VON STEUBEN Drillmaster of the Continental .Army Karl Theodore Marx
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The MILITARY REVIEW dissemi nates modern military thought and current Army doctrine concerning command and staff procedw-es of the division and higher echelons and provides a forum for articles which stimulate military thinking. " . " sPECIAL sEcrlb.Ns EDITOR' Authors, civilian and military alike, COL ROBERT' M..w.Ai.xER, ARTY are encouraged to submit articles which will assist in the fulfillment of this mission. Editor , GILBERTO GoNzAL:Iilz-JULIA, INF Assistant Editors ' MAJ ~oM!s H. GUFFAW, INF ORLANDO ORTIZ MORENO, INF POUCY. Unless otherwise indicated, the BRAZILIAN EDITION views expressed in the original ar Editor ticles in this magazine are those SEBASTIAO FEBREIRA CHAVES, ARTY of the individual authors and not necessarily precisely those of the Assistant Editor Department of the Army or the WALDm DA COSTA GoDOyWM, ARTY U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Production Officer , Editor. LT COL .LOUIS RUIZ, CMLC The printing of this publication' has been approvooby the Direetor' of the Bureau· of ,th~ Budget 19 June 1956. REVIEW-Pillilillhid, monthly' by ·11. S. ~. c:iotnfni,.nd alld GEneral Stall' College, Fort Leav in E"gll$h,';*,j,atl!t>b. ,.;,a pi>rt1iiuek~: jii~ ... ~cklass maUerAurust 81, 1984. at Fori: W$'liibHb:' Kan..... pBder tti,':Act :~ ••.~~j:I. Subserh>tloi rat.est $8.&0 ) a year':rn ,~;1'.intt.iit Skte&df ' ' '~', '" .. ' ~ee; ionl!.tI1* l:Oun~" 1!blcb of tbe Pai>;A~~l'oa'*t~~l:i'it. 0 a)iea1'Jn'iit'ot'behoUntries. , ~~' ,w,: '~~'~'?~~i~~~,~:_ 0;«. ~ -, . MILITARY R'EVIEW VOLUME XXXVII DECEMBER 1951 NUMBEU CONTENTS Soviet Views on Limited War ___________ _ Docto?' Raymond L. Garthoff Implications of Vertical Warfare _______________________________ 13 Doctor Hans Karl Gunther A Case for Behavior Techniques in Command ____________________ 19 Chaplain (Major) Leo W. Frye, Cha(plain Corps Von Steuben-Drillmaster of the Continental Army ______________ 25 Karl Theodore Marx ~obody Fights Alone _________________________________________ ~ ~ Colonel Hughes L. Ash, Infantry The Army of the Future _ ___ _. _____________________________ 38 Major J. H. P. Curtis, MC, British Army The Gettysburg Battle __________ ~ _____________________________ 48 Colonel Charles H., Blumenfeld, Artillery Development and Application of Joint Capabilities _____ '- _ _ _ 62 Colonel Hamid E. Nelson, General Staff MILITARY ~OTES AROUND THE WORLD ----------------------- ~ FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS __ _ __ _ _____ ________ ________ __ __ _____ 73 National Defense and Military Resources __ _____________ 73 The Demyansk Pocket, March-April 1942 ________ : ___________ 77 Problems of Atomic War __________________________________ 84 Irregular Warfare ______________________________________ 87 The Offensive ____________________________ ~ _____________ ._ 90 Against an Army of Mercenaries ____________________________ 96 Mutual Security Planning by the American Republics _________ 104 BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER __________________ ._ 109 This copy is not for sale. It is intended for more than one reader. PLEASE READ IT AND PASS IT ALONG, Souiet Views"on Limited Wor* Doctor Raymond L. Garthoff As' THE increasing Soviet nuclea~ sible limitations (geographicat or in the power has made all-out thermonuclear war use of weapons) on war, it is perhaps less and less attractive as even a reluctant useful to note that in addition to such resort, military thinkers in the West have military substitutes for total war, there been confronted with the problem of mili is an entire range of political substitutes tary (and political) substitutes for total for armed conflict. At the present, the war. Viewed in this perspective, it is not Soviets favor the use of nonmilitary sub difficult to understand the standing Soviet stitutes such as political and economic preference for such substitutes in the face pressures, inducements and blandishments, of American thermonuclear striking power. military demonstrations and threats, sub The mutual ability to destroy the oppo version, colonial rebellion, and guerrilla nent, regardless of who should strike first, warfare over direct military means as a apparently is in sight. strategy to extend Soviet influence and While such a situation may lead to control. mutual deterrence from all war, it is only Nikita S. Khrushchev, in his first major prudent to assume that it may only deter theoretical pronouncement (in February from tolal war, but not necessarily from 1956), stated that Marxism-Leninism in other forms of armed conflict. Mainte the contemporary era no longer considers nance of a continuing thermonuclear ca that war is inevitable; socialism may be pability for total war is, of course, essen established throughout the entire world tial to the deterrence of total war and without war. Thus characteristically, the would always be available to implement ideology is reinterpreted in terms of the a strategy of last resort. practical situation: war is no longer a The Soviets do not explicitly discuss useful course of national policy, therefore possibilities of limitation in doctrinal it is no longer "inevitable." And. if mili terms. Their occasional discussions of tary force is to be used, the Soviets well Western views on possible limitation usu understand (in the words of one colonel) ally are couched in propagandistic terms. the value of "the use of various means Nonetheless, it is possible and indeed most and forms of armed conflict depending necessary to consider the probable calcu upon the circumstances." lations on limited war in Soviet policy Soviet strategy is predicated upon the making. basic principle that war, as an instru Before discussing Soviet "iews of pos ment of policy, may assume various forms. It is not assumed either that nuclear -• This article is a chapter in the forthcominll" ~?Ok by tht> author titled Soviet Strategy in the weapons definitely will or definitely will Fuclenr ApC', to be published in early 1958 by rederlck A. Praeger, ]nC'., New York. not be used; rather, it is ,recognized that Although 'the Soviets' nuclear ar.senal is extremely powerful. it appears unlikely that they will initiate such warfare in a limited type conflict due to the overriding disadvantages that would accrue to the USSR 4 MILITARY REVIEW DECEMBER 1111 under various circumstances they mayor of the United States to invoke what u may not be employed. Consequently, the viewed as a virtually suicidal thel'lllO!Ul. Soviets seek to build and maintain mili clear 8trategy to save Iran-or even West tary forces necessary for conventional or Germany? Or would such countries wel. nonnuclear warfare, and to prepare the come even a "limitsKWar" tactical nu. forces necessary for nuclear war. Soviet clear strategy whlch is, in any eVen~ recognition of the need to be prepared for virtually suicidal for them? general thermonuclear war is evident in The Soviet Union recognizes the value many ways. Nonetheless, the available of exploiting this situation. The first ob evil!\ence suggests that the Soviets may be jective presumably is the isolation of these lieve it will be to their advantage to countries from the United States. By of· strive for the nonemployment of nuclear fering blandishments and probably avoid· weapons in a future war. ing the appearance of threat of war, the Soviet prqpaganda, ever since the war, Soviets will seek to secure the abrogation has ostensibly sought the complete prohi of US treaties of alliance and grants of bition of nuclear weapons. There are ob base rights to the United States. At a vious propaganda dividends from playing later stage, the blandishments might give upon the fears of peoples everywhere. way to more open pressures and threats There also is an obvious Soviet advantage and a further extension of Soviet influ· in attempting to neutralize the nuclear ence and control. If the circumstances deterrent strength of the United States. were deemed appropriate for resort to Less obvious, but more important, is the arms, in this context, it is quite possible possibility that under certain conditions that the Soviet Union in fact may favor this objective might be achieved. The nonuse of nuclear weapons in a major possibility of an effective international war even in a situation of nuclear strik· agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons ing parity in which the USSR holds the must be recognized as very remote. But initiative. under circumstances of nuclear stalemate Soviet Avoidance of Nuclears through mutual deterrence, the United Three important considerations might States might forego use of nuclear re lead the Soviet to avoid initiating the use taliation if the Soviet provocation were of nuclear weapons. First, the Soviet bloc clearly to involve less than a directly mor is stronger in nonnuclear military forces tal threat. -increasingly so as the West comes to Soviet Propaganda depend more and more upon nuclear mili· In the Soviet political-military strat tary power. The relative advantage of the egy, the wide belief in Europe and Asia of Soviet Union in seeking to avoid the em the existence of a general thermonuclear ployment of fission-fusion weapons, even stalemate between the Soviet Union and at the risk of possible loss of initiative in the United States is regarded as an im the use of these weapons, is very great. portant advantage. Will other nations Second, the'absolute advantage to both have confidence in the ability and resolve the Soviet Union and the free world is a powerful force for mutual deterrence Doctor Raymond L. Garthoff is a grad from their use in war. Soviet forfeiture uate 01 Princeton and Yale Universities. A SPl'cialist on Soviet military and politi of the opportunity for prior use of these cal affairs, he is the author 01 the book, weapons might lead to Western decision Soviet Military Doctrine. Two articles on withholding their use. As the Soviet ba8ed on thi8 book have appeared in the capability for deliVering massive megaton June 1959 and March 1955 issues of the MILITARY REVIEW. attacks increases, the possibility of West SOVIET VIEWS ON LIMITED WAR I) < ern initiation of a mutual destruetion duel did not definitely intend to use it.