The Army and Future Strategic Challenges

By Col. Robert B. Killebrew ated theaters until those wars are and Russia turned nasty again. So U.S. Army Retired closed out (which may be a decade or much for out-of-the-box thinking. Op- more); second, to rebuild the Army— erationally, few realized the extent to “Thank God all this is over and not just the fighting forces but the which warfare would change, becom- we can go back to real soldiering whole institution—so as to continue to ing more complex, more deadly and again.” be strategically decisive in coming more protracted. Army theorists —British NCO, September 1918 decades. This is a tough challenge; the dreamed of the global blitz, the “quick old sergeant’s urge to “get back to real win.” In the real world, though, win- he wars in Iraq and Afghanistan soldiering again” will tempt both re- ning is harder and takes longer—the- Tare going to continue for some cent veterans of the Iraqi counterinsur- ory colliding with experience. years yet, and Defense Secretary gency as well as those who yearn for In the real world, of course, there’s Robert Gates—the most nonlame the rapid, decisive operations of the no going back to the “real soldiering” “lame duck” in recent history—has fo- 1990s. Both would be wrong, however. of expeditionary warfare, with all of cused his attention on finishing the No matter who takes office after its associated quick-win doctrines that wars we have, rather than concentrat- the U.S. elections, the world is far delivered temporary success but could ing on future wars we’d rather fight. more dangerous now than it was eight not deliver strategic victory. Instead, The Secretary is exactly right. Still, the years ago. Our security challenges for the reasons outlined below, irregu- 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review have been transformed. Of all the fu- lar warfare and all that it enfolds lurks in the future, and even in the ture scenarios the Army crafted in the —insurgency and counterinsurgency, midst of war, the Army has to grapple late 1990s, none considered that by counterterrorism, military assistance, with the issues of rebuilding to meet 2008 the Army would be rotating foreign internal defense and so forth— the challenges of the years ahead. The combat brigades in and out of two is now at the core of the Army’s mis- Army’s leadership has to juggle two theaters for a decade while other ter- sions and will be for the foreseeable priorities: first, to maintain the war ef- rorist threats sprang up around the future. fort in Iraq, Afghanistan and associ- world, nuclear weapons proliferated We have entered a historical period

22 ARMY I September 2008 of constant warfare—in the words requires the introduction of regular gency vice help our friends, partners of the new National Security Strategy, units. Like Sun Tzu’s famous dictum and allies win their insurgency, we will “a prolonged, irregular campaign,” that “to subdue the enemy without focus on the wrong tasks.” The re- fought globally. Warfare in this time, fighting is the supreme excellence,” cently issued National Defense Strategy irregular or otherwise, will most true strategic success for the United of the United States of America clearly likely be characterized by what the States in the future will be helping recognizes this shift in warfare, as does scholar Frank Hoffman calls hybrid other nations meet their own security Defense Secretary Gates. Speaking re- war, in which all forms of warfare oc- challenges without committing U.S. cently, Gates said, “Building the secu- cur throughout the same battle area. units. This does not mean that we rity capacity of other nations through In fact, hybrid warfare is already hap- shouldn’t maintain strong, tough out- training and equipping programs has pening, as the Israelis discovered fits; on the strategic level, however, emerged as a core and enduring mili- fighting Hezbollah and our own sol- we need more options than just send- tary requirement, though none of these diers have found in Iraq, where regu- ing in the 82nd Airborne after things programs go forward without the ap- lar combined-arms combat can occur have fallen apart. proval of the Secretary of State.” next to irregular skirmishes and na- Making military assistance a major For the Army, this is a major chal- tion building. Because hybrid battle- mission is a new perspective for most lenge. The move to irregular war— fields are increasingly located in pop- U.S. soldiers and requires a new way of military assistance, advisers, host-na- ulated areas, and because this has be- strategic thinking. Col. David Maxwell, tion support—is a permanent shift, not come a “Lexus and Olive Tree” world one of the Army’s best thinkers on ir- just a fad, as some believe, or the pet on a 24-hour news cycle, a quiet revo- regular warfare, points out: “We can rock of a departing Secretary who can lution is occurring in the conduct of only be the external support to govern- be waited out. Regardless of which American warfare that puts people— ments that are threatened with insur- party wins our next election, Gates’ vi- civil populations, soldiers, irregulars, gency. We can only help them to be sion will largely be continued. Unless aid workers—rather than maneuver, successful as the essence of an insur- an essential ally is attacked, another firepower or technology, at the center gency is the fight for who will be the Iraq is not in the cards—“preemptive of strategic and operational planning legitimate governing power of the in- war” is a dead issue. Providing assis- and elevates the importance of the ir- digenous population. As long as we try tance, sending advisers, providing regular fight. to employ our forces to ‘win’ the insur- logistics and combat support—and

s we are relearning in Iraq and AAfghanistan, strategic success in irregular warfare comes not from fast armored sweeps—though some may be tactically necessary—but from en- abling the host country to take control of its own security and build strong, durable state institutions. This is the second revolution. In future warfare, the Army will always be engaged, to some extent, in the raising and equip- ping of other armies. The response to then-Maj. Gen. David Petraeus’ famous request—“Tell me how this ends”—is that U.S. troops successfully turn over security responsibilities to local, Ameri- can-trained forces. This is the Iraq and Afghanistan model, though we are do- ing it the hard way, building a state and an army under fire. The third revolution—and the one that poses the most significant chal- lenge to the Army’s adaptability—is a new national strategy (largely the product of the “Gates Revolution” at the Defense Department) that empha- sizes U.S. assistance to emerging or threatened nations before irregular war

September 2008 I ARMY 23 sending combat units—is the likely ir- warfare, for example, does not obviate on the open market, an FCS-equipped regular warfare scenario for the Army. the need for top-notch regular units. force did quite well. In fact, FCS can How the Army implements this shift Nor does it threaten (in fact, it rein- provide the margin of superiority in is critical to its success. forces) the need for the Future Com- the ground fight on the hybrid battle- bat Systems (FCS), the Army’s major field. o prepare for this era of irregular modernization program. Admittedly, There is another dimension to Army Twarfare, the Army needs to begin FCS has had a troubled history. Over- modernization, however. Since Amer- by ditching the term conventional forces sold in the global blitzkrieg days of ican security strategy is evolving into and the baggage associated with it. the late 1990s, its legacy continues to one of “building the security capabil- Nothing is conventional anymore. struggle against the irregular warfare ity of other nations through training Strong regular combat and support chic now engulfing the Defense De- and equipping programs,” the Army’s units are still vitally necessary, for partment and Congress. In fact, irreg- leadership should look closely at how three reasons: first, as the operational ular hybrid battlefields of the future new technologies, including FCS, can last resort—deploying U.S. power to effectively validate the need for FCS, be incorporated into security assis- assist an ally in extremis—and second, just as the bloody battles of the irregu- tance programs. This is not something for deterring would-be aggressors. lar Iraq war proved the value of ar- we have always done well, and we (For those reasons alone, the Army mored vehicles and precision fires in should never forget the earliest days should fight for all the combat-ready urban warfare—contrary to the opin- of Iraqi security assistance, when the brigades it can afford.) A third critical ions of many of the Army’s best fledgling Iraqi army was fighting with reason is that regular fighting and thinkers. Future hybrid battlefields castoff American gear and making support formations are the incubators will potentially be as tactically deadly their own body armor out of scrap of the top-notch military professional- as any state-on-state warfare; irregu- metal, hardly good commentary on ism and equipment that are so impor- lar threats are getting more and more our ability to support critical allies. tant to supporting allies threatened by dangerous and more “state-like” in Clearly, the whole subject of secu- insurgency or outright aggression. terms of armament and training. In re- rity assistance is complex and badly in The Army needs to greatly expand cent war games against a Hezbollah- need of depot-level maintenance by its understanding of the “irregular” in like enemy armed with precision fires Congress and DoD. Work is currently irregular warfare. The rise of irregular and secure communications obtained under way to overhaul the worst parts

24 ARMY I September 2008 of the system. The Army, for its part, sonal relationships with host-country ments after an advisory tour. Since the should continue to support technol- personnel. A second type of routine number of advisers afield—like the ogy and weapons transfers wherever military assistance is provided by numbers of MTT—will vary depend- appropriate through military-to-mili- units or specially organized teams that ing on host-country needs, State De- tary programs. Effective materiel sup- temporarily deploy to a host country partment requirements and DoD pri- port and a few advisers on the ground for a Joint exercise, mutual training or orities, the Army should concentrate are preferable in every way to commit- assisting the host country in fielding on building a schoolhouse—by either ting U.S. regular units to someone new equipment. This mobile training expanding the present security assis- else’s war. team (MTT) mission is familiar to tance training management office at Similarly, the business of “advisers” most soldiers. Indeed, the Army main- Fort Bragg, N.C., or rebuilding an ex- and “advising” is one of the most-dis- tains a security assistance training pro- panded course somewhere else. In ad- cussed and least-understood facets of gram that last year deployed more dition, the Army should maintain a the new strategy. An adviser, in Amer- than 400 Army personnel to conduct slight surplus of officers and senior ican military parlance, is a soldier as- more than 60 MTT-style security assis- NCOs in the total force structure to signed in a host country to advise or tance visits in 37 countries. account for Milgroup assignments. train a host-country army. The adviser The numbers will not be backbreak- is usually assigned to a military de- dvising, whether through perma- ers, though the change of attitudes in tachment generically called a military Anently stationed units or an MTT, the Army should be profound. Advis- group (or Milgroup), a military assis- is not a special military skill in itself. ing has to move into career main- tance advisory group (MAAG) or one Advisers should be highly trained streams, now and in the future. The of a dozen other terms acceptable to military professionals, proficient in Chief of Staff of the Army recently is- the host country. The Milgroup is at- whatever skill the host country re- sued helpful assignment and promo- tached to the U.S. country team and quires and not necessarily in that tion guidance for advisers in Iraq and works under the direction of the U.S. country’s culture. For this reason, ad- Afghanistan. One can only hope that ambassador and the regional com- visers and MTT should come out of perspective will continue for other mander. Advisers work closely with regular Army units, get some prepara- theaters as U.S. strategy shifts toward counterparts in the host country’s mil- tion, deploy while skills are fresh and having more soldiers assigned to mili- itary services and usually develop per- then return to mainstream assign- tary assistance duties.

September 2008 I ARMY 25 rmy doctrine—the bedrock of Ahow the Army adapts to new strategic challenges—has lagged be- hind the rise of irregular war, despite the publication of the now famous manual FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. The Army should move on these is- sues before a new administration, perceiving service foot-dragging, be- gins to legislate change. Irregular warfare, the hybrid battlefield and military assistance programs are not new to the Army; pieces are present in current operations, in current doc- trine and in various specialized parts of the service. They only need to be brought together. Defense Secretary Gates’ strategic vision and his new National Security Strategy are going to endure beyond his tenure, and the brunt—and the opportunity—of car- rying this out will fall first on the Army. I

COL. ROBERT B. KILLEBREW, USA Ret., was an infantryman for 30 years and now writes and speaks on defense issues.

26 ARMY I September 2008