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Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq

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Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq Why Did It All Go Wrong? Reassessing British Counterinsurgency in Iraq Warren Chin Britain has a relatively good track record in counterinsurgency (COIN).1 But as one journalist commented in 2008: “the war in Iraq has been one of the most disastrous wars ever fought by Britain. It has been small, but we achieved nothing.”2 Although this view can be contested, it is clear that, if judged in terms of the original aim, Britain’s achievements fell far short of expectations set in 2003. A fundamental reason for this failure was the ap­ parent ineffectiveness of Britain’s COIN campaign. The aim of this article is to explain why a strategy used so effectively in the past unraveled in Iraq. Specifically, it challenges the view that British failure in Iraq was inevitable or that it was the product of an outdated COIN strategy.3 Although the British accounted for only five percent of the entire coali­ tion force, such an analysis is warranted for two reasons. First, British ex­ perience of insurgency in Iraq proved to be very different from that of the Americans, and it is important to address this divergence if only because it reveals a different aspect of the campaign to stabilize the country. Initially at least, the British area of operations in the Multi-National Division (South- East) [MND(SE)] presented a relatively benign environment: there were no global insurgents, little sectarian conflict, and the six million people liv­ ing in the MND(SE) were primarily Shia Arabs, most of whom welcomed the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Why then did the people rebel against the British, and why were the British unable to deal with insurgent groups which began to blossom in the south? This last question leads into a second line of inquiry. British experience in Iraq appears to confirm the view that British COIN doctrine cannot deal with the new challenges posed by insurgents today and that, conse­ quently, this strategy is obsolete. It is true that British counterinsurgency Dr. Warren Chin is a senior lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London, at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. He has authored a range of articles on British defense and security policy and recent military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2008 [ 119 ] Chin.indd 119 10/30/08 1:19:15 PM Warren Chin doctrine emerged in response to the challenge of maintaining imperial control over its colonies where local populations embarked on nationalist struggles of independence. This strategy also played a critical role in manag­ ing Britain’s withdrawal from the empire and was used to good effect to ensure that pro-British governments were established in former colonial territories. During this period the British built up a body of knowledge based on Charles Caldwell’s Small Wars (1896), Sir Charles Gwynn’s Notes on Imperial Policing (1934), a government pamphlet called Imperial Policing and the Duties of Aid to the Civil Power (1949), Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), Julian Paget’s Counterinsurgency Campaigning (1967), and Frank Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations (1972). These various commentaries informed and shaped British counterinsurgency strategy and have been distilled into a series of principles that shaped the Brit­ ish army’s approach to counterinsurgency. These principles are as follows: 1. maintain political primacy over the military and focus on finding a political solution to the conflict; 2. apply a coordinated government and security infrastructure which ties all civil, police, and military agencies into a coherent campaign; 3. develop an effective intelligence and surveillance network; 4. separate the insurgents from the people; 5. neutralize the insurgent; and 6. look forward to the future in terms of postinsurgency planning.4 The application of this framework placed a great deal of importance in terms of addressing the economic, political, and social causes of the insurgency. It also stressed the discriminate use of force and focused on winning the trust and support of the civil population. In essence, it rec­ ognized that the people rather than the insurgent’s forces were the center of gravity. Using this “formula,” the British were able to achieve success in Malaya (1948–60), Borneo (1963–66), Oman (1970–75), and most recently, Northern Ireland (1969–98). Most important, failures such as Palestine (1945–48), Aden (1963–67), and Cyprus (1955–59) came to be explained in terms of a failure to adhere to these principles, which served to reinforce the power of this approach. The war in Iraq, and more recently Afghanistan, provoked a debate about the current utility of this doctrine. Initially it focused on the conduct of the US military in Iraq and the belief that a more British or classical COIN [ 120 ] STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2008 Chin.indd 120 10/30/08 1:19:15 PM Why Did It All Go Wrong? strategy, as it was termed, needed to be applied against the insurgency that was rapidly spreading amongst the Sunni population.5 However, this critical analysis of strategy very quickly infiltrated discussion within the British media, the military, and academia and focused on the deteriorat­ ing situation in the MND(SE). This debate centers on two main argu­ ments. The first relates to the changing environment in which COIN is conducted.6 The logic holds that such a construct worked well in Malaya and subsequent campaigns because the British were able to exploit a func­ tioning colonial administration and security apparatus to fight and defeat the insurgency. Equally important were the strong cultural and social links, which stemmed from long exposure by the British to the environment and the people and gave the British security forces at least some sense of how to engage the population. Where this understanding was absent, for example in the Southern Arabian Federation in the 1960s, failure followed. In theory this is a cause for concern because, while it is clear that British COIN doctrine proved a useful construct, even in the post-imperial era such as Oman in the 1970s, there is profound skepticism that such a strategy will work in this new setting. There is no government infrastructure and little appreciation or understanding of the target state by the intervening force.7 The challenge then is to create these pillars in the vacuum that exists.8 Failed states have also resulted in the proliferation of armed groups which compete with the state’s forces for control. This means that a COIN campaign must now deal with a number of opponents rather than just one which, as Steven Metz explains, makes it more difficult to establish security or implement an effective conflict termination strategy.9 Second, the nature of insurgent strategy has changed. According to the likes of Metz and John Mackinlay, insurgency in the Cold War was based largely on the Maoist model of revolutionary war, and British COIN doc­ trine evolved to address this threat. In simple terms this strategy entailed a protracted conflict in which the insurgent moved progressively through three phases of revolution. The first focused on political mobilization and the establishment of a shadow government. The second envisaged the move to guerrilla war. Finally, when the government was sufficiently weak, the insurgent strategy would shift to open, conventional war. The end of the Cold War made the application of this strategy problem­ atic. Thiswas caused in part by changing environmental conditions. Maoist revolutionary war was designed to operate within a rural setting, but the world was becoming increasingly urbanized—a trend that is very apparent STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY ♦ WINTER 2008 [ 121 ] Chin.indd 121 10/30/08 1:19:15 PM Warren Chin in Iraq, where over 70 percent of the population lives in cities and towns.10 The application of this strategy has also become more difficult because of change in the political domain. Of particular importance here has been the decline of secular ideologies such as Marxism and Maoist political think­ ing and the rise of ethnicity and religion as sources of internal conflict. The reasons for this reversion to more basic and reactionary forms of identity have been linked to the social and economic impact of globalization,11 but their effect has been to limit the utility of both Maoist insurgency and Brit­ ish COIN, because both assumed that the loyalties of a community were not fixed and could be won via promises of political and economic reform. Although this argument is controversial, it is clear that religion and identity in the form of conflict between Shia and Sunni or Sunni and Kurd played an important role in shaping the internal war in Iraq. Finally, materiel con­ straints also limited the extent to which insurgents could mimic past revo­ lutionary wars. This was caused by the decline in support the great powers provided. The most obvious aspect of this decline in external support was that insurgents had limited access to heavy weapons. This made it almost impossible for a movement to progress from guerrilla to open, conventional war and overthrow the existing regime. As Metz explains, the lack of a state sponsor often precluded strategic victory in the way Mao and Ho Chi Minh realized this goal; they simply did not possess the means.12 In some cases, such as Peru and Columbia, the lack of an external patron was compensated by the insurgents’ ability to exploit internal sources of wealth derived from the drug trade and organized crime. However, rather paradoxically, access to this resource did not result in a renewed commitment to the three phases of revolutionary war.
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