peoples to appreciate fully It is a development of time and circum· its true significance and the requirements stance. Its original mission has been ex· for counteraction. Fortunately though, panded and the internal organization has th!! broadminded and objectively analytical undergone changes. In 1949 it was de· leaders of the member nations have a fined as ". . . a military international complete understanding of the dangers. agency, subordinate to the governments of They have reflected their' concern for the American states, for consultation and these dangers as well as their confidence preparation in matters of collective ·self· in a board as an instrument of collective defense." Fundamentally, the essential security by their interest in the board's character of the board has remained the work and in their assignment of officers to same. The keynote has always been, and represent their respective nations in the continues to be, solidarity and coopera· council and to serve as members of the tion among the armed forces of the 21 board's International Staff and Secretariat. sister republics. It was never intended that the Inter­ For mOre than a century the Western American Defense Board should exercise Hemisphere has been the most secure direct detailed control' over the armed region on earth. The Inter-American De· forces engaged in the defense of the West­ fense Board is making its contribution ern Hemisphere. The many complex fac­ toward preserving this security, based on tors of hemisphere geography and the principles of solidarity through mutual diverse nature of the direct threats which understanding and mutual appreciatiQll. are involved have a marked influence on The board is attempting to provide the the board's organization. As a result, the coordination of objectives and the harmoltY board has deliberately confined its tech­ of action that transform dreams into reo nical and professional activities to the alities. broad principles of hemispheric defense But above all else, the Inter-American with emphasis on standardization of doc­ Defel'lse Board is a school of continental trine, training, and organization to the good will. It is a melting pot where tech· extent that the common purpose can best nical knowledge and traditional concepts be served. The detailed planning is' con­ are fused for the common good. It is an sidered to be a unilateral ,or regional func­ organization in which the military men tion within the broad framework of the of the continent learn to understand one board's coordinating role. The passage of another, to work tog~ther, and to devote time, reflecting as it does tqe .tremend~us themselves to the achievement of the ideal progress being made in the field of mili­ of a modern New World, confident of its tary development, has given an increased Plfaceful and orderly development in an tempo to the board's activity and to the a~mosphere of collective security. THE EMPEROR CHARLES THE FIFTH. THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN COMMU­ By Royall Tyler. 375 Pages. Essential NISM. By Theodore Draper. 498 Pages. Books, Inc., Fair ~awn, New Jer!ley. $7.50. The Viking Press, Inc., New York. $6.75. By MAJ RAYM~)ND O. MILLER, In! By MAJ RAY J, YANTIS, In! The biography of Charles V is'a study This initial volume of a series of studies in frustration. of the influence of communism in Ameri­ In Charles were united the thrones of can life, to be prepared with the supp'ort Spain and of the many holdings of the of the Fund for the Republic, is concerned Hapsburgs. He bought election to the title with the development of the Communist of Holy Roman Emperor and so plunged Party, USA, up to 1923. Beginning with himself into financial difficulties that early leftwing efforts, the meanderings of plagued him until death. His struggles movements and individuals as they drift with Catholic France, Moslem Turkey, toward communism, develop ihe Party, and Protestant Germany further'increased and come under the complete control of his debts. He'tried to reconcile Luther and Moscow are pictured. Particularly notable the Pope but met obstinacy on either are the struggles between "foreign lan­ side. A loyal Catholic, he attacked heresy guage" groups and "English-speaking" within his personal domains with the vigor groups, between advocates of a legal ver­ of the time-yet the Papacy thwarted his sus an illegal party, and between "un­ political and diplomatic endeavors. His compromising principled" Communists and one legitimate son and successor to his those who believed in expediency toward Spanish crowns he recognized as incom­ accomplishment of the desired goal. petent-but he was tired and abdicated in This is not a book for the expose seeker. his son's favor. Mr. Drape'r attempts to present events The military reader will find the many as they occurred, in a straightforward ap­ campaigns of Charles mentioned in pass­ proach, To an extent the infiltration of ing only as background for the other the Party by representatives of the:Jus­ themes-family, church, politics, and di­ tice Department and the post-World War plomacy. I legal difficulties are told. However, "in­ Students of history will derive pleasure terest raisers" are confined largely to ma­ and knowledge from this book, other read­ nipulations within the Party. el'S Who are tenacious and patient may do Extensively I;eferenced, this book will the same, but many average readers with be of valuable help to those who would limited time probably will follow Charles' understand the American Communist lead and quit before they are through. movement. 110 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER~,~951

HISTOIRE DE LA TACTIQUE ET DE LA . RETIREMENT FROM· THE ARMED STRATEGIE. By Captain Rene Pichene. fORCES. Prepared by a Committee of 222 Pages., Editions de la Pensee Moderne, Retired Army, Navy, and Air Force Offi. Paris, France. cers. 431 Pages. The Military Service Pob· By VI' COL JEAN P. MESLET, French Army lishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa. $4.95. This French-language volume presents By LT COL ROBERT M·. WALKER, ~I·ty an accurate study of tactics and strategy Unless death intervenes, retirement is from antiquity to World War I. It demon­ inevitable. Over 98 percent of all officers strates the importance and development with permanent commissions will retire of the presently known principles of war in their early fifties, and many of them and the manner i~ which various military will be unprepared for this major change personalities applied them. in their way of life. This book contains the advice of many retired officers who THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION. Edited were polled to find their reactions to the by Melvin J. Lasky. 318 Pages. Frederick problems of retirement. A. Praeger, Inc., New York. $5.00. It includes information on medical and By MAJ CHARLES L. STEEL, JR., CE health featur~s; places to live; how to "In July 1849, 200,000 Russians invaded get a job; how to acquire a hOJlle; a Hungary, Kossuth asked for help from sound program for savings and invest· 'free Europe.' He did not get it...." Over ment; benefits from the Veterans Admin. 100 years later, on 4 November 1957, these istration and Social Security; service ben· same Russians, in almost equal numbers, efits; rights and restrictions; living again invaded Hungary following the dra­ abroad; survivor benefits; and setting matic and yet tragic revolution and "free oneself up in business. Europe" as well as the rest of the "free world" again sat on the sidelines and re­ KHRUSHCHEV OF THE UKRAINE. By mained idle. Victor Alexandrov. 216 Pages. The Philo· Mr. Lasky in his white paper has done sophical Library, Inc., New York. $4.75. a masterful job of piecing together the By MAJ HARRY H. JACKSON, In! bills and pieces of the story which led up to the revolution and then portrays the Journalist Alexandrov has written an actual days of fighting and aftermath as easily read biography of the First Secre· they appeared through all the media of tary of the Communist Party. However. communication both from the "free world" in his journalese approach to Khrushchev and from behind the "Iron Curtain." he is rather hazy as to'the sources and For the military reader, the actions basis for some of his "facts" and conclu· taken by the Russians, their methods, and sions. This biography is a "once over the reactions of the Soviet soldier, in­ lightly" resume of a Communist's climb cluding many defections, are of interest. to power, but it leaves much to be desired This book, however, is not written to as a definitive work on the man who pres· enhance easy reading. Rather, it presents ently speaks for Russia. a comprehensive digest more suited as A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE WEST· ref material. e~ence ERN WORLD. Volume 3. From the Seven NOTES ON ATOMIC ENERGY FOR Days' Battle, 1862, to the Battle of Leyte MEDICAL OFFICERS. By The Royal Gulf, 1944. By Major General J. F. C. Ful· Naval Medical Sehool. 169 Pages. The Phil­ ler. 666 Pages. Funk & Wagnalls Co.• New osophical Librar);, Inc., New York. $4.75. York. $6.00. BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER 111 VICTORY IN PAPUA. U. S. Army in Berthier emerges as a loyal, competent'of­ World War II. By Samuel Milner. 409 ficer content to remain in the background Pages. Superintend,ent of Documents, U. S. while Napoleon accepted the plaudits of Government Printing Office, Washington, the

INTERAVIA ABC. DIRECTORY OF the same time increasing the likelihood of WORLD AVIATION. 1,235 Pages. Interavia. achieving military security. This type of New -York. $12.00. control is contrasted to what he calls "sub­ By LT COL GEORGE B. MACAULAY, Arty jective civilian control," in which conllict. ing civilian interests and groups vie for Here, for the first time, is a complete control over the military as a me!lns of and up-to-date directory of international enhancing their own power. aeronautics. It lists 30,000 administra­ tions, organizations, companies, and enter­ He then proceeds to demonstrate how prises and their addresses. his theory encompasses and explains rele· vant facts concerning the different ideolo· The volume is divided into four parts, gies of the Japanese and German officer an alphabetical listing of civil and mili­ corps and the interrelationship between tary aviation authorities, airlines, aircraft failures of national security policies and companies, equipment manufacturers, fly­ losses in military professionalism. ing clubs, and virtually every other type of aeronautical activity of every nation of Readers will be impressed with the au· the worl!!. This is cross-referenced to the thor's logic when he argues that security second part which provides details of ad­ will depend upon the ability of the United dresses, telephone numbers, cable ad­ States to evolve an intellectual climate dresses, names of executive personnel, more favorable to the existence of mil!· tary profe$sionalism and the achievement products manufactured, and listings of of objective civilian control. aircraft in use by the various airlines. The third part is a five-language glossary of POLAND. EAST-C~NTRAL EUROPE aeronautical terms, and the fourth section UNDER THE COMMUNISTS. 'Edited by is an alphabetical list of the world's senior Oscar Halecki. 601 Pages. Frederick A. aviation executives and officers. Praeger, Inc., New York. $10.00. By LT COL MITCHEL GOLDENTHAL, CE THE SOLDIER AND tHE STATE. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Rela­ The Mid-European Studies Center pro­ tions. By Samuel P. Huntington. 534 Pages. duced this massive volume which continues The Belnap Press of Harvard University the task of presenting accurate, compre­ Press, Cambridge, Mass. $7.50. hensive information and analysis on each By LT COL JOHN K. SINGLAUB, In! of the Mid-European countries dominated by the Communists. This work, prepared As an important contribution to the by a superb team of expert scholars, rep­ relatively new field of civil-military rela­ resents a trllly substantial addition to our tions, this thought-provoking book will in­ knowledge of Communist Poland. terest the professional officer as well as Mr. Halecki organized the book into 21 those civiliaps whose responsibilities are chapters covering Poland's history, poli· associated with the security of the Nation. tics, culture, and economy. These chapters In developing his theory, Mr. Hunting­ clearly reveal that Poland occupies a key ton first established the essential qualities position in the Soviet order because of her of the military profession and of the mili­ size, population, historical tradition, and tary ethic. He presents what he describes military and economic potential. The mili­ as "objective civilian control," in which tary reader will glean a key to understand· military professionalism is maximized, as ing the future of Europe and even COD!' the only effective method of reducing the munism itself by studying this carefully political power of the military while at prepared book about Poland. MILITARY REVIEW ANNUAL AWARD The monthly first place award articles submitted by military writers and pub­ lished in the MILITARY REVIEW during the period November 1956 through Octo­ ber 1957 inclusive have been reviewed by a faculty committee of the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. The following article was .selected to receive the Annual Award of $350:­

How Much Constitutes a Trend? Another Look at Unification, Lt Col Anthony L. Wermuth, Infantry, 21st Infantry, 24th In­ fantry Division, January 1957 issue.

The oth1er monthly award winners considered in the Annual Award competition were: Month Title and Author November Type Divisions for Atomic Warfare, Col James M. Shepherd, Infantry, Faculty, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College December Economics of Logistics, Col Thomas F. Donahue, Ordnance Corp8, Ord­ nance Section, Headquarters .Sixth Army March The Principles of War and Psywar, Maj R. D. Connolly, Signal Corp8, Faculty, The Special Warfare School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina April Readiness for the Little War-Optimum Integrated Strategy, Col8 Ray­ mond L. Shoemaker, Jr., Artillery, and Peter L. Urban, Artillery; Lt Col8 John Clapper, Jr., Signal Corp8; William D. McDowell, Infantry; Daniel A. Raymond, Corp8 of Engineer8; John K. Singlaub, Infantry; Cecil C. Helena, Infantry; and Major John H. CUBhman, Infantry, all staff and faculty, USA CGSC May Readiness for the Little War-A Strategic Security Force, by the same voluntary study group which authored the April award winning article. June Wanted: Professionals for Rescue and Rehabilitation, Maj Irvin M. Kent, Judge Advocate General's Corps, Headquarters, First.Army July The Military Function and the Soldier, Col Oliver K. Mar8hall, Artil­ lery, Headquarters, Continental Air Defense Command August Name, Rank, and Service Number, Col Carl E. WilliamBon, Judge Advo­ cate General'8 Corps, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command September Logistical Coordination Between Allied Forces, Col Albert S. Britt, Jr., Artillery, Faculty, U. S. Army Artillery and Missile School October' The Night Attack-Blueprint for Atomic V'ictory, Lt Col Robert M. Walker, Artillery, Faculty, USA CGSC ·0·0: '1IO~1lIseM uoSa!pI9d: 9ltL 'al~'4f-t mea AlImf J,O ~USlll~ed9a ~ql'l Amv Sltt

DISTRIBUTION: ACTIVE ARMY (OVERSEA DISTRIBUTION ONLY): OS Maj Comd (50); OS Base Comd (10) ; Armies (25); Corps (10); Div (10); Brig (5). NG & USAR: None.