The Decline of Deterrence
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The Decline of Deterrence Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. March 2019 Senior Fellow The Decline of Deterrence Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. Senior Fellow © 2019 Hudson Institute, Inc. All rights reserved. For more information about obtaining additional copies of this or other Hudson Institute publications, please visit Hudson’s website, www.hudson.org ABOUT HUDSON INSTITUTE Hudson Institute is a research organization promoting American leadership and global engagement for a secure, free, and prosperous future. Founded in 1961 by strategist Herman Kahn, Hudson Institute challenges conventional thinking and helps manage strategic transitions to the future through interdisciplinary studies in defense, international relations, economics, health care, technology, culture, and law. Hudson seeks to guide public policy makers and global leaders in government and business through a vigorous program of publications, conferences, policy briefings and recommendations. Visit www.hudson.org for more information. Hudson Institute 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20004 P: 202.974.2400 [email protected] www.hudson.org Table of Contents Acknowledgments............................................................................................................... 4 Acronyms ............................................................................................................................ 5 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 6 The Shifting Geopolitical Environment .......................................................................... 7 A Multidimensional Strategic Military Competition ...................................................... 7 Proximity and Speed of Attack ....................................................................................... 8 Expansion in New Domains............................................................................................ 9 The Democratization of Destruction ............................................................................... 9 The Human Condition..................................................................................................... 9 Some Modest Suggestions ............................................................................................ 10 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 13 Deterrence Defined ....................................................................................................... 16 Structure ........................................................................................................................ 17 The Cold War and the Rise of Deterrence .................................................................... 18 The Post–Cold War Unipolar Moment ......................................................................... 19 A Multipolar Competition................................................................................................. 24 Challenges to Western Views on Deterrence................................................................ 32 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 30 Multidimensional Strategic Warfare ................................................................................. 34 Multidimensional Strategic Forces ............................................................................... 34 The Blurring Firebreak ................................................................................................. 39 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 45 Geographic Factors, Early Warning, and Command and Control .................................... 47 Early Warning and Command and Control .................................................................. 49 Unintended/Accidental War.......................................................................................... 50 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 54 New Domains and the Democratization of Destruction ................................................... 56 New Domains................................................................................................................ 56 The Democratization of Destruction ............................................................................. 58 Catalytic War ................................................................................................................ 59 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 60 The Human Condition....................................................................................................... 62 Prospect Theory ............................................................................................................ 65 Optimism Bias .............................................................................................................. 66 The Endowment Effect and Reference Points .............................................................. 68 Culture, Fairness, and Decision-Making ...................................................................... 70 Why Policymakers Ignore These Characteristics ......................................................... 74 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 76 What Is to Be Done? ......................................................................................................... 78 Closing Thoughts .......................................................................................................... 82 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. Acknowledgments he author thanks Karl Hasslinger, Senator Jon Kyl, Andrew Marshall, Robert Martinage, Peter McAleer, Joel Scanlon, Abe Shulsky, Bruce Stubbs, and Barry T Watts for their helpful and constructive comments on drafts of this study. Thanks also are in order for my colleagues at the Hudson Institute, Joel Scanlon, for shepherding this study through the publication process, and my editor, Miriam Himmelfarb, for her fine work. Last, by hardly least, I am indebted to the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, and in particular to its senior program officer, Dianne Sehler, for supporting this project. The views herein, as well as any errors and omissions, remain the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the positions of any institution with which he is affiliated. 4 The Decline of Deterrence Acronyms ASAT Anti-Satellite BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System C2 Command and Control CCP Chinese Communist Party EMP Electromagnetic Pulse HEU Highly Enriched Uranium HUMINT Human Intelligence ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile KT Kilotons MAD Mutual Assured Destruction MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MT Metric Tons/Megatons NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NORAD North American Air Defense Command NSC National Security Council PGM Precision-Guided Munitions PLA People’s Liberation Army SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SIGINT Signals Intelligence SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SS Surface-to-Surface SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarines START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty UAE United Arab Emirates UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 5 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. Executive Summary The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation.1 —National Defense Strategy of the United States of America ince the end of World War II, the United States has relied on deterrence as the centerpiece of its defense strategy. This emphasis endures in the Trump S administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Yet as this study shows, the strategic environment in which deterrence must function has changed dramatically, and continues changing. Moreover, some lessons that we thought had emerged from our Cold War experience regarding the robustness of deterrence strategies have proven false. Similarly, some critical assumptions regarding how rationally humans behave when making decisions under conditions of risk have been overturned by advances in the cognitive and behavioral sciences. Deterrence involves efforts to prevent a competitor (the object or “target”) from pursuing a proscribed action. Those employing deterrence seek to influence the target’s calculation of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with pursuing the proscribed action. Assuming a rational target, deterrence works by convincing the rival that it has an unacceptably low probability of achieving its goals (deterrence through denial) or that the costs involved in pursuing the proscribed action will exceed any benefits derived (deterrence through punishment). While it cannot be proven that strategies based on deterrence have maintained the general peace for the past three-quarters of a century, there is strong circumstantial evidence supporting this. In particular, the introduction of nuclear weapons, with their immense destructive power, combined with the development