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Behaviorism and the Mind Behaviorism and the Mind A (Limited) Call for a Return to Introspection DAVID A. LIEBERMAN University of Stirling, Scotland ABSTRACT: Though perhaps few psychologists would information of truly impressive accuracy and re- now describe themselves as strict behaviorists, a re- liability. Assuming for the moment that this is view of the literature suggests that methodological and so—and I shall return to the validity of this as- radical behaviorism continue to exert a powerful influ- sumption later—why have some psychologists been ence on current research, even in such nominally cog- so reluctant to use introspection as a scientific nitive areas as imagery and hypothesis learning. In technique? The answer, I believe, is that although many ways this influence has been healthy, leading to a productive emphasis on the importance of environ- experimental psychologists have largely abandoned mental variables in shaping behavior, but some of its the language of behaviorism, many have continued consequences have been rather less benign. After re- to be influenced by its philosophical and methodo- viewing the historical arguments against the use of logical assumptions. The mind, in this view, is introspection, this article concludes that most either are at best of uncertain epistemological status, and invalid or no longer possess their original force, so the introspection is, in any case, an inherently flawed benefits from a wider use of introspection now seem tool for its analysis (see, e.g., Kanfer, 1968). likely to outweigh the possible costs. This view is not quite so baseless or absurd as some critics have implied (e.g., Joynson, 1974), Over the last two decades there has been a dra- but neither does it represent a fully balanced as- matic increase in cognitively based analyses of be- sessment. The dangers of introspection (and of havior, with terms such as memory, attention, and the mind), I argue below, are not nearly so great expectation becoming part of the common parlance as has sometimes been suggested. Before trying of our profession. If psychologists have largely i to develop this point in any detail, however, it may accepted the language of mentalism, however, there be useful to review briefly the history of introspec- has in many cases been a continuing reluctance to tion in order to provide some perspective on the accept the reality of the processes to which these issues involved. terms refer, and thus a reluctance to study these processes through the use of introspection. In some cases this caution is undoubtedly healthy. The Emergence oj Introspection The mere fact that people say they experienced The early experimental psychologists—Wundt, some thought or emotion, after all, by no means Titchener, Kulpe, for example—took as their goal proves that they did so. Suppose, for example, that an understanding of the human mind, and to this the defendant in a murder trial was a young and end they relied on the technique of introspection, attractive woman. Even if all the jurors involved the observation by a subject of his or her thoughts insisted that they had not been influenced in any and feelings. As used in the early psychological way by her appearance, we might still question laboratories, however, introspection bore little re- whether it had played some rale, and experimental semblance to the more casual processes of self- evidence from related situations suggests that awareness familiar from everyday life. Introspec- our skepticism might well be justified (see, e.g., Nisbett& Wilson, 1977). If introspective reports are sometimes wrong or Requests for reprints should be sent to David A. Lieber- misleading, however, there is equally compelling man, Department of Psychology, University of Stirling, evidence that in some instances they may provide Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA. Vol. 34, No. 4, 319-333 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • APRIL 1979 • 319 Copyright 1979 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0003-066X/79/3404-0319$00.7 5 tion was regarded as a skill, requiring just as much As this inability to agree became increasingly com- training and practice for its development as, say, mon, introspection began to appear increasingly learning to be a professional wine taster. In sterile and unsuitable as a vehicle for scientific Wundt's laboratory, for example, subjects were re- progress. quired to practice at least 10,000 separate intro- Reacting to the growing sense of stagnation and spections before they were considered ready to futility, Watson and other early behaviorists vig- participate in a genuine experiment, and once orously criticized introspectionists for their pre- properly trained a subject might require as much occupation with mental functioning and called in- as 20 minutes to report fully on his or her ex- stead for a new emphasis on overt behavior. The periences during a l.S-sec experiment (Boring, goal of psychology, they argued, should be the 19S3). In some areas—notably psychophysics— practical one of understanding (and thus poten- this painstaking effort paid off handsomely, and we tially changing) human behavior, and the proper still owe much of our current knowledge to this method for achieving this goal should be the ob- early experimentation. Within only a few decades, jective observation of behavior. It is perhaps not however, the systematic use of introspection as a always appreciated, however, that two logically scientific method was to disappear almost com- separable arguments are implicit in this position: pletely. One might well agree that the proper goal of psy- One reason for its demise was the impact of chology should ultimately be the prediction and Freud's revolutionary theories of the unconscious. control of behavior yet still argue that one method The foundation of introspective analysis was the for achieving this goal could be the systematic belief that all of the mind's functioning was acces- study of mental processes. Indeed, this forms the sible to conscious observation, for unless every thesis of this article: Behaviorism succeeded bril- aspect of human thought and emotion could be liantly insofar as it argued for a new emphasis on observed, introspection could provide at best only behavior, both as goal and as method, but in re- an incomplete and fragmented picture of mental acting to the limitations of introspection it went functioning. If consciousness represented only too far in rejecting it totally. Introspection is the visible tip of the iceberg, with vast areas of limited in what it can achieve, but an acknowledg- the mind permanently curtained off behind pow- ment of its limitations does not thereby require erful defensive barriers, then introspection was its total proscription. This rigid rejection may clearly doomed. The same conclusion was sug- initially have been the only way in which a new gested, moreover, by the introspectionists' own generation of psychologists could be shielded from findings. In trying to analyze the thought pro- the siren call of mentalism, but in their efforts to cesses involved in solving a problem, for example, avoid the difficulties posed by introspection, the subjects reported experiencing a sequence of early behaviorists may also have ignored the ad- thoughts, each one moving closer to the goal of vantages to be gained. As psychology has grown solution, but they could discover no conscious more mature, however—thanks in no small part process that guided these thoughts and determined to the work of behaviorists such as Watson and which one occurred at which time, Ach (1905) Skinner—we may have now reached a point where coined the term determining tendency to describe we are sophisticated enough to reap the fruits of the unconscious process, hidden from introspection, introspection without becoming entangled in its that guides thinking along its proper course. thorns. Inaccessibility of mental processes was bad To develop this case, I first consider some of enough, but the problem was compounded by the the arguments that have been raised against the inability of introspectionists to agree even when use of introspection as a scientific technique, and the object of study was ostensibly accessible. In I argue that, ultimately, the only reasonable cri- the controversy over imageless thought, for ex- terion is an empirical one: whether or not intro- ample, workers in Kulpe's laboratory reported that spective data help us to understand behavior. abstract thoughts could occur without being ac- I then turn to an examination of such data and companied by any form of mental imagery. Titch- argue that at least in some areas introspection has ener, on the other hand, insisted that when he already contributed significantly to our under- introspected he could see "vague, evanescent pat- standing of behavior and thus to our ability to terns of sensations and images" (Boring, 19S3). modify it. Finally, having argued for the ad- 320 • APRIL 1979 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST vantages of introspection as an empirical method, for producing images, say, without also producing I consider some of the implications of its use for neural activity, and there is thus no way of de- the status of the mind itself within psychology. termining whether the images by themselves could influence behavior. Even if the mind were only an epiphenomenon, moreover, this would not be an Does the Mind Exist? argument against studying it. Consider, for ex- ample, the status of fever. Fever is in some There are several possible strategies within the sense an epiphenomenon produced by disease: general framework of behaviorism for dealing with When the body is invaded by bacteria, blood is the problem of mental events. Perhaps the sim- diverted from the periphery of the body to the plest, most commonly associated with John B. center so that the white corpuscles carried by the Watson, is simply to deny their existence. Wat- blood can be concentrated in the body's core, where son himself, however, vacillated in his position they can then attack the invading bacteria.
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