DOCSLIB.ORG

Kazakhstan's Example in Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Kazakhstan's Example in Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation Kazakhstan’s example in promoting nuclear non-proliferation September 2017 Kazakhstan’s example in promoting nuclear non-proliferation oxan.com CONTENTS 2 Introduction 4 The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing 4 Removal of nuclear warheads 6 Nuclear disarmament 7 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program 7 Closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site 8 Nuclear safety 9 Contributions to nuclear security summits 10 Safe handling of nuclear materials 11 Mobilising global support through the United Nations 12 Empowerment through disarmament Cover images: Equipment found on the Semipalatinsk Test Site Craters and boreholes dot the former Soviet Union nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Kurchatov city: RIA Novosti archive, image #440215 / Alexander Liskin / CC-BY-SA 3.0 The Opening Plenary of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016: narendramodiofficial Missile launch tubes removed from a ballistic missile submarine: Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program OSI specialists gather gas samples from the ground to be examined for traces of the noble gas argon as evidence of an underground nuclear explosion: CTBTO Preparatory Commission Helicopter carrying a magnetometer: CTBTO Preparatory Commission 1 Kazakhstan’sGlobal nuclear example order: Kazakhstan’s in promoting legacy nuclear in non-proliferation oxan.com Introduction Nuclear warhead status (estimated as of November 3, 2016*) = 20 warheads This report comes at a crucial time when the foundation of the global nuclear order, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is in a precarious state. DEPLOYED STOCKPILED RETIRED Russia Enacted in 1970, the NPT outlines the underlying principles that guide nuclear policies. 1,796 4,500 2,800 Now, with 191 states party to this treaty, it provides a forum for states to engage on issues of United States disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. However, the current review cycle for the NPT, which will conclude in 2020, is taking place in an increas- 1,367 4,571 2,500 ingly difficult geopolitical environment. Profound disagreements between participating states France 300 are likely to derail the 2020 NPT Review Conference, as they did in 2005 and 2015. China 260 The future of US-Russia arms control is uncertain due to diverging views in Washington and United Kingdom 40 175 Moscow on what further reductions should include. Furthermore, North Korea continues to Pakistan 140 challenge the global nuclear order by testing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. India 110 These critical issues and other related trends are creating serious risks to international North Korea** 8 stability and overshadow the future of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. * Estimates of Israel’s undeclared arsenal vary widely (between 80 and 400); ** Status of North Korea’s warheads not verified As confidence wanes, however, recent history offers examples of how states can uphold the principles of disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. One …but pending items on Washington’s policy agenda could increase bilateral nuclear tensions important case study is Kazakhstan. To date Kazakhstan remains the only country to have completely sealed its nuclear testing sites and removed all nuclear warheads and weapons- Expansion of the US nuclear Activation of the US missile Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may grade nuclear material from its territory. Furthermore, it has become an active participant in arsenal beyond the ongoing defence site in Poland on track be the greatest restriction on 1-trillion-dollar modernisation could for 2018 may sour early-stage Trump disengaging from the global initiatives to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduce the risks associated spark parallel eorts in Russia. US outreach to Moscow. Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre. with peaceful use of nuclear materials. Global nuclear warhead stocks have fallen from their Cold War highs… Stockpiled warhead count (thousand warheads) 60 Global total 40 United States 20 Trump pressuring Tehran despite Upgrades to US conventional Trump may be overestimating Iranian nuclear deal compliance weaponry in Asia could prompt China’s capability -- let alone Russia could split European governments China to upgrade its nuclear forces willingness -- to force nuclear 0 from Washington. to preserve retaliatory capability. policy changes in Pyongyang. 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Sources: Arms Control Association, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ Nuclear Notebook, Oxford Analytica 2 Kazakhstan’sGlobal nuclear example order: Kazakhstan’s in promoting legacy nuclear in non-proliferation oxan.com Nuclear warhead status (estimated as of November 3, 2016*) = 20 warheads DEPLOYED STOCKPILED RETIRED Russia 1,796 4,500 2,800 United States 1,367 4,571 2,500 France 300 China 260 United Kingdom 40 175 Pakistan 140 India 110 North Korea** 8 * Estimates of Israel’s undeclared arsenal vary widely (between 80 and 400); ** Status of North Korea’s warheads not verified …but pending items on Washington’s policy agenda could increase bilateral nuclear tensions Expansion of the US nuclear Activation of the US missile Pakistan’s nuclear weapons may arsenal beyond the ongoing defence site in Poland on track be the greatest restriction on 1-trillion-dollar modernisation could for 2018 may sour early-stage Trump disengaging from the spark parallel eorts in Russia. US outreach to Moscow. Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre. Global nuclear warhead stocks have fallen from their Cold War highs… Stockpiled warhead count (thousand warheads) 60 Global total 40 United States 20 Trump pressuring Tehran despite Upgrades to US conventional Trump may be overestimating Iranian nuclear deal compliance weaponry in Asia could prompt China’s capability -- let alone Russia could split European governments China to upgrade its nuclear forces willingness -- to force nuclear 0 from Washington. to preserve retaliatory capability. policy changes in Pyongyang. 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Sources: Arms Control Association, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ Nuclear Notebook, Oxford Analytica 3 Kazakhstan’s example in promoting nuclear non-proliferation oxan.com The humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan of a leadership role in disarmament and nuclear found itself an independent nuclear-armed state with non-proliferation. the world’s fourth-largest arsenal of 1,410 nuclear warheads. In addition to logistical challenges of It has continued to take an active part in UN-based managing and securing such a vast arsenal, it also initiatives and has been a regional leader promoting inherited a large nuclear testing complex. This the Central Asian Nuclear-Free Zone established in included the world’s largest site at Semipalatinsk, 2009. This has become the first multilateral security which had already exposed around 1.5 million of agreement to include all five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan’s population to high levels of radiation. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan continues to campaign for On becoming independent, Kazakhstan rapidly relin- the establishment of similar zones in other parts of quished all of the nuclear weapons and dismantled the world, especially in the Middle East. the test sites in close and consistent cooperation with the international community. In 1992, it signed The country has also participated in the Humanitarian the Lisbon Protocol of the Non-Proliferation of Impacts (HI) of nuclear weapons initiative launched Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and declared itself in 2012 by the Norwegian government. This aims a non-nuclear weapon state upon joining the NPT. to increase awareness of the risks associated with nuclear weapons possession. President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s decision to shut down the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site after HI has convened meetings in Oslo (March 2013), years of radioactive fallout and debris signified a Nayarit (February 2014) and Vienna (December milestone in Kazakh public policy towards a respon- 2014) and this has resulted in a Humanitarian Pledge, sible use of nuclear resources and the assumption signed by 159 countries, including Kazakhstan. Removal of nuclear warheads After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, former the latter in particular required substantially more Soviet states reached an agreement whereby Soviet diplomatic negotiations. A series of bilateral negoti- military and nuclear forces would remain wherever ations produced an agreement which transferred they were located. At the time, it was not immedi- responsibility for the safety and maintenance of ately clear whether or not Kazakhstan, along with these nuclear warheads to Russia. Ukraine and Belarus, would relinquish former Soviet nuclear arsenals. In April 1995, the last of Kazakhstan’s warheads were transported to Russia, two months ahead of However, in 1994, Kazakhstan’s leadership decided schedule: 16 missile regiments had been decom- to voluntarily relinquish control of the nuclear armed missioned and disbanded and their ICBMs and forces stationed on Kazakh territory in favour of warheads, together with more than 18,000 metric greater security and stability. Similar agreements tons of missile fuel components, had been trans- were reached with Ukraine and Belarus, although ported to military sites in Russia. 4 Kazakhstan’s example in promoting nuclear non-proliferation oxan.com
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Foreign Minister Idrissov
    Time to ban nuclear weapons testing forever BY ERLAN IDRISSOV, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF KAZAKHSTAN The story of Kazakhstan's independence is intricately linked to the banning of nuclear testing and the renunciation of nuclear weapons. On 29 August 1991, Kazakhstan became the first country in the world to close a nuclear test site on its territory. The decision by President Nursultan Nazarbayev to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site where the Soviet Union carried out more than 450 nuclear weapon tests was welcomed by the people of Kazakhstan, and helped lead to the country's declaration of independence on 16 December 1991. OUR CLEAR CHOICE would damage, rather than bring, security It is no surprise that the Kazakh When the Soviet Union collapsed in and prestige. people were so strongly supportive of 1991, Kazakhstan inherited the fourth- the decision to shut the Semipalatinsk largest nuclear arsenal in the world: Since its independence, Kazakhstan site. The tests, which took place between more than 100 ballistic missiles and has been vigorously promoting 1949 and 1989, had the combined more than 1,000 nuclear warheads, the principles and ideals of nuclear explosive power of 2,500 atomic bombs capable of reaching any point on Earth. disarmament and working tirelessly to rid dropped on Hiroshima. The fall-out from What is less well known is that we also the world of the nuclear threat. We are a these tests – of which over 100 were found ourselves, if it had been our wish, founding member of the 2009 Nuclear- above ground – affected 1.5 million with the infrastructure and expertise to Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, which people and led to radioactive pollution maintain and deploy this arsenal.
    [Show full text]
  • Semipalatinsk Revisited Radiological Evaluation of the Former Nuclear Test Site
    Doc-03.qxd 1/21/99 9:34 AM Page 12 SEMIPALATINSK REVISITED RADIOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF THE FORMER NUCLEAR TEST SITE BY PETER STEGNAR AND TONY WRIXON arious locations around the world are Vaffected by residual radioactive material. Some of them are the result of past peaceful activities, while others result from military programmes, including the testing of nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, there has been growing international cooperation in assessing the radiological effects of past military nuclear activities. In many countries, attention has turned to assessing and, where necessary, remediating areas 12 affected by residual radioactive materials from military steppes of Kazakhstan became explosions were conducted activities. The IAEA has been the first centre for nuclear underground. Thirteen of the leading this effort of assessing weapons testing within the underground tests resulted in former nuclear-weapon test Soviet Union. The release of radioactive gases to the sites. This article reports on Semipalatinsk test site is a atmosphere. (See table, page 14.) preliminary radiological 19,000 km2 zone in the north- The only on-site inhabitants evaluations of the east of the country, 800 km during the testing programme Semipalatinsk site in north of the capital Almaty. were in the town of Kurchatov Kazakhstan, where the former The zone lies southwest of the whose purpose was to service Soviet Union conducted more Irtysh River which flows into the site, and in the small than 400 nuclear tests over a Kazakhstan from China and settlements of Akzhar and forty year period. which, for a short distance, Moldari along the northern forms part of the nuclear test edge of the site.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Cleanout: an Emerging Approach to the Civil Nuclear Material Threat About the Author Acknowledgements
    Belfer Center Managing the Atom for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Global Cleanout An emerging approach to the civil nuclear material threat Philipp C. Bleek September 2004 Managing the Atom (MTA) Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government http://www.managingtheatom.org Harvard University [email protected] 79 John F. Kennedy Street Cambridge, MA 02138 http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia Contents About the Author ii Acknowledgements ii Executive Summary iii Introduction 1 The Threat: Vulnerable Material Poses Unacceptable Dangers 1 The Status Quo: Ad Hoc Responses Incommensurate with the Threat 3 The Precedents: Five Case Studies 4 Project Sapphire 5 Operation Auburn Endeavor 9 Project Vinca 13 The Romania Operation 18 The Bulgaria Operation 20 Imagining Worst and Best Outcomes 21 Policy Failure 21 Policy Success 22 Patterns from the Cases 22 Passivity in Site Identification 22 Incoherence in Site Selection 23 Sluggish Implementation 23 Varying Incentives Needed to Convince Facilities to Give Up Material 24 Allowing Russia to Stymie Progress 25 Failure to Effectively Engage Third Parties 25 The Solution: A Comprehensive, Prioritized, Empowered Program 25 Comprehensive Global Threat Assessment 26 Prioritized Global Implementation Plan 26 Coherent Program with Adequate Resources 26 Flexibility to Target Incentives as Needed 27 Diplomatic Engagement with Russia 27 Engaging Third Parties 27 Conclusions 28 Notes 28 Bibliography and Interviews 37 Sources 37 Interviews and Correspondence 39 Global Cleanout: An Emerging Approach To The Civil Nuclear Material Threat About the Author Acknowledgements Philipp C. Bleek will be pursuing doctoral stud- The author gratefully acknowledges research ies at Georgetown’s Department of Govern- support from Harvard University’s Belfer Center ment beginning fall 2004.
    [Show full text]
  • The 2Nd Kazakhstan-US Convention
    WORKING TOGETHER FOR A SECURE FUTURE The 2nd Ka zakhstan- US Co nven tion 10 December 2 014 l Washington DC e t a t S f o t n e m t r a p e D S U : o t o h P H.E. Erlan Idrissov, Foreign Minister, meets with Hon. John Kerry, Secretary of State, in New York, September 2014 PRODUCED AND SPONSORED BY WORKING TOGETHER FOR A SECURE FUTURE The 2nd Ka zakhstan- US Co nven tion 10 December 2 014 l Washington DC Organized by the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United States with the support of the Council of Turkic American Associations Foreword A STRONG AND RELIABLE PARTNERSHIP His Excellency Erlan Idrissov Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of Kazakhstan ’m very pleased that the Embassy of situated close to the epicenter of geopolitical Kazakhstan is hosting, to coincide with the tensions, is affected by these forces.” I celebrations of our country’s Independence To make the nation’s economy more Day, the second Kazakhstan-US Convention sustainable and diversified, he appealed on the theme of “Working Together for a to the people of Kazakhstan to “work hard Secure Future.” and unite our efforts on the way to a better This is a particularly good moment future” just as he outlined a major package to discuss the importance of the strategic of infrastructure investment over the next partnership between Kazakhstan and the four years, which, to some extent, can be United States. It is a partnership based compared with Roosevelt’s New Deal in on the regular political dialogue between scope and significance for our economy.
    [Show full text]
  • Kazakhstan Missile Chronology
    Kazakhstan Missile Chronology Last update: May 2010 As of May 2010, this chronology is no longer being updated. For current developments, please see the Kazakhstan Missile Overview. This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here. Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation. 2009-1947 March 2009 On 4 March 2009, Kazakhstan signed a contract to purchase S-300 air defense missile systems from Russia. According to Ministry of Defense officials, Kazakhstan plans to purchase 10 batteries of S-300PS by 2011. Kazakhstan's Air Defense Commander Aleksandr Sorokin mentioned, however, that the 10 batteries would still not be enough to shield all the most vital" facilities designated earlier by a presidential decree. The export version of S- 300PS (NATO designation SA-10C Grumble) has a maximum range of 75 km and can hit targets moving at up to 1200 m/s at a minimum altitude of 25 meters.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ukrainian Weekly 1993, No.23
    www.ukrweekly.com INSIDE: • Ukraine's search for security by Dr. Roman Solchanyk — page 2. • Chornobyl victim needs bone marrow transplant ~ page 4 • Teaching English in Ukraine program is under way - page 1 1 Publishfd by the Ukrainian National Association inc., a fraternal non-prof it association rainianWee Vol. LXI No. 23 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, JUNE 6, 1993 50 cents New York commemorates Tensions mount over Black Sea Fleet by Marta Kolomayets Sea Fleet until 1995. 60th anniversary of Famine Kyyiv Press Bureau More than half the fleet — 203 ships — has raised the ensign of St. Andrew, by Andrij Wynnyckyj inaccurate reports carried in the press," KYYIV — Ukrainian President the flag of the Russian Imperial Navy. ranging from those of New York Times Leonid Kravchuk has asked for a summit NEW YORK — On June 1, the New None of the fleet's Warships, however, reporter Walter Duranty written in the meeting with Russian leader Boris have raised the ensign. On Friday, May York area's Ukrainian Americans com­ 1930s, to recent Soviet denials and Yeltsin to try to resolve mounting ten­ memorated the 60th anniversary of the Western attempts to smear famine sions surrounding control of the Black (Continued on page 13) tragic Soviet-induced famine of І932- researchers. Sea Fleet. 1933 with a "Day of Remembrance," "Now the facts are on the table," Mr. In response, Russian Foreign Minister consisting of an afternoon symposium Oilman said. "The archives have been Andrei Kozyrev is scheduled to arrive in Parliament begins held at the Ukrainian Institute of opened in Moscow and in Kyyiv, and the Ukraine on Friday morning, June 4, to America, and an evening requiem for the Ukrainian Holocaust has been revealed arrange the meeting between the two debate on START victims held at St.
    [Show full text]
  • Asia-Europe Connectivity Vision 2025
    Asia–Europe Connectivity Vision 2025 Challenges and Opportunities The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) enters into its third decade with commitments for a renewed and deepened engagement between Asia and Europe. After 20 years, and with tremendous global and regional changes behind it, there is a consensus that ASEM must bring out a new road map of Asia–Europe connectivity and cooperation. It is commonly understood that improved connectivity and increased cooperation between Europe and Asia require plans that are both sustainable and that can be upscaled. Asia–Europe Connectivity Vision 2025: Challenges and Opportunities, a joint work of ERIA and the Government of Mongolia for the 11th ASEM Summit 2016 in Ulaanbaatar, provides the ideas for an ASEM connectivity road map for the next decade which can give ASEM a unity of purpose comparable to, if not more advanced than, the integration and cooperation efforts in other regional groups. ASEM has the platform to create a connectivity blueprint for Asia and Europe. This ASEM Connectivity Vision Document provides the template for this blueprint. About ERIA The Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) was established at the Third East Asia Summit (EAS) in Singapore on 21 November 2007. It is an international organisation providing research and policy support to the East Asia region, and the ASEAN and EAS summit process. The 16 member countries of EAS—Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand—are members of ERIA. Anita Prakash is the Director General of Policy Department at ERIA.
    [Show full text]
  • Carnegie Corporation of New York and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Investments in Nuclear Security
    Backgrounder: Carnegie Corporation of New York and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Investments in Nuclear Security Carnegie Corporation of New York: A History of Addressing International Peace, Security and Nonproliferation Challenges Andrew Carnegie’s Quest for Peace Andrew Carnegie believed in the power of international laws and organizations to stave off conflict and he trusted that future wars would be averted by mediation. He felt that war is wasteful, that diplomacy can resolve disputes without bloodshed and that nations can and should act collectively to prosecute cases of injustice when necessary. One of the first to call for the establishment of a “league of nations,” he argued that war might be eliminated if such a global organization were established with authority to settle international disputes through arbitration and the use of economic sanctions. In 1903, Andrew Carnegie supported the founding of the Peace Palace at The Hague, which today houses the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the United Nation’s International Court of Justice, and The Hague Academy of International Law. In 1910, in an effort to “hasten the abolition of international war,” he gave $10 million to establish the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, an organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations. And in 1911, he established Carnegie Corporation of New York to “promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding,” a mission that was, in Carnegie’s mind, the surest path to permanent peace. Preparing for the Breakup of the Soviet Union In 1983, the year after David Hamburg became president of the foundation, during a period when international tensions were running high while international dialogue about how to address conflicts hardly rose above a murmur, the Corporation launched the Avoiding Nuclear War program.
    [Show full text]
  • HARVARD UKRAINIAN STUDIES EDITOR Lubomyr Hajda, Harvard University
    HARVARD UKRAINIAN STUDIES EDITOR Lubomyr Hajda, Harvard University EDITORIAL BOARD Michael S. Flier, George G. Grabowicz, Edward L. Keenan, and Roman Szporluk, Harvard University; Frank E. Sysyn, University of Alberta FOUNDING EDITORS Omeljan Pritsak and Ihor Sevcenko, Harvard University BOOK REVIEW EDITOR Larry Wolff EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Daría Yurchuk DIRECTOR OF PUBLICATIONS Robert A. DeLossa ADVISORY BOARD Zvi Ankori, Tel Aviv University—John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin—Yaroslav Bilinsky, University of Delaware—Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, Carleton University, Ottawa—Axinia Djurova, University of Sofia—Olexa Horbatsch, University of Frankfurt—Halil inalcık, University of Chi- cago—Jaroslav D. Isajevych, Institute of Ukrainian Studies, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, L'viv— Edward Kasinec, New York Public Library—Magdalena László-Kujiuk, University of Bucharest— Walter Leitsch, University of Vienna—L. R. Lewitter, Cambridge University—G. Luciani, University of Bordeaux—George S. N. Luckyj, University of Toronto—M. Łesiów, Marie Curie-Sktodowska University, Lublin—Paul R. Magocsi, University of Toronto—Dimitri Obolensky, Oxford Univer- sity—RiccardoPicchio, Yale University—MarcRaeff, Columbia University—HansRothe, University of Bonn—Bohdan Rubchak, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle—Władysław A. Serczyk, University of Warsaw at Białystok—George Y. Shevelov, Columbia University—Günther Stökl, University of Cologne—A. de Vincenz, University of Göttingen—Vaclav Żidlicky, Charles Univer- sity, Prague. COMMITTEE ON UKRAINIAN STUDIES, Harvard University Stanisław Barańczak Patricia Chaput Timothy Colton Michael S. Flier George G. Grabowicz Edward L. Keenan Jeffrey D. Sachs Roman Szporluk (Chairman) Subscription rates per volume (two double issues) are $28.00 U.S. in the United States and Canada, $32.00 in other countries. The price of one double issue is $ 18.00 ($20.00 overseas).
    [Show full text]
  • The Breach: Ukraine's Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum
    Issue Brief #3 Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The Breach: Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and the Budapest Memorandum Mariana Budjeryn Russia’s annexation of Crimea and covert invasion of eastern Ukraine places an uncomfortable focus on the worth of the security assurances pledged to Ukraine by the nuclear powers in exchange for its denuclearization. In 1994, the three depository states of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom—extended positive and negative security assurances to Ukraine. The depository states underlined their commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by signing the so-called “Budapest Memorandum.”1 Using new archival records, this examination of Ukraine’s search for security guarantees in the early 1990s reveals that, ironically, the threat of border revisionism by Russia was the single gravest concern of Ukraine’s leadership when surrendering the nuclear arsenal. The failure of the Budapest Memorandum to deter one of Ukraine’s security guarantors from military aggression has important implications both for Ukraine’s long-term security and for the value of security assurances for future international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Russia’s breach of the Memorandum invites strong scrutiny of other security commitments and opens an enormous rhetorical opportunity for proliferators to lobby for a nuclear deterrent. UKRAINE’S NUCLEAR PREDICAMENT In 1991, Ukraine inherited the world’s third largest more cautious approach to its nuclear inheritance, nuclear arsenal as a result of the collapse of the concerned that Russia’s monopoly on nuclear arms Soviet Union.2 By mid-1996, all nuclear munitions in the post-Soviet space would be conducive to its had been transferred from Ukraine to Russia resurgence as a dominating force in the region.
    [Show full text]
  • The Economic and Social Consequences of Environmental Migration in the Central Asian Countries
    Volume 21 Issue 2 2020 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES DOI: https://doi.org/10.37178/ca-c.20.2.13 Artem LUKYANETS Ph.D. (Econ.), Leading Researcher, Center for Social Demography, Institute of Socio-Political Research— Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPR FCTAS RAS) (Moscow, Russian Federation) Sergey RYAZANTSEV D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research— Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPR FCTAS RAS) (Moscow, Russian Federation) Evgenia MOISEEVA Junior Researcher, Center for Social Demography, Institute of Socio-Political Research—Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of he Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPR FCTAS RAS) (Moscow, Russian Federation) Roman MANSHIN Ph.D. (Econ.), Assistant Professor, Leading Researcher, Center for Social Demography, Institute of Socio-Political Research— Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISPR FCTAS RAS); Assistant Professor, People’s Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) (Moscow, Russian Federation) The study was conducted with support from the Russian Science Foundation, Project No. 18-78-10149. 142 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS English Edition Volume 21 Issue 2 2020 ABSTRACT owadays, increasing attention is paid make it impossible to cultivate crops in cer- to the impact of environmental change tain areas, and this, given the large share of N on society and the economies of the agricultural sector, leads to additional countries because of the growing frequency risks in the form of a slowdown in economic and intensity of various adverse natural and growth and, consequently, a decline in the man-made phenomena.
    [Show full text]
  • Radionuclide Contamination at Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk Test Site
    Preprint UCRL-JC-143920 Radionuclide Contamination at Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk Test Site: Implications on Human and Ecological Health T.M. Carlsen, L.E. Peterson, B.A. Ulsh, C.A. Werner, K.L. Purvis, A.C. Sharber This article was submitted to Human and Ecological Risk Assessment (HERA) June 2001 Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited DISCLAIMER This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. This is a preprint of a paper intended for publication in a journal or proceedings. Since changes may be made before publication, this preprint is made available with the understanding that it will not be cited or reproduced without the permission of the author. Radionuclide Contamination at Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk Test Site: Implications on Human and Ecological Health Tina M.
    [Show full text]